Integrating Safety and Security Design in Airports...NFPA 5000 Building Construction and Safety Code. NFPA 415 Standard on Airport Terminal Buildings, Fueling Ramp Drainage, and Loading

Luciano Borghetti

Hughes Associates Europe,

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Integrating Safety and Security design in Airport

Integrating

Safety and Security Design

in Airports

06-10-081

Luciano Borghetti


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Luciano Borghetti


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Integrating Safety and Security design in Airport2

Airports have always posed unique challenges for security and fire safety; after the events of 9/11 airport security has become synonymous with national security.

Security concerns, specifically related to large-scale terrorist incidents, are now seen as the highestpriority for airport management. The implications of a lapse in security extend far beyond the facility and its occupants.

The events of 9/11 have raised significant concerns over effectively managing airport security, fire safety provisions, life safety provisions and routine occupant movement in a complex and dynamic environment.

These management issues are highly coupled, and can occur simultaneously and will often interact.

The consequences of these interactions are often not well understood. The existence of a number of incident scenarios and the procedural response to them requires an integrated approach to prevent loopholes appearing and to prevent the various procedures interfering with one and other.

Background

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Luciano Borghetti


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The airport is a very complex system, the following represent a typical layout of an airport containing the most important and critical facilities and showing the flow of passengers movement related to the trip necessities.

The architectural examples are ……………………………..

Background

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Luciano Borghetti


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CONTROL TOWER

PASSENGER TERMINAL

AIRPORT SERVICES

CARGO TERMINAL

FENCING

MAINTENANCE HANGARS

TANKAGE

POWER GENERATION

RESTRICTED AREA ACCESSES

ACCESS ROADS / PARKINGS

RAILWAY / TRAIN STATION

HOTEL

PASSENGER MOVERS / STATION

Lisbon_conf-control_towers.ppt

Lisbon_conf-terminals.ppt

Lisbon_conf-fancing.ppt

Lisbon_conf-hangars.ppt

Lisbon_conf-access_roads.ppt

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Fire and Safety Principles

applied to the Airport Design

5

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The most comprehensive existing codes are NFPA, they are covering all the issues related to an Airport Design.

The application of the NFPA Code shall be coupled with the local codes (if existing) and in

accordance with the requirements of the Authority Having Jurisdiction.

The Fire Safety Design based on the application of the prescriptive option of the NFPA

codes shall refers specifically to the:

NFPA 5000 Building Construction and Safety Code.

NFPA 415 Standard on Airport Terminal Buildings, Fueling Ramp Drainage, and Loading Walkways.

NFPA 101 Life Safety Code.

And the following list of NFPA Codes for the airport facilities and ancillaries.

NFPA codes

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NFPA 10 Standards for Portable Fire Extinguishers

NFPA 13 Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems

NFPA 14 Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems

NFPA 24 Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances

NFPA 31 Standard for the Installation of Oil-Burning Equipment

NFPA 54 National Fuel Gas Code

NFPA 70 National Electrical Code

NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm Code

NFPA 80 Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives

NFPA 88A Standard for Parking Structures

NFPA 90A Standard for the Installation of Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems

NFPA 92A Standard for Smoke-Control Systems Utilizing Barriers and Pressure Differences

NFPA 92B Guide for Smoke Management Systems in Malls, Atria, and Large Areas

NFPA codes

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NFPA 101 Life Safety Code

NFPA 130 Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail System

NFPA 220 Standard on Types of Building Construction

NFPA 252 Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Door Assemblies

NFPA 255 Standard of Test of Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials

NFPA 285 Standard Fire Test Method for Evaluation of Fire Propagation Characteristics of Exterior Non-Load-Bearing Wall Assemblies Containing Combustible Components

NFPA 286 Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Evaluating Contribution of Wall and Ceiling Interior Finish to Room Fire Growth

NFPA 407 Standard for Aircraft Fuel Servicing

NFPA 415 Standard on Airport Terminal Buildings, Fueling Ramp Drainage, and Loading Walkways

NFPA 502 Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access Highways

NFPA 2001 Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems

NFPA 5000 Building Construction and Safety Code

NFPA codes

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The Fire Safety Design approach to be applied shall pursue the safety, health, building usability, and public welfare goals described by NFPA 5000, chapter 4.1, with specific reference to the fire safety goals of providing:

An environment for the occupants inside or near a building that is reasonably safe from fire and similar emergencies

Reasonable safety for fire fighters and emergency responders during search and rescue operations.

• The design approach is based on the assumption that multiple simultaneous fire incidents will not occur (NFPA 5000, 4.2), and on the “Prescriptive-Based Option” as described in NFPA 5000. The building shall be compliant with NFPA 5000 requirements Chapter 1 to 4 and 6 to 55.

• The Authority Having Jurisdiction has a primary role in the application of NFPA standards, since it is the organization which will determine whether the provisions of the Code are met.

Fire Safety Design Approach

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Passenger Terminal Building Classification of Occupancy and Hazard of Contents

The Passenger Terminal Building is the most complex building in which two or more classes of occupancy exist, it is defined as Multiple Occupancy building as per NFPA 5000, 6.2.2.1. It may includes the following occupancies:

Assembly

Business

Industrial

Mercantile

Storage

Detention and Correctional

Ambulatory Health Care

Hotels and Dormitory Occupancies, classified Hotel according to NFPA 5000, 24.1.5 and 6.1.8.1.3.

