January 2016

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This newsletter is intended to provide general information and may not be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior written approval of Drew & Napier LLC. It is not intended to be a comprehensive study of the subjects covered, nor is it intended to provide legal advice. Specific advice should be sought about your specific circumstances. Drew & Napier has made all reasonable efforts to ensure the information is accurate as of 25 January 2016.

WELCOME MESSAGE

In this issue, we round up some of the major developments in the competition law world from the second half of 2015. Looking ahead into 2016, the year promises to be a busy one as nine of the ten ASEAN countries have competition laws in place and are working towards implementing these laws. In April this year, Singapore will also play host to the International Competition Network’s annual meeting, which should shine a spotlight on the important role competition law plays in this region. On 3 and 4 March this year, the Global Competition Law, Law Leaders Forum, will be held in Singapore. Promising to be a successful event, our practice head Chong Kin will be co-chairing the event this year with a confirmed list of prominent competition law panel specialists. In particular, this event will feature an ASEAN roundtable to discuss new competition law regimes in the region. The list of panel specialists will include high-level officials from the competition authorities of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand. Through co-chairing this event, we extend a discounted rate to clients who are interested in attending. We have provided event details in the flyer attached to this update. We very much encourage and look forward to welcoming on the day. For more details on the Drew & Napier Competition Law and Regulatory Practice, please click here.

IN THE NEWS: AT A

GLANCE SINGAPORE CCS clears strategic alliance between Cebu Pacific and Tigerair Singapore

On 21 September 2015, the Competition Commission of Singapore (“CCS”) announced that it had cleared the notification for a decision by Cebu Air, Inc. (“Cebu Pacific”) and Tiger Airways Singapore Pte. Ltd. (Tigerair Singapore)

In this issue

Welcome Message 1 In The News: At A Glance 1 – Singapore 1

– Around The World 2

Singapore Competition Law Watch 4 Articles & Commentaries: Updates From Around the World 4 – Regulatory Updates 4

– Anti-Competitive Agreements 8

– Abuse of Dominance 13

– Mergers 16

– Other News 16

Feature Article 17

Proposed Changes to the CCS Guidelines

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(collectively, the Parties), relating to a proposed strategic alliance between the two. For more details, please click here. CCS studies e-commerce competition policy and contemplates publicly announcing probes

On 2 December 2015, at an e-commerce seminar, the Competition Commission of Singapore (“CCS”) presented key findings from its study on the growing implications of e-commerce on competition. Results from the study highlighted certain competition issues, based on the experience of other countries, which are more likely to arise in the context of e-commerce. For more details, please click here.

AROUND THE WORLD UK Competition and Markets Authority issues guidelines on voluntary redress schemes In August 2015, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) issued a guidance document on how voluntary redress schemes for infringements of competition law (i.e. a process where those affected by the infringement will be able to claim compensation through a redress scheme without having to go to court) can be approved by the CMA and other relevant regulators. For further details, please click here. US Federal Trade Commission issues guidance on section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act In August 2015, the US Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) released a guidance statement (“Guidance Statement”) on its enforcement principles regarding unfair methods of competition under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”). For further details, please click here. MOFCOM streamlines merger review procedures China’s Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) has introduced internal changes to streamline its merger review procedures. Changes will take effect from 15 September 2015. For further details, please click here.

Indonesian Economic Ministry directs Competition Regulator to assess industry structures The Indonesian competition regulator, the Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition (“KPPU”), has been tasked by the Ministry of Economic Coordination (“MEC”) to analyse industry structures, and in particular, industries which directly impact the general public. For further details, please click here. Hong Kong Competition Commission publishes enforcement and cartel leniency policies On 19 November 2015, the Hong Kong Competition Commission (“HKCC”) published its Enforcement Policy and Cartel Leniency Policy (“Cartel Leniency Policy”) under the Competition Ordinance (Cap. 619) (the “Ordinance”). This publication is issued in the lead-up to the full commencement of the Ordinance on 14 December 2015. For further details, please click here. ACCC loses two price-fixing appeals on the same day On 31 July 2015, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (“Full Court”) overturned two separate price-fixing appeals brought by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (“ACCC”) against travel agency Flight Centre Travel Group Limited (“Flight Centre”) and Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (“ANZ”). In both cases, the court held that price-fixing could not be established as the allegedly infringing companies did not compete in the same market. For more details, please click here. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission conditionally clears Qantas and China Eastern coordination In August 2015, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (“ACCC”) conditionally approved a joint coordination agreement (“Coordination Agreement”) between Qantas and China Eastern to coordinate their operations between Australia and China. For more details, please click here. Air cargo cartels in India and the UK Two distinct cases involving air cargo cartels and their surcharge rates have been decided in India and the UK. For further details, please click here.

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Japanese ball bearing manufacturer fined in Korea On 30 October 2015, the Seoul Central District Court issued a ruling sentencing Japanese ball bearing manufacturer Minebea Co., Ltd. (“Minebea”), and its Korean sales subsidiary, NMB Korea Co., Ltd. (“NMB Korea”), to fines of 100 million Won (approximately S$ 122,000) and 70 million Won (approximately S$ 85,000) respectively, for the violation of the Korea Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. For further details, please click here. South African High Court confirms rejection of leniency application from Allens Meshco Group On 5 November 2015, the Competition Commission of South Africa’s (“CCSA”) rejection of an immunity application from Allens Meshco Group (“AMG”), a group of metal wire suppliers, was upheld by South Africa’s High Court. For further details, please click here. Former Rabobank traders convicted in US Libor trial On 5 November 2015, two former Rabobank traders were convicted in a Manhattan district court for their involvement in the manipulation of submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”).For further details, please click here. CCI orders distributor association to cease anti-competitive conduct On 12 December 2015, the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) held that the Sonipat Distributor Association (“SDA”) had contravened section 3(1) of the Indian Competition Act, 2002. For more details, please click here. Australia fines Visa $18m for misusing its market power On 4 September 2015, the Federal Court of Australia (“Federal Court”) determined that Visa Worldwide Pte Ltd (“Visa Worldwide”) had misused its market power to prevent the expansion of a rival currency conversion service, imposing a fine of A$18 million (S$18.3 million). For more details, please click here.

Russia finds Google abused Android dominance On 14 September 2015, Russia’s Federal Antimonopoly Service (“FAS”) announced its finding that Google Inc. and Google Ireland Ltd. (collectively referred to as “Google”) , in violation of part 1, article 10 of the Russian Federal Law on Protection of Competition, had abused its dominant position in the market for pre-installed applications on devices running the Android operating system (“OS”). For more details, please click here. European Commission clears Intel and Altera merger On 14 October 2015, the European Commission (“EC”) announced, through a press release, its clearance of the acquisition of Altera by Intel. For more details, please click here.

FEATURE ARTICLE CCS consults on proposed changes to its Guidelines

In late 2015, the Competition Commission of Singapore (“CCS”) initiated a public consultation in respect of proposed changes to its various guidelines. The proposed changes include the introduction of a new fast track regime and various amendments on the existing approach to the enforcement of competition law in Singapore. We have outlined some of these key changes. For more details, please click here.

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SINGAPORE COMPETITION LAW WATCH

Table 1: Singapore Competition Law Watch Scoreboard (Accurate as at 25 Jan 2016)

ARTICLES & COMMENTARIES: UPDATES FROM AROUND THE WORLD REGULATORY UPDATES UK Competition and Markets Authority issues guidelines on voluntary redress schemes In August 2015, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) issued a guidance document (“Guidance Document”) on how voluntary redress schemes for infringements of competition law can be approved by the CMA and other relevant regulators (collectively, “Regulator”). The Guidance Document follows amendments to the Competition Act 1998, which now allows a person who has infringed competition laws to submit a voluntary redress scheme for the Regulator’s approval. In certain circumstances, infringers can receive a discount of up to a maximum of 20% on the penalty imposed by the Regulator. Those affected by the infringement can also claim compensation through the scheme without having to go to court. However, the availability of the scheme does not prevent persons who have been harmed by a competition law infringement from seeking recourse in other forms e.g. by bringing follow-on private action against the infringers. The redress schemes can

only be approved if they are related to decisions issued by the Regulator or the European Commission (e.g. in relation to a breach of the prohibition against anti-competitive agreements or abuse of a dominant position). The Guidance Document provides that an application for approval of a voluntary redress schemecan be submitted to the Regulator either during the course of an on-going investigation or after the Regulator or European Commission has issued an infringement decision. However, the voluntary redress scheme can only be approved at the time, or after, the relevant infringement decision is issued. The Guidance Document further notes that the voluntary redress scheme must be devised in accordance with the process, information and terms required in the Competition Act 1998 (Redress Scheme) (“Redress Regulations”) in order for it to be approved by the Regulator. Conditional approval by the Regulator of an outline of the voluntary redress scheme is possible even if the Redress Regulations has not been fully complied with. To qualify for this conditional approval, the applicant must furnish the Regulator with information about when and how the voluntary redress scheme will fully comply with the Redress Regulations. The Regulator may impose conditions as part of such conditional approval, for example, by requiring the applicant to comply with the Redress Regulations or to provide further information about the voluntary redress scheme by a particular date. The conditional approval can be revoked if the conditions are not met. The Guidance Document may be accessed here. In Singapore: The Singapore competition law framework does not currently provide for a process where infringers may propose voluntary redress schemes as a way of minimising their liabilities relating to an infringement of competition law. Section 86 of the Competition Act (Cap. 50B) allows individuals who have suffered loss directly as a result of an infringement of the Competition Act to bring follow-on private actions. US Federal Trade Commission issues guidance on section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act In August 2015, the US Federal Trade

