Instinct, emotion and appetite

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Instinct, emotion andappetiteC.F. Salmond M.A. aa Canterbury University College , NewZelandPublished online: 17 Jan 2008.

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INSTINCT, EMOTION AND APPETITE.

By C. F. SALMOND. M.A.. Professor of Philosophy, Canterbury University College,

New Zealand.

NONE can doubt the debt psychology owes to Shand and McDougall for the work they have done in th rowing l ight upon the p r i m a r y forces of human na t u r e and their re la t ion to the higher sys tem of the sent iments t ha t contro l t hem; this point of view has created l i t t le less than a revolut ion in our way of th ink ing of human nature , and has given us for the first t ime a f u n d a m e n t a l ins ight into those fac tors by which order and disorder are cons t i tu ted wi th in it. I n doing this service these crit ics, bu t especial ly McDougall , have a t the same t ime visi ted a new evil upon the science of psychology by their abuse of the t e rm inst inct . Since McDougal l wro te his social psychology a new god, inst inct , has ar isen in the science. The root-forces of all h u m a n ac t iv i ty are, we are told, to be found in cer ta in general ins t incts common to us with the animals . Not a social or educat ional psychology nowadays bu t speaks voluminously of the p a r t p layed by the inst incts and their evolution in h u m a n nature . I t would be s t range if a f t e r all i t should t u rn out t ha t there are no such inst incts , and t ha t McDougal l ' s I n s t i n c t is, as has a l ready been asser ted by more than one critic, bu t our old f r iend the facul ty over again. I t is the p u r p o r t of the present ar t ic le to show tha t McDougal l could have done as much for us wi thou t ment ion of the word ins t inc t ; t ha t the root-forces of our na tu re are to be found in t e rms of the concrete fac ts of emotion and appeti te , and t ha t there is no need to a s se r t an hypothet ica l ins t inc t behind these; and that , fu r ther , his account would have been then a t rue one, for he would not have been tempted , in obedience to his god, instinct , to deny a fundamen ta l dis- t inct ion between two kinds of root-forces in our na ture . H e might, t h a t is to say, have done all t h a t he has done, if he had subs t i tu ted for ins t inc t the two te rms emotion and appeti te .

The word ins t inc t was or ig inal ly u s e d - - a use to which i t should have been conf ined- - to denote specialized act ivi t ies in the animals , no tab ly in the insects, so r emarkab le as to a p p e a r to show reason, but which were evident ly not ra t ional . Because we do not know wha t they then are, we call them instinctive, and refer them to an instinct , words showing our ignorance, but connot ing cer ta in definite enough a t t r i bu te s present , tha t , namely, the act ivi t ies concerned owe nothing to reason or

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14 INSTINCT, EMOTION AND fikPPETITE.

exper i ence - - though experience m a y enter s econda r i l y - - t ha t they are done, p r i m a r i l y a t least, wi thout knowledge of the end involved, and tha t this end serves race preserva t ion or fur therance . The t e rm inst inct ive is then extended to any general ac t iv i ty owing noth ing to reason or experience, and known, di rect ly in ourselves and indirect ly in a t leas t the higher animals , to be impelled by feeling and impulse, as move- ments of escape in the case of fear or of a t t ack in the case of anger. This inna te capaci ty for feeling and impulse is s t r a igh tway a t t r i bu ted to an inst inct , and the thing is done: man becomes a c rea tu re of inst inct . Bu t this seems to mean nothing more, when we consider i t carefully, than the f ac t tha t man has cer ta in emot ions aroused di rec t ly in h im through his env i ronment and cer ta in appet i tes emerging f rom his own organism.

In the first place, i t mus t be noted tha t the extension of the t e rm ins t inct to such general act ivi t ies as ar ise f rom fear, anger, curiosi ty, etc., seems to r e s t upon a wrong analogy. In the specialized act ivi t ies of the animals , as in the web- weaving of the spider or the dam-bui lding of the beaver, we may indeed c o n j e c t u r e - - a n d observat ion of inst inct ive ac t iv i ty seems to prove-- - tha t there is feeling and impulse present in the an imal m i n d - - t h o u g h wha t this means in a c rea tu re so f a r removed f rom us as the insect i t is ha rd to s a y - - y e t i t has been a p p a r e n t l y overlooked that , whereas in fear, anger, etc., the ac t iv i ty of flight or offence is the di rect expression of the feeling with i ts impulse, there is no such re la t ion between the spider ' s weaving and the ins t inc t - in teres t accom- pany ing it. The b i rd ' s feeling is not expressed by its activity of nest-building as i ts fear of man is expressed by flight. There is obviously an essent ia l difference here between two kinds of activity, a difference which 5IcDougal l ' s a l l -embracing theory of ins t inc t overlooks. I n the one case the ac t iv i ty is accompanied, i t may be, if you like, de te rmined by feeling, in the other the ac t iv i ty is the expression of feeling. Between feeling and expression there is an observable para l l e l i sm: indeed, f rom the subject ive awareness of the feeling of fear or anger one could a lmos t a priori deduce their f o rm of express ion: wha t re la t ion of this k ind is to be found between ins t inct and a c t i v i t y ? Surely this is a rad ica l dist inct ion, and i t is th rough McDougal l ' s fa i lu re to see this t ha t m a n y of his difficulties in deal ing with ins t inc t arise. I t is a dis- t inct ion t ha t c lear ly m a r k s off emotion in m a n and m a m m a l f rom instinct , and i t is a dis t inct ion t ha t m u s t be carr ied down even into ins t inc t life. I n wha tever fo rm we mus t envisage emotion in the insects, there is no doubt t ha t there is an essent ial difference with them between ac t iv i ty t ha t

