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Is peace possible? The caseof Sri LankaMagnus Norell aa Senior Analyst at the Swedish NationalDefence College ,Published online: 20 Sep 2007.
To cite this article: Magnus Norell (2000) Is peace possible? The case of SriLanka, Civil Wars, 3:4, 105-118, DOI: 10.1080/13698240008402457
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698240008402457
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Is Peace Possible? The Case of Sri Lanka
MAGNUS NORELL
Since the 'Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam' (LTTE) took up arms tofight for an independent homeland in the north and north-east partsof Sri Lanka in 1983, tens of thousands of people have been killed,wounded or driven from their homes. At the beginning of themillennium, new peace initiatives have surfaced with Norwayemerging as a major external player. These initiatives coincided withthe launch of yet another offensive from the LTTE. The fightingsubsided somewhat during the summer of 2000 with both sidesseemingly locked in a war of attrition and unable to gain the initiative.This stalemate is also the result of war weariness and battle fatiguethat has sapped the strength of the LTTE, making governmentovertures for peace and limited self-rule more attractive to many inthe Tamil population than ever before. This prescriptive study of theconflict, based on the author's own firsthand experience argues thatthere now exists a 'window of opportunity', a window through whicha stable ceasefire, as well as moves towards a longer term politicalsolution to the war, can now be viewed as distinct possibilities.
In February 2000, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Knut Vollebaek, madea short visit to Sri Lanka having been invited to explore the possibility ofOslo assuming the role as a peace broker between the Sinhalese-dominatedgovernment in Colombo and the Tamil rebels led by the Liberation Tigersof Tamil Elam (LTTE). The message he conveyed during an impromptupress conference was one of cautious optimism. He declared that, 'Theconflict in Sri Lanka can only be solved by political means. A basis fordialogue must be established between the parties....We have also discussedmodalities for commencing direct talks...this places a heavy responsibilityon the parties themselves."
Since then the war has raged on, with the LTTE poised once again tocapture Jaffna, the 'capital' of the Jaffna Peninsula, part of the declared'heartland', seen by Tamil rebels as an integral part of their territorial claimsto an independent state. At present (November 2000) there would appearlittle prospect of peace talks commencing that could halt the longest andbloodiest civil war in South Asia, even though representatives from the Sri
Civil Wars, Vol.3, No.4 (Winter 2000), pp.105-118PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
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Lankan government, following the Norwegian initiative in February, havemade several comments to the effect that negotiations are the only realisticway of solving the conflict.2
This study does not deal with the history of the conflict, but rather withthe eventual possibilities of actually finding ' the modalities' to make peacethat Mr Vollebaek referred to in February 2000. After nearly 20 years ofarmed conflict it is clear that war weariness is widespread among thewarring parties. Over the years, the war has developed, or perhaps more tothe point, mutated into a vicious sectarian conflict where terrorism (mainlyin the form of suicide bombings) and collective punishment have becomecommonplace. The conflict has penetrated into every aspect of Sri Lankansociety, making it impossible to tackle the widespread poverty and ailingeconomy that marks contemporary Sri Lanka. In short, defining the'modalities' of a peaceful resolution to the conflict has become integral toany attempt to break the cycle of internecine violence that has so blightedthe history and politics of Sri Lanka.
THE SCENE
When the long-awaited LTTE offensive began in November 1999 thefighting escalated rapidly. Initially, the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) sufferedsevere losses in both men and material, while the capture of the strategicElephant Pass, the gateway into the Jaffna peninsula by the LTTErepresented a major battlefield defeat for the government forces. This forcedthe SLA to evacuate army bases elsewhere on the peninsula for fear thatthey would be outflanked by the Tamil rebels. The real prize, however, thecity of Jaffna itself, proved beyond the 'Tigers' capability to capture. Atpresent the city is still in government hands. Even though the fighting hasflared from time to time around the city and elsewhere in the north-east ofSri Lanka, the result of the fighting has been a military stalemate. Suchattrition underlines fact that the LTTE lacks the logistical capability toimpose a critical decision on Colombo through military means alone.
