JICA Support Programme for Reintegration and Community ... · The JICA Support Programme for Reintegration and Community Development in Kandahar (JSPR) was conceived to play one of

No.

09-52

J RRDD

JICA Support Programme for

Reintegration and Community Development in

Kandahar

Final Report

(Main Report)

June 2009

JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY

ORIENTAL CONSULTANTS CO., LTD.

Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Afghanistan

JICA Support Programme for

Reintegration and Community Development in

Kandahar

Final Report

(Main Report)

June 2009

JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY

ORIENTAL CONSULTANTS CO., LTD.

Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Afghanistan

Preface

The JICA Support Programme for Reintegration and Community Development in Kandahar (JSPR) was conceived to play one of important roles of National Development of Afghanistan. The JSPR Project started in June 2004 and was completed in June 2009.

We are pleased to submit the Final Report for this project. This Final Report consists of Main Report and Appendix. The Main Report describes the results of the project activities and the Appendix presents the JSPR Model in the form of compiled documents, which were prepared during the training and practice activities of community development workers. These documents of JSPR Model are from two parts of Training (Theory) and Practice, and each part has a specific Guideline and Manuals prepared for the theoretical and practical activities during the project period.

The people of Afghanistan are still facing many formidable challenges to reconstruct their stable life. And we support their efforts to build a better future.

We would like to express our sincere appreciation to all the parties concerned for their kind and effective cooperation for the successful implementation of JSPR, and we truly wish them well in their continuing concern and support towards the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Shozo Kawasaki

Project Leader

JICA Support Programme for Reintegration and Community Development in Kandahar

Project Outline and Target Area

Country: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Project Title: JICA Support Programme for Reintegration and Community Development in Kandahar (JSPR)

Scheme: Project Type Technical Cooperation (PROTECO)

Duration: June 2004 – June 2009 (Record of Discussion)

Target Area: Kandahar Province (Implementation of Community Development is in Dand district)

Counterpart: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), Provincial Rural Rehabilitation and

Development Department Kandahar (PRRRD Kandahar)

Overall Goal: Villagers including returnees in Kandahar enjoy their development through community development projects implemented using locally available resources.

Project Purpose: The capacity of those who are engaged in development programmes are developed to manage sustainable community development activities.

Outputs:

(1) Those who are engaged in community development acquire knowledge and mind-set required for carrying out participatory community development projects through training programmes (Theory).

(2) Those who are engaged in community development acquire skills and attitudes required for carrying out participatory community development projects through implementation of projects for Community Development (Practice).

(3) Those who are engaged in community development are able to have better coordination and to effectively collaborate among themselves

(4) A model of strengthening system of CDCs by utilizing locally available resources is developed.

Location

DDaanndd DDiissttrriicctt

KKaannddaahhaarr CCiittyy

Loy Balakarz Deh Khatai

Karez

Yahk Kariz

Kakaro Ghoshkhana

Deh Bagh

Kshata Kokaran

Ghulam Dastagir Kalacha

Dheh KuchiGundigan

Practice

Theory Project M

anagement

Kickoff Meeting in Kandahar February 2005

Japanese experts in Kandahar June 2005

Workshops by Japanese expertsMay 2007

PRA Training in Kandahar February 2006

In-country Exposure Trip Balkh and Samangan

November 2006

Training in Japan Okinawa

October 2007 Peacebuilding Training

August 2008

M&E Training February 2009

Training in Japan Niigata

October 2008

PRA Practice at the target village

April 2006

Skill Trainings September 2006

Infrastructure typeSubprojects March 2007

Ex-post Evaluation on the Rural Skill Promotion Project

June 2007

Infrastructure and Non-infrastructure

integrated type Subproject

January 2009

Non-Infrastructure typeSubprojects

January 2008

JCC in Kandahar February 2006

JCC (Terminal Evaluation)January 2009

JCC and Seminar February 2008 Follow-up Committee for

JSPR Model February 2009

JCC in Kabul September 2006

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE PROJECT OUTLINE AND TARGET AREA PHOTOGRAPHS OF ACTIVITIES LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Page

CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF JSPR

1.1 Returnees and IDPs in Kandahar ................................................................................... 1 - 1 1.2 Community Development and MRRD’s Support .......................................................... 1 - 2 1.3 Human Resource Development for Community Development ..................................... 1 - 6 1.4 Approach of JSPR.......................................................................................................... 1 - 7 1.5 Outline of JSPR.............................................................................................................. 1 - 11

CHAPTER 2: IMPLEMENTATION OF JSPR

2.1 Project Management ...................................................................................................... 2 - 1 2.1.1 Project Management Structure ....................................................................... 2 - 1 2.1.2 Implementation Structure ............................................................................... 2 - 6 2.1.3 Joint Coordination Committee and Evaluation............................................... 2 - 9 2.1.4 Public Relations .............................................................................................. 2 - 11

2.2 Capacity Building through “Theory” (Output 1) ........................................................... 2 - 13 2.2.1 Training Programme....................................................................................... 2 - 13 2.2.2 Implemented Training in FY2005 and FY2006 ............................................. 2 - 15 2.2.3 Implemented Training in FY2007 .................................................................. 2 - 16 2.2.4 Implemented Training in FY2008 .................................................................. 2 - 18

2.3 Capacity Building through “Practice” (Output 2) .......................................................... 2 - 19 2.3.1 Components of Practice.................................................................................. 2 - 19 2.3.2 Community Development Project .................................................................. 2 - 21 2.3.3 Rural Skill Promotion Project......................................................................... 2 - 26

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2.4 “Coordination” among Stakeholders.............................................................................. 2 - 30 2.4.1 Regular Coordination for Project Implementation ......................................... 2 - 30 2.4.2 Information Sharing and Various Coordination with Stakeholders................ 2 - 30 2.4.3 Joint Implementation of Activities ................................................................. 2 - 31

2.5 “Modelling” and JSPR Model........................................................................................ 2 - 31 2.5.1 Modelling Procedure ...................................................................................... 2 - 31 2.5.2 JSPR Model .................................................................................................... 2 - 33

CHAPTER 3: PROJECT EVALUATION

3.1 Project Performance ....................................................................................................... 3 - 1 3.2 Implementation Process ................................................................................................. 3 - 5 3.3 Perspective from Five Evaluation Criteria and Peacebuilding....................................... 3 - 7 3.4 Constraints and Inhibiting Factors ................................................................................. 3 - 10 3.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 3 - 11

CHAPTER 4: LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Lessons from “Theory” and “Practice”.......................................................................... 4 - 1 4.2 Approach of JSPR.......................................................................................................... 4 - 8 4.3 Adaptability of JSPR Model .......................................................................................... 4 - 9

ANNEXES ANNEX 1: PROJECT DESIGN MATRIX ANNEX 2: PLAN OF OPERATION ANNEX 3: ACHIVEMENTS OF PROJECT PURPOSE AND OUTPUTS ANNEX 4: TRAINING RECORD ANNEX 5: LISTS OF EQUIPMENT ANNEX 6: INPUTS ANNEX 7: RECORD OF DISCUSSION ANNEX 8: MINUTES OF MEETING ANNEX 9: NEWSLETTERS

APPENDIX: JSPR MODEL

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LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Page

FIGURES

Figure 1.1 National Programmes under MRRD...................................................................... 1 - 4 Figure 1.2 Position of JSPR .................................................................................................... 1 - 8 Figure 1.3 Vision of JSPR....................................................................................................... 1 - 12 Figure 2.1 Project Management Structure (up to FY2005)..................................................... 2 - 2 Figure 2.2 Project Management Structure (FY2008) .............................................................. 2 - 3 Figure 2.3 Implementation Structure (FY2004-FY2005) ....................................................... 2 - 7 Figure 2.4 Implementation Structure (FY2006-FY2008) ....................................................... 2 - 8 Figure 2.5 Training Cycle ....................................................................................................... 2 - 15 Figure 2.6 Project Cycle of Community Development ........................................................... 2 - 21 Figure 2.7 Procedure with Communities for Community Development Project .................... 2 - 22 Figure 2.8 Image of Rural Skill Promotion Project................................................................. 2 - 27 Figure 2.9 Procedure with Communities for Rural Skill Promotion Project........................... 2 - 27 Figure 2.10 Structure of Modelling........................................................................................... 2 - 32 Figure 2.11 Follow-up Committees........................................................................................... 2 - 33 Figure 2.12 Structure of JSPR Model Booklet.......................................................................... 2 - 34 Figure 4.1 Options of Utilisation of JSPR Model ................................................................... 4 - 8

