Integrative Thinking, Synthesis, and Creativity in InterdisciplinaryStudies

Sill, David J.

The Journal of General Education, Volume 50, Number 4, 2001,pp. 288-311 (Article)

Published by Penn State University PressDOI: 10.1353/jge.2001.0032

For additional information about this article

Access Provided by University Of Denver at 05/06/11 5:05PM GMT

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jge/summary/v050/50.4sill.html

JGE: THE JOURNAL OF GENERAL EDUCATION, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2001.Copyright © 2001 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.

INTEGRATIVE THINKING, SYNTHESIS, ANDCREATIVITY IN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES

David J. Sill (1996). Vol. 45, No. 2, 129–151.

I. Statement of the Problem: The Miracle Happens Here

One of the stated goals shared by interdisciplinary studies andliberal education in general is the development of students’ inte-grative thinking skills, including the skill of synthesis. Elsewherein this issue, Richards explores the limitations and possibilities ofdisciplinary synthesis within interdisciplinary studies. Using theword “synthesis,” in a different sense, this article concentrates onsynthesis as an integrative thinking skill. While the developmentof students’ integrative thinking skills may be valued in under-graduate education, at the same time the means of teaching inte-grative thinking are unclear and mysterious.

There is a cartoon that shows two scientists or engineers whohave filled a chalkboard with mathematical symbols forming theshape of an hourglass turned on its side. The left and right sides ofthe board are covered from top to bottom with formulae and num-bers. The scrawls on the chalkboard narrow from both sides to anisthmus where there is the note: “And a miracle happens here.”The answer as to how interdisciplinary studies teaches integrativethought is like that cartoon. While we trust that, with the properenvironment, students will synthesize information, the naggingdoubt remains that it will only happen if there is a miracle be-cause much of the process of teaching integrative thought remainshidden in mystery. This is due, at least in part, to the general lackof a model for interdisciplinary thinking, as pointed out by St.Germain (1993). This paper develops a model for integrative think-ing by using existing models for creativity, an approach suggestedby Klein (1990) when stating that future tasks for understandinginterdisciplinarity include “exploring the connections among cre-

PERSPECTIVES 289

ativity, problem solving, and the interdisciplinary process” (p.196).

Toward that end, this paper begins by exploring definitions ofinterdisciplinarity and creativity; it then develops a model of cre-ativity that serves as a model for synthesis and integrative thought,discusses its implications for interdisciplinary studies, and con-cludes by identifying areas for further work. Throughout this pa-per, the terms synthesis, integrative thought, and creativity willbe considered as slightly different aspects of the same thoughtprocess, and in some contexts the terms will be considered syn-onymous. This equivalency is valid only if we consider synthesisas a process, not a product, and if we limit the discussion to thetype of creativity the involves synthesis in thought.

II. Interdisciplinary Studies Defined

Before developing a creativity model for integrative and interdis-ciplinary thinking, we must first wrestle with definitions ofinterdisciplinarity, integrative studies, and interdisciplinary stud-ies (terms which we will consider synonymous). Interdisciplinarystudies holds multiple meanings, and those working in the fielddisagree among themselves over what they mean by it. The prob-lem is, first, that the meanings differ depending on whether thereference is to programs, courses, research areas, modes of teach-ing and learning, or administrative structures. Then, within eachof those areas, there is disagreement regarding what is and whatis not included in the definition. Klein (1990) identifies four sepa-rate varieties of definitions for interdisciplinarity: (1) by examplethrough the form that it takes, (2) by motivation examining why ittakes place, (3) by principles of interaction concerning how disci-plines interact, and (4) by hierarchical terminology. While con-centrating on the modes of teaching and learning within courses,this paper will define interdisciplinary studies based on the prin-ciples of disciplinary interaction, Klein’s third variety of defini-tion, by looking at the dynamics between disciplines ininterdisciplinary studies. As will be developed in the creativity

SILL290

model for integrative thought, it is the tension between interact-ing, discrete disciplines that provides the impetus for synthesis.

There is considerable range in interdisciplinary dynamics forcourses, programs, and research areas, some of which will falloutside the working definition assumed for here. For example,one type of program that is labeled interdisciplinary exists undersuch headings as Women’s Studies, Environmental Studies, andAmerican Studies. A cursory review of such programs reveals thatmost consist of collections of courses that are organized aroundcommon themes but which lack integration, relying instead on atag team approach to the material. The themes may relate to theprogram and course titles but disciplinary interconnections basedon those themes generally occur only in the minds of the students,frequently without guidance. Hausman (1979), and Newell andGreen (11982) define this type of program as multidisciplinaryrather than interdisciplinary. While these programs involve sub-ject matter that is unconstrained by disciplinary boundaries, theylack a key interdisciplinary element, one that we will discuss atsome length throughout this paper, the element of integration.

A second type of interdisciplinary program exists under head-ings such as biochemistry or biophysics. Under closer examina-tion we find that, while the programs may have interdisciplinaryroots, they no longer function in interdisciplinary ways. Rather,they function as newly formed disciplines. Sometime during theevolution of new disciplines, the task of integration overpowersthe need to guard the integrity of the originating disciplines, aprocess that Hausman (1979) call “transdisciplinarity.” At onepoint in the evolution of the transdiscipline, then, integration me-diates the confrontation between originating disciplines, but, oncecomplete, a new discipline emerges. Richards (1996) refers to theprocess whereby the disciplines themselves are altered or reformedas strong synthesis.

The two extremes above lie on the ends of a continuum asconstructed by Paxson (1994). In classifying degrees of inter-disciplinarity, Paxson basis his continuum in part on increasingamounts of disciplinary integration. At one end there is a tag teamapproach with no direct integration, as in the fist type of programdiscussed, and at the other there is the creation of a new disci-

PERSPECTIVES 291

pline with integration complete, as in the second. While the ex-amples discussed above are programs, the same degrees of disci-plinary and interdisciplinary structure can typify researchinitiatives and individual courses.

