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Investigative Report on Labour Rights in Hong Kong
Enterprises in China 2014-2015
Missing social security funds initiating a new wave of
labour movement: Violent suppression intensified
Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions
August 2015
2
Contents
Part I Executive Summary p.3-8
Part II Preamble
Research aims and scope p.9
Research methodology & limitations p.9
Definition of Hong Kong-invested enterprises p.9-10
Report framework p.10
Research Background p.10-12
Acknowledgement p.12
Part III Research findings:
Factors leading to strikes or large-scale labour
protests in Hong Kong enterprises p.13-19
Unprofessional ways adopted by management of
Hong Kong enterprises in handling labour
disputes
p.20-36
Part IV Hong Kong enterprises’ abuse of political
power in violating labour rights
p.37-42
Part V Conclusion & Recommendations p.43-46
Appendix p.47-50
3
Part I: Executive summary
A vast number of Hong Kong enterprises have set up factories or established businesses in
China. Many of them are suppliers for international brands such as Marks & Spencers, Disney,
UNIQLO, etc. Yet, the labour conditions in these enterprises have long been neglected, without
an efficient monitoring mechanism. To tackle this, the HKCTU has continued to run its
“Monitoring Database of Labour Rights in Hong Kong Enterprises”, which was developed in
2013 (see appendix). Through media, social networks, labour organizations in China and
interviews with Chinese workers, it collected information on labour rights violations from
large-scale labour disputes in Hong Kong enterprises, between May 2014 and April 2015. It
aims to expose the common labour rights violations of Hong Kong enterprises in China, to
monitor brands and Hong Kong enterprises, and to push the Hong Kong Government to protect
labour rights in China.
Major Findings:
1. Nearly 70%, a significant growth of collective labour disputes: Between May 2014
and April 2015, the HKCTU collected 25 cases of documented collective labour actions
in Hong Kong enterprises in China. Nearly 90% covered strikes and the rest were large-
scale protests. Compared with the previous years, there is a nearly 70% growth of
documented collective labour actions. This is related to the Hong Kong management’s
refusal to engage in collective bargaining and its unprofessional manner in handling
labour conflicts. Workers have no choice but to strike to force employers to negotiate.
2. Missing social security premiums is the cause of over 55% of the collective labour
disputes: Compared with last year (<15%), disputes caused by missing payment of
social security have increased significantly. Missing or under-payment of severance pay
at relocations, and missing wages are the two other reasons for collective labour actions,
accounting for 44% and 40% respectively.
3. Affecting an estimated 150,000 workers: It is estimated that these 25 cases of
collective labour action, affected about 150,000 workers. Since 28 May 2010, the
Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China has banned Chinese media from
reporting or discussing strikes. Therefore, it is believed that the actual number of strikes
is a lot higher than those documented.
4. Nearly 85% of labour disputes triggered by violations of Labour Contract Law:
As shown in these cases, the Hong Kong enterprises often violate multiple labour laws
4
simultaneously. For example, an enterprise might refuse to pay both severance
compensation and social security premiums at the same time. The Chinese authorities
tend to side with the employers. They avoid responsibility by claiming that workers’
missing pension insurance is outside their administrative jurisdiction. This opens the
door for the Hong Kong employers to avoid paying pension insurance for workers
indefinitely; For those areas which are not clearly stipulated in the Labour Contract
Law, the court gives judgement guidelines to judges, that open another door for the
Hong Kong employers to avoid severance compensation.
Focuses of the research report:
1. Large-scale listed companies, such as Chow Tak Fook, Stella International
Holdings Ltd., Pegasus International Holdings Ltd. and Arts Optical International
Holdings Ltd. merely launch corporate social responsibility (CSR) for the purpose
of window-dressing: Over 30% of cases involved major listed companies in Hong
Kong or their suppliers. For example at Arts Optical, its wholly-owned subsidiary
Argent Optical Manufactory Ltd. offers its senior employees with over 10 years of
experience, lower basic wages than new employees. Another one-fifth of Hong Kong
enterprises are recidivists, as strikes have repeatedly taken place due to their labour
rights violations. These companies take CSR as a cover-up, to hide their violations of
labour rights.
2. Workers' right to know is denied: Hong Kong enterprises have been systematically
and intentionally adopting various measures to avoid paying financial compensation
(severance) as required by Labour Contract Law. They intend to cut the costs of
restructuring, relocation or closures, under the Guangdong policy of industry-upgrading.
Many workers only learn about these when machinery is removed or the factory closes
down. Local governments tend to side with the enterprises, which creates more barriers
for workers to claim their severance pay.
3. Management actively invites the police to intervene; workers in nearly 80% of the
strikes have been surrounded, physical assaulted, suppressed or even detained:
For example, the owner of Artigas, a supplier factory of UNIQLO, personally led a
troop of policemen to storm the factory, detaining 31 workers’ representatives and
injuring many. One detainee had a serious head injury and had to be hospitalized. The
workers’ right to strike has been severely violated. However, some strikes lasted from
5
one to four months, which indicates that even under violent suppression, workers have
strong will and determination to fight for their rights.
4. Dismissal to retaliate against workers’ representatives, a violation of Trade Union
Law: Many Hong Kong enterprises adopt dismissal as a means to retaliate against
workers’ representatives. An example is Grosby Footwear (Shenzhen) Ltd., a supplier
of Marks & Spencers and Clarks. During a strike, Grosby dismissed a total of 109
workers in seven rounds, including a vocal vice-chairperson of the trade union. The
policy also led to a tragedy. A female worker, who had served in Grosby for 12 years,
committed suicide in the factory upon learning she had been dismissed. Enterprises’
retaliation would make strikes disorganized, as no workers dare to stand up and
represent the collective interest. This would extend the strike and harm both employees
and employers, badly damaging the reputation of the latter.
5. Hong Kong entrepreneurs make use of their political privileges to weaken
legislation on collective consultation, which leads to the growth of strikes: Hong
Kong entrepreneurs have repeatedly worked with their counterparts from Taiwan,
making use of their connections with politicians and the business sector, to influence
the law-making process, to remove pro-worker articles from new collective
consultation legislation. Hong Kong entrepreneurs have long colluded with the Chinese
authorities and strikers can face criminal charges anytime. One example is, Wu Guijun,
a workers’ representative from a Hong Kong-owned factory who was detained for a
year and seven days for joining a strike. The weakened collective consultation
regulations cannot hold the Hong Kong entrepreneurs accountable and when a dispute
takes place, the Hong Kong employer refuses to negotiate collectively. As a result,
labour conflicts are intensifying. When labour relations deteriorate and a strike breaks
out, the enterprise eventually suffers from the damage of its reputation, economic loss
due to production halts and even some other higher costs.
HKCTU’s recommendations:
1. Recommendations to Securities and Futures Commission & Stock Exchange: Public
interest is involved in the labour disputes of listed companies, therefore, they should be
more closely monitored. The HKCTU recommends following the examples of certain
countries, to include labour conditions as one of the criteria in regulating the listed
companies:
6
a. Recommendations to Securities and Futures Commission (SFC)
i. When a compliant is received, or there is evidence that a subsidary of a Hong
Kong listed company has violated Chinese labour laws, an immediate notice
should be sent to the licensed corporation of the listed company, demanding it
to take prompt and effective correctional measures, and to deliver a detailed
investigative report, covering the correctional measures, within a certain
timeframe.
ii. The listed company is required to document the violations at prominent
positions in its annual report and issue letters to its investors, to disclose such a
risk to its investors;
iii. SFC should upload its annual report and disclose a list of law-breaking listed
companies to make it publicly accessible.
iv. If the above-mentioned violation continues or severe violations are found, SFC
should conduct site visits or establish an independent investigation committee,
to further investigate or make inquiries. Disciplinary measures, such as public
condemnation, revocation or suspension of license or fines, should be exercised
when appropriate.
2. Recommendations to Stock Exchange:
a. It should require all listed companies to seek verification of any alleged violations of
labour laws in mainland China, the results will be used as one of the conditions of
listing approval.
b. To promote these policies, the Listing Rules should immediately be modified
accordingly.
c. The Stock Exchange should immediately learn from the company whether policies
have been implemented to protect mainland workers, and their responses to the
specific allegations of violations of labour laws. The listing process should be
suspended until a satisfactory reply has been presented.
3. Recommendations to the Hong Kong Government:
a. Taking OECD’s "OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises" as a reference, to
develop its own guidelines on labour rights, so that Hong Kong enterprises can
understand how to protect workers’ rights in Mainland China. Hong Kong
7
government should also set up complaint channels, to strengthen the supervision on
the implementation of the above labour rights protection;
b. Reflecting upon the laws on supervising the listed companies and the company
regulations, punishing the listed companies and Hong Kong enterprises that violate
labour laws in mainland China
c. That it take a neutral stance and stop favoring the business sector. In distributing /
collecting news and information related Chinese labour laws it should fully consult
all stakeholders, including the Legislative Council, trade unions and other labor
organizations.
4. Recommendations to major business associations: sending warning letters to Hong
Kong enterprises which have failed in taking up their corporate social responsibility and
have violated the labour regulations in mainland China, demanding them to take prompt
and effective correctional measures; blacklisting Hong Kong enterprises which have
repeatedly broken labour laws in the mainland, and blocking them from being members
of the business association.
