Chapter 10An Improved Key Management Schemewith High Security in Wireless Sensor Networks

D. Satish kumar, N. Nagarajan and Ahmad Taher Azar

Abstract Security becomes extremely important, when wireless sensor networksare deployed in a hostile environment. In order to provide security, wireless com-munication should be authenticated and encrypted. Key management is the mainproblem in wireless sensor networks when concentrated on security. Any key man-agement scheme proposed should have authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, flex-ibility and scalability. The key management scheme should be scalable to increasein sensor nodes substantially and also its dynamic nature. Asymmetric key manage-ment strategies are not suitable for wireless sensor networks as it operate on limitedbattery life. In the proposed system, key management is provided for privacy andsimultaneously validated for security measures. System performance improves inthe improved key management scheme by positioning the new node and forming thehead for multi-cluster to replace the failed relay nodes. The private key, the multi-cluster key, the primary key, and the structure key are used to encrypt every messagepassed within the improved key management scheme. The improved key manage-ment scheme acquires results on 4–5 % improved security level with lesser executiontime and communication energy consumption. A variety of numerical parameters arecomputed using ns2 simulator on existing key management schemes. The improvedkey management scheme is highly realistic because it is intended to incorporaterouting layer and security protocol without sacrificing energy.

D. Satish kumarNehru Institute of Technology, Coimbatore, Indiae-mail: satishcoimbatore@yahoo.co.in

N. NagarajanCoimbatore Institute of Engineering and Technology, Coimbatore, Indiae-mail: swekalnag@gmail.com

A. T. Azar (B)

Faculty of Computers and Information, Benha University, Benha, Egypte-mail: ahmad.azar@fci.bu.edu.eg

A. E. Hassanien et al. (eds.), Bio-inspiring Cyber Security and Cloud Services: 249Trends and Innovations, Intelligent Systems Reference Library 70,DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-43616-5_10, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

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10.1 Introduction

More recently, a pattern shift occurred from traditional macro sensors to themicro-sensors used in Wireless Sensor Relay Networks. A Wireless relay networkis comprised of wireless sensor modules, called nodes [1–3]. Each relay node ismade up of a few key components such as a micro-sensor to decide the preferredevent; a low-cost application-specific microprocessor; memory to store information;a battery; and a transceiver for communication between the node and the rest of thenetwork.

Due to the nature of wireless communication, data is available in the air forany third party to acquire. The security feature along with the ad-hoc nature,irregular connectivity, and resource limitations of relay network result in a number ofdesign challenges [4–6]. For example, the accessibility of data to third parties causesnumerous disasters in many military or homeland security applications. Therefore,it is critical to provide privacy and authentication while preventing data informationfrom being compromised. Traditionally, security is provided through public key-based protocols. However, these network topology controls engage great memorybandwidth and composite mechanism.

The incomplete resources of wireless relay network create a category of securityschemes unsuitable for implementation. Thus, security provides the unique featuresand resource limitations of relay network. Currently, very incomplete work has beendone on relay network security. The original work on securing relay network hasan end-to-end transmission, which requires time synchronization among sensors.A significant improvement for achieving broadcast validation of any messages sentfrom the base-station (BS).

One of the common drawbacks of those sensor network security schemes is thatthey do not combine security with energy-efficient hierarchical routing architectures.The wireless sensors only want to account data to the nearby sensors. It causedmuch overhead if construct secure links between any two relay nodes. Classically,to reduce routing overhead a relay network is able to self-organize itself a multi-cluster architecture after sensor deployment. A multi-cluster includes a group ofneighboring nodes where one of the group nodes is selected as Cluster Head (CH).The multi-cluster use parameters such as sensor energy level, mobility, position toform multiple clusters and determine CH. Data is combined by the CH that removesduplicated or redundant information. The aggregations are also be realize by havingnodes closer to the CH process the data coming from nodes further than away througheavesdrop.