In this study, we will focus at the point where two or moredisciplines integrate methods and insights but where the disci-plines remain intact, creating a tension between separate ways ofknowing. Neither of the extremes represents the type ofinterdisciplinarity that teaches nor necessarily encourages inte-grative thought because neither a tag team approach nor a newlyformed discipline requires the students to integrate or synthesizematerial in their own thinking. Drawing from the Newell and Green(1982), interdisciplinary studies is defined here as “inquiries whichcritically draw upon two or more disciplines and which leads toan integration of disciplinary insights” (p. 24). This integration ofdisciplinary insights is what Richards (1996) terms “weak” or “in-strumental” synthesis, in which the disciplines dynamically inter-act through interdisciplinary connections, but the disciplinesthemselves remain unchanged.

Tension between the disciplines, a key element in weak syn-thesis, is essential in order to reach integrative thought. E. M.Forster once stated, “Spoon feeding in the long run teaches usnothing but the shape of the spoon” (1951/1993). By engagingthe student in the complexities of the material, interdisciplinarystudy attempts to go beyond spoon feeding so that the studentlearns not only the shape of the spoon but the shape and nature ofthought as well.

One of the strengths of interdisciplinary studies sits preciselyat this point—the ability to teach higher order thinking skills. Thisbecomes obvious when we look at the expected outcomes of in-terdisciplinary studies. Newell (1993) identifies the positive out-comes of interdisciplinary courses to include, among other things,the development of tolerance and respect, an inquisitive attitude,basic thinking skills such as writing and critical thinking, and thoseexpectations that we have for a liberal education in general. Hefurther points to specific educational outcomes directly related tothe process of integrating disciplines within interdisciplinary stud-ies courses and programs:

SILL292

Other educational outcomes seem a product of the interdis-ciplinary process itself: an appreciation of, even seeking out,perspectives other than one’s own; the ability to evaluate thetestimony of experts; tolerance of, even a preference for,ambiguity; more sensitivity to ethical issues; the ability tosynthesize or integrate; enlarged perspectives or horizons;more creative, original, or unconventional thinking; morehumility or listening skills; and sensitivity to disciplinary,political, or religious bias. (p. 18)

These outcomes of interdisciplinary studies involve higherorder thinking skills such as integration, creativity, and evalua-tion. While these are all skills that we hope a liberal educationwill instill in students, the interdisciplinary studies course pro-vides an opportunity for us to guide the students in developingthose skills rather than relying on chance for the students to fig-ure out higher order thinking skills on their own.

Understanding how we are to go about reaching the outcomesdescribed above is somewhat less clear than the outcomes them-selves, partially because that is where the miracle happens. Hursh,Haas, and Moore (1983) develop an interdisciplinary design forgeneral education that, when applied to interdisciplinary studiesof all kinds, provides a framework for understanding the natureof interdisciplinary learning in which the miracle begins to beexplained. This design, which grows from the educational theo-ries of Dewey, Piaget, and Perry, stresses “generic skills” of criti-cal thinking. The design proposes improving general educationthrough “the introduction of multiple perspectives upon specificissues in order to exercise, among other things, skills of compari-son, contrast, analysis, and above all, synthesis” (pp. 43–44).Through a series of strategies, such as stressing the provisionalbasis of knowledge, generating disequilibrium through disagree-ments between disciplinary insights, and actively engaging thestudents, the design provides a mechanism for learning higherorder cognitive skills. The model that will be developed in Sec-tion IV for understanding integrative thought matches up quitewell with this design for interdisciplinary teaching and learning.

PERSPECTIVES 293

There are both direct and indirect connections between inte-grative thought and creativity, with a general equating of integra-tive and creative thought throughout the interdisciplinarityliterature. Objectives for interdisciplinary studies such as the in-tegration of knowledge, freedom of inquiry, innovation (Kavaloski,1979), and synthetic thinking (Hursh et al., 1983; Newell & Green,1982) involve aspects of creative thinking skills. Integrativethought consists of taking disconnected material or ideas and syn-thesizing them into something new, a task that is certainly a formof creativity. While we may be unclear about how to model inte-grative thought, the literature on creative thinking and on teach-ing creativity provides several powerful models. The modelselected for development in this article, Koestler’s bisociation(1964), is closely congruent to the type of integrated thought en-couraged by interdisciplinary studies.

III. Definitions of Creativity

Prior to developing a model of creative and integrative thought, itis important to provide a working definition of creativity. Just asin defining interdisciplinarity, defining creativity is a difficultenterprise, not so much because there is difficulty in identifyingcreativity when we see it, as because there is so much variance inwhat we mean by creativity. Also, as with interdisciplinarity, fur-ther confusion arises from the differing aspects of creativity thatcan be emphasized and valued in the definition.

Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi (1964) identify three distinctapproaches to defining creativity that rely on three different as-pects of creativity: (1) original production, (2) cognitive-problemsolving, and (3) subjective experience. Original production refersto the ability to produce something new, a process that involvescoming up with a novel idea, figuring out how to make it work,and getting it done. This way of defining creativity applies equallyto art, to business, and to science, and is measured through evalu-ation of the creative products. This approach can apply to inter-disciplinary studies and the kind of creativity that corresponds tointegrative thought if we consider the intended product for inter-

SILL294

disciplinary studies to be cognitive rather than physical. The sec-ond approach, defining creativity as a cognitive problem-solvingprocess, has yielded the greatest volume of creativity tools (tech-niques for generating creative outcomes) because it transfers sowell to the business world. Through trial, error, thought, and dis-cussion, interdisciplinarians have learned that problem-basedcourses provide some of the best results in encouraging integra-tive thought (Newell, 1994; Newell & Green, 1982). The thirdapproach, subjective experience, defines a process that cannot be“caught by a test or measured by a process” (Getzels et al., 1964,p. 7). For that reason, it is of little interest to experimentalists, butbecause it reveals aspects of thought, it is of maximum interest tohumanists and clinical psychologists (pp. 3–7). While the follow-ing discussion draws on all three of the above approaches, thelargest part of the model to be developed in section IV falls withinthe third approach, particularly that based on the work of Arieti(1976), Csikszentmihalyi (1993), Koestler (1964), May (1975),and Storr (1988).