The war ravaging Sri Lanka falls within the paradigm of a classicguerrilla struggle between opponents using completely different tactics andmodes of combat. This is underlined when comparing the size of the armywith the estimated number of LTTE fighters.3 The much larger governmentarmy is severely hindered by being forced to fight in unfamiliar terrain,where the LTTE have built up an infrastructure, geared towards keeping thewar capabilities of the LTTE intact. The much larger government army hasbeen unable to crush the rebels despite heavy investment of men andmaterial in the war effort. Not even the intervention of an Indian army
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expedition force in 1987 managed to oust the rebels from their strongholdsin the north and north-east of the Jaffna peninsula.
In early September 2000 the SLA launched another offensive with theexpressed purpose of driving the LTTE from areas the organisation capturedin late 1999. Whatever the final outcome of that offensive (still ongoing atthe time of writing) it is clear that at present there is no military solution tothe conflict. In reality, the SLA lacks sufficient means, both in terms of menand material to both defeat the LTTE militarily and subdue a restive andresentful Tamil population. But equally, the LTTE lacks both the militarycapability and political leverage that would force the government inColombo to accede to Tamil demands for full independence.
Moreover, it should be recognised that among the Tamil communityitself, the LTTE does not enjoy total support. During the time theorganisation ruled Jaffna, it ran a rather harsh regime, killing or imprisoningpolitical opponents and expelling non-Tamil populations, most notablymembers of the Muslim population living in the province. Such actionsproved to Sri Lankans, including many Tamils, that a long-term solutionmust lie in a political compromise where all sides would have to have a sayin the running of the province.
MODALITIES FOR PEACE: THE REQUISITES
A peace without a peace treaty, but entailing more than only a ceasefire, isa concept that has been tried successfully in other conflicts. Examples canbe taken from the Middle East, where, before any peace treaties were signedbetween Israel on the one hand, and Egypt, the PLO and Jordanrespectively, formal peace treaties and principles of agreement werepreceded by periods of 'de-tensioning'. This de-tensioning includingconfidence-building measures that focused upon on-going unofficialcontacts to ensure that no fighting erupted. Often this was facilitatedthrough third parties. Thus, a base was established upon which, when thetime was ripe, a more formal peace structure could be built.4 The mostrecent example of this process has occurred between Lebanon and Israel.Following the unilateral withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)from south Lebanon in May 2000, a period of de-tensioning followed whichincluded attempts to ensure the structures of peaceful co-existence werediscussed, and to some extent put in place, to negate the outbreak of anyrenewed hostilities on Israel's northern border.5
The structures discussed after the Israeli withdrawal includeddeployment of Lebanese security forces as well as civil police forces inLebanese towns and villages adjacent to the border fence. In addition
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elements of the United Nations forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were deployedcloser to along the border though not in the numbers deemed necessary byIsrael. Indeed, the necessity of an enlargement of the present UNIFIL forcewas acknowledged by the states providing troops to the force. In theory,UNIFIL should have coordinated with Lebanese security forces in ensuringa quiet border, but such cooperation and coordination has, to date, remainedsomewhat limited. To be fully effective operationally, UNIFIL's mandatewould have to be expanded providing greater operational freedom to meetthe new security situation.
Part of the security structure that has emerged between Israel andLebanon has been the erection of a 'security fence' by Israel complete withelectronic 'trigger-devices' for the detection of intruders. To boost thisfence a 'rapid reaction force' able to counter any attempt to infiltrate acrossthe border has been established by the IDF. Ideally, such a joint force shouldbe created to patrol both sides of the border. The construction of this borderfence would appear to correlate to the old adage that good borders makegood neighbours. While clear political constraints imposed by Damascuslimit the ability of the Lebanese government to engage Israel in aconstructive security dialogue, a quiescent border between the two at leastoffers the possibility that the foundations for such a dialogue can at least belaid under UN auspices.
Two things in particular stand out in these peace processes: first, it ispossible to lay a foundation for peace treaties through indirect and/orunofficial contacts, with the limited goal of putting an end to the actualfighting and making sure the 'peace' or 'ceasefire' does hold. Theseprocesses, as the case of Lebanon and Israel demonstrates, can take placebetween very hostile adversaries amid a very volatile regional environment.
