Is PAKISTAN Collapsing

8/4/2019 Is PAKISTAN Collapsing

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june 18, 2011 vol xlvi no 25 EPW Economic & Political Weekly16

Is Pakistan Collapsing?

S Akbar Zaidi

From drone attacks to constant

admonishing by the Obama

administration, to a weak

economy, an insurgency and

target-killing of the non-Baloch

in Balochistan, and a weekly dose

of suicide attacks on common

people, all support a perception

that Pakistan is collapsing.

However, this conventional

understanding may not beaccurate. What these events

suggest is that there is a growing

crisis and contradiction within

and between the institutions

of the state in Pakistan and

these crises and contradictions,

evaluated differently, might offer

a completely divergent narrative.

What may be collapsing is thepolitical settlement that has

existed for many decades and this

may be a positive development.

Democractic forces have an

opportunity now to end the

militarys domination of Pakistan.

Based on a long list of events and

responses around them, one canunambiguously answer this ques-

tion as a denite yes.

For instance, to start with, and just in

the month of May 2011, we now know that

the worlds most wanted notorious man,

declared a terrorist by the world, includ-

ing the Pakistani civilian and military

establishment, was found to have been

living in close proximity of Pakistans elite

Military Academy, perhaps since 2005.

This has led to a suggestion that Pakistans

military leadership, or some elements of

it, knew this fact and had offered protec-

tion to him, and had been complicit in har-

bouring the worlds most wanted terrorist.

If not quite complicit, then the military

high command for it is only the military

which matters in this situation and in such

relationships since it holds all power and

makes all decisions was incompetent in

not knowing that he was living so close to

general headquarters (GHQ) and other

military stations, and that he was not inWaziristan, or hiding in Afghanistan, or

preferably dead and buried somewhere in

the mountainous region.

This presence of Osama bin Laden led

to an extraordinary event of United States

(US) SEAL military ofcers invading

Pakistan, violating its air space, carrying

out a military operation for 40 minutes,

destroying their own helicopter, killing

the terrorist and his accomplices, perhaps

capturing some individuals, and safely

returning to their air bases in Afghanistan.

Along with this, the US military also bur-

ied the dead bin Laden at sea, and if it

was, as one suspects, the Arabian Sea,

that would have meant another ight of

more than an hour in Pakistans air space.

This event led to a severe reprimand

and dressing-down of Pakistans military,

civil and secret services by ofcials of the

US leading the international condemna-

tion of housing a terrorist, which caused

severe embarrassment to the Pakistanimilitary. The number of times the word

duplicitous was heard from the US,

charging Pakistans military of playing a

double, or triple game, could not be count-

ed. Having provided $20 billion as aid

since 2001, the US was asking how its

money was being spent and whose side

Pakistans military really was on. While

the military was quiet it took days for it to

publicly respond to all these allegations andcharges the civilian political actors, both

in the government and outside, screamed

that the nations sovereignty had been

trampled upon, and one heard loud cries

of how dare they resonating in Parlia-

ment, and of course, in Pakistans hugely

independent media.

This leads to the call for an enquiry, a

parliamentary resolution condemning the

action, and such responses by the govern-

ment and opposition. It also led to an un-

precedented presentation by the senior

military leadership, the director general (DG)

of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in

particular, in the presence of the chief of

the army staff, to parliament. This might

have been the rst time that the military

leadership in Pakistan was made to explain

something of such national importance to

elected civilian representatives. Not fol-

lowing the defeat of the 1971 war and the

rst democratic government in Pakistan,

or after the 1977 coup or the 1988 planecrash which killed general Zia ul Haq, or

after Kargil, or following the ouster of

general Musharraf, had the military leader-

ship been asked to explain itself. This time,

the DG ISI, a serving general, offered to

resign, if asked, he added, while making

his presentation to parliament.

Mehran and Shahzad Events

Soon after these developments relating to

Osama bin Laden, a terrorist attack took

place at a militarised navy base in Karachi

where, according to different reports,

four or 10 militants held the airbase and

its residents hostage and captive, where a

state of siege lasted for around 18 hours or

so, after which the base was eventually

liberated. While there have been a

number of attacks on military establish-

ments in Pakistan over the last decade,

including one extremely embarrassing one

at GHQ in Rawalpindi in October 2009,

where numerous military men were heldcaptive, the brazen attack on PNS Mehran

in Karachi, so soon following the events

S Akbar Zaidi ([email protected]) is a

social scientist based in Karachi, Pakistan.