Passenger Terminal Building

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Construction TypeConstruction type must comply with the requirements of NFPA 220 Standard on Types of Building Construction; NFPA 415; NFPA 5000 and NFPA 130 in case it includes train stations or underground trainways (Train Station connections and the Passengers Mover between terminals).

External nonbearing wallsNonbearing exterior walls shall be constructed of noncombustible materials, NFPA 285, “Standard Fire Test Method for Evaluation of Fire Propagation Characteristics of Exterior Non-Load-Bearing Wall Assemblies Containing Combustible Components”.

Fixed bridges and movable loading walkwaysThe fixed bridges leading from the departure and arrival galleries to the loading walkways are considered to be a part of the Terminal Building. The movable loading walkways that connect the fixed bridges to the aircrafts shall meet the requirements of NFPA 415 chapter 6.


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Glazing Material Covered Openings Facing the RampNFPA 415, 4.1.5 gives provisions intended to protect the openings of the building facing the ramp, covered with glazing material

Road Bridges, Viaduct, Access RoadNFPA 502 “Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access Highways”.

Fire separation distanceRequirement for horizontal separation distance from the Passenger Terminal Building and his ancillaries to others constructions.


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The Fire Compartment of the building designed as per the criteria of NFPA 5000:

Vertical shafts, other than exit enclosures, as per NFPA 5000 8.12.1.5.

Fire resistance of exit enclosures, penetrating floors (exit stairways) as required by NFPA 5000, 11.1.3.2.1.2.

Exit access corridors as per NFPA 5000, 16.3.6-2 and NFPA 5000, 24.3.6.5.

The airside constructions and other non-transit occupancy (if any) shall have a 3-hr fire separation from the train stations and from the Terminal, unless an engineering analysis of potential fire exposure hazards is performed, in accordance to NFPA 130, 5.2.3.5.1 and 5.2.3.5.2. (Performance Based Design Option).

Smoke compartmentsThe smoke compartmentation of the buildings as per NFPA 5000; floors separating stories shall be constructed as a smoke barrier as required by NFPA 5000, 8.12.1.1.


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Convenience openingsConvenience openings as per NFPA 5000, 8.12.4.

Protection of openingsOpenings in floors shall be enclosed with fire barrier walls, as required for vertical shafts, or protected with the installation of Smoke Door Assemblies as per NFPA 5000, 8.11.4.

Communicating spacesDeparture and arrival galleries are generally classified as Communicating Spaces and shall comply the provisions of NFPA 5000, 8.12.2.


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AtriaTerminal Building as per requirements of NFPA 5000, 8.12.3. If the building is sprinklered, the occupancy is Ordinary Hazard and the exits shall be as per NFPA 5000, 11.7.2, main provisions for the Terminal Building atria require:

an engineering analysis performed demonstrating that each atrium is designed to keep the smoke layer interface above the highest unprotected opening to adjoining spaces, or 1.830 m above the highest floor level of exit access open to the atrium,

each atrium is either separated with 1-hr fire resistance barriers or the engineering analysis is extended in order to include the communicating spaces and the results shall demonstrate the acceptability of the arrangements.

an engineered smoke control system is installed

MezzaninesAs per NFPA 5000, 8.13. Mezzanines exceeding the requirements shall designed as per the applicable requirements for communicating spaces.


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Passengers Terminal Building Fire Protection Systems

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Fire HydrantsFire hydrants outside the buildings as per NFPA 415, 4-5.3. hydrants location as per NFPA 24, 7.2.3.

StandpipesStandpipes shall be installed in all the areas of the buildings, Class I system in case of sprinklered buildings with 65 mm hose connections (fire brigade use).

Sprinkler systemsNFPA 415, 4.5.1 requires buildings provided with automatic sprinkler system, the sprinklers protection shall be provided in all the facilities required by NFPA 13.

Classification of Occupancies and CommoditiesAs per NFPA 13 - Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, (Chapter 5, Classification of Occupancies and Commodities) and NFPA 415, 5-1 - Standard on Airport Terminal Buildings, Fueling Ramp Drainage, and Loading Walkways.

Passengers Terminal Building Fire Protection System

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Overall design as per NFPA 101 and NFPA 5000 and NFPA 415, 4.3.1.

The terminal building means of egress shall comply the requirements of NFPA 101 - Life Safety Code.

Capacity of Means of Egress

Occupant loadThe occupant load assessed as per factors of NFPA 5000, Table 11.3.1.2. and, Table A.11.3.1.2.

Egress capacityEgress capacity based on factors as per NFPA 5000, Table 11.3.3.1, as follows:

Main Entrance/ExitPassenger Terminal Building Exits will shall be provided by means of the main entrances/exits on land side, with other exits distributed around the perimeter of the building.

Number of ExitsAs required in NFPA 5000, 11.4.1.2.

Passengers Terminal BuildingMeans of Egress

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Capacity of Means of Egress

Occupant loadThe occupant load assessed as per factors of NFPA 5000, Table 11.3.1.2. and, Table A.11.3.1.2.

Egress capacityEgress capacity based on factors as per NFPA 5000, Table 11.3.3.1, as follows:

Main Entrance/ExitPassenger Terminal Building Exits will shall be provided by means of the main entrances/exits on land side, with other exits distributed around the perimeter of the building.

Number of ExitsAs required in NFPA 5000, 11.4.1.2.