NTA process set channel ID for mobile stations, and time taken to accept a newmobile station are mainly focused [7]. The mobile stations, which are in the coveragearea of base station, are given initial preference, and those outside coverage area isallocating channel ID through relay stations. Existing work overlooks the idea thatsecurity scheme should be effortlessly incorporated with the special characteristicsof relay network architecture, especially routing protocols. In particular, most of theexisting relay network security strategies focus only on key management and security

10 An Improved Key Management Scheme with High Security 251

algorithms. For example, all existing keys pre distribution schemes try to establishpair wise keys between each pair of nodes. However, most sensors do not necessitatesetting up a direct protected channel with sensors multiple hops. Since, relay networkuse hop-to-hop communication techniques to achieve long distance transmission.

Most of the traditional sensor network security schemes presently center on end-to-end security issues and ignore relay network topology control details. They donot believe the low energy routing structural design and merely presume the entirenetwork uses tree or flat-based topology. It is necessary and beneficial to considercluster-based communication architecture to reduce key management overhead in asecure relay network.

Proposed INTK incorporate the cluster-based routing architecture and key man-agement in the relay node for enhanced reliability and security. INTK schemeachieves security in relay network topology control with routing procedure.Performance results show that the proposed multi clustering based intensity keying/re-keying scheme significantly saves energy. It is a dynamic, distributed protocolwhere security provides independent of central control. An additional significantfeature of INTK scheme is that it has a robust broadcast, and it recovers even themultiple key losses.

The chapter is organized as follows. Section 10.2 provide the related work.Section 10.3 describes the Incorporated Network Topological control and Key man-agement with a brief algorithm. Section 10.4 demonstrates the ns2 simulator environ-ment. Section 10.5 details the performance with resultant table and graph. Section 10.6provides conclusions about proposed work.

10.2 Related Work

Wireless Sensor network (WSN) routing topology inference is an incomplete pathmeasurement set in a collection cycle due to packet loss in real-world environments[8–12]. It does not handle large-scale of WSN consisting of thousands of nodes [13].The current WSN link loss and delay inference schemes are not extended to dealwith realistic WSN under dynamic routing. Multi-channel interface network codingthat is based on the combination of a new concept of coded-overhearing and codingaware channel assignment but fails in arbitrary network topologies and new routingalgorithms matched to the proposed network-coding scheme [14]. It does not takeinto account traffic patterns, directions and distributed channel assignments.

The problem of deploying the minimum sensors on grid points construct a con-nected wireless sensor network able to fully cover critical square grids, termedCRITICALSQUARE-GRID COVERAGE [15]. Polynomial-time distributed algo-rithm for maximizing the lifetime of the network does not require knowledge ofthe location’s nodes or directional information, which is difficult to obtain in sensornetworks. It employs disk sensing and communication models [16].

Distributed energy optimization method for objective tracking application on thesensor deployment considers only non-practical environment and are not a more

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energy-efficient communication framework [17]. Routing strategy tries to accountfor link stability and for minimum drain rate energy consumption in order to verifythe correctness of the bio objective optimization named Link-stAbility and Energyaware Routing protocols (LAER) but fails in providing security [18].

Localized Power Efficient Data Aggregation Protocols (L-PEDAP) are based ontopologies, such as LMST and RNG, that approximate minimum spanning tree andcompetently computed using only position or distance information of one-hop neigh-bors [19]. The actual routing tree is constructing over these topologies. Each topologyand parent selection strategy are compared in the study of [19] and it was concludedthat the best among them is the shortest path strategy over LMST structure.

Yuea et al. [20] proposed an energy efficient and balanced cluster-based dataaggregation algorithm (EEBCDA). The results of simulation show that EEBCDAcan remarkably enhance energy efficiency, balance energy dissipation and prolongnetwork lifetime.

Ant colony algorithms called DAACA for data aggregation consists of three phasesnamely initialization, packet’s transmissions and operations on pheromones. In thetransmission phase, each node estimates the outstanding energy and the quantity ofpheromones of neighbor nodes to calculate the probabilities for vigorously selectingthe next hop. After certain rounds of transmissions, the pheromone’s adjustmentsare performed, which take the compensation of both global and local merits forevaporating or depositing pheromones [21].

