JFCs Assessment of Progress Handbook

8/10/2019 JFCs Assessment of Progress Handbook

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/jfcs-assessment-of-progress-handbook 1/41

1

Handbook for Joint Force Commanders

Assessing progress in environments

involving irregular adversaries



2

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...................................................................................................... 5

GLOSSARY .............................................................................................................................. 9

GENERAL PRINCIPLES..................................................................................................... 10

1.1 Assessment in general ........................................................................................................... 10

1.2 Evaluation in military campaigns: the basis of assessment and an instrument ofdialogue ................................................................................................................................................ 10

1.3 Assessment in irregular environnement ............................................................................. 11

1.4 Implications of a comprehensive approach for assessment .............................................. 11

WHAT TO MEASURE?THE SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF IRREGULARADVERSARIES ..................................................................................................................... 12

2.1 Characterization of irregular entities ................................................................................. 12 2.1.1 Characterization by generic goal ............................................................................................... 12 2.1.2 Characterization by forms of violence....................................................................................... 13

2.2 Evaluate organizational changes of irregular entities ....................................................... 14 2.2.1 Based on the forms of collective violence employed ................................................................. 14 2.2.2 Based on their territorial footprint ............................................................................................ 15

2.3 Evaluate insurgency dynamics............................................................................................. 16 2.3.1 Winning central power ............................................................................................................... 16 2.3.2 Denial of central power............................................................................................................... 17

2.4 Evaluate irregular adversaries’ strategy ............................................................................ 18 2.4.1 Objective of the indirect strategy: destabilisation of institutions ............................................ 18 2.4.2 Characterize legitimacy .............................................................................................................. 19

2.5 Counter insurgency in the first model: re-establishment of State institutions................ 19 2.5.1 No counter-insurgency without a solid government................................................................. 19 2.5.2 Regular forces cover the process by violent organizations demilitarisation .......................... 20

2.6 Counter-insurgency in the second model: association and rallying strategies ................ 21 2.6.1 Absence of State implies shaping an integral strategy ............................................................. 21 2.6.2 Operational strategy consist in isolating violent non-cooperative elements ........................... 21

2.7 Conclusion: in both cases assess appropriateness of civil and military systems toneutralise irregulars ............................................................................................................................ 22 2.7.1 Protect government legitimacy by re-establishing territorial sovereignty ............................. 22 2.7.2 Strategy of association as a way to shape the peace process .................................................... 23



3

ASSESSMENT METHOD .................................................................................................... 24

3.1 Assessment planning............................................................................................................. 24 3.1.1 Preparation of the operational environment............................................................................. 25 3.1.2 Framework for planning............................................................................................................. 27 3.1.3 Situation awareness..................................................................................................................... 27

3.1.4 Operational orientation .............................................................................................................. 27 3.1.5 Concept of operation development ............................................................................................ 28 3.1.6 Operation plan development ...................................................................................................... 28 3.1.7 Method and recommendation to define indicators ................................................................... 29

3.2 The assessment process during the conduct of operations............................................... 31 3.1.1 Monitoring ................................................................................................................................... 31 3.2.2 Assessment cycles ........................................................................................................................ 31

3.2.3 Assessment method during the conduct of operation............................................................... 32 3.2.4 Evaluation products .................................................................................................................... 35

PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION FOR THE ASSESSMENT FUNCTION ............. 36

4.1 The assessment function within the Force HQ................................................................... 36 4.1.1 Assessment Cell ........................................................................................................................... 36 4.1.2 Assessment Working Group..................................................................................................... 366 4.1.3 Multidisciplinary Groups for evaluations ................................................................................. 37 4.1.4 Experts ....................................................................................................................................... 377

4.2 Relationships with other levels of command ...................................................................... 38 4.2.1 Relationships with strategic level of command ......................................................................... 38 4.2.2 Relationships with tactical level of command ........................................................................... 38

4.3 Relationships with civilian and host-nation actors ............................................................ 39

ANNEX 1 CANVAS SAMPLE OF AN ASSESSMENT PLAN.......................................41

ANNEX 2 TERMINOLOGY EQUIVALENCES ............................................................. 41



4

INTRODUCTION

Irregular adversaries practise non conventional forms of fighting in societies broken by major political

and social crises. In some cases, host nations cannot ensure the proper functioning of their

institutions; these may even have progressively disappeared because of armed rebellions. Theinternational community is then faced with extremely difficult situations in which international and non-

governmental organizations cannot undertake assistance, reconstruction and development activities.

Military strategies aiming to contain irregular adversaries, including through cooperation with the non-

military sphere, are not new. However they are seldom successful. Indeed, whilst military action

remains essential to establish a secure environment, military force is no longer decisive for the

resolution of crises resulting from the weakness or even the absence of State institutions. Difficulties

in finding a winning strategy are clearly indicative of the challenges of understanding irregular

environments and of positioning military engagements within them.

« Understand in order to act ». This axiom is more than ever valid. The complexity of modern

engagements increases the necessity, but also the difficulty, of understanding a given situation. Howis the opposing force evolving and what threats do we face? To what extent do changes of security

conditions result from the coalition’s actions? What actions should be rectified in order to enable

security conditions to progress in the desired direction? Military leaders seek answers to questions

such as these, in addition to determining their strategy’s relevance, often under the pressure of

events. Evaluating a campaign’s progress towards its goal and adjusting the campaign/operational

plan - in short, assessing the engagement - is precisely what allows the adaptation of the armed

forces’ role to changes in the environment. This effort is not simple. It is exposed to subjectivity, even

partiality, because a campaign is multifaceted, the adversary is elusive, and public opinion is versatile.

The present guide proposes a method to be used to design and conduct assessments when engagingforces in a non-conventional operation or campaign. It is particularly intended for Force Commanders,

who have been entrusted with the command of operations in the theatre.

It does not provide a pre-defined, easy solution including indicators for every type of operation. The

assessment framework is designed as an integral part of operational planning; defining indicators

appeals to the same intellectual modes, deductive and inductive. Assessment results from a

methodical analysis of these indicators, rather than from a reliance on statistics.

This method is meant to be complementary to existing assessment methods – it is indeed largely

inspired from principles and methods in use – and is particularly adapted to the specifics of irregular

adversaries, though it also applicable to other types of conflicts.

There are two main aspects to this document:

• One provides the intellectual framework necessary to conduct assessments in non-conventional engagements. It offers concepts and useful terminology, a typology ofconceivable campaigns, a typology of non-conventional violent entities, which may becomeadversaries, models of State destabilisation strategies, as well as civil and military means andactivities to be combined in order to reach campaign objectives.

• The other supplies methodological tools and processes for planning and conductingassessments, as well as proposals regarding the organization of assessment within the jointForce, as well as regarding its relationships with other levels of command and with theinstitutional and political environment in which it operates.

Lastly, it advocates having experts attached to the Force Commander staff which, more than themethod itself, is decisive for the quality of assessment. This recommendation calls for the adoption of

policies, where required, for the recruitment and management of these experts.



5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

General Framework

The framework of this guide includes counter-insurgency and stability operations, which seek to bringa solution in conflicts characterized by the struggle between State and non-State actors for legitimacyand influence over relevant populations.

The assessment of these types of campaigns implies:

• understanding the fundamental motives that have led irregular entities to take up arms:

- the inability of State institutions to satisfy populations’ basic needs,

- the will to take power,

- the perception that institutions perpetuate certain injustices,

- conflicting values,

- cultural habits.

• a thorough characterization of the nature of these entities, which function according to a certainmodel that is non-institutional and is capable of conducting a global destabilisation strategythrough one or more forms of organized collective violence. This characterization depends on theprincipal objective of the irregulars:

- predation,

- ideological subversion,

- power-claiming.

• The type of socio-political organization chosen by these irregular entities also conditions the formof collective violence that they exert:

- Counter-state entities, which mobilize and control populations. Some may consist incommunity organizations, particularly tribo-clanic societies that are able to manageparamilitary violence with a degree of sophistication corresponding to their maturation and totheir freedom of action;

- Secret-cells, which are limited to carrying out acts of terrorism in order to advance their

(subversive) cause;

- Private military societies which operate for the benefit of uncontrolled or hostile employers(foreign State, local chief);

- Criminal organizations, principally aiming at illegal profit, although some contribute to (or areintegrated in) the power-claiming entities’ funding system. The most powerful of these are

close to counter-states, for they control populations and use paramilitary violence.Theses entities preferentially exert one or another form of collective violence, according totheir organization: disobedience or rioting in an uprising logic, or, for armed rebellions,guerrilla (paramilitary organizations) or terrorism (secret-cells).

Lastly, irregular entities are characterized by the nature of their territorial footprint, which has a“social” (establishment within the population) and a geographic dimension, except for secret-cells.

• Once irregular entities are well characterized, assessments necessarily require an evaluation oftheir dynamics, founded on one of the following logics (which may coexist in a single theatre):

- Conquest of central power , characterized first by a progressive extension of areas controlledby the irregular entities (where State institutions are no longer capable of enforcing their

policies, are absent or are rejected), as well as by increasingly sophisticated machinery (cellsthen paramilitary) and by the method of control of the populations;



6

- Denial of central power , characteristic of community entities and notably tribo-clanic

organizations (emerging in anarchical societies and where the State is very weak). Conflictsoccur when the consensus among communities regarding hierarchy and the control overterritories and resources is broken by efforts to reinforce the central power.

Irregular entities generally employ indirect strategies: they use means other than military (or verylimited military means) to reach a long-term goal. This strategy by attrition always aims to

destabilise and then to neutralise the existing institutions, in order to replace them (conquest ofcentral power) or prevent their implementation (denial of central power). On the operational side, itmay take the shape of subversion or a strategy of chaos, seeking an overreaction of the securityapparatus. The logic varies with the nature of the irregular adversaries:

- Counter-states especially practise denial of territory,

- Secret-cells practise denial of public security,

- Criminal organizations put their efforts into denying good governance.

In all of these cases, the political legitimacy of the State is at stake. Populations’ consent to theleadership in place is necessarily based on some level of common identity and on their acceptance ofthe way that power is organized and distributed. Nonetheless, legitimacy has different meanings

depending on countries and social organizations: in communities or tribo-clanic societies, efforts mustbe made to seek legitimacy in the eyes of chiefs rather than in those of individuals. More generally,legitimacy is a long term task going beyond the short-term acquisition of the population’s goodwill.

Countering insurgents who aim to seize full power over the State consists in re-establishing Stateinstitutions and cannot be without a strong, durable government. Indeed, populations, whoseallegiance may vary momentarily and locally because of terror or attraction, will remain with thosewhom they sense will be able to maintain power in the long term. This process is accompanied by thedemilitarisation of irregular actors - notably by following a Clear-Hold-Build modus operandi - seekingto reduce the paramilitary organization into secret-cells, which can then be dealt with by police.

Countering insurgents who aim to deny central power necessarily implies intervention from outside,given the weakness of the State. This can be done through massive support to one of the communitiesor through the implementation of joining and association strategies, which aim to re-create consensus

regarding power sharing arrangements among entities. This strategy is accompanied by a securitystrategy aiming to isolate and reduce non-cooperative actors, either by a direct approach (punishment)or by an indirect approach (reconciliation).

Process

The very goal of assessment is to understand what is happening according to the above framework

and to be able to explain the changes that occurred in relation to one’s own activities, in order to

decide on the actions to take and adjustments to make, as well as to be able to justify the meaning of

the action and the correct use of the allocated means. Thus, it is principally a decision-making and a

communication tool for the Force Commander.

Inherent complexity in operations makes causal links between what has been done and the observedresults far from obvious, and thus hampers deductions and forecasts. The proposed method is originalin that it crosschecks the evaluation of progress, which military and civilian planners are used to doing,against the situation analysis, which is usually completed by the intelligence function, thereby allowingfor a complete assessment of the strategy.