HKCTU’s demand
Transnational corporations (TNC):
1. TNC should strictly follow the "OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises" and
their own codes of conduct, to ensure their suppliers are giving legal and reasonable
wages;
2. China’s Trade Union Law and Regulations on Enterprise Collective Consultations and
Collective Contracts both state that an enterprise must conduct collective consultation
with its employees. The “ILO Convention” and “OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises” clearly support workers’ freedom of association and rights to collective
bargaining. TNC should not allow suppliers to replace collective consultation with
telephone hotlines or face-to-face individual meetings with workers;
3. When a labour rights violation is reported at a supplier factory, TNC should not only
take in the report from the supplier, but it should also conduct an independent
investigation to discover the facts of the case. When a collective consultation takes
place, TNC might send a representative to attend, to promote and ensure that the
supplier responds to workers’ reasonable and lawful demands;
8
4. TNC should prohibit its supplier from making use of police brutality, assault, arbitrary
detention or criminal charges against workers in peaceful strikes;
5. TNC should strictly urge suppliers to pay workers their severance payments and
missing social security insurance premiums. If a supplier cannot afford these payments,
the TNC, should be responsible. It should prohibit suppliers from excusing themselves
from paying severance and social security insurance payments, by quoting the local
administrative jurisdiction’s lack of competence, or claiming that it has not broken the
law as the local government has arbitrarily set up guidelines claiming no clear
definition to implement the legislation.
9
Part II: Preamble
2.1 Research aims and scope
There has been a lack of attention and effective monitoring of the labour conditions of Hong
Kong-invested enterprises in China. To tackle this, the HKCTU established a “Monitoring
Database of Hong Kong Enterprises" (see appendix) 1 in 2013 and it has been operating for
two years. Through media, social networks, information provided by labour organizations in
China and interviews with workers, the HKCTU collected cases of large-scale labour disputes
in Hong Kong enterprises in China. The aim of this research is to expose the fact that Hong
Kong enterprises are commonly violating labour rights in China; to continuously monitor
brands and Hong Kong enterprises; and to lobby the Hong Kong Government to protect
Chinese workers’ rights.
Last year’s research indicates that, violations of labour rights have been severe in Hong Kong
enterprises, and an overwhelming number of Hong Kong entrepreneurs’ transgressions have
been reported in the media and on the internet. To make this year’s research more specific, we
focus on an in-depth study of large-scale labour disputes in Hong Kong enterprises. We attempt
to address these core questions: How did the management of Hong Kong enterprises exploit
workers? What mistakes did they make in dealing with the large-scale labour disputes? What
caused strikes or large-scale labour disputes to repeatedly take place?
2.2 Research methodology & limitations
This research covers the period between May 2014 and April 2015. In total, 25 cases were
identified involving Hong Kong capital and workers collective actions. Twenty-two of them
involved strikes and three were large-scale protests. The HKCTU has collected 96 micro-blog
and blog entries, 187 reports or commentaries from five labour organizations’ websites and 22
different newspapers on strikes, large-scale labour protests and labour rights in China, four
research reports on labour rights and conducted two interviews with workers.
2.3 Definition of Hong Kong-invested enterprises
Hong Kong-invested enterprises are defined as "enterprises in Hong Kong, regardless their
1 The database was named as “Monitoring Database on Collective Labour Disputes of Hong Kong Enterprises in China” between 2013-
2014, while it is now renamed as “Monitoring Database on Labour Rights in Hong Kong Enterprises in China” between 2014 and 2015”.
10
origins of investment, which set up enterprises or subsidiaries in China, or use OEM factories
in China as suppliers of their products. They include overseas companies which are listed in
Hong Kong. Labour rights are human rights and should be protected. By setting up business in
Hong Kong, enterprises provide the fundamental channels for Hong Kong citizens, trade
unions and labour organizations to monitor whether their operations respect basic labour rights.
By being listed in Hong Kong, shareholders of foreign enterprises would include Hong Kong
citizens. Thus they should be monitored by the general public of Hong Kong.
2.4 Report framework
This report starts with an executive summary, then a preamble. The third part discusses the
research findings, describing the causes of large scale labour disputes in Hong Kong enterprises
in China and how the enterprises unprofessionally handled the industrial actions. Part four
illustrates how Hong Kong entrepreneurs abuse their political influence to obstruct the labour
legislation in China. A conclusion and recommendations are to be found in Part five.
2.5 Research Background
2.5.1 Hong Kong entrepreneurs’ dependence on low-labour costs and low-tech production
In the late 1970s, drawn by lower labour and material costs, Hong Kong entrepreneurs moved
their factories from Hong Kong to China. Since then, they have become accustomed to the
privileges such as land and tax incentives exclusively offered to foreign investors and the trust
and networks they built with the central and local governments. Many of them have failed to
upgrade to higher-end industries in a timely fashion. In recent years, higher production costs
in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) and the local government’s policy to upgrade industries
(commonly known as “empty the cage for new birds” strategy) have pushed them to relocate
to the more remote regions of the PRD or inner provinces, such as Chongqing, Kunming, or
Shandong, to continue making profit as middlemen from low production costs.2
2.5.2 Local governments sacrificed workers’ interests for economic gains
Seeing foreign investment as an indicator of economic growth and working along with the
2 The background of Hong Kong-invested enterprises, their roles in the global production chain, ideology, how their development would
harm the Chinese workers, are discussed in our 2013-2014 annual report, which is available at the HKCTU website. “Monitoring Report on
Collective Labour Disputes of Hong Kong Enterprises in China 2013-2014 (I)”, pp.6-9,
http://www.hkctu.org.hk/cms/images/userfile/file/Corporate%20Monitoring%20Report_Final.pdf
11
unspoken rule of bribe-taking, local authorities favor employers in the process of promoting
the policy to upgrade industry. They allow the employers to take shortcuts in completing the
official requirements inexpensively, creating various exemptions for them to escape severance
payments and other lawful compensations required by the labour laws.
2.5.3 Hong Kong entrepreneurs’ resistance to labour rights
Compared with statistics collected in the previous year, 2014/15 witnessed a significant growth
(nearly 70%, increasing from 15 cases to 25 cases) in collective action (mainly strikes) in Hong
Kong-invested enterprises. Workers also encountered more grave retaliation and violent
suppression from management. This is linked to Hong Kong entrepreneurs’ stiff resistance to
labour rights, while they take market-oriented labour relations for granted.3 Their refusal to
engage in dialogue leads workers to strike as the last resort to press for negotiation.
The Guangdong Provincial Government intended to pass a collective negotiation bill, hoping
that collective negotiation at the enterprise-level could reduce strikes and enhance social
stability. However, the six major business associations in Hong Kong, together with their
counterparts from Taiwan, used their connections with politicians and the business sector, to
lobby for their own interests. As a result, clauses that could have empowered workers in
collective negotiation were all removed from the Regulations on Enterprise Collective
Consultations and Collective Contracts, which have been enforced since 1 January 2015. For
example, it removes all disciplinary measures on enterprises when they refuse to negotiate with
employees. In other words, the Hong Kong entrepreneurs shut workers out from fair
negotiation.
Noticing that labour arbitration is a long and tiring process with a low success rate, workers
feel that the legal system has failed to offer them solutions and the strike is seen as a way out.
The Hong Kong management seldom has the experience to handle collective labour disputes
and therefore when they encounter frequent labour actions in China, they act rather clumsy and
unprofessional.4 As a result, labour relations have been deteriorating.
3 HUI, E.S.I. & CHAN C.K.C., “The Role of Foreign Chambers of Commerce and Government Agencies in Shaping Labour Legislations in
China: A Case Study on the Shenzhen Collective Consultation Ordinance and the Guangdong Regulations on Democratic Management of
Enterprises”, City University of Hong Kong. 4 “Experts' views: Roles and Influence of Hong Kong Capital in the Global Production Chain”, May Wong (executive director of
Globalisation Monitor) and Dr Dae-oup Chang, (Senior Lecturer in Development Studies of the School of Oriental and African Studies,
12
2.5.4 TNCs failed to protect workers’ rights in their supply chain
Many Hong Kong-invested enterprises are indeed suppliers of TNCs. TNCs are in pursuit of
profit maximization and do not comply with ILO Conventions about labour protection. Their
usual practice is to order from suppliers who demand the lowest prices. In other words, they
are the accomplices, working with the Hong Kong business owners to exploit workers.
2.6 Acknowledgement
The HKCTU would like to thank the IUF for its valuable advice during the research process.
We also welcome suggestions and comments from all of you, as they could enhance our further
research. Please kindly email us your comments to [email protected], fax us +852 27707388,
or write us: 19th Floor, Wing Wong Commercial Building, 557-559 Nathan Road, Kowloon
Hong Kong.
University of London), HKCTU China Labour Quarterly, March 2014.
13
Part III: Research findings
3.1 Factors leading to strikes or large-scale labour protests in Hong Kong
enterprises
*Includes two strikes in the same Shenzhen Artigas Clothing & Leatherware Factory, where workers launched a
second strike on 9 June 2015, after the factory refused to discuss with them regarding the severance payment of
relocation. Though the strike did not take place within our research period, it is connected to the first strike.
Therefore, the second strike is included in the statistics.
3.1.1 Illegal or dishonest ways to avoid or cut severance pay
In order to cut costs, when enterprises relocate, restructure or shut down due to Guangdong’s
industry-upgrading policies, employers take illegal or dishonest means, to escape or cut
severance payments. Among 25 cases of labour disputes, over 40% were caused by missing
severance pay. Half of them involved well-known brands’ suppliers or subsidiaries of Hong
Kong listed companies. Another one-fifth of involved Hong Kong enterprises are recidivists,
which have encountered strikes before due to their repeated violations of labour rights.