Chao and Hsiao [22] proposed a structure-free and energy-balanced data aggrega-tion protocol, SFEB. SFEB features both efficient data gathering and balanced energyconsumption, which results from its two-phase aggregation process and the dynamicaggregator selection mechanism. The simulation and real system implementationresults verify the superiority of the proposed mechanism.

Wireless sensor networks are usually deployed in remote and hostile environ-ments to transmit sensitive information, sensor nodes are prone to node compromiseattacks and security issues such as data privacy and reliability but data aggregationdoes not take place in dynamic environments and does not perform a source codingbased secure data aggregation [23]. Hua and Yum [24] adopt a model to integrate dataaggregation with the underlying routing scheme and present a smoothing approxima-tion function for the optimization problem. The distributed algorithm can convergeto the optimal value efficiently under all network configurations.

Sicari et al. [25] presented an approach for dynamic secure end-to-end data aggre-gation with privacy function, named DyDAP. It has been designed starting from aUML model that encompasses the most important building blocks of a privacy-awareWSN, including aggregation policies. The results showed that DyDAP avoids net-work congestion and therefore improves WSN estimation accuracy while, at the sametime, guaranteeing anonymity and data integrity.

Transmission power between nodes cast a QoS metrics as multi objective prob-lem and operates with any Medium Access control (MAC) protocol. It employsan acknowledgment (ACK) mechanism [26]. Wireless Body Sensor Network con-straints, which show the useless of WSN security mechanisms, necessitate an originalsolution to obtain into explanation the performance of the key biometrics so that their

10 An Improved Key Management Scheme with High Security 253

Fig. 10.1 Processing Flow ofINTK Scheme Relay network Relay Nodes

Network TopologyControl

Key Management

Multi Clustered basedTopology Control

Multiple IntensityKeying

Security Featureachieved

use gives a very important impact for the level of security [27]. The implementationintervenes finally to test the efficiency of mechanism in the wireless body sensornetworks.

Secure neighbor discovery protocol, SEDINE, for static multihop wireless net-works fails in establishing false routes by possibly launching a wormhole attack. Itdoes not consider attacks that prevent two neighboring nodes from becoming neigh-bors [28]. To overcome all the above issues developed a scheme to incorporate thenetwork topology control and key management in wireless relay network.

10.3 INTK Scheme

Proposed Incorporated Network Topological control and Key management (INTK)is designed to be robust and secure. These changes in network topology controlsimplify the routing of messages within the relay network. In Fig. 10.1 below, intendto describe security features in the relay network.

The relay network refers to a broad class of network topology commonly usedin wireless sensor networks, where the source and destination are interconnected bymeans of some interrelated nodes. In such a relay network, the source and destinationcannot communicate to each other directly because the distance between the sourceand destination is greater than the transmission range of both of them, hence theneed for intermediate nodes to relay in INTK Scheme. Proposed System in the relaynetwork as shown in Fig. 10.1 incorporates the network topology control and themanaging the key in a single system to further improve the security feature.

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As relay nodes fail from lack of energy, system performance improves in theINTK by positioning the new node and forming the head for multi-cluster to replacethe failed relay nodes. Node loss and the exploitation of extra nodes result in aconstantly changing network topology control. The private key, the multi-cluster key,the primary key, and the structure key are used to encrypt every message passed withinthe INTK scheme. The following expressions depict the key generation principle inINTK scheme,

Ip = funcuni base (PANC(y)) (10.1)

The above equation generates the private key. All keys within the INTK scheme arecomputed through uni base hash functions and a Pseudo Arbitrary Number Creator(PANC). PANC is used to generate a number for the desired key length. A uni basehash function is then applied to this number in order to generate the key. Expressionfor generating the multi-cluster key is shown in Eq. (10.2),

IMC = funcuni base (PANC(y)) (10.2)

Expression for generating the refreshed multi-cluster key is shown in Eq. (10.3)

Irefreshed MC = funcuni base(PANC

(IpresentIMC

))(10.3)

