Irans Two Navies

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a maturing maritime strategy

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 1Commander Joshua Himes, U.S. Navy

October 2011

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Photo Credit: U.S. Navy Seaman Kyle Taylor, an operations specialist, observes passing ships throughthe Big Eyes during sunset aboard the amphibious dock landing ship USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41)while under way in the Mediterranean Sea June 13, 2011. The Whidbey Island was deployed as part

of the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group to support maritime security operations and theater securitycooperation eorts in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility. (DoD photo by Mass CommunicationSpecialist 1st Class Martin Cuaron, U.S. Navy/Released)

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MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 1Commander Joshua Himes, U.S. Navy

irans two navies


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aBOut tHe autHOr

Cmmd Jhu Hm dplyd t th U.s. ny 5th

Flt July 2011 d th attChief of Sta for Intelligence aboard the USS George H. W. Bush (Cvn-77) pt f C stk Gup2. H d th 2010-11 U.s. ny fll t th Ct f sttgc d ittl stud (Csis)dug hch tm h t th pt. CDr Hm d dputy dct f tllgc thNational Military Command Center in the Directorate of Intelligence on the Pentagons Joint Sta,

h h pbl f th Chm/scDf Dly itllgc Updt bf. Dug th tm, hl dplyd t th isaF Jt Cmmd Kbul, afght.

His prior joint tours include serving as a watch ocer and executive assistant to the commander at

the Joint Analysis Center in Molesworth, England, the operations ocer and systems integration

management ocer at the Joint Forces Intelligence Command, and as collections watch ocer at the

Joint Intelligence Center, Pacic. His operational tours have been with Carrier Airwing 11 embarked

bd Uss Abraham Lincoln d Uss Kitty Hawk, d C stk Gup 12, mbkd bd UssEnterprise. H h cductd multpl dplymt uppt f opt alld Fc, edug diq Fdm.

Cmmd Hm gdutd fm th Uty f Pyl 1993 th B.a. ttllt d fm th nl Ptgdut schl 2001 th M.s. ytm tchlgy. iddt t umu pl, ut, d cmpg d, h th cpt f th adml B.r.im ad f itllgc fm th nl Ptgdut schl ll th amy Klt adfm th Mlty itllgc Cp act.

aCKnOWLeDgments

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aBOut tHe institute

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-prot, public policy researchorganization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military aairs through reliable research,ud , d duc. w cmmd mpg h bto execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve U.S. strategic

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taBle oF Contents

exeCutive summary .... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 06

intrODuCtiOn .... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . 11

irans navaL reOrganizatiOn .... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 12

LeaDersHip anD strategiC perspeCtive ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 13

irans navaL pLatfOrms .... . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 15

an expanDing regiOnaL apprOaCH .... . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 18

iran maritime DOmain in 2025 ... . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. 21

impLiCatiOns fOr u.s. pOLiCy .... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 21

COnCLusiOn .... . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 23

nOtes .... . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 26

maps & figures

map 1 | C-802 saCCaDe missiLe range .... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . 16

figure 1 | COmparative iranian & gCC navaL pLatfOrms (2010) .. . . . . . . . 17

map 2 | iranian navy JOint exerCises .... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 20

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exeCUtive sUMMary

th ab spg h fmd cg uc h Mdd e, ccumc hch i g f cg cc. U.s. mp h gm d b cc inuclear program, the enduring energy chokepoint at the Strait of Hormuz, and Irans export of radical Shiamilitancy through proxy groups across the region, particularly as it aects Iraq, the Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC), ym, s, d lb.

th h hc ud fc d gc g d pjc fg pc mb dpriorities. The regime views its naval resources as its most visible counterforce to U.S. and allied operations oi h d h b ppd f i m c cduc c m p.

P h f f h shh, h imc rpubc f i n (irin) i pm fc dd cu h cu mm bd. Fg h i ru, supm ld ahruhh Khm bu md fc pc h g fm h u h dud h cmd fc d dubd h . i dg, h cd h i ru Gud Cp n(irGCn) gud h gm mm . th irin fcd h h f h Guf h h-cd m f h ru Gud.

th irin d irGCn hd pb f h f h Guf cfug, f h c, bu f h h hm h cm cc. i 2007, th d mm gzthat redened duties and reassigned operational areas of both the IRIN and IRGCN, clarifying the roles andpb f i . ahugh h hd d hd p h Cp s,P Guf, d Guf f om, h chg p h irin d irGCn f pb, d um,h m.

th f h irGCn c h gz 2007 m h g f h ruGud fm h gud f cc u cg dm h hd gm f i.th irGCn g mmc ppch d h d h hcg pd, m, dh gh d u h Guf. amd h , m h, hgh-pd m b,and potentially complemented by expanding supporting capabilities such as extended range coastal radars,

m -hp bc m, d irGCn-pd ubm, h irGCn p h cdsignicantly since assuming responsibility for defending the Persian Gulf in 2007. Now, almost 25 years after c, h irGCn h umd fu pb f h P Guf, gg h irin mc d h g.

The IRIN surface eet, on the other hand, remains anchored by the same platforms that formed the core of theShahs Navy in the 1970s. Despite its antiquated surface eet, the IRIN has managed to perform operations asf h rd s d e Md h h , d cu cmmdz. i h mphzd dpm f mmc , g h ubufc d-hp m cpb.

th mm gz bg ju dhp f h ru Gud g G MhmdAli Jafari in September 2007. He is credited with rening Iranian leadership thinking on asymmetric warfare,pdg df g, d ddg h f p h fm h w h th mf, k f h pm c f h mm gz. i fc, h d f h irGCn,Df M, d irin h b ppd c 2007 d h h supm ld mph mmc g d cc. th h k h phph h h k mdz d quptheir respective eets.

Naval foreign acquisition and domestic production trends since 2007 reect a strategy that emphasizes thismmc phph. i dhp c udd h d f f-c gh f c d pu bugh b d m dg p. i h d f-



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sucient in the production of naval armaments, missiles, and torpedoes; in early 2010 Iran produced a newc , ccd m ubm pduc, d spmb 2011 ucd p bud cf c.

Senior IRIN and IRGCN commanders have emphasized that the realignment of existing bases and the creationf b c f df p p h, m U.s. d d k gup,from reaching the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. This reorganization does more than just extend Iransdefensive depth along the southeastern coast; it reects a signicant change in strategy and sets forth a vision hch i n h g c f bd h. th irin cmmd, adm HbbhSayyari, repeatedly cites the Supreme Leaders directive to expand the IRINs reach as a critical underpinning toIrans 2025 outlook, framing Irans regional prominence and prosperity as contingent on naval expansion anddevelopment. Sayyari emphasizes that Iran intends to inuence the strategic maritime triangle that extends fromh Bb- Mdb h uh d f h rd s h s f Hmuz d c h idoc h s f Mcc. wh 2025 g d m h supm ld gc gudc, hIRIN has signicant time to continue the eet modernization, procurement, and diplomatic outreach needed upp dd cpb .

This reports ndings are as follows:

i 2007 i fc ud gz hch h imc rpubc f i nh(irin) d h i ru Gud Cp n (irGCn), hch hd pu hd duand water space, were separated. The reorganization reected a change in the regimes perceived role for fc, g i gg g p.