Labour Contract Law Article 40 (3), “The objective conditions taken as the basis for
conclusion of the contract have greatly changed, so that the original labor contract cannot
be performed and, after consultation between the employing unit and the worker, no
agreement is reached on modification of the contents of the labor contract, an employing
unit may revoke the labor contract, if it notifies in writing the worker of its intention 30
14
days in advance or after paying him an extra one month salary.” Article 46 and Article 47
lead to “Financial compensation shall be paid on the basis of the number of years a person
works in a unit, the rate being one month’s salary for the work of one full year.”
Relocation of an enterprise, change of legal representatives, change of an enterprise’s name (a
procedure of restructuring), can all lead to differences from the contracts that workers signed.
Therefore, the enterprise is obligated to discuss with workers and come to a new agreement
when it makes these changes. But since the Labour Contract Law has not defined “greatly
changed” the Hong Kong enterprises have been using this as a gray area, to collude with the
local government in exploiting workers.
Shenzhen Artigas Clothing & Leatherware Factory is such an illustration. Its parent company,
Lever Style Inc. made a statement on 25 June 2015, saying that there was “no legal requirement
for Lever Style to pay compensation for relocation within the same district. This has been
confirmed by the government and the company’s legal advisers.”5 (For details of Artigas Strike,
please see p.26-33)
On 28 July 2012, the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court gave guidelines on the ruling of
labour arbitration cases, stating that if the employing unit is not moving outside the territory of
Shenzhen City, it is not required to compensate its employees whose contracts are terminated
due to relocation issues. The court’s guidelines are indeed backing up the enterprises, as the
Labour Contract Law does not clearly define how to implement the court’s ruling and Hong
Kong enterprises make use of them to avoid severance payments.
Grosby Footwear (Shenzhen) Ltd., a supplier to world-famous British brands Marks &
Spencers and Clarks solidly illustrates such a trend. Originally a processing and assembly
factory, it has been restructured to become a wholly Hong Kong-owned enterprise, changing
its legal representative and company name in the process. In order to cut the costs of
restructuring, Grosby refused to discuss welfare and pay in their new contracts with its senior
workers, their years of service and if there would be layoffs. The company’s neglect led to a
strike, joined by all 600 workers. The employer made use of the excuse, “absenteeism”, to
5 Statement from Lever Style Inc., http://www.leverstyle.com/news/statement.htm.
15
dismiss 109 senior workers in seven rounds, without paying them their severance payment.
During the strike, workers were violently attacked, their rights to collective bargaining and
strike have been severely violated. For details, please see p20-25.
In some other cases, enterprises deceived workers during the restructuring process, in order to
avoid compensation. Hanson Metal Factory Ltd., a large-scale Hong Kong enterprise which
produces watch straps, cases and jewellery, played such tricks. Workers were not willing to be
relocated to Huizou City and demanded severance payment as required by law. However, the
enterprise had never informed the workers about relocation arrangements. In September 2014,
the management of its factory in Longgang District, Shenzhen City asked some workers to help
out in Huizhou for a month, promising their wages would be calculated as in the Shenzhen
factory and they would be given 380 yuan subsidy per month. However, upon arrival in
Huizhou, their work documents and smart cards were all confiscated and replaced with those
of the Huizhou factory. In other words, the factory tricked and forced workers to work in
Huizhou.
When the workers in Shenzhen learned about this, they launched a strike on 15 November,
involving a workforce of some 2,000. They encountered the worst suppression on 17th and 19th
November. At least 10 workers were detained, facing criminal charges such as “obstructing
governmental operation” or “disturbing public order”. Many workers were injured in the
clashes, one was hospitalized. A worker, Mr Chen said, “At 3pm on 17th November, the factory
management brought in 100 to 200 riot-police, together with policemen and security guards,
they had about 400 people. The riot police
first climbed in through the main door,
using shields to disperse workers. Very
quickly, some dozens of female workers
were cornered by the police. The police
grabbed them, forcibly took them away,
dragging them. Four to five policemen
took one person. I saw it with my own
eyes, they took about three to four women workers and before then, they had already filled two
16
cars with detainees.”6(See picture on the right on the previous page)
Workers sought help from media in Guangdong Province and Shenzhen City but no journalist
covered their story. A worker, Mr Zhan said, “On 19th November, 36 of us went to the Public
Security Bureau. The Bureau chief said the policemen were invited by the enterprise; it is not
their job to protect workers. We tried to get the district government, labour bureau, and village
committee to intervene but none of them wanted to get involved. The district government asked
us to talk to the Letters and Complaints Bureau, they just turn us around and won’t fix the
problems.”7
The three cases mentioned above are just the tip of the iceberg. Yet, they clearly show us that
from the beginning, the Hong Kong enterprises intended to shirk responsibility and avoid
compensating workers. They have systematically and calculatedly deceived workers, colluding
with various local authorities, to sacrifice workers' rights and interests in order to cut costs
while restructuring.
3.1.2 A new labour movement in Hong Kong enterprises to claim the missing social
security premiums
Among the collective labour actions, we witnessed a significant growth of cases related to
missing social security premiums. It contributed to 13% of cases in our investigative report last
year and grew to nearly 60% (56%) this year. Social security, sometimes known as social
insurance, is an important component of China’s social security system. It covers five
categories of insurance and one fund, namely pension insurance, medical insurance,
unemployment insurance, work-injury insurance, childbirth insurance and housing provident
fund. Both employers and employees should make contributions to the social security. This
research identifies that missing or underpayment of social security commonly occurs in many
international brands, such as UNIQLO, Wal-mart, Disney, Sony and Panasonic; or listed
6 “2,000 workers launched a five-day strike in a Hong Kong-invested factory in China (19 photos) “(深圳港資廠二千工人連續五天大罷工(19
圖)),Epoch Times, 20 September 2014,
http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/14/9/20/n4253230.htm%E6%B7%B1%E5%9C%B3%E6%B8%AF%E8%B3%87%E5%BB%A0%E4%BA
%8C%E5%8D%83%E5%B7%A5%E4%BA%BA%E9%80%A3%E7%BA%8C%E4%BA%94%E5%A4%A9%E5%A4%A7%E7%BD%B
7%E5%B7%A5%EF%BC%8819%E5%9C%96%EF%BC%89.html
7 “Some thousands of workers strike, cracked down by several hundreds police, a dozen of workers arrested” ( 深圳數千人罷工 數百警鎮壓 10 餘
人被捕), NTDTV.COM,20 September 2014, http://www.ntdtv.com/xtr/b5/2014/09/21/a1139940.html
17
companies or well-known enterprises, such as Chow Tak Fook (HKG 1929), Kingboard
Chemical Holdings Ltd. (HKG 0148), G2000, in both suppliers and subsidiaries in China.
In November 2014, 800 workers launched a strike at SPG Industrial (H.K.) Ltd.’s Huizhou
Plant, to demand their missing wages. SPG is a supplier for Sony and Panasonic, and has been
reported to have repeatedly violated laws, such as failing to pay housing provident fund,
unemployment insurance, childbirth insurance rather often. Ms Liu has worked in SPG for 20
years and she discovered that her unemployment insurance was not paid in two intervals;
between July 1994 and December 1998, and between March 2009 and May 2011. Her medical
insurance was cut between July 1994 and October 2001. However, her wages slips show that
each month, wages have been deducted for social insurance. She later found out from the local
taxation bureau that SPG had missed paying social insurance for some time. It indicates that
even the listed companies intentionally break the law and it was only when the workers exposed
the case, that SPG repaid a certain amount of the missing premiums. Last year, Yue Yuen (551)
was found paying the pension premiums by the standard of legal minimum wages. That led to
a three-week strike, involving some 50,000 workers. Yet until now, Yue Yuen still declines to
repay the missing pension insurance.8
Authorities in China tend to side with the enterprises, even if the latter refuse to repay the
missing social security (especial pension insurance) premiums. Article 20 of Regulation on
Labor Security Supervision states, “Where an act of violating labor security laws, regulations
or rules is neither found by the labor security administration nor reported or complained by
others within 2 years, the labor security administration shall no longer investigate it.” 9
Exceeding its administrative jurisdiction is a common reason for the Chinese authorities to
shirk their responsibility in helping workers to claim missing pension insurance. As a result,
Hong Kong enterprises continue to withhold pension insurance deliberately and indefinitely.
3.1.3 Low wages led to strikes in subsidiaries of three Hong Kong listed companies
Senior workers with 10 years’ experience earning less than new recruits led to a strike in the
8 “First anniversary of Yue Yuen Strike, some current facts which you should know” (裕元大罷工一周年 你不得不知的現狀), New Citizens
Movement, http://xgmyd.com/archives/16505.
9 Regulation on Labor Security Supervision, State Council, 23 May 2005. http://big5.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-
05/23/content_254.htm.
18
Hong Kong listed company Arts Optical International Holdings Limited (HKG 1120). Its
wholly-owned subsidiary Argent Optical Manufactory Ltd. has over 10,000 workers in its
factory in Longgang District of Shenzhen City. A worker, Mr You, reported, “The basic wage
of a new worker is 2,030 yuan (the legal minimum wage of Shenzhen City in 2015), while a
senior worker, referring to those who have worked seven, eight or even over 10 years, earns
some 1,800 yuan in basic wages. The enterprise will only make changes between the flexible
bonus and basic wages, but all in all, senior workers earn less than new workers."10
The situation finally led to a strike on 16 March 2015. The enterprise stated that it would
evaluate wages and make changes, without offering concrete solutions. A worker, Shen, quoted
the management as saying, "Due to labour shortage, the enterprise had to raise wages to make
it attractive. However, the factory could not afford to raise the senior workers' wages." Some
workers were upset by this comment and resigned, and then they discovered that over the past
years, the enterprises had not paid for workers' pension insurance, medical insurance, work-
injury insurance, childbirth
insurance, unemployment
insurance and housing funds.