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Economic & Political Weekly EPW june 18, 2011 vol xlvi no 25 17

outlined above, caused considerable con-

cern amongst naval actors as well as mem-

bers of political parties and civil society.

There were calls for the resignation of the

naval chief and acknowledgement of mas-

sive military (or state) failure. It was be-

lieved that most of the attackers were

Pakistanis, the militants may have be-longed to any one of the numerous terror-

ist organisations in Pakistan, but perhaps

even to the military services themselves.

In other words, an inside job.

Soon after these series of events, a well-

respected journalist, Saleem Shahzad

who, like a number of Pakistani journal-

ists, had been reporting on terrorism and

militants perhaps the only story in town

was picked up, tortured and then mur-

dered at the end of May. In the past, when-

ever military or civilian men have been

picked up, tortured and killed by groups

which can broadly be called The Taliban/

al-Qaida, there has been an announce-

ment made that so-and-so was murdered

by such-and-such group because he was

an American or CIA agent, a traitor, or an

informant. The groups who do the killing

give their reasons. In the past, there have

been allegations that even the Military In-

telligence (MI) or ISI or some other state

institution has threatened and roughed upcivil society members and journalists.

Immediately after Saleem Shahzads

murder, the ISI issued a statement that they

did not kill the journalist. This was quite

unprecedented, since the ISI seldom make

such announcements. It was forced to do so

because Saleem Shahzad had actually been

picked up by the ISI in October 2010, some-

thing that they acknowledged, and he had

warned his friends that he was receiving

threats for his reporting. His last two stories

had argued that the Taliban had inltrated

the Pakistan navy and that the navy was

trying to cut a deal with some known mili-

tants and that the deal had gone wrong,

hence the attack on PNS Mehran.

All these events and their consequences

took place within a single month. If one

were to step back another few months and

start from January this year, at least one

(and probably many more) signicant

events and responses to it, which have a

bearing on the Pakistan-is-collapsingthesis, is worth noting. In January this

year, the governor of Pakistans largest

province, the Punjab, was assassinated in

the afternoon by his own bodyguard. His

bodyguard confessed to his crime and

claimed that he had murdered the governor

because he was trying to repeal the blas-

phemy law. This law, introduced by Zia ul

Haq in the 1980s, was meant to deliver the

death penalty to anyone almost always anon-Muslim who committed blasphemy

against the Prophet of Islam, against the

Quran or against the religion of Islam,

broadly dened. A number of individuals

are in jail on account of the blasphemy law

awaiting trial or having been sentenced,

awaiting execution. Moreover, many of those

who have been accused on account of this

law have been killed in extrajudicial kill-

ings committed by individuals or organi-

sations. With a Christian woman convicted

to death on account of the law, many indi-

viduals were agitating for amendments

and in the way individuals were targeted.

There was little mention of a repeal. The

governor of the Punjab was one of those

individuals. His assassin said that the gov-

ernor was, in fact, trying to repeal Gods

Law and hence he killed him.

Assassination of Punjab Governor

What happened after the assassination

concerns us here. Firstly, the self-confessedassassin was heralded as a champion, a

ghazi, a ghter for the cause of Islam. He

was garlanded by a large number of lawyers

when he was presented in court, and there

were few lawyers willing to take up the case

against him. While the social media such as

Facebook and the like are not as prevalent

as in Egypt and elsewhere where it has

been part of social movements recently, a

Facebook account in support of the assassin

was set up and apparently had thousands of

followers. Moreover, the overly active and

zealous electronic media had numerous

analysts appearing on live television defend-

ing the assassin, or at least not condemning

him outright, while a few, very few, liberal

participants did. The ratio of those who

thought this was a heinous crime to those

who defended him or were apologists for

his cause would be close to 1:30.

The death of the governor led to a

number of other outcomes or responses

as well. Firstly, there was complete silencefrom the main political parties, the Peoples

Party and Nawaz Sharifs Muslim League.

Very few members of either party, includ-

ing senior government and political of-

cials, dared to attend his funeral. Neither

the chief minister of the Punjab nor his

brother, Nawaz Sharif, went to pay their

condolences to the assassinated gover-

nors family in a society and culture where

such condolence visits are mandatory andcut against all personal or political preju-

dices and animosity. In death, the gover-

nor, who had a very colourful social life

and long political life, was ostracised like

he had never been when alive, only out of

fear that anyone seen sympathetic to him

would also be considered a sympathiser of

someone who actively wanted to repeal

the blasphemy law and was hence, in

some way, anti-Islamic.