Most, if not all, definitions of creativity involve the appear-ance of something new—that is, the creation of something. Stein(1974) introduces the term, “useful novelty,” and Gardner (1993)points out that usefulness implies timeliness. Amabile (1983),Amabile and Tight (1993), and Ray and Myers (1986), identifycreativity as heuristic rather than algorithmic. Heuristic thinkingrelies on rules of thumb or incomplete guidelines to drive learn-ing and discovery whereas algorithmic thinking uses mechanicalsituation (Ray & Myers, 1986, p. 4). In heuristic thinking, thereare multiple right answers, in algorithmic only one.

One of the problems with analyzing creativity is that the cre-ative act appears obvious in hindsight. After all, one requirementof creativity is that the creative act must fit logically with whatwe know or it will be considered bizarre rather than creative. Thisis, at least in part, what Stern (1974) means by useful. But whilethere is logic in hindsight, there is no direct logical progression inthe development or discovery of the creative act in the first place.Rather, creativity relies on non-logical and non-linear thoughtprocesses, filled with digressions and diversions (for a full dis-cussion, see de Bono 1969 and Koestler 1964).

PERSPECTIVES 295

Creativity is a messy, complex process, and therefore diffi-cult to confine within a simple, precise definition. By its very na-ture, creativity violates the present order in creating new order.Simonton (1993) points out that no single, simple model for cre-ative processes can explain creativity, but that all models reveal apiece of the whole, just as in the fable of the blind men and theelephant. In Simonton’s view, creativity is a complex combina-tion of thought processes, and in keeping with Simonton’s viewthe following model will explore multiple processes with the ideathat they intertwine in complex patterns. At the same time, one ofthe difficulties that we have faced in modeling integrative thoughtis, perhaps, that we have been looking for a simple, precise defi-nition where one cannot exist.

IV. Creativity Model of Integrative Thought

Modeling of any complex phenomenon is necessarily incompleteand imperfect, and any model of creative thought is valid onlywithin a clearly defined range of tasks. Creativity is modeled oneway when looking at the activities of painting and sculpture, an-other when looking at inventing new business enterprises. In thiscase, we will be looking at creativity as a form of synthetic thought,and here is where creativity and integrative thought coincide.

Koestler (1964), whose work provides the starting point, craftsa model of creativity that encompasses both humor and discov-ery. Koestler uses the term “bisociation” to refer to the integra-tive thought that is central to humorous insight, the eureka effect,and artistic creation. Creativity derives from the bisociative think-ing, which in turn derives from the synthesis of independent ma-trices of thought. Such a notion fits quite well with the objectivesof the kind of interdisciplinarity in which students learn integra-tive thought through the simultaneous study of more than one dis-ciplinary approach toward a specific topic. The complete modelfor creative and integrative thought includes a set of interconnectedconcepts that describe the structure of creative thought (bisociationof independent matrices of thought), the subconscious processesthat provide the “miracle” (ripeness, subconscious ideas and im-

SILL296

ages, active imagination, and creative tension), and the temporalprocesses that describe how it comes about (iteration and com-plexity).

Understanding bisociation first requires an understanding ofwhat Koestler (1964) means by matrices of thought. Life andthought, in spite of their complexity and multiple dimensions, bothinvolve thoroughly ordered systems. Koester describes this or-dering in terms of rules of a game which lend to organic life “co-herence, order, and unity-in-variety…” (p. 631). Within the contextof the game, there is an endless variety of possibilities. While thisvariety allows for the subjective experience of freedom of choice,such freedom does not, but itself, lead to creativity. Creativity ismade possible by the ability to break free of the rules themselves.As Koestler puts it:

There is also an overall-rule of the game, which says that norule is absolutely final; that under certain circumstances theymay be altered and combined into a more sophisticatedgames, which provides a higher form of unity and yet in-creased variety; this is called the subject’s creative poten-tial. (p. 631)

This ability to change fundamental order allows us to synthesizea new order. Natural patterning is immensely powerful in that itorganizes complex structures into understandable perceptions, butalso is ultimately confining in that it limits possibilities to exist-ing patterns. Creativity is found in the human ability to move be-yond existing patterns to restructure the patterns themselves, and,as a result, to make a more sophisticated game.

The term, “matrix,” describes organized patterns of thoughtor activity defined by a particular set of rules. A matrix is a coher-ent and stable system which is consistent within the matrix itselfbut which loses its meaning outside of it, whether the matrix isone of thought, social construction, or pattern of activity.

In higher education, the disciplines represent matrices ofthought, each supported by assumptions that are themselves fre-quently invisible and unquestioned. The carefully tended bound-aries between disciplines reinforce the coherence of the matrices

PERSPECTIVES 297

by discriminating disciplinary matrices from those outside thediscipline. Fuller (1993), in arguing that identifying and studyingdisciplinary boundaries can usefully provide insights into the dis-ciplines themselves, states that “disciplinary boundaries providethe structure needed for a variety of functions ranging from theallocation of cognitive authority and material resource to the es-tablishment of reliable access to some extrasocial reality” (p. 126).In this, he points out that disciplines are complex organizations,composed not of a single matrix but of multiple matrices. Someof the matrices involve cognitive functions including disciplinarymethodologies and a body of knowledge, while other matricesinvolve social interactions and professional connections. As a re-sult, by bringing two disciplines together in the study of a singletopic or problem, the bisociative thought in interdisciplinary stud-ies involves the intersection of families of matrices, some cogni-tive and some social.

