INTRODUCTION A.1 PERIODIZATION

A.1.1 The Three Ages of Antiquity For the people of ancient (pre-Qin) China, what we call antiquity was the present and what they called antiquity was of course an age much closer to them than it is to us. To put it in another way, 1.6 billion minutes separate us from the Zhou conquest of the Shang [§56.5]), but for the First Emperor (in 221 BCE), the gap was only 0.4 billion minutes.

Much as we do today, time was broadly divided using the rela-tive terms ancient and modern ( gu 古 and jin 近), and ancient itself was further subdivided into the three ages of antiquity (sangu 三古):

shanggu 上古 [taigu 太古, yuangu 遠古] (meaning high or remote antiquity); taigu was often used for the archaic period before the age of the sages.

zhonggu 中古 (mid antiquity). xiagu 下古, jingu 近古, or jindai 近代 (recent past, recent times).

Definitions of the three antiquities differed. For some Han dyn-asty writers shanggu applied to the age of Fuxi 伏羲, zhonggu to that of Shennong 神農, and xiagu to the five emperors (Wudi 五帝); on these legendary figures, see §56.4. Others called the entire period of their rule shanggu, from then to King Wen of Zhou, zhonggu, and the time of Confucius, xiagu.

As time went by the tendency was to update the definitions of zhonggu and jingu in order to bridge the gap between the present and the remote past. For example, for the Tang historiographer, Liu Zhiji 劉知幾 (661–721), shanggu 上古 extended to the early Zhou; zhonggu or zhongshi 中世, to the Qin and Han; and jingu, the peri-od between the Han and the Sui. Likewise, in the Yuan dynasty, one writer defined shanggu 上古 as the legendary age, zhonggu 中古 as the Three dynasties (Sandai 三代, i.e., Xia, Shang, and Zhou), and xiagu 下古 as covering from the Warring States to the Yuan.

Neo-Confucians, too, believed that there were three periods: (1) the time when the Way was practiced by the sage kings (down to and including the Three Dynasties); (2) the long period during which the Way was lost (late Zhou, Han to Tang) and (3) the new age when the Way began to be practiced again beginning in the eleventh century (§A.2.6).

No matter how the boundaries of the three ages of antiquity were defined, all would have agreed that the models and inspiration for right conduct that Confucius had drawn upon lay in remote an-tiquity (shanggu). It was to him and to this age that people turned for their most revered paragons until the twentieth century. In finding value in a remote past (suitably adapted by later thinkers), the Chinese people were not unique. Buddhists and Christians to this day revere the truths revealed in the lives of the founders of their beliefs, who lived 2,500 and 2000 years ago, respectively.

Shorter periods were traditionally referred to in terms of royal or imperial dynasties (wangchao duandai 王朝斷代), each of which experienced cycles of rise and decline (§A.2.5).

The use of a group of dynasties to refer to past time dates from the Spring and Autumn period expression, Sandai 三代 (§A.2.3).

Elapsed time between the present and the past was reckoned in various ways, including counting the total years of the successive reigns of all the intervening dynasties or by counting the number of sexagenary cycles (§A.4).

The break with traditional concepts of the past came toward the end of the nineteenth century when some thinkers concluded that China was entering an entirely new phase of history. Both Xue Fu-cheng 薛福成 (1838–94) and Wang Tao 王韬 (1828–97), for ex-ample, realized that the period in which they lived marked a new

age, one in which China was facing an unprecedented series of dis-asters, including the loss of control of foreign trade (later referred to as the Opium War) and defeats in the Sino-French War, the Sino-Japanese Wars, and at the time of the Boxers.

A.1.2 Ancient, Medieval, Modern In the twentieth century two new methods were grafted onto the “three ages of antiquity,” at first by applying the system of three divisions (sanfen fa 三分法), that is the European concept of an-cient, medieval, and modern and secondly by using the system of five divisions (wufen fa 五分法), the Morgan-Engels or Marxist-Leninist five-stage mode of production theory (§A.1.3).

One of the earliest and most long-lasting of the new history textbooks was written by Xia Zengyou 夏曾佑 (1863–1924), who rearranged Chinese history along progressive lines into shanggu zhi shi 上古之世 (from the legendary age to the end of the Zhou), zhonggu zhi shi 中古之世 (from Qin to Tang), and jingu zhi shi 近古之世 (from Wudai to Qing). But he did not get beyond the end of the Tang (Xia Zengyou 1902–6).

Xia’s younger fellow provincial and friend, Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929), was an influential advocate of the European three ages model. In his proposal, ancient (shangshi 上世) was from the Yellow Thearch (Huangdi 黃帝) to the Qin; medieval (zhongshi 中世), from Qin to Qianlong; and modern ( jinshi 近世), from Qian-long to the present (§68.1). The attraction of this three-age model was that it predicated a progression from antiquity via the middle ages to the modern, with the modern age marking an advance on the previous two. In other words, all value was no longer placed in a remote past, but in the present and future.

Table 1 Japanese Periodizations of Chinese History

In 1914, Naitō Konan 内藤湖南 [Torajirō 虎次郎] (1866–1934), the influ-ential member of Japan’s Kyoto school of Sinology, adapted the threefold scheme ( jōko 上古, chūko 中古, kinsei 近世) by situating the start of the Chinese middle ages (chūko) at the fall of the Han and the beginning of the modern age after the fall of the Tang. Later, in his lectures of 1921–22, he nuanced this as follows:

1. Antiquity (up to the Later Han) > Transition: Later Han to Western Jin (316 CE) 2. Medieval: Eastern Jin to Late Tang > Transition: Late Tang to founding of Song (960) 3.1 Modern (1): Song and Yuan (to 1368) 3.2 Modern (2): Ming and Qing (Fogel 1984, 200)

The Naitō thesis makes the Song and Yuan early modern (kinsei zenki 近世前期) and the Ming and Qing, late modern (kinsei kōki 近世後期) on the grounds that the Song and later times saw (1) the decline of aristocracy and the rise of absolute monarchy, (2) the rise in the status of the people from slaves and tenants of the aristocrats to subjects of the emperor, (3) the intro-duction of civil service exams, which in theory were open to every subject of the emperor, (4) the appearance of political parties based on difference in government policy or intellectual background, (5) the growth of a money economy, (6) the tendency toward independent interpretation of the Classics, (7) the rise of a plebian culture, with new forms of literature and art; see also Zhang Guangda (2005), Liu Yiyan (2006), and Luo Yinan (2006).

The Tokyo school identified the late Ming as the beginning of the mod-ern. The Chūgokushi kenkyūkai 中国史研究会 (Chinese history society) group rejects both the Kyoto and Tokyo analyses and instead sees all of Chi-nese history from the Warring States in terms of the rise and fall of the auto-cratic state, which was eventually undermined by the petty commodity production economy that emerged in the late Ming, early Qing, without giving birth to a capitalist society. Recent Western scholarship has developed the “early modern paradigm” (coinciding with and characterized by the increasing monetization of society

2 IN TR OD U C T IO N

in the late Ming); see Huang (1991), Pomeranz (2002), and von Glahn (2004, 160–61). Both the protagonists of the early modern paradigm and the holders of the Chūgokushi kenkyūkai view were influenced by the argument first put forward in China in the 1940s that the Ming was a time in which the roots of capitalism appeared (§A.1.3). Another approach (taken by the writers of many Western textbooks) is to apply the European three-fold scheme directly to Chinese history. Thus, the pre-Qin is seen as China’s ancient period; Qin to the Song is the early or medieval empire; and Song to Qing is the later empire or early modern period. A traditional and still influential presentation is to lay stress on the alternation of periods when the empire was unified or partitioned (although strong views are held regarding the definition of these terms. If, for example, the Northern Song is seen as a period of unification, then the Liao and Xixia are by definition alien regimes, a view unacceptable to the orthodox in China today).

Fogel, Joshua A. 1984. Politics and sinology: The case of Naitō Konan (1866–1934). HUP. Based on his Columbia University PhD thesis.

Liu Liyan 柳立言 (Lau Nap-yin). 2006. He wei ‘Tang Song biange’? 何謂唐宋

變革 (What is the Tang-Song transition?). Zhonghua wenshi luncong 81: 125–71.

Luo, Yi’nan. 2006. A study of the changes in the Tang-Song transition model. JSYS 35: 99–107.

Pomeranz, Kenneth. 2000. The great divergence: China, Europe, and the making of the modern world economy. PUP. Reviewed by Philip Huang in JAS 61.2: 501–38 (2002). Pomeranz reacted in JAS 61.2: 539–90 (2002), to which Huang responded in JAS 62.1: 157–87 (2003).

Shiba Yoshinobu. 2012 (2002). The diversity of the socio-economy in Song China, 960–1279. Tōyō bunko.

Von Glahn, Richard. 2003. Premodern China in world historical perspective. In Smith, Paul Jakov and Richard von Glahn, eds. 2003. The Song- Yuan-Ming transition in Chinese history. HUP, 56–68.

Zhang Guangda 张广达. 2005. Naitō Konan de Tang Song biangeshuo jiqi yingxiang 内藤湖南的唐宋变革说及其影响 (The Naitō thesis on the Tang-Song transition and its influence). Tang yanjiu 11: 5–71. Vol. 11 is devoted to this subject.

A.1.3 Redline Theory The second main way of dividing Chinese history that was devel-oped in the twentieth century was to use the Marxist-Leninist five-stage mode of production theory (wuzhong shengchan fangshi shuo 五种生产方式说; known informally as the “Five-divisions theory” [wufen fa 五分法], or the “Redline theory” [hongxian lun 红线论]): primitive society, slave society, feudal society, semi-colonial, semi- feudal society (banzhimindi, banfengjian shehui 半殖民地半封建社会), and capitalist society (ziben zhuyi shehui 资本主义社会). Once the Party had pronounced itself on the question, no time was lost in debating whether or not such categories worked for China. Instead, there was much discussion as to when each period began and ended and to what extent the five periods could be subdivided (especially the “feudal period,” which was commonly separated into early middle, and late).

The timing of the transition from primitive to slave society (nuli shehui 奴隶社会) varies according to the historian from different periods of the Longshan 龍山 culture (2600–2000 BCE), the Xia, or the Shang dynasties. The end of slave and the beginning of feudal society ( fengjian shehui 封建社会) are placed in the Western Zhou, the Spring and Autumn, the Warring States, the Qin unification, the Later Han, or the Wei-Jin periods. The beginnings of the end of the feudal are usually put in the Ming and Qing with the appearance of capitalist sprouts (ziben zhuyi mengya 资本主义萌芽), nipped in the bud by the arrival of the imperialists.

The periodization of modern Chinese history was discussed by Mao Zedong in a number of talks in the late 1930s and early 1940s. On the CCP taking power under his leadership, these views became orthodox. They may be summarized as follows. Modern history ( jindaishi 近代史) starts with the Opium War, which marks the transition from the feudal to the semi-colonial, semi-feudal period

(1840–1949). This period is divided into two subperiods, (1) the Old Democratic (bourgeois) Revolution that culminates in the movement led by Sun Yatsen, the 1911 revolution, the collapse of imperial rule, and the foundation of the Republic of China; and (2) the New Democratic Revolution (1919–1949), which starts with the May Fourth Movement and soon comes under CCP leadership. The founding of the People’s Republic in 1949 marks the conclusion of the New Democratic Revolution, the end of the semi-colonial, semi-feudal period, and the start of Chinese socialism; see Mao Ze-dong, The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, 1939/12 and On new democracy, 1940/1.

Chinese historians are not alone in making the arrival of the foreign powers the turning point between ancient and modern. Japanese historians normally reckon that their country’s modern history (kindaishi 近代史) starts with the arrival of Commodore Perry’s squadron in Edo Bay 江戶湾 in 1853.

The norm in China to this day consists of a blend of the three ages of antiquity with the five-fold Marxist scheme. Thus, the huge 22-volume Zhongguo tongshi 中国通史 (1989–99; rev. edition, 2004), defines the period up to the use of writing as Yuangu 远古 (remote antiquity [primitive society]), the Sandai 三代 as shanggu 上古 (high antiquity [slave society]), and the period from the Qin unification to 1840 as zhonggu 中古 (medieval [feudal society]). Thereafter jindai 近代 (1840–1919) is what would in the past have been called xiagu 下古 or jingu 近古. The characteristics of each period are defined in Marxist terms (§45.1.3).