One can add an even longer list of events

and their consequences and outcomes and

not dwell on the question any longer and

say that Pakistan is on the verge of collapse.

From drone attacks to constant admonish-

ing by the Obama administration, to a

weak economy, an insurgency and target-

killing of the non-Baloch in Balochistan,

and a weekly dose of suicide attacks on

common people, all support this conclu-

sion. This is now the conventional wisdom

from Pakistanis and others, as well.

However, this article argues that this isnot the case. Instead, what these and other

events suggest is that there is a growing

crisis and contradiction within and between

the institutions of the State in Pakistan and, in

fact, these crises and contradictions, evaluat-

ed differently, might offer a completely

divergent narrative. What may be collaps-

ing is the political settlement that has ex-

isted for many decades and, in fact, these

can become very positive developments.

A Different Explanation

If some of the events in the month of May

have been quite unprecedented even for

Pakistan Osama bin Laden living in

Abbottabad and then being killed by in-

vading US forces; the attack on the naval

airbase PMS Mehran in Karachi so has

been much of the reaction to these events.

There is no contesting the fact that over

the last six decades, the most dominant of all

institutions in Pakistan, without doubt, has

been Pakistans army. It has ruled directly for33 years, and has determined the direction

of the State and most of its institutions


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including political parties and general elec-

tions for almost as long. It is not just

Pakistans military which has dominated

Pakistans political and even economic

spaces, using its might to privilege itself in a

lopsided eld determined through its hege-

mony, but over the last four decades, many

of its clandestine organisations (primarilythe ISI, but also MI) have had a particularly

strong inuence in controlling the activities

of political actors, as well as institutions and

individuals who belong to civil society.

Foolish Adventures

The militarys overtly acclaimed numer-

ous foolish adventures include the 1965

war, Kargil, coups in 1957, 1977 and 1999,

and their resulting consequences of caus-

ing the loss of East Pakistan following a

brutal genocide by the Pakistani army of

its own civilians. Islamisation resulted in

the worst kind of sectarianism in Pakistan

and is the precursor to much of the mili-

tancy and fundamentalism in the name of

religion in Pakistan today, and Pakistans

military general-presidents eagerly em-

bracing front line status in 1979 and 2001,

bringing different wars home to Pakistan.

There are other crimes as well, such as dis-

carding and disregarding the Constitution,

imprisonment, victimisation and even thekilling of political and civilian opponents.

The covert adventures of Pakistans ISI are

too numerous to enlist and include sup-

posed involvement in the Mumbai attacks

of 2008 and the Mumbai bomb blasts of

1993, the Indian Parliament attack of 2001,

supporting jihad in places ranging from the

Sudan to Chechnya, Kashmir to Indonesia.

In addition, there is excessive evidence

which shows how the ISI has helped create

terrorist organisations to use in Kashmir,

Afghanistan and also at home, in Pakistan.

However, this is probably the rst time

that Pakistans military has been publicly

criticised and attacked for numerous

shortcomings which led to some of the

events in May. Neither the humiliating

loss of East Pakistan nor the stupidity of

Kargil elicited the same public response.

Of course the new non-state electronic

media has played a major role in this. Sadly,

military generals, whether in 1957, 1977 or

1999, were welcomed by civilian politiciansto take over government, always supported

by some political group or the other as

well as in Musharrafs case, by civil socie-

ty and lifestyle liberals. Since military

generals, and the military more generally,

have been seen as saviours of the nation,

there has been little criticism or opposi-

tion to their taking over power.

Hence, the space which has been created

(or won) by some sections of the non-mili-tary sector in nding some voice following

the events described above is a major de-

parture from the past. Perhaps for the rst

time, the hegemony of the military has been

questioned, even challenged, with demands

that (military) heads should roll on ac-

count of loss of Pakistans sovereignty and

strategic security failures. If the military

cannot defend Pakistans border/sovereignty,

or its own military bases, then who will, is

the question being asked, even in Parliament.

The front page of Pakistans leading

English daily,Dawn, on 8 June 2011, had

the headline: PML-N [Nawaz Sharifs

party] in Savage Attack on Generals!