TABLES

Table 1.1 Main National Programmes Implemented by MRRD ........................................... 1 - 4 Table 2.1 Security Phase under JSPR .................................................................................... 2 - 5 Table 2.2 Joint Coordination Committees Meetings.............................................................. 2 - 10 Table 2.3 JSPR Seminars ....................................................................................................... 2 - 12 Table 2.4 Implemented Trainings in FY2005 and FY2006 ................................................... 2 - 16 Table 2.5 Implemented Training in FY2007 ......................................................................... 2 - 17 Table 2.6 Implemented Training in FY2008 ......................................................................... 2 - 18 Table 2.7 Implemented Infrastructure Type Subprojects....................................................... 2 - 24 Table 2.8 Implemented Non-Infrastructure Type Subprojects .............................................. 2 - 24 Table 2.9 Number of Trainees by Skill Training ................................................................... 2 - 29 Table 2.10 Repaired Items and Created Product...................................................................... 2 - 29 Table 2.11 Contents of Each Booklet of JSPR Model ............................................................. 2 - 35

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AGE Anti Government Element AIRD Afghanistan Institute for Rural Development ALO Afghan Literacy Organization AREDP Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Programme BRAC Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee CDC Community Development Council CDP Community Development Plan CDW Community Development Worker CHA Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance CLC Community Learning Centre CLDD Community Led Development Department DDA District Development Assembly DDP District Development Plan DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration DIAG Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups DOA Department of Agriculture DORR Department of Refugees and Repatriation DOWA Department of Women’s Affairs DSO District Social Organiser EWEEP Enhancing Women's Economic Empowerment Project FP Facilitation Partner FY Japanese Fiscal Year (from 1 April to 31 March) HAPA Humanitarian Action for People of Afghanistan IAA Interim Administration of Afghanistan ICD Institute for Community Development ICDN Integrated Community Development in Northern Afghanistan IDP Internally Displaced Person IP Implementing Partner IRDP Inter-Communal Rural Development Project JCC Joint Coordination Committee JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency JSPR JICA Support Programme for Reintegration and Community Development LKRO Loy Kandahar Reconstruction Organization MISFA Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan MOE Ministry of Education MoLSA Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs

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MoWE Ministry of Water and Energy MoPH Ministry of Public Health MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development MUDH Ministry of Urban Development and Housing M&E Monitoring and Evaluation NABDP National Area Based Development Programme NDF National Development Framework NFI Non Food Item NGO Non-governmental Organization NRAP National Rural Access Programme NSP National Solidarity Programme OECD/DAC Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development / Development

Assistance Committee OJT On-the-Job-Training PAL Participatory Alternative Livelihoods Programme PB Peacebuilding PCI Pacific Consultants International PCM Project Cycle Management PDM Project Design Matrix PR Public Relations PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal PROTECO Proposal Type Technical Cooperation PRR Priority Reform and Restructuring PRRDD Provincial Rural Rehabilitation and Development Department PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team QIPs Quick Impact Projects R/D Record of Discussion REAP Recovery and Employment Afghanistan Programme SADA South Afghanistan Development Association SDO Sanayee Development Organisation TOT Training of Trainers TIC Tokyo International Centre, JICA UNDP United Nations Development Programme UN Habitat United Nations Centre for Human Settlement (UNCHS Habitat)/ United Nations

Human Settlements Programme UNHCR The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees VARA Voluntary Association for Rehabilitation of Afghanistan WatSan Rural Water Supply and Sanitation WFP World Food Programme

JICA Support Programme for Reintegration and Community Development in Kandahar (JSPR)

Chapter 1-1

CHAPTER 1 OVERVIEW OF JSPR

1.1 Returnees and IDPs in Kandahar

The JICA Support Programme for Reintegration and Community Development in Kandahar (JSPR) was formulated by the Government of Afghanistan and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in 2003 in order to build the capacity of development workers for community empowerment and sustainable development. From the very beginning, the JSPR Project has been affected by various kinds of positive and negative influences under the unstable and changeable situation in Afghanistan. For a better understanding of the JSPR, therefore, it is important to recognise and appreciate its history and struggle, and lessons learned from past experience.

The region of Southern Afghanistan comprises five provinces bordering Pakistan and Iran. The estimated population of the region in 2002 was 2.66 million1. Most of the inhabitants are Pashtun who share the same language and similar culture with neighbouring Pakistani Pashtun. The climate in many parts is arid or semi-arid. Most of the inhabitants are engaged in agriculture or nomadic grazing in the rural areas. Especially Kandahar Province as the centre of the region used to be famous as the fruit basket of Afghanistan. There were a number of highly productive orchards.

The Soviet invasion and the civil war in Afghanistan were a serious cause of deterioration of both physical infrastructure and social and economic systems. The prolonged drought during the Taliban regime, in addition, accelerated the displacement of residents who became refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs). Communities were fragmented. Traditional social capital such as shura (participatory decision making system by community elders) and hashar (collective works) declined.

According to the statistics of UNHCR2, approximately 500,000 refugees from the region fled to Pakistan and Iran before the collapse of the Taliban regime. As of February 2004, there were still 311,923 refugees from the region. On the other hand, more than 140,000 IDPs stayed in camps outside Kandahar city. Many of the IDPs are drought-affected pastoralists (Kuchi people and non-Kuchi), and some of them are politically affected Pashtun people who fled from the Northern provinces. In addition, there were huge numbers of returned refugees in their home villages, especially in the surrounding areas of Kandahar city such as Dand District. Their prolonged presence, however, has created tension or conflicts over limited amount of jobs, water and fuel wood with neighbouring existing communities.

1 Total population of Afghanistan is 20.29 million according to the 1382 (2003) Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook. 2 According to UNHCR statistics, there were approximately 500,000 refugees from the Southern region while more than

5.4 million refugees from entire Afghanistan. As of February 2004, there were 311,923 refugees from the Southern region while 2,383,355 from entire country.

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Due to many years of drought and conflicts, rural communities and households have been severely exhausted both economically and socially. The ground water tables have been lowering to as low as 8 meters in Kandahar Province. Insufficient quantity of water coupled with the deteriorated quality of water has caused increasing morbidity and mortality among the rural people. Landless households amounted to 40% in the neighbouring districts (Arghandab, Daman and Dand) surrounding Kandahar City3, while the national average was around 21%. They did not have enough agricultural land to support their families. The landlessness of returning refugees was more serious in that 79% of them did not have access to agricultural land. Land conflicts always arose when refugees came back to their homeland.

Furthermore, malfunctioning government services have deprived rural people of opportunities for basic social services, such as health and education. In Dand District, a district in Kandahar province, for instance, the estimated gross enrolment ratio for primary school is 28% for boys and 5% for girls. These ratios are extremely lower than the national average which is 59% for boys and 30% for girls4. Concerning statistics in health, infant mortality rate is 23.1% and maternal mortality ratio is 2.6%. These statistics are much worse in the district compared with the national average which is 16.5% for infant mortality and 1.6% for maternal mortality5. In addition, unemployment is common in the district. Escalating prices of fuel and other commodities have negatively affected their livelihood.