Assessment is a process, which encompasses monitoring - a permanent process aiming to maintainupdated knowledge of the situation – and several evaluations - periodic processes aiming to measureand give a meaning to observed trends to enable a better understanding of the situation.

It relies partly on following a number of indicators, which are specific information themes meant toreveal an expected trend. Indicators encompass: situation indicators, which show trends in theconflict’s evolution; measures of effectiveness pertaining to the achievement of the elements of the

campaign design (objectives, decisive conditions, effects); and measures of performance pertainingto the tasks undertaken. These indicators may be quantitative or qualitative; they must always beobservable, simple and explicit.



7

As described above, determining trends in the conflict’s evolution requires being able to detectemerging patterns. Revealing these relies on a joint preparation of the operational environment,which includes four steps:

• Identification and characterization of irregular entities and the actual State, their respectivecomponents, functions and goals; and the distinctive factors of the theatre (geography, society,cognitive factors, etc.);

• Analysis of interactions between irregular entities, the State and the above factors, among whichare territorial footprints, as mentioned previously;

• Analysis of interactions between all these and foreign civilian actors and the Force deployed;

• Analysis of irregular entities’ strategies and courses of action and the corresponding dynamics.

As stated before, assessment planning is a facet of operational planning. The process is as follows:

• The first three steps of the list are implemented during the knowledge development and at thebeginning of the operational orientation phase. Uncertainties and risks noted throughout thisprocess are turned into hypotheses or assumptions, which frame planning, and lead to theselection of situation indicators for their follow-up and validation;

• The orientation phase determines objectives, decisive conditions and effects, and articulates themin a coherent campaign design. Measures of effectiveness are determined during this phase;

• During the concept development phase, the fourth of the steps listed above leads to thedevelopment of the last situation indicators; the selection of a course of action and subsequentassignment of tasks leads to the establishment of measures of performance;

• Lastly, the phase involving the development of the campaign plan is completed by thedevelopment of the “assessment” annex to the campaign plan, which combines both theassessment plan and the organization method for the assessment function.

Indicators are determined in the following manner:

• Based the preparation of the operational environment and on the campaign design, a group

brainstorming is undertaken to develop an initial list of indicators that can reveal evolutions of thesituation, decisive conditions, hypotheses, etc.;

• Then the group checks that indicators reveal nothing but the object they should be revealing;

• Each indicator is unambiguously defined;

• The ability to observe the indicators is checked;

• The physical area, the duration and the frequency of observation are fixed;

• Indicators are prioritised then allocated to organizations capable of observing them.

An assessment process implemented in the conduct of the campaign includes:

• Monitoring, i.e. collection, analysis and reporting of operational information.

• A raw evaluation, based on this operational information routinely collected as well as on aspecific complementary collection of information and intelligence; the raw evaluation is threefold:

- Evaluation of the operational situation, consisting in updating the joint preparation of theoperational environment;

- Evaluation of campaign design progression, by analysing measures of effectiveness thenprogresses made toward each evaluated effect, decisive condition and objective;

- Evaluation of the courses of action progression, which reviews the realisation of the assignedtasks and judges the appropriateness of operational capacities;

- Host nation and civil organizations’ own evaluations are also considered at this stage.

• Based on this work, a net evaluation is undertaken as follows:

- The evaluation of the operational environment is crosschecked against the evaluation of the



8

campaign design progress, to explain why the strategy followed led to the expected results ornot;

- The evaluation of the operational environment is then crosschecked against an evaluation ofthe completion of the course of action, to deduce constraints and mutual influences betweenthe course of action and the operational environment;

- Engagement perspectives, notably opportunities, constraints and risks relating to theexecution of the campaign design, the course of action as well as other actors activities, arededuced.

This net evaluation results in a set of conclusions regarding the relevance of the campaign design,the course of action and the adequacy of resources, and in explicit recommendations regardingplanning efforts and resources. This evaluation also results in updating the assessment plan. Awritten report follows, which is exploited to satisfy communication needs, according to thecommunication strategy in force.

Organization

The Force Commander relies on an assessment function1. It is comprised of:

•

An assessment cell, which organises and integrates work undertaken;• A multifunctional assessment working group including, beyond the HQ staff, representatives of

tactical commanders, civil agencies and the host nation. It is a permanent network, gathered on anad hoc basis to carry out net evaluations. It is recommended that the Force Commanderparticipates directly.

More than the method, success in assessment lies in expertise. It is recommended that the staffinclude area experts, experts in the civil organizations which the Force works with, and experts inirregular conflicts. The availability of expertise dictates the actual organization of the function. Due toanticipated shortage of expertise, the analysis strength should not be stretched across too manygroups, which is ineffective. Moreover, it is critical to get an external expertise from local services orfrom partnerships with civil agencies (e.g. political units from the UN). Such expertise shall beresourced through an explicit statement of requirements, stemming from the planning process.

In the end, assessing progress rests with the only one having the necessary overarching expertise: theForce Commander. The strategic level of command contributes by providing him with strategicinformation. The Strategic Commander also carries out his own assessment, relying on the theatreassessment, completed by strategic perspectives. Commanders at the tactical level, who also assesstheir mission in their areas of responsibility for their own needs, provide the Force Commander withinformation necessary for a comprehensive understanding of the environment and for the constructionof a holistic vision of the campaign and the conflict’s underlying dynamics.

Assessment of the campaign design encompasses various domains in which the Force acts in supportof other primary responsible organizations. Relationships with civil actors and the host Nation arecrucial. However, it is acknowledged that in many cases a comprehensive approach is rarely a reality.

Several levels of exchange with civil actors are envisaged:• Selected data exchange;

• Sharing assessment plans;

• Sharing assessment products;

• Developing a common assessment, recognising that this is hardly conceivable, given differentagendas and varying approaches.

This guide finally advocates that a Senior Civilian Representative entrusted with the civil expertise ofthe headquarters and serving as an interface with civil organizations, assist the Force Commander.

1 Operational function refers to a set of operational activities that are transverse to the hierarchical organization



9

GLOSSARY

The different notions used in evaluation are based on diverse theories2 and approaches, each

responding to differing needs. Thus terminology varies from an organization to another. Clarification is

always required to avoid being equivocal. Below are the key notions used in this guide.

• Assessment. It is the whole process that: facilitates understanding the current situation and the

mechanisms by which the situation changes; evaluates the results of the military engagement and

compares them to its final objectives; and decides on short-, mid- and long-term changes necessary to

improve the execution of the mission. It encompasses monitoring and evaluation.

• Monitoring. It is the function which continuously collects and compiles information, in order to

maintain an updated situational awareness and facilitate its perception. Monitoring answers the

question: « what is happening? » or « what happened? », as well as the implicit question « Is itaccording to expectations? ». It does not provide explanations.

• Evaluation is the punctual, normally periodic process, which consists of raw and net evaluations.

• Raw evaluation. It aims to measure: on one hand the results of the action of the Force, seen from

an objective perspective; and on the other hand the situation changes in the operational environment.

Raw evaluation is used to understand the situation, according to the engagement.

It answers the questions: “where are we compared to mission objectives?” and “how is the general

situation in-theatre progressing?”

• Net evaluation. It is the judgement made on which conduct the force should adopt for the sake of

mission accomplishment. It is based on the comparison of raw evaluations. Net evaluation explains:

“why and how did things happen?” or “why did they not happen?” and determines consequences for

the pursuit of the mission.

• Indicator. An indicator is a specific information topic that reveals a trend. It is used to steer data

collection. Three types of indicators are used in this guide :

- Situation indicators, which reveal a trend in the evolution of the operational environment.

- Measures of effectiveness (MoE), which measure the trend towards the attainment of an

objective, effect, or decisive condition.

- Measures of performance (MoP), which measure the completion of tasks by the Force units.

2 Principally sorted in two terminological families, attached to distinct theories: one result-oriented - Result Based Management

Terminology; the other effect-oriented - Effect-Based Operations Terminology.



10

Chapter

11

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1.1 Assessment in general

“Assessment in general” refers to “evaluation” and designates the process that allows drawing up a

judgement on a programme, by verifying that the outcomes it produces enable the attainment of the

objectives that have been established.

To be objective, evaluation draws on a method, which may vary according to the activity sector to be

evaluated, and on the respect of principles and criteria. To be credible, evaluation should beindependent and call for experts generally working in multidisciplinary groups.

There are several evaluations in a programme life: one is generally undertaken ex-ante to draw up a

baseline; many are conducted at regular intervals during its implementation to survey its progress,

judge its appropriateness and recommend adjustments to the process or the strategy or even

reconsider its validity; lastly an ex-post evaluation draws up the overall results.

1.2 Evaluation in military campaigns: the basis of assessment and an instrument of

dialogue

Force Commanders also need both to judge the effects created by the military forces and to comparethese to their expectations in order to rectify gaps and remain in line with to strategic objectives.

However, military operations involve opposition to adversaries who constantly adapt in terms of

organization and courses of action. Determinism is thereby ruled out: even when based on a valid

initial estimate and even if performed exceptionally well, military action does not automatically lead to

the desired changes, for the causal chain between actions and effects, on which the operation’s plan

is based, is continually thwarted by unwanted effects. To fulfil their objectives, military forces must

adapt their responses to environmental changes and consequently detect and correctly interpret signs

of change. Therefore, evaluation in military campaigns must take into account the operational

environment in which forces are engaged.

Evaluating the campaign’s progress ultimately amounts to assessing the engagement, i.e.:

- Understanding what is happening, including on-going conflict dynamics;

- Identifying the direct and indirect effects of the military action based on observed situation changes;

- Anticipating what could happen;

in order to:

- decide on short-, mid- and long-term desirable adjustments;

- report to authorities the meaning of actions undertaken and justify the required adjustments to the

strategy, including requests for supplementary resources;

- communicate the meaning of the military action to the other parties involved in the campaign, for

more effective collaboration.



11

Being a supporting tool for decision-making and communication, assessment supports and underpins

the Force Commander’s actions. « The measurement of success is a fundamental aspect of military

operations that should be foremost in the mind of every commander »3

Assessments must lead Force Commanders to stay at their level, keeping away from events and the

tactical management of the Force and focusing on strategic objectives and the desired end state.

Assessments also take place at every level of command for purposes of understanding, decision-making and communication.

1.3 Assessment in irregular environments

Engagements against irregular entities are almost never anticipated and therefore are not planned for

before Force deployment; rather, forces tend to find themselves engaged in non conventional wars

once they are already in theatre and in the midst of on-going operations. In this context, decision-

makers often need to review their objectives accordingly.

Although not predictable, engagements in the presence of irregular entities are governed by a number

of standard schemes. Knowing and integrating them in planning as soon as precursory signs are

detected is necessary to understand engagement in the presence of irregular adversaries. This is whythe recommendation by several methods to characterize a system-state to be reached and to

determine the appropriate instruments of measure accordingly, is unrealistic. Chapter 2 addresses key

points underlying this understanding.

1.4 Implications of a comprehensive approach for assessment

“The actual success of an operation will be measured against the overall result and not just on the

achievement of the military objectives” 1..Though military force is an essential tool to guarantee the

restoration of security by opposing the activities of irregular adversaries and protecting populations,

during the stabilisation phase, military operations are designed to permit the establishment of the

necessary conditions to restore stability. Military force is accordingly only one component of crisisresolution, among other organizations and institutions, with which it must necessarily coordinate its

efforts and without which there is no long-lasting solution. A comprehensive approach – or the

interaction with non-military actors – is therefore necessary:

• beginning at the planning and design stages, to increase the relevance of military action;

• to effectively transition responsibilities to non-military authorities and organizations.

To measure the effectiveness and progress of a campaign, a Force Commander needs to evaluate the

relative contribution of his actions and those of non-military actors, positively or negatively, towards the

attainment of the strategic objectives. The value of this evaluation will depend on the actual sharing of

information and analysis with other key actors, as well as on a solid understanding of how those actors

plan, conduct their projects and evaluate their activities.