According to the paper, in the National

Assembly, the role of top generals, parti-

cularly vis-a-vis the so-called war on

terror, came under scrutiny. Moreover,

the lifestyle of top generals using expen-

sive limousines, each worth eight crore

rupees and their inability to ght, is

how a senior member of Parliament refer-red to the Pakistan naval chief of staff

coming to the PNS Mehran in a BMW soon

after the attack. What is also signicant

here is not that the PML-N savagely at-

tacked the military generals in the budget

debate in the National Assembly, but such

a serious newspaper chose to use such

words as its main headline on its front

page. Television talk shows, of course,

have had a eld day in attacking the mili-

tary, again for the very rst time since the

media emerged in around 2006 or so. The

extensive revelations inDawn, reproduc-

ing memos from WikiLeaks, have shown

how the military has been complicit in the

US drone attacks, while trying to show a

nationalistic and patriotic public face.

Things That Have Changed

Before one makes the point that much has

changed in Pakistan in recent years, per-

haps sharply so since the middle of the last

decade (probably 2007), one needs toarticulate, in extremely brief form, a sen-

timent and perspective of what existed.1

Pakistan has not been a democracy for

almost all the 64 years that it has existed,

with the exception of perhaps the Z A Bhutto

era of 1971-77, although many scholars have

called that a period of civilian authoritari-

anism or even dictatorship. There are many

reasons why democracy has not existed in

Pakistan, and these range from explanationsthat the political leadership which created

Pakistan was composed of migrants from

what became independent India who had

no political roots in Pakistan, to arguments

which suggest that Pakistan was an over-

developed state, with the bureaucracy and

military being the most organised and

powerful institutions dominating the

country right from 1947 onwards.

In more recent years, the last two decade-

long military coups (1977-88, 1999-2008)

have been supported by politicians who

have even invited the military to take over

in one case, and by civil society actors and

liberals, in the second case. Both the

military generals Zia and Musharraf made

deep inroads into the non-military politi-

cal and civic sectors, creating alliances

with different groups of people. Accom-

plices were always willing partners to the

military, and collaborators were always

willing to have access to power. It has

been the access to the centre of absolutepolitical power, i e, the military, which

has allowed sections of Pakistans civilian

and political groups to support military

dictatorships. A key explanation for why

military rule has been so prolonged in

Pakistan is the presence of critical support

from different sections of society, includ-

ing justications for military rule from the

judiciary. While some actors and groups

have given willing and voluntary support

to military dictators to benet from

access to the seat of power, others have

been bought over, bribed, cajoled, threat-

ened and convinced with offers they

could not refuse. The long and lucrative

arms of the military have ensured that

opposition to military rule remains mut-

ed. A nal and important explanation for

why military rule persists in Pakistan is

because it has been given active diplo-

matic, military and nancial support by

the US and its allies, both in 1979 follow-

ing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistanand in 2001 following the American-led

invasion of Afghanistan.


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Economic & Political Weekly EPW june 18, 2011 vol xlvi no 25 19

Hence, through suppression, victimi-

sation, exile, as well as through accommo-

dating different groups and actors, all

backed by the powerful support of the US,

Pakistans military dictators have ruled

with ease for 20 years since 1971. However,

some things began to change in 2007.2

Again, just to summarise some of thekey developments since 2007, one can see

the rise of a broad, politically active, civil

society movement, led by lawyers asking

for the reinstatement of the chief justice of

Pakistan (and other judges) who had been

summarily dismissed by Musharraf in

March 2007. In July 2007, a mosque and

madrasa based in the heart of Islamabad

was attacked and cleared of armed mili-

tants by Pakistans law-enforcing authori-

ties resulting in many deaths estimated at

anything between 100 and 1,000.3 While

the judges were reinstated, Musharraf im-

posed an emergency, not quite martial

law, but suspending all basic and constitu-

tional rights in November 2007. In 2007,

political activity also started and formerly

exiled Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharrif

were both given permission by the military

to return to Pakistan to contest the elections.

Musharraf had cut a deal with Benazir

Bhutto where he would continue to serve as

a civilian president while she would becomehis subservient prime minister, the best

form of collaboration and accommodation

possible, far better than any attempts

made in the past, ideally suited to both, as

well as to the US ghting its war on terror.

One of the most important developments

in Pakistan in recent years has been the

electronic media explosion which has taken

place since about 2005 or 2006. When the

2002 Musharraf elections were held, there

was only one private TV channel. In 2008,

when the next elections were held there may

have been around 60 or so in regional lan-

guages, many of which were 24-hour news

and information channels. The lawyers

movement of 2007 was shown live on every

channel in Pakistan, where the 18-36 hour

long-marches of the chief justice were

watched by people of all sorts of ethnic and

class backgrounds right across Pakistan.