This discovery enraged workers
and on 20 November, some
5,000 workers, mainly senior
workers, launched a strike on
the road outside the factory. A
troop of policemen arrived to bar them from going to the City Government to make complaints
(See photo above). Workers have resumed working but they did not reach an agreement
regarding a pay rise. It is unclear if the enterprise will eventually pay all the workers their basic
wages according to the legal minimum wages of Shenzhen City. The factory has announced
that it cannot repay the pension insurance premiums.11
Furthermore, many workers refused to move to Huizhou and hoped the enterprise would pay
10 “Thousands of workers in an optical factory in Shenzhen staged a road blockade to protest against low wages” (深圳眼鏡廠數千工人抗議薪資
低堵路),Epoch Times, 23 March 2015, http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/15/3/24/n4394819.htm#sthash.JlHMriAD.dpuf
11 “Textile workers launched a blockade and more strike from an optical factory” (紡織工人堵路 眼鏡廠再有罷工),Radio Free Asia Cantonese
Services, 23 March 2015, http://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/labor-03232015091553.html
19
them compensation. On 15 August 2014, Arts Optical International Holdings Limited sold its
land and property in Longgang District to Kaisa Group Holdings Ltd. for 1.5797 billion yuan.
According to the contract, the sale price should cover the costs and relevant compensation
required for laying off workers at Arts Optical.12
Arts Optical is a listed company with robust financial backing. It made enormous profit from
selling land and yet, it has violated the laws and not paid workers' social security premiums for
many years. It is unclear whether Arts Optical will compensate workers who refuse to relocate,
that is, for each year of service, a financial compensation of a month's wages, as required by
Labour Contract Law Article 40 (3), Article 46 and Article 47.
Strikes also occurred in two other Hong Kong listed enterprises: Kingboard Chemical Holdings
Ltd. (HKG 0148) and
Pegasus International
Holding Ltd. (HKG
0676), which are both
treating their workers
in ways similar to Arts
Optical.
12 “Arts Optical (1120) sold land and property in Longgang District of Shenzhen for 1.5797 billion yuan” Quamnet, 18 September 2014,
http://www.quamnet.com/newscontent.action?articleId=3828810
Workers from the Elec & Eltek factory under the Kingboard Chemical Holdings
Ltd. post a banner saying ‘we want higher pay’ on the front door of the company
20
3.2 Unprofessional ways adopted by management of Hong Kong enterprises
in handling labour disputes
3.2.1 Rights to collective bargaining and strike not recognized by the management of
Hong Kong enterprises
3.2.1a Management’s retaliation against workers’ representatives
The management of Hong Kong enterprises often refuses to
collectively consult with workers, and then dismisses
workers’ representatives and active workers when strikes
take place. Hong Kong-invested Grosby Footwear
(Shenzhen) Ltd., a supplier of British TNCs, Marks &
Spencers and Clarks and other major brands, vividly
illustrated this practice. Grosby restructured itself in 2014
and after the Lunar New Year that year, problems such as
overdue wages, late payments of social insurance premiums,
and reduction of orders occurred. Workers became worried
about whether the enterprise would shut down and repeatedly demanded to negotiate with the
employer. Grosby refused and only put out notices to explain, which led to a strike on 26 May
2014. On 5 June, the enterprise released a list of dismissals, naming 65 workers. By 16 July, a
total of 109 workers had been sacked. A
female worker who had worked in
Grosby for 12 years, jumped from a
deadly height and killed herself after she
had been dismissed (See photo above).13
A worker, Liu Xinhua reflected, “The
management has never thought of talking
to us. Most of the sacked workers are
union members and active strikers.” 14
13 “Shenzhen female worker jumped from height and killed after being dismissed in a strike” (深圳女工參與停工活動遭開除跳樓身亡), Caixin, 17
July 2014, http://china.caixin.com/2014-07-17/100705378.html. 14 First hearing of the labour dispute arbitration at Grosby Footwear (Shenzhen) Ltd. (深圳哥士比鞋業勞資糾紛案仲裁開庭), China Labour
Bulletin, 28 July 2014,
http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/content/%E6%B7%B1%E5%9C%B3%E5%93%A5%E5%A3%AB%E6%AF%94%E9%9E%8B%E4%B8%9A
%E5%8A%B3%E8%B5%84%E7%BA%A0%E7%BA%B7%E6%A1%88%E4%BB%B2%E8%A3%81%E5%BC%80%E5%BA%AD
July 17th: Husband, daughter and colleagues of Zhou
Jianrong mourning the deceased.
21
Furthermore, workers confirmed that the so-called restructuring was merely a trick to cut costs
by sacrificing workers’ interests. Most of the dismissed workers were senior workers, some
had even served there for over 20 years.15 On 25 July, vice-chairman of the trade union, Luo
Xiangxun, who was dismissed as he represented the workers to fight for their rights, testified
in front of the Arbitration Committee of Labour Disputes, for a case of 73 workers demanding
reinstatement. He stated, “The management has been looking for ways to cut down its
workforce, especially to sack the senior workers without paying severance compensation. The
strike gave it a golden excuse to do so.” 16
The focal points of the Grosby case can be seen on Table 1.
Table 1: Labour rights violations in Grosby
(The green highlighted areas are the key points of the suppression)
Management did not
respect the trade
union and refused to
negotiate.
Late
May
The enterprise refused to communicate, but put out a
“Restructuring Notice”, announcing it had been transformed
from a processing and assembly factory to a wholly Hong
Kong-owned enterprise. Workers’ years of services, wages and
benefits would remain unchanged.
26 May Employer’s refusal to communicate led to a strike, joined by all
600 workers. On the second day of the strike, the trade union
represented the workers to invite the employer for negotiation,
but no reply was given.
Management did not
respect the workers
4 June The trade union had first called the workers to return to work
and wait for negotiation. However, the management kept taking
videos of workers and verbally provoked them, which led to
another strike.
Dismissing workers’
representatives and
active strikers, as
retaliation
12 June 39 workers were sacked, quoting “joining strike, violating
factory rules” as reasons.
15 Meng Quan, Ph.D., lecturer of Department of Labour Relations, Institute of Labour Economics, Capital University of Economics and
Business, “Face-changing: governance and labour solidarity: analysis of the labour dispute at Grosby Footwear (Shenzhen) Ltd. (“變臉”治理
與勞工團結——深圳哥士比鞋廠勞資衝突事件分析), http://www.chineseworkers.com.cn/_d276742044.htm. 16 Ibid
22
Grosby started to
work with the police,
to threaten the
workers with
detention if they
continued to defend
their rights
24 June Luo Xiangxun, the union vice-chairperson was taken to police
station and put under administrative detention for seven days.
In the afternoon, the government pressurized workers one by
one, demanding them to resume working. It requested workers
to immediately select representatives to meet with the
employer.
Management
provoked the workers
and made
unreasonable
demands
25 June Grosby clarified that it would not close down and had still land
in Shenzhen, which could be used for workers’ severance
payments in future. It put out its conditions for workers to
return to work: not to break the factory rules again and to accept
disciplinary measures from the factory. Workers refused and
continued their strike.
Management
attempted
strikebreaking
8 July The dismissed workers were forbidden from entering the
factory, those who never joined the strike were given a 500
Yuan reward. Those who voluntarily resigned were given one
month of wages as subsidy.
Management further
provoked workers,
strike continued
12 July The factory gave an ultimatum, urging the remaining 87
dismissed workers to return to work the next day. Originally,
some workers returned to work. However, they were shocked
and provoked when the enterprise later demanded they write a
“reinstatement application and guarantee”, including clauses
“asking for the enterprise’s forgiveness”, “promising not to
take ‘illegal’ means to express their demands”, “pledging to
obey the management” and “accepting disciplinary measures”.
Grosby continued to
dismiss workers in
seven rounds and led
to a tragedy
16 July Another 16 workers were fired for “joining strike” and
“hindering business operation” (the seventh round, i.e. the last
round). Zhou Jianrong, a 50 years old female worker who had
worked in Grosby for 12 years was one of them. At 5.48am the
next morning, Zhou jumped from the 4-story factory building
and was killed on spot. Between 12 June and 17 July, 109
workers were dismissed in seven rounds.
Grosby worked again 17 July Zhou Jianrong’s family and colleagues asked for an
23
with the police, to
stop Zhou’s family
from defending for
her rights
explanation from Grosby and attempted to bring Zhou’s body
from the hospital to the factory. However, they were dispersed
by riot police and Zhou’s body was taken by the police and sent
to a funeral home. Workers continued to strike.
Grosby has not only violated the rights to collective bargaining and strike, but also the Chinese
Trade Union Law. Its Article 27 states, “In case of work-stoppage or slow-down strike in an
enterprise or institution…With respect to the reasonable demands made by the workers and
staff members, the enterprise or institution shall try to satisfy them….” and its Article 53 states,
“Any organization or individual…rejects consultation on an equal footing without justifiable
reasons… shall be ordered by the people's government at or above the county level to rectify,
and the said government shall handle the case according to law.” These two articles clearly
point out that an enterprise has a responsibility to consult with workers. However, Grosby’s
behavior, namely refusing collective consultation and dismissing workers’ representatives, has
repeatedly violated the Trade Union Law.17
17 Trade Union Law, People’s Republic of China, 25 May 2005, http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-05/25/content_896.htm.