Expression for generating structure keys is,

IStructure = funcuni base (PANC(y)) (10.4)

Expression for generating refreshed Structure keys is,

Irefreshed Structure = funcuni base(PANC

(IpresentIStructure

))(10.5)

In the case of refreshing a present key, the present key is used in place of thegenerated number, and the hash function is applied to the present key to generatea new key in INTK scheme. The personal keys are generated prior to deploymentand are stored within the memory. Multiple keys are important in the INTK Schemebecause they make a compromise exceptionally difficult and provide two levels ofvalidation. Not only must a compromised node have knowledge of three differentkeys (i.e. private key, multi-cluster key and structure key), but also know exactlywhen to use them. Also, because of different keys and message sizes, it is extremelydifficult to decipher the different portions of the message.

INTK scheme uses two keys to provide privacy and validation at every step in thenetwork. All routing information of any message passed within is encrypted withthe structure key while the data portion is encrypted by the structure key and themulti-cluster key (MC), or the private key of the relay node. Therefore, if a node islacking of the structure key, no information is sent or received. This provides first-level validation of the relay node. The data portion of all messages within is encrypted

10 An Improved Key Management Scheme with High Security 255

Fig. 10.2 Validation processusing structure key Relay Network Relay Nodes

Private Key and Primary

Structure Key (Validate)

Base Station (BS)

with different kinds of keys. Correspondingly, a relay node needs to have informationof network topology control and understand network functionality in order to use thecorrect key for decrypting the information portion. It finally, provides second levelvalidation of the relay node.

10.3.1 Initial INTK Setup Process

The initial structure setup of INTK consists of three phases namely the validationphase, multi cluster organization phase, and network topology route control phase.Each of these structure setup phases builds upon the preceding phase and completedbefore the following phase commenced. A detailed description of each phase isdescribed in the following sections.

10.3.1.1 Validation Phase

Every relay node participates in the INTK Scheme must be validated. A node isvalidated by having the latest structure key. In order to get the latest structure key,a node sends a request to the base Station (BS) in the relay network, encrypted withthat node’s private key and the primary key. The BS knows that the node is authenticbecause the relay node has the personal key associated with its node ID. The BSreplies to the node with the latest structure key, encrypted by the primary key and theprivate key of the requesting node. A diagram depicting an overview of the validationphase is shown in Fig. 10.2.

The node receives and decrypts the system key, and attempts to join a multi-cluster. During the primary structure setup phase, some nodes are selected as ClusterHead (CH) based on the load-balanced. When initially requesting the latest structurekey, CH validates themselves in the same fashion as relay nodes through their privatekey and the primary key. A CH needs to request a multi-cluster key which used it tosecurely organize a cluster among neighboring sensors. Cluster Head (CH) receivedboth the latest structure key and a multi-cluster key from the BS in reply to theirvalidation request.

After this initial validation, and for the rest of its lifetime, a relay node continuouslyreceives and decrypts the latest structure key. All relay nodes in an INTK scheme are

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continuously and periodically validated and achieved through the periodic refreshingof the structure key.

funcuni base(PANC

(IpresentIStructure

)) = Irefreshed Structure (10.6)

The structure key is broadcast three times in order to reduce the effects of wirelesssensor errors and the resulting chances of a relay node failing to validate. Any messagewhose topology routing is not encrypted with the most recent structure key is ignoredand not ACKed in INTK scheme. Therefore, a relay node will be totally ignored bythe rest of the INTK scheme if the node does not have the latest structure key.It guarantees that a node tampered by the enemy does not have the latest systemkey when it attempts to rejoin the relay network. The relay node cannot attempt torejoin the INTK scheme, because each private key used once to acquire the lateststructure key.