This reorganization reects Iranian leaders focus on a strategic triangle that extends from the Bab al-hMdb b Djbu d sud ab, c h ab s h s f Hmuz, d ch id oc h Mcc s. th cmp gc mm cmmc u h

i dm cug h fuu f cmc c.Ud h ucu, h irin p h Cp s, h Guf f om, d h fmhBd abb, h s f Hmuz, P Bd, Pk. th hf bhgnew bases in the area, and utilizing existing capitol ships as well as submarines. Currently the IRINconsists of approximately 200 ships and 18,000 personnel. While many of its surface ships hail from theshh , c ubufc d cu m pcum, gg dmc pduccpc h cd cpb.

Mh, h irGCn h b cud c df fc g fcud mmc dhmb cmb cpb h P Guf. lg h h irin, h irGCn c f 20,000p d h fm hudd hud hp d m cf. rc dpmhas expanded the IRGCNs capabilities, equipping it with fast attack boats, torpedoes, and anti-shipcu m.

irin cpb cud h ruh Kilo class submarine (three units in hand, three expected as early 2015) d h Ghadir/Yono class mini-sub (eleven units in hand, nine more expected over the next h ), hch h b dmc pducd cg c . thKilo, pm dgd f -ub -hp f, f ck, h h Ghadir-csubs are dicult to track, though they remain less formidable in terms of combat power. Perhaps moremp, md p dc h pb dpm f md-zd ubm h cudpresent a hybrid threat if it proves to be suitably powerful and similarly dicult to track. Developmentf h irin ufc hp cu b b pcm .

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th irGCn h md fcud ddg d upgdg f hgh-pd hhm d pd cpb. rc dd cud md Peykaap/Tirc m b, dmc pduc f Bladerunner, d Bavar 2 stealth ying boats. Developmentprograms seek to increase the top speed of existing craft from 55 knots to 80-85 knots, along with

cg bc d mub dgd b cu-m d pd cpb.

add c- dpm cud -hp bc m (g 250-300km), dh(g 500km), c d (g 300km), d hp-b d (g 60km). i h increased its stockpiles of C-802 anti-ship missiles, which appear to have been reverse engineeredfm Ch md d h dmc pducd. th dpm h cud dpcg c.

The reorganization of the navys maritime footprint appears to be aimed at exerting short-term softhpower inuence with a long-term goal of primacy in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. High-levelmilitary exchanges and joint-operations with Qatar, Djibouti, Oman, and Turkey, as well as numerousm udg h pb f j-c h h Guf Cp Cuc, hghgh h

g.

The IRIN surface eet, on the other hand, remains anchored by the same platforms that formed the core ofthe Shahs Navy in the 1970s. Despite its antiquated surface eet, the IRIN has managed to perform operations f h Guf f ad h h , d cu cm mdz. i h mphzd dpm f mmc , g h ubufc d -hp mcpb.

Enhance U.S. regional maritime partnerships and build upon existing maritime cooperation to containhany regional Iranian soft power inuencesuch as economic, diplomatic, or otherwise strategic, non-military combat initiativesand to oset IRGCN modernization and expansion.

Adjust contingency planning, training scenarios, and operating patterns to reect Irans evolvingh

mm g.

Build an in-depth Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) examination of Irans navies tohu gz pg fucu d dmc mufcug.

Cd h u f ggm h h irin cdu th.h

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intrODuCtiOn

U.s.-i h g cg 2011, following several years in which military conicts bh f i bd bbd g d f U.s.pg, p, d pc fcu. Dug h m,Tehran has focused aggressively on expanding its navalp g d h. i dhp m gc c mg cmd fc d h b ppd f i mc cduc c m p. ithis context, Irans naval infrastructure and deploymentprovide some context for Irans broader foreign policy andm g mb.2

i 2007, h imc rpubc f i n (irin) di ru Gud Cp n (irGCn) bga reorganization that redened their respective missionsd pb. ahugh h hd hd p h Cp s, PGuf, d Guf f om, h gz p hirin d irGCn f pb d um,h m fcu.

The split and changed missions of Irans two navies extendsi df dph g h uh c d

reects a signicant shift in strategy, setting forth a vision hch i h bd g c. thi gm c d u cmc dpmp, v 2025, hugh hch i ud b h g m cmc dpd cm.3s, irin Cmmd, pd c h supmLeaders directive to expand the IRINs reach as a criticaludpg i 2025 uk, fmg ig pmc d pp cg expansion and development.4 s mphz

Irans intent to inuence the strategic triangle that denesthe maritime commerce routes and extends fromh Bb- Mdb h s f Hmuz d c hid oc h Mcc s.

th ucug, g h cd pfm upgdd fc, h fcud i gSayyari claims that new IRIN bases will extend fromBd abb, h s f Hmuz, P Bd,djc Pk, b 2015.5 s irin d irGCncmmd h mphzd h h gm fexisting bases and the creation of new bases will create a

f df p p h, m U.sd d k gup, fm chg h s fHmuz d h P Guf.

sc 2007, th h kd c fuh hcthe capacity of Irans two navies and the inuential role theyplay in the region. The regimes use of its navies to expandIrans regional inuence underlies its overall strategicccuu d mpc U.s. d d pd pg h g f cm. i hhistorically exaggerated its military capabilities, whichmk cmph mg f i m

cqu, d c h m mp. Hsuggests that, although Irans leaders may exaggerate theircu cpb d cug h udpcp f i g dmc, h dcpb f zd. thu, hugh thcm cbd b ud uc h p-uc, amc pcmk hud f hh m pjc i f fc cpbd dju U.s. gc d g pc ccdg.


irans two naviesB Cmmd Jhu Hm, U.s. n

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 1

The track record of our navy goes back 700 to 800 years. On the day that our ships left the ports ofthe Persian Gulf and set sail out to the far reaches of Asia, these other countrieswhich today share ahighly regarded reputation across the seasdid not even exist. Given our nations experience, capabilitiesand our youths skillful ngertips, why should we remain so far behind?

IRIN Commander, Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, August 20101


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Maritime Reorganization

i gz ucud h ggphc f pb f h irin d irGCn d d h pg f b d mm f g h h ggphc pb.11 idf bh c pg h m , h irin gd hp f h Cp s d h Guf fom, g h P Guf h irGCn, b hm p f d h s f Hmuz.12

th gz d h g d m cpbbu- pfm f h irin p ud hlimited connes of the Gulf, providing Iran with greaterregional leverage. It also added complexity and depth i mm df, g hm u hGuf f om mp ufc, ubufc, d cum df g h uh c bd

h s f Hmuz. th gz hcddczd cmmd d c (C2) chcu bmpfg irin d irGCn pc mgmk mgg u C2 ub h padversary could exploit in combat. Ultimately, it gave theIRGCN primacy in the Gulf, a constricted area that ampliesthe natural benets of a small, fast, unconventional forcepg bckd.

Although these changes reected logical military goalsthey also highlighted the growing political inuence of theru Gud. th mg f h gz

initiated on the heels of a signicant shake-up in IRGCleadership in 2007, suggests that Tehranunder increasedpressure internationally and domesticallyneeded tocd m zu cc gudh cc gm g pcd h fm h

w.