Evaluation methods are specific to each evaluated domain (emergency aid, development,

governance, security, etc.) and to the organizations who are involved in these domains. It is therefore

important to make every effort to share perceptions in order to reach a comprehensive approach to

evaluation.

Assessment includes the following key aspects:

Effectiveness of civil and military deployments, at each phase of the campaign, apportioned toaccomplish lines of operation;

The right time to transfer responsibility between military and international then local civil actors.

3 AJP 3(A)



12

Chapter

22

WHAT TO MEASURE AGAINST?

THE SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF IRREGULAR ADVERSARIES

2.1 Characterization of irregular entities4

Many types and forms of Irregular entities – characterized here as armed non-governmentalorganizations – exist, sometimes within one theatre. A clear understanding of how they function shouldallow legitimate security forces to react appropriately. Therefore it is essential to identify the patterns ofirregular organizations, which not only will give initial orientation to the intelligence chain, but will also

serve to analyse and design the operation, and thus provide a framework for assessment.

2.1.1 Characterization by generic goal

An irregular entity is organized to achieve a common goal, deemed sufficiently important to justify themobilization of means and possibly the sacrifice of lives. It falls in one of the groups:

Taxonomy of Irregular Entities by GoalTaxonomy of Irregular Entities by Goal

Irregular Organizations Systems: Entities organized along a non-bureaucratic framework,able to plan and conduct a comprehensive strategy of destabilisation by mastering one or

several non-conventional forms of collective violence.

Motivations

Organizational functions

Favorite COA

leadership

External support

Force generation

Criminal system Power claiming system System of subversionWorldwide

ideological goalLocal political goalIllegal profit

Systemic

components

Three irregular systems

With specific agenda

Fig.1 Taxonomy of irregular entities by goals

• Criminal systems and predators. These systems are motivated by profit; their goal is to prosperand survive within the societies in which they live as parasites by bypassing or by spoiling the securityand judiciary components that could pose a threat to them. Such organizations are mainly comprisedof a resource collection network, protection forces, and channels to sell illicit products and to recycleprofits into local and international legal activities. Typical examples are mafias and cartels, in whichleadership is very hierarchical. In fragile States and societies suffering crisis, predators tend to bemore loosely organized and their activities aim to survive.

4 This taxonomy is the production of a scholar programme financed by the French Army Staff and the Procurement Board (DGA).



13

• Power-claiming system. These systems seek to respond to dissatisfaction among populationswho regard themselves as victims of injustice in political, institutional or economical fields. Their goal isto occupy or conquer the local power apparatus. Armed struggle is part of a comprehensive strategy,seeking to gain national-level political legitimacy and international support. Their objectives consist in:fighting for territories and corresponding populations, which rebels seek to remove from thegovernment’s authority; and fighting to avoid the development of a strong central power.

• Subversive System. These systems are inspired by totalitarian or religious ideological visions.They aim to substitute prevailing values by alternative ones. Conquest of a local power counts lessthan the destruction of the disputed social or international order.

An irregular entity must adapt its organization to one goal only, or risks failure. Yet an initial goal may

change over time, thereby leading to a shift in its organization.

2.1.2 Characterization by forms of violence

To survive and grow, violent irregular organizations must get rid of the supervision of the institutions,

against which they struggle, by the use of some form of collective violence: predators use corruption

and occupation of States’ components; power-claiming and subversive systems seek to overthrow

State institutions or neutralise their functioning until then. Most known violent irregular entities include:

• Counter-state organizations, which carry out armed uprisings by mobilizing populations. Theycreate parallel structures of government and administration, which are geographically organized, andaim to control populations and collect resources. They also have a structured command whichdesigns, plans and conducts armed struggle from a controlled territory. As they are able to mobilizeeconomic and human resources on a large scale, they preferentially perform structured forms ofparamilitary violence. It is the preferred organization of power-claiming systems. It includes:

- Revolutionary-type organizations, whose objective is to win over the central governmentthrough strength in numbers (Viet-Cong, FLN, FARC);

- Community organizations, based on ethnic, cultural or religious identities, among which aretribo-clanic organizations, peculiar to anarchical societies (Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen,

sub-Sahara Africa). These organizations employ armed actions to protect a human group,whose identity and allegiance are defined by family relationships and territorial alliances. Thedecision making structure follows the hierarchy of family heads.

• Secret-cell organizations, which promote actions of isolated individuals or groups of violentactivists who do not enjoy popular support (at least initially). They rely on a clandestine functional cellstructure, whose purpose is to isolate its members from the surrounding environment and to protectthe secrecy that is necessary for their freedom of movement and action. Being seldom capable ofperforming paramilitary violence, they use terrorist violence.

• Organized crime. Those performing violence as predators should be included in the assessment:

- Rebel organizations which mobilize a part of their means for the exploitation of a resource;

- Criminals who finance a violent irregular entity’s war effort;

- Warlords, heading an armed organization to control a territory in order to derive income. Suchan organization has a paramilitary function, which maintains a local favourable order, aresource collection function and a trading function to commercialize the products of theseresources worldwide. As opposed to counter-state organizations, it must maintain a certainlevel of conflict in its environment in order to avoid the return of police and judiciaryinstitutions

5. Therefore warlords often constitute a major obstacle to peace processes.

• Private Military Firms, harmful when they serve non regular or hostile employers such as :

- A foreign government wishing to keep its territorial ambitions discreet;

- A local government no longer able to maintain an armed force or a security force;

- Private contractors, local chiefs or criminals in a country divided by civil war.

5 However, some of well organized and most powerful warlords can be categorized as counter-state organizations, should they have

locally an actual political legitimacy based on the following conditions: share a same community with local population, protect that

community and redistribute a part of the collected illegal income in the form of social aid to members of that community.





15

2.2.2 Based on their territorial footprint

An irregular entity is also characterized by its territorial footprint, which is comprised of:

• a dimension relative to the part of the society in which it operates;

• a dimension pertaining to the geographic area in which it has material means at its disposal.

Paramilitary violence used by counter-state organizations requires: controlling thousands ofindividuals conscripted to the rebel war effort; time and a great deal of money to obtain sufficientarmament, trained units, logistics bases and sanctuaries beyond the reach of regular forces.Therefore, their territorial footprint is bound to progressively expand. As the model of « popular war »by Mao Ze Dong indicates, it contains: a political direction (unless this acts from abroad) to design andlead a comprehensive strategy organized by domains (economic, social, military); running structuresfor each domain i.e. resources mobilization, military operations, weaponry acquisition and production,infiltration of socio-professional organizations, internal and external propaganda, justice and police;and for each structure, a tight occupancy of the geographic space to effectively control the populace.

For tribo-clanic organizations the two dimensions – social and geographic – often overlap.

Secret-cells rarely demand heavy means and have no geographic space to physically control.Clandestine cells structures are conceived to avoid leaving any visible footprints. Their humandimension corresponds to the social fabric in which they operate and move. The best structuredorganizations (IRA, Al-Qaeda before 2001) hide their weaponry in caches and have training campsbeyond the reach of regular forces or even abroad, which indicates a possible shift towards a moresophisticated form of combat.

As for criminals, their territory corresponds to the geographic space in which they exert their illegalactivities and parasitize society. Armed criminal violence does not require a geographic hold.However, the nature of illegal activities influences the territorialisation of an organization. Converselyintangible activities do not require space, and to evaluate the territorial footprint of such criminalorganizations relies on deep expertise in police, legal and economic spheres.

Warlords rule the geographic territory from which they derive their income. The size of that de facto sovereignty area is defined by the social attachment of the chief and is limited by the effective controlexerted by his armed group.

Combined Forms of Collective Violence and Typical OrganizationsCombined Forms of Collective Violence and Typical Organizations

Source: FRS-CEROM

SubversivePower Claiming Predator

Counter-state Secret CellType ofType of

functionalfunctionalorganizationorganization

Business-like

PrevailingPrevailing

Goal Goal

Type ofType of

collectivecollective

violenceviolence

Paramilitary

Violence(Guerrilla – PMF)

Activist group Organized Crime

technical violence

Mob Riot

Coup

Terrorism

Insurrectionarycommittees

Community

Revolutionary

Warlords

IRREGULAR VIOLENT ENTITIES

Fig. 3 Combined forms of collective violence and typical irregular organizations



16

2.3 Evaluate insurgency dynamics

Campaign success against irregular entities largely depends on understanding insurgency dynamics.Insurgency either seeks to gain central power (model 1) or to counter the establishment of a centralpower (model 2). In the first model, insurgent organizations promote change against a regime thatseeks to protect the Establishment. On the contrary, the second model is conservative, upholding an

anarchical organization of society against attempts to introduce political and social change.

The evaluation of a given situation against these two theoretic models, which can coexist or succeedone another, must highlight conflict dynamics and the developing logic of insurgency.

2.3.1 Winning central power

Be it a revolutionary and popular war aiming to overthrow a national political regime or a nationalliberation war against an occupying military power and its local political allies, for the contesting entitythe strategy consists in:

• undermining the legitimacy of the authority in office by leading an armed rebellion;

• building its own political legitimacy;

• progressively building up its military and police forces to equal those of the disputed authority.

Rebels will then turn into more and more sophisticated organizations and step by step remove parts ofthe territory and the corresponding population from authorities’ influence. Support from a foreignsponsor State increases chances of success.

STATE

COUNTER-

STATE

Organization ALN–Alger1957

chefdes groupesarmésdudistrict

adjoint

chefdegroupe armé

adjoint

4/4/27

Organisation paramilitaire de dis trictOrganisation paramilitaire de dis trictOrganisation paramilitaire de dis trict

Boîteà lettre

Armements typesde la cellule de

base (3 hommes)

PrincipesdelaclandestinitéPrincipesde laclandestinité

1 . O r ganis at ion c lois onnée

2. Aucun contact directentrecellules

RogerTrinquier,La guerremoderne,La tableronde,Paris, 1961, p. 27

Boîteà lettre

ALN–Alger 1957

chefdes groupes armésdudistrict

adjoint

chefde groupearmé

adjoint

4/4/27

Organisation paramilitaire de dis trictOrganisation paramilitaire de dis trictOrganisation paramilitaire de dis trict

Boîte à lettre

Armements typesde la cellule debase (3 hommes)

Principesdela clandestinitéPrincipesdelaclandestinité

1 . O r ganis at ion c lois onnée

2. Aucuncontact direct entre cellules

RogerTrinquier,La guerre moderne , La table ronde, Paris, 1961,p.27

Boîteà lettre

Identifiedas HVT

Notional Pattern of Mutation of Power Claiming EntitiesNotional Pattern of Mutation of Power Claiming Entities

Mutating

successful

Rebel

Movement

Power

Claiming

Gaining territories:

1.Then population;2.Then resources;3.Then legitimacy

Nascent

MatureParamilitary Violence

Activist Violence

Fig. 4 Patterns of mutation of power-claiming entities

The progressive shift of a nascent cellular organization towards that of a counter-state organization willbe revealed by a simple set of indicators designed to measure the irregular entity’s footprint, which arethe areas where:

- Regular security forces can no longer circulate or station freely;

- Officials of the administration are removed, returned or eliminated;

-

Taxes are no longer collected by the official collection system;- State justice is no longer provided.



17

More generally, every indicator revealing inability to implement a government’s (or occupying power’s)decision at local level will be sought. The more they increase in number and spread over the territory,

the more the assumption that rebels are gaining actual power must be envisaged.

2.3.2 Denial of central power

These insurgency dynamics are observed inter alia in Somalia and Yemen. They concern anarchicalsocieties that cannot structure themselves as a Nation and fragile States unable to effectively exertsovereignty due to chronic instability or civil war. The actual matter of the conflict lies in the rejection ofa State’s central power.

The political system is based on a consensus between the various communities on:

- Allocation of power,

- Access to various resources,

- Respect of an acknowledged hierarchy in terms of privilege and prestige among communities andfor the allegiances that bind them.