As the key dates in the Chinese orthodox schema for modern political history (1840, 1911, 1919, 1949) fade further into the past and as new ones are added (for example, the beginning of reform and opening in 1978), the periods previously designated as modern ( jindai 近代), contemporary (xiandai 現代), and current (dangdai 當代) no longer fit the labels. Accordingly, already in the 1990s, the distinction between modern and contemporary was dropped and the entire period from 1840 to 1949 was labeled modern (and characterized as China’s semi-feudal, semi-colonial period). That leaves current history (xiandaishi 現代史) as starting in 1949, with contemporary history increasingly seen as beginning in 1978.

Whatever their other differences almost all Chinese historians continue to take the nation as their proper focus. There is, therefore, a tendency to select political events that are seen as contributing to the formation of the nation, if not the Party, as the major turning points in history.

A.1.4 Conclusions A major disadvantage of trying to squeeze Chinese history into the European three stages is that the labels ancient, medieval, and mod-ern are already closely attached to particular attributes and assump-tions associated with European history. These used to be considered universal. No longer.

One weakness of the Marxist periodization as applied to China is that it creates a “feudal” period so long as to be meaningless. In this sense it reflects its European origins: slave, feudal, and capital-ist neatly fitted the European divisions of ancient, medieval, and modern, but failed to do so in China.

Another weakness of the Marxist scheme is that it uses old terms to describe completely different concepts. In classical China, the fengjian zhidu 封建制度 (the patrimonial system of indirect rule through appointed relatives of the Zhou ruling house) broke down during the internecine strife of the Warring States and was abol-ished by the First Emperor of Qin. Its place was taken by the jun-xian zhidu 郡縣制度 (imperial government ruling through centrally appointed officials at the commandery and county levels). But feng-jian 封建 was borrowed at the end of the nineteenth century to translate “feudal” (a term used to describe the medieval European landholding system). Confusingly, Chinese Marxist historians de-scribe the period after the collapse of ancient China’s fengjian sys-

D YNA ST I ES 3

tem as China’s fengjian (feudal) stage. A stage said to last for the next 2,000 years. Small wonder that “feudal” in this sense has had difficulty in establishing itself as a useful analytical term and has tended to be used in the general sense of anything ancient or back-ward (Dirlik 1997; Feng Tianyu 2006; Jin and Liu 2009 [§3.1]; Li 2003 [§7.1.1]).

Controversies have raged as to which method of periodization to use and where the demarcation lines should be drawn, but perio-dization is not a science. The whole argument becomes more inte-resting as soon as it is allowed that different types of history have different stages of development. For example, the history of Chinese mathematics (§38.16) does not necessarily coincide with changes of production or of political institutions and the same applies to the history of the Chinese language, the start of whose “modern” phase begins six centuries before the start of “modern” political history (§1.1). Economic watersheds, too, often occur at different periods than do political ones, because in China, as elsewhere, economies change faster than do political systems.

Finally, it is worth recalling that the fundamental periodization provided by climate change has the advantage that it links China with changes affecting the rest of the world within broadly the same time frame (§13.1).

No matter which method of presenting the story is chosen (and each has drawbacks and advantages), it should serve to clarify analysis; to stimulate comparisons with the historical experience of

other civilizations, countries, and peoples; and to assist the mem-ory, not to provide a procrustean bed into which to fit the data in order to buttress the self-serving claims of this or that political party.

In the manual I present the sources of Chinese history in two different ways: (1) by subjects (books 1 to 9 and 14) and (2) chron-ologically (books 10 to 13). Because many of the most important sources that have been preserved were produced by each dynasty, the chronological chapters are divided by dynasty. Many Europeans and Americans are already familiar with the names of the dynasties from phrases such as Tang poems, Song paintings, Ming vases, or Qin terracotta warriors, just as they are with Jacobean drama, Sec-ond empire furniture, or Victorian cities. There is no reason to suppose that the use of such conventional labels, including dynastic ones, should tie the user to the perspectives of the imperial court. Moreover, dynasties still provide a useful framework for Chinese political, military, and institutional history (a point elaborated on at §A.2.5).

Cohen, Paul A. 2003. Ambiguities of a watershed date: The 1949 divide in Chinese history. In his China unbound: Evolving perspectives on the Chinese past. RoutledgeCurzon, 133–47.

Lin Ganquan 林甘泉 et al. 1982. Zhongguo gudaishi fenqi taolun wushi nian: 1929–1979 中国古代史分期讨论五十年一九二九年-一九七九年 (Fifty years of debate on the periodization of Chinese ancient history: 1929–1979). Shanghai renmin.

A.2 DYNASTIES “Dynasty” has four possible meanings depending on the context: (1) a succession of hereditary rulers qualified by patrilineal descent from the dynastic founder; (2) the period in history in which a particular dynasty ruled; (3) the reign of a particular ruler of a dynasty; and (4) the country or territory over which the dynasty ruled. For most of Chinese history, guo 國 (country, kingdom) embraced these diverse meanings in phrases such as guohao 國號 (dynastic name) or guoshi 國史 (histories of the current dynasty). It is only in the twentieth century that it takes on the new sense of nation.

Table 2 The Dynasties (Pre-Qin)

Dynasty, Groups of Dynasties, or Periods Dates Capitals

Three August Ones (Sanhuang 三皇 [§56.4]) Five Thearchs (Wudi 五帝 [§56.4]) Sandai 三代 (The Three Dynasties) Xia 夏 Shang 商 Yin Shang 殷商 Zhou 周 Western Zhou 西周 Eastern Zhou 東周 Two Zhou 二周 Spring and Autumn (Chunqiu 春秋) Warring States (Zhanguo 戰國) Six Kingdoms (Liuguo 六國)

2070–1600 BCE ca. 1600–1046 ca. 1300–1046

1046–256 1046–771 770–256

722–476 (§58.1) 475–221 (§58.1) 475–221 (§58.1)

Anyang 安阳 Qi 岐, Feng 丰, Hao 镐 Luoyi 雒邑 巩王城 (雒邑)

Note: The dates for the Three Dynasties and the beginning of the Zhou are those resulting from the Xia Shang Zhou Chronology Project (§58.6). The historicity of the Xia 夏 is generally accepted in China despite the fact that no contemporary written evidence has been found. Since the Zhou, the founders of the Three Dynasties were regarded as models of sagely rectitude. The Bronze Age in China was from about 2000 to 500 BCE (corresponding roughly with Xia, Shang, and Zhou). The Iron Age began in the Spring and Autumn period; by the later Warring States steel was being produced.

4 IN TR OD U C T IO N

Table 3 The Dynasties (Imperial China)

Dynasty, Groups of Dynasties, or Periods Dates Capitals

*Qin 秦 Hou-Chu 後楚 Xi-Chu 西楚 *Han 漢 Former (Western) Han 前[西]漢 Xin 新 (Wang Mang 王莽) Gengshi zhiluan 更始之亂 Later (Eastern) Han 後[東]漢 Three Kingdoms 三國 *Wei 魏 Shu Han 蜀漢 Wu 吳 *Jin 晉 Western Jin 西晉 Eastern Jin 東晉 Sixteen Kingdoms 十六國 Nanbeichao 南北朝 Southern Dynasties 南朝 *Song 宋 *Qi 齊 *Liang 梁 *Chen 陳 Northern Dynasties 北朝 Wei 魏 (Northern Wei 北魏; Hou-Wei 後魏) Eastern Wei 東魏 Western Wei 西魏 Northern Qi 北齊 Northern Zhou 北周 *Sui 隋 *Tang 唐 Zhou 周 *Tang 唐 (continued) Five Dynasties & Ten Kingdoms 五代十國 *Five Dynasties (Wudai 五代) Ten Kingdoms (Shiguo 十國) *Liao 遼 (Qidan 契丹, Kitan) *Song 宋 Northern Song 北宋 period Southern Song 南宋 period *Jin 金 (Nüzhen 女真, Jurchen) Xia 夏 [Xixia 西夏] (Dangxiang 黨項, Tangut) *Yuan 元 (Menggu 蒙古, Mongol) [1260] *Ming 明 (for era names, see Ch. 65, Table 134) *Qing 清 (Manzhou 滿洲, Manchu) [Hou-Jin 後金,

1616–35] (for era names, see Ch. 66, Table 135)

221–206 BCE 207–205 205–202

202 BCE–8 CE

9–23 CE 23–27

27–220

220–265 221–263 222–280

265–316 317–420 304–439 420–589 420–579 420–479 479–502 502–557 557–589 386–581 386–534 534–550 535–556 550–577 557–581 581–618 618–907 690–705 705–907

902–979 907–960

916–1125 960–1279 960–1127

1127–1279 1115–1234 1038–1227 1271–1368 1368–1644 1636–1912

咸陽 彭城[徐州] 長安 長安 雒陽 洛陽 成都 建業 (南京) 洛陽 建康 (南京) See Ch. 60, Table 131 建康 建康 建康 建康 平城 (大同), 洛陽 鄴 鄴, 長安 鄴 長安 大興城 (西安西北) 長安 (so-named from 652) 長安, 洛陽 長安 See §61.12, Table 132 See §61.12, Table 133 上京 (南京, 中京, 東京, 西京); see Ch. 63 東京 汴梁 臨安 上京會寧; 中都大興府; 南京開封 興慶府 (銀川) 大都 北京, 南京 北京, 盛京

Note: *Dynasties marked with an asterisk were regarded as being in the legitimate succession (§A.2.6).

Table 4 The Twentieth Century

Zhonghua minguo 中華民國 (Republic of China) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 中华人民共和国 (People’s Republic of China)

1912–1949 1949–

Nanjing, Chongqing Beijing 北京 established as national cap-

ital on 9/27/1949.

A.2.1 Dynastic Tables

The dynastic tables can easily mislead, because they present neat beginnings and endings when the reality was often confused (the end of the Song and the start of the Yuan in the conventional tables is given as 1279, but Temüjin established the Mongol khanate in 1206; the conquest of North China was completed in 1234; Qubilai founded the Yuan dynasty in 1271; and South China fell in 1276, in

which year the Southern Song surrendered the imperial seals [§64. 1.3]). For other examples of adjusted chronologies, see the dating of the start of the Former Han (Ch. 59) and the beginning and end of the Qing (§66.1.1 & §66.1.2, Box 111).

Genealogical tables of the rulers of each dynasty were kept from as far back as we have records. During the Zhou these were com-bined in chronological tables of dynasties that showed each follow-ing the preceding one in an unbroken succession without overlap.

D YNA ST I ES 5

One of the main reasons for creating a single line of dynasties was to legitimize the current dynasty by showing that it was linked in an unbroken line back to the Three Sages (Yao 堯, Shun 舜, and Yu 禹) via the rulers of the Three Dynasties. Another was for the convenience of having no gaps in a chronology that was based on counting in regnal years (§39.11.1). Accordingly, much care and attention was paid as to which dynasties to include as legitimate and what dates should be chosen for their beginnings and their endings (§A.2.4). Dynasties not considered in the legitimate succes-sion were generally omitted from the conventional tables (§A.2.6).

The list of legitimate dynasties, their dates, and ways of distin-guishing dynasties with the same name were retroactively and sel-ectively determined in a continuous process of editing, updating. The choice of dynasties to maintain the chronological sequence during the many periods of disunity when several ruled at the same time was also often only decided much later.

The dynastic tables were widely known, because they were among the first things that Chinese children memorized, usually expressed in doggerel verse (§A.5). From the tables they gained sev-eral impressions, including that history is represented by a straight line from Fuxi 伏羲, Shennong 神農, or Huangdi 黄帝 to the dynas-ty in which they lived; that dynasties succeeded each other in an un-broken line; that history was organized like a genealogy, each dyn-asty (like each generation), following a fixed pattern of rise, ex-pansion, consolidation, decline, last-ditch reform, and final collapse (a mindset that lay at the basis of all Chinese historical writing and deeply influenced the ways in which people conceived of the dynas-ty during which they lived and its place in history); that the state was like a family writ large; that the historicity of the culture heroes and legendary rulers who figured so prominently in the morality and ethics sponsored by the state was not in doubt (their dates are given in exactly the same form as those of historical rulers); that all Chinese were descended from the same source; that the Mandate of Heaven was lost either as the result of the immorality or incompe-tence of rulers or both; that the five long-lasting dynasties (Former Han, Later Han, Tang, Song, and Ming) were preceded by five short ones (Qin, Xin, Sui, Wudai, and Yuan) and that these fell because they placed too great a reliance on force; that the entire process leading to the glorious present dynasty was inevitable; and that dy-nastic history was history: there were no competing story lines or different versions (there were, however, numerous colorful drama-tizations, usually focused on the collapse of an old dynasty and the rise of a new one [Chapter 54]).