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INSTINCT, EMOTION AND APPETITE. 15

expresses feel ing and act ivi ty accompanied by, or de termined by, feeling. Thus, when a spider " shams dead," to use the boy's phrase, wha t we have is an expression of the emotion of fear which migh t have been expressed by other reac t ions such as flight or concealment , and involves nei ther any specialized physiological s t ruc tu re nor any men ta l s t ruc tu re in t e rms of rac ia l experience, whereas when the spider spins i ts web we have an act ivi ty, express ing no feeling, but determined, if you will, by feeling, and cer ta in ly de te rmined to a fixed form by rac ia l experience and physiological s t ructure . The first fo rm of ac t iv i ty we should refer to an emotion, the second only is i t permissible to refer to an inst inct . Whe the r we should give the name ins t inc t to those different motor react ions which an emotion m a y make use of, is ano ther ma t t e r to which fu r the r reference will be made.

I f we now tu rn to McDougal l ' s theory of the re la t ion between ins t inct and emotion, we find tha t he so defines the p r i m a r y emotions of anger, fear, disgust , curiosi ty, etc., as to make them appea r as a t t r ibu tes or aspects of ins t incts behind them, the ins t inct having a t the same t ime two other aspects, a cognit ive and a conative. Thus, fear is a roused by the cognit ion of some class of object to which i t is ins t inct ively a t tached, and a response is set u p - - w h e t h e r by this fear i tself or the ins t inc t to which i t belongs McDougal l leaves us u n c e r t a i n - - i n the fo rm of an impulse to a more or less definite fo rm of act ivi ty. The problem then a r i se s - - s ince especial ly in human na tu re fears, angers and curiosi t ies obviously do not forever cl ing to their or iginal objects, but come to a t t ach themselves to more and more remote ideas and complexes of i d e a s - - h o w these ever slip away f rom the anchorage of these objects and a t t ach themselves to something else. To account for this McDougal l calls into p lay his so called afferent (i.e., cognitive) in le t of the ins t inc t (unders tood physiological ly to consist of a cer ta in a r r a n g e m e n t of neurones) , and speaks of this as being enlarged th rough experience. Thus we are asked to believe tha t the expans ion of the range of fears in an imal and man is s imply the resu l t of the widening of the afferent approach to the ins t inc t of flight. Ci t ing the ins tance of birds on an uninhabi ted is land tha t show no fea r of man on his first appearance, McDougal l says " the absence of fea r a t the sight of man implies, no t t ha t the birds have no ins t inc t of fear, but t ha t the ins t inc t has no afferent inlet specialized for the reception of the re t ina l impress ion made by the human form," and when, he adds, they do th rough experience acquire fear for man, i t is because the afferent approach to the ins t inc t has been widened. I n such an ingenious way McDougal l upholds the existence of the supposed ins t inc t behind the emotion.

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16 INSTINCT, EMOTION AND APPETITE.