Alliances and allegiances vary according to agreement on the following topics:

- Acknowledgement of communities’ territories,

- Communities’ self-protection, in the absence of a supra-community security apparatus,

- Acceptable apportionment of the permanent sources of income,

- Adoption of a common code of behaviour (essentially guided by tradition and religion) pertaining tothe practice of justice/vengeance, mixed marriage and respect of property outside the community.

Blows to the status quo on these topics are punished by reprisals and could degenerate intointercommunity violence.

Equally, attempts to create or restore a superior central order can generate insurgency.

State spoilers

Denying a Central GovernmentDenying a Central Government

COMMUNITY X

COMMUNITY Y

COMMUNITY Z

COMMUNITY Z1POLITICAL CONSENSUS

Power sharing system

Hierarchy of communities

Territorial

autonomy

Community self-

protection

Allocation of

resources

ALTERNATE ALLIANCES / ALLEGIANCES RETALLIATION

• Intruders

• Foreigners

• Deviant groups

Agreed common

behavior on

• Honor

• Justice• Private property

• Hospitality

Competition

Cooperation

Rebellion

Allegiance

Synthesis of four historical recordsSynthesis of four historical records

Fig. 5 Political model for denying the central State



18

2.4 Evaluate irregular entities’ strategy

« Military operations directed against an irregular adversary are intended to break his strategy ratherthan his potential in order to set up the favourable conditions required for a political solution »

6 . Thus it

is paramount to characterize the strategy of the irregular adversaries. It requires knowledge of theviolent rebel organizations on the ground, their goals, the forms of violence they exert, and their

evolution during their confrontation with regular forces. Rebels’ strategies are either direct or indirect.

Direct strategies rely principally on military force to reach a goal; they require an advantageousbalance of power to obtain a swift, decisive position allowing them to force the adversary to surrenderrapidly and at a lower cost. Conversely, indirect strategies consist in the utilisation of limited or nomilitary means, to reach a long-term goal by attrition. For insurgents, to resort to an indirect strategyresponds to three objectives:

- To save up available means, as they progressively grow;

- To raise the physical cost of fighting for the opposing forces by attempting to exhaust them;

- To raise the psychological cost of fighting by raising doubt regarding the political legitimacy andethicality of the opponent’s struggle, both within the country and abroad.

2.4.1 Objective of the indirect strategy: destabilization of institutions

Whatever the irregular organization may be, its objective is always to weaken the State’s institutions.Courses of action may vary, depending on their capability to control paramilitary violence, buteventually there is no other outcome than to “de-institutionalize” the State, in order to:

- annihilate it to replace it (1st model); in this case, the indirect destabilisation strategy consists in

breaking the normal functioning of local institutions, through a set of violent organized activities,physical or immaterial, in order to instil mistrust among citizens, develop distrust between socialbodies and leading elites, and overthrow the regime in-place.

or

- prevent it from ruling the country (2nd

model); in this case, the indirect destabilization strategy

consists in impeding consolidation of national institutions that aim to replace existing communities’political and social organizations, through a set of violent, physical or immaterial, organizedactivities.

This integral indirect strategy may follow two major forms:

- Subversive, aiming to reduce the effectiveness of the States’ institutions and compromisemanagers by corruption, through infiltration of rebel elements in the political and security bodiesand circulation of propaganda. The desired outcome is for the public opinion to no longer trust anincompetent or rotten political system.

- Chaotic (“scorched earth” strategy), aiming to generate large-scale troubles in civil society by

undermining public order (terrorist acts, sabotage, riots, strikes) in order to overload securityservices and provoke the suspension of individual freedom, activation of laws of exception and

atrocities. The desired outcome is for the government to be hated and for the population to maturetowards rebellion

7.

These strategies are valid provided that the society is already weakened by economic, social andpolitical crises. Each organization follows its method:

Counter-state organizations ruin trust in State institutions by “denial of territory”, i.e. by preventingState control over parts of its territory and access to part of its population.

Following indicators will reveal the balance of power in favour of counter-state organizations: existenceof territorial sanctuaries; existence of an organized paramilitary power capable of mobilizing large-scale manpower and certain political legitimacy; absence of civil servants and State employees in theconcerned area. This is even more important for power-claiming organizations such as tribo-clanic.

6 PIA 00-180, Op. Cit.

7 Theory of country insurgent hotbeds by Che Guevara, repeated by Carlos Marighela and Miguel Guellen in urban environment.



19

A secret cell organization compromises a government by “denial of public security”. Terroristviolence undermines trust in police and justice effectiveness.

Mature criminal organizations attack certain State institutions by “denial of good governance”.

Corruption of local decision-makers and within certain police services, intimidation of magistrates,infiltration and collusion with national political elites allow neutralising repressive penal activities orsignificantly reduce their efficacy. Their territory is the area where they perform their illegal activities.

2.4.2 Characterize legitimacy

Doctrine manuals base success in counter-insurgency campaigns on legitimacy, a notion that isseldom defined. Legitimacy corresponds, for sociologists, to a population consenting to be ruled. Thisconsent is conditioned by a common identity, founded on a Nation’s/community’s history and by therespect of certain forms of lawfulness and constitutionality. However, other sources of legitimacy existsuch as custom, tradition or the charisma of leaders. As a result, the matter of legitimacy will varyconsiderably according to the type of society and the insurgencies it generates. The two genericmodels look at legitimacy differently:

- In the first model, insurgents compete with a weak or corrupt State to “win hearts and minds”.While the authority in office relies on legally constituted institutions assumed to function according

to fundamental laws and acknowledged by the international community, insurgents rely on thepopulation’s dissatisfaction to denounce the fake legality of institutions that no longer representthe will of the people. Competition includes appeal and terror to stop people from going over to theopposite camp. Eventually, the legitimacy issue is settled by elections, organized by the winner.

- In the second model, local populations are ruled by inherited political and social communitysystems. The legitimacy of local powers is derived from traditional devolution of the authoritycoming from dynasty or from religious or cultural precious knowledge. Chiefs pledge on behalf ofthe community and determine collective behaviour. Therefore, the newly established State mustconvince chiefs for the new system to be agreed. Should it fail, a struggle would occur and thenew institutions would have to subdue local systems by force or disappear.

2.5 Counter insurgency in the first model: re-establishment of State institutions

Experience gained during the 20th century has led Western countries to develop doctrine for counter-insurgency, stemming from the combination of three models: British, French and American, whichconverge around the common observation that a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy consistsin re-establishing institutions of the attacked State, so that it can take on the actual causes ofdiscontent. Military force protects this enterprise by demilitarising the most dangerous organizations.

2.5.1 No counter-insurgency strategy without a solid government

Past experiences are often invoked to justify current counter-insurgency strategies that focus onconquering “hearts and minds”. However, that is not where the bulk of efforts really go. With noexception to the rule, the centre of gravity of the counter-insurgency efforts is the maintenance of asolid government empowered with effective institutions. The re-establishment of State institutions iswhat eventually wins the struggle for political legitimacy over power-claiming organizations. Indeed,

institutions act like a functional and geographical network of sensors that understand populationneeds, and are also enablers for putting in place public policies for reforms. Presence of stronginstitutions also constitutes the best tangible evidence of the permanence of State - and converselythe weakness of insurgents - which the population seeks above all, even if its allegiance may varytemporarily and locally because of terror or appeal.

A counter-insurgency strategy amounts to all governmental actions aiming to deprive an insurgency ofits political legitimacy by re-establishing State institutions, in order to respond to the roots of discontentwhich can lead to collective violence.

Nonetheless, it is important to be aware of another form of counter-insurgency, more prevalent inhistory, which is State terror: State institutions, namely the security and defence apparatus, mayfunction partially and be used for oppression. In this case, a counter-insurgency strategy amounts to

all governmental institutional repressive actions aimed at eliminating all forms of armed and non-violent opposition. It is essential to remember this if the campaign is in support of a government.



20

2.5.2 Regular forces cover the process by violent organizations demilitarization

The general strategy of regular forces, normally subordinated to an overarching counter-insurgencystrategy, takes the form of disarmament campaigns against irregular paramilitary organizations, forwhich doctrine already exists: counter-guerrilla and counter-terrorism.

The objective consists in safeguarding the process of re-establishing State institutions by theprogressive extension of government-controlled areas through: clearing operations; re-establishmentof security structures and public services supported by military forces (hold); and progressivenormalisation of social and economic life (build).

The desired effect consists in reducing paramilitary organizations into cells, through a tactic of attritionof combat capacities, whilst attacking their source of force re-generation. Several operations shall besynchronised aiming to: interdict freedom of manoeuvre on the territory; cover sanctuaries (wheneveraccessible in the national territory); and survey trafficking linked to the war effort. This reduction is notaimed to put an end to insurrection, but to interdict taking the power by arms. If defeated, paramilitaryorganizations will be reduced and only able to perform secret-cell forms of violence (terrorism, rioting),which must then be handled by security services and the judiciary apparatus. Effective national andlocal inter-agency coordination and a combined military-police system are of absolute necessity.

The evaluation of campaign success can only be measured by:

- The extent of conquered and administrated geographical areas;

- Capability of security services to work in these areas without support from regular armed forces;

- Changes in and frequency of observable violent courses of action. Clearly, a militarization ofcourses of action indicates probable sophistication and reinforcement of freedom of movement ofadversaries. Conversely, terrorist activities or riots following paramilitary activities indicate aweakened position, at least momentarily.

- Indications of an effective re-institutionalisation, to include tax collection and functioning of localand provincial administration, observed by upper level technical inspection missions.

These campaigns demand time and permanent efforts; otherwise cleared territorial areas go back toadversaries’ sphere. An important, however often underestimated dimension, is money. Re-establishing a State’s institutions is an expensive endeavour. Resource gathering is a prerequisite forsustaining the campaign and should therefore be thoroughly planned for, so as to be able to fund thevarious activities required in each phase of the campaign.

One of the key components of this type of campaign consists in ensuring the protection of the localpopulation, until public order is re-established and secured. Considering the nature of the linksbetween the local population and the armed rebellion, several options are possible:

- In an area disputed by a counter-state revolutionary organization, protection can be assured by apermanent military and police presence (area control, curfew). It can also be indirect by equippingand training local self-defence units backed up and supported by regular forces set up as a joint

reserve force;- For a local community rebellion, disarmament of respective groups will lead to a perception of

increased insecurity by the community, and therefore in increased hostility. Respecting the rule oflaw will be all the more rigorous for regular forces in charge of re-establishing order. It will benecessarily accompanied by immediate compensating measures: payment, keeping securityelements slightly armed or equipped with non-lethal weapons for maintaining order;

- As for tribo-clanic organizations, disarmament is an issue to be handled with extreme caution. Itis perceived as a blow to the warrior status and threatens the survival of the group facing his rivalswithout means of defence

8. Security of population shall not be provided in this manner but rather

by negotiation and pressure on local chiefs to put in place a system to control the circulation ofweapons (precise location, identification of holders, exclusion zones), pending a better solution.

8 Ex. UN forces in Somalia in the early 90s.



21

2.6 Counter-insurgency in the second model: association and rallying strategies

The second model illustrates the failure of a process aiming to install a modern form of powerorganization. An anarchic society may result from the following three situations, possibly combined:

- A civil war putting an end to the central State inherited from a post-colonial era, during which

institutions progressively declined until reaching the point of total disappearance

9

. Parties are soweak that none can win.

- A community or tribo-clanic organization seizing remnants of the State apparatus in a multi-community society. Holding the State does not mean assuming power over the entire territory,only exercising it in the relevant community area. Hence a constant rivalry between communitiescapable of conquering the capital-city or the presidential palace

10.

- Predominance of traditional forms of power, in which violence is locally accepted as a way of life.Intrusion of foreigners generates temporary alliances to chase out intruders and their plans forreforming the State

11.