The neatly dovetailed tables of “legitimate” dynasties have been copied in Western textbooks and references on Chinese history since they were first translated into Latin and other European lan-guages in the seventeenth century (§A.6).

Dynastic tables giving the length of reigns are still essential to read Chinese sources, because all dates in the sources are expressed in their terms (Tables 2–4). The construction of the tables and the messages they were intended to convey are the subjects of the re-mainder of this chapter that starts with sections on naming, group-ing, and dating of dynasties (§A.2.2–4); the dynastic cycle (§A.2.5); and legitimate succession (§A.2.6). Next come brief sections on absolute dates (§A.3.1–2) and retrodictions (§A.3.3), counting long periods of time (§A.4), the teaching of the dynasties in grade school (§A.5), early European conceptions of Chinese chronology (§A.6), and tables of the main dynasties of Vietnam, Korea, and Japan (§A.7). Detailed notes on individual dynasties are placed at the head of the period-specific chapters (59–66). Questions relating to the transcription of the names of dynasties into English are dealt with at §SS.5 (Style Sheet section 5).

A.2.2 Naming the Dynasties Nearly all the names of dynasties (guohao 國號) and polities up to and including the Han 漢 were taken from place names. Between

the fall of the Han and the establishment of the Liao 遼 in the tenth century, these same names were used for dynasties over and over again. Most were taken from the previous place of appointment of the dynastic founder.

Of all the dynastic names, the most long-lived and frequently used was Zhou 周. For the Zhou dynasty itself (1046–256 BCE); the Zhou dynasty that ruled in North China, 557–81 CE, later dif-ferentiated as Bei Zhou 北周 or Hou-Zhou 後周; the short-lived Zhou dynasty of Wu Zetian 武則天, 690–705, later differentiated as Wu Zhou 吳周; the Zhou dynasty that briefly ruled part of North China, 951–60, later differentiated as Hou-Zhou 後周; Great Zhou (1354–67) founded by Zhang Shicheng 張士誠, and the Zhou dyn-asty established by Wu Sangui 吳三桂 (1612–78) in southern and southwestern China in the early Qing (1673–81). The second most long-lived and frequently used dynastic name was Han.

An alternative tradition (that dates from the Han) claims that the names of the early dynasties were not derived from toponyms. Instead, it assigns a fine or auspicious meaning to them. For exam-ple, Tang 唐 = majesty, Xia 夏 = great, Yin 殷 = to flourish, Zhou 周 = to attain, Han 漢 = Milky Way (Tianhe 天河, Tianhan 天漢), and Xin 新 = new. For a discussion of these auspicious readings (in the context of Wang Mang’s use of Xin 新), see Yang (1956 & 1957; Liao Boyuan 2002 [§39.11.2.1]).

The Liao and the Jin 金 followed the old traditions in the sense that the names they chose were territorial. Not those of ancient states, but of rivers in their homelands (Liao is a very ancient name, Jin less so). Qubilai Khan adopted the term Mighty greatness (Da Yuan 大元) for the name of his dynasty. It was taken from the beginning of the Yi 易 (Changes) and it is therefore the first dynastic name clearly chosen for its meaning. A precedent followed by both the Ming 明 (Chapter 65) and the Qing 清 (§66.1.1).

All the major dynasties appear in Tables 2 and 3. But there were many others, including those declared by pretenders to the throne. Most chose traditional dynastic names (not shown).

Because so many dynasties bore the same name, later histori-ans found the following ways to distinguish among them:

1. By time: for example, Former and Later Han (Qian-Han 前漢 and Hou- Han 後漢).

2. By place (usually based on the relative position of the capital): for example, Northern and Southern Song (capitals at Bianliang 汴梁 and Lin’an 臨安, present-day Kaifeng and Hangzhou). Occasionally, dynasties were identified by the names of their capitals, as Bian-Song 汴宋 (Northern Song).

3. By the family name of the ruling house (guoxing 國姓): for example, the Liu 劉 in Liu Song 劉宋 for the southern dynasty founded by Liu Yu 劉裕, Zhao Song 趙宋 for the dynasty founded by Zhao Kuangyin 趙匡胤 (better known simply as the Song dynasty), or Cao Wei 曹魏 for the Wei kingdom of the Three Kingdoms period (founded by Cao Pi 曹丕, 187–226), and Tuoba Wei 拓跋魏, after the kin name of the dynastic founder, Tuoba Gui 拓跋珪 (§60.1.4).

4. By group or set: for example, Sanguo Wei 三國魏 (Three Kingdoms Wei) and Nanchao Song 南朝宋 (Southern Dynasties Song).

5. By the dynasty’s identifying power (wuxing 五行 phase): for example, Wood Zhou (mu Zhou 木周), Water Qin (shui Qin 水秦), Fire Han (huo Han 火漢, yan Han 炎漢, or yanhuo Han 炎火漢), Earth Wei (tu Wei 土魏), or Water Song (shui Song 水宋, i.e., Liu Song) as distinct from Fire Song (huo Song 火宋, i.e., Zhao Song).

From the above it can be seen that the same dynasties are not always distinguished in the same way (Liu Song is also known as Nanchao Song 南朝宋, or Shui Song 水宋). So familiar have many of these labels become that it is worth repeating that at the time the dynasties were in existence no qualifiers were needed.

Words formed with the name of the dynasty plus either chao 朝 or dai 代, such as Songchao 宋朝 (literally, the Song dynasty), or Songdai 宋代 (literally, the Song period or dynasty) were never used by contemporaries when writing of their own dynasty, but they did use them of previous dynasties. Of the two expressions,

6 IN TR OD U C T IO N

-chao 朝 was more frequently used in literary Chinese than -dai 代 (except in set phrases like Liudai 六代, Sandai 三代, and Wudai 五代). Since the later twentieth century, it has been the other way around. Chaodai 朝代 became the norm for dynasty only recently.

Ever since the Han, the polite way of referring to the current dynasty was to qualify its name with Da 大 (the Great), as in Da Han 大漢, Da Wei 大魏, Da Tang 大唐, and Da Song 大宋. Starting from the Da Yuan 大元 (Mighty Greatness) and continuing thereaf-ter, Da 大 was made part of the official name, thus, Da Ming 大明 and Da Qing 大清. Da 大 was essential in official correspondence. Its earliest appearance is in the memorable opening phrase of the message of the Xiongnu ruler (chanyu 單于) to Han Wudi 漢武帝 in 89 BCE as reported in the History of the Han, “To the south there is the great Han dynasty; to the north, the mighty Xiongnu.” 南有大漢北有強胡 (Hanshu 漢書 94A: 3768).

Already in the Tang, Da 大 begins to appear before the name of the dynasty in the titles of imperially commissioned books (§70. 4.2), but it is only from the Ming that it begins to be featured regu-larly and more widely, for example, on imperial ceramics.

In everyday usage, the dynasty of the day was referred to as guochao 國朝 or benchao 本朝 (the present dynasty). More formal-ly, apart from Da 大 before the name, contemporaries used the expression huangchao 皇朝 (this august dynasty; the present dyn-asty) or tianchao 天朝 (heavenly dynasty; i.e., this dynasty), sheng-chao 聖朝 (literally, this divine dynasty; in practice, the present dynasty or Your Majesty). Huangchao 皇朝 was also much used in book titles, especially in the Ming and Qing.

A.2.3 Sets of Dynasties Dynasties that for one reason or another were split into two succes-sive halves were later (never at the time) referred to as “the two …,” as er-Zhou 二周, liang Han 兩漢, liang Jin 兩晉, and liang Song 兩宋.

Two successive or important dynasties were often paired as in Qin-Han 秦漢, Sui-Tang 隋唐, or Song-Yuan 宋元. Or they were grouped in larger clusters, such as Wei Jin Nanbeichao 魏晉南北朝 or Sui, Tang, Wudai 隋唐五代 (all still in use).

Numbered sets that refer to what were regarded as a sequence of dynasties rather than to a contemporaneous group are usually described as -chao 朝 or -dai 代. They include the Three Dynasties (Sandai 三代) and the Six Dynasties (Liudai 六代) of high antiquity (§56.4), the northern Six Dynasties (Liuchao 六朝) and the south-ern Six Dynasties (Liuchao 六朝) between the Han and the Tang, usually called the Southern and Northern Dynasties (Nanbeichao 南北朝), and the Five Dynasties (Wudai 五代).

Numerical sets of dynasties that are described as guo 國 denote the kingdoms that ruled during periods of disunion or the period as a whole in which they ruled. The five best-known sets are shown at §A.2.3.2–3.

The art of encapsulating a long period of disunion in a short phrase, such as Spring and Autumn (Chunqiu 春秋) or Warring States (Zhanguo 戰國) flourished in the Former Han. The practice continued during the empire, but not so colorfully. Instead, direc-tion or number labels, such as Three Kingdoms, became the norm. Reflecting literary fashion, these were usually expressed in balanced phrases like Northern and Southern Dynasties, Five Barbarians, Sixteen Kingdoms, or Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms. Descrip-tion came back in the twentieth century with the Warlord period, but by then, the coining of balanced phrases was no longer in fash-ion.

An important part of the skill of the historian is to understand how people in the past situated themselves in the flow of historical time. As a first step, he or she should be aware that when we talk about the Spring and Autumn period or the Northern Song, we are continuing to neatly package the past in a manner that nobody who lived in these periods would have.

There are detailed definitions of six sets of legendary rulers, seven sets of states, and two periods (all in the pre-Qin) at the appropriate place in the period-specific chapters as indicated:

A.2.3.1 Legendary Age–Zhou (§56.4) Three August Ones (Sanhuang 三皇) Five Thearchs (Wudi 五帝) Two Thearchs (Erdi 二帝) Three Sage Rulers (Sansheng 三聖) Three Monarchs (Sanwang 三王) Three Dynasties (Sandai 三代) Six Dynasties (Liudai 六代)

A.2.3.2 Pre-Qin (§58.1) Five overlords (Wuba 五霸 or Chunqiu wuba 春秋五霸) Three Jin (San-Jin 三晉) Two Zhou (Er-Zhou 二周) Spring and Autumn (Chunqiu 春秋) Warring States (Zhanguo 戰國) Seven States (Qiguo 七國) Seven Powerful States (Qixiong 七雄; Zhanguo qixiong 戰國七雄) Six States (Liuguo 六國)

A.2.3.3 Han–Tang

More than 50 dynasties ruled over all or parts of China between the fall of the Han in 220 and the establishment of the Song in 960. Forty-five of them are usually listed in the six groups shown below (eight dynasties ruled for such short periods that they are not nor-mally listed under the Sixteen Kingdoms, where they belong).

There are detailed definitions of these six sets at the appropriate place in the period-specific chapters as indicated.

Three Kingdoms (Sanguo 三國); Ch 60 Sixteen Kingdoms (Shiliuguo 十六國); Chapter 60, Table 131 Southern and Northern Dynasties (Nanbeichao 南北朝); Ch. 60 Six Dynasties (Liuchao 六朝); Ch 60 Five Dynasties (Wudai 五代 [§61.12, Table 132]) The Ten Kingdoms (Shiguo 十國 [§61.12, Table 133])

A.2.4 Dating the Dynasties Dynasties rarely ended neatly because their heirs and supporters often continued to fight in the provinces after the capital had fallen. Deposed Chinese rulers and their courts tended to flee to the south (Jin 晉, Song 宋, Ming, Republic of China); deposed alien dynasties (sometimes called conquest dynasties), fled to the north (Liao, Jin, Yuan, and Qing). To avoid confusion with the Liao, Yuan, and Ming, later historians dubbed the remnant courts of these dynas-ties, Northern Liao (Bei Liao 北遼, 1122), Northern Yuan (Bei Yuan 北元, 1368–1634), and Southern or Later Ming (Nan-, Hou-Ming 南[後]明, 1644–63). None of these names were used at the time by the successor regimes and their adherents (yilao 遺老), who delib-erately emphasized the continuity of their claim and their loyalty by continuing to use the old dynastic names.