In Koestler’s conception (1964), there is a clear distinctionbetween associative and bisociative thought. Associative thoughtworks within the confines of a single matrix, and while associa-tive thought may be very complex, “complexity of thought is nomeasure of originality” (p. 652). Bisociative thought works at theintersection of distinctly separate matrices, whether those matri-ces are simple or complex. While Koestler points out that thisdifference is a relative distinguishing criterion rather than abso-lute, he states that “the term ‘bisociation’ is meant to point to theindependent, autonomous character of the matrices which arebrought into contact in the creative act, whereas associative thoughtoperates among members of a single pre-existing matrix” (p. 656).

Koestler (1964) defines all thought as “a multi-dimensionalaffair” (p. 630). By multi-dimensional, he refers both to verticaland horizontal scales, in which he includes degrees of conscious-ness, verbalization, abstraction, and flexibility; motivations; real-istic versus autistic thought; outer versus inner environment;learning versus performing; and routine versus originality (pp.630–631). This is similar to Guilford’s (1968) argument that in-telligence and creativity are abilities composed of multiple fac-tors. For Koestler, as for both Guilford and Simonton (1993),creativity is a complex combination of thought processes.

SILL298

Storr (1988) reinforces Koestler’s argument that bisociativethought is at the core of creativity, and in doing so he further re-lates creativity to the kind of integrative thought that figures promi-nently in interdisciplinary studies. For Storr, creativity is “anactivity that forms new links between formerly disparate entities,the union between opposites described by Jung” (p. 199). Theforming of new links is a particularly important creative part ofthe scientific development of new ideas, “in which a new hypoth-esis reconciles or supersedes ideas which were previously thoughtto be incompatible” (p. 199). Storr uses the development of ideasfrom Kepler, through Galileo to Newton, as an example of justsuch a reconciliation of incompatible ideas. He argues that onlybecause Newton first conceived that gravity functions over vastdistances in the same way that it functions on earth (or in otherwords, gravity could operate on the moon the way it does on anapple) was he able to discover universal laws that reconciled ourobservations of earth-bound objects with the discoveries of Keplerand Galileo regarding the motions of heavenly bodies, two seem-ingly incompatible matrices of thought (p. 199).

Koestler (1964) draws a similar example from science, illus-trating the importance of bisociation to creative thought and dis-covery:

Historically speaking, the frames of reference of magnetismand electricity, of physics and chemistry, of corpuscles andwaves, developed separately and independently, both in theindividual and the collective mind, until the frontiers brokedown. And this breakdown was no caused by establishinggradual, tentative connections between individual membersof the separate matrices, but by the amalgamation of tworealms as wholes, and the integration of the laws of bothrealms into a unified code of greater universality. Multiplediscoveries and priority disputes do not diminish the objec-tive, historical novelty produced by these major bisociativeevents – they merely prove that the time was ripe for thatparticular synthesis. (pp. 657–658)

PERSPECTIVES 299

It is exactly this amalgamation and integration of “two realmsas wholes” that Koestler means by bisociative thought. In this,bisociation provides a powerful model for understanding creativeand integrative thought. Unfortunately, while understandingbisociation gives us a sense of “what happens,” it does not yetgive us an understanding of “how it happens.” With bisociationalone the model is incomplete.

In the preceding passage, Koestler (1964) introduces the con-cept of “ripeness” which he applies to both cultural creativity, asin his own example in which the time was ripe for synthesizingthe concepts of wave and particle motion of light, and individualcreativity, as in Storr’s example in which Newton was ripe forintegrating earthly and celestial phenomena. It is interesting tonote that some of our most creative societies have occurred attimes when societies redefined the understanding of what it meansto be a human being in the cosmos. This is clear in ClassicalGreece, the Renaissance, the transition into the modern era, andthe twentieth century. The ripe society is filled with a fundamen-tal attitude of questioning – the idea that not all answers are known,or, what may be a more powerful driving force in a creative soci-ety, the idea that the current answers to basic questions are inad-equate.

Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi (1964) offer the possibility thatthe most important part of the creative process may not be thecreative product, which in the case of integrative thinking is theintegrated thought itself, but rather may well be the framing, dis-covery, or envisioning of the creative question (p. 125). The ideathat creative societies derive some of their creative energy fromthe emergence of unanswered and unanswerable questions rein-forces the importance of the creative question to generating cre-ative activity. Furthermore, the connection between creative andintegrative thought suggests that creative questions can encour-age integrative thought. In agreement with this, Newell (1994)argues that the most effective strategy for engaging the topic ofan interdisciplinary course is to ask a question that, in the answer-ing, draws upon the insights of more than one discipline – a ques-tion that in unanswerable if confined within a single disciplinebecause it extends beyond disciplinary boundaries.

SILL300

Preceding the moment of discovery must come preparation inorder for the discovery to become ripe. Stein (1974) points outthat creativity is a temporal process that moves through severaloverlapping phases or stages, one of which includes preparation.Edwards (1986), using a stage model of creativity (i.e., that cre-ativity happens as a result of passing through a series of definablestages), identifies five stages in the creative process: (1) First in-sight, (2) Saturation, (3) Incubation, (4) The Ah-Ha! And (5) Veri-fication. The first three of these stages in one way or anothercontribute to the state of ripeness. Without the initial idea or im-petus, without saturation in the ideas, the background, the cul-ture, and the social order, and without time to allow creativity tohappen, creativity cannot occur because all of these are necessar-ily present if the mind is ripe for creativity. Koestler (1964) quotesPasteur: “Chance only favours invention for minds which are pre-pared for discoveries by patient study and persevering efforts” (p.145).