Second, real and more long-term results concerning this form ofpeacemaking can emerge as a result of bilateral, or sometimes trilateral,negotiations. Both these major features of conflict resolution are ofrelevance to the war in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, in the case of Sri Lankathere is a history of attempts to reach a solution to the conflict. Theseattempts have all failed to create a long-term solution but at the same timehas generated a pool of experience in negotiations that can be drawn uponin attempts to reach a durable peace.
In the context of Sri Lanka, low-key and/or indirect and unofficialcontacts can be successful, even with the very limited goal of just reachinga ceasefire. Both during the most recent fighting and for example during theperiod when Jaffna remained under the control of the LTTE (until 1995),various locally negotiated ceasefires geared to solve specific problems werereached successfully. The most recent example occurred in October 2000
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when the government, via local negotiators, and the LTTE agreed to letmedical personnel distribute inoculations to children in the area of fighting.
Such measures are very important since a persistent problem in earlierattempts to reach agreements in the case of Sri Lanka is that the 'goal',defined as a full peace settlement, has been too ambitious and failed to takeinto account the necessity of a 'cooling-off' period. When the stipulated andvery often highly-publicised goal of a real peace has not been achieved, theprocess has been marked a major failure and the whole idea of reaching apeaceful solution thrown into serious doubt. This has in turn opened the wayfor renewed fighting, strengthening the 'hardline' positions on both sidesand as a result, weakening the voices calling for some form of politicalaccommodation.
The situation in Sri Lanka does nonetheless, contain one advantage overthe Arab-Israeli conflict. In Sri Lanka there is already a structure in placewhereby third parties (whoever they turn out to be) can communicate withboth sides.6 How 'long-term' and how formal this peacemaking will turn outto be remains of course to be seen, but the mere fact that third parties canbe used successfully in this type of situation should be encouraging. To datehowever, peace initiatives in Sri Lanka have been marked by a lack ofpolitical will by all sides, either unilaterally or bilaterally to make thenecessary compromises required for establishing the basis of a peacefulsolution.
The most apposite example of such intransigence was the assassinationof President Premadasa in 1990 by the LTTE even though the governmentand LTTE were in the middle of negotiations. Moreover, the Sri Lankangovernment has in the past transferred weapons to be used against the IndianPeace Keeping Force as well as handing over several military bases to theLTTE, all in the misguided attempt to win the confidence of the LTTE. TheLTTE for all intents and purposes, has used periods of relative calm in thefighting to build up their strength and stock up on military hardware. Itturned out to be a successful operation since the end result was the captureand occupation of the Jaffna peninsula by the LTTE for the next five years.
What examples from the Middle East, as well as earlier, local, efforts toachieve peace in Sri Lanka demonstrate is that in addition to halting theactual violence, structures have to be put in place to hinder renewed fightingif negotiations should (temporarily) break down. Even more important forfuture peacemaking efforts, there has to be a long-term strategy of resolvingthe conflict beyond just stopping the shooting war, something that has beenclearly lacking in earlier attempts. If that will is lacking no lasting peace willbe achieved. The current military stalemate has however, brought about a'window of opportunity'. If exploited to the full, the present situationcontains a unique opening for peace.
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STEPS TOWARDS PEACE
The stalemate, resulting both from the recent fighting as well as theoutcome of the general election in October 2000,7 has laid the groundworkfor possible renewed peace initiatives that can pave the way for third partyintervention aiming at getting the parties back to the negotiating table. This,in turn, provides a chance for a political solution to be seriously considered.Indeed, both sides have acknowledged that the conflict will have to end witha negotiated settlement. To date however, both sides have prevaricatedabout engaging in actual negotiations, stating that the time is not right.