2.6.1 Absence of State implies shaping an integral strategy

Without the existence of a functioning State, a counter-insurgency strategy based on the first modelcannot produce significant effects. One of two approaches is often adopted:

- Either a third State eager to stabilise its neighbourhood involves itself in direct support to onecommunity to the detriment of others to ensure its leadership and domination. This is done bysending advisors and assistance means, or even by directly engaging with armed forces to end acivil war and support factions favourable to this third State against those which oppose it

12.

- Or the international community agrees to help the State by re-establishing institutions and the UN(or one of the security organizations covered by chapter VIII of the UN Charter) intervenes with amultidimensional peacekeeping and peace consolidation operation to facilitate a process ofpolitical association among community chiefs, in the framework of a peace agreement. Theobjective is to reach an agreement on the power sharing system in the State. A transition

government is set up, and arrangements are made regarding the complete cessation of hostilities,disarmament of armed entities, re-constitution of local administrations, all supported by differentactors and aided by funding from donors.

2.6.2 The operational strategy consists in isolating violent non-cooperative elements

It is not possible to re-establish State institutions before a political agreement has been ratified andimplemented. Once this has been done, military and security international apparatuses are deployedto neutralise predator-type non-cooperative elements by their destruction or arrest, to safeguard thepeace process against attempts by power-claiming extremists to hinder it.

13

The objective of the campaign consists in ensuring a so-called “safe and secure” environment to allowthe deployment of civil organizations. The generic desired effect on irregular non-cooperative entities

is to convince them that any armed opposition to the process of political association is doomed to fail.

Military and security forces are deployed to compartmentalize the theatre of operations in order todeny freedom of manoeuvre to violent non cooperative elements and to neutralise their nuisancestrategy. Two branches can be planned sequentially or simultaneously:

- A direct military-security option of “punishment” aiming to isolate or to control the area where non-cooperative actors are. Destruction of a part of these irregular capacities shall be ensured untilthey renounce their violent strategy. This option often supports political pressure from the upperlevel (threaten irregulars with prosecution before an international court) ;

9 Ex. Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 80s and 90s.

10 Ex. contemporary Yemen.

11 Ex. Somalia since President Syad Barre fell in 1991.12

Ex. Ethiopia intervening to the benefit of the national transition government against the Islamic Courts militia.13

This logic corresponds to campaigns or operations known in the 90s as “violence control”.



22

- An indirect option of “rallying” or “reconciliation”, seeking to offer an alternative to the irregularviolent strategy. Associated tactics are not explicitly mentioned in current counter-insurgencymanuals, which are essentially conceived to counter a model of conquest of central power. Localsolutions may be inspired by practices of the Indirect Rule, consisting in leaning on a network ofchiefs, whose neutrality or helpfulness is bought, while keeping visible and credible means ofretaliation. The social and territorial management tasks continue to rest with these chiefs, provided

that they no longer hinder the process of association by taking up arms. The advantage of thisapproach consists in involving local actors in the political process.

This operational modus operandi is very distinct from traditional counter-insurgency campaigns,because “conquering hearts and minds” is not set in the same terms. The core issue is to rallyresponsible persons through a process of association. Populations’ influence on their leader can alsohelp the process by demonstrating that the envisaged global agreement offers a future to thecommunity, whilst the maintenance of an armed struggle compromises it.

2.7 Conclusion: in both cases assess appropriateness of civil and military

systems to neutralise irregulars

2.7.1 Protect government legitimacy by re-establishing territorial sovereignty

To prevent irregular entities from winning central power, the government must concretely exert theattributes of sovereignty throughout its territory. The enabling organization in charge of planning andimplementing security and normalisation policies (i.e. to maintain, re-establish or impose theseattributes durably) must have mainly two branches:

• One branch must deal with fighting against irregular adversaries. There is no other way as to buildup a territorial network of security and military grid. Geographical areas are split into operationalsectors covered by a mix of local / auxiliary police and military forces backed by tactical andoperational reserve units. Additionally, the centre of gravity of the counter-insurgency strategy is aGovernmental interagency intelligence centre, including all national available resources for

collecting and processing data on the insurgency. This branch should simultaneously:

- enforce law and maintain public order by arresting predators and dismantling secret-cellsorganizations;

- keep counter-state organizations, paramilitary units or warlords at bay, either by fighting them orby repelling them to a temporarily less sensitive sector.

A comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy implemented by a competent state requires tippingthe balance in favour of regular forces and institutions. That is why a discriminate use of militaryforce is highly recommended. Respecting rule of law and proportionality in law enforcement is nota guarantee for success, but it at least contributes to hampering the escalation of violence soughtby insurgents using “scorched earth” and “subversive” irregular strategies.

• The other branch must focus on the establishment of the State’s institutional control overpopulations and territorial regions by:

- building administration and infrastructure networks, necessary for the coming normalisation;

- re-activating local administrations (mayors, councils), police stations and courts;

- re-activating laws and rules in effect, to extend the rule of law to economic and social activities;

- urgently re-starting the economic fabric by rehabilitating transportation and communicationinfrastructure.

To succeed, these objectives must be planned by upper levels, but implementation must bedelegated to subordinate territorial levels, to take into account the specifics needs at theprovincial/local levels.



23

In areas newly brought to peace and in those favourable to insurgents, the branches are gathered intofunctional and geographic inter-agency structures. They must cover the following generic domains:

- identification of local needs and their relation with security in the area;

- the territorial organization of security and of maintenance of public order;

- determination of priorities in terms of programs in key areas;

- management of the resources, capabilities and know-how necessary to manage programs;

- hand-over of the responsibility of these programs and resources to populations and their officialrepresentatives.

Security operations and re-establishment of State institutions must be synchronized either by thenational military authority in command of all required means or by the civilian representative headingboth civilian and military structures. Campaign evaluation will draw on performance indicators definedarea by area by the local echelons of these structures, which are better positioned to determine thenature of indicators and their calibration to locally gauge progress against the objectives fixed byupper levels.

2.7.2 Strategy of association as a way to shape the peace process

Depending on progress in the peace process, the various international organizations involved deployfull operational expertise and assets when local security is under control. In the recent past, theinternational community has tried to combine civilian, security and military expertise in various ways

14.

Based on these experiences, the United Nations have published a doctrine for multidimensionalpeacekeeping seeking to combine civilian assistance, police and military issues.

The objectives are normally those of the peace agreement design. So it is indeed possible for a groupof organizations to plan a timely implementation of the peace agreement. Methods exist from the Multi-Year Road Map up to the different implementation processes in a comprehensive approach tested byNATO or the EU.

It is important for the Force Commander to ensure that military forces are appropriately deployed toallow the establishment of civil activities according to the objectives fixed by the agreements.Instruments for assessing a campaign that is comprehensive in nature must include:

- the creation of a board of empowered agency representatives ;

- a common evaluation of the situation, which must be defined by heads of mission in placeaccording to existing or ad hoc processes;

- objectives must be compared to the international mandate by each stakeholder in its domain ofcompetency (for those who do not have a planning system, it is recommended to put in placeappropriate missing tools);

- in the campaign phase in progress, combinations of military, civil-military, and civil by geographic

area must be engineered and synchronized (distribution of mission and tasks);

- the requirement for necessary resources must be anticipated and their availability verified.

Though criteria for success are specific to each institution, some indicators should be observed by all:

- commitment of local actors to the process (appropriation of the tools proposed by internationalcommunity then self-creation of ad hoc tools to enable the process to succeed);

- the alternative expression of antagonisms through forms of action no longer involving collectiveorganized violence;

- progressive occupation of the ground by civil organizations.

14 In Former-Yugoslavia, the first attempt of coordination in BiH by the technique of “Boards” was disappointing. Progress has been made

thereafter by the institutionalization of the Bureau of the High Representative. In Kosovo the “Pillar” system under the UN Authority

provided a better framework for coordination.



24

Chapter

3ASSESSMENT METHOD

In general, assessment processes – whether civilian or military – seek to determine progress within agiven strategy but do not convey the degree of complexity of the situation as a whole, including itsdynamics and undercurrents. Conversely, intelligence gathering and “knowledge development”functions analyse the situation without necessarily seeking to challenge and cross examine theirhypotheses with the progress achieved on the ground. The assessment method developed in thismanual intends to combine both approaches – that of looking at progress towards objectives within astrategy and that of analysing the situation – in order to add value to each and arrive at betterexplanations regarding relationship between our actions and the evolution of a given situation.3

3 3.1 Assessment planning

Assessment planning requires defining and setting up the tools (indicators), the human resources,organization and the procedures that will enable the conduct of assessments.

Assessment planning is an integral part of operational planning. Indeed, an assessment processapplies to subjects that result from planning. Therefore, it is appropriate to extract, from the sameanalysis, the instruments to measure the actions/operations undertaken, as shown is the graph below.

The next paragraphs present the key steps of assessment planning.

In this approach, analysis of the operational environment plays a predominant role. The methodproposed below relies largely on the principles of the well-known Joint Preparation of the OperationalEnvironment, while broadening its scope and focusing on campaigns involving irregular entities.

Situation awareness

Operational orientation

CONOPS development

Situation

indicators

Mesures of

performance

Initial systemic analysis

Evaluation of the operat al environment

Op al objectives, criteria for success , effects

Development of the campaign design Situation indicators

Preparation ofhe operational

environment

Analyse of opposing course of action

Development of own COA

Annex NN

Campaign Assessment

Development of the OPLAN

Planning of C2

Mesures ofeffectiveness

Msn analysis : assumption

Collection

plan

Fig.6 Assessment Planning steps in Operational Planning





26

The first step takes place within the knowledge development phase; it consists in mapping

strategic entities in the Force Commander’s area of responsibility, aiming at identifying the

irregular adversary system(s), characterizing their identity (ethnic, politic, socio-economic etc…),

and finally determining the different functions and elements that constitute this irregular adversary.

At this stage, it is appropriate to begin to characterize the adversary in terms of:

•

the organization of its power (human network constituting its leadership, power centre andleverage, mechanism of its exercise, degree of centralisation, etc);

• resources (material, human, lawful and unlawful financial resources, external support, etc);

• Operating capabilities (personnel, materials) in the different operational C2 functions, action,support, intelligence, etc.

If these entities are active at several levels (national, regional, provincial, local, etc), it is important

to understand the dynamics between these levels. However, the idea of partitioning the

operational environment into PMESII domains is not retained in this handbook.

In the meantime, an analysis of the theatre factors should be conducted via the identification of

destabilizing factors, antagonisms and divisions, whether cultural, sociological or geographical,

such as:

• geography, the terrain and the environment;

• demographic characteristics;

• the organization of society: ethnic groups, tribes, socio-political or economic classes;

• infrastructure: transportation, communications, etc. ;

• economic resources and their distribution;

• cognitive factors: the values held by various segments of the population, based on theirposition within their society; the codes that regulate social life, the perceptions of one anotherheld by different groups constituting the population (perception of the force included), etc.

The second step takes place in the orientation phase of the planning process. It aims at

determining which entity (the host nation or the irregular adversary) controls which part of the

theatre. This involves identifying areas that are under direct or indirect control of either the State or

the adversary; then within these areas determining the mechanisms and means of controlling the

population, such as justice, indoctrination networks, resource redistribution networks, etc. Such

information is used to refine understanding of the adversary’s nature and how its power and

resource systems function; it also enables the identification and evaluation of its strengths and

weaknesses, its opportunities and constraints with regard to the theatre and to other strategic

entities. For instance, how does a strategy to control a certain population take advantage of that

population’s value system, as well as of its perceptions of the State’s authority? Each factor is

analysed independently, then the mechanisms that are transversal to these factors are identified.

The third step analyses the impact of the different factors on the armed forces deployed intheatre; then, during the conduct of operations, this analysis will take into account the interactions

between the Force, external actors present in theatre, irregular adversaries and the host nation.