Arrangement of Means of Egress and Travel distance to exitsIn accordance to NFPA 5000, 11.5.1.4.3 for sprinklered buildings

Passengers Terminal Building Means of Egress

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Discharge from ExitsDischarge from exits will be in compliance with NFPA 5000, 11.7.

AccessibilityAccessible means of egress in compliance with NFPA 5000, 11.5.4. providing accessible (usable by disabled occupants) means of egress for public areas suitable for people with severe mobility impairment.Each exit door shall have a tactile signage as per NFPA 5000, 11.10.1.3.Refuge areas shall be provided with a two-way communication system with the central control room.

Illumination of Means of Egress and Emergency LightingIllumination as per NFPA 5000, 11.8. emergency lighting as per Section NFPA 5000, 11.9.

Marking of Means of EgressMarking of means of egress as per NFPA 5000, 11.10.

Passengers Terminal Building Means of Egress

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Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning EquipmentIn accordance with NFPA 31, Standard for the Installation of Oil-Burning Equipment; NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code; and NFPA 90A, Standard for the Installation of Air-Conditioning and Ventilating Systems. Exhaust hood for restaurant as per NFPA 96, Standard for Ventilation Control and Fire Protection of Commercial Cooking Operations. Duct smoke detection as per NFPA 90A, 6.4.

Elevators, Escalators, and Conveyors.Elevators, Escalators and Conveyors as per NFPA 5000, 54, and ASME A17.1, Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators.

Baggage Handling System.The Baggage Handling System often is housed underground and located below constructions, ramps, apron or parking; appropriate NFPA codes shall be applied.

Passengers Terminal Building Services

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Light hazard OccupanciesOffices and Restrooms and Restaurants areas are classified Light hazard occupancies (NFPA 13), if not separated from passengers areas are classified Ordinary Hazard Group 1.

Ordinary Hazard Group 1 OccupancyPassenger handling areas are classified Ordinary Hazard Group 1 as per NFPA 415, 4-5.1.3, if not separated from the restaurant service areas, kitchens, and Restaurant seating areas.

Ordinary Hazard Group 2 OccupancyBaggage, package, mail handling areas, shops and technical rooms are classified Ordinary Hazard Group 2 Occupancy as per NFPA 415, 4-5.1.4.

Water supplyBased on the maximum sprinkler demand for the Terminal Building (Extra Hazard Group 2) and Facilities Building, shall include provision for hydraulic unbalance and water supply duration as per NFPA 1. The water supply shall be provided by reliable source and water reservoirs if necessary.


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Sprinkler protection of concealed spacesSprinkler protection shall be extended to concealed spaces as per NFPA 13.

Fire alarm systemNFPA 415 requires Fire Alarm and Communications Systems be installed in accordance to NFPA 101, 12.3.4 (equivalent to provisions of NFPA 5000 16.3.4).

Portable Fire ExtinguishersPortable Fire Extinguishers shall be provided in all the areas as per NFPA10.


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Smoke control systems Terminal Building, Atria, Train Stations, Passengers Mover shall be equipped with an engineered smoke control system as per NFPA 5000, 8.12.3 and a mechanical emergency ventilation system as per NFPA 130, 7.1.2.2, for certain architectural arrangements a non mechanical ventilation system may be allowed.The smoke control system/management shall be supported by engineering analyses that specifically include CFD.The atria system are required to comply with NFPA 92B and must maintain smoke at least 1830mm above highest level.

Fire emergency vehicle accessFire emergency vehicle access as per NFPA 5000, 7.1.5.2.

Passenger Terminal Building Connected Facilities

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Short Term Car Parking

Short Term Car Parking Construction typeThe Short Term Car Park are usually buildings identified as Open Parking Structure as per NFPA 5000, 30.8 and NFPA 88A definition.

Vertical openingsUnprotected vertical openings through floors in open parking structures shall be as per NFPA 5000, 30.8.3.1.2 (NFPA 88A, 4.7.4).

Hazard classificationThe Short Term Car Park is Ordinary Hazard as per NFPA 5000, 30.8.1.5.

Passenger Terminal Building Connected Car Parking

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Maximum travel distance to exits Maximum travel distance to exits or parking having not less than 50% open structure as per NFPA 5000, 30.8.2.6.

Common path of travelCommon path of travel limited to 15 m as per NFPA 5000, 30.8.2.5.1.

Dead endsDead ends limited to 15 m as per NFPA 5000, 30.8.2.5.2.

Passenger Terminal Building Connected Car Parking Means of Egress

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Protection

StandpipesStandpipes Class I as per NFPA 5000, 30.8.3.5.4.

Sprinkler systemNot required (NFPA 5000, 30.8.3.5.) but recommended.

Fire Alarm SystemNot required (NFPA 5000, 30.8.3.4.1) but recommended.

Portable ExtinguishersPortable Fire Extinguishers shall be provided (Ordinary Hazard classification)

Passenger Terminal Building Connected Car Parking Fire Protection System

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The code allows the Authority Having Jurisdiction to approve alternative design solutions as the application of strict code compliance is technically infeasible or will impose excessive hardship in case of construction/architecture difficulties [NFPA 5000 15.1.2.3.1].

Deviations from the code and Performance Based Design Options

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Vulnerability

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The Vulnerability Assessment (VA) is a starting tool to develop the process of integrating the various emergency and non-emergency procedures that are present in an airport. It provides a high-level methodology for identifying areas of vulnerability that can then be quantified and assessed using a performance-based approach: VA enables vulnerabilities to be identified; performance-based approaches are then employed to quantify these vulnerabilities and suggest improvements.