10.3.1.2 Multi-Cluster Organization Phase

INTK scheme multi-cluster organization phase sets up the network topology con-trol in the course of creating multiple clusters, which incorporate the packets withenhanced security. Once a Cluster Head (CH) is selected and validated it broadcastsinformation, encrypted with the latest structure key. Information contains the clusterID number, and the multi-cluster key. Relay Nodes pay attention to this informationand record their Received Signal Strength (RSS). The strongest recorded RSS islinked with the adjacent CH, and the relay node sends a multi-cluster joined messageto this CH encrypted with the multi-cluster key. The multi-cluster key is receivedthrough the cluster information.

As multi-cluster joining requests are received, the CH adds those relay nodes toits multi-cluster member registry. The CH keeps a counter who is reset whenever arelay node joins its cluster in INTK scheme. When the counter expires, the CH sendsa multi-cluster organization report to the BS, encrypted with the structure key. Themulti-cluster organization report is complete with the multi-cluster ID, the CH ID,the present multi-cluster key, and the multi-cluster member registry.

The multi-cluster member registry is a list of all relay nodes within a given cluster.The BS keeps track of network topology control throughout the multi-cluster memberregistry chart in each CH. A change in the network topology control of a multi-cluster;an innovative multi-cluster organization account is send to the BS. This knowledgeis used in the event of CH concession in order to re-organize the multi-cluster.

10.3.1.3 Network Topology Route Control Phase

The phase of network topology route control is responsible for setting up thecommunication routes for inter multi-cluster and intra multi-cluster routing. Aftermulti-clusters are organized in INTK scheme, the CH sends its principal multi-cluster

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organization description and locates a topology route to the BS. In precise, if the BS isnot one of its neighbors, the CH which transmits a Route Request (RREQ) message.A neighbor is defined to be a relay node that’s RSS is above a definite threshold, andevery hop of route must take place between neighbors.

All routing messages are transmitted to neighbor CH in a multi cluster way, and CHremains with the series number of each message. A CH receives a request message; itchecks to see if the request destination is one of its neighbors in the relay network. Ifthe current recipient is NOT a neighbor of the requested destination, then it forwardsthe RREQ to all of its neighbors through a broadcast encrypted with the structurekey. It appends its own relay node ID to the topology route contained within therequest before forwarding the message. The receiving relay node is the destinationof the RREQ, and then it creates a Route Reply (RREP) message containing thewhole topology route from source to destination.

Only the first received RREQ is replied to an all following RREQ messages withthe same series number are ignored. In the event that the request is planned for oneof the neighbors of the current recipient, the modified RREQ is promoted only to thedestination. The topology route control process in INTK scheme is used for both CHto BS routing, and for node to CH routing within a multi-cluster. Similarly, requestand reply messages are encrypted with the structure key allowing the relay nodesand CH to secure on network topology routing information. It allows them to fill intheir own routing chart without sending additional RREQ messages.

10.3.2 INTK Structure Operation Algorithm

There are three basic steps such as validation phase, multi cluster organization phase,and network topology route control phase. The procedure of INTK algorithm is asfollows.

Input: Get sample no of relay nodes to be optimized in WSNStep 1: Initialize, the value of i= transmit structure key, multi-cluster,Ip, IMC , Irefreshed MC , Irefreshed Structure, BS, CH, Cluster ID number, and MC key.

// Validation loopStep 2: For (i<=3)Step 3: Received packet validated through latest Structure Key.Step 4: Periodic refreshment of structure Key

Irefreshed Structure = funcuni base(PANC

(IpresentIStructure

))

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Step 5: If (latest structure key)Step 6: Relay node validated.Step 7: Else, terminates the loop.//Multi-Cluster loopStep 8: Next generation of relay node selects the CH.Step 9: Encrypts IStructure, adds to MC member registry.Step 10: Tracks network topology, BS re-organize the MC Irefreshed MCfor security//Topology Route Control loopStep 11: Establish Topology RouteStep 12: RREQ send to neighbors with IStructure keyStep 13: CH sends the Irefreshed MC with series numberStep 14: Locate the topology route to BS, RREP sent secure (i.e.) privacyinformation.Output: Security enhanced in relay node with minimal energy consump-tion in relay network.