However, the LTTE, as well as the people in the North are in desperateneed of a respite from fighting that failed to produce tangible military orpolitical results. At the same time the government in Colombo has facedgrowing political pressure in the rest of the country over the apparentinability to reach a successful outcome to the war. Following the electionsin October 2000, the government put forward a wide-ranging 'devolutionpackage' that aimed to address at least some of the grievances of the Tamilpopulation. During the last year both Norway and India have been active intrying to facilitate renewed negotiations between the Sri Lankangovernment and the LTTE, a clear indication that third parties now believethat the political environment (regionally as well as internationally) is nowchanged in favour of a political solution.
As stated previously, the military option for both sides has clearly beenexhausted. The Sri Lankan armed forces have been unable to build up theright level of training and experience to end the war successfully. This is notfor lack of skilled officers or 'bad' soldiers, but because of the limitedresources available in building up a viable offensive capability. The resulthas been an army ill equipped to prosecute a counter insurgency campaignto a successful conclusion.8
This 'ripeness' in the regional environment has manifested itself bothinternally in Sri Lanka and in a heightened Indian interest in solving theconflict peacefully. In Sri Lanka the current stalemate has producedrenewed contacts between the government and the LTTE in reachingagreements concerning humanitarian efforts to provide medical assistanceto the population in areas where fighting occurred. Here, the embryo for amore long-term negotiating process has begun to emerge.
There are two main reasons for the heightened and renewed interestshown by New Delhi in promoting an end to the conflict in Sri Lanka.
The first reason is the situation in the Indian province Tamil Nadu.There, pressure from across the local political spectrum has demanded thatthe federal government get involved to help the Tamils across the straits in
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Sri Lanka to reach a fair deal. Traditionally, support for the LTTE andaffiliated groups in Sri Lanka, has been solid. In the last year, however, arealisation that the current war is not going to resolve the Tamil question hasled to the conclusion that a political solution based on a compromise withColombo remains the best option available, promising as it does sometangible political gains for the Tamil population.
The second reason is more strategic. India has long looked upon itself asa regional power with interests across South Asia. The worsening situationin Kashmir and inside Afghanistan has driven home the point that thesimmering conflict in Sri Lanka draws both military resources and politicalmaneuverability away from the far more serious conflicts facing India alongits borders with Pakistan. In sum then, the current situation, politically aswell militarily, presents a 'window of opportunity' for pushing a politicalprocess that at least could lead up to a ceasefire agreement. Once established,this has the potential to develop into a more permanent agreement.
THE VIEW FROM 'GOVERNMENT HOUSE'
In several offensives since 1995 (when the city of Jaffna was retaken afternearly five years of LTTE control) the army failed to break the LTTE andforce a political solution to end the conflict. Clearly this has fostered a moremature and realistic understanding of the conflict on the part of thegovernment, as well as among the military establishment itself. The fact thatthe Army is still built up as a professional force, with no conscription, pointsto an understanding on part of the defence forces that resources are finitewith procurement determined by a rather narrow economic framework. Thisclearly has implications for the way the government can and will fight theLTTE. Only so much can be achieved by military means and this knowledgeis generally accepted at least within the higher echelons of the military. Theconclusion is that the defence forces can contain, but not resolve, theconflict. For this to be achieved a political solution is needed.
This view among the military was brought home very clearly to theauthor in several interviews conducted with military and political leaders inFebruary 2000 during a lecture tour of Sri Lanka.9 Opinions expressed bythe Army Chief of Staff, Major General Lionel Balagalle, the Minister ofForeign Affairs, Lakshman Kadirgamar, and from top leaders of theintelligence community, all pointed in the direction of a political solutionprovided, of course, that the LTTE would be. willing to accept a negotiatedsolution.10 Parallel with the understanding for a political solution thereremained however a deep suspicion as to how serious the LTTE leadershipreally was when it came to entertaining the idea of a negotiated solution.
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The internal parliamentary divisions between the government,dominated by the Peoples Alliance (PA) and the main opposition partyUnited National Party (UNP) has centred around the so-called 'devolutionpackage' that the government have presented as its major tool for bringingabout a peaceful solution. In short, the package is intended to give theTamils in the north and east a substantial measure of self-rule, but not fullindependence. This position has been contested by the opposition as goingto far in accommodating the LTTE. However, when 'push comes to shove',the opposition can probably be counted on to support a compromisesolution. After all, the UNP has, when in government, put forth peaceinitiatives of its own, initiatives based on a limited self-rule for the northernand eastern provinces. When election rhetoric is taken away, severalstatements by opposition leaders point in that direction. Underlying thisposition is probably an understanding that the general population is warweary and will support whoever can deliver on the peace deal.