Vulnerability Assessment in Airport

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"Vulnerability" is the propensity of assets to be damaged when the system is submitted to an “adverse action/event”. Vulnerability is therefore related to weakness of the system. Vulnerability is therefore the “measure” of damage susceptibility related to the intrinsic characteristics of the system. In order to be of use, this needs to be quantified. This quantification will then allow various structural and procedural changes to be assessed and modified to reduce the level of vulnerability in the system. The use of performance-based tools enables this assessment to be made.Vulnerability Assessment is the process of identifying and quantifying vulnerabilities in a system.Vulnerability assessments are typically performed according to the following steps:

Threat Identification and Assessment

Cataloguing assets and critical features in a system

Cataloguing resources available in a system

Assessing the assets and critical features

Assessing the resources

Identifying the vulnerabilities or potential threats and adverse agents to each resource or asset

Identifying the method/provisions containing or eliminating the vulnerabilities.


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When applying this approach to safety and security, a number of issues will arise:

Fencing and Gates (security and safety)

Lighting system (security and safety)

Door controls (security and safety)

Remote surveillance (security and safety)

Intrusion detection

Monitoring and controls (security and safety)

Response of security and safety alarms


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The Performance Based Approach is a method to evaluate the level of vulnerability within a system and the effectiveness of the system in responding to this vulnerability. It does this by assessing the performance of the system according to key criteria (e.g. evacuation time, fatality levels, access levels, etc.) as opposed to following pre-determined design rules that are deemed to provide a level of safety and robustness. This represents an engineering approach to assess the performance of the system given a number of different scenarios.

Vulnerability and Performance Base Approach

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There are a number of responses to any given incident scenario. The selection of a particular response will be governed by the hazards posed by the incident, the abilities of the population and the ability to manage the response.

These procedural responses are influenced by three factors:

Action: remain in place; move to a shelter within the building; evacuate the building; move to a predefined point of assembly; evacuate the site. For instance, an evacuation will encourage a population to move from a place of danger to a place of relative safety.

Population: a room; a floor; a building; a site. For instance, in response to an industrial spill, a whole site may be evacuated.

Access: restrict access; maintain access; increase access. For instance, security measures at an airport may be superseded during a fire.These three factors can be combined to produce a range of different procedural responses. A selection of these are presented below.

Vulnerability and Performance Base Approach

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General

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The following provides an example of the type of integrated approach that may be developed using a vulnerability assessment and performance-based approach. The procedural response identified below addresses many of the key vulnerabilities associated with airport emergency response.For most of the 20th century, it was widely assumed that an evacuating population should be deprived of information regarding an emergency incident (e.g., a fire), as it would have instilled panic. This point of view has been replaced, through advances in our understanding of human behavior, by the view that the population needs to be informed of the event necessitating their evacuation as early and comprehensively as possible in order to increase their acceptance of the emergency procedures and inform their decision making process. In fact it is now widely accepted that depriving evacuees of information increases their probability of performing irrational or sub-optimal actions.There is an admitted difference between the response that fire alarm systems are intended to evoke and the response that actually occurs. Although there is a range of reasons why occupants do not immediately begin movement out of a fire area a common thread within the reasons is a lack of information regarding the location and/or severity of the event. In many cases this lack of input causes occupants to make judgments regarding their level of safety that may be incorrect. Additionally, directives regarding security within a given locale, as well as the known consequences of violating security features, can further affect response to emergency situations.

Integrating Fire Safety and Security into Movement Management

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People present in airport spaces generally have a specific reason for being there. For instance, they may be departing or waiting for the arrival of someone. In most instances the individual will be committed to remaining in the space especially if they have moved into a secure area. Responding to a fire at an airport terminal therefore presents several key problems given this level of engagement:

People will not want to leave given their commitment to an activity.

If people are asked to leave unnecessarily, their removal from the terminal may cause serious disruption (e.g., people missing their flights).

People will be reluctant to believe that there is a real incident, especially when there is not physical evidence of an incident (e.g., the presence of smoke).

Once people have begun movement, they move in a managed way rather than purely according to familiarity with the routes available.The design of the emergency response procedure is therefore critical in insuring that occupants respond quickly and evacuate in the prescribed manner.


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The interconnection of fire detection or fire alarm devices with security doors has occurred for decades, with the emergency egress function being considered primary over the security function. Persons wanting to do harm to airport patrons and employees, airport property or aircraft could use the fire detection and alarm system as a means to opening security doors and gain access to various areas, to cause persons to gather in particular areas or to force responders to enter specific areas. In any of these cases, the scenario could be prearranged such that the fire alarm system is the means by which access is obtained or personnel are gathered to a particular location so that maximum harm can be achieved.Because of this, an integrated approach to fire and security must be examined. One option would be to retain the current design (i.e., two detection devices within a security zone releasing the doors in that zone) and ensure that security procedures support the arrangement. This has the benefit of ease of transition for any modifications of the fire alarm system. As well, it would require no new security procedures to be developed, since it is the current system and has been addressed to the extent possible. Observed conditions on the concourses indicate that a much more significant security force would be necessary to prevent opportunistic use of the current arrangement. From an egress perspective, the current arrangement is somewhat problematic since a limited number of doors release upon fire alarm initiation, but the fire alarm system is arranged to initiate general evacuation.