This was the rst live television revolution

of its kind in Pakistan, which had a huge

and enthusiastic participatory audience.The military attack on the Lal Masjid in

Islamabad mentioned above was also

shown live, as was extensive footage on

Benazirs assassination in December 2007.

This was a real media revolution which

has helped provide information and ex-

planation of events that have taken place

in Pakistan since 2007.4

Following Benazir Bhuttos assassina-

tion in December 2007, with Musharrafbasically having lost any hope of staying

on and with the military also tired and

less popular after eight years of rule, elec-

tions in 2008 brought about a victory for

the incumbent Pakistan Peoples Party

with Yousuf Raza Gilani as prime minister

and Asif Ali Zardari eventually replacing

Musharraf as president of Pakistan. One

needs to emphasise that the 2008 elec-

tions were the fairest and freest since

those held in 1970. There have been seven

elections held between 1970 and 2008,

but all have been manipulated, rigged and

predetermined, usually by the military.

Pakistan had moved from electoral politics

in the 1990s to a praetorian democracy in

2002, to an evolving and emerging demo-

cracy after 2008. Despite instability and

rumours galore about the collapsing presi-

dency or the fall of the government, a

transition to a democratic order seems to

have been made.5

And Those That Havent...

It has been the militarys material might

which has led to its domination over the

State which has given rise to the military

reinventing itself as the sole guardian of

Pakistans many boundaries, frontiers and

terrains. It has assumed the right to speak

for the nation and its constituents and to

even represent the nation. The justication

for the national security state was created

by Pakistans military and the numerous

civilians in positions of inuence and pow-

er who have provided support to the mili-

tary in one way or another. Whether using

the threat from India, or more recently as

the defenders of Pakistan in the war

against terrorism and against militancy,

the military in Pakistan has used its power

and position to create the narrative of the

national security state, a state where the

military defends the people, the frontiers

and the interests of all Pakistan.

Most recently, the militarys bluff has beencalled and it is clear that it has been unable

to determine whose interests it serves,

what those interests are, and, hence, its

inability to defend those interests. Moreo-

ver, this lack of clarity and ambiguity

about what exactly Pakistans interest

ought to be has cost the military dear in

terms of its reputation and image. It has,

in fact, seen another layer being removed

from the facade of what was justied asPakistans national security state. The fal-

sity of the notion of the national security

state has once again been laid bare.

Pakistans state, in fact, is a national

insecurity state and has been one for some

years now. The militarys inability to pro-

tect anyones interests other than its own

narrow ones, in terms of economic and

material privileges, underscores this im-

pression. However, an important point

which needs to be highlighted is that the

militarys invention of itself as the saviour

of Pakistan and as the defenders of the

land and the faith is completely justiable

when one examines the interplay and

positioning of different social forces.

Probably for the very rst time, the mil-

itary is being seen as the cause and creator

of Pakistans numerous problems and cer-

tainly not as the nations saviour. This,

despite the fact that western scholars and

hacks continue to write in their columns

and books that Pakistans army/militaryis its only hope, and that it is an ef-

cient and well-disciplined, united institu-

tion. And the US administration continues

to sidestep the freely and genuinely elected

democratic civilian government in Pakistan

(only the second one despite eight general

elections) and talk to and cut deals with

the military directly, strengthening the latter

at the cost of democracy. The criticism

and attacks on the military in the public

media have been strong and has certainly

damaged the reputation of the military,

challenging its hegemony over the state.

Why would the military not defend the

interests of its large constituency and why

should it not claim to speak as the nation

itself? Institutions which are allowed to

dominate will enforce that domination, and

this should not come as a surprise. However,

the problem in this relationship of power

between the military and civilian and (for

once) democratically elected institutions is

not so much the strength of the military, butmore importantly the cowardly, dithering

and weak civilian elites and the compromises


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they make with military power. The DGISI

who, as mentioned earlier, spoke in front of

the National Assembly after the Abbottabad

raid volunteered to resign if asked. He

was never asked.

What might be collapsing in Pakistan is

the dominance and hegemony of the mili-

tary, but for a New Pakistan to emerge,politicians will have to press for more

space and enforce public sentiment. It is

not often that one gets this chance to actu-

ally overthrow Pakistans military.

Notes

1 This section, and some of the ideas in this paperdraw on a previous article written in this journal,State, Military and Social Transition: The Improb-able Future of Democracy in Pakistan, Vol 40, No49, 2005. In that article I had argued for the im-probability of democracy taking root in Pakistan fora numerous set of reasons. However, events since2007 have proven me wrong. One certainly gets asense of a growing embeddedness of democratisa-

tion in Pakistan and that there are an increasingnumber of groups and interests in protecting andpromoting forms of democracy. What we do notknow, however, is whether this a permanent changeor a brief moment of contradiction to the norm.