In a similar fashion, today, in China, the Republic of China is regarded as having ended on October 1, 1949, the day that the new government of the People’s Republic of China was established. Therefore, in China, the government has opposed the use of the term “Republic of China” by the government in Taiwan (but it has accepted new names, such as “Chinese Taiwan”). Conversely, in Taiwan, the government has insisted on continuing to use “Repub-lic of China,” the name that it held when it ruled all of China prior to 1949.

Because many dynasties were founded before the dynasty in power had been overthrown and many dynasties continued to assert their claims as they were losing power (a process that could last for decades), historians had to pay particular attention to select-ing the dates for the start and end of dynasties. The term for making the correct choice of dates for the cut-off point of the old dynasty and the start of the new one was duanxian 斷限 (setting the limits).

D YNA ST I ES 7

It was taken from long-established administrative jargon by Liu Zhiji 劉知幾 (Shitong 史通 Neipian 12). Duanxian simply meant “time limit,” and this continued to be its main usage (for its applica-tion in deciding to which dynasty an individual’s biography be-longed, see the last paragraph of §9.3). Note that duandai 斷代 occurs in several modern expressions, such as duandaishi 斷代史 (dynastic history), duandai 斷代 (synchronous), and duandaifa 斷代法 (methods of dating [in archeology]).

A.2.5 The Dynastic Cycle The dynastic cycle is part and parcel of the theory of the Mandate of Heaven (§A.2.6). Three of the best known statements of the cycle (xunhuan 循環) are in the Mengzi 孟子, the Shiji 史記, and the Sanguo zhi yanyi 三國志演義.

“Every five hundred years a true King should arise” (Mengzi II.B13) and also “The world has existed for a long time. Now in peace, now in disorder.” 天下之生久矣. 一治一亂 (Mengzi 3B.9).

Sima Qian elaborated the idea in this way, “The way of the Three Dynasties of old is like a cycle which, when it ends must be-gin over again.” 三王之道若循環,終而複始 (Shiji 8: 393–94; Wat-son, 1993 [§59.1.8], 85–86).

The action of the Sanguo zhi yanyi covers 113 years from the fall of the Han dynasty, the period of division into Three Kingdoms, and the reunification of the empire under the Jin dynasty. The neat description of those confused years as alternating division and unity is encapsulated in a vernacular form of the Mencian phrase just quoted. It is better known today than this or the passage from the Shiji, because division and unity are causally linked and expressed in two easily memorized four-character set phrases: “Long divided, must unite; long united, must divide.” 分久必合, 合久必分. The complete phrase that occurs on the first and last pages of the novel is “The empire long divided, must unite: long united, must divide.” 論天下大勢, 分久必合, 合久必分.

Starting in the third century BCE, the change from one dynasty to the next began to be explained in terms of a theory of the succes-sive rotations of cosmic forces as indicated by a cycle of five phases (wuxing 五行) or five powers (wude 五德). The elements were at first said to proceed in a mutually overcoming cycle (xiangke 相克): earth, wood, metal, fire, and water (tu 土, mu 木, jin 金, huo 火, shui 水). The cosmological school credited with the development of the Five-Power theory, that of Zou Yan 鄒衍 (345–240 BCE), assigned the five powers to the legitimate dynasties. The legitimacy of a dynasty was expressed in the choice of the appropriate phase and its associated color, which it used for its banners and ritual para-phernalia.

The First Emperor was the first ruler to adopt the Five-Power theory as part of the legitimation of his rule (by the logic of the cycle at that time, Qin took water, black, the number six, and a calendar beginning in the tenth month just before the winter solstice).

The first rulers of the Han inherited the Qin power of water and the symbols that went with it, but during the reign of Han Wudi 漢武帝(b. 156; r. 141–87 BCE), the five phases were re-ordered (by Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 [179?–104? BCE]). According to the new order, the “mutually producing” cycle (xiangsheng 相生), each phase produced its successor: wood, fire, earth, metal, and water. In 104 BCE, Wudi adopted the revised cycle and the dynasty switched to the earth power, yellow, the number five, and a calendar begin-ning two months after the winter solstice.

The seizure of power by Wang Mang 王莽 a century later re-quired new legitimizing arguments. These were provided by Liu Xin 劉歆 (46 BCE–23 CE) and included the provision of the first of many detailed retroactive chronologies linking the mythological rulers with the Golden Age of Yao 堯 and Shun 舜 and the Three Dynasties of Xia, Shang, and Zhou and the creation of a bogus an-cestry for Wang Mang making him a direct descendant of Huangdi and Shun (Loewe 1994). Once again the first month of the calendar

was changed, this time to the first month after the winter solstice (§39.6, Box 72).

There were many theories as to what caused the rise and fall of dynasties. Much weight was put on domestic causes, principally, decadence, as seen in the corruption, moral decline, or weakness of the last emperors of the Xia, Shang, and Zhou. This was the view expressed by Sima Qian. The costs and dangers of overreach-expansion were also recognized, as were the dangers posed by external invaders. Most dangerous of all were internal weaknesses combined with external (barbarian) invasion. The saying to encap-sulate such a situation in the later empire was “Problems at home and foreign invasion” (Neiyou waihuan 內憂外患 or Neiluan wai-huan 內亂外患). It was abbreviated from a Warring States expres-sion, the locus classicus of which is in the Guanzi 管子, which makes the causality explicit, “If a state has misfortune at home, this is bound to invite disaster from abroad” (邦有內憂必有外患). Peas-ant rebellion was felt to be the most common cause of internal disorder (§24.2).

Explanations of the fall of dynasties that single out external in-vaders alone are unconvincing, particularly when couched (as they tend to be) in terms of a simple contrast between civilization at home challenged by barbarism from abroad (on cyclical theories of Sino-Steppe relations, see §27.2).

One common theory is that after an initial period of strong rule and increasing returns to organization, dynasties faced falling re-turns under later rulers. As a result, regional power holders grew in numbers and strength with the result that the central government’s tax base and hence military control of the rest of the country de-clined. As soon as this happened, the dynasty’s grip on power was likely to be challenged—within the palace itself or by regional war-lords, by bandit armies recruited from oppressed peasants or by ex-ternal enemies, or by one or all of these either singly or acting to-gether. Detailed examination of dynastic founders and their follow-ers would strengthen such an analysis.

Dynasties rose to power by force and the control of tightly knit groups commanding superior military forces and strategies. By the later empire, immediately after the acquisition of power, top posts were awarded to the founder’s inner circle of generals and support-ers. They had fought with him since the beginning and were often from the same locality. In the next generation many of the top posts went to the sons of the founding elite (the sons and families of the founder himself, however, were politically neutered in the Song and Ming). Thereafter, it became increasingly difficult to maintain the cohesion of the original group. Indeed, many dynastic founders turned against their original followers in order to lay the basis for a wider leadership talent pool with administrative rather than mili-tary skills and new debts of loyalty to the aging founder (Zhu Yuan-zhang of the Ming provides a good example, and no doubt others could be found from more recent history).

At first the intake of new talent to administer the country is drawn from a broad circle, but after a few generations the circle narrows again. This can be seen in the social background of the metropolitan graduates ( jinshi) during the Ming. In the early years of the dynasty only about 14 percent came from families that had provided previous officials, but toward the end of the dynasty 60 percent came from established elite families. In other words, the talent pool narrowed as time went by and fewer and fewer people had a direct stake in the dynasty (Qian Maowei [2004], 140).

Meskill, John, ed. 1983 (1965). The pattern of Chinese history: Cycles, development, or stagnation? Greenwood.

Qian Maowei 钱茂伟. 2004. Guojia keju yu shehui 国家科举与社会 (The nation, the examination system, and society). Beijing tushuguan.

Yang, L. S. (Yang Lien-sheng; Yang Liansheng 楊聯陞). 1961. Toward a study of dynastic configurations in Chinese history. In Yang (1961), 1–17. Originally published in HJAS 17: 329–45.

———. 1961. Studies in Chinese institutional history. HUP.

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A.2.6 Legitimate Succession In archaic China, as in other ancient societies, legitimacy was based on the divine origin of kingship, which enabled the ruler to mediate between cosmic forces and man. Thus the Shang kings justified their rule on the basis of descent from a divine ancestor and their ability to understand, represent, and control cosmic forces. Thus, too, the Zhou rulers claimed to have received the Mandate of Heav-en (Tianming 天命), which they and their successors retained, so long as they ruled effectively and (argued the followers of Confu-cius) according to the principles laid down in the Classics.

New Chinese rulers sought to win support and to bolster their legitimacy (and at the same time exclude their rivals) in a variety of different ways. These included the use of force, both to acquire pow-er and to maintain it; the provision of lavish rewards for loyalty and swift punishment for disloyalty; the maintenance of peace, stability, and unity; the provision of effective government services and insti-tution building; and the rewriting of the past, especially of the pre-ceding dynasty and of the circumstances by which the present dy-nasty had come to power.

Emperors of alien dynasties, notably the Kitan Liao and the Manchu Qing, presented themselves not only as sage emperors in the Confucian tradition but also as Buddhist chakravartin (universal and just rulers).

At no time in Chinese history before the twentieth century did the concept of a ruler’s legitimacy connote sanction by law, political assembly, or popular consent.

In addition to the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven and the cyclical pulsation of the cosmic forces as embodied in five-phase theory, a third principle to legitimize dynastic rule emerged in the Later Han. It was summed up in the expression zhengtong 正統 (literally, correct control or rectified unity; what I prefer to call legit-imate succession).

After the second restoration of the Han dynasty in 25 CE, one of the claims to legitimacy of the emperor Shizu (r. 25–57), a for-mer rice dealer named Liu Xiu 劉秀, was his descent from the foun-der of the Han, the emperor Gaozu, Liu Bang 劉邦 (of whom Liu Xiu was the ninth generation great-grandson). Zhengtong 正統 was the phrase invented to encapsulate this claim of legitimacy based on bloodline.

In elaborating the theory of legitimate succession, the Later Han historian Ban Gu 班固 (32–92 CE) introduced the calendrical terms zheng 正 (regular) and run 閏 (intercalary) to distinguish le-gitimate and illegitimate rulers (the reign of Wang Mang was clas-sified as run 閏, thus allowing the Later Han emperors to claim direct descent from the mythical emperor Yao through the Former Han emperors). The Later Han also continued to use five-phase theory to bolster their claims, as did all dynasties for the next one thousand years, but legitimacy was increasingly based on claims to political and moral attainments, not on an unbroken bloodline.

Finally, in the Northern Song, zhengtong 正統 was delinked from five-phase theory and redefined by Ouyang Xiu as consisting of two elements, zheng 正, the moral right to succession, and tong 統, the fact of unified political control. Ouyang also argued that there were periods in which these conditions were not met. Sima Guang applied the new definition of legitimate and illegitimate rulers in the Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑 (§48.3), as did Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) in a slightly different sequence in his abridgment of it, the Zizhi tongjian gangmu 資治通鑑綱目 (§48.5).

All were adamant that only one dynasty could hold the man- date at any one time, but there was no final agreement on which states were in the legitimate succession during periods of disunion or alien rule.

Given the influence of the Zizhi tongjian and the Gangmu, it is worth quoting their authors’ views. After noting that scholars in the Han had begun to place Qin in an intercalary position (that is, not in the legitimate line of succession), and after noting the confusion

at the fall of the Han, Sima Guang continues, “Your servant, being stupid, cannot claim to know the legitimate and intercalated posi-tions of the previous dynasties” (臣愚誠不足以識前代之正閏). He continues by pointing out that neither the criterion of unifying the empire nor direct succession, nor moral behavior are adequate criteria and therefore “from antiquity to the present, the theory of legitimate and intercalated succession is never sufficiently convinc-ing to compel us to adhere to it” (是以正閏之論自古及今未有能通其義確然使人不可移奪者也). He concludes that nevertheless some framework of chronology is needed for recording the sequence of events during times of division (然天下離析之際不可無歲時月日以識事之先後). So, he follows the chronology (in effect, the reign titles) of Han, Wei, Jin, Song, Chen, Sui, Tang, and the Later Liang and eventually, the Later Zhou down to the Song. “In doing so,” he says, “we are not honoring one and treating another with contempt, nor making the distinction of the orthodox and intercalary posi-tions” (非尊此而卑彼有正閏之辨也); quotes based on Zizhi tong-jian 資治通鑑 juan 69, Zhonghua edition, vol. 5, 2187–88; English translation by Fang (1952 [§60.2 under Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑], vol. 1, 46–47).