In these circumstances, humanitarian emergency relief done by the international community certainly has played significant roles to remove immediate difficulties. However, it did not provide significant improvement to the living environments and economic conditions conducive to medium and long-term process of returnees’ reintegration and economic development in communities. Humanitarian relief includes food distribution, construction of wells, “food for work” and “cash for work” for rehabilitating basic infrastructure, which have benefited much not only the returnees and IDPs but also the local community people. However, this type of assistance tends to create dependency of people for assistance. Moreover, simply it is impossible to pursue such humanitarian relief for many years.

Some projects for social development and capacity building, including education and vocational training, were also carried out in previous years. However, priority was given to infrastructure projects needed for urgent rehabilitation. Although much work for rehabilitation and reconstruction of economic and social infrastructure is still needed, such hardware projects will not in any way 3 In Draft Final Report of JICA Urgent Rehabilitation Support Program of Agriculture in Kandahar, Afghanistan, large

landowners account for 8%, small landowners account for 52%, and landless households account for 40%. The survey covered 100 households out of the total 16,760 households in the three districts.

4 Gross enrolment ratios are from UNDP (UNDP 2004) for national average and from the result of JSPR survey (LKRO 2006) for Dand district. Statistics of UNDP were estimated from the data in 2002. Statistics of LKRO were based on the baseline survey in 2005.

5 Infant mortality rate and maternal mortality rate are from UNDP (UNDP 2004) for national average and from the result of JSPR survey (LKRO 2006) for Dand district. Statistics of UNDP were estimated from the data in 2002. Statistics of LKRO were based on the baseline survey in 2005.


Chapter 1-3

directly help people’s initiatives to manage the development activities by themselves, thereby resulting in unattainable social reconstruction.

Due to the above mentioned issues, the weak solidarity among people made it difficult for returnees and IDPs to successfully reintegrate into their place of origin, and increase their “human insecurity”. The additional number of returnees competing for the limited available jobs and resources negatively affected the attitude of host communities toward returnees. Under such environmental and poverty hardship, the absorption capacity of communities was limited.

To ensure a seamless transition for the reintegration of returnees and IDPs from humanitarian emergency to sustainable development, it is important to create an environment to address these issues. Therefore, community development was conceived as an effective approach to promote sustainable reintegration of returnees and IDPs.

1.2 Community Development and MRRD’s Support

It is necessary for sustainable reintegration of returnees and IDPs to promote community development for improving living conditions of people and absorption capacity of community to accommodate more returnees. Thus, issues of reintegration and community development are inter-linked in Afghanistan so that the Government of Afghanistan put its priority on “Return and Reintegration of Refugees and IDPs” and “Sustainable Livelihood” at the beginning of its nation rebuilding6.

The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) is the ministry which is responsible for tackling this issue. MRRD has developed the goal and strategy for rural development of Afghanistan. The goal is “to ensure the social, economic and political well-being of rural community especially poor and vulnerable people through the provision of basic service, strengthening local governance and promoting sustainable livelihood free from dependency on illicit poppy cultivation”. Also, MRRD has its strategy and priorities in “Improved Rural well being”, “Local governance”, “Equitable gender development”, “Programme alignment”, “Organizational development”, and “Partnership”. For achieving the mission, MRRD has conducted various national programmes supported by bilateral and multilateral donors. Figure 1.1 shows major national programmes.

6 The Interim Administration of Afghanistan (IAA), established by the Bonn Agreement at the end of 2001, drew up its

development vision of “Peaceful and Prosperous Afghanistan”. In April 2002, IAA presented the “National Development Framework (NDF)”, which elaborated strategies and policies to achieve the vision. NDF has three main pillars: 1. Humanitarian and Human and Social Capital, 2. Physical Reconstruction and Natural Resources, and 3. Private Sector Development. “Return and Reintegration of Refugees and IDPs” and “Sustainable Livelihood” are priority areas in the first pillar.

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Figure 1.1 National Programmes under MRRD

Among the national programmes, JSPR was influenced by National Solidarity Programme (NSP), especially in target size and procedure of intervention in community level. Considering the aspect of local governance, JSPR also considered and respected the approach of National Area Based Development Programme (NABDP) in district level intervention. Outlines of the two important national programmes which are closely linked with JSPR are summarised below.

Table 1.1 Main National Programmes Implemented by MRRD

Programme NSP (National Solidarity Programme) NABDP (National Area Based Development Programme)

Donors

Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, EU, Finland, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA, World Bank

Belgium, Canada, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, UNDP, USA

Target Areas 17,300 communities (NSP I) 4,300 communities (NSP II)

All 34 provinces

Timeframe 2003-2007 (NSP I) 2007-2010 (NSP II)

2002-2006 (Phase I) 2006-2008 (Phase II)

Major component

Establishment of Community Development Councils (CDC), Capacity building of CDCs, Implementation of subprojects

Community empowerment at district level, Institutional development for MRRD, Implementation support for rural infrastructure development and economic regeneration

(1) National Solidarity Programme (NSP)

The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) has been supported since 2003 by the World Bank and other donors. In particular, NSP is regarded as the most important entity since NSP is the largest item in the budget among MRRD responsible programmes. The programme aims to enhance solidarity of communities by establishing local governance bodies named Community Development Councils

Livelihood

Infrastructure

Governance

NSP National Solidarity Programme

NABDP National Area Based

Development Programme

AREDP Afghanistan Rural Enterprise

Development Programme

MISFA Microfinance Investment

Support Facility for Afghanistan

WatSan Rural Water Supply and

Sanitation

NRAP National Rural Access

Programme


Chapter 1-5

(CDCs) and implementing small community development projects. Over 21,552 CDCs7 have been established throughout all 34 provinces under the NSP for the purpose of strengthening grassroots level governance and implementing small-scale community-led development projects.

In practice, the NSP has a large number of NGOs as facilitation partners (FPs). Most of the FPs are international NGOs and the remaining ones are capable national NGOs. FPs support CDCs to prepare and implement their small-scale projects using NSP block grant8. In Kandahar, the NSP was conducting small-scale projects facilitated by UN-Habitat as the facilitation partner in the districts of Arghandab, Daman and Dand when JSPR started.

Generally, the NSP seems to contribute to improving the living environment through small scale community-led projects such as road construction and enhancing participatory decision making system at the grassroots level. Sustainability of community-led development by the established CDCs after the completion of small-scale projects, however, has limitation. It is difficult to reduce poverty and vulnerability of people without continuous community-led activities under CDC initiatives. Securing sustainability was a big question at the beginning of NSP as well as other community development projects.

(2) National Area Based Development Programme (NABDP)

In contrast with NSP, the National Area Based Development Programme (NABDP) focuses on the local governance in district level. Especially in NABDP Phase II, it focuses on community empowerment at district and provincial levels ─ institutional capacity building of MRRD to conduct economic regeneration and rural development projects, although the Phase I focused on addressing immediate recovery considerations through the delivery of urgent community infrastructure projects.

In the middle of JSPR, District Development Assemblies (DDAs) were established in Kandahar Province in 2006. The members of these DDAs were elected from the members of Cluster CDCs which were formed by CDCs under the facilitation of UN-Habitat. Each established DDA prepared the District Development Plan (DDP) consisting of development strategy and priority projects of each district. In practice, the NABDP supported to implement various projects in Kandahar through building the capacity of DDAs and the Provincial Rural Rehabilitation and Development Department in Kandahar (PRRDD). Under the deteriorated security situation of the region, the NABDP adopted a government-led approach with strong initiative of the Minister for the implementation of development projects. This is so called “Kandahar model”.

7 As of August 2008, MRRD Website. 8 The NSP provides direct Block Grant transfers to a bank account established by the CDCs to support rehabilitation and

development activities planned and implemented by the elected CDCs. The funding takes the form of Block Grants which are calculated at US$200 per family with an average grant of US$ 33,000 and maximum of US$ 60,000 per community. Portions of the Block Grant are released for procurement and phased implementation of the approved subproject(s). Source: http://www.nspafghanistan.org/about_nsp.shtm

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The Kandahar model seems to be effective under the difficult security situation of Kandahar, especially for providing quick impacts to the population by addressing their immediate needs. However, it seems to have limitation of community empowerment toward a sustainable long-term development of Kandahar.