The above algorithm during the initial structure setup phase, INTK schemeachieves authentication through each relay node using its private key and primarykey. Once the initial system setup phase has completed, INTK validates the entirestructure by periodically refreshing the structure key. In INTK, the structure key isbroadcast three times in rapid succession to the relay network at the beginning stage.A CH private key must be used in order to get the structure key for the first time. Theglobal validation is achieved by periodically refreshing the structure key.

A CH is compromised and detected; a removal message is broadcast to the system.The BS generates a re-organization message Irefreshed MC , in response to this removalmessage, and sends it to the corresponding relay nodes as shown. Similar to theabove topology control procedure, INTK achieves privacy through the use of keysand encryption scheme. In situations when INTK uses two different keys to encrypta message, the relay node needs to have knowledge of both types of keys and theorder to use them, which enhances the privacy and node identity.

10.3.3 INTK Security Feature

INTK is innovative in its use of multiple keys for encrypt the message. It makes thenode compromise and key compromise extremely difficult. To intercept a message,not only must the right keys be known, but it must also be known in which orderto apply them to a given message. The comprehensive encryption and dual key’sscheme converse the system responds to compromised nodes in INTK Scheme.

The INTK scheme in rely network utilizes multiple keys to achieve security,validation, and privacy. Due to the limitations of sensor nodes, all keys within INTK

10 An Improved Key Management Scheme with High Security 259

are symmetric. The symmetric keys are simpler, smaller, and computationally lessrigorous than asymmetric keys. INTK uses three main keys namely the structurekey, the private key and the multi-cluster key. The system key is used for globalvalidation purposes and is periodically refreshed. The private key is used for initialnode validation during the structure setup phase. The multi cluster key is used forsecurity and used to encrypt the information portions of all messages exchangedwithin the cluster on the relay network.

Encryption in INTK Scheme is achieved through uni-base hash functions, whichhave security features such as computational simplicity, low memory and resourceoverhead. The choice of encryption in INTK scheme is dependent on the applicationand the network environment. The uni-base transformation hash function imple-mented in INTK utilizes a numerical value that allows it to change base. Then, adecimal and octal form of key value is transformed into a hexadecimal key to formhash value.

10.4 Simulation Environment

Simulations are used to analyze and evaluate the performance of the INTK scheme. Ituses the network simulator named NS2 to simulate the method. A comparative studybetween the behaviors of the relay network is examined. The well known NS2 simu-lation tool is used. It is an isolated event network simulator for networking research.NS2 provides a complete development environment for performance evaluation ofcommunication networks and distributed systems. It provides a substantial supportto simulate the group of protocols.

To verify the incorporated network topology and key management algorithm, theresults are compared with existing Network Topology Acquisition (NTA) processesfor non transparent mode relay networks. RWM use and standard of the total numberof mail sent or received per node as calculated of the communication requirements,and measure resiliency by counting the number of times must run the protocol inorder to detect a single node replication.

The wireless relay nodes were arranged randomly in the field 500 m× 500 m in thesensor fields. The time for transmitting such a packet is considered, and relay nodeswere also arranged. The relay nodes perform the simulation with 600 simulationseconds, fixed a pause time of 30 simulation seconds and a minimum moving speedof 1 m/s of each node.

In the Random Way Point (RWM) model, each relay node shifted to an errati-cally chosen location with a arbitrarily selected speed between a predefined smallestamount and highest speed. It assumes the normal unit disc bidirectional commu-nication replica and adjusts the message range, so that each relay node will haveroughly 60 neighbors on average. The purpose of the study investigates the behaviorof communication energy, security level, and execution time.

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Table 10.1 Node density versus communication energy

Node density Communication energy (J)(nodes/10 m2) NTA process INTK scheme

5 5.9 4.110 10.1 8.715 11.3 9.520 20.5 16.225 25.3 21.830 28.1 24.535 31.2 25.8

10.5 Results and Discussion

Incorporated Network Topological control and Key management (INTK) schemeis compared with the existing Network Topology Acquisition (NTA) processes fornon transparent mode relay networks in measuring the communication energy con-sumption, security level and execution time. Communication energy consumption isdefined as the amount of energy consumed to transfer the information from sourcerelay node to destination relay node in the wireless relay network. It is measured interms of joules (J).