Zhu Xi 朱熹 argued that Shu Han 蜀漢 was legitimate and that Sanguo Wei 三國魏 was not. Living in a period of struggle with alien states ruling over parts of northern China, he regarded all such states, including Bei Wei, as not legitimate ( jianguo 僭國). There-fore, in his rather uncompromising view, the Nanbeichao and the Wudai Shiguo were periods in which the legitimate succession was interrupted (wutong 無統); see Bol (2008 [§28.2.1], 100–101).

In the later empire, it was Zhu Xi’s view that tended to prevail, largely thanks to the popularity of the Gangmu and the many con-tinuations and simplifications of it. Moreover, events encouraged his restrictive definition of legitimacy. For example, following the crushing defeat of Ming forces in 1449 at the hands of the Oirat Mongols, many historians removed the Liao, Jin, and Yuan from the category of legitimate dynasties.

Ban Gu’s use of the calendrical terms regular and intercalary points to another important and practical aspect of legitimate suc-cession. It was the emperor’s prerogative to establish the standard calendar for the empire. Under no circumstances were alternative (non-standard) ones tolerated, but in practice there were many occasions when the empire was divided and several different calen-dars were in use. For the historian there were obvious advantages in having one calendar and one legitimate dynasty with no breaks be-tween reigns.

One way of demonstrating continuity was for each dynasty to sponsor the production and publication of official histories, inclu-ding of the previous dynasty or dynasties. These standard histories, zhengshi 正史, as they came to be called, eventually formed an un-broken and authoritative account of China’s main dynasties (Chap-ters 47 and 49).

Polities judged to be legitimate were usually called chao 朝 or chaodai 朝代 (dynasties) as distinct from those considered not in the legitimate succession, or illegitimate, which were referred to as guo 國 (kingdoms). Thus, the Xia, Shang, and Zhou were collect-ively called the Sandai 三代 (Three Dynasties), while the other states at that time were all kingdoms (states, statelets). Just after the Han, there were Three Kingdoms (Sanguo 三國), all ruled by emperors; in the interval between the Jin and the Sui, there was no consensus as to whether the legitimate succession had been trans-ferred or interrupted. However, all agreed that the Sixteen King-doms were not in the succession, but the Southern Dynasties were.

In the early Song, it was decided for obvious reasons that the Five Dynasties in northern China represented the legitimate succes-sion linking the Tang to the Song (the Song founder had served at one of the northern courts, the Later Zhou). The polities in central and South China were not considered legitimate and hence collec-tively called the Shiguo 十國 (Ten Kingdoms).

D YNA ST I ES 9

The distinction between chao and guo was not always main-tained—during the Song, the term Beichao 北朝 was commonly used to refer to the Kitan Liao and the Jurchen Jin dynasties at a time when neither was considered in the legitimate succession. Bei-chao was later extended as a general term for the dynasties that ruled North China (386–581).

Usually, the editors of the standard histories put rulers they considered in the legitimate succession in the basic annals (benji 本紀) and those not, in special sections such as zaiji 載記 (annals of non-legitimate rulers) or in the biographies (liezhuan 列傳). Thus, for example, only the rulers of Wei have basic annals in the Sanguo zhi. The rulers of Shu and Wu are put in the biographies section. Likewise, only the five ruling houses of the Five Dynasties appear in the basic annals of the Jiu Wudai shi.

During the Yuan, after much discussion it was finally decided that the Liao and Jin dynasties should be considered legitimate. The Xixia (Xiaguo 夏國 in contemporary Chinese sources) was never even considered for inclusion.

Another way of demonstrating continuity was for a new dy-nasty to repair and guard the tombs of the previous dynasty (§51.5, Box 94). Dynasties, once established, also authorized the worship of their predecessors as part of the state religion. For example, a tem-ple for past rulers (Lidai diwang miao 歷代帝王廟) was built in the 1530s at imperial command for the consolidated worship of the founding emperors of the Han, Tang, Song, and Yuan dynasties. It also became standard practice in the later empire for the emperor of a new dynasty to grant a posthumous title to the last ruler of the preceding one (§18.4).

The terminology of succession included the following:

chuantong 傳統 (to pass on the succession; later, tradition). cuanzei 篡賊 (usurpers, such as Empress Dowager Lü, Wang Mang, or

Empress Wu). geju 割據 (separatist polities, such as Wu during the Three Kingdoms). jianguo 僭國 (non-legitimate states). jianqie 僭竊 (usurpations). jianwei 僭偽 (usurpations or puppet dynasties); the ten kingdoms of the

Wudai shiguo period were often referred to in this way. lieguo 列國 (states appointed by legitimate dynasties, as during the Spring

and Autumn and Warring States periods); often in the expression zhuhou lieguo 諸侯列國.

pian’an 偏安 (security in only one part of the country). runwei 閏位 (non-legitimate position). wutong 無統 (no unification, as [according to some] between the Zhou and

the Qin, the Jin and the Sui, and the Tang and the Song). zhengrun 正閏 (legitimate and non-legitimate dynasties). zhengtong 正統 (legitimate succession); typically, by origin, an amalgam of

two terms found in one of the commentaries to the Classics. The source was the Gongyang zhuan 公羊傳 (Gongyang commentary) to the Chun-qiu 春秋 (Spring and autumn annals). The two terms were da yitong 大一統 (the great unity) and da juzheng 大居正 (augustly commands an upright position) in the phrases 何言乎王正月大一統也 (Why does it mention thGong Zhene king’s first month? Because he majestically in-augurates a unified system) and 故君子大居正 (Therefore, the superior man augustly commands an upright position); Chunqiu Gongyang zhuan 春秋公羊傳, Yingong yuannian 陰公元年 (722 BCE) and Yingong sannian 陰公三年 (720 BCE).

zhengwei 正位 (legitimate position).

Although the theory of legitimate succession (zhengtong 正統) was abandoned in the early twentieth century with the fall of the Qing and the introduction of new ideologies under the Republic, the term itself remained in use in the sense of “orthodox” and the lead-ers of the Republic claimed to be the heirs to the orthodox tradition of the Chinese sages (daotong 道統). Meanwhile, conservative scholars, such as Qian Mu 錢穆 (1895–1990) and Jin Yufu 金毓黻 (1887–1962), continued to use zhengtong 正統 in the old sense in their historical works.

After 1949, Chinese history on the Mainland of China was rein-terpreted in Marxist-Maoist terms and the concept of zhengtong 正

統 in the old sense was discarded. The Hanyu dacidian 汉语大词典 (HD) provides a conventional definition with several citations. Per-haps not surprisingly, the Encyclopedia of Chinese history (up to 1911), which contains over 67,000 entries, makes no mention of zhengtong in the senses discussed above.

Chan, Hok-lam (Chen Xuelin 陳學霖 [1938–2011]). 1984. Patterns of legit-imation in imperial China. In Chan (§63.5), 19–48.

Chaussende, Damien. 2010. Des Trois royaumes aux Jin: Légitimation du pouvoir impérial en Chine au IIIe siècle. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Graham, Angus C. (1919–91). 1989. The cosmologists. In his Disputers of the Tao (§58.6.1), 315–70.

Hirase Takao 平勢隆郎 (2007a [§48.1.1.2]). ———. (2007b [§59.1.9]). Loewe, Michael. 1994. Wang Mang and his forbears: The making of the

myth. TP 80.4/5: 197–222. McMullen, David L. 1987. Bureaucrats and cosmology: The ritual code of

T’ang China. In Rituals of royalty: Power and ceremonial in traditional societies, David Cannadine and Simon Price, eds. CUP, 181–236. Demonstrates the importance of Confucian sanctioned imperial ritual and the political realities underlying the rhetoric. Also shows that the Da Tang Kaiyuan li 大唐開元禮 (§61.1) was the ancestor for the ritual codes of the Song, Jin, Ming, and Qing dynasties.

Pankenier, David W. 2013. The cosmopolitical mandate. Ch. 6 of Pankenier (§39.1).

Pines, Yuri. 2001. Name or substance? Between zhengtong 正統 and yitong 一統. History: Theory and Criticism 2: 105–37.

Rao Zongyi 饒宗頤 (1917–). 1996 (1977). Zhongguo shixue shang zhi zheng-tong lun 中國史學上之正統論 (Theories of legitimate succession in Chi-nese historiography). Yuandong. Useful anthology of excerpts; reviewed by Xie Gui’an 谢贵安 in Shixue lilun yanjiu 2005.3.

Trauzettel, Rolf (1930–). 1967. Ou-yang Hsius Essays über die legitime Thronnachfolge. Sinologica 9.3/4: 226–49.

Van der Sprenkel, Otto (1906–78). 1960. Chronographie et historiographie Chinoises. In Mélanges publiés par l’Institut des hautes études chinoises. PUF, vol. 2, 407–21.

Wang, Aihe. 2000. Cosmology and political culture in early China. CUP. Traces the transformation of Shang Sifang 四方 cosmology (the center of which was conceived as the king’s body and his ancestral line, through which the world of the gods and the world of humans communicated) and the emergence of Wuxing during the Warring States; also the politi-cal use of Wuxing during the Qin and Han. Based on the author’s PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1995. Reviewed by Nathan Sivin, CRI 8.2: 566–72 (2001).

Wechsler, Howard J. 1985. Offerings of jade and silk: Ritual and symbol in the legitimation of the T’ang dynasty. YUP.

Xu Chong 徐冲 2012 (§46.6.3).

A.3 ABSOLUTE DATES

A.3.1 Absolute Year Dates Absolute year dates in written Chinese historical sources begin in 841 BCE: Gonghe yuannian 共和元年 (i.e., Zhou Gong Bohe yuan-nian 周共伯和元年, the first year of the interregnum of Bohe of Gong [literally, Elder He of the state of Gong). It is the first date recorded in Sima Qian’s Chronological tables of the 12 subordinate rulers (Shiji 14, Shi’er zhuhou nianbiao 十二諸侯年表). It is an ab-solute date because the historian was able to count back the reigns of Zhou kings from the first year of the Chunqiu (722 BCE) to 841. He was also able to provide in this and subsequent tables a column for every year between 841 and ca. 100 BCE and to supply plenty of verifiable historical and astronomical data (after his death, others extended the table forward to 25 BCE). Later Histories carefully record subsequent years, months, and days in an unbroken series up to the end of the last dynasty and the adoption of the interna-tional calendar in the twentieth century (§39.9).

Prior to 841 BCE, extant Chinese texts record dates and also reigns or rulers’ names, but because there is no agreement on the length of the reigns, the dates cannot be fixed with any certainty. For example, a date might record that on the second month of the thirteenth year of the king a meeting took place, but although we

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might know roughly when the king reigned, there is no confirmed date of accession and therefore no way of establishing an absolute date for his 13th year.

