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ITU-T Workshop on SecuritySeoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
Telecommunication network reliability
Dr. Chidung LAC
france telecom R&D 2ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
Outline
Dependability and survivabilityAvailability assessment Recovery mechanisms
Physical layer ATM network IP level
From random non-intentional to provocated failures
france telecom R&D 3ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
Dependability and survivability (1/2)
Quality of Service
AccessibilityService
continuitySecurity Ease of use Billing
Availability Performances
Degradedstate
Nominalstate
Survivability
france telecom R&D 4ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
Dependability and survivability (2/2)
Unavailability
Reliability
MaintenancesupportMaintainability
Traffic engineering
Systemcapacity
Offeredtraffic
Grade ofservice
FailuresCongestion
Abnormalsituations
Natural disasters(Safety)
Man-made events(Security)Dependability
Networkelements
france telecom R&D 5ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
Availability assessment methodology
Identification of elements contributing to the service’s unavailability (equipments, cable infrastructure, OAM errors, …)
Block diagram representation (series, parallel) of these elements taking into account network architecture (redundancy, …)
Allocation of a failure rate and a repair time MTTR to each element
Estimated values from equipments vendors () Use of field data (, MTTR)
Service unavailability and failure rate assessment
france telecom R&D 6ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
Availability assessment : example (1/2)
Optical distribution frame
Amplifier
ADM
ADM
Optical fiber
WDM
WDM WDM
WDM
WDM
WDM
ADM
france telecom R&D 7ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
Availability assessment : example (2/2)
Powersupply
Powersupply
Backplane
Tributaryunit
Opticalaggregate
Clock
Clock
ADM block diagram representation
Unavailability and failure rate calculation
UBoard i = Board i * MTTRBoard i
USerial system = UBoard j
UParallel system = UBoard k UADM
Serial system = i
Parallel system = U2U1 ADM
Board i Failurerate
i (h-1)
MTTRi
(h)
Unavailability
Ui
Tributary unit 3 10-5 1,5 4,5 10-5
Backplane 1 10-5 1,5 1,5 10-5
… … … …
france telecom R&D 8ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
Pre-WDM networks protection
Automatic protection switching
Link 1
Link 2
Source
Working link
Backuplink
1+1 1:1
Destination
1:n
...
n working links
m:n
...
...
Source
Source
Source
Destination
Destination
Destination
m backup links
Backuplink
n working links
france telecom R&D 9ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
Pre-WDM self-healing rings (1/2)
Unidirectional rings
Backupring
Workingring
A
B
A
B
Link protection (1:1)
Path 1
Path 2
B
A
B
Failure
Path protection (1+1)
Failure
A
france telecom R&D 10ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
Pre-WDM self-healing rings (2/2)
Bidirectional rings
2-fiber ring
B
A
A
B
...
Unused backup bandwidth
...
4-fiber ring
A
Backuprings
B
A
Failure
Backup bandwidth used
Failure
...
Workingrings
B
france telecom R&D 11ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
Pre-WDM meshed networks restoration
1 2 3
4
7
5
8 9
6
1 2 3
4
7
5
8 9
6
Failure
Around the failure
1 2 3
4
7
5
8 9
6
Failure
End-to-end
Failure
1 2 3
4
7
5
8 9
6
Local-destination
france telecom R&D 12ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
WDM rings protection
2-fiber bidirectional
rings
Shared wavelenght
Failure
C
D
C
D
C D
C D
C D
C D
C D
C D
C D
C
D
C
D
Failure
C D
C D
C D
C D
france telecom R&D 13ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
WDM meshed networks (1/2)
Link protection
1 2 3
4 5 6
Dedicated approach
1 2 3
4 5 6
Shared approach
Failure1 2 3
4 5 6
or
Failure
Failure
Failure
france telecom R&D 14ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
WDM meshed networks (2/2)
Path protection
1 2 3
4 5 6
Dedicated approach
1 2 3
4 5 6
Failure
1 2 3
4 5 6
Shared approach
or
Failure
Failure
Failure
france telecom R&D 15ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
ATM network (1/2)
ATM v/s SDH-SONET Bandwidth on-demand v/s no dynamic bandwidth control Bursty traffic v/s switched services, private lines Logical v/s physical path structure Variations of VPs and VCs’ capabilities (from 0 to the physical link rate) v/s fixed capacities
Non-hierarchy v/s hierarchy path capacity Separation of capacity allocation and physical route assignment
for VPs and VCs OAM bandwidth with allocation on demand delay reduction for
restoration message exchange, quicker detection of system degradation
Faster detection of soft failure
france telecom R&D 16ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
ATM network (2/2)
Automatic protection switching VPs or VCs used as links (protection units)
1+1 : connection switching by the receiver side node (from working to backup link)
1:1 : switching done both by the transmitter side and the receiver side nodes
Self-healing network Distributed control restoration scheme More effective resource utilization Dynamic planned scheme : flooding algorithm to locate restoration routes
Preplanned scheme : predetermination of the optimal alternate route and pre-assignement of a backup VP to each VP
france telecom R&D 17ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
IP level
Recovery mechanisms proposed for MultiProtocol Label Switching
Architecture used : Integrated Services with Resource Reservation Protocol (signaling protocol)
Differentiated Services
Main recovery modes : Link protection 1+1 and 1:1 Path protection Restoration/rerouting : on-demand establishment of Label Switched Paths
france telecom R&D 18ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
From random non-intentional to provocated failures
Telcos’ poor experience in the domain
Example of assessment difficulty : how to apply mathematical failure rate distribution ?
Possible directions : Infrastructure’s protection : security reinforcement Logical intrusion : main challenge with actual’s networks interfunctioning (operators’ networks, Internet, …)
Behavior modelling : human factors applied to volontary acts
Some initiatives : Critical Infrastructure Protection cascading effects due to interdependencies among different domains
IEEE DIREN’02, New York, June 2002
france telecom R&D 19ITU-T Workshop on Security
Seoul (Korea), 13-14 May 2002
To probe further
IEEE Communications – Issue on Survivable communication networks, August 1999
IEEE Communications – Issue on Resilience in communication networks, January 2002
IEEE Network – Issue on Network and service security, Nov/Dec 2002 ITU-T, Rec. E.800, Terms and definitions related to QoS and network
performance including dependability Network reliability steering committee, Alliance for telecommunications
industry solutions, http://www.atis.org T1A1.2 WG on Network Survivability Performance,
Reliability/availability framework for IP-based networks and services, Draft technical report, July 2001