Once the mind is fully prepared, discovery is ready to hap-pen, but it happens of its own accord. It cannot be willed. Theprocess of discovery involves an open irrationality. In examiningdiscovery in the field of mathematics, Koestler (1964) finds thatthere is a paradox between what we think as of the way of math-ematical knowing – logical, objective, and verifiable abstract sym-bols – and the way in which mathematical discovery emerges from“mental processes which are subjective, irrational, and verifiableonly after the event” (p. 147). Koestler uses the concept of think-ing aside, which he draws from Souriau, to explain these underly-ing cognitive processes that may be subjective and irrational, butthat are also essential for discovery to occur. Thinking aside meansallowing the subconscious and the unconscious to work towardsolutions that hare hidden or blocked by language, habit, and thelogic of the conscious mind.

Because creativity draws from the richness of the subcon-scious, the understanding of creativity requires study of thoughtprocesses that lie below or beyond conscious awareness. Getzelsand Csikszentmihalyi (1964) argue that in order to understandcreativity, it is best to begin by examining the depths of “the uniquevalue-and-meaning systems of creative people” (p. 8). In

PERSPECTIVES 301

Csikszentmihalyi’s view (1993), every creative act is a search fortruth, that the “creative product is never random or arbitrary; itmust be true to something deeply sensed or felt inside the person”(p. 62). Integrating insight “emerges from the very depths of hu-man being and human experience,” and understanding creativityrequires exploring deeper psychological processes than those in-volved in other forms of cognition (Getzels et al., p. 8). Hammer(1984) argues that creativity grows from basic emotions (primaryprocess thinking).

On the other hand, the simple existence of subconscious pro-cesses, which everyone has whether they are being creative ornot, is sufficient to ensure creative thought. The subconscious pro-cesses must be of the right type and retrievable into the conscious.Finke, Ward, and Smith (1992) suggest the concept of“preinventive structure” existing in the subconscious as a way ofunderstanding the generation of creative ideas (p. 198).Preinventive structures can be ideas, images, or concepts that haveyet to be tested and that reside in memory or emerge in the imagi-nation. These ideas, images, and concepts provide the raw mate-rial for creative combinations. The preinventive structures thatencourage creative insights tend to be ambiguous, novel, mean-ingful, incongruent, divergent, and contain emergent features (p.199). In line with the definition of creativity, preinventive struc-tures with these characteristics tend to support heuristic rather thanalgorithmic processes.

The mental state of “active imagination,” in Jungian terms, isthe state in which preinventive structures, ideas, and images cansurface and combine spontaneously, in much the same way thatdream images surface and combine, but at the same time beingsufficiently conscious and aware as the preinventive structuresform creative links (Storr, 1988, p. 198). This is the state in whichthe subconscious comes close to the surface. Sometimes, it is atthe time right before or right after sleep when long sought aftersolutions appear to difficult problems. At other times, we find in-sights springing to mind while jogging, driving, drawing, daydreaming, or bathing. The key, according to Koestler (1964), isthe suspension of conscious controls, allowing freedom from habitsand disciplines of thought, a freedom that is necessary for cre-

SILL302

ative leaps across restricting boundaries (p. 169). It is boundarycrossing that makes possible the redefinition of the boundariesthemselves and provides the energy and means for synthesizingnew order of thought.

The implications for the interdisciplinary student are that theintegrative discovery often will occur outside of the class activ-ity, but in order for it to occur the student must engage in thetypes of activity that will encourage and allow active imagina-tion. Along this line of thought, perhaps the value in peripateticteaching has always been in the activity of walking itself.

Many people in looking for ways to teach creativity directtheir focus on freedom, either as freedom to let the subconsciousact, freedom from habits of thought, or both. Unfortunately, therelationship between freedom and creativity is frequently over-played with far too much expected from the breaking down ofinhibitions along. Lack of freedom clearly inhibits creativity, butthe presence of freedom cannot guarantee it because freedom is anecessary but not sufficient condition for creativity.

One reason that freedom is insufficient is that creativity hasits negative side, too—it is not all positive. Koestler (1964) pointsout that any new discovery has both constructive and destructiveaspects:

The re-structuring of mental organization effected by the newdiscovery implies that the creative act has a revolutionary ordestructive side. The paths of history is strewn with its vic-tims: the discarded isms of art, the epicycles and phlogistonsof science. (p. 659)

The destructive aspect of the creative act may include a despoil-ing of previously held beliefs, such as, in the case of interdiscipli-nary studies, the despoiling of the belief in the unquestioned verityof disciplinary knowledge. The revolutionary nature of discov-ery, combined with discovery’s fickle disregard for the status quo,carries with it a sense of danger, of risk.

In light of this risk for all forms of creativity, the questionarises, “Why create?” The corresponding question for interdisci-plinary studies is “Why integrate?” when it is safer and easier to

PERSPECTIVES 303

present artifacts of others’ discoveries. As Koestler (1964) pointsout, our natural thought processes strive to construct order out ofdisorder. To do that, we naturally avoid novelty because order re-quires stability whereas novelty brings about instability. Habitsof the mind are comfortable. As Koestler points out, “the defensemechanisms which protect habits against the intrusion of noveltyaccounts (sic) both for our mental inertia – and mental stability”(p. 216). In this model, the answer to the question, “Why create?”is found in the concept of creative tension, which becomes theengine that drives creativity.