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Inserire filamato di evacuazione e smoke simulation

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Airport Security Design

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Introduction

The security design strategy shall include the security systems design and security operations design. The airport represent an attractive target and the increased passenger loads will necessitate enhanced security surveillance and access control. The security design measures applied to the airport shall not only meet international codes and standards, but represent state-of-the-art development in airport security and utilize a comprehensive coordinated and systematic approach incorporating a “Concentric Layers of Protection” or “Defense in Depth” approach methodology, the security begins at the airport perimeter and shall be applied throughout the airport in a systematic manner consistent with threats and vulnerabilities.


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Three main factors dominate the security design:

• Flexibility, which means the systems must be flexible to change as needs evolve

• Expandability, which means the systems must meet criteria set forth for expansion and increased capacity

• Reliability, which means the systems must have demonstrated a high level of industry acceptance


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Programming Security Criteria

The security system design programming criteria is the principle to be applied for the protection of the Airport property, assets, staff/employees and visitors. The utilization of electronic security measures are one of several important elements of a comprehensive security program. A program that relies solely upon electronic security countermeasures is destined to fail. Policies, procedures, planning and staffing are but a few of the necessary components of an overall, comprehensive security plan. Before considering electronic security measures for retrofit or new construction on the Airport facility, the implementation of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design should be considered, working with the architect during the programming phase.


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Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)The CPTED concept is based upon the assumption that the proper design and effective use of the built environment can lead to a reduction in both the fear of crime and the incidence of crime. The three key components of CPTED that should be considered in all planning decisions are:

Natural Surveillance

Natural Access Control

Territoriality


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Basis for Design The security design criteria represents a conceptual approach to develop site security elements facilitating the use of electronic assessment system elements to monitor potential facility threats from a central location through the utilization of closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras, access control and perimeter intrusion detection systems to protect building perimeters and interiors.

Codes and StandardsThe security strategy shall comply with the main references on security standards in airports including but not limited to the listed below:

ICAO Annex 17 to the Convention of International Civil Aviation, International Standards and Recommended Practices for Security

ICAO Doc 8973: Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference (Restricted) – 6th Edition – 2002

IATA: Security Manual – 4th Edition – 2005

FAA: Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design and Construction –June 2001

FAA Advisory Circulars: 107, 150/5300-13, 150/5370-10, and others


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Definition and Design Considerations of Security Areas and Sub Areas

Landside vs Airside – Perimeter Boundaries

Perimeter Areas and Segregation of Facilities

Fences and Barriers


Air Traffic Control Tower

Fuel Farm

Aircraft Maintenance Facilities

Air Cargo Facilities

General Aviation Areas

Ground Service Equipment Maintenance Facilities

In-flight Catering Facilities

Utilities and Infrastructure Facilities

Aircraft Rescue & Fire Fighting Facilities

Aircraft & Ground Defensive Options


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Definition of Airside and Landside Areas

LandsideThe landside is the area of the airport and buildings to which both traveling passengers and non-traveling public have unrestricted access, as public parking, terminal and public roadways, and rental car operations.

AirsideAirside is the portion of the airport beyond the security screening stations and restricting perimeters where air operations and aircraft movement occurs including passenger loading/unloading, aircraft overnight parking, General Aviation parking and the isolated security parking position.

Airside/Landside BoundaryThe airside/landside boundary is defined by the perimeter security fence. The boundary may bisect structures whose functions require their placement on the perimeter, as maintenance hangars, catering buildings, postal and cargo facilities. Access control and electronic surveillance measures consistent with measures applied to secure areas elsewhere in the Airport shall be applied.


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Definition of Main Security Areas and Sub Areas

Security/Sub Areas International aviation security standards identify three main security areas and two sub areas.

Main Security Areas:

Air Operations Area (AOA)

Security Identification Display Area (SIDA)

Secured Areas

Sub Areas

Sterile area

Exclusive area

Control of AccessThe airport operator is required to control and prevent access the AOA, control movement within the AOA and prevent unauthorized penetrations of the AOA. The SIDA is that portion of the Airport that requires the display of the identification badge at all times as the continuous procedural attention from employees and the security force. The highest level of access control is applied to the AOA and SIDA.


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Sub areas

Sterile AreasThe sterile area is that part of the passenger terminal (or terminals) where passengers have been screened pursuant to boarding departing aircraft or passengers arriving from incoming aircraft, including concessions that serve departing and arriving passengers. The persons in the sterile area must have gone through the screening process, the concern is unauthorized entry or breach in the sterile area From a design standpoint, a physical breach control system is:

Source and location of a breach alarm generator

Location of physical barriers which respond to the breach alarm

Sufficient separation distance between the alarm and the barrier to allow safe closure prior to an intruder’s further penetration which could result in terminal evacuation.

Exclusion AreasIs the exclusive area portion of the AOA or SIDA where the air carrier is responsible for performing security responsibilities, as general aviation, charter carrier sites, and overnight delivery service carriers. CCTV surveillance cameras and automated access control devices shall be used generally under the authority and monitoring of the respective air carrier.

Segregated Areas / FacilityArriving and Departing Domestic and International PassengersSecure passageways (sterile corridors) shall be provided for arriving passengers to the

customs/passport inspection sites. CCTV cameras and personal


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Illumination is one of the most important security measures allowing security personnel to observe activities around and inside the Airport coupled with CCTV surveillance cameras.