24
Marks & Spencers joined the Ethical Trading Initiative in 1999. However, it allowed Grosby
to violate fundamental labour rights. This means, Marks and Spencers has failed to follow ETI
base code on freedom of association and rights to collective bargaining. The four major aspects
The notice from Grosby to strike workers, stating that workers will be fired because of their active participation
in the strike.
25
of these rights include:18
1. Workers, without distinction, have the right to join or form trade unions of their own
choosing and to bargain collectively.
2. The employer adopts an open attitude towards the activities of trade unions and their
organisational activities.
3. Workers representatives are not discriminated against and have access to carry out their
representative functions in the workplace.
4. Where the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining is restricted under law,
the employer facilitates, and does not hinder, the development of parallel means for
independent and free association and bargaining.
The retaliation against workers has cost the enterprise’s reputation, income from orders and
even share price. It also led the strike to become disorganized as no workers’ representative
would speak up. Without a counterpart to negotiate, there is no chance to reach a common
ground and this prolongs the strike. In the end, both employees and employer lose in this battle
and the enterprise’s reputation is badly damaged. This lesson could have been easily learnt
from the three-week strike of Yue Yuen Industrial Holdings, in which workers did not propose
or elect any representatives to negotiate with the employer. Many workers at Yue Yuen said,
“We dare not. Whoever becomes our representative is very likely to be detained.”19 Workers
reported that, “On 14 April, we went to a strike assembly and those in front were detained. In
our building alone, 10 workers were detained for six or seven days and they dare not join any
workers’ meetings anymore. They used to be very active and now they say nothing… it is said
that they were sent to a correctional institution, where they were re-educated through labour.”20
3.2.1b Violence and threat of criminal detention to suppress strikes
Hong Kong-invested enterprises have been using the authority of the police to threaten the
strikers with violence and criminal detention. In nearly 80% of the cases, workers have been
surrounded by police, violently assaulted and even detained, a similar picture to the year before.
18 Introduction of ETI, Ethical Trade Initiative, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/about-eti and its base code, Ethical Trade Initiative, 2014,
http://www.ethicaltrade.org/sites/default/files/resources/ETI%20Base%20Code%2C%20English.pdf
19 Por-Yee Lin, Ph.D candidate in Sociology, University of London and part-time lecturer, “Observations of the Yue Yuen Strike”( 裕元罷工停
看聽), Macau Daily, 19 May 2014, http://www.coolloud.org.tw/node/78760 20 Ibid
26
However, there has been an increasing trend of Hong Kong entrepreneurs employing police
brutality to suppress strikes, even some volunteers of labour organizations were attacked by
police, for their efforts to help other workers.
This report has selected two well-documented
strikes in two factories, namely, Shenzhen
Artigas Clothing & Leatherware Factory and
Sunsang Accessories Co., to compare their
similarities and differences (see Table 2, the
backgrounds of the two factories refer to
footnote 21 & 2221 22 ). Artigas supplies for
world famous Japanese brand UNIQLO and Hong Kong brand G2000. G2000 is headed by
Michael Tien, a member of the National People’s Congress and a legislator in Hong Kong.
Artigas itself belongs to Lever Style Inc., its chairman and CEO, Stanley Szeto received the
2009 Young Industrialist Award of Hong Kong from the Federation of Hong Kong Industries.23
Strikes broke out in these two factories due to missing social security insurance payments and
employers’ refusal to engage in collective consultation. In Sunsang, workers also tried to hold
21 Background of the Artigas strike:Artigas is a subsidiary garment factory of Hong Kong Lever Style Inc. in Shenzhen. It is located in
Longhua New District of Shenzhen City, with a workforce of nearly 1,000 workers. Most workers have been employed for over 10 years or
even 20 years. However, it was only after 2003, their employer started to pay for workers’ social security premiums. Some female workers
who worked there for 20 years but have only been covered for pension premiums three years ago. To be entitled to pension payment, one has
to pay in social security premiums for at least 15 years. It means when some female workers who are retiring at the age of 50 (the official
retirement age of women workers in China), they would find themselves getting no pension. Workers demanded the enterprise to repay social
security fund and housing provident fund of the missing years, yet the enterprise only gave them “verbal promises” without concrete actions,
which led to two strikes from 10 December 2014 on, to protest against the enterprise’s illegal practice of not paying social security premiums
and housing fund over years.
22 Background of the Sunsang strike:Sunsang Accessories Co. is jointly owned by Hong Kong, Macauese and Taiwanese capital, producing
artificial jewellery, handbags, shoes and etc. It was founded in 1994, located in Panyu District of Guangzhou City. 116 workers (mostly
working at the shoe production section, but later the handbag workers joined in) grew dissatisfied, as the factory secretly relocated in August
2014 without consulting them regarding the settlement measures. They also pointed out that the factory had had long record of violations of
labour laws, such as failing to pay social security premiums, refusing to give workers paid annual leave or statutory holidays, and not paying
workers overtime wages. In mid-August 2014 when workers discussed unfair treatments at the factory, a managerial staff ridiculed them by
saying, “Even if you produce more products, the company will only pay you the legal minimum wages of Panyu District. You can stay or quit
as you wish.” Such a nasty attitude outraged the workers and they demanded to negotiate with the management. Yet, the employer ignored
their lawful demands and called the police to threaten the workers, which led to a strike on 16 September. They put out a banner at the open
area of the factory, shouting slogan such as “demand collective bargaining, fight for legal rights!”
23 “Lee Man-tat conferred with the Industrialist of the Year Award”, Press release, Federation of Hong Kong Industries, 16 November 2009,
http://fhki.industryhk.org/print/english/news/news_press/pr_091116_049.php
Artigas female workers stayed at the factory to
guard the machines from being secretly moving
away by the management.
27
the employer accountable for severance payment as the factory relocated. The workers in these
two Hong Kong-invested enterprises faced three similar types of suppression. First, the
management would pretend to negotiate with workers or work with the local government to
hint that it would. When the workers lowered their guard, it signaled the police to violently
crack down on the industrial action. Artigas workers were not conducting a road blockade but
peacefully staying in the factory during the strike. However, the police still stormed into the
factory and some workers were seriously assaulted and hospitalized.
Second, the factories would threaten the workers with detention, to stop them from fighting for
their rights. Workers from both factories have been detained, after the employers had brought
police in. A manager from its Hong Kong parent
company Lever Style Inc., personally led the
police into the Artigas factory to detain workers.
Sunsang Accessories Co. provided a name list and
photos to the police, to help them to detain workers
in the factory. After detention, seven workers’
representatives faced a criminal charge of
“sabotaging production and business operation”.
Third, the management adopted various ways to threaten the workers, to keep them from
fighting for their rights. After workers were being forced to resume work, the management of
Artigas sent security guards or police to supervise workers in the factory. A worker described
this on his micro-blog, “If we slow down, we
will be violently assaulted.” 24 Sunsang
Accessories Co. treated workers with
administrative disciplinary measures. It
would start with a warning letter, a demerit
point, and then a “resume work or dismissal”
notice warning workers, threatening the
24 Micro-blog “Artigas workers defending rights” (「慶盛廠工人維權」微博), 23 December 2014,
http://www.weibo.com/5430587020/BC9clgsrj
A female worker who fainted due to miscarriage
while she safeguarded the factory at Shenzhen.
A number of senior female workers were also
sent to hospital for sunstroke on their way to
petition to the Guangzhou provincial
government.
More than 100 female workers asked for public
donations on the street of Guangzhou, in order to
support their transport, accommodation and meal
fee at the period they went to petition to the
provincial government at Guangzhou.
28
workers untill they give up their fight. 25
What harm would it do to the labour relations, when the management begins to treat workers
with violence? A worker Ping (not her real name) reflected after Artigas voluntarily invited the
police to suppress the labour action, “We took legal means to protest but were considered as
disturbing social order. That makes us feel helpless. Some workers have served the factory for
20 or 30 years, yet the factory repaid them with continuous suppression and lies. The enterprise
also tried to break us apart from our lawyers and make us disorganized. These unscrupulous
measures made us so disappointed. The enterprise, the police, the trade union and authority, all
four of them joined hands to crack down on us. Some workers gave up fighting, we keep
working there, working and waiting in the factory (It means staying at the workplace but not
working). The enterprise would take photos of us every day, monitor our work and make us
like prisoners under surveillance. Even though we don’t like it, we have to tolerate it, it makes
us so disheartened and feel hopeless.” 26
25 Collection of enterprise notice (公司公告集合),Youth Sparks, 15 November 2014, http://www.youth-
sparks.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=4280&page=1#pid22242, & photos of enterprise notices, uploaded to micro-blog, 15 November 2014,
http://photo.weibo.com/2687403913/albums/detail/album_id/3776544156817174#!/mode/1/page/1
26 Ibid
29
Table 2: Similarity and difference of suppression in two strikes in Artigas and
Sunsang
Similarity (1): the employers pretended to negotiate or worked with the local authorities to make
workers believe that their demands are heard, while colluding with the police to prepare for
violent suppression.
Artigas On 15 Dec 2014 (the 6th day of the strike), workers sent
an invitation to the employer for negotiation. The
employer confirmed its arrival two days later, on 17 Dec
and appointed to meet on the next morning (18 Dec). The
employer also put out a notice, stating it supported
“workers to directly elect” their representatives. Yet, at
7am the next morning, instead of coming to negotiate, the
owner of Lever Style Inc. led some 300 armed police to
storm into the factory (See photo below). He demanded the workers to first resume
working before negotiation (See photo on the right). Workers stayed united and refused
his demand. At 9am, the factory
indicated to the police to forcibly
disperse workers, claiming it was a “fire
drill” to the public while the reality was,
Artigas had to remove the workers in
order to deliver a shipment to UNIQLO.