In general, creative tension results from the mind’s need toconstruct order turning in on itself. When two or more orderingsystems (i.e., matrices of thought) contradict or conflict, then themind feels tension until the conflict is resolved through the cre-ation of a new order. Such resolution is an integrating thoughtprocess.

The primary source for creative tension is the condition ofabsurdity, which refers, in this case, to a disjunction or discon-nection between a subject and its meaning. In Koestler’s terms(1964), of course, when he talks of the basis of creativity, discov-ery, and humor being the intersection of matrices of thought, theabsurdity derives from the meaning from one matrix being ap-plied within the context of another. Something that makes perfectsense in one mental matrix makes no sense at all when it is putinto a second. Making a subject or an idea “problematic” is mak-ing it absurd, that is, taking an idea or ideas to the point wherethey no longer make sense. The technique of making the subjectproblematic can in turn provide the necessary creative tension totrigger integrative thought in the students.

Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi (1964) use the term “creativeattitude” to describe the process in which creative people operate,distinguishing creative attitude from the processes incorporatedin the terms “concrete attitude” and “abstract attitude.” The cre-ative attitude presumes a state of mind that “impels the person toseek uncertainty in what appears to be ‘obvious’ certainty and toraise questions that are in some way startling” (p. 125). In theconcrete attitude, the student concentrates on the details of expe-rience while attempting to reason from objective information. In

SILL304

the abstract attitude, the student looks for generalizations and logi-cal categories that can be extracted from the objective informa-tion. In the creative attitude, the student turns the objective andabstracted information over in the mind to discover differing waysof understanding. Both the concrete and the abstract attitude seeksimplification for understanding, whereas the creative attitudeseeks complexity, which can in itself generate creative tension.

Creativity and discovery happen neither in the abstract nor inisolation but rather within a particular context in terms of boththe individual and the social unit. Stein (1974) argues that thesocial context is an aspect of all creativity and that the creativeindividual is trained and enculturated in a particular social unit ata particular time. In addition, the social unit reacts to and evalu-ates the creative product, so that the “useful” part of useful nov-elty is finally judged in the eyes of the social unit. Klein (in press)argues that creativity and integrative thought in an interdiscipli-nary studies class are demarcated by the political processes withinthe group. In this view, the social context is neither passive norbenign.

The creative process is both complex, as stated earlier, andfluid. While we have considered different aspects of the complex-ity at some length, we have only considered the equally impor-tant, temporal part of the creative process within the context ofripeness and preparation. We now must turn to consider the itera-tive nature of the creative process in order to complete our modelof creative and integrative thought.

In constructing their model for creativity, Finke, Ward, andSmith (1992) distinguish between generative and cognitive pro-cesses. The generative phase uses preinventive structures that pro-mote discovery where the preinventive structures are generated,regenerated, and modified throughout the course of creative ex-ploration (p. 17). The cognitive exploration phase consists of test-ing the preinventive structures against limitations and constraints,then regenerating the preinventive structures in response to thediscoveries in the exploration phase. Clearly these activities in-teract in a dynamic process that leads not to trial and error but totrial and modification. In this view, creativity is an iterative pro-cess that works toward solution through an interweaving of gen-

PERSPECTIVES 305

erative and cognitive processes, not a big bang that comes all atonce, then not again.

Stein (1974) assumes that creativity is time bound, not instan-taneous. He defines the process in terms of stages that appear some-what different than those defined by Edwards (1986), but whichinclude the same elements packaged in a different conceptualframework. Stein’s stages include: forming hypotheses, testinghypotheses, and communicating the results, with a preparationstage that is necessary for creativity to happen but which is notcreative itself. Science develops through a continual repetition ofthese stages – hypothesis generation, testing, modification, retest-ing, new hypothesis generation, testing, etc., again an iterativeprocess. The power of Stein’s formulation of stages comes fromthe nature of the hypothesis as a means of controlling and shapingthe creative process. The hypothesis can provide the generativepower of Edwards’ “First Insight” or Getzel and Csikszentmihalyi’s“creative question.” But the hypothesis is valuable only when it isfluid and dynamic. A static hypothesis, one that is never reconsid-ered, reformulated, or restated, can stultify creative and integra-tive thought rather than encourage it. It has this power becausethe hypothesis directs the process, and an unchanging hypothesisimplies a single algorithmic solution rather than the multiple an-swers characteristic of heuristic thought. A changing hypothesisalso encourages the iterative nature of creative thought.

May (1975) refers to the combination of intense engagement(what he calls encounter) and relaxation as essential for creativ-ity. The creative process is most fruitful when periods of intensework are combined with periods of rest, particularly when the cre-ative person is passionately engaged in the focus of the creativityeven while resting. For May, the artist who appears to be doingnothing while waiting for inspiration to strike is in fact most ener-getically engaged with the creative process. What is important isthe rhythm of the process, the changes or alternations betweenengagement and relaxation. Poincare (1952) agrees in that he seesthe unconscious work of creativity as only being of value if it ispreceded by an intense period of work and is in turn followed byan intense period of work – the former necessary to fully engagethe mind on the task, to fill the subconscious with pre-inventive

SILL306

structures as the raw material of the creative insight – the latternecessary to bring the creative insight to some kind of completion(pp. 38-39).

V. Implications for Interdisciplinary Studies

The major characteristics of the creativity model for integratedthought are bisociation, ripeness, creative tension, preinventivestructures including subconscious ideas and images, active imagi-nation, iterative process, and complexity. The important role thatseparate matrices of thought play in the bisociative process sug-gests the need to maintain the integrity of the disciplines in orderto encourage integrative thought. While this returns to the defini-tion of interdisciplinary studies with which we started, in a way,we have completed a cycle of hypothesis formulation and testing.We can accept the circularity of the argument as a check that ourmodel of creativity does in fact correspond to the structure thatwe postulated for a type of interdisciplinary studies that couldencourage integrative thought.