Sima Qian’s own reason for not supplying dates between the starting point of the Shiji (Huangdi, the Yellow Thearch) and 841 is along slightly different lines. It is worth quoting, because it illus-trates his understanding of the problem and also shows the excep-tional care and skepticism with which he approached his sources. Bear in mind that this is someone writing 2,100 years ago about ancient monarchs who were believed to have ruled 2,000 years before that:

Confucius used the annals of the historians to put in order the Chunqiu (Spring and autumn annals); he noted the initial year of the reign, the sea-son, the month and the day, such was his exactitude. But when he wrote the preface to the Shangshu (Venerated documents), he only wrote in approxi-mate terms and cited neither years nor months. While there were a few dates, many were missing and so could not be recorded. Thus when he was in doubt he transmitted his doubts, such was his good faith. As for me, I have read the genealogies. From Huangdi they all have dates. I have checked their chronol-ogies and their genealogical lists as well as the Record of the cycle of the five phases, but none of the ancient texts are in agreement with each other. They are filled with contradictions and divergences. The sage certainly had his reasons for not giving years and months. That is why I have drawn up a list by generations from Huangdi to the period of Duke He (841 BCE) and made the Table of generations on the basis of the Successions and clans of the Five Emperors, and the Shangshu. 太史公曰: 五帝, 三代之記, 尚矣. 自殷以前諸侯不可得而譜, 周以來乃頗可著. 孔子因史文次春秋, 紀元年, 正時日月,

蓋其詳哉. 至於序尚書則略, 無年月; 或頗有, 然多闕, 不可錄. 故疑則傳疑, 蓋其慎也. 餘讀諜記, 黃帝以來皆有年數. 稽其曆譜諜終始五德之傳, 古

文鹹不同, 乖異. 夫子之弗論次其年月, 豈虛哉！於是以五帝系諜, 尚書集世紀黃帝以來訖共和為世表 (Shiji 13: 487–88).

At the end of the Shiji he repeats the main point, “The three dynasties [Xia, Shang, and Zhou] are ancient and their chronologies cannot be known precisely.” 維三代尚矣年紀不可考 (Shiji 130: 3303).

A.3.2 Absolute Day Dates The first day date that is verifiable in Chinese history is February 22, 720 BCE (in the proleptic Julian calendar): “On the jisi 己巳 day of the second month of the third year of the reign of Duke Yin [posthumous title] of Lu, there was a total solar eclipse.” 陰公三年春王二月己巳日有食之 (Chunqiu Gongyang zhuan 春秋公羊傳, Yin 3). It is an absolute date because the eclipse can be corroborated by modern astronomical retrodictions. According to Zhang Peiyu (1990 [§39.13.2 #3]), its magnitude was 0.47 and it could have been observed at Qufu at 07:18 hours, Julian day 1458496. From that day onward all Chinese day dates can in theory be precisely identified up to the present time. For the definition of Julian days and other technical calendrical terms, see §39.5, Box 85, Calendri-cal Conventions and Common Confusions.

A.3.3 Raising Antiquity All Nations, before they began to keep exact accounts of Time, have been prone to raise their Antiquities, Isaac Newton. The chronology of ancient kingdoms amended. London: J. Tonson et al., 1728, 43.

During the reign of Wang Mang, an influential attempt was made to link recorded heavenly phenomena with a revised astronomical system whose calculations extended back to the legendary age and beyond. This became the basis for the interpolation of sexagenary year dates from the Yellow Thearch to the Zhou kings.

The results of these and similar efforts in the Tang and Song were mixed, because (1) very little evidence was found that Sima Qian had not already either used or rejected and (2) the methodolo-gy for retrodicting pre-841 astronomical phenomena and matching these with known events was insufficient to produce accurate re-sults (§56.5.3). Nevertheless, the net effect was to historicize the legendary rulers. The entire retrodicted chronological edifice was

not challenged until the first half of the twentieth century by the Doubting Antiquity School (§56.6).

In recent years, efforts have continued to extend China’s abso-lute chronology further into the past using new dating techniques, newly excavated inscriptions, and a greater knowledge of astronom-ical cycles. In some cases these have enabled more accurate retro-dictions to be linked to recorded events. The results of these and earlier calculations are summarized at §56.7.

A.4 LONG PERIODS OF TIME The main way of recording time in China from the Zhou dynasty until 1912 was by the year of a reign or part of a reign era ([§39. 11.2]). This has led to the widespread view that people thought of time only in terms of the dynasty in which they lived. Thus, the author of a recent biography of the Ming literatus and historian, Zhang Dai 張岱 (1597–1680), writes on the first page, “Time measured on a Ming framework was the only time Zhang knew…” (Spence, Jonathan. 2007. Return to Dragon Mountain: Memories of a late Ming man. Viking).

This is a curious remark, because Zhang Dai and his contemp-oraries not only recorded time in terms of the eras (nianhao 年號) of the Ming (and Qing) dynasties but also thought in terms of the continuous stretch of time that separated their own day from the legendary rulers of the golden age, the great dynasties of antiquity, and all the intervening dynasties. They did so in various ways.

Apart from astronomical cycles, the earliest to appear and most frequently used was to add the years of the successive reigns of the intervening dynasties. A method that most people in the late impe-rial period would have first encountered in their pre-school years in the primers like the Three character classic (Sanzi jing 三字經), which give the number of years that each of the major dynasties lasted. Later they would have read of the influential calculation made by Liu Xin 劉歆 in the Han that the Xia, Shang, and Zhou lasted respectively 432, 629, and 867 years. These figures were incorporated into the Hanshu 漢書 and repeated by later writers.

Calculating elapsed time between the Sandai and a writer’s own dynasty was also common. To take but one example, in his valedic-tory edict (yizhao 遺詔), drafted in 1714, the Kangxi emperor reck-oned that more than 300 rulers had reigned for a period of over 4,350 years since the first 60 years of the Yellow Thearch’s reign. Typically, he pointed out that facts during the Three Dynasties prior to the Qin burning of the books were not always reliable. But 1,960 years had elapsed since the first year of the First Emperor (246 BCE), and 211 emperors with era names had ruled during this per-iod (Shengzu shilu, juan 275; KX 56.11 [Dec. 1717]).

A second way of calculating long periods of time was familiar to all those who were classically literate since at least the Han dynasty. It consisted of counting the number of sexagenary cycles between two events (not unlike counting centuries, except the unit contained 60, not 100, years). For example, Zhang Dai took a group of friends to visit the site of the Orchid pavilion outside his birthplace, Shao-xing, in 1613 because it was a guichou 癸丑 year and Wang Xizhi 王羲之 had written his famous Preface to the Orchid Pavilion po-ems (Lanting ji xu 蘭亭集序) there in a guichou year (353). Sixty years later, in the next guichou year (1673), Zhang revisited the Orchid pavilion and recalled his youthful outing, “Now it is a guichou year again and there have been 22 guichou years from the Yonghe era (353 CE) until now. How fortunate I have been to have had two such opportunities.” 今年又值癸丑. 自永和至今, 凡二十二癸丑. 餘兩際之, 不勝欣幸 (Gu lanting bian 古蘭亭辨 in Zhang’s Langhuan wenji 琅嬛文集 (Paradise Collection). Yun Gao 雲告, collated and punctuated. Yuelu, 1985, 119).

Counting in sexagenary cycles was called “Successive years of jiazi” (Linian jiazi 厯年甲子) by the late Ming amateur astronomer, Xing Yunlu 邢雲路 ( jinshi 1580). He published a table of the num-ber of years between 1280 (Yuan, zhiyuan 17) and every jiazi year

D YNA ST I ES 1 1

(first year of the cycle of 60) starting from the first one (2697 BCE). For example, the 71st jiazi year was in Hongzhi 17 (1504), 224 years after 1280. 第七十一甲子弘治十七年積二百二十四年 (Gujin lüli kao 古今律曆考 [Studies of mathematical harmonics and as-tronomy, ancient and modern], juan 62). Xing chose 1280 as his base year because this was the epoch of the Granting the seasons astronomical system (Shoushi li 授時曆, 1280 [§39.17.1.2]), which was still in operation with minor modifications in the Ming. There were many other near contemporaries of Zhang Dai who used jiazi cycles to calculate lapsed time between the ancients and the present and several, including Xue Yingqi 薛應旗 ( jinshi 1538) and Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲, who also published tables of the cycles (§56.5.4).

One special application of jiazi cycles (of days, not years) for counting long time periods was on tomb-tablet inscriptions in the Tang and Song: “Since her late great-grandfather, there have been four generations, altogether 1,200 jiazi 甲子 (1,200 × 60 ÷ 360 = 200 years). The practice dates back to the Spring and Autumn period (§9.11.2.2).

Clearly, calculating elapsed time over a long period was easy. In childhood people memorized the dynasties in the legitimate succes-sion, the length and number of reigns in each, and the total years of each dynasty. These figures were included as mnemonic verses of kings and emperors of successive dynasties (Lidai diwang jinian ge 歷代帝王紀年歌) and printed separately or in popular encyclopedi-as. Another way was to consult historical tables of kings and em-perors (Lidai diwang jinianbiao 歷代帝王紀年表) arranged by san-yuan jiazi 三元甲子 (180 years per double page) or tables of jiazi cycles converted into total elapsed years.

Centuries seem so familiar today that it is easy to forget that they did not come into widespread use before the eighteenth centu-ry in Europe. Prior to that it was mainly Muslim historians who or-ganized their work in this way.

In China, the idea of using 100 years or a multiple of 100 years to commemorate or celebrate an event in the past was introduced during the Yuan dynasty in a Buddhist context in which a monk marked off each century after the Buddha’s death, but the idea did not catch on. Centuries were reintroduced in China in about 1900. At first the old word zhou 周 was used, as in shijiu zhou 十九周 or shijiu zhou shiji 十九周世紀 (nineteenth century). The word shiji 世紀 for century emerged shortly thereafter, as also the words for de-cade (niandai 年代 or shinian 十年). Before then decades (zhi 秩) had only been used for counting a person’s age.

Note: A decade is reckoned from zero to nine; thus, the nineties of the twenti-eth century are from 1990 to 1999. A century, on the other hand, is reckoned from one to zero. For example, the fifteenth century runs from 1401 to 1500 (not from 1400 to 1499, still less from 1400 to 1500). However, in common expressions, such as “the 1400s,” the years are usually taken as 1400 to 1499. Finally, “millennium,” as in “in the third millennium BCE” refers to a period of time (in this case, 3000–2000 BCE or 5000–4000 BP), not a point in time (3000 BCE). In Chinese, the difference is between 公元前第三千年 (or 距今5000–4000 年前) and 公元前三千年.

A.5 GRADE-SCHOOL HISTORY Given the value attached to history, it is hardly surprising that even the basic grade school language primers contained long passages on the subject. They are in the form of “dynastic doggerel” that enu-merates the number of rulers in each successive dynasty, plus the total number of years that each dynasty ruled, starting from the legendary culture heroes. One quarter of the Sanzi jing 三字經 is devoted to history in this form. As time passed, new editions were kept up-to-date by adding new dynasties. The main passage of the original Song edition summarizes the first 17 dynasties with the emphasis on the first sage kings and the Three Dynasties. In pri-mers such as Hu Yin’s 胡寅 (1098–1156) Xugu qianwen 敘古千文 (Recounting the past in a thousand words), these dynasties take two thirds of the text. Another feature is the lavish praise for the

dynasty in which the author writes: “How admirable our Song! ‘Perfectly beautiful, perfectly good’ [Analects 3.27]. Boundless, hard to name, Transforming all.” 猗與我宋, 盡美全懿, 坱圠難名, 普率純被 (Schirokauer 1993). The same is true of Xu Heng’s 許衡, Bian-nian gekuo 編年歌括.

Dynastic verses appear not only in the primers but also in ency-lopedias for daily use (§73.1.3). Two examples follow (excerpted from Wu Huifang 2001, 130–40). The first is as mechanical as a multiplication table:

After the Five Thearchs, came the Great Yu, who was the ruler of Xia; the dynasty had 17 rulers and lasted over 400 years until defeat during the reign of Jie. So, Tang succeeded as the king of Shang; the dynasty had 30 rulers and lasted for over 600 years until defeat during the reign of Zhou. So, King Wu succeeded as king of Zhou; the dynasty had 37 rulers and lasted for over 800 years until defeat during the reign of [King] Nan. From the Xia to the Shang and from the Shang to the Zhou is known as the Three Dynasties.… After the defeat of the Zhou [in 959 CE], Zhao the great ancestor [i.e., Song Taizu] followed. This was the Great Song; the dynasty had 16 rulers and lasted for 316 years until its destruction. The Jurchens followed as the Great Yuan; the dynasty had 14 rulers and lasted for 163 years until it ended with Shundi and all under Heaven was united under the Great Ming; Wanjin quanshu 萬錦全書 (Wanli ed.) 3: 1–3. Note that the Yuan dynasty is de-scribed as Jurchen, not Mongol. 五帝之後有大禹是為夏後氏傳十七君曆四百餘年而敗亡于桀故湯承之是為商王傳三十君曆六百餘年而敗亡于紂故武王

承之是為周王傳三十七君曆八百餘年而敗亡于赧由夏而商由商而周是為三代….周敗後故趙太祖繼之是為大宋傳一十六君曆三百一十六年而滅女真繼

之是為大元傳一十四君曆一百六十三年而終順帝而天下歸於大明.