1.3 Human Resource Development for Community Development

In Afghanistan, especially in Kandahar, human resources, as well as allocated budget for implementing sustainable community development, are scarce and insufficient, although there are capable resources to implement humanitarian relief and quick impact projects. Government officers who are able to play key roles in promoting and facilitating community and regional development are in short. Local NGOs and community-based organisations such as CDCs also have not been well developed. As a result, not much effort has been made at medium and long-term development.

Those local NGOs have conducted humanitarian relief in areas of providing material and services as well as physical rehabilitation. They were inexpensive local contractors who delivered such assistance for humanitarian relief. Their experiences and skills for this kind of humanitarian assistance are not always suitable for promoting medium and long-term development.

At the stage of medium and long-term development, participation and self-help effort at the level of communities are more important. Development workers who have facilitation skills for participatory approach process are essential. Such local NGOs and staff as well as local government staff have not developed the necessary skills and attitudes good enough for development assistance yet partly due to two decades of isolation from international development and partly due to years of intensive experiences of humanitarian relief and urgent rehabilitation. It is necessary to pay attention to development of human resources for the new agenda of development assistance beyond the phase of humanitarian relief and urgent rehabilitation.

Government institutions and officers have played minor roles in the massive assistance work of humanitarian relief and urgent rehabilitation, in comparison with international donors, international NGOs and national/local NGOs. In this situation, government agencies and officers tend to have negative feelings towards local NGOs. Moreover, government agencies neither understand nor accept the new roles to be played by NGOs in medium and long-term development. Government agencies also should realize their own new roles of guiding, facilitating and monitoring in development activities, in which community people are major actors and both government agencies and local NGOs are facilitators. It is necessary for government agencies and officers to understand the meaning of community development and their respective roles in community development and empowerment.


Chapter 1-7

Reflecting current situation and problems described above, the following four areas of problems were identified for the Project.

(1) How to develop human resources or to train development workers who are able to facilitate community development using participatory approach, for the purpose of promoting medium and long-term development beyond the stage of humanitarian relief and urgent rehabilitation

(2) How to encourage community leaders and people, as well as community organisations, to understand the importance of participation in organising community development, and their roles and initiatives in management of community development activities

(3) How to implement community development projects covering both software and hardware aspects in participatory manners by utilising human resources (both NGO staff and community leaders) to be trained in the Project, for the purpose of enhancing human and social capital and improving livelihoods

(4) How to encourage government officers to study and practice community development to gain experience, so that they could realise the significance and methods of community development and further their own roles for promoting community development

Not only protecting people living in poverty through humanitarian relief and quick impact projects, but also empowering people and community through facilitation by local development workers is essential for durable solution for human security in the region. Considering long-term sustainable community development, in short, there is huge demand of capacity building of local human resources including government officers, local NGO staff and CDC members for sustainable development.

1.4 Approach of JSPR

Under the background mentioned above, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) called for submission of proposals for technical cooperation (PROTECO) for “supporting reintegration of returnees in Kandahar” in November 2002. According to the evaluation of proposals and interviews, Pacific Consultants International (PCI)9 was selected as the partner of JICA to conduct the technical cooperation project. In May 2003, a Project Formulation Mission was despatched. Based on this mission’s result, PCI proposed a project which aimed to promote reintegration of returnees and regional stability adopting approaches for the multi-sectoral community and regional development. The Government of Afghanistan formally made a request to the Government of Japan10 for the

9 On 1 August 2008, the consulting firm was changed to Oriental Consultants Co., Ltd. 10 The Government of Japan has supported Afghanistan continuously. During September 2001 to September 2008, Japan

pledged US$1.45 billion for assistance to Afghanistan including NSP, NABDP and JSPR.

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implementation of the Project in September 2003. JICA approved the implementation of the Project based on the results of ex-ante evaluation of the Preparatory Mission conducted in March 2004. Through the ex-ante evaluation, the demand for capacity building of community development workers for the post-NSP era was identified. The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), as the counterpart agency of the Government of Afghanistan and JICA, then, agreed and signed a Record of Discussion (R/D), shown as Annex 7, concerning the implementation of the Project in June 2004.

The Project originally intended capacity building of local development workers for community empowerment and sustainable development toward human security, although the situation of Kandahar was still in the humanitarian or rehabilitation phase. It can be said that the project was challenging and its purpose was ambitious. Considering medium and long-term development by local people’s initiative, however, it is necessary to establish a foundation of sustainable development as early as possible. The figure below shows the position of JSPR.

Figure 1.2 Position of JSPR

Based on basic concepts of sustainable community development and capacity building, the Project adopted the following key strategies/approaches:

Humanitarian Relief Phase (Emergency Relief) - Food, NFI

Rehabilitation & Quick Impact Phase (Stability, Trust Building, Rapid Change) - Infrastructure, Security

Sustainable Development Phase (Community Empowerment) - Human Resource, Well-being

Repatriation of Refugees by UNHCR

Food Distribution by WFP

QIPs by Donors, e.g. REAP, PRT

DDR, DIAG

NSP

NABDP

JSPR

Future Programme by MRRD


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(1) Inter-linkage between Training and Project Implementation

The two major components of the Project, namely, training programmes and small-scale community development projects, are functionally inter-linked and support and strengthen each other. The training programs will provide the opportunity for community development workers to learn key concepts and basic skills for community development. Then, the actual implementation of small-scale community development projects provides the opportunity to put the theories and skills learned in the classrooms into practice. Afterwards, the lessons learned from practical application would be brought back to classrooms for re-evaluating the concepts and skills in training programmes, thereby building up the skills for practitioners of community development. Various methods for participatory learning, including workshops, exposure trips and on-the-job training are utilised.

(2) Emphasis on Learning Process

The emphasis is on the learning process. The Project not only focuses on direct benefits to be brought about by implementing community projects, but also on the learning to be gained through experiences of actually implementing community projects. Issues are given proper attention and taken up in the follow-up training programmes.

(3) Empowerment of Community People

The Project aims at empowering community people so that their natural initiatives, energy and commitment as well as indigenous resources are effectively applied in their community development projects. We believe that community people are empowered when they utilise their potential and resources in their community development efforts.

(4) Equal Participation

Everyone involved in the Project will be learning and practicing participatory approaches; hence, women, children, the poor and deprived can equally participate and benefit from their community-based development activities.

(5) Partnership with Local NGOs

The Project works with Kandahar based local NGOs for implementation of community development projects. NGO personnel also participate in training programmes along with government personnel and community representatives. In Kandahar, there are about 300 registered NGOs, many of which are not actually operating. Only a few NGOs have well-trained professional quality personnel. The target of the Project will be those NGOs who have good potential or those who have done much in rehabilitation or reconstruction of physical infrastructure, but not social and human development.

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(6) Coordination with National Programmes and Other Support

For promoting synergy effects rather than avoiding duplication among the national programmes and other support in Kandahar, coordination among stakeholders is essential. JSPR established the Joint Coordination Committees (JCC) in Kabul for national level coordination involving representatives from donors that are engaged in community development as well as the national programmes under MRRD. In Kandahar, the Project practically set up a regular coordination mechanism with PRRDD, UN-Habitat as the FP of NSP, and other supporting bodies for monitoring and review of the overall progress of the Project activities and achievement of the technical cooperation programme, to exchange views on major issues arising from or in connection with implementation of the Project, to coordinate the Project with other regional development policies and programmes, and to provide its assessment and feedback to the JCC at the national level.

At the beginning, the Project shared its “guiding principle” and “strategies for sustainability”, shown below, with stakeholders in Kandahar. In fact, some project components were changed due to the security deterioration in Kandahar after the commencement of project. The size of implementation of community development project which aimed to improve conditions of villages in the target area was squeezed after Japanese experts left from Kandahar to Kabul. However, the philosophy of the technical cooperation project has not been changed throughout the Project period.