Before looking at how this model of creative thought appliesto interdisciplinary studies, it is important and heartening to drawtwo points from the creativity literature. The first, as put forwardby de Bono (1969) , Edwards (1986), and Stein (1974), is thatcreativity is natural and teachable, which suggests the proposi-tion that integrative thought also is teachable. Second, Amabileand Tighe (1993), Simonton (1984, 1993), Stein (1974, 1975),and others point out that environmental factors can either encour-age or discourage creativity, and that an environment that encour-ages and values creativity can enable creativity in both theindividual and the group. The implication is that through the shap-ing of class activities and assignment, the instructor can encour-age integrative thought.

While we expect students in an interdisciplinary studies courseto have original thoughts that synthesize information into a neworder, it is important to remember that, in general, students havebeen taught not to do that. They have been taught to accept coursematerial on the basis that the teacher is the expert, the textbook isthe expert, and that material should be accepted for what it is with-

PERSPECTIVES 307

out question. Modeling alternative ways of thinking, in this caseintegrative thinking, can help students to catch on.

Finke, Ward, and Smith (1992) suggest the use of creativeexemplars and the use of the imagination in the teaching of cre-ativity. In the interdisciplinary classroom, providing modeling andexamples gives students ways to approach integrated thought andgives them permission to accept information that is problematic,to create their own synthesis. By engaging in integrative thinkingand by making such visible in the classroom, the instructor canprovide the exemplar. Furthermore, by hearing and understand-ing the stores of those individuals who have integrated materialeither in the source disciplines or in the insights between disci-plines, the students can find exemplars among the pioneers. Inorder for the pioneers to serve as exemplars, the integrative pro-cesses through which those pioneers made their important dis-coveries must be visible to the student. Because the creativeprocess is logical in reverse, the work of the pioneers is most of-ten presented as a straightforward process of reasoned discoverywhen in fact the process through which those pioneers came totheir discoveries involved guesses, mistrials, and backtracking.

Edwards (1986) emphasizes the importance of imagery andvisual thinking in creativity. Adams (1979) concentrates on theneed to remove conceptual blocks to creativity and suggests theuse of other sensory languages, i.e., hearing, touch, and smell, asa means of circumventing entrenched patterns of thought. Thecombined use of imagination and sensory languages can help stu-dents to consider something in a different way, such as imagininghow something might smell or feel. For example, in studying Res-toration Theatre in England, if students can imagine what it wouldsmell like to be in an enclosed space with a thousand unwashedbodies, lit by smoking and sometimes rotten tallow candles, andwith very little ventilation, then the students can form concretememories from their imaginative experiences that, when combinedwith the intellectual experience of reading a play script, can helpthem integrate their understanding of the historical experience withexperiences in their own lives.

De Bono (1992) provides a collection of techniques that canassist in lateral thinking, thinking aside, getting out of the rut.

SILL308

One technique is the introduction of a ridiculous or preposterousoption and then examining where it might lead. For example, onemight begin designing a car suspension with the provocative as-sumption that the car has square wheels. Or, for an example thatis more clearly applicable to a possible class setting, students couldinvent a history for the United States following the Second WorldWar and defend the logic of that history with the provocative as-sumption that there were no such thing as Communism.

The requirements of empowering discovery that we can drawfrom the literature on creativity include quiet, reflective time forthe student and enriching the information environment from mul-tiple and varied sources. Instructors can encourage discovery bypresenting material in such a way as to trigger thought in mul-tiple, simultaneous matrices, to provide a supportive environmentwhich encourages and rewards divergent thinking, to allow quiet,reflective time, and to model creative thought. Such reasoningcan lead to some startling conclusions. For example, while wehave a bias against doing nothing in class, this analysis indicatesthat guided silence may be a most effective way to encourage dis-covery. De Bono (1992) suggests using the creative pause, plannedand intentional thinking time, to encourage creativity. After en-riching the thought environment (by providing information inwritten, visual, and verbal forms, for example), the instructor mightinclude quiet time among class activities, by ending a class withfive minutes of quiet time, then five minutes of writing, perhapswhile listening to Beethoven after discussing Napoleon or listen-ing to nature sounds after discussing the impact of cities on theenvironment. In this view, quiet time is as valuable a part of thelearning environment as any other class activity and is clearly notwasted because it actively engages the student in the material, areformulated conception of active learning.

To the extent that creative thought parallels integrative thought,the model for creative thought as developed here provides insightinto integrative thought as a process by providing a model forintegrative thought. Understanding the creative thinking modelfor integrative thought can in turn help the instructor in shapingclass activities and assignments in ways that can encourage ratherthan discourage integrative thought in the student. The examples

PERSPECTIVES 309

given in the preceding sections provide only the very beginnings,but perhaps can suggest directions for further exploration. Par-ticularly promising areas for further study include the relation-ship between visualization and integrative thought; a comparisonbetween the accepted practices for interdisciplinary course con-struction and the model for integrative thought; and analysis ofthe rhythms of course activities that encourage rather than inter-fere with integrative thought. In that creative thought can be adirect outcome of interdisciplinary studies, and with the value thatsociety places on creative thought, such an outcome is worthwhilein itself. Furthermore, to the extent that all learning is creativeactivity, the above model provides valuable understanding of thelearning process throughout the curriculum, extending beyondinterdisciplinary studies.