I pass over here the difficulty of under s t and ing how, in the case of man, an ins t inc t can a t t ach i tself to an idea, or how, if we are told tha t i t is the emotion, and not the instinct , t ha t does so, the emotion can separa te i tself f rom the ins t inc t of which i t is a par t , and wish to show only t ha t everything t h a t McDougal l here a t t em p t s to explain in t e rms of ins t inc t can be explained wi thou t it. H i s whole t r e a t m e n t overlooks the fac t tha t the p r i m a r y emotions, his inst incts , are awakened not by a special kind of object bu t by a general k ind of s i tuat ion, and in so doing overlooks an essent ia l dis t inct ion between these general ins t incts of his and the specialized or pure ins t incts of animals , as in the insects. Whereas, tha t is to say, in the l a t t e r the ins t inc t is a t t ached to one k ind of object or group of sensations, in the fo rmer there is no one kind of object, but merely a general s i tua t ion under which different kinds of object m a y fall. Thus, fea r is a t tached to any s i tua t ion tha t has the general charac te r of t h r ea t to existence, anger to any s i tua t ion t ha t sets up opposi t ion to the an ima l ' s activit ies. This dis t inct ion McDougal l ' s t r e a t m e n t does away with, bu t yet all a long is implic i t ly dr iven to recognize. Thus, when we have been told tha t the ins t inc t shows i tself in response to one kind of object, and has therefore p resumably one afferent inlet cor responding to t ha t object, we find this a t once qualified by the s t a tement t ha t an ins t inc t m a y have several afferent inlets, and tha t m a n y ins t incts may be excited by very different objects affecting different senses, pr ior to all experience of such objects. Thus, fea r m a y be excited by cer ta in special impress ions of sight, of smell, and of hearing, as well as by all loud noises (perhaps also by any pa infu l sense-impression) . "In some of the more t imid creatures ," we are told a few pages fu r the r on, " i t would seem tha t every unfami l ia r sound or s ight is capable of exci t ing it." And again, " i t is difficult to discover wha t objects and impress ions were its na tu r a l exc i tan ts in pr imi t ive man ." When he comes to discuss pugnac i ty McDougal l expl ic i t ly disavows his own definition, since we are told tha t " i t has no specific object or objects the percept ion of which cons t i tu tes the ini t ial s tage of the inst inct ive process." The reason is obvious, as he him- self al lows in his nex t sentence, the condit ion of i ts exci tement being the general s i tua t ion of obs t ruc t ion to activity. And wha t is t rue of anger is as obviously t rue of cur ios i ty whose condit ion of exci tement is a general s i tua t ion having novelty, or tha t involving threat . The nat ive exc i tan t of the inst inct , we are told, would seem to be any object s imi lar to, ye t percept ibly different from, fami l i a r objects hab i tua l ly noticed. Here evidently we have got very fa r f rom the object tha t excites one of the pure ins t incts of the insect. The fac t of the

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mat t e r is, tha t there seems here to be need to posit an ins t inc t behind the separate discharges of feeling themselves; what we have are simply manifes ta t ions of emotion, caused in each separate case by the presented si tuation. I t is not a kind of object tha t excites an inst inct , but any object tha t comes under a general s i tuat ion tha t excites an emotion, and this whether the object is pr ior to or presupposes experience of it. Thus "any sudden loud noise independent ly of previous experience of danger or harm associated with such noises" is capable of exci t ing the instinct, merely because such a noise causes a dis turbance to the whole organism, mind and body, and so causes an emotion of fear, the s i tua t ion of th rea t being at once there. Here we may speak, if we like, of an inst inct ive fear, but there is nothing gained by affirming an ins t inct of flight to which i t at taches. Sti l l less is there need to posit an ins t inct in the case of a manifes ta t ion of fear resul t ing f rom experience, t ha t is to say, where an associat ion has been set up in the animal 's mind between a ha rmfu l thing and something connected with i t on a former occasion. McDougall 's elaborate a t t em p t to show how the afferent inlet of his ins t inc t is widened through experience is s imply an applicat ion of the well known principle tha t i t is through association, in implici t or explici t form, tha t the life of emotion is extended in scope, specialized, and takes on new complex forms. Thus, in explaining how birds, unaccustomed to man's presence, learn, through the experience of s o m e of them being shot at, to fear man, McDougall tells us tha t the visual presenta t ion of the human form repeatedly accompanies the exci tement of the ins t inct of fear by the sound of a gun, and so acquires the power of excit ing di rec t ly the react ions character is t ic of this inst inct , r a the r than indirect ly by way of the reproduct ion of the idea of the sound. W h a t is this but a s ta tement of tha t kind of learning through experience which S tou t calls "acqui rement of meaning," or, in his la ter terminology, " reproduced meaning"? T h a t is to say, what takes place here is t ha t the sight of the man di rec t ly reproduces through implici t association the total disposit ion excited by the first experience, and so awakens the centres of fear. So i t is always, when new objects come to awaken emotion through experience: the general s i tua t ion excit ing the emotion has come to be connected by implici t or explici t associat ion (explicit often in the case of man, of course, especially with ideal emotion) with a new object. So emotion spreads over a wider and wider field, but i t is a lways emotion in i ts own right, i .e . , not a t tached to an inst inct , and hence, too, the infinite shades of qual i ty in the same emotion resul t ing f rom the idea of complex of ideas involved in it. If , then, we consider the emotions

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as exis t ing in thei r own r igh t in this way, we are no longer confronted wi th the problem of how an ins t inc t can, as i t were, s t re tch itself to accommodate a grea ter mul t i tude of objects.