The Islamic Republic of Iran Navy

Made up of approximately 200 ships and 18,000 personnelh irin ufc cmb cpb m chdb m f h m pfm h fmd h c f

h shh n h 1970.13

Following the conictsof the 1980s, the IRIN invested heavily in its subsurfaced cu m h h pcum fumu md -hp cu m h ru Kilo c ubm, h dm fits eet of surface ships. Due to limited domestic repaird hu fc, h irin h fcd d dduc chg, bu dmc pduc cpbpp b mpg.14

irans navaL reOrganizatiOn

Background

P h f f h shh 1979, h irin i pm fc d d cu h

mm bd. th p h 1970to create a greater blue-water force as part of an eort toproject an expanded regional presence, but the Islamicru 1979 d h ubqu i-iq whd h .

i ap 1979, h f h i ru uf h shh d h fudg f h imc rpubc,supm ld ah ruhh Khm bhdh i ru Gud Cp (irGC). Khmud h irGC gud h ru d chm bcu h dud h c

md fc d dubd h .6

Fg hu, h irin fcd h h f hGuf h h cd m f h ruGuard Corps, which was established in September 1985 as dpd gd h irin.7

th irGCn pd cuc h i-iq w dused its experience in this conict to rene its asymmetricmm g. th irGCn uc

hdd dug f duc h h1980s. During the Tanker War in 1984, Iranian and Iraqik gd ch h d u hp, dg

estimated 564 commercial vessels and killing approximately430 c.8 In Operation Praying Mantis in April 18,1988, U.S. naval forces retaliated against Iranian navaluc f h Uss Samuel B. Roberts dmgd b i m. th p dmgd i d gc fucu, dg h ipdb, fg, d gub.9

The type of naval warfare the IRGCN experienced duringthese formative years was far dierent from the experiencef h irin, cug fc b h c. th ck f ch d dug h

i-iq w h irGCn dd cp h hirin mp bg c ud h cf h gu m. nh, h ucppch f h irGCn fd b dhp th m ufu p.10 B 2011, m -ve years after its creation, the IRGCN has assumed fullpb f h P Guf, gg h irin project extended deterrence and diplomatic engagementud h s f Hmuz.


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LeaDersHip anD strategiC perspeCtive

th m f i m d c2007 pd gh i gc mm

. ahugh irin d irGCn d f cudsomewhat exaggerated claims, they often clarify the regimesgoals and reect how changes directed by the 2025 Visionh hpd h mm gc jc. a bfbgphc f irGC d irin dhpsince 2007 helps contextualize Irans maritime changesbd h fu .

IRGC Commander, General Mohamad Ali Jafari

For a long time, the enemy has realized the vulnerability of the presenceof its warships in the Persian Gulf, and apparently one of its militaryand operational strategies is that if it wants to take any military action

against us, it will take these

warships out of the PersianGulf and station them nearthe Sea of Oman and IndianOcean and launch operationsagainst us from there. Weare trying to increase ouroperational range capabilityand to gain access to the enemyvessels there, as well.22

irGC Cmmd, G Mhmd a Jf, ap 2011

G Mhmd a Jf ppd spmb2007 d h ru Gud.23 H cdd with rening Irans thinking on asymmetric warfare andcg f p h h gm. Fm 2005 2006, Jf d gc ch c h pb f m g dug pd h i dhp hgh pcd h fm h w.24 H ppm, hchccdd h h irGC fm gm dfd f cc u cu , kexplains the timing of the IRGCNs rise to preeminence inh Guf.25 ldg cdb h d, Jf fcud

h h f mmc df d uc f h pch cmmd.26 i hspeech, he expanded the concept of threats to the regime cud f p h f cuu d ppmm.

Despite maintenance challenges, in 2008 the IRINd p h Guf f ad, ud d P Guf d Guf f om pg. th irin md h cd pmp, dp dpd dub f gc d

m d. wh dcbg h irin m, s fmphz h gc fc m dcd b supmld Khm. i pch th UFd P i n D nmb 26, 2010,h hghghd mpm h irin, g hpmz f cmb, ufc, d u;mdz f qupm bd ufc dsubsurface platforms; and the execution of exercisescpdg h.15 H d h h irineventually aims to be self-sucient in producing its own

qupm, cpb h h g c 2007.16

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy

sc 2007, h z f h irGCn h upd h fthe IRIN, growing to approximately 20,000 personnel.i m g d fm hudd hud hp d m cf.17 th irGCn hbhd c df bgd ucu mg-hp m m. a p f mmc dexible construct, the IRGCN developed a C2 structure thatd gg, dpd-mdd ubd.18

th f h irGCn m h g f hru Gud fm h gud fcc u dm h hd gmf i.19 Cc dhp i h g cg h irGC dfd g pufor political and economic reform and external pressuremd dg i uc pgm.

In July 2008, then-IRGCN Commander Habibollahsf pmd h irGCn h pc f h

d g jugu hugh h s f Hmuz.20 a h 17h au irGC n smpum Ju

2010, h cmmd f h irGCn, r adm aFd, pdd h hugh h irGCn g.21 Hmphzd h h irGCn h ugh mdz d dju pcd chg h pc,m, d cu h p f .


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specically cited the damage to USS Samuel B. Roberts b Iranian mine on April 14, 1988, and the resulting U.SNavy attacks against Iran as an example of why largercp hp ufu, uggg h h b hh Ud s ud b b m

cd d.32

H h pd gud f mdf m bu cpb h k g dfdagainst larger U.S. ships. His comments often reect his

f df f h Guf: e m p cproduce huge eects in the strategic Strait of Hormuz andh P Guf.33 Fd h g gcbckgud, hg pu d h irGC chf fn igc.

IRIN Commander, Admiral Habibollah Sayyari

The IRINs presence within theGulf of Aden is not just aimed acombating piracy As outlinedin the directives set forth by ouSupreme Leader, our strategyis to become a strategic nava

force and maintain a presencin the high seas.34

irin Cmmdadm Hbbh

s, spmb 2010

Littoral states of the Persian

Gulf should certainly welcomethe gesture of joint maneuvers with Iran. We heavily publicize thatour exercises are a message of peace and friendship and we announcethat we are prepared to establish regional security with our brother

from the navies of the Persian Gulfs littoral states whom with we sharea lot of joint interests. There is no need to have strangers presenwithin the region because their presence is not to establish security but toensure war and insecurity forever endures within the region.35

s, ocb 2010

adm Hbbh s ppd h irin

cmmd augu 20, 2007.36

H fm p h Mm spc op fc, dhe was injured in combat by mortar re while supportingIranian eorts to break the siege of Abadan in 1981. Hepch h u f h mmc ppch, hghghgh pcp f h md u f U.s. Hg g pd f much qupm h b bcu ju h [U.s.] ub dmk hm h m f g g f u.37 H hchmpd h irin gc m fg h

Minister of Defense, General Ahmad Vahidi

Equipping the countrysNaval and Armed forceswith advanced and modernweaponry will bolster thestability and security of theregion and play an eectiverole in consolidating Iransdeterrent power.27

M f Df,G ahmd vhd,

spmb 2010

G ahmd vhd cd augu 2009 m f Df fg fu dpum f Df. H hugh h k f h

IRGC Qods Force, Irans primary asset for exporting theu.28 He is one of ve Iranians sought by Interpolf h gd m h 1994 bmbg f

Jh c Bu a d mpcd h1996 Khb t bmbg sud ab h kd19 U.s. cm.29 H c Df Mis widely considered one of many eorts by the IRGC tocd p d c f h cu.