2 These themes have been discussed in greaterdetail in Akbar Zaidi (2011)Military, Civil Society

and Democratisation in Pakistan (Vanguard,Lahore).

3 Many of the subsequent suicide attacks in Paki-stan are said to have been in response to thisaction by the State.

4 This is not to state that the media is necessar ily apositive motor of change, bringing in democracyand libert y, for the media in Pakistan has played adangerously reactionary role as well. Some haveargued that the media trapped the assassinatedgovernor of the Punjab into saying things that hedid not mean, which resulted in his being killed.

5 One must add that Pakistans democracy is anewly emerging democracy and comparisons

with India, or even Bangladesh, are misleading. Itis still in the stages of developing and only more

years of civilian assertion will ensure that Pakistanactually becomes a democracy.

The Battle for Land:Unaddressed Issues

Avinash Kumar

The episodes of violence in land

acquisition by the government,

as witnessed recently in

Bhatta-Parsaul in Uttar Pradesh

and in other states earlier, occur

because patterns of violence are

inbuilt into the process. Despite a

bill pending in Parliament since

2007, there has been little effort

by political parties to evolve a

consensus on acquisition of

agricultural land for

non-agricultural purposes. The

law as at present and also the

provisions of the pending bill do

not leave any scope for resistance

other than on the issue of

compensation. The UP

governments new policy on land

acquisition is an improvement but

more needs to be done.

The drive for rapid industrialisation

and urbanisation in the last one

decade has led to the rise of a large

number of protests by farmers on the issue

of land acquisition. The recent episode of

violence in the twin villages Bhatta-

Parsaul of Greater Noida in Uttar Pradesh

(UP) indicates yet another epicentre.

Though the process has not been an un-familiar one it has taken on a different

intensity and degree with the defeat of the

worlds longest democratically elected

communist regime in West Bengal which

traditionally enjoyed the support of this

class. This may well be a reason for the

Left Front to ponder over the drubbing it

received; the challenge is to understand

the larger sense of disjunction as far as the

issue of land acquisition is concerned.

Whether it is Nandigram and Singur in

West Bengal, the agitations by tribals in

Orissa, the massive resistance to land ac-

quisition in Goa, Maharashtra, Kerala,

Andhra Pradesh or the one that UP wit-

nessed recently, all point to the need to

urgently consider this issue.

The State in modern India has been

seen as synonymous with modernisation

which in turn translates as being on the

side of science and development. The epi-

sodes of state violence, as witnessed in the

cases mentioned above are not because theState is necessarily in the wrong hands,

but because the patterns of violence are

inbuilt into the process.1 In a true Hegelian

sense, whatever the State does is to be

accepted as right, and with so mighty a

form must trample down many an inno-

cent ower; it must crush to pieces many

an object in its path. Thus, at a stage when

we have already accepted this process of

modernisation as natural, the question is

how to safeguard the interests of those

who are being crushed to pieces by the

State. The categories, communities, indi-

viduals and factors falling under this are

many, but the focus here will remain only

on the issue of land acquisition.

One of the most signicant changes in

policies after the liberalisation of the

economy in the early 1990s has been theshift away from land reform to that of the

removal of government protection to agri-

cultural land in order to use it for a variety

of industrial/commercial purposes. This

fundamental change has attracted much

controversy and in fact a large number of

problems. However, just problematising it

as a nexus of legality, state power and

neo-liberal capital (Sampath 2008) or a

form of corporate imperialism (Srivas-

tava 2010) or the biggest land-grab move-

ment in the history of modern India2 does

not throw up a solution in itself. The pur-

pose of land acquisition from farmers and

the issue of alternate livelihood for them

remain unanswered.

In the competitive electoral politics of

the day, any and all episodes of agitation

and demands are politicised in such a way

that instead of a solution the masses make

do with a few more dharnas and bandhs,

only to politicise it further. Farmers allege

that they are entrapped in a situationwhere leaders rush to encourage and sup-

port their agitations but do very little to

The argument presented in this paper is the

outcome of the discussions with Sudha Pai as

a part of our ongoing work on land acquisition

for special economic zones in Uttar Pradesh.

Avinash Kumar ([email protected]) teaches political science at Ram Lal

Anand College (E), University of Delhi.

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