Score Board

Number Status

Concluded Pending

Notified Agreements or Conduct

15 14 1

Notified Mergers or Anticipated Mergers

53 51 2

Infringement Decisions 11 10 1

Appeals 11 10 1

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Commission (“FTC”) released a guidance statement (“Guidance Statement”) on its enforcement principles regarding unfair methods of competition under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”). Section 5 of the FCT Act prohibits “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”. The section, and the correct enforcement approach under it, has always remained somewhat unclear and vague. The prohibition on “unfair methods of competition” was intentionally worded broadly by Congress, to give the FTC the authority to apply the provision flexibly, on a case-by-case basis. Since the enactment of the FTC Act more than 100 years ago, the FTC has not issued any guidance on how it would enforce section 5 of the FTC Act. There has reportedly been pressure for the FTC to issue some guidance to provide clarity to businesses and lawyers on how the section should be used. The Guidance Statement now explicitly sets out the principles under which the FTC will enforce section 5 of the FTC Act. Specifically, it clarifies that the ban on “unfair methods of competition” encompasses not only acts and practices that violate the Sherman or Clayton Act, but also those acts and practices that contravene the spirit of the antitrust laws as well as those that, if allowed to mature or complete, could violate the Sherman or Clayton Act. The FTC also sets out three principles that it would adopt when deciding whether to challenge a specific conduct to be an unfair method of competition in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act: (a) the FTC will be guided by the public policy

underlying the antitrust laws (i.e. the promotion of consumer welfare);

(b) the conduct will be evaluated under a framework similar to the rule of reason (i.e. the conduct in question must cause, or be likely to cause, harm to competition or the competitive process, taking into account any associated cognisable efficiencies and business justifications); and

(c) the FTC is less likely to challenge a conduct

as an unfair method of competition on a standalone basis (i.e. only under section 5 of the FTC Act), if enforcement of the Sherman

or Clayton Act is sufficient to address the competitive harm arising from the conduct.

FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez noted that the Guidance Statement makes explicit the approach that the FTC had previously adopted in enforcing section 5 of the FTC Act, and that the Guidance Statement does not indicate any change of course in its enforcement practices and priorities. The Guidance Statement may be accessed here. In Singapore: The Competition Act (Cap. 50B) does not expressly prohibit “unfair methods of competition”. Instead, it is concerned with conduct that would, for example, prevent, restrict or distort competition in Singapore (section 34 of the Competition Act). However, other laws may provide some form of protection against unfair methods and practices. For example, the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act (Cap. 52A) (“CPFTA”) protects consumers against “unfair practices”, which includes practices that deceive or mislead consumers, or that involve making false claims. MOFCOM streamlines merger review procedures China’s Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) has introduced internal changes to streamline its merger review procedures. These changes will take effect from 15 September 2015. Prior to these changes, merger notifications were sent to the Consultation division of the Anti-Monopoly Bureau (“AMB”), which was in charge of pre-filing consultation and pre-review (also known as formality review), before case initiation. After the case was accepted for review by the consultation division, it was passed to either the legal or economics case-handling divisions for substantial review. According to the director general of the AMB, there were complaints received that the previous pre-review consultation period, a period lasting 40 to 50 days before a case is accepted for review, was too long. Additionally, he noted that, as lawyers became increasingly familiar with the merger filing system, MOFCOM had been receiving fewer consultation requests, while at the same time facing more pressure to clear substantial reviews.

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The new rules abolish the pre-review system and restructure the consultation division, which has since assumed a new function as the third case-handling devision. All three divisions are now responsible for both pre-review and substantive merger review. To encourage sector-specific experience and expertise, each division is responsible for specific industries and is tasked to examine all merger filings within the particular sector. Accordingly, the new regime allows MOFCOM to dedicate more resources to case reviews, by having consultation officials to handle cases as well. The new regime now allows companies to consult after a case is initiated, although companies may still submit requests, through a different procedure, for consultation prior to merger notifications. In addition, MOFCOM has also streamlined its merger filing content requirements and revised its case notification forms and software. The amendments are yet another demonstration of MOFCOM’s commitment to expediting the merger review process. In 2014, MOFCOM introduced a “fast-track” review procedure for “simple cases” that do not raise competition concerns in China. According to the director general of the AMB, 65-70% of cases are now handled under the simplified procedure, which has significantly improved the efficiency of MOFCOM’s merger review process. Indonesian Economic Ministry directs Competition Regulator to assess industry structures The Indonesian competition regulator, the Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition (“KPPU”), has been tasked by the Ministry of Economic Coordination (“MEC”) to analyse industry structures, and in particular, industries which directly impact the general public. This is a step towards enabling and facilitating the government to devise effective and appropriate policies to overcome inefficiencies in various industries. With the intention to reap the benefits of competition law, Indonesia’s president, Joko Widodo has issued a presidential decree on the Medium-term National Development Plan 2015 – 2019. This decree, which s sets out competition

law as a fundamental concern, not only aims to strengthen the powers of the KPPU, it also implies that businesses should ensure their business plans and operations are properly aligned with pro-competition values. Notably, pursuant to directions from the MEC and a mandate given by Widodo to supervise the food industry, on 19 August 2015, the KPPU announced that it is working with three other government bodies (i.e. the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Trade and the national police) to prosecute 32 companies in an alleged collusion in the beef industry. On 13 November 2015, Widodo tasked the KPPU to eradicate cartel practices in seven commodities. In Singapore: The CCS has powers under the Competition Act (Cap. 50B) to undertake market inquiries where it considers that a feature, or features, of that market may give rise to competition concerns. The CCS has previously undertaken such studies in respect of (inter alia) the retail petrol industry and the airline industry. Hong Kong Competition Commission issues six guidelines under Competition Ordinance On 19 November 2015, the Hong Kong Competition Commission (“HKCC”) published its Enforcement Policy and its Leniency Policy for Undertakings Engaging in Cartel Conduct (“Cartel Leniency Policy”) under the Competition Ordinance (Cap. 619) (the “Ordinance”). The Enforcement Policy and Cartel Leniency Policy provide further details of how the HKCC intends to carry out its functions under the Ordinance, which was enacted in June 2012 and came into full effect on 14 December 2015. The objective of the Ordinance is to prohibit conduct that prevents, restricts or distorts competition and mergers that substantially lessen competition in Hong Kong. To date, the Merger Rule applies only to mergers involving an undertaking that directly or indirectly holds a carrier licence issued under the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap. 106). Enforcement Policy The Enforcement Policy outlines how the HKCC will prioritise the use of its operational resources to investigate possible contraventions of the First

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Conduct Rule (prohibition against anti-competitive agreements and practices) and the Second Conduct Rule (prohibition against the abuse of dominance) in an efficient and timely manner, ensuring the greatest overall benefit to competition and consumers in Hong Kong. The Enforcement Policy supplements the Ordinance and the HKCC’s six Guidelines, published last year on 27 July 2015. In considering whether to investigate a matter, the HKCC will take into account three main issues in addition to the specific facts of a case: (a) the focus on compliance; (b) the severity of the conduct; and (c) the effectiveness and appropriateness of the remedy. Cartel Leniency Policy The HKCC has stated that it considers leniency as a key investigative tool to combat cartels, a contravention of the First Conduct Rule under the Ordinance. The Cartel Leniency Policy outlines the HKCC’s approach to leniency by providing a strong and clear incentive for a cartel member to stop the cartel conduct and to report it to the HKCC. It also enables the HKCC to obtain evidence more efficiently and effectively, thereby leading to quicker resolution of the HKCC’s investigations of cartels. Under the Cartel Leniency Policy, in exchange for a cartel member’s cooperation, the HKCC will not commence proceedings to impose a pecuniary penalty against the first cartel member who reports the cartel conduct to the HKCC. However, the reporting cartel member should also meet all the requirements for receiving leniency under the Cartel Leniency Policy. The HKCC will further extend the leniency to current officers and employees of the cartel member and in particular, named former officers or employees and current and former agents of the cartel member who cooperate with the HKCC. There are five steps in applying for leniency under the Cartel Leniency Policy: Step 1: Applying for a marker As the Cartel Leniency Policy provides leniency only to the first successful applicant, the HKCC

uses a marker system to establish a queue in the order of date and time the HKCC is contacted. To obtain a marker and thereby preserve the undertaking’s place in the queue, the applicant must provide sufficient information to enable the HKCC to assess its place in the queue in relation to that specific cartel, e.g. information on the nature of the cartel (such as the product(s) and/or service(s) involved) and the main participants in the cartel conduct. Step 2: Invitation to apply for leniency On the basis of the information provided when applying for a marker, the HKCC will make a preliminary determination as to whether the reported conduct is anti-competitive and whether leniency is available. Step 3: Making the leniency application through a proffer The undertaking invited to apply for leniency will then be asked to provide a detailed description of the cartel, the entities involved, the role of the applicant, a timeline of the conduct and the evidence that the leniency applicant can provide in respect of the cartel conduct. This is commonly referred to as a “proffer”. The proffer should include an explanation of how the cartel conduct affects or relates to competition in Hong Kong so to establish a jurisdictional nexus and provide an estimate of the value or volume of sales affected by the cartel in Hong Kong. The HKCC will invite the undertaking to submit an application by completing its proffer within a specified period, ordinarily within 30 calendar days. Should the undertaking fail to complete its proffer within this timeframe, or any extension to it as may be agreed by the HKCC, its marker will automatically lapse. The next undertaking in the marker queue will then be invited by the HKCC to make an application for leniency. Step 4: Offer to enter into a leniency agreement If the applicant meets the conditions for leniency, it will be asked to sign a leniency agreement with any necessary amendments or specific terms as might be appropriate to the applicant. Step 5: Leniency agreement Once an undertaking has entered into a leniency agreement with the HKCC, it will be required to provide, without delay, the HKCC with all non-

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privileged information and evidence in respect of the cartel conduct. Witnesses will also be interviewed by the HKCC and can be called upon to provide evidence before the Competition Tribunal in due course. The Cartel Leniency Policy does not preclude the possibility of a follow-on action against cartel members, including a party to a leniency agreement, by persons who can prove they have suffered loss or damage as a result of the cartel. In Singapore: The CCS has similarly issued guidelines outlining its approach to enforcement and leniency for cartels in its Guidelines on Enforcement and Guidelines on Lenient Treatment for Undertakings Coming Forward with Information on Cartel Activity Cases 2009 respectively. In particular, as part of the CCS’s leniency policy, the CCS may grant an undertaking the benefit of total immunity from financial penalties if various conditions are satisfied.

ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS ACCC loses two price-fixing appeals on same day On 31 July 2015, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (“Full Court”) overturned two separate price-fixing appeals brought by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (“ACCC”) against travel agency Flight Centre Travel Group Limited (“Flight Centre”) and Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (“ANZ”). In both cases, the court held that price-fixing could not be established as the allegedly infringing companies did not compete in the same market. Flight Centre The ACCC instituted proceedings against Flight Centre on 9 March 2012 in the Federal Court of Australia (“Federal Court”). On 6 December 2013, the Federal Court found for the ACCC and ordered Flight Centre to pay penalties totaling A$11 million (S$11.2 million). Flight Centre lodged and appeal and the ACCC lodged a cross-appeal. On 31 July 2015, the Full Court allowed Flight Centre’s appeal, dismissed the ACCC’s cross-appeal, and overturned the decision of the Federal Court.

This case was initiated by ACCC’s concern that Flight Centre’s conduct could harm competition and ultimately, affect the prices available to consumers. Flight Centre traditionally operated according to a ‘price beat guarantee’, where Flight Centre would beat a cheaper airfare offered by its competitors by A$1 plus a A$20 voucher. As a result of such guarantee, Flight Centre was obliged to match cheaper web fares of its competitors and this resulted in lower revenue in some cases for Flight Centre. ACCC argued that, on six occasions between 2005 and 2009, Flight Centre attempted to induce three international airlines, Singapore Airlines, Malaysian Airlines and Emirates, to agree to stop directly offering and booking their own international airfares (including over the Internet) at prices less than the amount offered by Flight Centre. Flight Centre’s prices included both the amount collected for the airfare itself plus the commission that Flight Centre retained for its booking and distribution services. ACCC also argued that Flight Centre provided booking services to the public and distribution services to the international airlines, in competition with the airlines’ internal sales divisions. The purpose and likely effect of the arrangements sought by Flight Centre was to maintain the level of Flight Centre’s commissions, and this was allegedly a contravention of section 45 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (“CCA”) (formerly section 45A of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (“TPA”)). The Federal Court agreed with ACCC and fined Flight Centre for repeatedly attempting to enter into anti-competitive arrangements with the three international airlines to eliminate differences in international air fares offered to customers. Flight Center was ordered to pay penalties totaling A$11 million in relation to five breaches of the CCA. However, on appeal, the Full Court reversed the Federal Court’s decision and found that Flight Centre did not compete with the airlines in the passenger air travel market and therefore could not have engaged in price-fixing. The Full Court found that that there was no separate market for booking and distribution services to consumers, and as a consequence, Flight Centre and the three international airlines did not compete with each other in such a market. Instead, the supply of booking and distribution services was an ancillary part of the supply of international passenger air

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travel in which Flight Centre acted as agent for the airlines. ANZ Banking Group On 21 August 2007, ACCC brought proceedings against ANZ, alleging that ANZ had made and given effect to a price-fixing agreement in 2004, in breach of section 45 of the CCA (formerly section 45A of the TPA). In 2004, ANZ had required Mortgage Refunds Pty Ltd (“Mortgage Refunds”) to agree to limit the amount of the refund that it could provide to its customers when arranging ANZ home loans. ACCC alleged that ANZ made and gave effect to an agreement where it would only allow Mortgage Refunds to continue to be accredited to offer ANZ mortgage products if it agreed to limit any refund it paid to its customers to A$600 (S$610), which would allow ANZ branches to match the deal if they chose to waive ANZ’s loan establishment fee. According to ACCC, this allegedly amounted to price-fixing because ANZ and Mortgage Refunds were competitors in the market for the provision of loan arrangement services to customers. On 18 November 2013, the Federal Court found that ANZ did not participate in a market for the provision of loan arrangement services, and consequently ANZ and Mortgage Refunds were not competitors in this market. As a result, ANZ’s conduct was found not to amount to a price-fixing agreement and ACCC’s application was dismissed. On 10 December 2013, ACCC appealed against the Federal Court’s decision. However, in its decision of 31 July 2015, the Full Court dismissed ACCC’s appeal, and upheld the lower court’s decision. The Full Court agreed with the trial judge’s decision that ANZ’s actions did not amount to the creation of a price-fixing agreement in breach of the CCA because the companies did not compete with each other in the same market. ANZ branches did not supply loan arrangement services and therefore did not compete with independent mortgage brokers such as Mortgage Refunds. In addition, the Full Court allowed ANZ’s cross appeal, finding that the Mortgage Refunds payment could not be considered a “rebate” for the purposes of the price-fixing provisions in the CCA.

In Singapore: Agreements that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition are prohibited under section 34 of the Singapore Competition Act (Cap. 50B). Appeals of Competition Commission of Singapore decisions can be made to the Competition Appeal Board in the first instance. Subsequent appeals may be brought to the High Court and Court of Appeal, but only on points of law or the amount of the financial penalty. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission conditionally clears Qantas and China Eastern coordination In August 2015, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (“ACCC”) conditionally approved a joint coordination agreement (“Coordination Agreement”) between Qantas and China Eastern to coordinate their operations between Australia and China. The approval comes after ACCC issued a draft decision in March 2015, proposing to prohibit coordination between the two airlines, on the grounds that the coordination would likely result in significant public detriment if airlines are given the incentive and ability to increase airfares and limit capacity on the Sydney-Shanghai route. ACCC noted then that Qantas and China Eastern together provided 80% of the capacity on the direct Sydney-Shanghai route, and that the Sydney-Shanghai route accounted for around 24% of all direct flights between China and Australia. Following the draft decision in March 2015, China Eastern has committed to increasing the frequency of its routes from Shanghai to various destinations in Australia over the next two years, as well as to introduce a new route. Amongst other things, the two airlines have committed to expand significantly the number of destinations covered by their current codeshare agreement. The airlines submitted that the primary focus in the coordination is to utilise Shanghai as a gateway for connecting flights between Australia and China. ACCC noted that the addition of new services and expansion of the range of destinations would constitute a significant public benefit. The coordination would also result in public benefit through the enhancement of the attractiveness of the airlines’ loyalty programs. Qantas’ co-location

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with China Eastern at Shanghai Pudong International Airport under the Coordination Agreement would also result in cost savings in the form of processing transiting passengers through more convenient and quicker connections for Qantas passengers transferring to China Eastern flights in Shanghai. However, ACCC also noted that the Coordination Agreement could result in significant public detriment, for example, through increased prices, as the airlines would not pose major competitive constraints on each other on the Sydney-Shanghai route once the Coordination Agreement lapsed. To monitor such behaviour, the ACCC has required the airlines to report their average fares, month by month, on each route that they operate between Australia and China. ACCC also required, as a condition for approval, that the airlines grow their capacity on routes between Australia and Shanghai by around 21.67% over the five year term that the Coordination Agreement will be authorised. The ACCC will be able to review the capacity growth obligations and to impose a Sydney-Shanghai route specific growth obligation. With the conditions in place, ACCC noted that on balance, the public benefit arising from the Coordination Agreement would outweigh the detriments from the lessening of competition on the Sydney-Shanghai route, and approved the coordination on that basis. In Singapore: Airline alliances may potentially give rise to questions of compatibility with the section 34 prohibition. Accordingly, many airline alliances have been previously notified to the Competition Commission of Singapore (“CCS”) under section 44(1)(b) of the Competition Act (Cap. 50B), seeking a positive decision by the CCS, before the alliances were fully implemented. CCS clears strategic alliance between Cebu Pacific and Tigerair Singapore On 21 September 2015, the Competition Commission of Singapore (“CCS”) announced that it had cleared the notification for a decision by Cebu Air, Inc. (“Cebu Pacific”) and Tiger Airways Singapore Pte. Ltd. (“Tigerair Singapore”) (collectively, “the Parties”), relating to a proposed strategic alliance between the two. CCS originally

identified certain concerns relating to the proposed alliance, but determined to clear the notification following revisions made to the proposed level of cooperation between the Parties on certain routes between Singapore and the Philippines. The Parties presently overlap in respect of services offered between three sets of city pairs: (a) Singapore - Cebu; (b) Singapore - Clark; and (c) Singapore - Manila. The proposed alliance involved coordination on pricing, capacity and revenue sharing between the Parties on the overlapping routes, and thus potentially gave rise to concerns under section 34 of the Competition Act (Cap. 50B) (the “Act”). In particular, the proposed alliance contemplated that the parties would: (a) jointly operate common routes between

Singapore and the Philippines, and other markets that may emerge, on a metal-neutral basis;

(b) jointly sell and market common and non-common routes using codeshare or interline arrangements; and

(c) cooperate in relation to sales and marketing, distribution, airport operations and ground handling, scheduling, pricing, service policies, innovation, procurement and other matters to improve the overall quality of service offered to passengers on their respective operations and to reduce cost.