IRGCN Commander, Admiral Ali Fadavi

The trend of modernization, equipment and change within the IRGCN

will continue at a higher speed until the specied goals of increasedoensive and assault capability, improved eectiveness and timelinessof response, and enhanced mobility, strength, and destruction capabilityof the IRGCN are attained.30

IRGCN Commander, Admiral Ali Fadavi, June 2010

adm a Fd ppd cmmd f hirGC n 2010.31 Hpu d irGCn fc h d f h i-iq

War, specically during kineticconict with the U.S. Navy hch h fc udh . H pud b hd-, d b d g humfm h i-iq w d h U.s. m ccd1988 downing of an Iranian jetliner. In interviews sinceh umd cmmd, h f ud h pd fconict and to U.S. maritime vulnerabilities. Fadavi has


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nine anticipated over the next two to three years.43 oh c p h 2007 gzrc P pg h pg f 2011 dcdh h irGCn b h cp f m f h u, pb dcg h irGCn cu

expand its mission and water space in the years ahead.44

G h Ghadir m z d g , U.seorts at targeting and tracking it are dicult; howeverits combat power is signicantly smaller than that of theKilo. P p dc h ubm approximately 500 tons will be produced.45 th ud bf h h h Ghadirbu f h Kilo, d mp hbd ubufc h bu . i udb bu hd ck h Ghadirbu g ugh project a more signicant anti-ship weapons capabilityk h Kilo.46

This emphasis on expanding subsurface capability andcg c df cu m ph irin fm muu mdzg ufceet, forcing it to rely on antiquated core assets. Althoughdmc pduc f h Jamaran (Mowj)fg d hdd f upgdd Combattante-II (Sina c)fg m pd bc f-cc pcm f hsurface eet, there is certainly no comparable increase incpb umb mch gh f h ubufcm, f b, m .47 This reects anmmc ppch h pcd mm h i d php um h h irin , h

incremental improvement, can achieve the expandedpc h irin k pjc h Guf f adand Arabian Sea. Should conict arise in the regionirin ud pumb b dmd b h gd m dcd pfm f h Ud s h w p. a, h m hzof 2025, IRIN ocials may perceive that there is moretime to expand domestic production to address surfacepfm h h f h m cc dcpb bugh b cd mmc mmdf.

IRGCN Platforms & GoalsTracking specic numbers of IRGCN assets is substantiallym chgg h ckg h f h irin, du h m z d h fc h h c b hudg pc f i 1,100-km h.48 thIRGCN has undertaken an aggressive eort to modernized upgd hgh-pd h cm d pd cpb. sc 2007, h mdi f h ck cf h cd

2007 gz, d h mphz h mpcof the maritime domain in expanding Irans inuence.

irans navaL pLatfOrms: aCquisitiOn anD

DOmestiC prODuCtiOn trenDs

n fg cqu d dmc pduc dc 2007 pd gh h dc f i navies and reect a strategy that emphasizes both asymmetryd f-c. Chg i d f bsince 2007 reect how Iran has positioned its maritime mp bud fc upp 2025

Vision and maritime goals. Given the diculty inherent ckg irGCn h p-uc, isources, while they may exaggerate, do reveal Iranianbjc f cu d fuu cpb d h h

gm ud k h pc .

38

IRIN Platforms & Capability

th m cmpg chg irin h ubufc d cu m cg. i htwo primary submarine classes. The rst is the diesel-pd, ru-bu Kilo c ubm. Pmdgd f -ubm d -hp f, hKilo ugh 70 m g h ufc dpcmf 2300 .39 With six 533-millimeter torpedo tubes, itis capable of carrying 18 torpedoes or 24 mines.40 iKilo ss m m h h u d

is unlikely to expand until a follow-on contract is securedh d f pb h m md (636 )Kilo Amur ubm, p 2015.41Du h md umb d g z, i Kiloc ubm ck; h, potential arsenalcombined with the fact that it is regardedas one of the quietest submarines in the worldmakes theKilo fmdb .

i h m ubm c m-ub cd hGhadir (Yono), d dmc pduc f h cdsignicantly in recent years. Ghadir c ubm

k dgd upp c chkpcc pc k h s f Hmuz dpfm k uch m-g, dc, d p. Dpcg 100 , h 533-mmpd ub.42 wh h irin pb f ud h s, k h b ud h d f h s d g h p f Jkd Bd abb f gc upp. e u hdb cmmd b h umm f 2011, h h


16/30



rc p i m b pgm mphzi p c pd fm h cu m f55 knots to speeds of 80 to 85 knots in future platforms.54

s chgc dc, uch h u f pmcmp d d ufc mmz hp

radar signature and, by extension, U.S. detection, werehghghd h p. rc p mdh dpm f g bc d mub upp bd umd m d pdcpb.55

IRIN-IRGCN Common Armaments

th irin d h irGCn p umb f hdmm. Pduc d mp f h m hm f h mmc (m, pd, danti-ship missiles) are more dicult to assess. Althoughh c m p h gzi mph h d chgc p gg. a c Dcmb 2010, scommented that the IRIN has reached self-suciency inpduc f mm, m, d pd.5

signicantly.49 th md-augu 2010 ug f additional modern small boats that expand the Peykaap/Tirc h pd d m cpb hghgh fh d.50 sm, h irGCn ucd augu2010 dmc pduc f Bladerunner hgh pd

, hch b quppd h pd m d ck, d Bavar 2 stealth yingb, hch cud b ud f cc km.51

i spmb 2010, irGCn Cmmd Fd d uh f cqu d pduc h fcu pd, h, d m budg h irGCn .52H cd h md umb f U.s. n hp hh hudd h dp d mphzd pd dchg h ckg uch d hk m h h ch h dd

g d mp h m pd gumb. Fd mphzd h g d h pc h m gz f h irGCn[bcu] chg g m h u p hm cu d ud h u.53

map 1 | C-802 saCCaDe missiLe range


17/30



extension of the box launcher reects a slightly longerm, hch m dc g g. th u f h ud h Guf ud g h s ocb2008 speech at the opening ceremony of the new IRINnaval base at Jask, a small shing port 300 kilometers f Bd abb, hch h cmd, a f df h b bhd h f h s fHmuz d f c c p m hpfm g h P Guf.60

Domestic Productiontckg upgd f ck cf, mm,and missiles will become increasingly dicult as domesticpduc d fg cqu qud. s h chd h ocb 2010: wh dmc pducd f h cd cmpbd qupm h h cqud h p.td, h d f chg u h bcu

we can sustain our eets presence.61 Fd ucd

i Fbu 2011, Jf cmd h h irGCn udh m -hp bc m h 250- 300-km g, d h h mufcugradars with 500-kilometer ranges and had nishedud dpg 300-km c d d60-km hp-b d.57 th cmb fmpd mm ckg h pc bc mh cud p f g k u pg h P Guf d g h uh c f iand signicantly expand the deterrent inuence that Iran

budg.

i dd, i h ddd -hp cu m,g h cd hcd d d C2 ucu,to its inventory to supplement existing missile stockpiles.58Bd p mg fm h ug cm (dlater conrmed by Western sources), the missiles appearto be variants of the C-802 anti-ship cruise missile useduccfu b lb Hzbh k h in shp H, Saar-V c c, 2006.59 th

94

8 10 11

2126

14

6

32

11

2

23

9 6

8

28

23

5

72

26

4

1

5

5

3

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Iran Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE

NumberofVessels

Patrols and Coastal Combatants Principle Surface Combatants Amphibious

Submarines Mine Warfare Logistics and Support

Comparative Iranian and GCCNaval Platforms (2010)

sOurCe: ami internatiOnaL


18/30



gz, d p b h ugc f hirGCn bu b h supm ld ggc

, b h irin p ud h mdconnes of the Gulf and harkens back to the Shahs blue-

g mm f h 1970. s

repeatedly cites the Supreme Leaders directive to expandh n ch cc udpg i fuupp d h udcd h h f-pc p h Guf f ad d hcFbu 2011 dpm lk, s. 68

Iran clearly seeks to expand its primacy in the Indian Ocean , b 2025 fmk. th irin pc

p f th hcd gcpc dp i p g,d c h h gm d b cgzd g hgm.70

i kd, php cd nh K, ugcc m c mpf gc mgg order to inuence regional and Western political decision-mk. th c irin dpm h Mds fm Fbu Mch 2011 pd ufu