Dr. McDougal l in his l a te r book, "The Outl ine of Psych- ology," qualms pe rhaps having come over h im in the in te rva l between his books abou t dissociat ing the a b s t r a c t e lement of feeling f rom a prob lemat ica l ins t inc t to which i t belongs, in par t icular , the problem having cons tan t ly come up whether to t r ea t the impulse concomi tan t as belonging to the ins t inc t i tself or to i ts emotion, tells us t ha t there are two possible and legi t imate ways of defining emotion, one, his own method in the social psychology, the other, t ha t of defining the emot ion as the whole concrete s ta te of the moment , including cognitive, feeling and conat ive elements, which, of course, was a lways the way of defining emotion before McDougal l came along with his new way of definition. Bu t here is the point . I f we now define the p r i m a r y emotions in this way, wha t becomes of the ins t inc t to which they are supposed to a t t ach ? Evident ly , the emotion now swallows up the cognit ive and the conat ive aspects of the inst inct , and we have noth ing lef t but a bare something itself, a "stupid, senseless somewhat ." Or, is i t not r a the r t ha t the ins t inc t is no longer so much as that , since i t is no th ing but the emotion. I t is qui te obvious t ha t the impulse now belongs to the emotion, and cannot belong to some ins t inct d is t inc t f rom the emotion. W h a t difference, we mus t ask, is there between McDougal l ' s ins t inc t and the emotions of anger, fear, and so on as defined by the older psychologis ts like Sul ly and Ribo t? I t is in vain to fal l back on a disposi t ion behind the emotion, because t h a t disposi t ion will expla in nothing t ha t the emotion i tself will not explain. I t is not permissible here to fal l back upon the dis t inct ion between s t ruc tu re and func- tion, because we have no r ight to speak of s t ruc tu re except in t e rms of experience. We cannot unde r s t and the funct ioning of memory wi thout cal l ing in s t ructure , because the s implest fac ts of memory involve pas t experience "s tored away ." Similar ly, in the region of feeling, we cannot speak of sen t iment except in t e rms of s t ruc ture , bu t i t is obviously quite otherwise with the p r i m a r y emot ions : we can complete ly unders tand the funct ioning of these wi thout cal l ing in experience. An an imal feels fear whenever any th ing seems to th rea ten it, ange r when any th ing obs t ruc ts i t : wha t can be more easily under- stood in i tself than th is? I t would be a s t range organism, we might r a t he r assert , t ha t did not so respond. Indeed, wha t we should r a the r do is to fal l back upon experience when we wish to accoun t for such responses not being made. Thus, we are told, alone of an imal o rgan isms of a n y degree of com- plexity, the hedgehog and the skunk never evince any manifes t -

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at ion of fear , and this evidently because experience has t augh t them tha t they are so protected by na t u r e t ha t fear is un- necessary. I t will be objected t h a t i t is, of course, rac ia l experience t h a t we m u s t fa l l back upon in the case of the instincts. This is cer ta in ly t rue in the case of the specialized inst incts of the insect, bu t there is no possible need for cal l ing this into account for the p r i m a r y emotions of fear, anger , and the like. Suppose an an imal introduced, impossible no doubt, w i thou t ances tors into an envi ronment , t ha t is, wi th no he red i t a ry fac tors wi th in i ts organism, would not such an an imal d isp lay fear on the first appea rance of danger to i t ? There is evident ly more need, indeed, to call in heredi ty to account for those inna te capaci t ies pecul ia r to the individual which we somet imes call inst incts , such as an ins t inc t for music, etc.

The f ac t seems to be, tha t there are no such general inst incts beyond the separa te d ischarges of the emotion, t ha t is to say, there is no ins t inc t of pugnac i ty other than w h a t is seen in the separa te ou tburs t s of anger , no ins t inc t of fl ight other than displayed in different man i fes t a t ions of fear . Everyone m u s t have noticed wha t difficulty the social psychologists have with their t e rminology here: they never know whether to speak of fear or flight when they speak of th is instinct, and find i t very difficult sometimes, as in the case of curiosity, to find two words, one for the ins t inc t and ano ther for the emotion. B u t the real h a r m here is the cons tan t ascr ibing of powers of mischief in the world to enti t ies t h a t do not exist. I do not speak here of the "herd ins t inc t" of Tro t t e r wi th i ts mul t ip le f u n c t i o n s - - s u r e l y i t is involved in the very mean ing of ins t inc t t h a t i t has one funct ion, since we know i t only th rough one a c t i v i t y - - o r to the pro tean sex- inst inct of the psycho-analyst , which is indeed in more senses than one capable of anything, bu t of the wrongness of a t t r ib- uting, for example, anger among men and nat ions to an ins t inc t of pugnac i ty , which is to wait , s tor ing up, as i t were, i ts energy, for a chance to explode in anger, s tor ing up the more of this the longer i t waits . Thus, as is well known, it has been a favour i t e a r g u m e n t for the imposs ibi l i ty of r es t ra in ing m a n k i n d f rom war for a lengthy period, t h a t the inst inct of pugnac i ty m u s t have i ts way. A recent wr i t e r in the Contemporary Review, in showing the e r ro r of this, points out t ha t i t is here assumed tha t an ins t inc t is a cons tan t ly active process t h a t keeps accumula t ing energy which mus t every now and then be discharged in a cer ta in specific way. This is true, he asserts , of one class of i n s t i nc t s - -he means the appet i tes bu t these other inst incts , "the activity o~ which depends upon the presence of some obiect," and the combat ive