Guiding Principle

In the history of Afghanistan, people have repeatedly proven themselves to be extremely resilient. Now again at this turning point of its history, the country faces the big challenge of rebuilding and forging lasting peace. This can never be done properly without putting significant attention to the innate and resilient power of the people. Every development activity carried out by foreign donor agencies should take great care not to create dependency and not to ruin the inherent and powerful nature of the people. Intervention should be done in a way that builds up people’s spirits and strength. The central player of the development activities should be the people themselves, and the government and NGOs and outsiders such as foreign experts and consultants have the roles to support and facilitate.

Strategies for Sustainability

The Project lasts only five years, while development activities by community people themselves will be carried on continuously; therefore, this Project weaves essential aspects of sustainability in its activities. Two of the major components of the Project have definite meanings for sustainability. One is capacity development. By helping build and develop capacities, those who are engaged in community activities will utilize their knowledge and skills even after the Project is finished. Working with local NGOs is another major strategy for sustainability. Community organizations


Chapter 1-11

need external assistance for enabling them to do their own work by themselves. For community development projects, what community people need is not just funds; they need someone who would sit with them, listen to them, consult with them, link them with outside, encourage them, and build trust in the relationship until the people become confident and able to do everything on their own. At the initial stage, such community development workers are essential to keep a close relationship with community people. At this point in Afghanistan, local government cannot play this role. As NSP is experiencing, facilitation partners are either national or international NGOs. The Project is designed to work with local NGOs, which would continue working in the region with Afghan communities long, even after the Project is phased out.

1.5 Outline of JSPR

The project outline is given in the Project Design Matrix (PDM11) shown in Annex 1. However, the PDM was revised twice during the project period due to the security deterioration in the target area and change of needs of the counterpart MRRD, although the core element and philosophy of the Project have not been changed. The significant turning point of the Project was the withdrawal of Japanese experts from Kandahar to Kabul in April 2006 due to the security concern. Originally, the Project had a two-fold intention: to build capacity and to improve living conditions of the target communities by the close technical support from Japanese experts. However, it was difficult for the Project to conduct a number of community development projects successfully without the Japanese experts. Thus, the Project focused on capacity building of community development workers through theoretical trainings and implementation of a limited number of community development projects as “practical training”. On the other hand, the Project added to have counterpart in central level (Community Led Development Department: CLDD) in addition to original ones. After the mid-term evaluation in February 2007, the Project focused on building capacity of central level counterpart as well as original ones and added to compile the experience as a capacity development model for sustainable community development.

The mandate or purpose of the Project is capacity building of development workers. When the project purpose is achieved, community development activities are activated. Then, the activated community development activities will promote reintegration of returnees and IDPs. This will have a positive impact on human security and stability in the region.

The vision of JSPR is shown in the below figure.

11 A format of logical framework which is used in technical cooperation projects by JICA.

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Figure 1.3 Vision of JSPR

For achieving the project purpose, the following activities are planned and implemented:

Outputs and Activities

Output 1

Those who are engaged in community development acquire knowledge and mind-set required for

carrying out participatory community development projects through training programmes (Theory).

Activities for Output 1

• Conduct training needs assessment, design curriculum and prepare material • Establish the Institute for Community Development (ICD) and conduct various

training/workshops/seminars targeting CDC members, government personnel, and NGO staff

• Carry out study tours/exposure trips • On- the- job training for counterparts and partner NGOs

Output 2

Those who are engaged in community development acquire skills and attitudes required for carrying out participatory community development projects through implementation of projects for

Community Development (Practice).

Promote Reintegration of Returnees and IDPs Super Goal: Promotion of reintegration of returnees, displaced persons in their communities,

hence, the improvement of communal harmony.

Human Security and Regional Stability

Activate Community Development Activities Overall Goal: Villagers including returnees in Kandahar enjoy their development

through community development projects implemented using locally available resources.

Mandate: Capacity Building of Development Workers Project Purpose: The capacity of those who are engaged in development programmes

are developed to manage sustainable community development activities.


Chapter 1-13


• Select target communities in consultation with local authorities and concerned agencies and based on surveys of existing data

• Conduct a baseline survey of Dand District in the initial stage • Make implementation strategy and design the mechanism for partnering among government

offices, CDCs and NGOs

• Facilitate Pilot and Community Development projects at selected villages in partnership with government offices, and CDCs/NGOs

• Implement skill training support projects • Feedback the lessons learned into the training programme

Output 3

Those who are engaged in community development are able to have better coordination and to effectively collaborate among themselves.


• Use every occasion for involving various stakeholders to meet and facilitate sharing and coordinating

• Hold coordination meetings, planning workshops participated by various stakeholders

Output 4

A model of strengthening system of CDCs by utilising locally available resources is developed.


• Develop a model of strengthening system of CDCs from experience of the Project activities • Share the model with Afghan authorities and donors

Target Area

The original target area was Kandahar Province. Due to the security deterioration, however, target area for community development project has been squeezed and was limited to only Dand District near Kandahar city. Instead, target area for capacity development was expanded to national level counterpart personnel, although the original plan was to train development workers in Kandahar only.

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Implementation Period

The implementation duration of the Project was originally June 2004 to June 2009 based on the R/D. However, the commencement of the Project was delayed due to the presidential election and security issues in 2004. The implementation of the Project officially started in January 2005 by the deployment of Japanese experts in Afghanistan.


Chapter 2-1

CHAPTER 2 IMPLEMENTATION OF JSPR

2.1 Project Management

Project activities in Afghanistan started in January 2005 in Kandahar, continued for about four years, and was completed in March 2009. It was planned for the Project to be implemented in Kandahar with government officials as well as local NGO staff in Kandahar. The project team arrived in Kandahar in January 2005. And the kickoff meeting was held in February 2005 attended by local government officials in Kandahar. The first version of Project Design Matrix (PDM) for JSPR was developed through the meeting and following workshop in a participatory manner. The Project started with close collaboration between Japanese experts and local counterparts in Kandahar. However, security concern had prevented Japanese experts from entering Kandahar since April 2006, and they were forced to operate activities in Kabul. Under this circumstance, the Project established a project office in Kabul in June 2006, reviewed the project framework including project purpose and subsequently revised the Project Design Matrix (PDM) of the Project in September 2006. After that, project activities were implemented both in Kandahar and Kabul up to the end of activities in Afghanistan. In this section, various aspects regarding project management are described.

2.1.1 Project Management Structure

(1) Project Offices

The Project had one project office in Kandahar City until March 2006 and established a management structure for the office. The project office was established outside PRRDD Kandahar because of lack of space at PRRDD Kandahar office as well as safety issues of its location. There were about 25 national staff members in the office under Japanese experts, from national manager, senior project officers and administration officers to outdoor guards. The figure below shows the management structure until March 2006.

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Japanese Experts

Senior Project Officer

Security Officer

AssistantTraining Officer

Chief Guard

National Manager

Deputy Manager/Training Officer

Administration Officer

Project Assistant

Project Assistant(Social Organizer)

Project Assistant(Social Organizer)

Receptionist

Drivers

Guard

AssistantAdmin.

Officer (logi)

Maintenance

AssistantAdmin.Officer

(Account)

MaintenanceAssistant

Senior Staff

Figure 2.1 Project Management Structure (up to FY2005)

In June 2006, after Japanese experts were no longer able to work in Kandahar because of security concern, the Project established another project office in Kabul. Nevertheless, the Project was unable to set up office inside MRRD because of insufficient space as well, and had to set up office outside the MRRD compound. In late FY20061, MRRD moved from the centre of Kabul City to Darul Aman area. In this new location of MRRD, the Project could be provided office space, and so the office established outside the old MRRD was closed and the Project moved completely to the office inside MRRD at the beginning of FY2007.