A public consultation was conducted to seek feedback on the Strategic Alliance, from 22 September 2014 to 3 October 2014. CCS received responses from other airlines active in the Asia region, the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore, the Ministry of Transport, and the Changi Airport Group. Ultimately, the relevant question for CCS to consider was whether the alliance would give rise to a net economic benefit, such that it would be excluded from consideration under the section 34 prohibition through the operation of paragraph 9 of the Third Schedule to the Act. Whilst CCS determined that such benefits would arise in respect of the Singapore - Manila route, CCS determined that the requirements for finding net

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economic benefit would not be met in respect of the other routes. Following this, the Parties revised the Strategic Alliance to reduce the level of cooperation on the Singapore - Clark and the Singapore - Cebu routes to an interline basis. The Parties will not coordinate on any commercial activities, such as pricing, surcharges and capacity, and will not undertake any form of revenue sharing on the two routes. Coordination will be restricted to coordinating minimum and maximum connecting times in the Parties’ booking systems for the purpose of creating joint interline itineraries. Scheduling of flights on these two routes will also be carried out independently by each party. On this basis, CCS determined that the new proposed level of coordination would not infringe the Act. Air cargo cartels in India and the UK Two distinct cases involving air cargo cartels and their surcharge rates have been decided in India and the UK. India In India, three airlines were found to have violated section 3(1) of the Indian Competition Act, 2002. According to the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”), the three airlines had “acted in a concerted manner” in fixing and revising their fuel surcharge rates (“FSC rates”). It was observed that the airlines “exhibited parallel behaviour” on multiple instances. In particular, a hike in the FSC rates of one airline would be succeeded by similar behaviour by the other airlines. The CCI was of the opinion that the “only plausible reason” for such parallel conduct was collusion among the airlines. The three airlines were each ordered to pay a fine set at 1% of their average turnovers over the past three financial years, amounting to a total of Rs 2.58 billion. The three airlines intend to appeal the decision. UK On 14 October 2015, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales passed judgement in favour of a group of airlines, including British Airways (“BA”), in their appeal against several decisions of the High Court. These decisions were made in the context of civil claims brought against the airlines. The High Court had ordered that BA disclose the unredacted version of a European Commission

Decision, in which the airlines were found to have coordinated their Fuel and Security Surcharges. It had also refused BA’s application to strike out the economic torts that were brought against it. The Court of Appeal overruled the High Court on both matters. It set aside the order for disclosure, as it was contrary to the principle of presumption of innocence. It also ordered the striking out of the torts. In Singapore: Section 34 of the Competition Act (Cap. 50B) prohibits any agreement between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within Singapore. The fixing of prices, or components of prices, would likely be considered as being a restriction of competition by object. Japanese ball bearing manufacturer sentenced to fines in Korea On 30 October 2015, the Seoul Central District Court imposed fines on Japanese ball bearing manufacturer Minebea Co., Ltd. (“Minebea”), and its Korean sales subsidiary, NMB Korea Co., Ltd. (“NMB Korea”), amounting to 100 million Won (approximately S$ 122,000) and 70 million Won (approximately S$ 85,000) respectively, for the violation of the Korea Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. This marks the first time a foreign company has been subject to a price fixing action in Korea, and comes after the Korea Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”), on 17 November 2014, filed complaints against both companies with the Seoul Central District Prosecutor’s Office for price fixing on the direct supply of small-sized bearings, and imposed a 4.9 billion Won (approximately S$ 6 million) fine on Minebea. As part of a wider investigation, the KFTC has imposed total fines of 77.8 billion Won (approximately S$ 95 million) on nine Japanese and German bearing suppliers (including Minebea and NMB Korea) for price fixing of bearings for commercial sales and steel facilities, as well as small-sized bearings, for 14 years from 1998 to 2012.

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In relation to the price fixing on small-sized bearings, the KFTC found that sales managers at Minebea and NSK Ltd. (“NSK”) in Japan had agreed to fix the prices of small-size bearings they supplied to Korea’s global electronic manufacturers, such as Samsung, LG, and Daewoo, for the period between June 2003 and August 2011. In addition, when steel prices and exchange rates rose in 2008, the KTFC found that Minebea and NSK had agreed to raise prices for all small-size bearings they exported through the above-mentioned channels. Their respective Korean subsidiaries, NMB Korea and NSK Korea Co. Ltd., had agreed to maintain the increased price levels, and had drawn up a detailed plan for price hikes in respect of each client, in accordance with the instructions and approval of Minebea and NSK. Despite its key involvement in the cartel, NSK and its subsidiary avoided both indictment and civil penalties amounting to 33 billion Won (approximately S$ 40 million), through a leniency application to the KFTC. In Singapore: On 27 May 2014, the Competition Commission of Singapore (“CCS”) issued an infringement decision against four Japanese manufacturers of ball bearings and their Singapore subsidiaries for contravening section 34 of the Competition Act (Cap. 50B) by engaging in anti-competitive agreements and unlawful exchange of information in respect of the price and sale of ball and roller bearings sold to customers in Singapore. Financial penalties totaling S$9,306,977 were imposed for the infringement; however, one party received full immunity from the financial penalties on the basis of being a successful leniency applicant. Further reductions in financial penalties were also granted to the subsequent leniency applicants as part of the CCS’s leniency programme. The media release of the CCS’s full decision is available here. South African High Court confirms rejection of leniency application from Allens Meshco Group On 5 November 2015, the Competition Commission of South Africa’s (“CCSA”) rejection of an application for immunity from Allens Meshco

Group (“AMG”), a group of metal wire suppliers, was upheld by South Africa’s High Court. In 2008, AMG submitted a marker application with information that some companies under the group, which were competitors in the market for the supply of diamond mesh and galvanised wire, were part of a cartel. AMG submitted further information, such as the names of the alleged cartel participants and the terms and conditions founds in certain agreements, to the CCSA in September 2008. No further steps were taken to expand AMG’s application and fines were imposed in 2009. The court dismissed the appeal and ruled that AMG did not meet the evidential and procedural demands of a leniency application. The court explained that a separate leniency application had to be submitted together with AMG’s marker request as both applications had different substantive and procedural requirements, and a marker request alone, together with the information provided, could not meet the requirements to secure leniency. The court also ruled that the appeal, launched by AMG in May 2013, did not fall within the limitation period to seek a judicial review. This is significant as it is a clear statement that decisions to refuse leniency applications are susceptible to review under South African law. In Singapore: According to the guidelines of the Competition Commission of Singapore (“CCS”), applications for leniency may be made via an online form, email, post or in person. The undertaking should provide the CCS with all the evidence relating to the suspected infringement at the time of submission. The CCS is currently reviewing its guidelines relating to leniency, and has recently consulted on proposed changes to the guidelines (amongst other guidelines). Former Rabobank traders convicted in US Libor trial On 5 November 2015, two former Rabobank traders were convicted in a Manhattan district court for their involvement in the manipulation of submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”).

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The LIBOR is an average interest rate, calculated based on submissions from contributing banks. The LIBOR reflects the rates these banks believe they would be charged if borrowing from other banks. The LIBOR serves as the primary benchmark for short-term interest rates globally and is used as a reference rate for many interest rate contracts, mortgages, credit cards, student loans and other consumer lending products. The ex-Rabobank traders had been charged with conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud and various substantive counts of wire fraud. Their trial is the first to arise in the US as a result of multi-jurisdictional investigations into LIBOR rigging and comes a year after Rabobank itself reached a deferred prosecution agreement with the Department of Justice to pay a US$325m penalty, for its alleged role in the manipulation of LIBOR. Counsels for the defendants have indicated that they plan to appeal. Sentencing is set for 10 March 2016, at 4pm. In Singapore: Infringement of the prohibitions in the Competition Act (Cap. 50B) (the “Act”) gives rise to civil penalties payable to the Competition Commission of Singapore (“CCS”) but does not, on its own, give rise to criminal offences. However, criminal liability could arise under the Act in respect of obstruction offences, committed during the course of an investigation carried out by the CCS. On 29 July 2014, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (“MAS”) proposed a new regulatory framework under which the manipulation of any financial benchmarks in Singapore would attract criminal and civil sanctions under the Securities and Futures Act. In addition, administrators and submitters of key financial benchmarks designated by the MAS, e.g. the Singapore Interbank Offered Rate (“SIBOR”) and Swap Offered Rates (“SOR”), will be subject to regulation, including licensing requirements. The public consultation for comments on these changes closed on 29 August 2014. CCI orders distributor association to cease anti-competitive conduct On 12 December 2015, the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) held that the Sonipat Distributor Association (“SDA”) had contravened section 3(1) of the Indian Competition Act, 2002. section 3(1) prohibits anti-competitive agreements

in India. The CCI found that certain clauses of the bye-laws of the SDA were anti-competitive. The SDA is an association of distributors of fast-moving consumer goods (“FMCG”) in Sonipat and its surrounding regions. Under its bye-laws, a new distributor who wished to begin working with a company would have to acquire permission from the company’s old distributor, in the form of a “no objection certificate” (“NOC”). A distributor who began dealing without a NOC would be subject to a fine. Finally, the bye-laws imposed territorial restraints by preventing outsiders from entering an SDA member’s “authorised area”. With regard to the NOC rules, CCI held that the SDA was “restricting the freedom of trade through its bye-laws, which has the effect of limiting or controlling the market or supply of goods in the market”. On the territorial restraints imposed by the bye-laws, CCI found that the rules of the SDA granted “territorial protection to a dealer from all competition in the market”, and was therefore anti-competitive by object. Such rules would reduce competition in the market and also raise barriers to entry in the market. As a consequence, the SDA was ordered to cease and desist from its contravening actions. It was also instructed to produce a “Competition Compliance Manual” for its members. There were, however, no fines imposed by the CCI, a result of which was thought to be unusual by a local commenter. In Singapore: Section 34 of the Competition Act (Cap. 50B) prohibits any agreement between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within Singapore. The prohibition potentially encompasses rules of associations of undertakings. Agreements to share markets are regarded as restrictive of competition by object.

