Jake MolloyRegional Organiser

RMT

Piper Alpha

Brent Bravo

Deepwater Horizon

Summary

Occidental CEO;

“I took the absence of information indicating anything was wrong as confirmation that all was ok!”

The Cullen InquiryPara’ 21.74;

“The representation of the workforce in regard to safety matters is important not merely for what it achieves on installations but also for the effect which it has on the morale of the workforce – in showing that their views are taken into account and that they are making a worthwhile contribution to their own safety. For this purpose it is clearly advisable to have statutory provisions which are well known, universally applied in similar circumstances and effective in operation.”

Workforce input on operations:

Leaks in various bits of pipe work. If you apply the same principles as the Incident Triangle then surely it's inevitable that a more serious leak is lurking around the corner.

The prevailing concern this trip is undoubtedly the Maintenance Strategy. Concern also about a lack of direction with regards to pipe wrapping and leaks.

The maintenance strategy is still very much on people's minds and is diluting focus elsewhere. Pipe wrapping is a constant source of questions.

Technowrap. Several constituents were unhappy with the reported statements from management where it was suggested that on a wrap by wrap basis temporary repairs would be checked and if okay would be classified as permanent repairs.

The Health and Safety Executive response:

“The changes do not present any imminent risks to the health and safety of those persons working on your installations.”

US Chemical Safety And Hazard Investigation Board Investigation Report Volume 1 Explosion And Fire At The Macondo Well Report No. 2010-10-I-OS

“On the day of the April 20 tragedy, no effective safeguards were in place to eliminate or minimize the consequences of a process safety incident. The safeguards (or barriers) intended to prevent such a disaster were not properly constructed, tested, or maintained, or they had been removed. The management systems intended to ensure the required functionality, availability, and reliability of these safety critical barriers were inadequate. Ultimately, the barriers meant to prevent, mitigate, or control a blowout failed on the day of the accident.”

US Chemical Safety And Hazard Investigation Board Investigation Report

Volume 3

Explosion And Fire At The Macondo Well

Report No. 2010-10-I-OS

“The risk management policies of both BP and Transocean promote an incident-free workplace. BP’s 2008 major corporate safety Operating Management System (OMS) framework states, “Our goals are simply stated: no accidents, no harm to people, and no damage to the environment.” In Transocean’s 2009 Health and Safety Policy statement, the company commits to operating in an ‘incident-free workplace—all the time, everywhere’.”

US Chemical Safety And Hazard Investigation Board Investigation Report Volume 4Explosion And Fire At The Macondo Well Report No. 2010-10-I-OS

“The only other mechanism in SEMS [Safety and Environmental Management Systems] directly addressing worker involvement besides EPP [Employee Participation Plan] are the Stop-Work Authority (SWA) provisions; however, SWA provisions are a weak substitute for worker involvement in major accident prevention offshore. A regulatory SWA provision will not be successful if the workforce is not aware of the specific safety risks of the work.”

“As one person stated, “they don’t know what they don’t know.” The stop-work programs of BP and Transocean allowed for any employee to call for a stop work to intervene in hazardous operating conditions, but without clear understanding of the risks, the workforce is hindered from effectively identifying situations when major hazard risk barriers have been compromised and, thus, will be less likely to initiate a stop work.”

US Chemical Safety And Hazard Investigation Board Investigation Report Volume 4Explosion And Fire At The Macondo Well Report No. 2010-10-I-OS

“Placing “the responsibility and authority” to halt dangerous activities on workers can create a culture of assigning blame to workers. The provision discusses that workers should not fear reprisal for initiating an SWA; however, the regulation does not speak to the protections granted to those who arguably failed to initiate an SWA when circumstances might have seemed to require it. If workers do not have a sufficient awareness of the hazards of an activity, they may be blamed or criticized after an incident for failing to initiate a stop work. Essentially, a worker is confronted with the dilemma of choosing between facing criticism (or worse) for stopping work or being blamed for failure to act.”

US Chemical Safety And Hazard Investigation Board Investigation Report

Volume 3

Explosion And Fire At The Macondo Well

Report No. 2010-10-I-OS

“Performance Judged “Good” or “Bad” Depending on the Outcome”

“Error-free performance is unattainable, largely because the performance decision or action is subjectively judged erroneous or error-free based on the outcome. After an incident, the decisions and actions of those immediately involved in the event are invariably criticized. Personnel have broken rules, not followed procedures, and made “illogical” decisions. However, the CSB has frequently found that decisions and actions labeled as “poor” post-incident were previously accepted, and sometimes even rewarded.”

A fundamental part of everything we do

July 1988

April 2010