The fourth step seeks to identify the objectives and strategies implemented by the adversary to

weaken the State or the deployed armed forces. This step should take into account:

• The goals and strategic objectives (subversion, infiltration) of the irregular adversary;

• The territorial dimension of its strategy (territorial gains of the enemy);

• The possible operational courses of actions pertaining to the nature of its organization;

• Its probable communication strategy: aims, type of messages, audience targeted, means, etc.



27

This analysis starts in the orientation phase as its conclusions are indispensable to conceive thecampaign plan; it will be further refined during the development of the opposing forces’ course ofaction, as part of the concept of operations (CONOPS)

For each step of this analysis of the operational environment, the military staff will identify:

• The central questions for which it has no answers

• New tendencies/trends that are emerging but need to be confirmed

• The possible risks, given the dynamics identified

Each of these elements leads to the formulation of planning hypotheses that are translated intoassessment indicators to be monitored. Some of these hypotheses condition the validity of theplanning: they are assumptions.

This preparation of the operational environment developed during initial planning can be considered abaseline analysis, based on the available time and information. It will be complemented and updatediteratively at each assessment cycle.

3.1.2 Framework for planning

The Initiating Directive provides the necessary framework with which to start the operational planning,namely, inter alia, the political objectives and the desired end state, from which the strategic planninggroup derives its strategic objectives. Staff headquarters should be associated with the analysis asmuch as possible so as to share the decision makers’ vision. Further assessments should keep in linewith the political objectives and the desired end state. This Initiating Directive possibly relies on anincomplete theatre expertise, should armed forces not yet be deployed: so hypotheses are formulated,which will be followed until proven invalid.

The framework given by the Initiating Directive offers some indications regarding the level ofinteraction entitled with non-military actors involved in the stabilisation process. The objectives ofthese actors, their “theories of change” and their indicators are to be taken into account, as they allowan evaluation of their contribution to the campaign and of the logic underpinning their actions.

Finally, theoretically, by enunciating a desired end state, this directive announces the type of transitionit expects. The transition corresponds to the progressive handover of the force’s responsibilities to theappropriate civil, military, international or local entities. The conditions in which this transition shouldbe executed are in themselves an objective to be attained.

3.1.3 Situation awareness – Knowledge development

During this first phase of the planning, the first step of the aforementioned preparation of the

operational environment is carried out. This initial analysis will identify a first set of situation indicators.

3.1.4 Operational orientation

The operational orientation is a key phase, for the assessment planning, even more so within the

framework of a comprehensive approach. The orientation phase needs to bring together the Force

Commander’s staff, the other actors involved on the ground and the strategic level since a coordinated

action cannot be built without a shared understanding of the problem at hand.

During this phase, the staff continues to analyse the operational environment (steps 2 and 3 as

defined above: identification of actors on the ground, balance of powers, population management or

control mechanism, impact of theatre factors, etc.) and to identify the constraints and opportunities this

operational environment represents for the irregular adversary, the host nation and the forces

deployed in theatre. Here again, the dynamics identified allow further definition or refinement of the

situation indicators.



28

Throughout the mission specific analysis, mentioned in paragraph 3.1.2., the military staff makes

assumptions that will constitute the fundamental basis for the campaign design, then the operational

plan. Some of these assumptions, as described above, are directly derived from the hypotheses

developed during the preparation of the operational environmental and need to be substantiated to the

extent possible by situation indicators.

After a specific analysis of the mission, comes the elaboration of the campaign design. Thiscampaign design sets the operational objectives to be reached, the decisive conditions to be achieved

and the effects to be created in order to achieve these objectives; along the lines of efforts, which are,

typically in a comprehensive approach, security, governance, basic services and economic

development.

It is highly recommended to make explicit and clear the logics that connect actions to effects, effects to

decisive conditions and decisive conditions to objectives. These logics, or “theories of change”, serve

to underline hypotheses. That means their validity should never be taken for granted insofar as

between action and desired effect may exist imperceptible and unforeseeable shifts that take place

and alter the relation. The approach of explaining these logical connections should at least enable the

identification, if not the isolation, of undesired effects. It is also relevant to bring up the temporal and

geographical dimensions (national, regional, local scale) of these theories of change.

The campaign design is inevitably affected by the plans of each civilian actor independently involved

in the different lines of effort, most significantly in UN missions. It is also affected by the host nation’s

plans if the host nation still sufficiently robust to be able to implement structured actions. Conversely,

the campaign design can also be affected by the non-existence or weakness of civilian actors’ plans

within a region or at time that would request the contribution of the armed forces. Therefore, the

participation and contribution of all actors is necessary and should be actively sought.

The most relevant MoE are identified from this reflection on the campaign design. They should reveal

the achievement of objectives, decisive conditions and effects (see method Para. 3.1.7). Some

indicators may also be extracted from the civilian actors’ assessment framework.

3.1.5 Concept of operation development

During this phase, the following elements are defined:

• New situation indicators: by analysing the opposing forces’ courses of action, it is possible tospot dynamic elements that will lead to the identification of situation indicators. These indicatorscan then be used to measure the execution – and therefore as warning signals – of actions bythe opposing forces.

• Measures of performance: these indicators measure the accomplishment of the armed forcesthroughout the execution of essential tasks aimed at creating effects needed to fulfil essentialconditions of the campaign design

16. Tasks are essentially attributed to components of the

Force; therefore, the measure of performance, in principle, will apply to the tactical level. The

only tasks measured by the operational level will be those that pertain to this particular level.

3.1.6 Operation plan development

The “Assessment” Annex of the campaign plan is developed during this phase. It is comprised of:

• The organization of the assessment function and the tasking of the personnel in charge ofimplementing it;

• The Force Commander’s assessment plan (see model at Annex 1), that is the collection of allindicators and for each of them:

16 The tasks listed in the campaign design can be excessively general and MoPs are relevant only if they refer to detailed actions within a

given area and a given time; this explains why MoPs are more useful during the concept of operation elaboration’s phase. The selected

mode of actions organize precisely the actions to be led within a given area and timeline, as opposed to the orientation phase.



29

- A clear definition of the indicator;

- The topic it refers to (that is, for instance, to give the element of situation in the case of asituation indicator, the measure of success, the essential condition of the effect for a MoE, thetask for a MoP);

- The frequency with which it is to be observed and reported on;

- A brief explanation of the rationale behind the selection of the indicator regarding the topicthat must be revealed;

- The area of observation;

- The source that is in charge of making the observation;

- The briefing format.

During the development of the assessment plan, potential redundancies among situation indicators(defined during operational environment analysis), and the MoEs (defined during the campaign designconstruction) should be deconflicted.

The assessment plan is a living document that is up-dated along each assessment cycle. It orientates

an important share of the situation monitoring and the one-off information collection undertaken duringthe assessment process.

3.1.73.1.73.1.73.1.7 Method andMethod andMethod andMethod and r rr recommendationecommendationecommendationecommendationssss for the definitionfor the definitionfor the definitionfor the definition of iof iof iof indicandicandicandicatorstorstorstors

The definition of situation indicators and measures of effectiveness can proceed as follows:

• Identify, via brainstorming, an initial set of factors that are deemed to reveal evolution or progressfor each object to be assessed: the operational situation, objectives, decisive conditions, effects,etc. These indicators can either be quantitative or qualitative measures. In this respect, reality onthe ground calls for caution with regard to indicators relying on opinion polls, which are used tocollate population perceptions; using indicators that focus on the population’s actions and activitiesseem to be more relevant and reliable.

• Ensure that indicators reveal nothing but the object it should be revealing; otherwise, the indicatorshould be re-defined or reformulated, so as to avoid any confusion.

• Describe the indicator so as to prevent any ambiguity in the understanding.

• Once the indicator is characterized, an analysis should be conducted by a multidisciplinary teamregarding the ability to observe this indicator based on the means of information collectionavailable within the Force and partners. An indicator that demands information that is very difficultor costly to obtain should be disregarded. Precisions should also be given regarding theoccurrence of the effort to be made in order to monitor the situation: is it permanent or demandingone-off efforts?

• The frequency with which the indicator should be updated and the area of monitoring should thenbe fixed. Special attention must to be paid to the conclusions drawn from variations in time and

space. For instance, the time-lag between an action and the effect it is supposed to produce.

• Once agreed to, the list of indicators should be organized into a hierarchy so as to prioritisecollection efforts. The priority list must be derived from the campaign design, which articulates theeffects and the distinct decisive conditions to be attained over time.

• The workload entailed by this observation should then be appropriately apportioned amongrelevant staffs and branches, and even among civilian actors when if they agree to contribute.They should identify sensors and the most adapted mode of collection strategy taking into accountthe area to be observed. A wide number of indicators fall naturally into the intelligence domain andshould be included in the intelligence collection plan. Others may call on databases external to theForce and can be retrieved by liaison detachment by the host nation and other organizations.However, given the lack of guarantee in the perennial and objective nature of this data collection,the assessment should not depend too heavily on them.

Indicators should be reasonably limited in number so as to be adapted to collection capabilities and beregularly followed without representing an extra burden.



30

A similar method could be applied to the definition of MoPs, despite the fact that their determination ismuch easier. This is explained by the fact that the relation between an action and its execution isdeterministic and the aptitude to observe it is obvious.

Indicators should be developed based on the following characteristics:

- They can be objective (based on an observation) or subjective (based on perceptions andopinions).

- They can be qualitative (countable) or qualitative (uncountable, phenomenon such as changes inactions, behaviour, or estimated value scales), according to a given context. There is no reason toprefer one over the other. A quantitative indicator does not offer, in itself, a more objectiveevaluation and is not easier to deal with or interpret. The use of both quantitative and qualitativeindicators is useful to compensate for potential biases.

- They must imperatively be observable.

- They can be punctual (be retrieved on a one-off basis) or, on the contrary, useful all along theengagement of the armed forces.

- They need to remain simple. A permanent simplification effort must be made and supported by

staff officers. One single significant and specific indicator, checked regularly, is more useful than arange of heavy and constraining indicators that would be too numerous to feed and wouldrepresent a burden to analyse. They would defeat the interest of this approach.

- They need to be relevant with regard to the local context.

- They need to be explicit. This means that the format of the indicators must be as clear as possibleand be accompanied by a concise explanation describing what they aim to demonstrate, in orderto avoid any ambiguities that could generate false conclusions. Similarly, the sensor or source (theperson in charge of recovering data) should provide, for each objective measure, a contextualanalysis in order to explain the relevance of the indicator with regard to the conjuncture.

Examples:

One decisive condition in the campaign design is: “this province has reached a level of securitythat is compatible with the execution of long term development activities ”. The associated MoE

could be as follows:- The number of insurgents attacks on this given district- The feeling of security of its inhabitants- The number of NGO deployed on the ground in the province.

One of the effects associated to this condition being that “the police forces exercise progressively,on a given timeline (month), an effective and lasting footprint in the province going from onedistrict to the others” . The MoEs measuring these footprints could be formulated as follows:- The number of policemen (police officers) deployed in a given district at a given time- The freedom of action of policemen deployed in their mission and in their personal movements- The number and type of actions which are led by policemen.

However, in practice, one may realise that the last MoE formulated is irrelevant as the policemencan be deployed without noticeable effects, and the actions identified and enumerated are notgood indicators as far as there is no culture of briefing/debriefing in the context under scrutiny.

During the updating of the preparation of the operational environment, a few elements allow tonotice that following the deployment of troops by the Force in the region, the insurgents organizedso far in companies, split in small groups among the population. One situation indicator couldbe:- The number of important ambushes led in rural areas;

- The number of harassing attacks led by groups.



31

3.2 The assessment process during the conduct of operations

Assessment serves to highlight which trends, some of which are hardly perceptible, could generate

risks and opportunities for action, with regard the fragile equilibrium of the operational environment.

During the engagement, assessment rests on two complementary cycles:

• Monitoring, which supports the conduct of the action at operational level;

• Evaluation, which facilitates the understanding of the operation in its global context and supportsthe planning process in the medium and long term.