ABUSE OF DOMINANCE Australia fines Visa $18m for misusing its market power

On 4 September 2015, the Federal Court of Australia (“Federal Court”) ordered Visa

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Worldwide Pte Ltd (“Visa Worldwide”), a subsidiary of Visa Inc (“Visa”) in Australia, to pay a pecuniary penalty of A$18 million (S$18.3 million) for engaging in anti-competitive conduct and misusing its market power, in proceedings brought by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (“ACCC”). In addition, the Federal Court also ordered Visa Worldwide to pay the ACCC’s costs of the proceedings, in the amount of A$2 million (S$2.03 million). ACCC had instituted proceedings against Visa and other Visa entities in February 2013, alleging that Visa, the operator of the world’s largest retail electronic payments processing network, had contravened the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 in relation to the dynamic currency conversion services (“DCC”). DCC is a service which competes with Visa’s currency conversion services and gives international cardholders a choice to complete a transaction in their home currency rather than in the local currency of the merchant, including online merchants. If a consumer chooses DCC, the exchange rate is locked in and disclosed to the cardholder at the time of making a transaction. For international travellers to Australia wishing to use their Visa card to make purchases at point of sale (“POS”), Visa has always supplied the currency conversion services necessary to allow the Australian merchant to be paid in $AUD and the purchases to be later billed to the cardholder in their home currency. Visa earns substantial revenue from the provision of these services, both in the form of foreign currency trading revenue and fees. ACCC alleged that Visa had misused its market power for the purposes of: (a) preventing the expansion of DCC to new

merchant outlets in Australia, such as retail stores; and

(b) preventing businesses in Australia from

supplying DCC services on ATMs in competition with Visa’s own currency conversion service.

One of ACCC’s concerns was that Visa’s conduct was likely to stop the growth of currency conversion services which was in competition with its own and, as a result, limiting the choices available to consumers.

The Federal Court determined that Visa had contravened section 47 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, which prohibits the practice of exclusive dealing. The Federal Court held that during the period 1 May 2010 to 6 October 2010, Visa Worldwide implemented and maintained a moratorium by making changes to the Visa rules which prohibited the further expansion of the supply of DCC services on POS transactions on the Visa network by its rival suppliers of currency conversion services in many parts of the world, including in Australia. This prohibition meant that retail stores, hotels and restaurants that were not already offering DCC to their customers as at 30 April 2010 could not choose to offer DCC. This had the effect of freezing the pool of merchants who could offer DCC during the period of the prohibition, which in turn prevented the further expansion of DCC during that period. The Federal Court indicated that the penalty should send a clarion call to large multi-national corporations with operations in Australia, that whatever decisions made globally, Australia will not tolerate conduct that contravenes its competition laws and will not tolerate conduct that are likely to substantially lessen competition in the Australian markets. Moreover, according to ACCC, the imposition of the substantial penalty on Visa Worldwide reflects the serious nature of the conduct which hindered the competitive process and restricted an emerging technology and service from developing under otherwise competitive market conditions. Commentators have also suggested that the outcome of this case could potentially open the way for more abuse of dominance cases to be brought against Visa both in Australia and abroad. Although the case went to trial, the parties reached a settlement on the first day. As part of the terms of settlement, Visa and ACCC agreed to orders that all other claims against Visa be dismissed, including allegations relating to the supply of DCC at ATMs on the Visa network. The settlement agreement is awaiting confirmation by a federal judge. In Singapore: The Competition Commission of Singapore (“CCS”) has only issued one infringement decision relating to an abuse of dominant position. The decision relates to ticketing agent SISTIC.com Pte

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Ltd’s (“SISTIC”) exclusive agreements with the Esplanade Co. Ltd and the Singapore Sports Council. The decision was upheld on appeal, but SISTIC’s fine was reduced by 20%. In assessing whether a practice is an abuse of dominance in Singapore, CCS’s primary concern will be the extent to which competition is foreclosed from the market by the conduct in question. Russia finds Google abused Android dominance On 14 September 2015, Russia’s Federal Antimonopoly Service (“FAS”) announced its finding that Google Inc. and Google Ireland Ltd. (collectively referred to as “Google”) had abused its dominant position in the market for pre-installed applications on devices running the Android operating system (“OS”), in violation of Part 1, Article 10 of the Russian Federal Law on Protection of Competition. This appears to be the first competition ruling against Google, who has been the subject of years of investigation by competition law enforcers worldwide. The FAS’s commenced its investigations against Google on 20 February 2015, upon receipt of a complaint that Google was engaging in anti-competitive actions, from Yandex NV (“Yandex”), Russian’s largest search engine operators. The FAS found that Google had abused its dominance by bundling the Google Play Store, through which Android users can download applications, games, books, music and movies, with Google applications and the Google search engine. In particular, the FAS found that Google had allegedly made available the Google Play Store to producers of Android mobile devices designed for sale in the Russia Federation, on several conditions, including the mandatory installation of Google’s search engine as the default on devices; mandatory pre-installation of Google’s applications on devices, with priority placement on the device home page; and prohibition of pre-installation of applications of other developers. While the FAS initially appeared to be considering Google’s conduct under the provision against engaging in unfair competition, it did not find any violation by Google of the same, and terminated the proceedings against Google in this regard.

Following its announcement, the FAS issued a determination to Google on 5 October 2015 to cease the abuse of dominance by 18 November 2015, and to adjust its contracts with device makers to exclude clauses which restrict the installation of applications and services of other developers. According to the FAS, this would allow application developers to pre-install their software on Android devices distributed in the Russian Federation. Users of such devices would be informed through a notice appearing on the screens of their mobile devices about pre-activating pre-installed Google applications, changing the search engine in the Google Chrome browser, the possibility of installing other search widgets and other applications similar to those included in the Google Mobile Services package, and changing icon locations in the screen. The FAS also indicated that an administrative case against Google would be opened in the near future. Under the Federal Law on Protection of Competition, Google could be fined from 1% to 15% of its turnover on the market of preinstalled application stores in 2014. Google has the right to appeal the FAS’s decision or determination within three months from the date such decision was adopted or such determination was issued. An appeal to a court of law or an arbitration court would suspend the fulfillment of the determination issued by FAS until the court’s ruling comes into legal force. More recently, Yandex confirmed on 13 November 2015 that it had filed a complaint with the European Commission (“EC”) against Google in April this year, which largely mirrors its claims against Google in Russia. Yandex’s complaint forms part of the EC’s investigations into Google’s practices in relation to the Android operating system, which was formally opened in the same month. The scope of the EC’s investigation focuses on three allegations: whether Google has hindered the development and market access of rival mobile operating systems, applications or services by: (a) requiring or incentivising smartphone and

tablet manufacturers to exclusively pre-install Google’s own applications or services;

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(b) preventing smartphone and tablet manufacturers who wish to install Google's applications and services on some of their Android devices from developing and marketing modified and potentially competing versions of Android on other devices;

(c) tying or bundling certain Google applications

and services distributed on Android devices with other Google applications, services and/or application programming interfaces of Google.

The EC’s latest investigation into Android takes on a separate branch of Google’s business from that which was the subject of its Statement of Objections issued to Google on 15 April 2015, which centred on Google’s core search and advertising business. In the Statement of Objections, the EC alleged that the Internet giant had abused its dominant position in the markets for general internet search services in the European Economic Area (“EEA”) by systematically favoring its own comparison shopping product in its general search results pages. Google has since provided a formal reply to the Statement of Objections in which it has set out arguments in rejection of the EC’s accusations. In Singapore: Section 47 of the Competition Act (Cap. 50B) prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. To date, the Competition Commission of Singapore has only issued one infringement decision in respect of an abuse of dominance against SISTIC.com Pte. Ltd., in respect of its exclusive contracts with event promoters and venue operator partners.