Fbu 6, 2011 h i hd h cpb cuc new line of high-speed small boats (85 knots) with missilecpc g Mch 2011.62

th dpm f hJamaran fg d uccfu ghfGhadir ubm pduc dc h i

expanding its production capability. Outside of statementsby Fadavi and news reports, however, it is dicult to verifycm bu i dmc pduc d mpdmc d fubhm cpc hugh -i uc. i m c ucm, hdg p f cf c hd b ppd dh k ud bg h, b f h m mbum pu fd b h gm d pd mdc f h gm pc f mkg gducm hu c hg h hh mpm hm.63

i uc hh c h mpdd i b fud df budg d m m hdproduction goals. For example, in January 2011, Bushehrsprovincial governor alluded to the way nancial limitshave aected the speed of the maritime transition as partf h gz. H d k i hdbeen halted by the heavy expenses associated with erectingfc d pdd 20- mb f g hf.64 Although his extended timeframe may haveb md h i pubc, cmc c budg cpc uh i m b mpdc h fuu.65

th i df budg h gd ud 3pc f i GDP h p dcd. accdg h i iu f sgc sud MBc, c 2007, i m pdg huctuated between 2.5 percent and 3 percent, though ith dcd dug h pd, m kdu h gb cmc c. M pdgin 2007 was 2.87 percent in 2007 and 2.53 percent in2010.66 a, aMi i, hch u hpbudg d, d i 2010m pdg b c 5 pc f GDP. th

AMI data, which is based on ongoing procurement eorts,pjcd pdg m 5 pc g c d cd pu d hhghd h m.67

an expanDing regiOnaL apprOaCH

The IRIN under Sayyari is committed to expanding fp d h g-m . i

The IRIN currently has a presence within the Gulf of

Aden, the security corridor and some areas of the northern

Indian Ocean. However, we plan on having a presence

o the coasts of India and inside the vital MalaccaStrait. The strait forms a point of the triangle in which

a high percentage of the worlds energ y is exchanged and

transferred. Ships within the Persian Gulf which set sail

towards the Suez Canal and enter the Mediterranean

Sea and those ships which set sail eastward, all pass

through this triangle. By expanding our presence with

this triangle, we will be able to completely oversee the

transit of the worlds energ y and at that same timeprotect our own interests. At the same time, we will have

greater deterrence power within this region when facing

enemies and rivals of the Islamic Republic of Iran.68

IRIN Deputy for Operations, Rear Admiral Qasem

Rostamabadi, August 2010


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IRIN in Djibouti in December 2010

s d dg Djbu Dcmb 2010under the pretext of supporting regional antipiracy eortss ud h gm upp gcounter-terrorism eorts and to coordinate ship repair

d mc fuc. th Djbu mcmmd d i b pd gd fgud f dd gcand equipment eorts.78 a i php hDjbu ud pd h i n much-ddfd dchm c b m fqup h Guf f ad, Bb- Mdb s, rds, d h Md s. th gm

h Djbu m pd g gc fp h Guf f ad, bg g irin pc hg.79

IRIN in the Mediterranean in February 2011

i upcdd dpm, Fbu 2011, hIranian agship Arvand, c, d upp hpKharg, d h Md lk, s bfug hugh h suz C Mch 3, 2011.80

th p b p f mdhpmg dpm. i fg m bdh dpm pc, d c, h mgcud h b m ppuc f th ppu uph pd c nh afc d hMdd e.

IRIN and Oman Joint Naval Exercises

IRIN and Omani naval forces conducted joint exercises inDcmb 2010 d Fbu 2011.81 ahugh mdto Search and Rescue (SAR) serials, it could be expandedbeyond relief and rescue drills to a more tactical exercise.8

This coincides with approximately eight Iranian port calls om h p .83

Open Invitation for 2011 Joint Exercises in the Gulf

The IRGCN attempted to build o their trip to Qatar

by announcing plans to conduct joint military exercises h Guf bh g cu d bu b cg h Guf ghb.84 This eort isc dd cmmuc U.s. d d pg p f h cmbd mm k fc h g h i c dm h Guf .85 i also intended to suggest that GCC countries are better o

hu h c f h U.s. Ffh F d .

example.71 wh h m h b ccbjc f h dpm, g gmc sd rmbd g gc mg f h irinexpanding inuence at a time of great uncertainty in theg.72 th Md dpm ccudd h

cp gm h s h ssigned aboard the IRIN auxiliaryKharg h pd lk.73 th f Dcmb 2010 u hDjibouti and maritime partnership eorts with Oman inFbu 2011.74 wh h irGCn fcud h hd-p m f dg d p dfdg hP Guf fm w d d h, h irin able to focus on a broader role designed to expand Iranianinuence and increase its leverage in the region at theexpense of the West.

Irans public statements reect a desire to partner with Gulf

Cp Cuc (GCC) ghb h mmdm, gug h i m cdb p hw , hch b pb f hinstability in the region. Iranian ocials have conductedan extensive outreach campaign to make this case tothose countries that may be amenable to Irans inuence.Ultimately, these eorts reect both Irans perception of cc g p d mph fpower expansion to deter potential aggression. Overturesm b dgd p h GCC bck b hmore amenable Oman and Qatar and the less-friendly f sud ab, Bh, Ku, d h Ud

ab em.75

th mg f h dpm dgm ccd h h U.s. dd iqand may represent an eort to ll a void Iran perceives tob dpg. i m gug g hpm b h Djbu fg h Dcmb 2010 d ubqu j m gm. th mprovides Iran inuence and potential presence at thegc Bb- Mdb chkp.76

IRGCN in Qatar in December 2010

i Dcmb 2010, h irGCn dpchd ships to Qatar as part of an eort to expand defense tiesd cp h ghb. th fd hparticipation of a Qatari military commander in IRGCNdrills during Exercise Great Prophet 5 in April 2010.77

ahugh h irin d h fc ud reect the face of the regime to its neighbors, the recent

visit of IRGCN personnel and assets to Qatar reects thecd h irGCn pg h h Guf dthe importance Tehran places in trying to build externalphp.


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c b i cmmd d tukhcivilians on a Gaza aid otilla in May 2010.

IRGCN Asymmetric Defense

While the IRIN expanded its operational footprint, theirGCn g md fcud cg lethality and complexity in the Persian Gulf and Straitof Hormuz. In addition to aggressively expanding its

Iranian Military Observer to Turkish Search and RescueExercise

i m ch tuk dd ch drescue exercise in the eastern Mediterranean on June 16,2010 h h tuk f mg.86 th hrst time Iran had sent a bystander to participate in thisp f h tuk. a h m m tuk dd i, pu c , fg

DECEMBER 2010

FEBRUARY 2011IRGCN-QATARI EXERCISE

TO EXPAND DEFENSE CO-

OPERATION

FEBRUARY 2011IRIN SHIPS SET SAIL FOR

SYRIA FOR TRAINING

DEPLOYMENT

DECEMBER 2010IRIN-DJIBOUTIAN

EXERCISE TO SUPPORT

ANTIPIRACY EFFORTS

JUNE 2010IRANIAN MILITARY ATTACHE

ATTENDED TURKISH SEARCH-AND-RESCUE EXERCISE

FEBRUARY-APRIL 2011IRIN-OMANI PORT CALLS

AND SEARCH-AND-RESCUE

EXERCISES

FEBRUARY 22, 2011IRANIAN VESSELS PASS

THROUGH SUEZ CANAL

FOR THE FIRST TIMESINCE 1979.

map 2 | iranian navy JOint exerCises


21/30



ppu f g c d ggm.