Some have pithy evaluative couplets, for example, this one on the Tang:

After Gaozong [r. 650–83] there was much woman trouble; after Suzong [r. 756–62], there were many overmighty regional commanders, Santai Wan-yong zhengzong 三台萬用正宗 (1599 [§73.1.3.2]), juan 4, 13–14. 高宗以後多女亂. 肅宗以後多強藩.

Usually, verses such as these were accompanied by a chart of the legitimate dynasties arranged like a family tree stretching back to the Yellow Thearch. The earliest dynastic genealogical tree to have survived was inscribed on stone in 1247:

Diwang zhaoyun tu 帝王紹運圖 (Table of succession of the emperors and kings). Huang Shang 黃裳, 1190s; inscribed on a stele, 1247 (original held in Suzhou Museum of Inscribed Steles, §69.11.5). The Zhaoyun tu was prepared as an instructional text for Song Lizong 宋理宗 (b. 1205; r. 1224–64), when he was still crown prince. It is in the form of a genea-logical table, whose descent line connects the names of the 195 rulers of legitimate dynasties from the Yellow Thearch to the Great Song (rulers of other dynasties are shown to the left or right of the main line). No dates are provided, but the inscription at the foot of the table stresses the number of years during which the empire was divided, saying the Jin only held all the empire united for 20 years; the Tang unity broke down with the An Lushan 安祿山 rebellion in 755 and it was not recovered un-til the Great Song. The conclusion was clearly intended to impress the crown prince with the weight of his future responsibilities: “the empire was united under a unique authority during only 500 years; for more than 1,700 years it was not united … from antiquity to the present, good government was only realized one in ten times and problems arose nine times out of ten. He who wields sovereign power should take this as a warning” (Chavannes 1913).

Such dynastic genealogies are still compiled and published. Children were taught how to count historical time in sexage-

nary cycles by means of simple verses, such as those by the eminent Yuan Lixue 理學 scholar and educator, Xu Heng 許衡 (1209–81), the first line of whose Biannian gekuo 編年歌括 (Annals in mne-monic verses) reads:

Starting from Yao xuchen year [sexagenary year 5, the 24th year of Yao’s reign, i.e., 2333 BCE] and ending in year guisi [sexagenary year 30] of the Jin dynasty [1233 CE] is 3,600 minus 34 years” [i.e., 60 cycles of 60 minus 34 years = 3566 = 2333 + 1233]. Xu Heng. Lu zhai yishu 魯齋遺書 (Written legacy of the Lu study), juan 10. 始自堯戊辰, 終於金癸巳, 三千六百年, 內減

三十四.

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One conclusion that stands out from an examination of the dy-nastic doggerel verses is that they lend little support to the often repeated comment that the Chinese people only revered a golden age and thought of time exclusively as being cyclical. Almost invari-ably the dynasty of the day is presented in a positive light, especially those dynasties that succeeded in reuniting China after a period of foreign rule or a period of disunity, or both.

Although the mythological and legendary rulers are enumerat-ed, no more attention is paid to them than the rulers of historical dynasties. Indeed they receive less attention, because the contempo-rary dynasty is given a fuller treatment and usually the achieve-ments of the present were compared favorably with those of the distant past. In this sense, the following words of General Zhang Fu, the early Ming conqueror of Yunnan, are not untypical.

The Grand Preceptor, Zhang Fu, Duke of Ying noted “The age of Yao and Shun was in the distant past. Also, their territory did not extend far into the distance. They had only the nine zhou and the areas beyond these were under indirect rule…. Now, our dynasty has unified the four seas and, the Chinese, the Yi, the Man and the Mo are all in accord.” 太師英國公張輔等議…. 蓋唐虞之時去古未遠其地不過九州要荒之外止於覊縻而已然苗民來格猶不免有三

危之竄. 今我國家混一四海, 華夏蠻貊罔不率 (Ming shilu, Zhengtong 6, 1st month, day 16 [February 7, 1441]; translation adapted from Wade 2005 [§27.4.1.3]).

Given the importance of the official ethical code, the Confucian concept of a timeless morality as exemplified in the golden age of the Three Dynasties was hugely influential. Indeed, it continues to influence modern perceptions of Chinese history and historical myth making to this day. But the concept of an unchanging and universally valid morality was not the only concept of time in impe-rial China. There was no single concept of time. People held differ-ent concepts that they used depending on the occasion.

Apart from dynastic verses and genealogical charts of the dy-nasties, grade school children also internalized their history in textbooks and readers, such as

Mengqiu 蒙求 or the Shiqi shi mengqiu 十七史蒙求 (§22.1.4). Yang Yi 楊億. Lidai jiyuan fu 歴代紀元賦 (Prose poem of the era names of

successive dynasties). Song. Covers from Han to Wudai. Nothing is known of the author (Junzhai dushu zhi 郡齋讀書志, Houzhi 後志 1).

Secondary Sources Chavannes, Édouard (1865–1918). 1913. L’Instruction d’un futur empereur

de la Chine en 1193. Mémoires concernant l’Asie orientale. Leroux, vol. 1: 19–64 [32–42]; plus folio-size illustration of rubbing: planche 7.

Liang Qizi 梁其姿. 1999. Sanzi jing li lishi shijian de wenti. 三字經裡歷史時

間的問題 (Questions relating to historical time in the Sanzi jing). In Shi-jian, lishi yu jiyi 時間歷史與記憶 (Time, history, and memory). Huang Yinggui 黃應貴, ed. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, Minzuxue yanjiusuo, 31–74.

Schirokauer, Conrad. 1993. Hu Yin’s “Recounting of the past in a thousand words.” In Guoji Zhuzi xue huiyi 國際朱子學會議 (Proceedings of the In-ternational Conference on Chu Hsi Studies). 2 vols. Nangang: Academia Sinica, Zhongguo wenzhesuo 中國文哲所, vol. 2, 1049–81.

Wu Huifang 吳蕙芳. 2001. Wanbao quanshu: Ming Qing shiqi de minjian shenghuo shilu 萬寶全書明清時期的民間生活實錄 (§73.1.3).

A.6 EUROPEAN CHRONOLOGIES From the early middle ages to the eighteenth century, Europeans measured their own and world history in terms of the Biblical story of creation and the many and various chronologies that had been constructed for it. On encountering the Chinese, therefore, the first reflex was to try to fit them into this framework. But as the Jesuits reported, China was different in that it had a well-established chro-nology that predated the Biblical chronology. The news was seized upon by all those in Europe critical of the Church. In the hands of Diderot, Voltaire, and other eighteenth-century thinkers, and with the discovery of geological time, this eventually led to the aban-donment of Biblical chronology in Europe and the beginnings of a

global chronology based upon non-Biblical criteria. The early Euro-pean efforts to fit China into a Biblical scheme by suggesting that the Chinese were a lost tribe of Moses were for the most part aban-doned by the early twentieth century. In China, on the other hand, no adjustments were made in the old chronology (the Yellow The-arch was only abandoned as a historical figure in the 1930s).

Martini, Martino (1614–61). Sinicae historiae decas prima. Munich: Lucae Straubii, 1658; 2nd ed. Amsterdam: Johannes Blauer, 1659. Covers from Fuxi 伏羲 (2952) to 8 CE; uses both 60 year cycle and Christian year equivalents; Melchisédec Thêvenot produced a complete chronology: Synopsis chronologica monarchiae Sinicae. Paris 1672 in his Relations de divers voyages curieux, vol. 2.4. Ends in 1425. Both works were based on abbreviations of the Gangmu and its continuations (§48.5).

Schall reported in 1628 on the Chinese chronology taking 2357 for Yao 堯. Among the arguments that he used for its reliability was that the 60-year cycle was continuous from Yao and that the eclipse records provided ad-ditional evidence. He received instructions from Rome in 1637 that the Jesuits were to use the longer (Septuagent) Biblical chronology in China.

Foucquet, Joseph. 1729. Tabula chronologica, historiae sinica connexa cym cyclo vulgo kia-tse dicitur. Rome: J. Petroschi. Foucquet argues that Chinese chronology before Zhou Weilie wang 周威烈王 23 (403 BCE) is legendary, but he was in a minority. The dominant trend in Europe in the eighteenth century was to accept Chinese chronology from Huangdi 黃帝 as being historical. Foucquet was based on the Flemish Jesuit, Philippe Couplet’s Tabula chronologica monarchiae sinicae. Paris: Hor-themels, 1686 (Huangdi to 1683); on which see David Mungello, A study of the prefaces to Ph. Couplet’s Tabula chronologica monarchiae sinicae. In Philippe Couplet, S.J. (1623–1693), The man who brought China to Europe. Jerome Heyndrickx, ed. Steyler, 1990, 183–99.

One feature of the Couplet and other early European chrono-logies of China was that the dynasties were numbered in the same manner as had been used since antiquity for ancient Egypt; thus, Xia was I, the Tang was XIII, and the Song was XIX. By a curious coincidence, the Ming is numbered XXI, which coincides with the count of 21 Histories, even though the dynasties enumerated are different (Han is V, and the Liao and Jin are left out in the Couplet chronological table); see his Tabula numerica XXII. Familiarum, imperialum, imperatorum, annorum, Tabula chronologica monar-chiae sinicae, p. 36 (Collani 2005).

Collani, Claudia von. 2005. Chinese emperors in Martino Martini Sinicae historiae decas prima (1658) and also her, The traditional list of Chinese emperors in Martino Martini [1658] and Philippe Couplet Tabula chronologica monarchiae Sinicae (1686). Both in Adrian Hsia and Ruprecht Wimmer, eds. Mission und Theater: Japan und China auf den Bühnen der Gesellschaft Jesu. Regensburg: Schnell + Steiner, 113–75.

Gaubil, Antoine. Completed in 1749. Traité de la chronologie chinoise. Print-ed for the first time in vol. 16 of the Jesuit Mémoires (§29.7.2); facs. rpnt., CUP, 2013. Souciet points out that Gaubil’s citing of the ganzhi 干支 as proof of China’s antiquity (at least to 2357 BCE) is weak, because they could have been added retroactively (Gaubil was also influenced by the 2155 eclipse record); see Mémoires, vol. 16, Appendix, note 1.

On the impact of the Chinese chronology in the debate over the revision of the Biblical chronology, see App (2010; §76.4.1.2) and

Mungello (1985: 124–33 [§29.7.2]). Pinot, Virgile. 1932. L’Antiquité de l’histoire chinoise et la chronologie. In his

La Chine et la formation de l’esprit philosophique en France (1640– 1740). Geuthner, 189–279.

Van kley, Edwin J. 1983. Europe’s discovery of China and the writing of world history. AHR 76: 358–85.

A.7 DYNASTIES OF JAPAN, KOREA & VIETNAM It is impossible to study the history of China in isolation from its neighbors, both peoples and states, because for much of Chinese history the borders between them frequently changed. For example, considerable parts of the area of China today were inhabited by and ruled over in ancient times by forerunners of the peoples of Vietnam and Korea. Also, for about 1,000 years, starting from the Han and

D YNA ST I ES 1 3

lasting through the Tang, what later became the northern parts of independent states in modern Vietnam and Korea were integral, albeit distant, parts or adjuncts of the Chinese empire. The present borders of the Himalayan kingdoms at China’s southwestern rim only emerged in the last three centuries, and today’s Mongolian and Tibetan borders were fluid until the twentieth century. A second reason is that even after local rulers in Vietnam, North China, and Korea gained their independence from China in the tenth century (following the fall of the Tang) and established their own inde-pendent states, their elites remained deeply influenced by China, in politics, economics, and culture. A final reason is that much of the interstate politics of the region, since very early times, consisted of a shifting pattern of defensive and offensive alliances between China and its neighbors in various combinations. A distant neighbor, such as Japan, was also deeply affected by China; from time to time,

especially in the late sixteenth and more so in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it impacted heavily and in different ways upon both China and its tributary state Korea.