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instinct is one of them, are "not normally active unless pro- voked." This is true, but the writer does not proceed to the inevitable conclusion that these so-called instincts do not exist except in manifestations of emotion. Anyone who has read carefully the account given by the social writers of the part played by this instinct in human society, will be struck by the fact that all the phenomena said to be its manifestations can equally well be explained without it. Take for example, Dr. McDougall's account of the part played by pugnacity. Modern Europe is an armed camp because of the instinct of pugnacity among the nations. Is hot this absurd? May we not explain this "armed camp" in terms of national ambition, rivalry, and recurrent threats of fear? The tribes of central Borneo, we are told, live in a constant state of warfare between village and village, tribe and tribe, a state of strife wholly due to the instinct of pugnacity; yet these people are "very sociable and kindly to one another within each village com- munity." Why, then, does not this so strong instinct of pugnacity find vent in the breaking of wives' and neighbours' heads? I t is apparently because there is no instinct of pugnacity there, and this constant warfare between tribes is simply a bad habit arising from ancient rivalries. The reason was given by the intelligent chief who, when asked why he did not give up this senseless practice, answered that, if he did so his neighbours would not respect him and his people, and would fall upon them and exterminate them. I t does not appear that anything can be explained in terms of pugnacity that is not otherwise explainable. A striking example of the failure of pugnacity to play the par t expected of it in animal life, is given by the article mentioned. Hudson, the famous naturalist and writer, tells us how he expected to see, from the dogs muzzled during the war, a great outbreaking of the instinct of pugnacity during the first few months after their unmuzzling, the idea being that the energy of that instinct must have been stored up during that period; but no such outbreak occurred, and after years he is stiI1 awaiting this outbreak from dogs that have apparently lost this instinct. I t is probable that what the dogs have, through disuse, lost is merely a bad habit of quarreling on the least provocation. Years of enforced contemplation have shown them that it is not worth the candle. Does not this, indeed, give us a hint as to the abolishing of war ? All that needs to be done is to muzzle certain people: the trouble begins only when we ask whom we ought to muzzle.

We have been concerned in this article with a criticism of McDougall's account of the relation of instinct and emotion, but if we turn to other writers on instinct, we find ourselves

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in l i t t le be t ter case as regards enl ightenment . Shand alone, in his "Founda t ions of Charac ter , " solves the difficulty by asser t ing t ha t wha t we have in auger, fear, and the rest , are not ins t incts but emotions, or r a t h e r emot ional systems, since with him the emotion is the conscious p a r t of the emot ional system. Shand ' s emot ional sys tems are therefore McDougal l ' s instincts. B u t Shand proceeds to confound us by adding t ha t these emot iona l systems conta in wi th in them inst incts , as the unconscious par t , or an i m p o r t a n t leaven in the unconscious part , of the whole system. Thus, the emot ional sys tem of fear contains wi th in i t a number of inst incts , the impulse of flight, of concealment , of motionlessness, etc. These ins t incts are, however, according to McDougall , mere ly "motor mechanisms," not inst incts . And, indeed, i t is ha rd to see how we can give the name of ins t inc t to these impulses, since the emot ional sys tem behind them uses now one, now another , of them, or even more than one on the same occasion, to meet the demands of i ts own ends. Sure ly they are the means, va ry ing according to c i r c u m s t a n c e s - - w e can never be sure whether some an imals will choose flight or c o n c e a l m e n t - - b y which the general impulse of the e m o t i o n - - i n this case the impulse to e s cape - - finds sat isfact ion. I t is no tewor thy in this connection tha t McDougal l in his "Out l ine" no longer speaks of the ins t inc t of flight, bu t of the ins t inc t of escape, recognizing t h a t the general impulse may take the fo rm now of one motor mech- anism, as of flight, now of another , as of concealment. I t is a p i ty t h a t he does not take the fu r t he r step of recognizing tha t these motor mechanisms are the means, not of an ins t inc t of escape, but of an emotion of fear . Woodwor th and others t ry to solve the difficulty of the re la t ion between ins t inc t and emotion by asser t ing tha t we have emotion in so fa r as the response to a s i tua t ion is in ternal , ins t inc t when i t is out- ward ly di rec ted: ins t inct is directed towards the end react ion, while emotion is p r e p a r a t o r y react ion. But this seems like an ingenious a t t e m p t to make two things out of one. Why in the whole complex process should there be two forces a t work, why should the impulse of the ins t inct t h ru s t i ts way th rough the feeling of the emot ion? W h y is the emotion not capable of p lay ing the double p a r t of feeling and impulse? We are in no be t te r case when we come to those who distin- guish ins t inc t and emotion by asse r t ing tha t emotion ar ises only through the obs t ruc t ion or the a r res t of the inst inct , tha t anger, for example, ar ises only when the impulse of pugnac i ty is obs t ructed or arrested. This cer ta in ly makes a difference between the two, bu t does i t not do violence to the fac t s in mak ing the impulse of the supposed ins t inc t precede the feeling ? According to this theory, I mus t a lways have the