The only significant change in the management structure of the Kandahar project office from FY2006 and the one before FY2006 is the location, that is, Japanese experts were moved to Kabul. The Kabul project office had about five national staff members, consisting of project assistants, an administration officer, and so on. Project management structures both in Kandahar and Kabul in FY2008 are shown in the figure below.

1 FY: Japanese fiscal year (from 1 April to 31 March).


Chapter 2-3

Figure 2.2 Project Management Structure (FY2008)

The Project closed the Kandahar office at the end of February 2009 and the Kabul office in mid- March 2009, at the same time as the end of employment of all national staff.

There were various difficulties to remotely operate both project office and activities in Kandahar from Kabul. Japanese experts tried to increase transparency and accountability on project management in order that both Japanese experts and national staff members could trust each other. Especially, the following measures were taken for smooth operation of project activities.

• Establishment of Communication System

It was very important to minimise communication gaps and misunderstandings between Japanese experts and national staff. Towards this end, communications between Japanese

Kandahar OfficeKabul Office

Japanese Experts

Administration Officer (1)

Drivers (2)

Maintenance (1)

Kandahar Office Organ Gram

Kandahar Senior Staff (4)

Project Assistant (2)

Kandahar Office

TechnicalSocial

Senior Project Officer (1)

Security Officer (1)

AssistantTraining Officer (1)

National Manager (1)

Administration Officer (1)

Senior Project Officer (1)

Drivers (4)

AssistantAdmin. Officer (1)

Maintenance (1)

MaintenanceAssistant (2)

Senior Staff

Receptionist (1)

Project Assistant (5)

Chief Guard (1)

Guard (5)

Engineers (2)

Training Section Programme Section

Japanese Experts in KabulProject Assistant /

Assistant Training Office (1)

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experts and national staff in Kandahar were basically made only through senior staff members. Also, when Japanese experts were in Kabul, this was how communication was done: First, meet with national staff member in Kabul for a face-to-face discussion, and then national staff member in Kabul calls up national staff member in Kandahar by phone to convey Japanese expert’s message/instructions in their own language. E-mail was also used in communicating. Basic communications were done through e-mail and supplementary and detailed explanations were given directly over the phone.

• Documentation of Detailed Rules and Instructions

Instructions of Japanese experts to national staff were documented as much as possible. Regarding project management, there were office rules and regulations which were discussed and agreed upon between Japanese experts and national staff; also, duties and responsibilities of each staff member were set by job descriptions which were basically developed by each national staff member.

In terms of project activities, Japanese experts tried to develop paper instructions of each project activity which explained objectives, outcomes, outputs, procedure and so on, so that the national staff could understand why they implemented the activity and how. As the Project went on, Japanese experts asked national staff to plan each project activity including all the aforementioned items by themselves, to show to Japanese experts what they planned to do.

The purchase of necessary equipment for activities in Kandahar was almost completed by March 2006 when Japanese experts had to leave Kandahar. Most of necessary equipment for activities in Kabul were purchased in FY2006. Therefore, in FY2007 and FY2008, only a few required items were purchased. Most of these equipment were donated to PRRDD Kandahar and CLDD at the completion of project activities in Afghanistan based on requests from them, and after discussing the matter with JICA Afghanistan Office. Lists of donated equipment are attached as Annex 5.

(2) Security Measures

Security situations in Afghanistan became increasingly worse year by year during the project implementation period except after the last parliamentary election in 2005 when security situations became a little better. As a result, the Project had to take various security measures to be able to safely implement activities in collaboration with JICA’s security advisors.

Because the Kandahar office was established separate from PRRDD Kandahar, the Project itself took security measures for the office. A security officer was hired for information collection. There was 24-hour security provided by armed guards contracted from Ministry of Interior and deployed outside the office compound and by non-armed guards hired for checking security inside the office compound. The office compound was surrounded by barbed wires, and window glasses of the


Chapter 2-5

compound were covered by blast resistant films. Food and water supplies were kept in the office for emergency.

Since there were many incidents on the roads between Kandahar City and target communities, when national staff members went to target communities, they did not use 4-wheel drive vehicles but sedan vehicles and wore local clothes in order not to stand out. The Project enforced “low profile” field works for all staff. In addition, a telephone communication tree was established and made available to all national staff in Kandahar, which enabled ease of confirmation of their safety when some incidents happened on roads.

Because roads between Kandahar and Kabul were also targeted by Anti Government Elements

(AGEs), special considerations were given. National staff members as well as counterparts travelled by air for movements between Kandahar and Kabul when situations allowed them. If they had to move by land, they used local buses and did not carry any documents which could show their ties with international organisations.

In FY2007 when security situations became severely worsened and several incidents actually

happened in target communities, the Project took it upon itself to draw up security phases and started to implement monthly assessments of security situations for each target community. The security phases are shown below. The security phase was around 2 in the beginning of the Project and became around 4 at the end of the Project.

Table 2.1 Security Phase under JSPR

Security Phase Security Situation

1 Although there are some anti-government activities, foreign aid workers as well as Afghan national staff for international organisations would not be targets and they could move safely from the airport to Kandahar City and within Dand District.

2 Although they are not direct targets, foreign aid workers might be involved in incidents by anti-governmental forces. In terms of Afghan national staff for international organisations, they are not targets and could move safely from the airport to Kandahar City and within Dand District.

3 Afghan national staff as well as foreign aid workers could be targets of terrorism and abductions. It sometimes happens that they receive threat letters, or that some of them could be involved in such kinds of activities. There would be limitations of movement from the airport to Kandahar City and within Dand District.

4 There are widespread anti-government activities in the target areas and government influence will dramatically decrease. Engaging in governmental community development activities becomes difficult not only for Afghan national staff (including FP staff as well as government staff) but even for CDC members.

5 Anti-government activities are real threats for villagers in the target areas and they could not be engaged in governmental community development activities anymore. In addition, Afghan national staff is unable to go to target villages.

6 Target areas enter into a state of war.

As was previously mentioned, the Project took security measures as much as possible and, fortunately, did not face any critical incidents during the Project implementation. However, it was

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strongly felt that assessments of security situations for instituting appropriate security measures were difficult for those who did not have any expertise for this type of work.

The Kabul office, on the other hand, was under security control by JICA Afghanistan Office and MRRD. All window glasses were covered by blast resistant films, and food and water supplies were kept in the office for emergency. Since the security situations in Kabul also became increasingly worse year by year, all land travels of Japanese experts were made using bullet-proof vehicles provided by JICA Afghanistan Office from FY2008.

2.1.2 Implementation Structure

MRRD was the counterpart of the Project. At the central level, the Programme Deputy Minister was appointed as the counterpart. At the provincial level, on the other hand, PRRDD was the main counterpart organisation of the Project together with related provincial organisations such as Department of Agriculture, Department of Repatriation and Refugees Affairs, and Department of Women’s Affairs. In addition to working with local counterparts, the Project hired members of national staff for managing training and subproject activities in the field. They were expected to act as supervisors or master trainers for capacity building of local counterparts and facilitating partners (FPs), because there was lack of experienced persons in the field of participatory community development in the local government and local NGOs.

In the beginning of the Project, Japanese experts were based in Kandahar and focused on targets in Kandahar. Since Japanese experts were in the same place where target groups such as PRRDD Kandahar staff, national staff and FP staff were, the Japanese experts could provide technical advice and instructions directly to them. They planned to build capacities of target groups through training courses and on-the-job training as well as to supervise and support community development activities in target communities. The implementation structure until the end of FY2005 is shown in the figure below.


Chapter 2-7

PRRDD KandaharSupervision

CDCsFacilitation & Project Management

JSPR NSFacilitation, Project Management,

Monitoring & Evaluation

FPs (Local NGO)Facilitation, Support Project Management,


JSPR JPN experts

Kandahar

Figure 2.3 Implementation Structure (FY2004-FY2005)

In FY2006, when security concern made it impossible for Japanese experts to work in Kandahar, overall project framework was reconsidered. The Project concentrated on capacity building of community development workers rather than size of implementation of community development projects. Since Japanese experts were based in Kabul, the implementation structure was also reviewed and changed into the one shown in the figure below. Capacity building was conducted step by step and capacities of national staff members were firstly built so that they could support target groups in Kandahar instead of Japanese experts.