MONITORING

RAW

EVALUATION

DATA COLLECTION

FEEDBACKS

s i t u a t i on

i n d i c a t or s

M OE

M OP

Evaluation

of the Situation

per se

Evaluation of the

Campaign design

progression

Evaluation of the

course of action

progression

Present situation Perspectives

Engagement Evaluation

Communication

strategy

Capabilities, Recommendations,

organization, planning

NET

EVALUATION

Assess.From IO

Assess.

From

the host

nation

Infos IO

Info host nation

One-off

collection

Fig. 8 Assessment process

3.2.1 Monitoring

Monitoring consists in collecting and analysing data and information that are given by variouscollection and analysis channels and operational information briefs ( “-REP”-type messages fromlower-level units, synthesized by ASSESSREPS and, in the intelligence field, INTSUM messages) and

also by field investigations and reports as well as the exchanges with host nation authorities andcivilian agencies. These pieces of information are used to keep updated vision of the operationalsituation.

Such follow-up is naturally carried out principally by subordinate units on the ground; it may also bedone at the operational level for all activities pertaining to it. It is orientated by the assessment plan.

3.2.2 Assessment cycles

There are two categories of assessment cycles:

At campaign level: the campaign assessment aims primarily to orientate operation planning or thenext phases of the operation and to verify the relevance of the campaign plan by proposing

adjustments if need be. Occurring once every several months, it should mark the end of a phase withinthe on-going operation. It looks at the achievement on the whole of the campaign plan’s objectives,and draws from the analysis of the indicators and measures.



32

At the level of an ongoing operation, the operational assessment aims primarily to validate and re-

orientate the conduct of on-going operations. Occurring once every several weeks, it focuses morespecifically on the attainment of decisive points and conditions of the various lines of operations. Itdelivers recommendations regarding possible changes to orders or regarding the necessity of initiatingnew planning, to adapt to new circumstances and improve the efficiency of the armed forces’ action.

Both assessment types deliver the same capacity to provide an understanding of the current situation.

3.2.3 Assessment method during the conduct of operations

Whatever is the assessment cycle it follows a 5 phase method:

- Assessment orientation

- Information collection effort

- Raw evaluation of the engagement

- Net evaluation of the engagement

- Conclusion and recommendations

• Assessment orientation. In addition to the orientation that concludes the previous cycle, aspecific orientation may be provided by the Force Commander to start the on-going assessmentcycle. This leads a re-weighing or a re-definition of the indicators in the assessment plan,depending on the priorities established and on the evolution of the situation, as presented by thesituation monitoring products; (some indicators could indeed become irrelevant or impossible tocollect as a result of a lack of means to measure them: for instance, measuring the number ofNGOs present in an area to measure its level of security becomes irrelevant if a human disasterforces them to enter his area regardless of the danger; the measure of the armed forces’ activitiesbecomes useless if the contingent in charge of retrieving them is discharged unexpectedly).

• Information collection effort. It may be necessary to complement the collection effort by specificinformation requirements to fill missing indicators. In particular some data needs to come from

actors external to the Force.

The information collection channels need to be accurately defined to avoid redundancy which cancause bias in analysis. The intelligence services’ method of sources inventory and informationgrading applies.

• Raw evaluation of engagement. It is based on three distinct evaluations carried outsimultaneously :

- The evaluation of the situation per se, which analyses the operational environment;

- The evaluation of the campaign progression, which analyses the achievement of effects,decisive conditions and objectives;

- The evaluation of the progression of the course of action, which analyses the fulfilment ofessential tasks.

These various analyses are based on trends shown by indicators. The definition of thresholds canbe useful, but only in the case of an evaluation of campaign progression, to represent grossresults with colour codes. The establishment of thresholds is done arbitrarily; they should notnormally be sufficient to indicate the attainment or not of an objective or a decisive condition.These thresholds are not unchanging; however they must be agreed on by the command group.

Indicators having been chosen according to their sensitivity to change, one expects to observephenomenon variations within space and time over a period covering an assessment cycle.Working out averages across the entire space and time should avoid hiding peaks and breakingpoints.



33

- Evaluation of the situation per se. It is an evaluation of the operational environment, based

on the situation indicators, the monitoring feedbacks and the specific information collectiongathered prior to the evaluation. This evaluation of the situation per se follows the proceduredeveloped above for the preparation of the operational environment, using updated data onthe host nation, the irregular adversary’s constituting elements, its strategy and its interactionwith the components of the theatre. This assessment must include a holistic analysis of

interactions between the irregular adversary and the theatre components on one hand and theForce and civilian actors on the other. The perception of civilian actors by the irregularadversary should also be included. This evaluation must enable:

• To validate or invalidate the hypotheses previously formulated and readjust them ifneeded or formulate new ones taking into account dynamics, antagonisms and cleavages.

• To identify new trends to monitor and new risks and uncertainties to watch for.

• To identify new situation indicators to be followed and formulate new presuppositions tobe used for planning.

- Evaluation of the campaign design progression. This consists in analysing the informationgathered corresponding to the MoE, and then to analyse and synthesize the progresses

towards achievement of each effect, decisive condition and objective. Once this has beendone, partial conclusions for each line of operations or line of effort can be formulated. Theformat chosen to present the results of the analysis can include charts or cards, but forpedagogic purposes and easy visualisation it may adopt the graphics used in campaigndesign, labelled with colour codes. Finally and most importantly, the purpose of this effort is tosynthesize the various partial conclusions and to evaluate to what extent the theories ofchange on which the campaign design relies are or are not in the process of being completed.

- Evaluation of the course of action progression. This relates to the Force’s directachievements resulting from tasks and instructions contained in the campaign plan (or,depending on the type of assessment cycle, the operation plan). To start with, an evaluation ofthe accomplishment of tasks is drawn from an analysis of monitoring feedback and other datacorresponding to MoPs. Secondly, an evaluation must be made regarding the suitability of the

assigned tasks compared to dedicated operational capabilities. This evaluation is conductedat the tactical level of command, the tasks being essentially executed by the Force tacticalcomponents, and then synthesized at the operational level.

- The evaluations realised by civilian actors and the host nation should be taken into

account as much as possible in order to give a complete and coherent vision of thestabilisation system in which the Force’s actions take place.

• The net evaluation of the engagement. This consists in confronting the results of the precedingevaluations in order to identify possible causal relationships among them and to better understandthe engagement’s logic. It represents an intellectually demanding phase. It has two distinct parts:

- The evaluation of the current situation. First, the evaluation of the campaign design

progression is confronted with the evaluation of the situation per se (each synthesis of theevaluation of the campaign design, or even each partial conclusion developed for the variouslines of effort, is cross examined with each aspect of the preparation of the operationalenvironment) in order to highlight the elements that led to the success or failure in therealisation of objectives. This confrontation allows the revelation of second order effects orexternal causes that could explain the direction taken by the campaign. The purpose is tounderstand and explain why the strategy being carried out is leading or not to the expectedresults. For example: MoEs indicate a slow or inexistent progress of the security situation inmost areas, apart from a neighbouring area, where desired effects are reached with anequivalent level of efforts. The confrontation with the evaluation of the situation per se showsthat in this particular area, irregular adversaries are confronted with a growing resistance fromlocal political actors who undermine their strategy.

In the second place, this analysis is cross examined with the evaluation of the Force’sfulfilment of its courses of action in order to determine to what extent the Force and civilianactors’ actions have influenced the situation’s evolution and altered the irregular adversaries



34

(or reinforced them through counterproductive effects such as collateral damages,inappropriate behaviour, etc.). This analysis, inductive by nature, can consist in determiningthe probable effects, both direct and indirect, of the actions of the Force and of civilian actors,and then confronting them with the results obtained from the analysis of the situation per se.

Then, after a reverse analysis, evaluate to what extent the operational situation constrained or

helped the execution of tasks of the course of action. Using the example mentioned above:this second analysis seems to demonstrate that the achievement of desired effects in the areacan result from a programme implemented by the Force and civilian actors, which wasaccepted by local political actors.

- Perspectives for the engagement. This is about deducing, for the present situation, theopportunities, constraints and risks deriving from the current circumstances (normallyidentified and analysed during the update of the preparation of the operational environment),for the execution of the campaign design, the course of action and the activities of the otheractors engaged

17. The ability or the inability to conduct actions or produce effects, connected

to designated objectives, serves to identify the scope of feasibility. From these doable actions,branch plans can be refined and then considered or the campaign plan can be updated by adefinition of new hypotheses.

• Formulation of conclusions and recommendations; This phase is the culminating point of the

evaluation cycle. The evaluation conclusions must allow a judgement on:

- The relevance of the campaign design (“what we want to achieve” ) and the logics that

underpin it (theories of change) or on the contrary the adjustments that must be made.

- The relevance of the course of action (“what we do” ) or the need for a contingency plan suchas a sequel or a branch plan.

- The appropriateness of operational capabilities with regard to the situation and the state ofcampaign progress as well as the proper distribution of efforts.

The evaluation must be concluded with explicit recommendations on:

- The capability efforts to consent to,

- The organizational adjustments to bring,

- The reach and nature of FRAGO,

- The complementary planning to undertake,

- And finally: modifications on indicators.

Some recommendations can be proposed as lessons learned, to improve the operationalpreparation of relieving troops.

Feedback on synthesis and decisions made must be given to all involved parties who take part inthe evaluation process.

17 A SWOT (Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) applies to the force, its partners and irregular adversaries could be conducted.



35

Evaluation of

the situation per se

Analyze of the dynamics in:

• Composition of entities

• Theater drivers

• Interactions btw entities & drivers• Entities’ strategies

Evaluation of

the campaign design progressionAnalyze of the attainment of effects, decisiveconditions and given objectives:

• analyze of MoE

• synthesis by effect or decisive conditionor line of operation or objective

• inclusion of host nation and IO/NGO

assessments

Evaluation of

the course of action progression

Analysis and synthesis of:

• tasks execution via reports

(ASSESSREP, …), even MoP

• appropriateness of operationalcapabilities

RAW EVALUATION

NET EVALUATION

Evaluation of

the

current situation

Engagementperspectives

. Understanding of the operating situation and the progression of the engagement:systems by effect or decisive condition or etc. VS analysis of dynamics

. Analysis of the mutual influences:

execution of the course of action and IO/NGO activities VS operational situation

• Analyze of constraints & opportunities of the current situation

for the pursuit of the campaign design and the course of action and IO/NGO activities

• Risk analysis: census , analysis and weighting of possible impacts

• Do campaign design and theories of change remain relevant?

• Coherence of the course of action with IO/NGO and host nation activities? Realism with regard to the situation?

• Can own course of action manage potential risks?

• Are the capabilities appropriate?

CONCLUSIONS

Fig. 9 Raw and net evaluations

3.2.4 Evaluation products

Communication and feedback as material or immaterial support to the evaluation:

• Feedback; The conclusions of the evaluation will be contained in the feedback addressed tomilitary authorities and political leaders. Depending on the hierarchical level they account to, theprecisions of this feedback will vary. An explanation can be given on the analysis leading to the

situation evaluation.

• Institutional communication: Whether it is formal or not, it must conform to the communicationstrategy opted for and validated by the highest authorities, to include dissemination, productions,messages and targeted audiences. This institutional communication must be clear and coherent.Its conclusions are validated by the Force Commander and accessible at all time.

• Theatre Communication; The Force is probably the most structured element present on thetheatre of operations and the only one able to conduct a detailed operational analysis. Byfacilitating access to these operational analyses, it participates in developing mutualunderstanding. The reports and briefs to be distributed are based on conclusions and elementscontained in the synthesis analyses. Therefore they have the same dissemination frequency.However, there is no reason to publish the pieces of information that pertain to the internalfunctioning of the force outside the hierarchical chain.

• Communication support; They can be either written or non-written (physical or not)

- A written communication is the principal vehicle to communicate with other levels ofcommand and other actors. The content is adapted to the message to be communicated and,when appropriate, to restrictions over the release of operational information. Althoughoriginally literal, the content should be illustrated by charts and figures. On the other hand, achart illustrating the realisation of effects and decisive conditions cannot explain fully elementssuch as the mechanisms that allow the engaged Forces to reach their objectives or not.Therefore, in these cases, causality and influence diagrams can be relevant.