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impulse to escape or to strike before I can feel the emotion of fear or anger. As far as my own experience goes, this is certainly contrary to the fact: I have no impulse to escape until I have first, at least incipient fear, and certainly no impulse of combat until I am angry. The impulse thus belongs to the emotion and not to the instinct. I t is surely carrying reactionism too far to ask us to believe that the situation calls up immediately the impulse to escape without some centrally initiated feeling, some primary mental excitement intermediate between the two. I t is in this primary mental excitement that I find the essential of the emotion. Indeed, if Cannon is r ight in his assertion that the inner organic changes are much the same in the emotions of anger and fear, where are we to look for the difference between them except in the central feeling immediately aroused? I know that Woodworth and others say that for most people the emotion of fear means primarily the impulse to flee and, only second- arily, the feeling of fear. If this is so, I must be content to be among the few who cannot understand what emotion is unless the feeling comes first. I t is probable that this account of the matter arises part ly from that confusion of emotion and appetite that we find in the majority of instinct psych- o]ogists.

This brings us back to McDougall and another defect in his theory of instinct, namely, his t reatment of appetite. In McDougall the all-devouring instinct swallows up, not only the primary emotions, but the appetites also. The appetites of sex, hunger and thirst become at once instincts, not different in essence from escape, pugnacity~ curiosity, etc. He refuses, that is to say, to recognize a separate class of appetites, except, indeed, to allow in one place that they may be considered as forming a sub-class of the instincts. For McDougall all instincts have their characteristic impulse or appetites, the two things being identical, the special appetites being simply the impulses of the instincts of sex, hunger and thirst. The difference formerly made by psychology between appetite and emotion, therefore practically disappears with McDougall: he speaks, for example, of the emotion of lust, and, I suppose, would not object to speak with Woodworth of the emotion of hunger. But the older psychologists distinguished an appetite from an emotion in three ways: (i.) by the predominance of the conative element (the impulse) within it, (it.) by its being conditioned by a state of the organism, whereas an emotion is normally dependent on an external cause, (iii.) by its periodicity. In this distinction the older psychology seems to be r ight: the first two differences (the third may be looked upon as dependent upon the second)

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are essential differences, and cannot (with Shand) be regarded as un impor tan t . Sully is unquest ionably r ight in defining an appet i te as a periodic, organical ly-condit ioned craving. I t is not a mere theoret ical d is t inct ion to classify an appet i te as a conative process because of the predominance of the impulse element in i t : i t is the impulse element in the appeti te, direct ly ar is ing f rom a state of the organism, tha t gives the very core of the psychosis: here the impulse element is not only s t ronger than the feeling, bu t comes first, the feeling element ar is ing in and through i t ; while in the p r imary emotions of anger and fear the feeling element is s t rongest and comes first, the impulse following upon the feeling. Indeed, when we come to analyse the matter , what a difference appears between the massive urge of an appet i te like sex and the impulse element in the emotion of anger, or (stil l more glaringly) of curiosity, disgust, or self-elation. The second difference, tha t the appet i te arises through a s tate of the organism itself and not, like an emotion, f rom an external cause, is of great biological and even ethical significance and therefore, one would suppose, psychological significance also. I t is th rough the neglect of this dis t inct ion in classifying the appet i tes a t once as instincts, tha t the error, to which reference has a l ready been made in this article, has arisen of a t t r ibu t ing to the so-called ins t inct of pugnac i ty stored-up energy tha t must have its vent, the more explosive the longer stored. This is obviously t rue of the appetites, since they depend on a s tate of the organism, but is jus t as obviously not t rue of the p r imary emotions. McDougall, in his "Outl ine of Psychology" (lamely, as i t seems to the present wr i ter ) strives to show tha t this dis t inct ion is not valid, because, even in the so-called appeti tes, the impulse, as in the case of the sex activit ies of cer ta in animals, is seen to wa i t upon an external cause. I t is t rue tha t sometimes the impulse is not set going except on the occasion of some sense-experience, but here i t is evident tha t i t is not the external object t ha t is the source of the impulse, which comes f rom the organism, but only a t the best the excit ing cause. Thus, in man, a well-set table may excite an impulse of hunger, but only if the state of the organism is such as to generate hunger, otherwise, it may excite merely nausea or biliousness. But how different with anger, fear and the res t of the pr imary emotions.