This is not to underestimate the resentment among those portions of themajority Sinhalese that for a long time have opposed any compromisesolution with the LTTE. Fearing that even a very small measure of self-ruleto the Tamils would effectively mean the end of Sri Lanka as a state. Duringthe later part of the 1980s these groups, centred around the radical Sinhaleseyouth movement Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna ('The peoples liberation front')created havoc in the country using terror as a means to intimidate Tamilcommunities (adopting methods employed by the 'Tigers') that resulted inthe deaths of thousands of people before finally being suppressed in 1990.
Today, smaller groups that still oppose any Tamil self-rule, in whatevershape or form remain an obstacle to any deal, but it remains unlikely thatthey enjoy enough support among the majority Sinhalese to undermine anagreement altogether. The government decision to hold parliamentaryelections in October should also be seen in this light. The calculation wasmade that a passing of the 'devolution package' in the new parliamentwould create the necessary base for continued, or renewed, negotiationswith the LTTE, in whatever shape or form.
THE 'TIGER' PERSPECTIVE
For the LTTE, the military successes in late 1999 and in the spring of 2000failed to bring about the recapture of Jaffna city, the real prize in their questfor independence. Neither could it hide the fact that the organisation lackssufficient resources to force the hands of the government and achieve realindependence. The failure to retake Jaffna, despite inflicting heavy losses ongovernment forces, was probably a far more severe setback than the LTTE
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would like to admit. This in itself could be reason enough to re-enternegotiations with the government from a position of relative strength. Itremains unclear however, if this reality has been fully understood oraccepted within the closely-knit leadership clique that runs the LTTE.
It is one thing for political spokespersons for the LTTE to declare theirsupport for an end to the war before the international community . It is quiteanother story however as to whether this really reflects the will of the leaderof the LTTE, Vellupillai Prabakharan. It often creates problems innegotiations if representatives from one side sit too far away from the realdecision-makers. A major reason for the failure of earlier peace initiativeswas the fact that the people representing the LTTE could not communicatewith the leadership in a smooth way without encountering severe practicalproblems. In a situation that is already fraught with suspicion and mutualmistrust, poor lines of communication between the leadership and theirrepresentatives in negotiations can undermine moves towards a resolutionto the conflict.
At present the LTTE is built up on two 'pillars'; the military and thepolitical wing. The military wing contains special operations groups, anaval section called the 'Sea Tigers', intelligence, weapons procurement,'Women's Front', communication, police, finance, a military office andeven an air wing called the 'Air Tigers'. This military wing runs parallel toa political wing containing 'ministries' that embrace a health, arts andculture, education, women's rights, a judicial structure , economicdevelopment and political and administration centres. These variousmilitary and political branches are established on a local level throughoutthe north and north-east of the Jaffna peninsula.
Nonetheless, it remains clear that the military 'pillar' of the LTTEdominates the decision-making process of the organisation. This representsa structural problem that the LTTE, sooner or later, will have to tackle sinceit harms its ability to conduct meaningful negotiations. The lack of 'internaldemocracy' inside the LTTE remains problematic and constitutes a majorimpediment in the ability of the LTTE to transform itself from a more or lesspurely military organisation to one where a political echelon remainsdominant. This is not to say that the LTTE does not pursue political goals,but merely to point out that the military structure of the organisationremains incongruent to the broader need for a more inclusive politicalstructure. Such reform to the structure of the LTTE is clearly needed if theorganisation wishes to claim a broad legitimacy among the Tamilpopulation on whose behalf it claims to have fought the war.