Electronics Engineering Conceptual Design Criteria, Access Control System Concept CriteriaThe Access Control System (ACS) shall be a powerful, multi-function security and access management system designed to allow for expansion to accommodate future growth. The system shall support and manage a multi-site network. The system shall have true multi-tasking and remote terminal capability; independent activities and monitoring can occur simultaneously at different locations. Remote workstations will have the ability to produce photo-ID badges for employees. The operator workstation shall be easy to use and shall employ icon-based menus and provide a mouse-driven interface for system operation and the creation of color graphic maps. Field devices, such as biometric/card readers, alarm inputs, control points, etc., shall be connected to fully distributed intelligent field controllers capable of operating without host computer intervention.


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Airport Security DesignPerimeter Intrusion Detection Concept CriteriaAll perimeter fencing, ECF/gates, building access doors and ground level windows shall be monitored with supervised lines to detect unauthorized entry and/or tampering, designated interior access control doors, including interior fire doors shall be monitored 24 hours a day. Ground level rooms with perimeter windows in addition to high value/core asset rooms (i.e.: IDF, Elect rooms, HVAC, etc) shall be protected with secondary protection provided by dual technology motion detectors. Also incorporated into the security system design shall be duress/panic alarm buttons that will be strategically placed in designated areas. The Intrusion Detection systems shall be compatible with and integrate to the Access control Management System to provide a single unified interface for the operators.

Video Surveillance and CCTV Criteria (1)The Video Surveillance Closed Circuit Television Video (CCTV) system shall be an

IP-based video surveillance system to provide both local and remote operational control of all cameras with-in the system. The IP-based video surveillance (CCTV) system shall record all events at the Airport location and these events and video shall be capable to be stored on a storage media anywhere on the network. The IP-based video (CCTV) system shall allow users to monitor remote locations via a local area network (LAN) or the Internet, through a dedicated surveillance application. The IP-based video (CCTV) camera system design shall incorporate, depending upon the application, environment and lighting conditions, the use of Color/Black and White (day/night) dome style cameras, recommended for their inherent deterrent value, for PTZ and fixed applications along with applicable environmentally controlled housing units, mounts, lenses, power supply, wiring/fiber, PC workstations, and Network Digital Video Recording (NVR) Equipment.

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Airport Security DesignPerimeter Intrusion Detection Concept Criteria

Video Surveillance and CCTV Criteria (2)It is envisioned that the CCTV system shall incorporate the use of intelligent video motion detection and an Intelligent Analytical Video Software package, with the fixed position dome and Pan/Tilt/Zoom (PTZ) dome cameras, as well as provide the capabilities to interface with the (ACS) and (IDS) systems for alarm call-up for indexing of alarm inputs, to enable the system to automatically reposition (PTZ) cameras to programmed preset field of view locations, and will be used to monitor the buildings, grounds, and parking lot areas. It is envisioned that cameras shall be used to record activity at all primary entrances in addition to monitoring access to areas leading to perimeter doors. Cameras shall be located to view approaches to the facilities and other designated areas. The personnel will be able to view, change, and control fixed cameras, and pan/tilt/zoom cameras via the (LAN) utilizing the software of the Network and network video recorder (NVR). Video outputs shall be displayed locally on (CCTV) monitor screens mounted in designated location(s). In addition high value/core asset/designated rooms shall also be equipped with fixed color dome cameras to monitor room activity and use of assets. The CCTV system shall provide for complete interconnection to related devices and will interface with the (ACS) system for indexing of alarm inputs. Multiple Airport authorized users shall be able to control, over the local area network (LAN), the network video recorder(s) (NVR) and associated cameras via integrated software. Authorized users shall be able to use preset locations and obtain full control of associated pan/tilt/zoom cameras depending on the user’s level of access.

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Building Management System Design Criteria: Recent terrorist events have increased interest in the vulnerability of buildings to CBR (Chemical, Biological, and Radiological) threats. Airborne contaminants can be gases, vapors, or aerosols (small solid and liquid particles). Most biological and radiological agents are aerosols, whereas most chemical warfare agents are gaseous. Building Management and mechanical system design standards should address limiting damage to critical infrastructure and protecting building occupants against CBR threats. The primary goal of a mechanical system after a terrorist attack should be to continue to operate key life safety systems. Of particular concern are building HVAC systems, because they can become an entry point and distribution system for airborne hazardous contaminants. After the presence of an airborne hazard is detected, there are five possible protective actions for a building and its occupants. In increasing order of complexity and cost, these actions are:

Evacuation

Sheltering in Place

Personal Protective Equipment

Air Filtration and Pressurization

Exhausting and Purging


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The Security Force Organization is subject to coordination with other governmental authorities at the airport. Police tasks would include vehicular patrol, walking patrol, traffic control, crime investigation, explosive ordinance disposal, administration, and short term detention. These tasks also would need to be coordinated with other governmental authorities at the airport. At least four departments typically constitute an airport police force. The four departments are:

– Headquarters

– Patrol

– Investigations

– Special Units


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Integration of Security with Other Airport Operations SystemsThe key to integration is systems featuring an open architecture platform which enable processes residing on multiple processors and operating systems to communicate with each other seamlessly, as if they were running on the same processor under the same operating system. This enables the customization of systems' capabilities with the specific feature sets and functionality needed and or required for airport security applications. Open architecture also facilitates interoperability between formerly disparate systems devices. In a distributed IP video surveillance scenario, the ability to view, share and distribute video, statistical and integrated information with other applications and systems such as access control and intrusion detection systems would not be possible without an open architecture platform. Open architecture platforms combine these systems so as to provide integrated functionality.