Communication Energy Consumption = Ts2

where, ‘T’=Total number of information and ‘s’ represents the speed of transferringeffect of data in relay node.

The security is defined as the amount of security given for the fulfillment of anobligation (i.e.) the information encrypted and decrypted using INTK scheme in thewireless relay network. It is measured in terms of percentage (%).

Execution time is when a series is running. That is, when start a series running,it is the runtime for that series. The execution time is defined as the time taken totransfer the data from the source relay node to destination relay node in the relaynetwork. It is measured in terms of milliseconds (ms).

Execution Time = RREQtime − RREPtime (10.7)

Table 10.1 describes the communication energy consumption based on the nodedensity and it is illustrated in Fig. 10.3. The data portion of all messages within isencrypted with different multi-cluster keys. Correspondingly, a relay node needs tohave information of network topology control and understand network functionalityin order to use the correct key for decrypting the information portion by reducing thecommunication energy consumption. The INTK scheme energy used to communicateare 5–10 % lesser when compared with the NTA process.

The security level of NTA process and INTK schemes are examined, and theoutput obtained in terms of percentage (%) as shown in Table 10.2 and Fig. 10.4.

10 An Improved Key Management Scheme with High Security 261

Fig. 10.3 Node density versus communication energy

Table 10.2 Technique versus security

Technique Security level (%)

INTK scheme 88.8NTA process 84.3

Fig. 10.4 Technique versus security

INTK Scheme achieved security level of 88 % while NTA process achieved 84.3 %security level. The results demonstrated that the multi cluster key used for securityand is used to encrypt the information portions of all messages exchanged withinthe cluster on the relay network. The encrypted message is decrypted on other sides,which will definitely improve the security of INTK scheme to 4.5 % when comparedwith the NTA process.

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Table 10.3 Node density versus communication energy

No. of nodes Execution time (ms)NTA process INTK scheme

10 376 36020 377 36230 397 38340 481 46050 482 46960 483 471

Fig. 10.5 No. of nodes versus execution time

Table 10.3 describes the execution time based on the average nodes involved inthe processing and is illustrated graphically in Fig. 10.5. The INTK scheme is lesserthan NTA scheme in execution time by 2–5 % because Cluster Head (CH) is selectedand validated. The broadcast’s information, encrypted with the latest structure keyto reduce execution time in the proposed system when compared with the existingNTA process. Therefore, a relay node will be totally ignored by the rest of the INTKscheme if the node does not have the latest structure key.

Finally, relay nodes are tiny sensors; the security protocols to have low energyconsumption for communication. Even a single relay node misses the latest structurekey, it no longer function in the structure since its topology routing header cannotbe decrypted. The relay node is ignored and eventually removed by the structure, ifnot validated, and unable to reenter the INTK relay network scheme. Relay nodesthat miss the structure key due to an enemy trying to infiltrate the relay network byphysically compromising the relay node will be kept out of the NTK relay networkscheme in the same manner.

10 An Improved Key Management Scheme with High Security 263

10.6 Conclusion

Present solutions to the security issue in the relay network were developed withvalidation and privacy in mind using the Incorporated Network Topological controland Key management scheme. Validation for security measure is offered in relaynodes and simultaneously, Key management is provided for privacy. INTK schemeencompasses the incorporation of security and routing, active security, robustre-keying, low complexity and the multiple intensities of encrypt features in relaynetworks. It is far from optimal because network topology routing and securities areclosely associated. Multi cluster based topology control through an intensity keyingconsumes lesser communication energy due to its multi cluster key executive. INTKis highly realistic because it is intended to incorporate routing layer and securityprotocol without sacrificing energy. A variety of numerical parameters are com-puted using ns2 simulator on INTK Scheme acquires 4.5 % improved security levelwith lesser execution time and minimal communication energy consumption. Relaynetwork provides the effective routing and security solution.

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