The LTTE is a centralised organisation where the decision-making processis very much in the hands of Vellupillai Prabakharan whose domination of the
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LTTE is rubber-stamped with the help of a Central Committee." All throughits existence the LTTE has invested as much effort in trying to dominate thepolitical field within the Tamil community as they have in fighting against thegovernment. During the years when the LTTE controlled the Jaffna peninsulapolitical opposition was either crushed or subdued in order for the LTTE tobecome the dominant player. The success of this policy is clearly obvioustoday when the LTTE, from a distance, can still influence proceedings withinTamil political parties in the Sri Lankan parliament.
A further structural problem for the LTTE is the very centralised andsecretive way the organisation is run. This means that whoever wants to talkto the LTTE has to do so initially through a third party, even if that thirdparty is closely affiliated with LTTE. In the initial stages of a negotiatingprocess this is perhaps understandable. Eventually however, a morepersonal 'rapprochement' will be needed for a successful peace process.
Given the highly stratified nature of the LTTE, personal diplomacyconducted by key individuals within the organisation remains key to futurenegotiations achieving tangible progress. Experience from the Middle Eastas well as from other conflicts in South and South East Asia, such as EastTimor, demonstrate the key role that individuals have played in securingsettlements, however fragile.
This structural and organisational dilemma is something that the LTTEhas in common with other nationalist-separatist organisations. Thedifference lies however in that while organisations like the PLO and thePKK have conducted extensive and relentless efforts to court theinternational community, the LTTE has focused almost entirely on its ownconstituency, including the build-up of an extensive economic network innorthern Sri Lanka, India, and among the wider Tamil diaspora.12
While organisations such as the PLO, IRA and the Hizb'allahconsciously tried to gain support from the wider international communityand in the process dispatched representatives to court actively worldopinion, the LTTE has a leader who goes public once a year (during anannual Tamil festival) and then only to address his own community. Thereason for such caution remains the fear of assassination attempts sponsoredby the Sri Lankan government. But in comparison one can take another'international fugitive' for many years, Yasser Arafat, who, despite personalthreats against his own life by a multitude of state and non-state actors, stillpressed the Palestinian cause in person around the globe.13
This problem ties in with another essential feature of peace building andconflict resolution, namely the necessity of having a long-term goal that canbe accommodated politically. In order to achieve this a political vision forthe future is needed. It is not enough to strive for 'independence'. A far
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more persistent and important question is what type of independence isbeing pursued. Is it, for example, inclusive in terms of ethnicity or exclusiveto the point where ethnic minorities can expect few, if any political or civilrights in any new dispensation that may emerge. At present, suchclarification is conspicuous by its absence among the LTTE leadership. Inthe case of the PLO for example, this was done by trying to base themselveson a wider support group than just their own constituency. It also made itpossible for Arafat to construct a political structure that switched theemphasis of the Palestinian national movement away from the 'armedstruggle' to a political struggle since it now enjoyed broad internationallegitimacy as well as commanding the allegiance of Palestinians throughoutthe Arab world and among its own diaspora.
This is a crucial point to bear in mind with regard to any analysis of theLTTE. In making any successful transfer from the military to the politicalsphere, it remains essential that the LTTE develops political structures thatremain inclusive. Despite dominating the Tamil political scene, the LTTEneeds to take into account that it is not the only political actor within theTamil community. Indeed, despite a position of unrivalled power derivedfrom its military capability it has a special responsibility to accommodateother Tamil political forces. Basing oneself almost exclusively on a narrowlydefined ethnicity, as interpreted by the LTTE leadership, remains inimical tomeeting the minimum requirements of achieving long-term stability.
TOWARDS PRESCRIPTIVE ACTION: SOME SUGGESTIONS
It remains clear that the use of military power by both sides to achieve'victory' in the civil war in Sri Lanka has been exhausted. Based onexperience from other conflict zones, most notably the Middle East, thereare, nonetheless, several steps that can be taken in order to lay the groundfor a lasting ceasefire and a long-term solution to this bitter conflagration.