At the same time, MRRD was struggling to build capacity of newly established Community Led Development Department (CLDD), which was responsible for follow-up of NSP and community-led development in post-NSP era. MRRD and JICA agreed to appoint CLDD as practical counterpart of the Project officially in September 2006. Then, Japanese experts built capacities of CLDD staff directly in Kabul, in addition to the capacity building of development workers in Kandahar by the remote management.

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PRRDD KandaharSupervision

MRRD/CLDDSupervision

CDCsFacilitation & Project Management

JSPR NSFacilitation, Project Management,


FPs (Local NGO)Facilitation, Support Project Management,


JSPR JPN

KabulKandahar

Figure 2.4 Implementation Structure (FY2006-FY2008)

Training for the capacity building of target groups in Kandahar was mainly conducted through national staff. These people had relatively good community development backgrounds considering the situation of Afghanistan at the time of starting the Project. However, they lacked an understanding of basic theories of community development as well as practical experiences except for infrastructure construction. Therefore, the Project trained the national staff first, and then trained the counterparts and FPs. The Project also created some opportunities to conduct capacity building directly from Japanese experts by inviting target groups to Kabul when Japanese experts were staying at Kabul.

As for the target groups in Kabul, Japanese experts conducted the capacity building training directly.

On the whole, difficulties of keeping target group persons were obstacles to the Project. Although there were not major changes in terms of members of the counterparts at PRRDD Kandahar, they were occupied with routine works and unable to spare time for, or participate in, the project activities continuously. As for the CLDD, the department itself was newly established, thus its organisational ability was weak and not many personnel were posted permanently. CLDD also took charge of various national programmes making it difficult for its personnel to participate in the Project continuously. In addition, Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR)2 was conducted at the beginning of FY2008. The Project faced the situation that most of the target groups personnel were unavailable. Some measures such as introduction of internship system were considered in an attempt to find a breakthrough to this situation, but it was not realised due to institutional difficulties such as payroll.

2 PRR started in full-scale process since May 2008, and revision of qualifications to each post in all departments as well

as qualification exam were conducted. Even routine works of counterparts stopped during the time of qualification exam, and the counterparts had difficulties in engaging in the Project.


Chapter 2-9

Other factors that limited counterpart participation are lack of good understanding on “Technical Cooperation” and tendency of presuming project team as implementing partner.

As for the NGO staff who served as FPs, most of them were contract-based and tended to change jobs depending on the treatment at each NGO. There were also some cases that staff who were in charge of community development projects under JSPR left their positions once the contract with JSPR finished. Considering the business conditions associated with international assistances in the post-conflict settings, it was difficult to appeal to their sense of responsibility and retain Afghan staff that work at NGOs or Government for the sake of their livelihood.

2.1.3 Joint Coordination Committee and Evaluation

(1) Joint Coordination Committee (JCC)

A Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) was established both at central (Kabul) level and Kandahar level, and held periodical meetings in order to share information and exchange opinion regarding the Project. JCC meetings at central level were basically held once a year, chaired by the Programme Deputy Minister of MRRD, and attended by various staff including counterparts. Participants included personnel from MRRD’s national programmes and related Departments, related line Ministries, other JICA projects, JICA Afghanistan Office, International Organisations and NGOs. Main purposes of JCC meetings were to exchange opinion about progress of the Project, activity plan and approval of annual plan of operation as well as mid-term and terminal evaluations. JCC meetings at Kandahar level were basically held weekly, attended by the representatives of PRRDD, FP, IRDP, JICA, UN-Habitat and other related organisations, and shared information as to progress of the Project. JCC meetings at central level are listed in the following table.

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Table 2.2 Joint Coordination Committee Meetings

No. Date Major Agenda Major Participants Location

1 March 3, 2005

- Explanation of Programme Framework

- Presentation of PO and Annual Plan for FY2005

MRRD, MoWE3, MOE, MoPH4, MoLSA5, MUDH6, DOWA Kandahar, PRRDD Kandahar, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNDP, NABDP, NSP, IRDP, JICA

KBL

2 February 26, 2006

- Explanation of Progress in FY2005 - Presentation of Annual Plan for

FY2006

PRRDD Kandahar, DORR Kandahar, DOA Kandahar, UNHCR, UN-Habitat, NSP, JICA

KDH

3 September 13, 2006

- Explanation of Change of Programme Framework

- Explanation of Progress - Explanation of Annual Plan for

FY2006 - Exchange of Minutes of Meeting

MRRD, UNHCR, MOE, MoLSA, UNDP, PRRDD Kandahar, ICDN, JICA

KBL

4 February 13, 2007

- Explanation of Result of Mid-term Evaluation

- Explanation of Progress - Explanation of Annual Plan for

FY2007 - Exchange of Minutes of Meeting

MRRD, PRRDD Kandahar, NSP, IRDP, JICA KBL

5 January 28, 2008

- Explanation of JICA Programme Approach for Rural Development

- Explanation of Progress and FY2008 Annual Plan of JSPR

- Explanation of Progress and FY2008 Annual Plan of IRDP

MRRD, AIRD, PRRDD Kandahar, NSP, PAL, CHA, UN-Habitat, NRAP, MOEW, MoPH, JICA

KBL

6 January 28, 2009

- Explanation of Achievements - Explanation of Result of Terminal

Evaluation - Exchange of Minutes of Meeting

MRRD, NSP, PRRDD Kandahar, HAPA, VARA, LKRO, ALO, UN-Habitat, PAL, NABDP, AIRD, IRDP, JICA

KBL

(2) Mid-term Evaluation

A mid-term evaluation of the Project was conducted in February 2007. The evaluation indicated that the Project Purpose shall be achieved according to schedule providing that further emphasis would be put on the capacity building of MRRD. In addition, major recommendations were identified as follows:

• More focus on capacity development of MRRD/CLDD, PRRDD Kandahar and CDCs • More involvement of MRRD/CLDD and PRRDD Kandahar • Addition of one more target village for community development projects • Closer collaboration with IRDP • Sharing of implementation experience among “follow-up” projects and programmes of NSP

3 Ministry of Water and Energy 4 Ministry of Public Health 5 Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 6 Ministry of Urban Development and Housing


Chapter 2-11

• Modification of PDM (Clarification of indicators) • Improvement of communication between Kandahar and Kabul project offices

The result of mid-term evaluation was approved by JCC and Minutes of Meeting was prepared and signed by the relevant parties, with each being given a copy (see Annex 8).

(3) Terminal Evaluation

Terminal evaluation was initially scheduled for November 2008, but postponed to January 2009 due to security conditions. The evaluation found that: the Project was successfully implemented at large, project purpose shall be achieved by the end of the project period and the Project shall be completed as noted in the R/D. Furthermore, Terminal Evaluation was also conducted from a peacebuilding perspective. The evaluation results indicated that the Project contributed to reconstruct social institutions to some extent by bringing back communities’ trust and instilling in them a sense of ownership as well as achieving capacity building of government officials.

On the basis of the evaluation, the following recommendations were made, to be undertaken until the end of the Project:

• Instilling ownership of JSPR Model by MRRD • Fine-tuning of JSPR Model to the local context

For “after the Project”, recommendations made were as follows:

• More emphasis on capacity development of civil servants • More collaboration with other Ministries • Recognition of local NGOs as local development partners • Continuous support for CDCs towards their sustainable efforts

The result of terminal evaluation was approved by the JCC at their sixth meeting and Minutes of Meeting was prepared and signed by the relevant parties, with each being given a copy (see Annex 8).