The title “king” [guowang國王] was conferred on and off on the rulers of China’s client states, such as the Li in Annam, the Yi in Korea, or the shoguns of Japan. As sole superpower in the region, China also approved the dynastic name proposed by their rulers (§27.1).

The bare bones of the complex political history of what are to-day called Japan, Korea, and Vietnam are shown in Tables 5–7 below. Use the chronological table edited by Yu Baolin (2010), which also provides details of the genealogies of the ruling dynasties of these countries (§39.13.1). Oustanding recent works that include a regional perspective include (Holcombe [§45.1.1]), Robinson (2009 [§64.6.5]), and Rawski (2015 [§45.1.1]).

Table 5 Japan: Prehistory & Historical Periods & Eras

Archeological Cultures (ca. fourth century BCE–fourth century CE)

Jōmon 縄文 Yayoi 弥生

Kofun 古墳 (ca. 300–710)

From 710–1867 Japanese historical periods were based on lo-cation of power (from Nara 奈良 to Edo 江戶 [東京]) and from 1868 on eras (one per reign), starting with Meiji 明治. In addi-tion, the dominant political family was also used (from Fuji-wara 藤原 [894–1185] to Tokugawa 德川 [1600–1867]).

Nara 奈良 Heian 平安 Kamakura 鎌倉 Muromachi 室町 Momoyama 桃山 Edo 江户

Meiji 明治 Taishō 大正 Shōwa 昭和 Heisei 平成

710–794 794–1185

1185–1333 1333–1568 1568–1600 1600–1868

1868–1912 1912–1926 1926–1989

1989–

For an outline of the Japanese calendar, see §39.10.1. Chinese calendrical tables that include Ja-pan are introduced at §39.13.1. For references to Sino-Japanese relations in Japanese sources and for other Japanese sources on China, see §27.8.1. Japanese language borrowings from Chi-nese are outlined at §3.2.1.

14 I NTR OD U CT I ON

Table 6 Korea: Main Dynasties & Governments

Korea is called Han-guk in the ROK (South Korea) and Joseon (Chosŏn) in the DPRK (North Korea). The ROK (Taehan minguk 大韩民国) is read in Chinese as Da Han minguo (the Han 韩 comes from the Samhan 三韩, the three confederacies that are said to have preceded the Three Kingdoms [Samguk 三国]). The DPRK (Joseon Minjujui Inmin Konghuaguk 朝鮮民主主義人民共和國) is read in Chinese as Chaoxian minzhu zhuyi renmin gonghe guo, and its capital, Pyeonyang, is pronounced Pingrang 平壤. So, South Korea in Chinese is known for short as Hanguo 韩国 (from Han-guk) and North Korea, as Chaoxian 朝鮮 (from Joseon). Between the fourth and seventh centuries the three kingdoms on the Korean peninsula were frequently referred to in Chinese sources as Haidong sanguo 海東三國 (Haedong samguk). Following unification, the term was Haidong 海東 (Haedong), Dongguo 東國 (Dongguk), or simply the name of the dynasty in power. The name Korea dates from the tenth century when Goryeo unified the country (prior to that there was no single name for the peninsula). The word “Korea” in English as well as similar words in other European languages, also comes from Goryeo, towards the end of which dynasty news of the country trickled through to Europe for the first time.

Neolithic Bronze Age Old Joseon Iron Age

Old Joseon and with it many of the tribal peoples and small polities in what is now Northeast China and the northern part of the Korean peninsula were incorporated into four border commanderies (in effect, Han military outposts similar to those established in NW, SW, and S China) during the reign of Han Wudi starting in 108 BCE. The largest was Nangnang (Lelang 樂浪), near present-day Pyeong-yang 平壤. Its absorbtion by Goguryeo in 313 CE marked the end of the era of these commanderies; see Byington, Mark E., ed. 2013. The Han commanderies in early Korean history. UHP.

Three Kingdoms (Samguk 三國). Dates of foundation are mythical.

Goguryeo 高句麗 (in North Korea and Chinese NE); capital located at present-day Pyeongyang (427) Baekje 百濟 (in Southwest); capitals, Gongju 公州, Buyeo 扶餘 Silla 新羅 (in Southeast); capital, Gyeongju 慶州

Gaya League 加倻聯盟 (in the southwest corner of Silla opposite Tsushima Island) Buddhism introduced to Goguryeo (372), Baekje (384), and Silla (528)

Goguryeo-Sui (598–614) and Goguryeo-Tang (645–668) wars Unified (or Later) Silla (the first dynasty to unite almost the entire Korean peninsula; accomplished in

alliance with Tang against Baekje and then Goguryeo) Northern and Southern States (Silla) and Balhae [Bohai 渤海] (698–926) Later Three Kingdoms: Silla, Later Baekje (900–936) and Later Goguryeo (901–935) Goryeo 高麗 (Korean peninsula unified again in 936 after the fall of the Later Three Kingdoms); capital, Gaeseong 開城

Khitan invasions Mongol invasions

Goryeo a tributary of the Yuan dynasty Joseon 朝鮮 (also referred to as Lichao 李朝 [Li dynasty]); capital, Hanseong 漢城 (Seoul)

Hunmin jeongeum 訓民正音: proclamation of the Korean script (§3.2.2) Baegongdong Seowon 紹修書院, oldest private Neo-Confucian academy founded Japanese Invasions led by Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉 [1537–98]; see §24.1.2 under Imjin 壬辰 Manchu invasions (Jongmyo, pyongja horan 丁卯丙子胡亂)

Japanese colonial rule: Chōsen 朝鮮 was ruled by a Governor-general (Sōtoku 總督) Republic of Korea (ROK); capital, Seoul (Hanseong 漢城) Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK); capital, Pyeongyang 平壤

Korean War

8000–2000 BCE 2000–300 BCE 7th c.–108 BCE

300 BCE

121–108 BCE

57 BCE–668 CE ca 37 BCE–668 CE ca 18 BCE–660 CE

ca 57 BCE–935 4th–6th centuries

668–918

900–936

918–1392

993, 1010, 1018 1231–1258 1270–1351

1392–1910

1446 1543

1592–1598 1627, 1636 1910–1945

1948– 1948–

1950–1953

Note: As can be seen from the above table, the transcription of the names of Korean kingdoms in Chinese sources followed the usual course for transcriptions into Chinese. At first the transcription was fairly close to the language being transcribed. Then in the course of time the more common reading of the characters moved away from the original transcription. For example, Joseon was written 朝鲜 but pronounced Zhāoxiān until the twentieth century, when Cháoxiǎn became the norm.

For an outline of the Korean calendar, see §39.10.2. Chinese calendrical tables that include Korea are introduced at §39.13.1. For references to Korean dynastic sources containing passages on Sino-Korean relations and for other Korean sources on China, see §27.8.2. Korean scripts are outlined at §3.2.2. For an excellent historical atlas see Shin, Michael D., ed. 2014. Korean history in maps: From prehistory to the twenty-first century. CUP.

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Table 7 Vietnam: Main Dynasties & Governments

Under the Qin dynasty, a small part of the area from the Red River delta up to the present Sino-Vietnamese border was included in Xiangjun 象郡 (Elephant commandery). After 111 BCE, for most of the next 1,000 years this area was incorporated (often loosely) in-to the Chinese empire under Jiaozhi 交趾 prefecture. Vietnam down to the central region was placed under Chinese rule in the Han, and by the Later Han, the area south of Jiaozhi was administered by two prefectures—Jiuzhen 九真 (Nine camps), and Rinan 日南 (South of the sun). All three came under Jiaozhou 交州 commandery, which covered parts of present-day Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan. This remained the case until the end of the Tang (with a number of changes of the names of the three units). Jiaozhou com-mandery was renamed Annan 安南 (Pacified south) in 679, Lingnan 嶺南 in 711, and Annan again in the eighth century. Annan re-mained the usual Chinese name for Vietnam until the 1950s.

Dong Son archeological culture 500–300 BCE Thuc 蜀 dynasty, Kingdom of Au Lac 甌駱 in the Red River delta area 257–207 BCE Au Lac loosely incorporated into Qin empire as part of the commandery of Xiang 象郡 (near Hanoi) 220–207 BCE Trieu 趙 dynasty, Kingdom of Nam Viet 南越, whose capital was Panyu 番禺 (Guangzhou). Absorbs Au Lac; see

§59.7.1.3 207–111 BCE

Loosely incorporated under Chinese rule as part of the commandery of Lingnan 嶺南郡, later, Jiaozhou 交州 (incl. Annam and present Hainan, Guangdong, and Guangxi)

111 BCE–544 CE

Uprisings of the Trung sisters, Trung Trac 征側 and Trung Nhi 征貳 defeated by Ma Yuan 馬援 (§15.5.3) 40–43 Ly dynasty 李朝 544–602 Incorporated into Chinese administration as Jiaozhou 交州 (Annam 安南 Protectorate as from 679) 602–906 Ngo dynasty 吳朝 Dinh dynasty 丁朝: Dinh Bo Linh [Ding Buling 丁部領], proclaimed himself first emperor of Dai Co Viet 大瞿越;

recognized by the Song as King of Jiaozhi (first Chinese recognition of Vietnamese independence) Former Le dynasty 前黎朝

939–967 968–980 980–1009

Ly dynasty 李朝 ruled Dai Viet 大越. In 1077, roughly the current border was agreed between Song and Ly 1010–1225 Conquest of the South (Namtien), i.e., Champa [Zhancheng 占城] and parts of the Khmer empire (Zhenla 真臘) 1064–1757 Tran dynasty 陳朝 1225–1400 Mongol invasions (1257–1258 and 1284–1285; finally defeated in 1287) Ho dynasty 胡朝; dynastic name changed to Dai Ngu 大虞

1400–1407

Ming forces entered Vietnam on a punitive expedition (wenzui zhi shi 問罪之師) Incorporated into China as a province (Jiaozhi 交趾)

1407 1413–1425

Later Le dynasty 後黎朝 Dai Viet (Annam) effectively divided into northern and southern parts, called respectively, Tonkin and Annam Mac dynasty 莫朝 Tay Son dynasty 西山朝 (founded by the three Nguyen 阮 brothers of Tay Sơn village; defeat of Chinese punitive

expedition in support of Le, first day of the Chinese New Year, 1788)

1428–1788 1527–1592 1778–1801

Nguyen 阮 dynasty (founded by Nguyen Phuc Anh 阮福映 having defeated Tay Son and reunited Annam and

Tonkin as Dai Viet (capital Hue). In 1803, Anh’s title was conferred on him by the Jiaqing emperor, namely Yuenan guowang Viet Nam quoc vuong 越南國王 (King of the land south of the Yue; Vietnam). Yuenan was chosen by the Chinese court because Nam Viet/Nan-Yue was unacceptable—it recalled the ancient kingdom of Nam Viet/Nan-Yue 南越 (see under Trieu dynasty above), which had incorporated Guangdong and Guangxi. The term “Vietnam” (Yuenan 越南) dates from this time. In China, however, Vietnam continued to be called Annan until the 1950s.

French rule gradually instituted. From 1858, the country was divided into three: two protectorates (Tonkin Bac Ky 北區, or North Vietnam, and Annam Trung Ky 中區, or Central Vietnam), and one colony (Cochin China Nam Ky 南區, or South Vietnam, the Mekong Delta).

Sino-French War

1802–1945 1858–1884 1883–85

Democratic Republic of Vietnam (capital Hanoi 河內) State of Vietnam (capital Saigon 西貢)

First Indochina War (1946–54) effectively ended with the defeat of French forces at Dien Bien Phu (奠邊府) Viet Nam partitioned at the Geneva Conference between North (DRV) and South (RV) Republic of Vietnam (capital Saigon) Vietnam War (Second Indochina War)

1945–1976 1949–1955 1946–1954/5 1954 1955–1975 1959–1975

Socialist Republic of Vietnam (capital Hanoi) Sino-Vietnamese Border War

1976– 1979/2/17–3/6

For an outline of how the Vietnamese calendar worked and a Vietnamese calendrical concordance, see §39.10.3. Comprehensive Chi-nese calendrical tables that include Vietnam are introduced at §39.13.1.

Vietnamese sources that touch on Sino-Vietnamese relations are introduced at sections §62.4.3 (Song), §64.5.7 (Yuan), and §66.6.3 (Qing). Vietnamese scripts are outlined at §3.2.3.