To append the special appet i tes to the inst incts as ~IcDougall does, is surely to overlook the essential pa r t tha t these appet i tes play in the maintenance of life, a pa r t tha t the p r imary emotions, however important , cannot be said to p lay ; but, for McDougall, the sex-appetite, d isappear ing with the sex-instinct, is of no more importance for life apparen t ly than pugnacity,

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flight, or curiosity. Hunger becomes the impulse of the food- getting instinct, but is it not biologically more probable that the so-called food-getting instinct, i.e., the animal's instinctive way of procuring its food, has simply developed from and round the original appetite of hunger---has been determined racially by the animal's configuration and habitat? Similarly, we might conjecture that all the complex activities in which the supposed sex-instinct shows itself, have slowly accreted round the original appetite. I t seems legitimate to regard the appetites as prior to the primary emotions, and plausible even to suppose that the primary emotions have developed round the appetites, that in animal life, for example, anger, curiosity, self-elation, self-submission have evolved round the appetite of sex. In many a human life, indeed, do we not see almost the whole of the emotional life consist in a kind of planetary motion of the primary emotions round the appetites? But the mischief does not end here. This refusal of recog- nition of the appetites as a distinct class from the instincts, is finally seen to be fatal to McDougall's theory of the root- forces of human nature. His whole thesis is that in the instincts, under which come the appetites, we have the root- forces moving nature: from these primary forces the whole life of emotion and desire is ultimately derived: take these away, and "the organism would become incapable of activity of any kind ; it would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clockwork whose mainspring had been removed or a steam engine whose fires had been drawn." Directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity. What, then, of pleasure and pain that former thinkers had held to be the prime movers of human nature. These, according to Dr. McDougall, are not in themselves springs of action, but serve merely to modify instinctive processes, pleasure tend- ing to sustain and prolong any mode of action, pain to cut it short. They thus play the subordinate par t of guiding the instincts in the choice of the means to their own satisfaction. That is to say, in the interests of this all-inclusive theory of instinct, Dr. McDougall is led to deny that pleasure and pain have any direct par t to play as movers of human activity, though, how, indeed, they e v e n play the par t attributed to them, unless there is an original movement towards pleasure, remains a mystery. In his denial of a special place to the appetites in human nature, he has to exclude from his account any reference to that most obvious fact of human nature, that it moves appetitively towards pleasure (and away from pain) as the plant turns towards the sun. Dr. McDougall thus denies that general appetite towards pleasure without which it is impossible to explain human nature, and that because his

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all-inclusive theory of instinct, involving as i t does his hormic theory of action, namely, tha t impulse always comes first and feeling last, does not permi t him to allow it. There is no room for appet i te outside the i n s t i nc t - - an appet i te must appear only as an impulse belonging to an i n s t i nc t - - and to admi t a general appet i te towards pleasure would be to admit tha t feeling may come first. H u m a n na tu re must be a ma t t e r of touch and go, controlled, tha t is to say, by a number of but tons to be pressed: touch one and you get a movement, and only af ter that , a feeling. Can any th ing be more absurd than this? Nothing can be weaker than Dr. McDougall 's a t t empt in the "Outl ine of Psychology" to deny, in developing his hormic theory and in his anxie ty to rebut psychological hedonism, any direct pa r t played by the appet i te towards pleasure. He then u t t e r ly fai ls to show tha t we never move direct ly towards pleasure, and of course must do so. Bu t to assert a general appet i te towards pleasure is not to asser t tha t the only object of desire is pleasure, which is what psychological hedonism says, a doctr ine tha t seems to have ar isen in the days of a loose psychology which did not differentiate desire and appeti te . A blind movement towards pleasure is a fac t wi thout which i t is impossible to explain human nature , and here alone is i t t rue tha t "pleasure and pain are man's sovereign masters ." The t ru th , then, is tha t in the endeavour to explain our na ture in terms of root-forces, we must include not only McDongall 's inst incts (the p r imary emotions) but the appetites, general and special, and i t is in the in te rp lay of these forces tha t we shall find, as Dr. Drever has well pointed out, the basal facts of our nature . In i ts fundamenta l form, showing itself ~ in the appet i te towards sense-pleasure, this general appet i te becomes not only the source of our acquired appetites, but, according to the law of selection, i t reacts upon the instincts, modifying them, since any inst inctive act iv i ty tha t leads to unpleasurable consequences tends to cease. The format ion of what Dewey calls interest-disposit ions of the appeti te order, which resul t f rom acquired appet i te aroused f rom the experience of the feeling accompanying the satisfac- t ion of the inst incts themselves, is of grea t importance because of the d is rupt ing effect these may have on human nature , since, as Drever points out, these involve the tendency to a t tach value to the agreeableness of an experience, while the inst incts generate interests tha t a t tach to objects themselves. Evidently, the s t ronger the tendency to a t tach value to the mere pleasureableness of an experience, the more does this come to control the ends sought by human nature . Thus does the "craving for pleasure" increase by what i t feeds on, and tha t this is a peri l of our t imes and of all advanced civiliza- tions, needs no emphasis.