The creative thinking model for integrative thought corre-sponds in several important areas to the interdisciplinary designfor general education articulated by Hursh, Haas, and Moore(1983). As stated earlier, that design stresses generic skills of criti-cal thinking in order to encourage discipline and standards as wellas to ensure preparation and to provide necessary intellectual re-sources—all of which are important aspects of both the saturationand verification phases of creativity. Clearly, students’ mastery ofbasic skills is a necessary component of ripeness. The design forgeneral education proposes stressing the provisional basis ofknowledge, and by so doing, allowing the openness and freedomof thought. For Koestler (1964) where matrices of thought areenvisioned as rules of a game, the provisional nature of knowl-edge is an essential part of the ability to change the rules, or in theterms of interdisciplinary studies, to cross disciplinary boundaries.The design by Hursh et al. suggests generating disequilibriumthrough disagreements between disciplinary insights, a strategywhich generates creative tension and contributes to complexity ofthought, both of which are important elements for the students’generating integrative thought. Indeed, as discussed earlier, suchcreative tension is the driving force for integrative thoughts, pro-viding the motivation to integrate. The creative thinking modelfor integrative thought goes beyond the design of Hursh et al inseveral ways, particularly by including a social dimension or so-

SILL310

cial context, and by defining integrative thought as a iterative pro-cess. In the end, the combination of the creative thinking modelfor integrative thought with the interdisciplinary design for gen-eral education provides a theoretical framework for the connec-tions between interdisciplinary studies and integrative thought.In returning to our cartoon, because of the irrational and subcon-scious aspects of integrative thought, we cannot explain the miracleas a rational process, but the creative thinking model provides away of understanding the process as a natural psychological out-come that may be encouraged and shaped, if not taught. To thatextent, the miracle is explained.

ReferencesAdams, J. L. (1979). Conceptual blockbusting: A guide to better ideas (2nd ed.). New

York: Norton.Amabile, T. (1983). The social psychology of creativity. New York: Springer-Verlag.Amabile, T., & Tighe, E. (1993). Questions of creativity. In J. Brockman (Ed.), Creativ-

ity (pp. 7–27). New York: Touchstone.Arieti, S. (1976). Creativity: The magic synthesis. New York: Basic Books.Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1993). The evolving self. New York: Harper Collins.de Bono, E. (1969). The mechanism of the mind. New York: Simon and Schuster.de Dono, E. (1992). Serious creativity: Using the power of lateral thinking to create

novel ideas. New York: Harper Business.Edwards, B. (1986). Drawing on the artists within. New York: Simon and Schuster.Finke, R. A., Ward, T. B., & Smith, S. M. (1992). Creative cognition: Theory, research,

and applications. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.Forster, E. M. (1993). Quote in The London Observer (1951 October 7). In TheColumbia Dictionary of Quotations. [CD-ROM, Microsoft Bookshelf ‘94]. New York:

Columbia University Press.Fuller, S. (1993). Disciplinary boundaries and the rhetoric of the social sciences. In E.Messer-Davidow, D. R. Shumway, & D. J. Silvan (Eds.), Knowledges: Historical and

Critical Studies in Disciplinarity (pp. 125–149). Charlottesville, VA: UniversityPress of Virginia.

Gardner, H. (1993) Creating minds. New York: Basic Books.Getzels, J. W., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1964). Creative thinking in art students: An

exploratory study. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Guilford, J. P. (1968). Intelligence, creativity, and their educational implications. San

Diego: Robert R. Knapp.Hammer, E. F. (1984). Creativity, talent, and personality. Malabar, FL: Robert E. Krieger.Hausman, C. R. (1979). Disciplinarity or interdisciplinarity? In J. J. Kockelmans (Ed.),

Interdisciplinarity and higher education. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania StateUniversity Press.

Hursh, B., Haas, P., & Moore, M. (1983)> An interdisciplinary model to implement gen-eral education. Journal of Higher Education 54, 42–59.

PERSPECTIVES 311

Kavaloski, V. (1979). Interdisciplinary education and humanistic aspiration: A criticalreflection. In J. J. Kockelmans (Ed.), Interdisciplinarity and higher education.University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Klein, J . T. (1996). Crossing boundaries: Knowledge, Disciplinarit ies, andInterdisciplinarities. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia.

Klein, J. T. (1990). Interdisciplinarity: History, theory, and practice. Detroit, MI: WayneState University Press

Koestler, A. (1964). The act of creation. New York: Macmillan.Newell, W. H. (1994). Designing interdisciplinary courses. In J. T. Klein & W. Doty(Eds.), Interdisciplinary studies today: Vol. 58. New Directions for Teaching and Learn-

ing (pp. 35–51). San Francisco: Jossey Bass.Newell, W. H., & Green, W. J. (1982). Defining and teaching interdisciplinary studies.

Improving College and University Teaching, 31 (1), 22–30.Paxson, T. (1994). Degrees of interdisciplinarity. Unpublished manuscript, Miami Uni-

versity, Institute for Integrative Studies, Oxford.Poincare, H. (1952). Mathematical creation. In B. Ghiselin (Ed.) The creative process.

New York: Penguin.Ray, M., & Myers, R. (1986). Creativity in business. New York: Douleday.Richards, D. (1996). The meaning and relevance of “synthesis” in interdisciplinary stud-

ies. Journal of General Education, 45 (2), 114–128.Simonton, D. K. (1993). Genius and chance: A Darwinian perspective. In J. Brockman

(Ed.), Creativity (pp. 176–201). New York: Touchstone.Simonton, D. K. (1984). Genius, creativity, and leadership: Historiometric inquiries.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Stein, M. I. (1975). Stimulating creativity: Volume 1, individual procedures. New York:

Academic Press.Stein, M. I. (1975). Stimulating creativity: Volume 2, group procedures. New York: Aca-

demic Press.St. Germain, S. (1993). Institute journal. Association of Integrative Studies Newsletter,

15 (3), 1–4.Storr, A. (1988). Solitude: A return to self. New York: Ballentine.