MERGERS European Commission clears Intel and Altera merger In a press release on 14 October 2015, the European Commission (“EC”) announced its clearance of the acquisition of Altera by Intel. The two companies are producers of electronic components in the United States, involved in the production of semiconductors, which are ubiquitous components of modern electronic devices. In its investigation, the EC concentrated

on the markets for central processing units, complex programmable logic devices, field programmable gate arrays and semiconductor contract manufacturing. With regard to the market for semiconductor contract manufacturing, the EC found that the merger was unlikely to result in input foreclosure (by Intel’s refusal to supply Altera’s competitors), due to Intel’s small market share in the market. Furthermore, the merger would not grant Intel the ability to effectively exclude its competitors from offering their own contract manufacturing services. There was also a concern that Intel’s strength in the CPU market would adversely affect competition in the market for server workload acceleration, through Intel’s adoption of exclusionary strategies, such as “tying and bundling”. However, the EC found that, post-merger, the competitors both of Intel and of Altera could not be made dependent on the merged entity in the market, due to the presence of alternative technologies and suppliers. Consequently, the EC concluded that the acquisition should be cleared. According to Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, the “decision demonstrates that relevant deals can be swiftly approved if they raise no competition concern”. In Singapore: Section 54 of the Competition Act (Cap. 50B) prohibits mergers that have resulted, or may be expected to result, in a substantial lessening of competition within any market in Singapore for goods and services. “Merger” includes the acquisition of one undertaking by another. The Competition Commission of Singapore has reviewed and cleared several mergers involving producers of semiconductors and other electronic products.

OTHER NEWS CCS studies e-commerce competition policy and contemplates publicly announcing probes On 2 December 2015, at an e-commerce seminar, the Competition Commission of Singapore (“CCS”) presented key findings from its study on the implications of growing e-commerce on

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competition. The results of the study highlighted certain competition issues, based on the experience of other countries, which are more likely to arise in the context of e-commerce. The CCS noted that the study’s findings would help it “better understand the drivers and barriers for e-commerce activities in Singapore”. In particular, CCS said that as anti-competitive practices could pose barriers to entry and expansion in the e-commerce market, “a level e-playing field would be essential to encourage and facilitate companies to embark on their e-commerce journey”. To this end, CCS stated that it will continue to closely monitor market developments and learn from the experience of other countries, including the approach of various competition authorities to the “opportunities and challenges presented by e-commerce”. CCS also expressed hope that the idea of a level e-commerce playing field could “move across national boundaries and be extended to the ASEAN Economic Community and the vision of a single market integration”. This year, CCS will embark on a new joint study with the Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore to further examine the impact of e-commerce on the postal and logistics market in Singapore. In an effort to enhance transparency, CCS is also contemplating publicly announcing the commencement of investigations. It noted that while the announcements would bring about such benefits as increasing public awareness of competition law, they could adversely affect the evidence-gathering process. Hence, CCS plans to gather feedback through discussions with private practitioners and evaluate the pros and cons of the proposal.

FEATURE ARTICLE PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE CCS

GUIDELINES On 25 September 2015, the Competition Commission of Singapore (“CCS”) announced a consultation process in relation to proposed amendments to its existing guidelines. The CCS has previously issued 13 sets of guidelines:

(a) CCS Guidelines on the Major Provisions;

(b) CCS Guidelines on the Section 34 Prohibition;

(c) CCS Guidelines on the Section 47 Prohibition;

(d) CCS Guidelines on the Substantive

Assessment of Mergers; (e) CCS Guidelines on Merger Procedures 2012; (f) CCS Guidelines on Market Definition; (g) CCS Guidelines on the Powers of

Investigation; (h) CCS Guidelines on Enforcement; (i) CCS Guidelines on Lenient Treatment for

Undertakings Coming Forward with Information on Cartel Activity Cases 2009;

(j) CCS Guidelines on Filing Notifications for

Guidance or Decision with respect to the Section 34 Prohibition and Section 47 Prohibition;

(k) CCS Guidelines on the Appropriate Amount of

Penalty; (l) CCS Guidelines on the Treatment of

Intellectual Property Rights; and (m) CCS Guidelines on Competition Impact

Assessment for Government Agencies. Whilst not statements of law, the guidelines generally outline how the CCS will administer and enforce the provisions of the Competition Act (Cap. 50B) (the “Act”), and are an important reference point for businesses and practitioners. In the current consultation process, changes are proposed for a large number of the guidelines. We have set out below an accessible guide for businesses to understand some of the key changes and, where relevant, the potential impact that these proposed changes might have. New guideline: Fast-track procedure for section 34 and section 47 cases A key feature of the consultation process is the introduction of a proposed fast-track procedure, which represents a fundamental new development rather than a revision of the existing guidelines.

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The fast-track procedure essentially provides an avenue for parties to admit liability for infringements of the Act (and comply with various other conditions) and in return, the party receives a reduction in the amount of financial penalty to be imposed (which is set at 10% of the penalty that would otherwise be imposed). CCS has also highlighted that an added benefit is that the party will benefit from a shorter, expedited investigative timeframe. CCS has stated that the fast-track procedure will be initiated by the CCS in appropriate cases (as determined on a case-by-case basis). Parties have the option to agree to the fast track procedure but are not under an obligation to agree to it. CCS has indicated that to allow parties under investigations to determine whether they wish the fast-track procedure to take effect, discussion will take place with the CCS regarding the scope and gravity of the conduct, including identifying the infringements upon which the CCS contemplates making a decision, how the reduction in financial penalty for fast-track procedure will be applied, and the possible range and quantum of financial penalties. The procedure outlines that the reduction in financial penalties that can be gained from the fast-track procedure are in addition to any potential reductions in financial penalties that a party might stand to gain through the use of the CCS’s leniency programme. The procedure also states that CCS envisages that in general, the fast-track procedure will be applied only when all parties under investigations in the appropriate case agree to the fast-track procedure. The procedure represents an interesting development and option for parties under investigation. The fact that parties will need to admit liability in order to qualify for the fast-track procedure is significant and this factor may be particularly relevant in the context of abuse of dominance cases, where it is usually much more unclear as to whether the conduct in question is a breach of the law, especially early on in the investigation. With that said, abuse of dominance investigations can be lengthy and complicated, which may increase the attractiveness of a fast track option.

Another critical consequence of admitting liability is that it potentially exposes the party in question to follow on actions for damages by parties that have suffered loss or damage directly as a result of the infringing conduct. Accordingly, while weighing the benefit of a potential reduction in possible financial penalties against the time and cost involved in a full investigation, parties will also need to factor in potential exposure to private damages claims. How the procedure will play out in practice remains to be seen, but it is clear that the system will run parallel to the leniency system, which may give rise to interesting questions for undertakings as to whether they apply for leniency or seek to fast track the case or both. Guidelines on lenient treatment CCS’s leniency programme essentially incentivises cartel participants to come forward with information and evidence of an anti-competitive arrangement, in return for lenient treatment in the context of the investigation. In relation to CCS’s enforcement decisions, to date, many parties have benefitted from the programme in receiving total immunity (or a substantial reduction) from financial penalties. One of the biggest changes to the CCS’s guidelines on leniency is the introduction of two further criteria in order to qualify for leniency. In particular, CCS has stated that the party seeking leniency must grant a waiver of confidentiality to the CCS in respect of any jurisdiction where the applicant has also applied for leniency or any other regulatory authority for which it has informed of the conduct. In addition, a further condition requires the party to unconditionally admit to the conduct for which leniency is sought, and to detail the extent to which this had an impact in Singapore by preventing, restricting or distorting competition. In addition to the new criteria, CCS has also tweaked the other criteria applying to leniency applications, though such changes are arguably of lesser consequence. This guideline also goes into significant detail with regard to the actual procedures for requesting a marker and leniency. In particular, CCS outlines in much greater detail the procedure that should be followed in order to be granted a leniency marker, conditional leniency, and then ultimately immunity

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or leniency, which represent the three key milestones in the process. CCS has also provided further detail on when information provided in the course of a leniency application may be disclosed to third parties. In particular, CCS has stated that information provided to the CCS will be accessible to addressees of any provisional infringement decision, provided that the addressee undertakes not to make any copy by mechanical or electronic means. CCS’s new condition that applicants must admit liability is an interesting development. There are many situations where it is unclear as to whether particular conduct constitutes and infringement of competition law, and many situations where it may be difficult to determine whether conduct has actually given rise to an adverse impact on competition in Singapore. Moreover, an admission of liability opens the door for private actions for damages against the party, which might have the counter-productive effect of making parties more hesitant in wanting to apply for leniency. The increased level of detail provided on the procedures relating to leniency applications has obviously been distilled from the CCS’s practice in dealing with such applications over the years, and provides further clarity on the concrete steps that parties will need to take to qualify for leniency. Guidelines on the section 34 prohibition The most notable change to this guideline is in relation to the meaning of what constitutes a restriction of competition by “object”. First, CCS has specifically noted that the words “object” or “effect” are alternative and not cumulative requirements. Secondly, CCS has set out that it will assess a number of factors in order to determine whether a particular arrangement constitutes a restriction of competition by object, including the content of the agreement and the objective aims pursued by it. Thirdly, and notably, CCS has stated that should it be of the opinion that particular types of arrangements restrict competition by object, then it will consider such conduct to restrict competition by an appreciable extent. Previously, assumptions that agreements will be regarded as restrictive of competition to an appreciable extent were reserved for the four hard-core restrictions (i.e.,

price fixing, market sharing, bid-rigging and output limitation). CCS also provides more detail on how it will assess instances of information sharing (both of price information and non-price information). This further explanation mirrors the CCS’s approach in its enforcement decision involving ferry operators in 2012, where the CCS determined that the exchange of forward looking price information was a restriction of competition by object. In particular, CCS has highlighted that the unilateral disclosure of information by one undertaking to another might constitute a prohibited concerted practice, if the other party requests the information or at the very least accepts it. CCS goes on to highlight that the receiving party would need to respond with a clear statement that it does not wish to receive such information, otherwise it may be held liable in any enforcement proceedings. Another proposed change involves a specific mention that price recommendations by trade or professional associations may be harmful to competition because they create focal points for prices to converge, restrict independent pricing decisions and signal to market players in respect of how their competitors might act. This change reflects the position taken by CCS in previous decisions such as its decision in respect of the Singapore Medical Association’s Guidelines on Fees for Doctors in Private Practice, which it considered would contravene section 34 of the Act. CCS has also included some further explanation as to what constitutes a vertical arrangement (which are excluded from consideration under section 34 of the Act), and outlined that the existence of a vertical agreement does not preclude the existence of a horizontal agreement. Again, this change provides further clarification to businesses seeking to better understand the application of the exclusion provided to vertical agreements, but does not represent a fundamentally new approach. Most of the proposed changes to this guideline are clarifications and appear to be made to reflect CCS’s current decisional practice. The changes relating to vertical agreements and guidelines on fees can be seen as clarifications, rather than radical moves in policy or approach. CCS’s proposed revisions relating to when it will consider that an agreement might restrict competition by object has the potential to make it