31 workers’ leaders were detained and many were injured. One detained leader’s head
was badly injured and he was hospitalized. Other workers, including pregnant women,
were also attacked by police.
Sunsang On 31 Oct 2014 (Friday), Labour Bureau of Guangzhou City promised that by the
following Monday, a solution of severance settlement would be delivered to workers at
Sunsang. However, when workers arrived the factory on 3 Nov (Monday), they were
surrounded by some 200 policemen. The police hid the factory area with cloths and
detained 14 workers’ representatives, with pictures and a name list provided by the
employer. They also forcibly took or destroyed workers’ mobile phones. Some female
workers had been scared and cried.27
27 Timeline of Sunsang workers’ struggles, Yang Jinyan’s blog, Sina blog, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_a02e87890102vawz.html.
30
Similarity (2): detention as a threat to stop workers from fighting for their rights
Difference: Sunsang workers’ representatives were criminally detained
Artigas On 18 Dec, workers were dispersed and the management threatened the workers to
resume working and elect representatives who were close to the management. Detained
workers’ leaders were threatened by the police in the police station that they had to give
up the strike and sign a “statement to stop defending rights” before being released.
However, all of them refused to comply and after some 12 hours of detention, they were
released before mid-night.
Sunsang On 3 Nov, the day the 14 workers were detained, fellow workers and labour activists
went to negotiate with the police at Donghuan Police Station, to demand the release of
workers and show them support. Seven
workers were released at mid-night, but
another seven (Qín Qìngméi, Zhāng Wèipíng,
Yáng Lìyàn, Zhū Guógāng, Bì Yòuxiáng,
Yáng Dōngshēng, Yè Shìbīn) were criminally
detained, facing charges of “sabotaging
production and business operation”.28
On 5 Nov, after 50 hours of detention of the
seven workers, Yang Dongsheng’s wife, Yu
Sanmei requested to visit him and give him
some medicine, as he suffered from a serious
liver disease. However, her request was
immediately turned down by the Donghuan police station.
Similarity (3): various means to threaten workers
Difference: Artigas workers were monitored by the management while Sunsang workers were
punished by factory rules
28 Guangzhou citizen Liu Shaoming’s live coverage of Sunsang workers’ right-defending incident (廣州公民劉少明關於新生鞋廠工人維權事件的實
況報導), Changweibo, http://www.changweibo.com/p/2014110608485198399.
The wife of the workers’ representative
Yang Dongsheng sent a letter to the police,
demanding them to be responsible for her
husband’s deterioration caused by
deprivation of medicines and visits.
31
Artigas On 23 Dec, workers were forced to resume working. They uploaded pictures to micro-
blogs, showing that they were monitored by police or security guards at work (See
photos on the left). “If we work
slowly, we will be violently
attacked. The outside world thinks
that our boss has addressed our
demands with reasonable means,
but the truth is we got none of what
we should have got. Despicable
and cruel Hong Kong employer
used violence to force us to go
back to work.
Sunsang The factory put out several notices on 11 or 12 Sept 2014 (exact date was covered and
blurred by a stamp), punishing strikers with warning letter, demerit point and dismissal
warning with administrative disciplinary measures (See photo below).29
29 Same as footnote 25.
32
In the process of being violently suppressed by employers and local governments, workers
have developed the tactic of using their collective power in protecting the workers’
representatives. For example, when their representatives are taken away by the police and
detained in a police station. Workers would unite and gather in front of the police station,
calling the media to expose the truth. Such a tactic can pressure the public security and help to
call for immediate release.
Famous brands tend to present themselves as businesses with a conscience, even if they are
violators of international conventions and fundamental labour rights. For example, UNIQLO
is owned by Fast Retailing Co. Ltd. and claims to have a mission “to use our business to change
the world for the better, to improve the lives of people around the world and change the society
for the better.” In practice, it leaves its supplier Artigas to refuse collective consultation with
its workers, miss the payments of social security, and even violently attack striking workers.
Artigas’ behaviours violate the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, whose Article
1 and Article 2 of Part V “Employment and Industrial Relations”, calls for respect and
recognition of organizations of employees’ own choosing, engagement in constructive
negotiations, provision of information and facilities to workers’ representatives as may be
necessary to assist in the development of effective collective agreements.
Artigas has failed to address the problems of missing social security premiums and in early
June 2015, without informing its workers about its relocation plan, it removed machinery from
the factory and attempted to avoid severance payments. Workers safeguarded the machinery
in shifts and from 9 June, they launched a second strike, urging the employer to talk with them.
By 17 July, six workers had been criminally detained by police for joining the strike and are
not yet freed. One of them has been detained since 6 June.
In December 2014, June and July 2015, UNIQLO issued statements, claiming “ensuring human
rights and appropriate working conditions are of the utmost importance. Fast Retailing is
concerned by the reported strike and is looking into it. Fast Retailing has requested that
management of the owner company, Lever Style, undertake thorough discussions with the
33
workers, for a peaceful resolution.”30 However, such a publicity gesture has not brought any
constructive action to help workers with equal consultation or compensation as required by the
Chinese labour laws. UNIQLO even accepted Lever Style Inc.’s proposal to use a “care
hotline”, instead of collective consultation, to talk to the workers’ representatives. Chairperson
of G2000, Michael Tien even cut orders from Artigas, to avoid responsibility before the labour
dispute had been addressed.
3.2.2 Management of Hong Kong enterprises deprives workers’ of freedom of association
Enterprise management commonly controls the trade unions and deprives workers’ of their
freedom of association. One of the examples is Foshan Arts & Crafts Works Co. Ltd. (hereafter:
Foshan Ltd.), which is a supplier factory of the Hong Kong listed company Chow Tak Fook
(HKG 1929). Foshan Ltd. is located in Chancheng District of Fushan City, it also supplies for
other Hong Kong enterprises such as Gold Forever Ltd. and Gold Apex Precious Metal (H.K.)
Ltd., Mansion Bullion Ltd. and others. However, it secretly set up a factory in Dali Town under
another name, and from April 2014 onwards, moved machinery from the old factory to the new
factory, neither informing its workers nor discussing future arrangements with them.31
Fifty-nine workers had served in the factory for 10 years or more. A sudden decline of workload
caused their monthly income to drop from 7,000 or 8,000 yuan to 2,000 yuan. Foshan Ltd.’s
move intended to force them to resign, without paying their severance payment.32 Workers
launched a strike on 16 June 2014, and after months of struggles, the enterprise finally repaid
all of the missing social security premiums, housing fund and paid leave to workers on 10
October.
During the strike, workers sought help from the Foshan City Federation of Trade Unions and
demanded to set up a union. However, they were informed that “you have been members.” and
“Li Yueying is the union chairperson”. Yet, workers had never participated in a union election,
30 Statement “Regarding the Strike at Shenzhen Artigas Clothing & Leatherware Factory in China”, UNIQLO, 17 June 2015,
http://www.fastretailing.com/eng/csr/news/1506171300.html 31 “Wage cutting and forced relocation in Foshan Ltd.: stalemate as no consent has been reached” (佛山同心首飾廠降薪逼遷:勞資談不攏維權陷僵
局), 21 July 2014, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_ed2baf420102uxzv.html.