The United States should work to enhance regionalmaritime partnerships and build upon existingmaritime cooperation to contain any soft power Iranhopes to create with its navy and to oset IRGCN

modernization. th mm fc f h GCC cp ub h gd, U.s. pc m md p d umb f h fbfuu. th m, m g fc f h GCC dPakistan provide a comparable oset to Irans inuence andd f b. i u c pd d umcdg h cmpg h ddd f pdcb U.s. C sk Gup (CsG)oering.90

w CsG h s f Hmuz h ddten to twelve escortscomprised of corvettes, patrol boats

m cf pd b h sud, em, Bhand even possibly Pakistanisthe Iranians would certainlyk . a mmc ppch ud b b GCC mm fc cpb, phpug h pc m h Guf f ad d

justication. Although the near-term focus would bsm pc, upgd pfm d -dexperience would disquiet Irans defense leadership.

Adjust contingency and training scenarios to reecIrans evolving maritime strategy. th gg p fh irGC h h i gm, cupd h irGCn

pmc h h Guf, c h khd f cc cdwith strategic ramications. The IranianShia concept of resistance as an objective is dicult tounderstand in a Western context. The philosophy ofresistance emanates from the 1979 Revolution and reect bd b h gm d pp gh ud d. i ufu gc fmkfrom which to justify the development of proxy militantsd upp.91 i d h irGCn zh dc, kc c fb m b hchto remove U.S. inuence in the region, and they havemd h f mmc c m ch h m m. if f i gccenters of gravity relies on an image of sacrice andc g gmc d h iand disenfranchised Muslims worldwide, it aects Iransccuu h mm dm. Fm h ppcthe regime may calculate that it would benet from losing alimited kinetic conictconcurrent with a well-sequencedstrategic messageturning a tactical loss into a strategicg.

inventory of missile shooters to support existing asymmetricgc p f m f d c df cumissiles, the IRGCN may be expanding its strategy with theg f ubufc .87 i uc h quckh c hpp gh f g, dmc pduc,

d p u, bu m fm bh h irGCand IRGCN commander give credibility to this signicantp.88 wh h irin fcud m h f p, pb h Yono d h mub u

um bg h irGCn, g h irin p h Kilo f- ubm h bu-

.

iran maritime DOmain in 2025

The U.S. deterrence calculus grows more dicult as the

irGCn dp m h , ccuh h dpm f m -hp bc m,hcd uc, d fuu mmc .89

At a minimum, the expanding IRIN footprint and growingirGCn hud g U.s. m p pu cd g-hd ump bu i ccd gc cpb d dph. ahugh m mhb hh kpcm f i b ch

f g gh b 2025, h d md date are signicant.

Um, i h h ghd gposition by expanded outreach and greater lethality in theGuf b m chgg pc pbm f U.s.g d g h i GCC ghb fh cu ck f dpmc b h U.s. d ihd. th p bh chg d ppuf h U.s. d .

impLiCatiOns fOr u.s. pOLiCy

i d uccfu d gg i, U.s.pcmk mu udd h d thudg gd. idd, i ccuu mconcerned with soft-power threats to the regimebothinternal and externalthan hard-power, external threats.rh h chg w h ccpb, h gm d h h gd irinextend Irans regional inuence. Meanwhile, enhancedirGCn h dgd gh i dfpu, pdg g dc g pck. th gc u cmpc dpg d h mm m bu pd


22/30



launches to exaggerate the number of launches.92 Cm 2006 d 2007 f ug umd hc(UAV) to overy U.S. aircraft carriers were also discounted i fg hd cf h g c.93

nh, h m f uh hexaggerations that bear further examination. Iran hasmpd bh bc m cpb d Uav, b mb h cmd. th cu p gh f c i cm fsmart anti-ship ballistic missiles, IRGCN expansion intoubm pfm, d u f ubm p

all of which at rst glance appear to exaggerate Iraniancpb.

a ccu U.s. dc ccuu qu hughd cud u f i dmc pduccapacity and its resulting self-suciency in naval warfare

a f h dg hch chave or have not aected Iranian defense expendituresd dmc mufcug f p. thgz pc mu b c mdConstruction and expansion of facilities at Asuluyeh inh P Guf d Jk d Chbh h Guf f

om cc m f mu i gd b dg dc f i pg dh gm 2025 .

Consider the utility of engagement with the IRIN as aconduit to Tehran. i d b fuu b, im um b qud p cuc g. a pc f c d m b ufu h -m, bu i ggc p cudum d pcmk m bd h

thugh i cud mk dc md kc k fuh gc m, alternative scenario exists. An incident could arise fromhg h pf ( m f) irGCn p h cmmd , mccu

at a tactical level, and set o a chain of events that couldspiral into conict. Coalition Naval Task Force (CTF)training needs to adapt as the IRGCN expands its arsenalf hgh-pd m d pd h, c dd m u, d pb m-ubm fc.CtF mu h h mu d judgm hd hincreased stress brought on by multi-axis, high-speedpb h pg h Guf.

Adjust U.S. and allied operating patterns in theregion to reect Irans growing capability in the Gulf.Statements from Iranian naval leadership reect their

condence that U.S. and allied naval assets are predictabled g. Fuu dpm h Gufhud mp cu h ump b pg h chg i b m d ckd . th cud cud ug h m uf h GCC updcb p d c.th g dpm f h l Cmb shp(lCs), m, h ufc cmb pfm h p c h, m pd ddexibility in this area.

Moreover, allied navies need to rene their calculus

ccu f h irin gg pg . Fexample, Irans defense in depth could eventually includethe covert deployment of C-802 missiles in the Red Sea,dd b k Kharg ug ym e. ahugh mpbb d, h ch ymand future second-order eects from the Arab Spring maypd i h fuu php ppu. thc dpm f i ubm h rd scud cmpc h ubufc h h m h c cdd f pg.

Dedicate attention to evaluate the reorganizations

progress in infrastructure and domestic manufacturing.Iran has historically exaggerated its military capabilities, hch mk cmph mg hmore important. Recent examples include the 2006dm f h Hoot hgh-pd pd d hBavar 2 ying boat. Both of these platforms were announcedduring high-prole exercises but were reportedly notgd h i fc ucu u much d m b. add, i fmudoctored photos from the July 2008 ballistic missile

The IRINs number one priority is the development

of the countrys coastline out to Chabahar port and as

far as Pasa Bandar. We have several dierent plans for

this development. [Veleyat] calls for the expansion of

the IRIN through the construction and development

of facilities and equipment along the coast...We plan

on having a presence o the coasts of India and inside

the vital Malacca Strait.93 IRIN Operations RearAdmiral Rostamabadi, October 2010


23/30



leverage. It also adds complexity and depth to Iranianmm df i b b u h Guf fom mp ufc, ubufc, d cu mdf g h uh c bd hs f Hmuz. Um, g h irGCn pmc

in the Gulf, a constricted area that amplies the naturalbenets of a small, fast, unconventional force.

th irGCn h ccd gg mpg b cpb b budg pd, h,d m h mmc bckb f dc hGuf. i dd pcug d pducg fm b d f b, pfm dgd c h d mdum g -hp m d/pd f cd h.

th irin h b gd pm ubddefensive role vis--vis the IRGCN, likely reecting thecg f h ru Gud h isecurity and politics. This simplies Iranian maritimeC2 d mmz h p f dud fcbu d cc bu irGCn p h Guf d h p f udd c fcc cd.

i h d mph dmc mpduc m m d. Bh h irin dIRGCN have redoubled eorts to ensure platforms

p, d uppg cmmd d ccpb pducd dmc mmzh d fg cqu gh f hc d ub p. n d hb quck pubc hghgh dmc pduccpc dp.

th f h GCC d g d p b mgg i dc h mmdm. th GCC pd m mmc fc counter IRGCN eorts in the Gulf itself, and a regionalapproach mitigates some of the soft power inuence thatthe IRIN seeks by expanding its operational area.