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Terrorism It represent a Growing Threat, defending against suicide attacks requires the coordination of intelligence agencies and constant communication, the application of physical measures, blast protection schemes and security procedures.

Measures to Protect the Passenger Terminal and the Airport Buildings

Vehicle parking should be maintained a safe distance from the buildings to minimize the effects of an explosion.

Reinforce the building’s construction to withstand the effects of an explosion.

Material and furniture used in public and retail areas shall be designed/chosen to minimize casualties and damage following an explosion

Materials used in buildings shall be fire resistant and do not develop toxic fumes

In a state of alert install road barriers to restrict vehicle traffic and allow inspections

Screening function shall be placed at building entrance

Eliminate places where explosives may be concealed


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Blast Protection

Buildings floor shall be constructed with concrete floor slabs

Beam and column and floor connections shall be designed for load reversals.

Steel beams and columns shall be encased in concrete or wrap in Kevlar

Roof and cladding adequately designed.

uilding structure designed in manner to survive in case of loss of columns avoiding progressive collapse

Anti-shatter material shall be applied to windows

Forced Entry The possibility of forced entry is reduced by the systematic application of access control devices as well as the early alert to an attempted incursion through installation of intrusion detection devices and electronic surveillance cameras.


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Defense against Biological or Chemical Attack The public portions of the passenger’s areas are most vulnerable due to the fact that the public has not yet been subjected to security screening. Vigilance and electronic surveillance are the most effective ways of observing suspicious behavior in these public places. A more sensitive target of biological or chemical attack is the Airport’s utility plant (air conditioning system) only authorized persons shall enter the facility. Automated access control devices, biometric systems and anti-tailgating equipment shall be installed as CCTV cameras observing all entrances, pedestrian and vehicles. Vehicle gates shall inspect all incoming vehicles.

Other CrimesTransfer of Illegal GoodsFrequently involve the participation of airport personnel as airport or air carrier employee support the smuggler, that will require an inside investigation subsequent the suspect. The placement of CCTV cameras and listening devices can be effective measures. Some examples of illegal activity:

Smuggling weapons and explosives on commercial aircraft

Concealing contraband on commercial aircraft

Smuggling contraband aboard cargo aircraft

Concealing contraband or persons aboard General Aviation aircraft


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Vandalism It is best defeated by good surveillance and proper security force reaction. CCTV cameras with recording capability are effective measures. Typical crimes are:

Defacing structures and furnishings

Writing graffiti on walls and buildings

Wanton destruction of property

Theft It may occur in the passenger terminal for theft of items carried by passengers, theft also occurs in cargo facilities, postal facilities, General Aviation and the fuel farm. Electronic surveillance may support the detection of the crime, but CCTV cameras sometime cannot small crimes in extremely crowded places. Examples of theft crimes:

Hand checked baggage

Items taken by pick-pockets

Cargo or small package deliveries

Burglaries

Robberies

Vehicles or contents therein

Petroleum products

Building Management System Design Criteria

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Violence against People Electronic surveillance, CCTV and fast communication are the keys for a rapid response of security forces. Examples of these crimes:

Assaults

Civil disturbance

Hostage situations in airport facilities


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Security objectives will assure:

Passengers, hand held materials and hold baggage are screened to prevent weapons, explosives and contraband from being placed aboard aircraft.

Provide procedures to reconcile suspect baggage

Physical separation between international arriving and departing passengers.

No unauthorized persons permitted to exit the terminal to the airside

Alarms activation as unauthorized activity is detected

Computerized access control devices on portals controlling the authorized person entry.

All the public areas shall be under electronic surveillance

Vulnerability of the passenger terminal is reduced by:

Passenger and Baggage Screening

Access from the Passenger Terminal

Intrusion Detection in the Passenger Terminal

Device Location Criteria

Public Areas of the Passenger Terminal

Airport Security DesignPassenger Terminal Building

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The Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) is a critical facility. Because it houses the air controllers as well as the Tracon communications center it is vital to on-going operations in an Airport. It is, therefore, a prime target for terrorists who wish to disrupt air traffic.

Security Objectives will assure:

Explosive-laden vehicles be prevented from ramming the tower or being parked adjacent to the tower

Unauthorized persons not gain access to the tower

Security force as well as air traffic controllers be able to observe activities surrounding the tower

Vulnerability of the ATCT is reduced by:

No parking next to the tower.

Access restricted to Authorized Persons only.

Providing CCTV cameras at the base of the tower that view 360 degrees surrounding the tower.

Safe location of the ATCT, i.e. not adjacent to a high speed roadway.

Airport Security DesignAir Traffic Control Tower

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Important Infrastructure

Fuel Farm

Aircraft Maintenance Hangars

Air Cargo Facilities

General Aviation Ground Service Equipment Maintenance Facility (GSEM)

In-Flight Catering Facility

Utilities and Related Structures

Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Facilities (ARFF)

Airport Security DesignProtection of Important Equipment and Infrastructure

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Limits and FencesThe Airport perimeters need to provided with the most advanced warning of threats or

intrusions from outside to prevent runway incursions and unauthorized entry to the airfield, both for physical security and safety/liability aspects. The Airport perimeters, fuel storage, aircraft parking, working ramp areas, baggage handling, maintenance facilities and runways are an example of where the airport is vulnerable and at-risk.