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easier for CCS to take enforcement actions under the prohibition, and arguably narrows the defences that might be available to parties under investigation. How these changes take effect practically remains to be seen. In terms of information sharing, the proposed changes highlight that should businesses receive information from competitors (even unsolicited information), a clear rejection of this information should be made. Passive receipt of the information in the absence of any formal agreement relating to how the information will be used is not sufficient to absolve the receiving party from responsibility. Guidelines on the section 47 prohibition A key change to this guideline is the inclusion of the legal test for abuse of dominance, as was determined by the Competition Appeal Board in 2012, in hearing the appeal of SISTIC.com Ltd in relation to the CCS’s infringement finding against it. Specifically, CCS states that it will take an effects-based assessment as to whether the conduct “has, or is likely to have, an adverse effect on the process of competition”. CCS has also added an indication that it may use a counterfactual analysis as a tool for assessing abuse of dominance (albeit that this is not a legal requirement). A counterfactual is essentially a hypothetical “with and without” comparison, often used by competition authorities worldwide for trying to determine the effects of the conduct in question. Whilst the inclusion of the legal test for abuse of dominance provides more detail than the original draft of the guideline, it is remains unclear as to exactly how an adverse effect on the process of competition would be established, or what might be relevant to the consideration. The test reflected in the guidelines arguably makes it rather easy for the CCS to determine that conduct is abusive, as there is no objective yardstick for determining when conduct might be considered to have an adverse effect on the process of competition. This means that businesses that might be in a dominant position should be very cautious to assess their business conduct which might have an exclusionary effect on their competitors. With the above said, it is noteworthy that the test reflected in the CCS guidelines is derived from the decision of the Competition Appeal Board, in

hearing the appeal of SISTIC.com Pte Ltd in 2011, in respect of the CCS’s infringement decision against it. In that regard, the test reflected by the CCS is not a novel creation. Guidelines on appropriate amount of penalty CCS has proposed a number of clarifications to its guidelines on the appropriate amount of penalty, which sets out the CCS’s approach to determining financial penalties in the context of an infringement finding. In particular, CCS has made changes to reflect: (a) that where an undertaking is unable or

refuses to provide the CCS with its relevant turnover or is suspected of providing the CCS with very low relevant turnover, CCS will attribute a proportionate relevant turnover to that undertaking based on a proxy formula;

(b) that CCS will not usually make an adjustment for duration in bid-rigging or collusive tendering cases, i.e. the duration multiplier will be set at 1. However, CCS will treat as aggravating, every bid-rigging infringement that the undertaking participates after the first infringement;

(c) that unreasonable failure by an undertaking

to respond to a request for financial information or providing incomplete information may be treated as an aggravating factor taken into account in the calibration of penalties;

(d) that CCS may impose an uplift to the

financial penalty calculated, at step 4 above, to ensure its policy objectives are achieved; and

(e) that CCS may take into account leniency and

immunity reductions as well as discounts which may be applicable under the new fast track procedure.

The changes to this guideline generally reflect minor revisions to the existing process, and clarifications. The proposed revisions will not likely have an impact on businesses in relation to their day-to-day operations, but will provide more clarity for businesses under investigation by the CCS and trying to determine their likely financial penalties. In this regard, the clarifications ought to assist considerations of whether to apply for leniency or

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CCS’s fast-track procedure, by potentially making it slightly easier to judge likely financial penalties. Guidelines on powers of investigation CCS has only included minor changes to this guideline to reflect that it may exercise its powers of investigation and its powers of enforcements in respect of the section 54 prohibition, which is to be read together with the CCS Guidelines on Merger Procedures 2012. Guidelines on the substantive assessment of mergers The revisions to the Draft CCS Guidelines on the Substantive Assessment of Mergers provide greater clarity on a large number of issues relevant to how CCS reviews mergers which have been notified to it or mergers which it investigates unilaterally. It has always been the case under Singapore’s competition laws that the acquisition of minority shareholdings may give rise to a merger which falls for consideration under the merger review regime in the Act if it confers upon the acquirer decisive influence over an undertaking. Whilst this is not a novel position taken by the CCS, CCS has provided express clarification and additional illustration on how a minority shareholder may also be deemed to have sole control over an undertaking on a legal or de facto basis. CCS has explained that the acquisition of, inter alia, (a) additional rights which allow minority shareholders to acquire veto decisions that are essential to the strategic commercial behaviour of the undertaking; or (b) control over decisions made at shareholders’ meeting due to patterns of attendance and voting (where the remaining shares are widely dispersed), can amount to an acquisition of control which may lead to a reviewable merger under the Act. CCS has also clarified that mergers between competing buyers may create or enhance the merged firm’s ability to (unilaterally or in coordination with other firms) exercise market power when buying products or services. This creation or increase in “monopsony power” may lead to a substantial lessening of competition (“SLC”) in the relevant (buying) market. CCS has also provided relevant considerations in assessing the competition effects of the merger in the relevant markets. These include, inter alia:

(a) the number of other purchasers purchasing the products/services in the relevant market;

(b) the market shares of the merger parties (as buyers) and that of other buyers;

(c) the potential “entry” of a new buyer or

increase in purchases if prices decreased; and

(d) the possibility of suppliers exiting the market

or reducing production or investment in response to any price decrease.

CCS has provided further elaboration on the types of information it may consider in assessing whether there is countervailing buyer power of customers. These include, inter alia: (a) examples of customers switching between

alternative suppliers pre-merger; (b) the proportion of revenue large customers

represent for the merger parties; (c) evidence and examples of (extensive) past

negotiations on price, quality of products or services between the customer and the merger parties;

(d) whether the buyer has a large volume order

or the ability to sponsor entry for a potential supplier which is not currently in the market; and

(e) evidence that customers have regularly and

successfully resisted attempts by a supplier to raise prices.

CCS has also provided illustrations on the types of efficiencies it may consider in applying the Net Economic Efficiencies” test. The section 54 prohibition of mergers which has or is likely to result in a SLC in any market in Singapore does not apply to any merger if the economic efficiencies arising or that may arise from the merger outweigh the adverse effects of the merger in the relevant market in Singapore. The illustrations provided by the CCS include, inter alia, (a) supply-side efficiencies (such as cost reductions and increased investment); (b) demand-side efficiencies (such as any beneficial price effects on complementary products or benefits of one-stop shopping); and (c) dynamic efficiencies (such as increased innovation).

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The proposed revisions generally provide greater clarity to merger parties as to whether their transactions may potentially fall to be considered within the merger review regime under the Act. CCS’s clarification that mergers of competing buyers can potentially adversely impact competition in the relevant market (on the buying side) highlights to merger parties undertaking a self-assessment that (where relevant), consideration must be made also on whether the merger would create or enhance the merged entity’s ability to exercise monopsony power on the buying side. CCS’s further elaboration and illustrations on countervailing buyer power as a means to discipline supplier pricing and explanation of the efficiencies that the CCS may consider in assessing a merger situation will assist merger parties in structuring and formulating their representations to the CCS in their notifications on why their transactions do not give rise to a SLC in any market in Singapore Guidelines on filing notifications for guidance or decision Agreements, conduct and mergers can be notified to the CCS for approval. The notification system under the Competition Act is voluntary and designed to provide parties with commercial and legal certainty that their transactions or conduct will not likely infringe the Act. This guideline deals with the procedure for filing notifications for guidance or a decision in respect of the section 34 and section 47 prohibitions. CCS has proposed changes regarding the information to be submitted within a “Form 1” application. In particular, CCS has indicated that there is now a requirement for information on the relevant product and geographic markets to be provided. CCS has also specified other areas on which information is required, such as in respect of identifying the applicant’s five largest competitors and detail relating to the applicability of any vertical relationships between the parties involved. Under the current prevailing notification system, CCS may refuse to accept an application if it is incomplete. The proposed amendments clarify that where the information provided by the applicant in Form 1 is incomplete, CCS will notify the applicant and specify a time frame for the applicant to provide the outstanding information. If the applicant fails to do so within the time frame (or

any extensions granted) then the application will be deemed not to have been made. Where the outstanding information is submitted, then the application will be deemed to be made on the day CCS receives all such information. CCS has also clarified that documents which are not in the English language must be accompanied by a translation certified by a court interpreter or verified by the affidavit of a qualified translator. However, this clarification simply reflects the CCS’s current practice. In general, the proposed changes seek to refine the process of making notifications to the CCS. The additional information requirements may involve some additional work in relation to the preparation of the notification; however, the additional information required at the initial stages might to some extent help to limit the degree to which the CCS needs to request further information from the applicants during the consideration of the notification. Conclusion With competition law in Singapore about to enter its 11th year of active enforcement, and CCS’s bank of cases continuing to grow from year to year, it is timely for the CCS to revisit some of the key principles and processes encapsulated in its guidelines. Whilst the majority of the proposed changes reflect minor revisions and improvements to existing processes, the proposed changes also touch on key substantive concepts such as what is meant by a restriction of competition by object under section 34 of the Act, and when an abuse of dominance under section 47 of the Act can be established. The introduction of a fast-track procedure for parties who admit liability under sections 34 or 47 at an early stage in return for a fixed reduction in financial penalties represents one of the most novel changes, with such a system poised to sit alongside the CCS’s leniency programme as potential options for undertakings in the early stages of a CCS investigation. Should you require further information on the guidelines and the proposed changes, please feel free to contact the Drew & Napier Competition Law Practice Group.