32 “Foshan Ltd. relocated its machinery and cut wages, workers demanded the truth” (佛山市工藝總廠又搬設備又降薪,工人停工求真相), Forum of
China’s collective bargaining.(中國集體談判論壇),7 July 2014, http://www.jttp.cn/a/report/news/labor/2014/0706 /5802.html
34
had no union membership cards, and had never known of the existence of the union
chairperson.33 According to workers, Li Yueying is one of the senior managers from the
employer’s side. Workers returned to the enterprise, demanded to improve the union structure
and the distribution of their membership cards. They also wanted Li Yueying’s assistance to
call on the employer to negotiate concerning guaranteed wages and the abolishment of
unreasonable factory rules. However, their demands were ignored by both the enterprise and
Li. Instead, on 15 October and 10 November, the enterprise punished the workers with factory
rules, as retaliation.34
China’s Trade Union Law and Constitution of the Chinese Trade Unions allow workers to seek
upper union’s approval to dismiss a trade union chairperson and re-elect, when the current trade
union chairperson fails to carry
out her/his duties. Workers
decided to hold a general meeting
and invited the Guangdong
Provincial Federation of Trade
Unions and Foshan City
Federation of Trade Unions as
witnesses, to re-elect its trade
union chairperson and committee
on 27 November. Both upper level
unions declined to reply.35 On the
morning of 25 November, the
enterprise fired three workers’
representatives, Zhù Xīnhuá, Qián
Sēnhuá and Zhèng Hóngshuāng
(see photo on the left) and
dispersed the workers with police
33 “Timeline of the case of the Foshan Ltd.’s wages-cutting and forced relocation (2014.06.23-2014.11.28)”,Youth Sparks, 6 July 2014,
http://www.youth-sparks.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=4161
34 Ibid 35 “Foshan workers plan to sue unions for its indifference to factory’s unscrupulous acts and neglect to their demand of union chairperson
re-election” (佛山工人擬控工會不履職 責無視廠方惡行 求直選主席無回應), Mingpao Canada, 11 Decemeber 2014,
http://www.mingpaocanada.com/tor/htm/News/20141211/tcaf1_r.htm
35
force. All workers went to seek help from the City Federation of Trade Unions but were turned
down. On 27 November, 35 out of 59 workers participated the re-election of trade union
representatives. However, the meeting hall was guarded by the management and a dozen
security guards. Workers could not conduct the re-election and decided to reschedule. No one
from the upper unions attended. On the same afternoon, 32 current workers were denied entry
to the factory. This ban lasted over two months, until the workers sued the factory for “illegal
dismissal” at the Labour Arbitration Committee.36
Another case comes from Yue Yuen Shoe Factory in Dongguan. In April 2014, 50,000 workers
staged a strike and they said, “We didn’t know that the union existed. Unions only provide
services like life coaching, but do not genuinely fight for workers’ rights.”37
Taking the employers’ side, the ACFTU has not only neglected its duty to represent workers
and help solve labour disputes, it also exposes workers to more risks when they fight for their
rights. The previous cases illustrate that the upper level unions (which are branches of ACFTU
at the local levels), do not only ignore workers’ lawful demands to safeguard themselves, but
also threaten workers with violence or obstruct them from making further complaints to higher-
level government authorities or unions. Between late 2014 and early 2015, during the strike at
Artigas, workers brought their case to the Shenzhen City Federation of Trade Unions,
Shenzhen’s Letters and Complaints Bureau and the Guangdong Provincial Federation of Trade
Unions. They received numerous violent threats for making these trips. On 14 January 2015,
the Longhua District Union chairman Wang Jianping sent out his staff members and policemen,
to track workers down, attempting to stop them from making the complaint at the provincial
union. Sunsang Factory’s workers experienced the cruel reality that three levels of trade unions
(city, district and community levels) and their employer joined forces to shut them out of
consultation and bargaining. Workers described “trade unions (referring to all upper level
unions, which are branches under the ACFTU) as accomplices in exploiting workers. The scale
36 First hearing of the illegal dismissal of Foshan Ltd. at the Labour Arbitration Committee, Chinese news, China Labour Bulletin, 4
February 2015,
http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/content/%E4%BD%9B%E5%B1%B1%E5%B7%A5%E8%89%BA%E6%80%BB%E5%8E%82%E5%B7%A5
%E4%BA%BA%E8%A2%AB%E9%9D%9E%E6%B3%95%E8%A7%A3%E9%9B%87%E6%A1%88%E4%BB%B2%E8%A3%81%E5
%BC%80%E5%BA%AD
37 Same as footnote 19
36
of the unions’ deception and destruction is indeed the highest.”38
38 Timeline of Sunsang workers’ struggles, Yang Jinyan’s blog, Sina blog, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_a02e87890102vawz.html.
37
Part IV: Hong Kong enterprises’ abuse of political power in
violating labour rights
4.1 Hong Kong and Taiwanese entrepreneurs joined forces to weaken the
collective consultation regulations
In past years Hong Kong and Taiwanese entrepreneurs colluded with local governments to turn
the collective consultation regulations into a toothless tiger. Rights to collective bargaining are
internationally recognized as fundamental human rights and labour rights and clearly stated in
the ILO Convention. Freedom of association can ensure workers are represented through
democratic mechanisms.39 Trade unions and workers’ organizations should not be controlled
or manipulated by the employers or the government, to guarantee equal collective negotiation
with employers. Such a standard can ensure fair negotiation results and protect workers’ rights.
It also can build up healthy labour relations, to avoid costly labour disputes for both parties.
While freedom of association is prohibited in China, on the one hand, workers do not have
effective and equal mechanisms to conduct fair collective negotiations with their employers;
and on the other, strikes or other rights-defending actions lead to criminal accusations.
For example, Wu Guijun, a workers’ leader of the Hong Kong-invested furniture factory
Diweixin was detained in May 2013, for his involvement in a strike and protest at the city
government. He finally walked free after one year and seven days. His case is seen as an
example that Hong Kong enterprises often collude with local governments and use their
authority to suppress labour rights. Without an environment for equal collective negotiations,
the Hong Kong and Taiwanese entrepreneurs manipulated the law-making process of collective
consultation regulation (i.e. Guangdong Province’s Regulations on Enterprise Collective
Contracts). It is the final version of collective consultation legislation, implemented since 1
January 2015, hereafter: Regulations). The business sector’s “efforts” have removed the last
few clauses which could have regulated employers to take account of workers’ voices. The
finalized regulation cannot bite, even if the employers would refuse to consult with workers;
and if the employers’ power is not checked, regulation on collective consultation is no more
than just a paper regulation.
39 ILO standard on Collective Bargaining, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-
standards/collective-bargaining/lang--en/index.htm
38
Back in 2008, the Guangdong
Provincial Government attempted
to incorporate labour negotiations
into the system through
legislation. The earlier draft
allowed employees to officially
demand that the employers
negotiate regarding workplace
issues, as a tool to reduce strikes.
However, the Hong Kong business
sector joined force with its
Taiwanese counterparts, to manipulate the law-making process. They removed most of the
clauses which would have enhanced fair negotiation from the final version of the Regulations
on Enterprise Collective Contracts.
The Hong Kong entrepreneurs cornered those drafts, the parts regarding collective consultation
have been shunted several times. The government re-started the consultation in October 2013.
By then, many restrictions had been put on the draft of the Regulations on Enterprise Collective
Consultation and Collective Contracts, which were unfriendly to labour rights; for example,
strikes are not allowed during labour consultation. The six major business associations from
Hong Kong,40 together with Taiwanese chambers of commerce, such as Taiwan Businessmen
Association Dongguan,41 continued to pressurize various authorities in China, Hong Kong and
Taiwan to gain more ground. They met directly with Huang Yebin, vice-chairman of the
Standing Committee of the Provincial National People’s Congress and chairman of Guangdong
Provincial Federation of Trade Unions, demanding to stunt the legislation. They also used all
channels to express their resistance to this legislation, including to the Guangdong Provincial
Government, the Taiwan Affairs Office, the Hong Kong SAR Government, the Liaison Office
40 The six major chambers of commerce include Chinese Manufacturers' Association of Hong Kong, Chinese General Chamber of
Commerce, Federation of Hong Kong Industries, Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong Chinese Importers' & Exporters'
Association, and the Real Estate Developers Association of Hong Kong. 41 Zhang Zhuzhong, legal consultate, Analysis of Regulations of Enterprise Collective Contracts Guangdong (《廣東省企業集體合同條例》解析),
22 January 2015,http://www.ts960.com/management/3342.html
On June 6th 2014, CTU and other labour unions protested at the
HKGCC Annual General Meeting, strongly protesting against the
establishment of Regulations on Enterprise Collective
Consultation and Collective Contracts.
39
of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong, Hong Kong delegates of the National
People's Congress, members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the
Central Government.42 As a result, many articles which would have been in favour of labour
rights but were attacked by the Hong Kong entrepreneurs, have been either removed or largely
revised (see Table 3). For example, all disciplinary measures on enterprises, when they refuse
to consult with workers, have been removed. Pearl River Delta Council, an affiliate of the
Federation of Hong Kong Industries, even said it was “pleased” that the Regulations were
passed.43
The business associations consider the outcome as a significant victory. However, without the
right to collective bargaining equally, it would eventually lead to more strikes. In other words,
it is the business sector which caused the deterioration of labour relations.
Table 3: Articles of the Regulations which are removed / largely amended due to furious
attacks from the Hong Kong entrepreneurs
Before amendments / removals: Regulations
on enterprise collective consultation and
collective contract of Guangdong
Province(Draft for comments)
After amendments / removals: Regulations on
enterprise collective contract of Guangdong
Province (final legislation on collective
consultation)
The negative impact on workers for the removal of Article 59:
1. It removes all disciplinary measures on enterprises when they refuse to negotiate with
employees. Without any costs, it is ineffective to order enterprises to conduct negotiations with
workers.
2. The only method that workers can use to force employers to negotiate, the right to strike,
under certain conditions, has been abolished.
Article 59:
When an enterprise violates Article 25, fails
to reply or provide a justified reason to refuse
consultation within the prescribed time limit,
thus leads to a collective work stoppage,
Article 59 removed
42 Regulations of Enterprise Collective Contract, Guangdong Province, will be implemented on 1 January 2015, Association Notice, Pearl
River Delta Council, 8 October 2014, http://www.prdcouncil.org/index.php/xhdt/xhxx/xhtg/1018-2015-1-1 43 Ibid
40
slowdown, employees are not considered as
severely violating the business rules and
regulations, and the enterprise shall not
terminate their labour contracts. If employees
terminate the labour contracts, the enterprise
shall pay financial compensation as required
by law.
The negative impact on workers for the revision on Article 26:
The revision raises the benchmark for workers to demand collective bargaining, from approval
of 1/3 to 1/2 of employees.
Article 26:
…based on employees’ opinions and the
actual situation of the enterprise, an enterprise
union could decide to demand collective
consultation with the enterprise. When 1/3 or
more of workers or workers’ congress
propose to conduct collective consultation,
the union shall demand the enterprise to do so.
For an enterprise without a union, or its union
fails to properly operate, employees could
propose to the upper level union. After the
upper level union has collected consent from
1/3 or more of workers or workers’ congress,
it shall demand the enterprise to conduct
collective consultation.
Article 18:
… When a half or more of workers or workers’
congress propose to conduct collective
consultation, the union shall demand the
enterprise to do so. For an enterprise without a
union, employees could propose to the local
federation of trade unions. After the upper level
union has collected consent from 1/2 or more of
workers or workers’ congress, it shall demand
the enterprise to conduct collective
consultation…
The negative impact on workers for the revision on Article 23:
The definition of relevant information for the purpose of consultation has been removed and
replaced by “true situation and materials relevant to collective consultation”. It makes the final
definition very vague. The right of workers to actively demand information has also been
removed.