Protection and Access

Defense

Climbing or Scaling Fences

Entry Control Facility (ECF)

Traffic Flow

Airport Security DesignLimits and Fences

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Perimeter DefinitionIt is important to note that the boundary of an airport is not necessarily the security perimeter. The boundary would define the terrain limits of the land provided to the airport, and in most cases the security perimeter of the airport would exist somewhere within.

Importance of the Security Perimeter The security perimeter defines the area that must be protected from unauthorized penetration. It should have the following characteristics:

Provide an impression to the public that only authorized persons can gain entrance

The material chosen for the perimeter constitute an obstacle to intrusion

That the terrain as well as the material chosen for the perimeter constitute a deterrent to casual or innocent intrusion

Limits and Fences

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Perimeter Road Space immediately inside the perimeter should be set aside for a roadway that can support security and operational patrols. The road should be wide enough to accommodate two-way traffic and consist of hardened material such as macadam. Users of the road include:

Air traffic control personnel who service navigational aid equipment

Airport maintenance personnel who service, replace and repair airport equipment along the perimeter and infield

Fire and rescue personnel and their vehicles

Security personnel and their vehicle who conduct regular patrols and respond to incidents

Signage Signs placed at intervals on the perimeter give both advice and warning to the public. These informative and warning signs could be:

No trespassing

Danger: aircraft operations

Main entrance next exit

Violators will be prosecuted

Limits and Fences

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Lighting Proper illumination is one of the most important security measures that can be taken. It allows security personnel to observe activities around and inside the AIRPORT. It allows the observation of contrasts, silhouettes and other features, especially important when CCTV cameras are used for surveillance purposes.

Intrusion Detection System Fundamental Principle of Intrusion Detection Regardless of new technology and improved equipment, the fundamental principle of intrusion detection has not changed. Virtually all sensors are based on the core principle of establishing and monitoring a norm and detecting by signal a change in the norm, above, below or within a preset threshold.:

Capacitance

Microwave

Active Infrared

Dual Technology Passive Infrared/Microwave

Buried Coaxial Cable

Buried Geophone

Video Motion Detection

Electric Field (E-Field)

Operational Requirements

Sensor Categories

Application

Performance Characteristics

Power Supply

Perimeter Intrusion Detection

Strain Sensitive Cable

Fiber Optic Cable

Limits and Fences

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Video Surveillance and CCTV

IP-Based Solutions

Increased Security and Response Time

Open Platform

Benefits of Integration

Effective Operations

Access Control

Complete Monitoring and Control

Seamless Integration

Vehicle and Aircraft Detection SystemIt is important that AIRPORT Operations has current knowledge of the location of vehicles and aircraft at AIRPORT. This would include transportation assigned to maintenance, ground service, security, catering, and airport staff.

Types of Tracking DevicesThe two most common electronic tracking systems are:

Radio frequency Identification (RFID)

Global Positioning Systems (GPS).:

Limits and Fences

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Chemical Detectors

Biological Detectors

Radiological Detectors

Control and Monitoring

Mechanical Room

Airport Security DesignBuilding Management Systems (BMS) Monitoring and Control

Sheltering in Place

Personal Protective Equipment

Air Filtration and Pressurization

Exhausting and Purging capacitance

CBR detection

Building Management Systems (BMS) Monitoring and ControlFunctionality Mechanical system design standards should address limiting damage to critical infrastructure and protecting building occupants against CBR (Chemical, Biological, Radiological) threats. Airborne contaminants can be gases, vapors, or aerosols (small solid and liquid particles). Most biological and radiological agents are aerosols, whereas most chemical warfare agents are gaseous. Of particular concern are building HVAC systems, because they can become an entry point and distribution system for airborne hazardous contaminants. After the presence of an airborne hazard is detected, there are five possible protective actions for a building and its occupants. In increasing order of complexity and cost, these actions are:

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Open Architecture

Advanced Level of Control

Intelligent Video

Sharing Via Open Architecture

Integration of Security with other Operations Systems

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Due to the project complexity, both in case of a new airport and/or substantial enlargements/modifications of an existing one, considering that to develop the full engineering will need several specific expertise I would like to suggest to form a team of experts, having good managements of all the industrial/technical critical issues. The team will have the commitment to implement the “conceptual design” of the facilities highlighting the interaction of the building, systems, equipments, transportations to be installed. The team shall have since the beginning of the job the support of a highly qualified consultant for safety aspects addressing the life safety code compliance of the facilities, the building fire rating, the smoke management inside the buildings, the use of a CFD computer modeling, the egress analysis and the application of a performance based approach, coupled with the contribution of a highly qualified consultant for security issues including the vulnerably analysis to integrate since the beginning the Safety and Security provisions.

What would be the main recommendations to the consultants

and engineers that are engaged in the project of a new airport facility?

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Acknowledgements

www.adp-i.com

www.haifire.com

www.haifire.com

www.hae.it

Documents

Integrating Safety and Security Design in Airports...NFPA 5000 Building Construction and Safety Code. NFPA 415 Standard on Airport Terminal Buildings, Fueling Ramp Drainage, and Loading