- A briefing completes the written communication. It can easily contain charts and figures andcan be accompanied by a power point presentation.

- A knowledge database. All the elements developed within the framework of an evaluationmust be integrated within a knowledge database, accessible depending on the need to haveaccess to specific pieces of information.



36

Chapter

4PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION OF THE ASSESSMENT FUNCTION

4The practical organization of assessment varies according to various factors such as the organizationof command and control or the extent to which it interacts with civil organizations. The principlesoffered in this chapter are neither absolute, nor specific to a particular type of conflict. Rather, they aredrawn from the analysis method presented in chapter 3.

Decisions regarding organization, like process, must be guided by good sense and simplicity.

4.1 The assessment function within the Force HQ

The assessment function covers the personnel and organizations involved, partly or wholly, in the

process leading to the assessment of the engagement. At Force HQ level, it rests on the Assessment

Cell and on the Assessment Working Group.

The assessment function begins with campaign planning, which is undertaken by the joint operational

planning group (JOPG). As mentioned previously, assessment planning stems from operational

planning. Thus, the assessment cell, which is the heart of the assessment function, must be merged

into the JOPG. In other words, the JOPG should encompass what becomes the core of the

assessment function during the execution phase.

4.1.1 Assessment Cell

It is the permanent component of the assessment function, composed of personnel exclusively

assigned to assessment. It is responsible for:

• developing and updating the assessment plan;

• coordinating the efforts of the different individuals and functional areas involved in assessment;

• as required, developing assessments ;

• managing, from a methodology standpoint, the Assessment Working Group;

• integrating productions.

4.1.2 Assessment Working Group

It is both a permanent network of experts, through which information and knowledge are exchanged,and the analysis group which carries out assessment up to completion. It consists of at least:

• the Force Commander or chief of staff, in the final phase;

• the civilian representative18

;

• the Assessment Cell ;

• functional experts (from staff sections);

• component commanders or their representatives;

•

civilian agencies’ and host nation government’s representatives and experts

18 See further



37

It convenes:

• In the planning phase, to develop the assessment plan and ensure that it is properly understood;

• to carry out the net evaluation of the engagement, based on the various evaluations provided bythe intelligence branch and the Assessment Cell. Meetings consist in exploring all tracks openedin the confrontation of raw evaluations. Dialogue should be as open and frank as possible, in view

of raising noteworthy points and outlooks, as per the indications contained in chapter 3. The ForceCommander or his chief of staff joins and directly contributes to this crucial, intellectual phase; it iswarmly recommended to directly involve the Force Commander in debates with experts.

The preparation of the sessions and the handling of meetings is the Assessment Cell’s responsibility.Following a session, the Assessment Cell prepares a draft synthesis, returned to the AssessmentWorking Group members for proofreading and, once finalized, to the Command Group for approval.The structure of this synthesis would depend on the Force Commander needs, but should at leastinclude:

• reminder of the Force Commander’s guidance;

• a perspective of the assessment according to the campaign plan;

• risks, opportunities and recommendations;

• principal interventions on key points, to keep synthesis as objective as possible and the lessfiltered out. Residual differences of views and tricky dialogue with third parties shall be mentioned.

• Formal validation of the decisions taken or to be taken, including on external dissemination of theresults.

Compilation of the decisions taken is disseminated for internal needs.

4.1.3 Multidisciplinary Groups for evaluations

Staff branches naturally contribute within the assessment working group to the assessment effort,each in their domain, by: contributing to monitoring; following-up on indicators; and building their ownpart of the assessment.

The assessment working group may be split across three multidisciplinary groups to carry out rawevaluations, as per Para. 3.2.2.:

- one group devoted to the evaluation of the completion of course of action, steered by the OPSbranch,

- one group to evaluate the progress of the campaign design, steered by the PLANS branch,

- one group to evaluate the situation, run by the INTEL branch.

4.1.4 Experts

The quality of assessment is largely dependant on the various experts, who are the only ones really

capable of determining the relative importance of each situation indicator, and therefore of correctlyinterpreting the whole situation. Three types of expertise are necessary:

• An expertise of the area, consisting of knowledge of the theatre, to include the political and socialstructures, the populations, their sociology, cultures, language, etc. This expertise is generallyheld by military or non-military personnel who have operated in the country for a number of years.

• Expertise in civilian organizations (non-governmental and international organizations and hostnations’ institutions). This expertise should lie amongst civilian actors who have been involved inUnited Nations peace operations.

• Expertise in conflict dynamics, particularly in irregular wars. It cannot be acquired without thoroughstudies (which military education should give due care). Such experts, should they exist, are notnecessarily deployed, but they should be identified.



38

The scarcity of experts generally precludes assigning one permanently to a single function, but ratheradvocates for the centralization of this resource (which moreover limits the risks of circular reportingand generic meaningless products).

Additionally, staff must seek external expertise, locally hired and/or resulting from a partnership withcivilian agencies in place, to augment HQ analysis capacity, especially if experts are few, and also to

counterbalance institutional, rather conformist staff ( phenomenon of group thinking ).

The need for this expertise must be clearly identified during the planning process and required duringforce generation.

4.2 Relationships with other levels of command19

4.2.1 Relationships with the strategic level of command

Understanding the operational environment is a bottom-up effort, with standpoints and perspectivesbecoming increasingly broad as they reach higher levels. A strategic command has its ownassessment process, which seeks to identify campaign progress towards its own strategic objectives

and effects. Assessment at the strategic level is for the most part fed by the Force Commander’sassessment, which constitutes its central piece. The strategic assessment cycle is reliant andtherefore synchronized with the Force Commander’s.

Strengthened by a rigorous assessment of the engagement, the Force Commander may call forchanges regarding the strategy, the Force list, the rules of engagement and behaviour, etc. Strategicdecisions are partly oriented and constructed upon the Force Commander’s assessment.

The Strategic Commander supports the Force Commander’s assessment by providing him withinformation on his area of interest

20 and by assigning him experts in strategic military intelligence.

4.2.2 Relationships with the tactical level of command

Tactical commanders conduct assessments at their level in their area of responsibility, where theyexecute prescribed tasks corresponding to the selected course of action, as per the plan.

Irregular organizations’ territorial footprints vary according to force factors and display unevenness.Decentralization of assessment allows capturing local trends and emerging meanings. Thus TacticalCommanders contribute to Force Commander’s situational understanding by:

• monitoring;

• providing him with the assessments of their missions in their areas of responsibility;

• providing the complementary assessments requested by the Force Commander;

• directly participating in the Force Commander’s assessment through Assessment Working Group.

Changes observed at local level are indeed of interest and may be reflected in the theatre-level ForceCommander’s assessment; however, theatre-level dynamics are not meant to be a simple compilationof local trends.

The Force commander:

• defines the assessment plan and orients components for all assessments carried out in the jointoperations area;

• integrates and synthesizes tactical-level assessments, which contribute to his own assessment;

19 Relationships between levels of command do not rule out informal exchanges at desk level, which prepare the ground and improve

mutual understanding.20

Area is taken here in a geographic as well as in a thematic meaning.



39

• directs specific information collection and assessment efforts regarding national-level topics suchas; host nation central governance or build-up of security forces;

• as requested, directs tactical commanders assessments on specific themes of critical interest;

• provides tactical commanders with information on their area of interest.

4.3 Relationships with civilian and host-nation actors

One of the major challenges facing the Force Commander is to understand the progress of thecomprehensive campaign plan, even though he is not responsible for most effects and actionsundertaken. Thus close coordination is required with civilian actors; it is envisaged differentlydepending on whether the Force operates under the coordination of or in the absence of a HighRepresentative mandated to coordinate all efforts.

Moreover the struggle for legitimacy requires the coalition and civilian actors to support a sovereignhost nation government, which may not function or even exist anywhere but on paper. With a fake orfailed government and international stakeholders acting in a scattered manner, a comprehensiveapproach and therefore an integrated, or even a well coordinated assessment, is simply unachievable.When it is the case, one should at least consider the following levels of exchange between the

different stakeholders:

- exchange of selected raw data;

- sharing assessment plans;

- sharing assessment products.

Informal exchanges with civilian actors must be encouraged, under the “share all, withold byexception” principle, and the classification of assessment products reduced to a bare minimum.

In order to align efforts and to assess the effects of the Force contribution to lines of activities thatcome under the leadership of the host nation or of designated civilian organizations, the ForceCommander needs continuous and facilitated relationships with the host nation. The appointment of a

high ranking civilian next to the Force Commander, particularly in a coalition, deserves consideration.Such an individual heading the various civil advisors and liaison personnel, would hold all the civilianexpertise of the Force headquarters.

The modalities of how to set up of the overall articulation for assessment as well as the informationexchange architecture between the Force and civilian actors is specific to every engagement andbeyond the reach of this guide.



A N N E X

1

C A N V A S S A M P L E O F A N

A S S E S M E N T P L A N

R E L A T E D I T E

M

I N D I C A T O R S

E X P L A N A T I O N

F O L L O W - U P T I M E S P A N

A R E

A F O L L O W E D - U P

R E S P O N S I B L E

E N T I T Y

R E P O R T T Y P E

M e a s u r e s o f e f f e c t i v e n e s s

M o E s 1 . 1

F r e q u e n t i n g o f d i s t r i c t

c o u n t r y t o w n s b a z a a r s b y

r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n i n r e g i o n

Y .

I n r e g i o n Y , b a z a a r s a r e t h e p r i n c i p a l

p l a c e w h e r e m a r k e t e x c h a n g e s t a k e

p l a c e . F r e q u e n t a t i o n i n c r e a s e s h o u l d

r e v e a l a g r e a t e r f r e e d o m o f a c t i o n f o r

r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n , t h e r e b y a g r e a t e r

s e n s e o f s e c u r i t y .

T o b e l a u n c h e d a t o n c e .

R e p o r t m o n t h l y .

D i s t r i c t s A , B a n d C

T a s k F o r c e T a n g o

4 4 t h B r i g a d e

T o i n c l u d e i n

A S S E S S R E P

E f f e c t # 1 : « l e v e l

o f

s e c u r i t y i n r e g i o n Y i s

c o m p a t i b l e w i t h s t a r t i n g

u p X d e v e l o p m e n t

a c t i v i t i e s »

M o E 1 . 2

N u m b e r o f N G O w i s h i n g

t o w o r k i n r e g i o n Y

T o b e l a u n c h e d i n t w o

m o n t h s .

R e p o r t m o n t h l y .

D i s t r i c t s A , B a n d C

J 9 t h r o u g h C I M

I C

C e n t r e

I n d i c a t o r s o f s i t u

a t i o n

C a m p a i g n p l a n

a s s u m p t i o n :

« f o r r e a s o n X ,

c o m m u n i t y Z s h o u l d n o t

p o l i t i c a l l y o p p o s e

i n t h e

n e x t s i x m o n t h s »

I S 1

C a l l t o f i g h t a g a i n s t t h e

F o r c e a n d s e c u r i t y f o r c e s

w i t h i n Z c o m m u n i t y

p l a c e s o f w o r s h i p .

Z c o m m u n i t y h a s a s t r o n g r e l i g i o u s

i d e n t i t y . S e r m o n s a r e a n i n v a l u a b l e

g a u g e o f t h e p o l i t i c a l i n t e n t i o n s o f

t h e c o m m u n i t y l e a d e r s .

T o b e l a u n c h e d a t o n c e .

R e p o r t w e e k l y .

R e g i o n s A , B , C c o v e r e d

b y Z c

o m m u n i t y

J 2 ( i n c o r p o r a t e

d i n

t h e C o l l e c t i o n P l a n )

T o i n c l u d e i n

I N T S U M



Documents

JFCs Assessment of Progress Handbook