In order to exploit a 'window of opportunity' open towards a politicalsolution created by the impasse in fighting, the involvement of third partiesas mediators or objective brokers is required. The situation is ripe for suchan initiative since neither the government nor the LTTE has achieved aconclusive military victory. An immediate ceasefire, negotiated by neutralactors, would leave the parties with their limited achievements intact (thecity of Jaffna still in government hands and the LTTE with their territorialgains). Thus both parties could be negotiating from a position of 'strength'.
The immediate limited goal at this stage should not be long term, butrather to get a ceasefire agreement that would last for at least six months.That would leave sufficient time to take into consideration the results and
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implications of the October 2000 elections in Sri Lanka and to work out anagenda for renewed negotiations under third party guidance. It is importantthat this third party is trusted by both parties (a likely candidate is Norway)and that both parties are in agreement as to what role that party should have.
At this early stage, no formal guarantees towards any long-term solutioncould, or should, be made. Instead various confidence-building measurescould be created. This process could be facilitated through the third partyand could include measures such as prisoner exchanges, the creation of a'buffer zone' to minimise the risks of 'accidental' flare-ups in the fighting,and perhaps commitments not to initiate any offensive actions.
In order to ensure continued security between the government and theLTTE while the negotiations got under way, some form of outside observerpresence between and among the opposing forces should be allowed. Therewould be a twofold purpose to this: both parties could through the presenceof a 'neutral' observer have direct access to a forum to where complaintsand grievances could be brought. In addition, an indirect way ofcoordination of a sort between the government and the LTTE could beestablished, facilitating a more day-to-day communication. In the long runthis communication line could probably be used to build up smoother wayof engaging in 'practical problem solving'.
This set-up would not in any way compete with the more substantialnegotiations aimed at a more long-term solution. Instead this informalstructure could help these substantial negotiations by freeing them fromhaving to deal with issues that would be better dealt with on a local level. Theobserver force should not be made up of staff from any large conventionalorganisation such as the UN. A better choice could either be a local orregional organisation such as the Association of South East Asian Nations(ASEAN), or a group of observers put together by the third party, or parties,involved in the actual negotiations. The reason for downplaying theinternational presence through for example, an organisation such as the UN,in favour of a more regional approach is to put the onus of conflict resolutionon the immediate warring parties. The 'third party' involvement, necessaryas it is, should be kept to a minimum so as not to relieve the LTTE and theSri Lankan government of any responsibility in the quest for a solution. Nolong-term agreements will be viable if it is 'imposed' from outside.
It should be noted however, that the need for third party mediation andfacilitation has been recognised by both sides. For the LTTE it has long beena condition for peace talks that external meditation is part of the structure.The debate has focused on which country might serve this role. In thisregard, Norway and India appear to be the most likely candidates with theNorwegians in particular recognised for their skills in conflict resolution.
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Such skills can be extended to include the role as guarantor and provider ofresource and development needs in order to underwrite the peace process.14
Different parts of these activities may be required separately or incombination during the process but need not be only confined to state actors.Individuals, as well as non-governmental organisations can act as providers,particularly in the areas of healthcare and housing. In the end, successfulthird-party intervention will require a team of people, each with clearlydefined roles, foreigners as well as Sri Lankans. Defining the tasks, goals,and qualities required from the mediators remains a crucial task in itself.
During the time of the ceasefire, and while agendas and venues for peacenegotiations are worked out, efforts should be directed towards helping andameliorating the plight of the civilian population caught in the fighting.These efforts could be aimed at resettlement of refugees, financialcompensation to people who lost their homes and are unable to return and aconcerted attempt to reconstruct the civil society in and around the Jaffnapeninsula where most of the heavy fighting has occurred. Furthermore, in thetime leading up to the beginning of the peace negotiations measures shouldbe taken to ease and develop indirect, and perhaps direct, contacts betweenthe government and the LTTE. The purpose is not to force through any kindof 'recognition', but rather to find modalities for solving practical day-to-dayproblems. Again, this would be part of several efforts to build trust and a'working relationship'. This could pave the way for a solid peace agreement.