2.1.4 Public Relations

The Project conducted various Public Relations (PR) activities for the purposes of public acknowledgement and sharing experience/outcomes of the Project.

(1) Newsletter

The Project published a biannual newsletter since May 2005. The newsletter, which reports on the project activities, is produced in both English and Pashto, and distributed to related organisations. All the published newsletters are attached as Annex 9.

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(2) Website

The Project created an English website within the MRRD website7 and updated it periodically since FY2006. The website offers information that includes an introduction of project activities, project reports and Newsletters. The Japanese version of the website, which also introduces project activities, was created since FY2007, embedded within the JICA Technical Cooperation Project website8.

(3) Seminar

In order to broadly share outcome of the Project and exchange opinion with related people, Seminars were organised four times during the project period as listed below. There was no seminar organised in 2007 because of the presentation of project outcome at JCC meeting.

Table 2.3 JSPR Seminars

Date Major Agenda Location

22 February 2006

- Explanation of JSPR - Explanation of Progress - Explanation of Plan - Q & A and Discussion

KDH

2 March 2008

- Explanation of JSPR - Explanation of Infrastructure-type Subprojects - Presentation of FPs’ Achievements - Distribution of Completion Certificates - Q & A

KBL

18 February 2009

- JSPR and Future Afghanistan - Explanation of Outline and Achievements of JSPR - Explanation of JSPR Model - Discussion

KBL

25 February 2009

- Explanation of Outline and Achievements of JSPR - Explanation of JSPR Model - Presentation of Lessons Learned by FPs - Presentation of Lessons Learned by CDCs - Discussion - Distribution of Completion Certificates

KDH

As part of capacity building training, representatives of FPs and CDC at targeted communities made a presentation about the project outcomes in the Seminars. Completion Certificate on community development subprojects were also issued to FPs and CDC representatives during the Seminars.

(4) Leaflet

Given the formulation of JSPR model, a leaflet was created in English, Pashto and Dali in order to introduce the JSPR model and encourage related organisations to utilise the model. The leaflet was distributed to related organisations.

7 http://www.mrrd.gov.af/jspr/ 8 http://www.jica.go.jp/project/afghanistan/0603849/


Chapter 2-13

(5) DVD

The Project created a DVD which introduces the JSPR model and basic theoretical and practical applications of the model for the capacity building. The narrations were done in both Dali and Pashto. It is expected that the DVD will contribute to a better understanding of the JSPR model by MRRD staff so that they can apply the model to other situations.

2.2 Capacity Building through “Theory” (Output 1)

Capacity building in the JSPR was achieved through “Theory” and “Practice”. “Theory” means training which is an entry point for the capacity building, and it is aimed at providing practitioners of community development with knowledge, attitude and skills necessary for the facilitation in advance to the practice. The Project implemented various training since FY2005.

2.2.1 Training Programme

(1) Establishment of Institute for Community Development (ICD)

In June 2005, the Project established the Institute for Community Development (ICD) within its project office at Kandahar. ICD is equipped with a conference/meeting space, an audio-visual space, library space and internet facilities in a room. All the necessary equipment were procured in FY2005, and trainings as well as conferences in Kandahar were held at this ICD.

When the security situation worsened for Japanese experts in Kandahar, necessary equipment were purchased in Kabul as well so that trainings and conferences can be held in Kabul. The Project rented office space in Kabul in FY2006 which was large enough to be able to hold trainings and conferences. Since FY2007, the office space had been moved to inside of MRRD compound, and MRRD conference room was used for training/conference purposes with equipment provided by the Project.

(2) Type and Selection of Training

The types of trainings necessary for target groups of capacity building, namely, community development workers, were considered and selected through interviews with local NGOs in Kandahar, conducting training needs assessment and interviews with MRRD in Kabul. As a result, it was found that most of the community development workers started engaging in this kind of activities only since the collapse of the Taliban regime and so do not have enough experience. Therefore, the Project reached a conclusion that trainings for the workers to equip themselves with knowledge and skills for community development are necessary. In particular, trainings to provide necessary knowledge and skills for community development were conducted as Fellowship Training (Packaged Training) and trainings to provide a wider range of knowledge and skills for community development were conducted as Stand-alone Training. Fellowship Training includes trainings such

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as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) Training, Project Cycle Management (PCM) Training and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Training. Stand-alone Training (Supplementary Training) includes trainings such as Training of Trainers (TOT) and Peacebuilding Training, both of which were conducted to persons directly involved with community development activities. These trainings were conducted for a certain period of time and the method includes lecture, group work and field training. In addition, it is considered necessary to further conduct Exposure Trips in and outside of Afghanistan as well as on-the-job (OJT) trainings. These ideas were all noted as Output 1 in the project design matrix, and trainings were started since FY2005.

Later, given the changes of project design as well as actual outcome of the trainings, the Project changed the composition of the trainings. Considering the fact that TOT is conducted in other programmes, only Peacebuilding Training remained as Stand-alone Training. As for the OJT, the Project regarded learning through actual works as “Practice”, and only the “Theory”, such as necessary knowledge and skills which can be learned through Short Workshop, was conducted as activities under Output 1.

(3) Changes of Target Groups for Training

Initially, target groups of the Project were the community development workers in Kandahar. Thus, major target groups for the trainings had been FPs, government staff and national staff that were directly involved with project implementation. In addition, it was planned that the training shall be provided to local NGOs and local government staff other than counterparts in Kabul. However, the Project was forced to manage the Kandahar office by remote control from Kabul since FY2006. Thereafter, Project Design was revised, the focus of the target groups was changed, and target groups for the training were to include only those directly involved with the project implementation such as FPs, government staff and national staff. Major target groups for the trainings were changed step by step. First cycle of training was conducted to FPs and national staff in Kandahar, second cycle of training was to government staff in Kandahar and third cycle of training was to government staff in Kabul.

As for the CDC, initially they were included to part of the training. However, it was identified that it

is not very efficient to provide the trainings to CDC, FPs, government staff and national staff together since their status and education level were different from one another. Therefore, trainings for CDC were conducted separately through FPs, and it was placed at Output 2 as part of “Practice”.

(4) Management of Training and Implementation Methods

Trainings were conducted step by step since there was a limit in the number of participants for each training. Training for FPs and national staff was conducted in First cycle (FY2005 to FY2006). Training for government staff and FPs was conducted in Second cycle (FY2007). Training mainly for government staff in Kabul was conducted in Third cycle (FY2008).


Chapter 2-15

First training was conducted by Japanese experts together with an NGO and private consultant

specialised in such training. In the Second training, project staff created curriculum and implemented the training based on the result and experience obtained from the first training. In the Third training, project staff reflected the result of the past trainings, revised the training curriculum of the second training, and implemented the training as part of creating model training modules.

Since the Second training, training was managed thoroughly from planning to evaluation (Training Cycle Management). In addition, Training Taskforce (FY2007) and Training Working Group (FY2008) were created by national staff and counterpart staff; and as part of capacity building activities, they conducted the planning, creation of curriculum, preparation, implementation and evaluation of trainings with support from Japanese experts.

Designing Training Course

(2)


(2)

ImplementingTraining Course

(3)


(3)

Evaluating Training Course

(4)


(4)

Determining Training

Needs(1)


Needs(1)


(2)


(2)


(3)


(3)


(4)


(4)


Needs(1)


Needs(1)

Figure 2.5 Training Cycle

2.2.2 Implemented Training in FY2005 and FY2006

Since FY2005 to FY2006, First training was conducted with community development projects (Batch I) as a practice. Major target groups were staff in Kandahar such as FP staff who facilitate CDC in community development projects and national staff who oversee FPs.

Basically, trainings were conducted by utilising outside resources. Contents of the training were

developed by combining training module brought by outside resources and request from the Project.

Venue of the training was ICD in the Kandahar project office since Japanese experts were based in

Kandahar in FY2005. It was changed since FY2006 and participants of trainings were mainly invited to Kabul due to the situation that Japanese e

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