U.s. d d p d u htraining, contingency planning, and operations reecth cd phc f h irGCn h d hg p ch f h irin. th pgd ccu f irin p h rd sd Guf f ad, m bc m h, d hIRGCN expansion into subsurface operations. Althoughh cpb m b p, h u, d b pp pp cf

cu mp d ggm. o mpc fIrans divergence in maritime missions and the expandingirin pc h p g h irin m c cmmuc h i. thGuf f ad cu-pc k fc (Cmbd tk

Fc 151), hch d Ju 2009, uchg f ppu f g cmmuc d mm cp. i h p ck cd bgg gh m h 20 f cmmcu.95 ah ppu ud b h irinto participate in a regional international exercise. Forexample, Pakistan hostedAman 2011, a ve-day, 39-countryexercise in March 2011 that was designed to address h d pd cmm fum ffm hg d muu uddg.96

COnCLusiOn

i mm g cu mu. thgz d 2007 d irGCn dirin p d pduc h hd d

p chg U.s. pcmk, dhp, d fc pg h g. sccu f, bd h chg bd h fu c h gz.

s irin d irGCn cmmd mphz hthe realignment of existing bases and the creation of b fm f df p p

h, m U.s. d d k gup, fmchg h s f Hmuz d h P Guf. threorganization does more than extend Irans defensivedepth along the southeastern coast. Indeed, it reectsa signicant change in strategy and sets forth a vision in

hch h irin h g c bd hd pd cc udpg i 2025economic outlook that denes Irans regional prominenceand prosperity as contingent on naval expansion anddpm.97 This expansion, if realized, wouldultimately carry Irans inuence to the strategic maritimetriangle that denes the maritime commerce routes andextends fromh Bb- Mdb h s f Hmuzd c h id oc h Mcc s.lk, h h h irGCn p ud mu dexpand, not geographically, but in terms of its deterrentcpb.

rgz h g d m cpb bu- pfm f h irin p ud h mdconnes of the Gulf, providing Iran with greater regional


24/30



h cpb h h c h h bcmp.

i gg mph dmc mm pducand self-suciency should force regional and alliedintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance eorts

bd cp d ccu f fucudpm g h c d dmc mmdu b d gh.

eu, i m b cmpd p cuc h g du ggc mpc. Gcooperation with the IRIN through existing multinational cud b pb duc h b h Ud s d h gm th.

a, cud b mchm b hch fcuIranian unity of eort.

Um, h gg phc f irGCn h,speed, and mass provides a more complex challenge in anypotential future conict. The expanding regional role ofh irin pd th cmpm cpbthat relies less on new missiles and more on inuenceprojection and reects a long-term vision for greaterregional inuence to both support economic growth andmg w h. th mug mm g

qu U.s. pcmk h ppch p h P Guf d uudg g.


25/30


26/30

notes


21 irGC n h chd hgh df cpb: cmmd,th tm, Ju 22, 2010.22 F n agc i, ap 22, 2011.23 i chg ru Gud cmmd: tv, ruspmb 1, 2007.24

vhd sph, i: n Cmmd tk o ruGud, rd F eup rd lb, spmb 4, 2007.25 e H-t d nh Gzz, th Mz f P-Khomeini Iran: Praetorianism 2.0, The Washington Quarterlyw 2010.26 Jafaris statements reected a new direction for the IRGC in 2007 and2008 which coincided with new IRGCN responsibilities. Pasdarani ru Gud Cp (irCG), Gbscu.gFbu 13, 2009.27 Stealth ying boats join IRGC eet, Press TV, September 282010.28 e lk, i df m upc, th whgtm, augu 21, 2009.29 i jc b ag ccu d bmbg, Ku n agc, ocb 3, 2009.30 F n agc, Ju 2010.31i d pp n chf, imc rpubc nagc, augu 20, 2007.32 David Crist, Gulf of Conict: A History of U.S.-IranianCf s, Pc Fcu #95, whg iu fn e Pc, Ju 2009; Jm--Jm tv nk, spmb2010.33 Cmmd s irGC rd Cmb em tp PG, F n agc, ocb 29, 2007.34 F n agc, spmb 13, 2010.35 i h r adm s, Mh n agc, ocb19, 2010.36 i d pp n chf, i n agcaugu 20, 2007.37 i h r adm s, Mh n agc, spmb26, 2010.38 Specic order of battle gures in this and subsequent sections aredd fm mup uc cud aMi i, JFghg shp d wd n, h i iu fsgc sud, n iu Gud Cmb F f h wdand Global Security.org. These gures help understand productiond cqu f gh f i.39 Russian Navy: Project 877 Kilo class, Project 636 Kilo class, Diesel-ecc tpd subm, Fd f amc scspmb 7, 2000.40 Russian Navy: Project 877 Kilo class, Project 636 Kilo class, Diesel-ecc tpd subm, Fd f amc scspmb 7, 2000.41 i o, aMi i, Dcmb 2010.42 Fbz Hgh, i ammc n wf, PcFocus #87, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September2008.43 Iran Ghadir Class Diesel-Electric Submarine (SS), AMIi, Dcmb 2010.44 Jafari expressed the inherent value for the IRGCN of subsurfacemmc cpb: Ud gd (f c) h ud b u fc bu mmc d m-c fmmg h kg bud g d g ubmc h ub. i h G Mhmd aJf, F n, ap 24, 2011.

1 i h irin Cmmd s, imc rpubc f iBdcg, aug 2010.2 i n Fc: Fm Gu wf Md nStrategy, Oce of Naval Intelligence, Fall 2009.3 imc rpubc f i ouk P f 2025, imc rpubcf i M f Cp; d i 2011, th Bu y,

Ju 2011, dcb pc f v 2025.4i h adm s, imc rpubc f i Bdcg,augu 2010.5 i n Fc: Fm Gu wf Md nStrategy, Oce of Naval Intelligence, Fall 2009.6 David Crist, Gulf of Conict: A History of U.S.-IranianCf s, Pc Fcu #95, whg iu fn e Pc, Ju 2009. th gu u d dc gud h ru d chm g fm gfmk h h pg f h i Cu Dcmb3, 1979. Crist points out that IRIN commanders from 1989 to 2005 bugh fm h irGCn.7 rb Kp, amm s, th ac, ocb 16,2008.8 David Crist, Gulf of Conict: A History of U.S.-IranianCf s, Pc Fcu #95, whg iu fn e Pc, Ju 2009.9 David Crist, Gulf of Conict: A History of U.S.-IranianCf s, Pc Fcu #95, whg iu fn e Pc, Ju 2009.10 Fbz Hgh, i ammc n wf, PcFocus #87, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September2008. Fariborz Hagshenass details the early friction between the IRINd irGCn.11 i n Fc: Fm Gu wf Md nStrategy, Oce of Naval Intelligence, Fall 2009.12 irin tchc Cmmd Co, r adm am rg,explained: During reconnaissance patrols, the IRIN monitors allbud u f fg cu fm h s f om d hChbh g up h h P Guf d fm