Copyright in this publication is owned by Drew & Napier LLC. This publication may not be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, in whole or in part, without prior written approval. Drew & Napier LLC accepts no liability for, and does not guarantee the accuracy of information or opinion contained in this publication. This publication covers a wide range of topics and is not intended to be a comprehensive study of the subjects covered nor is it intended to provide legal advice. It should not be treated as a substitute for specific advice on specific situations.

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The Drew & Napier Competition Law Team

For more information on the Competition Law Practice Group, please click here.

Cavinder Bull, SC •••• Director (Dispute Resolution)

Cavinder handles complex litigation spanning a wide area of corporate and commercial matters. Cavinder has successfully defended companies being investigated for abusing a dominant position in Singapore, and filed the first appeal to the Competition Appeal Board in respect of a CCS infringement decision. Cavinder previously practised antitrust law in New York, working on cases like the Microsoft antitrust litigation and obtaining US Department of Justice’s approval for the merger between Grand Metropolitan and Guinness, one of the world’s largest mergers then. Cavinder graduated from the University of Oxford with First Class Honours in Law. He clerked for the Chief Justice of Singapore as a Justices’ Law Clerk. Cavinder also has a Masters in Law from Harvard Law School which he attended on a Lee Kuan Yew Scholarship. Cavinder is consistently recognised as one of the leading litigators in Singapore. Chambers Asia 2015 lists Cavinder as a leading individual, “Excellent when it comes to litigation matters: very sharp, very reliable and very reassuring”.

Tel: +65 6531 2416 •••• Fax: +65 6533 3591 •••• Email: cavinder.bull@drewnapier.com

Lim Chong Kin •••• Director (Competition & Regulatory)

Chong Kin played a key role in the development of competition regulation in the telecommunications, media and postal industries in Singapore, before moving on to undertake general competition work when the Competition Act was enacted in 2005. His diverse client portfolio spans the Competition Commission of Singapore, the sectoral competition regulators, and private sector companies. He undertakes a whole range of competition law matters including cartel investigations, merger filing, decisions and guidance, complex market studies, drafting competition legislation and enforcement work. Chong Kin has been widely acknowledged as the leading competition law expert in Singapore by major ranking publications. Chambers Asia-Pacific 2015 ranks Chong Kin as a Band 1 Competition/Antitrust lawyer. Asia Pacific Legal 500: 2015 recognises him as a competition and regulatory specialist. AsiaLaw Profiles 2015 recognises Chong Kin for his expertise in Competition Law. Who’s Who Legal: Competition 2008 – 2015 and Telecoms, Media & Technology 2014 – 2016 all recognise Chong Kin for his strength in regulatory and competition advisory work.

Tel: +65 6531 4110 •••• Fax: +65 6535 4864 •••• Email: chongkin.lim@drewnapier.com

Scott Clements •••• Deputy Head, Competition & Regulatory

Scott is the Deputy Head of Drew & Napier’s Competition and Regulatory Practice Group and is admitted to both the Singapore bar and the New Zealand bar. Scott has extensive experience in all areas of competition law, including anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance, and mergers and acquisitions. Scott recently assisted SISTIC.com Pte. Ltd. in its appeal before the Competition Appeal Board in relation to the first and only abuse of dominance infringement finding made to date by CCS, and secured a 20% reduction in the financial penalty imposed. Scott was previously a senior investigator with the New Zealand Commerce Commission and was involved in leading investigations and analysing competition law and economic issues, including leading a number of high profile investigations into mergers and acquisitions. Scott was also involved in numerous investigations involving electricity matters. Scott was a key member of the team commissioned by the ASEAN Secretariat to conduct a review of competition law and policy in the ASEAN region and to propose best practices for the implementation of competition law in ASEAN. Scott has been recognised by Chambers 2015 as an Up and Coming lawyer with clients declaring that he “is able to understand the business model very clearly and provide advice that is precise and to the point."

Tel: +65 6531 4183 •••• Fax: +65 6535 4864 •••• Email: scott.clements@drewnapier.com

Register Online at GlobalCompetitionReview.com/Singapore2016 For any queries, please contact +44 207 467 0174

Drew & Napier and Global Competition Review invites you and your colleagues to our 5th Annual

Law Leaders Asia-Pacific Conference, taking place on 3-4 of March at Maxwell Chambers,

Singapore.

Co-chaired by Susan Ning, King & Wood Mallesons, and Chong Kin Lim, Drew & Napier, this year’s

conference promises lively debate about recent enforcement developments and ongoing challenges in

the region, as well as informative presentations by senior government regulators and expert in-house

and outside counsel.

Day One

9:15 Chairs’ welcome

9:30 – 11:10 ASEAN Roundtable

Part 1: Regulator discussion on new competition law regimes in ASEAN, moderated

by Chong Kin Lim, Drew & Napier

Sarong Kem, Ministry of Commerce, Cambodia

Toh Han Li, Competition Commission of Singapore

R. Kurnia Sya'ranie, Indonesia's Commission for the Supervision of Business

Competition

Tuan Ragunath Kesavan, Malaysia Competition Commission

Han Lin Zaw, Department of Trade, Ministry of Commerce, Myanmar

Register Online at GlobalCompetitionReview.com/Singapore2016 For any queries, please contact +44 207 467 0174

Part 2: Discussion on competition law in practice in the ASEAN region from

practitioners’ perspective

David Fruitman, DFDL Legal & Tax

Anh Tuan Nguyen, LNT & Partners

Faizah Jamaludin, SKRINE

Fachri Mochamad, Baker & McKenzie

11:30 – 12:45 Case Study: Mergers

Moderated by Kirstie Nicholson, BHP Billiton

Richard Blewett, Clifford Chance

Nicholas French, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer

Ee Kia Ng, Competition Commission of Singapore

François Renard, Allen & Overy

12:45 Networking Lunch sponsored by Drew & Napier

13:45 - 15:00 Economics: Hot tub on hot tubbing

Moderated by Anthony Maton, Hausfeld & Co.

Greg Houston, HoustonKemp Economists

Philip Williams, Frontier Economics

Elsa Chen, Allen & Gledhill

Simon Bishop, RBB Economics

15:20 – 16:40 International cartel enforcement

Moderated by Bill Reid, Ashurst

Scott Clements, Drew & Napier

Suhail Nathani, Economic Laws Practice

Zhang Handong, Chairman, National Development and Reform Commission,

People's Republic of China (NDRC)

16:40 Onwards - Delegates are invited to attend a cocktail reception kindly hosted by

Shearman & Sterling

Day Two

9:05- 11:00 North Asia roundtable

Moderated by Susan Ning, King & Wood Mallesons

Jet Zhisong Deng, Dentons Beijing Office

Mark Ohlson, Yangming Partners

Alvin Hiromasa, Shiozaki, Nishimura & Asahi

Hoil Yoon, Yoon & Yang

Sadaaki Suwazono, Japan Fair Trade Commission

Sung Keun Kim, Korea Fair Trade Commission

Register Online at GlobalCompetitionReview.com/Singapore2016 For any queries, please contact +44 207 467 0174

State Administration for Industry and Commerce (invited)

11:20 – 12:40 IP & Antitrust

Moderated by George Addy, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg

Joy Fuyuno, Microsoft

Jim Jeffs, , Intel

Burton Ong, University of Singapore

Miguel Rato, Shearman & Sterling

M. Auraellia Wang, Google

12:40 Networking lunch sponsored by Drew & Napier

13:45 – 15:15 GCR Live Oxford Union-style debate

Motion: "To what extent should information exchange be regulated?"

Moderated by H. Stephen Harris, Jr., Winston & Strawn

Atul Chitale, Supreme Court of India

Ninette Dodoo, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer

Mark Jephcott, Herbert Smith Freehills

Lisa Mather, Colgate-Palmolive Company

Sharon Tan, ZICOlaw

15:15 – 5:20 Chairs' closing remarks and Close of conference

Registration fees

For the full programme please visit: www.globalcompetitionreview.com/Singapore2016

To register at the Drew & Napier discounted rate of £800, please click here.

If you have any questions about the conference please contact Sophie Guest at

sophie.guest@globalcompetitionreview.com

We hope you will be able to join us in Singapore for what promises to be a day of lively debate and

unparalleled insight and networking.

Administrative details

Cancellations

Cancellations received in writing on and before 8 January will receive a refund less 10%. Cancellations received on and between 9 January and 28 January will receive a refund less 50%. Cancellations received on and after 29 January will not receive a refund. Substitute delegates are welcome at any time.

Programme changes

It may be necessary for reasons beyond the control of the organisers to change the date, timing or speakers.

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The personal information provided when registering will be held on a database and may be shared with other Law Business Research publications. If you do not want us to use your information for marketing purposes, please contact GCRLive@globalcompetitionreview.com