Article 23: Article 15:
41
Representatives to the consultation serve the
rights to demand relevant information from the
other party for the purpose of consultation.
Relevant information includes, registration
status, rules, financial reports, labour
allotment criteria, payment of wages, taxes
and social security payment reports.
An enterprise shall guarantee the
representatives with the working conditions
and time necessarily required for consultation,
to inform the employees’ representatives of the
true situation and provide materials relevant to
collective consultation…
4.2 Lack of equal collective consultation rights leads to growth of strikes
Hong Kong entrepreneurs’ denial of the workers’ equal rights to collective consultation, can
only lead to significant growth of strikes and more risks for their business operations. If
workers do not have access to their labour rights within the system, they will take more direct
and prompt means, such as wild-cat strikes, to force the employers to talk. One internal survey
conducted by a Chinese non-profit organization has shown that, at times of factory relocations,
closures or restructuring, only 15% of workers settle their problems through legal procedures
while 62% take collective action such as stoppages, slowdowns or strikes.44 These numbers
reflect that the more the Hong Kong entrepreneurs seek to avoid labour rights, the more
intensive the labour conflicts become. When the labour relations break down and a strike breaks
out, the enterprise will eventually suffer damage to its reputation and financial losses as
production halts. The massive strike of Yue Yuen in April 2014 is an example. Yue Yuen
admitted that it had a direct loss of USD 27 million from that strike.45 There is also, the further
higher price of ruining the trust between employees and the employer.
According to China Labour Bulletin’s statistics, the numbers of strikes have been multiplied in
China. The accumulated number of strikes of the first quarter of 2015 (Jan to Mar) has been
2.24 times higher than the total number of strike in 2011. These numbers indicate, the more
the Hong Kong entrepreneurs avoid labour rights and resist equal labour consultation, the more
44 The survey was to study and analyse the labour rights conditions, workers’ actions and updates of their livelihood after the industry
upgrade in Guangdong Province. A questionnaire survey was conducted among the workers who had been affected by factory relocations,
closures and therefore experienced labour conflicts. It covered the areas of Shenzhen, Guangzhou and Dongguan. The involved workers
were identified from the labour organization’s consultation and case handling services, followed by face-to-face interviews or telephone
interviews. 176 valid questionnaires were received.
45 “Another strike at Yue Yuen, 2,000 affected” (裕元東莞廠再罷工 影響 2000 人), 19 March 2015,,
http://money.udn.com/money/story/5641/775442-%E8%A3%95%E5%85%83%E6%9D%B1%E8%8E%9E%E5%BB%A0%E5%86%8D%
E7%BD%B7%E5%B7%A5--%E5%BD%B1%E9%9F%BF2000%E4%BA%BA
42
unrealistic their wish for harmonious labour relations will become. Research scholar Aaron
Halegua of the US-Asia Law Institute of the School of Law at New York University described
the effectiveness of collective consultation legislation in Guangdong Province saying, “In short,
the final regulation maintains the status quo. There are no new tools to pressure employers to
take bargaining seriously. Instead, the Year of the Sheep is likely to see the strikes - along with
the firings, injuries, detentions and arrests - continue to rage on in Guangdong.” 46 In other
words, without equal negotiation, there is no way out.
Collective bargaining rights are an internationally recognized fundamental human right and a
core labour right. ILO’s C98 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention entitles
workers to collectively bargain with their employers equally. In the earlier years, such a right
did exist in Hong Kong. Thus, the Hong Kong entrepreneurs should implement it and the Hong
Kong Government is obligated to legislate it and monitor the Hong Kong entrepreneurs. No
matter where they are operating, they should recognize workers’ rights to collective bargaining.
46 Aaron Halegua, research scholar of US-Asia Law Institute, School of Law, New York University, “China's new collective bargaining rule
is too weak to ease labour conflicts”, South China Morning Post, 25 February 2015, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-
opinion/article/1723213/chinas-new-collective-bargaining-rule-too-weak-ease-labour
43
Part V: Conclusion and Recommendations
Between May 2014 and April 2015, 25 cases of collective labour action in Hong Kong-invested
enterprises have been identified, affecting approximately 150,000 workers. It is believed the
actual figures of labour violations, individually and collectively, have been countless. Among
the 25 identified cases, more than 30% took place in either factories owned by large-scale listed
companies or their suppliers, such as Stella International Holdings Ltd., Pegasus International
Holdings Ltd., Arts Optical and Chow Tak Fook.
These enterprises all claim that they have their own CSR standards and will examine their
suppliers’ codes of conduct through other famous brands. However, through strikes and large-
scale labour actions, we realize that they are offenders of labour rights violations. They do not
only violate labour laws and provide workers with poor working conditions, but also invite
police to violently attack workers and dismiss workers as retaliation. Their denial of collective
bargaining is the major cause of strikes, and in return, they run into more troubles when they
operate. CSR models are voluntary and not legally binding, which are unhelpful in either
eliminating or addressing the violations that grassroots workers face. The current mechanism
must be re-evaluated and legislation should be considered to solve the problem.
Furthermore, internationally-known brands, such as UNIQLO, Wal-mart, Disney and Sony
have turned a blind eye to the labour rights violations at their suppliers’ factories. These TNCs
have signed the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in their home countries and
have their own CSR polices. However, they see these as empty promises and fail to comply.
The HKCTU urges the TNCs to honor and implement their policies, in order to protect labour
rights.
HKCTU’s recommendations:
1. Recommendations to Securities and Futures Commission & Stock Exchange: Public
interest is involved in the labour disputes of listed companies, therefore, they should be
more closely monitored. The HKCTU recommends following the examples of certain
countries, to include labour conditions as one of the criteria in regulating the listed
companies:
44
a. Recommendations to Securities and Futures Commission (SFC):
i. When a compliant is received, or there is evidence that a subsidary of a Hong
Kong listed company has violated Chinese labour laws, an immediate notice
should be sent to the licensed corporation of the listed company, demanding
it to take prompt and effective correctional measures, and to deliver a detailed
investigative report, covering the correctional measures, within a certain
timeframe.
ii. The listed company is required to document the violations at prominent
positions in its annual report and issue letters to its investors, to disclose such
a risk to its investors;
iii. SFC should upload its annual report and disclose a list of law-breaking listed
companies to make it publicly accessible;
iv. If the above-mentioned violation continues or severe violations are found,
SFC should conduct site visits or establish an independent investigation
committee, to further investigate or make inquiries. Disciplinary measures,
such as public condemnation, revocation or suspension of license or fines,
should be exercised when appropriate;
b. Recommendations to Stock Exchange:
i. It should require all listed companies to seek verification of any alleged
violations of labour laws in mainland China, the results will be used as one of
the conditions of listing approval;
ii. To promote these policies, the Listing Rules should immediately be modified
accordingly;
iii. The Stock Exchange should immediately learn from the company whether
policies have been implemented to protect mainland workers, and their
responses to the specific allegations of violations of labour laws. The listing
process should be suspended until a satisfactory reply has been presented;
2. Recommendations to the Hong Kong Government:
a. Taking OECD’s "OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises" as a reference, to
develop its own guidelines on labour rights, so that Hong Kong enterprises can
understand how to protect workers’ rights in Mainland China. Hong Kong government
45
should also set up complaint channels, to strengthen the supervision on the
implementation of the above labour rights protection;
b. Reflecting upon the laws on supervising the listed companies and the company
regulations, punishing the listed companies and Hong Kong enterprises that violate
labour laws in mainland China;
c. That it take a neutral stance and stop favoring the business sector. In distributing /
collecting news and information related Chinese labour laws it should fully consult
all stakeholders, including the Legislative Council, trade unions and other labor
organizations;
3. Recommendations to major business associations: sending warning letters to Hong
Kong enterprises which have failed in taking up their corporate social responsibility and
have violated the labour regulations in mainland China, demanding them to take prompt
and effective correctional measures; blacklisting Hong Kong enterprises which have
repeatedly broken labour laws in the mainland, and blocking them from being members
of the business association.
HKCTU’s demand
Transnational corporations (TNC):
1. TNC should strictly follow the "OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises" and
their own codes of conduct, to ensure their suppliers are giving legal and reasonable
wages;
2. China’s Trade Union Law and Regulations on Enterprise Collective Consultations and
Collective Contracts both state that an enterprise must conduct collective consultation
with its employees. The “ILO Convention” and “OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises” clearly support workers’ freedom of association and rights to collective
bargaining. TNC should not allow suppliers to replace collective consultation with
telephone hotlines or face-to-face individual meetings with workers;
3. When a labour rights violation is reported at a supplier factory, TNC should not only take
in the report from the supplier, but it should also conduct an independent investigation to
discover the facts of the case. When a collective consultation takes place, TNC might send
a representative to attend, to promote and ensure that the supplier responds to workers’
reasonable and lawful demands;
46
4. TNC should prohibit its supplier from making use of police brutality, assault, arbitrary
detention or criminal charges against workers in peaceful strikes;
5. TNC should strictly urge suppliers to pay workers their severance payments and missing
social security insurance premiums. If a supplier cannot afford these payments, the TNC,
should be responsible. It should prohibit suppliers from excusing themselves from paying
severance and social security insurance payments, by quoting the local administrative
jurisdiction’s lack of competence, or claiming that it has not broken the law as the local
government has arbitrarily set up guidelines claiming no clear definition to implement the
legislation.
1
2
3
4