is exchanged simultaneously. Information about the foreign units d up b h irin d h c h h PGuf, h fm mmd d h irGCn f hdp. F n agc, nmb 29, 2010.13 i, n, iHs J s scu am, M 5,2011.14 s h c acqu d Dmc Pduc td.15 imc rpubc n agc, nmb 26, 2010.16 aMi i m f i mm pduc.i o, aMi i, Dcmb 2010.17 i, n, iHs J s scu am, M 5,2011.18 th g, k mc df, dcz hcmmd ucu d g cc um b ddu

cmmd. th Mch 2007 dm f Bh following a stand-o with IRGCN elements is a recent example hch irGCn cmmd h nh Guf dd f c, hugh h c pbb ppdp b h ch f cmmd, dcbd whg iuPolicy Focus #95. David Crist, Gulf of Conict: A History of U.S.-i Cf s, Pc Fcu #95, whg iuf n e Pc, Ju 2009.19 e H-t d nh Gzz, th Mz f P-Khomeini Iran: Praetorianism 2.0, The Washington Quarterly,w 2010.20 M numb f irGC M d v a rd fDc ac h s f Hmuz [ P],F n agc,July 8, 2008.

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45 Fbz Hgh, i ammc n wf, Pc Fcu#87, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2008.46 th ucd z fu m h g f h y bu fuh f Kilo. This announcement may reect a renewed focus on amd-g Kilo replacement, the Qaeem, which appears to be based onh ru amu 950 c ccdg aMi Dcmb 2010 i

o. i o, aMi i, Dcmb 2010.47 th cd Mj-c c, Veleyat, is expected to becommissioned in 2012 according to AMI. A total of six units areexpected by 2016, with two operating in the Caspian Sea. They willk pc h d PF 103 d ad c c h cu c. i o, aMi i, Dcmb2010.48 i uh h 1100 km ccdg h Cia wdFcbk.49 Bd cmpg mup od f B cu f h cm b (raDM Fd cg iPs d Bdu )h mk up h md cmpd 2007 .50 i am o Bdu B: Cmmd, agcFc-P, augu 10, 2010.51 i am o Bdu B: Cmmd, agc

France-Presse, August 10, 2010; Iran unveils squadrons of yingboats, CNN, September 28, 2010.52 i h raDM Fd, Jm- Jm o, spmb2010.53 n cmmd d i m cpb, Jm- Jm,August 28, 2010.54 Iran shows o high destruction speed boats in war games, Thetgph, ap 22, 2010; i M-Pduc irGC Fspdb, F n agc, Mch 14, 2011.55 Mhgh n, Mch 2011. Mhgh n, hugh cdd hd- gc i, pd d h pdbpgm, hch h b pd b mup h uc.56 F n agc, Dcmb 2010.57 i m pducg m bc m: irGC chf, th

Times, February 8, 2011; Iran to Unveil New Home-Made BallisticMissiles Next Week, Fars News Agency, May 18, 2011; IranianBc M sc Dc H tg shp, Df Upd,February 8, 2011.58 P tv cg f Df M ahmd vhd d radm s cfc ug; F n agc, Ju 3,2011. of h h f cu m m (gh, dpd,and extensive) the third includes target detection, launch pads, andd gudc m ug g C2 c.59 John Diamond, Trained eye can see right through box of weapons,USA Today, augu 17, 2006.60 H a, a f dfc: i cpb,iHs J, Ju 27, 2009.61 i h irin Cmmd r adm s, Mh nagc, ocb 19, 2010.62

Fadavi highlighted the eort to mount missile launchers amongh p h dmc f h UK Bdu.imc rpubc n agc, Fbu 6, 2011.63 Iran Navy to build aircraft carriers, Press TV, September 28,2011.64 Cmm h p fm njb.65 th Pc G m b g h d d mg fc fm Buhh.66 M Bc-i GDP D, i iu fsgc sud,67 D cqu d df pdg cm pm fm aMii d h i cu ud fcud cuc

d mdz fc. aMi i, Dc 2010.68 i h adm s, imc rpubc f iBdcg, augu 2010.69 Mm ogz cfc augu 2010 bDpu f op f h irin, rd adm rmbd,Pd Mm ogz.70 Cg f adm s h cm hm cm f PF103 c p hp naGHDi, F n agc.71 e ld d thm edbk, i h hpm Md, Washington Post, Fbu 22, 2011Mhmd yu, edmud B d tm Pc, i hp uvia Suez Canal, says ocial, Reuters, March 2, 2011.72 i p cd -pc g d uc dcc h m f h dpm. thAlvandf not a signicant threat, although the Kharg upc mp du gc cpc d p p p d m i ug h g.73 i, s Dpg sgc Df t, F n agcFebruary 28, 2011.74 i, Djbu ag n Cp, F n agc

Ju 11, 2011; i, om hd j d, xhucm, Fbu 10, 2011; iri, om j m cu mu, imc rpubc f i Bdcg, Fbu 9, 2011.75 Both Bahrain and Kuwait have recently expelled Iranian diplomatf pg d h Uae m dd h i dpud d.76 i, Djbu ag n Cp, F n agcJu 11, 2011.77 Fars News Agency, January 8, 2011.78 F n agc, Ju 11, 2011.79 i, Djbu ag n Cp, F n agcJu 11, 2011.80 e ld d thm edbk, i h hpm Md, Washington Post, Fbu 22, 2011Mhmd yu, edmud B d tm Pc, i hp u

via Suez Canal, says ocial, Reuters, March 2, 2011.81 i, om hd j d, xhu.cm, Fbu10, 2011; iri, om j m cu mu , imcrpubc f i Bdcg, Fbu 9, 2011.82 F n agc, Fbu 11, 2011.83 imc rpubc n agc, Ju 31, 2011.84 Fars News Agency, January 8, 2011.85 th h dg cmbd k fc ud h upcf h Cmbd Mm Fc, 25 c bd Bh. th m pm pc d cu c h f h Mdd e.86 i m ch uk, Mdd e Md rchiu Bg, Ju 2, 2011.87 General Fadavi and Jafari have both alluded to this eort indicatingh cu y m m, mmc ubm bpd b h irGCn p f h mc df.88 i c f m fm ud , Ptv, ap 252011; i Dp M-sub, Mdd e n, ap 262011; i dp hmmd ubm uh cmmd, xhu G n sc, ap 17, 2011.89 F n agc, Fbu 7, 2011.90 a pc dpd CsG cud uc pd cfc (Cvn), h fu gudd m d (DDG/CG), guided missile frigate (FFG), and auxiliary ships.91 Frederic Wehrey, Danger But Not Omnipotent: Exploring therch d lm f i P h Mdd e, ranD

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2009. rp cpu h gc cu h d th dmphz h mc df mmc phphd m, g d gm u.92 Mk nzz d Pck l, i i img, M tM, th ld Bg, New York Times, July 10, 2008.93 Jhg a, ob wp, Uc tcc, d

Mdm Z: H i ud pp ammc n wfDoctrine in a Future Conict, Occasional Paper No. 10, George C.Mh eup C f scu sud, ap 2007.94 i h adm rmbd, augu 2010, P Mmogz.95 Commander, Combined Maritime Forces Public Aairs, NewCu-Pc tk Fc ebhd, Ud s n, Ju8, 2009.96 Mahnoor Sherazee, Aman-11 navy exercises: Joint eorts urged inght against piracy, maritime terrorism, The Express Tribune, Mch 9,2011.97 i h adm s, imc rpubc f iBdcg, augu 2010.

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Irans Two Navies