This process need not be as difficult as first glance would show. Thereis a rather long history of meetings and various forms of interaction betweenthe LTTE and several administrations in Colombo. To encourage the partiesto build on this experience should be one of the most important tasks of thefacilitating third party. Again, the main purpose is to form as solid a basisfor long-term peace and stability as possible. A basis that is firmly anchoredwithin the Sri Lankan society. Finally, the international community, with'sponsoring' parties (states, NGOs or individuals) to the fore should backthe peace process with the aim of securing a comprehensive peaceagreement. This means help to implement a 'security structure', followedby a ceasefire, between the LTTE and the government, as well as supportingthe build-up of a peaceful, long-lasting agreement that would end theconflict. External help has to be both political and financial but perhapsinclude political 'carrots' as well as diplomatic 'sticks'.
This is where the role of the international community can carry the mostweight. Various intelligence estimates claim the risk of continued fightingremains high even in the immediate aftermath of a ceasefire in Sri Lanka.Punitive measures that negate the use of violence as a political tool andtarget the transgressor are required. Carefully worded messages threatening
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political and economic sanctions could be used in this regard. If suchmeasures become necessary, it remains essential that such sanctions belevied equally against the LTTE as well as the government. Such sanctionsshould include labelling the LTTE and its affiliated groups as a terroristorganisation. By the same token, if the LTTE demonstrate a commitment topeace the 'terrorist-label' should be removed. In the end, of course, it stillrequires the belligerent parties to make a strategic decision for peace. Aslong as elites on both sides continue to at least consider violence as alegitimate means through which to achieve their respective political goals,Sri Lanka will remain in the shadow of war.
NOTES
1. The Sunday Leader, 20 Feb. 2000, p.13.2. Among the comments is an answer to a direct question by Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister,
Lakshman Kadiragamar, to the author during an interview in Colombo shortly after MrVollebaek's visit, 21 Feb. 2000.
3. Estimates varies, but sources from reliable intelligence agencies place the number of battle-ready cadres within the LTTE to between 7,000 and 9,000. These figures should, however,be treated with caution. The Sri Lankan Defence Forces total some 110,000 personnel.
4. For a more comprehensive discussion about this concept, see 'International Studies',Stockholm Foreign Policy Institute, Fall 2000, (in Swedish); 'The Middle East, peacewithout a peace treaty?' and 'Conflict resolution in the Middle East, the case of Israel vs.Lebanon'. Papers presented at the annual BRISMES conference in Cambridge, UnitedKingdom, 2-4 July 2000.
5. Unfortunately, this was not done on a large enough scale. At the time of renewed hostilitiesbetween Israelis and Palestinians in Oct. 2000, continued tensions at the border betweenIsrael and Lebanon escalated culminating with the abduction of three Israeli soldiers bymembers of Hizb'allah.
6. This structure includes not only external actors such as Norway and India. All through theconflict, low-key, more or less official contacts between the warring parties have taken place.
7. The result of the elections was that the present administration stays in power. In effect thismeans that the initiatives about 'power-sharing' (the so-called devolution packet) with theTamils can still be put forward. The government will surely see the elections as a publicendorsement of that policy.
8. In order to improve training and to become less dependent on outside facilities, an ArmyCommand and Staff College was established in Sapugaskanda in 1997.
9. The trip took place 18-25 Feb. 2000.10. Interview with Major General Lionel Balagalle, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 23 Feb. 2000;
interview with officers from Sri Lankan military intelligence (names withheld) 21 and 22Feb. 2000.
11. This Committee includes key allies of Velupillai Prabakharan. Among the central figures areAnton Balasingham (political adviser), Thamil Chelvam, seen by many as the deputy leaderof the LTTE, and Lawrence Thilgar, secretary to the International Secretariat of the LTTE.
12. For an extensive overview of the various economic enterprises run by the LTTE, or affiliatedgroups, see Rohan Gunaratna, International and Regional Security, Implications of the SriLankan Tamil Insurgency (Colombo: International Foundation of Sri Lankans 1997).
13. Another reason for this caution was given to the author by a centrally-placed Tamil sourcewho stated that Prabakharan faced threats from among the Tamil community. The sorrowand suffering he has brought upon his own people has engendered much resentment fromwithin the Tamil community.
14. Ibid.
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