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The question arises whether there is in our na tu re any other general appet i te besides the appet i te for pleasure tha t acts as a fundamenta l root-force and serves, like the appet i te for pleasure, to modify the life of the instincts. I offer the suggestion tha t there is another general appet i te which, obvious as i t is, has, because of i ts close association with the general appet i te for pleasure itself, been apparen t ly overlooked by psychologists; I mean the appet i te for excitement. The "love of exci tement" is a phrase cons tant ly upon our lips, but here, as often, popular language is not exact enough, and for "love" should be subst i tuted "appet i te ." The craving for exci tement has all the character is t ics of a t rue appet i te ; i t is a craving condit ioned by the organism, periodic in na ture , and seeking its object. And this craving is not to be identified with the craving for pleasure, for, though i t normal ly perhaps fol- lows along the l imit of pleasure, and is therefore apt to be dis- guised under the form of appet i te for pleasure, i t may find sat isfact ion of i ts impulse in pain, or a t least in exci tement tha t has a predominance of pain over pleasure. When Dewey tells us tha t what leads men as t ray is not pleasure, but the tendency to drink pleasure to the dregs, to lose themselves in pleasure, what can this mean but tha t there is here a fundamenta l craving, other than the craving for pleasure, seeking satisfac- t ion? Dewey refers, in this connection, to t tazl i t t , who says in one of his essays tha t the charm of a life of crime is found in the intense exci tement accompanying it. I t would be surely to juggle, as has often been done, with the word "pleasure" to assert t ha t i t is the pleasure of exci tement tha t is here sought: i t is the exci tement itself. I t is obvious, too, tha t the indulgence of the appeti tes, special and acquired, is enhanced and complicated by the appet i te for excitement. I t seems impossible to explain many of the activit ies of men except in terms of this fundamenta l appet i te of our na ture tha t abhors a tedium as na tu re is said to abhor a vacuum. I t is cer ta in ly nei ther the inst incts nor their derivatives, nor the appet i te for pleasure, nor any conjunct ion of these tha t will wholly explain these activities. Why do men go to face the perils of the South Pole ? Are we to say tha t i t is merely f rom curiosity, or com- bativeness, or the appet i te towards pleasure, or some conjunc- tion of these? Surely these offer an insufficient explanation, and we must call in tha t more fundamenta l craving of our nature, the craving for excitement. Drunkenness has, no doubt, many causes, but a chief cause is this appet i te for excitement, which inevi tably finds a vent through the special and acquired appeti tes, and along with the appet i te for pleasure, gives these thei r inordinate power over human nature . Who shall say tha t one chief cause of war has not always been

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this periodic craving for exci tement on the par t of the nations, ra ther than a supposed ins t inct of pugnaci ty seeking a vent for its energy? This appet i te has marked forms in the exci tement of the gaming table and the racecourse, two universal forms of human act iv i ty which i t is cer ta in ly impossible to explain merely in terms of pleasure and the so-called instincts. A large par t of the problem of human be t te rment is the task of drawing off this fundamenta l driving force into higher or more useful channels. One impor t an t test of moral progress is the degree to which men find higher, more rat ional , vents for this pr imit ive appetite. While our ancestors found their excitement wholly in love, war and the chase, we, if we can never wholly escape these, have at least found nobler means of satisfaction. And i t is in vain to hope tha t human na tu re can ever be wholly freed f rom the more primit ive excitements, even of the acquired appetites. I t is on this rock tha t too a rdent moral and social reformers, with their denials and prohibit ions, will a lways come to grief. Thus, prohibi t ion as a solution of the dr ink problem, one may confidently assert, will a lways prove futile, and America must become an object lesson to the world, by which i t shall learn the folly of a t tempt ing merely to deny human appeti te.

I t is the general pu rpor t of this article, then, to show that in the difficult task of t ry ing to unders tand human nature , it is bet ter to proceed wi thout use of the word ins t inc t and to subst i tu te the words emotion and appetite. I t is cer ta in tha t we can do all tha t Shand and McDougall have done without using the word instinct. I t is t rue tha t there are cer ta in so-called inst incts less impor t an t in the const i tu t ion of human nature , but much spoken of in the pages of social wri ters and educationists, tha t cannot be resolved into emotion without , at least, doing some violence to tha t term. Bu t these so-called inst incts can none the less all be resolved away, and the activit ies supposed to proceed f rom them explained as easily wi thout them. Thus, as regards the inst incts of p lay and imitat ion, even McDougall allows tha t to a t t r ibu te the activit ies concerned in each case to an ins t inct behind them, is to be guil ty of the facul ty e r ro r : to a t t r ibu te the activit ies of play, for example, to an ins t inc t of play is to explain nothing. As for the two inst incts of const ruct ion and acquisitiveness, these will i l lus t ra te the confusions tha t beset the term instinct . We find McDougall grouping under the one ins t inc t of const ruct ion the insect activit ies of web- weaving and hive-building and the child's desire or love of const ruct ing something. But how can these two things be placed under the same ca tegory? The spider 's ins t inc t is directed to a definite object, the const ruct ing of a web is surely

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28 INSTINCT, EMOTION AND A P P E T I T E .

not an ins t inc t of construct iveness in general. How, again, can we place under one inst inct of acquisit iveness the insect 's heaping up of a par t i cu la r kind of food for its progeny and the boy's love of pu t t ing into his pocket any and every small object tha t he comes across? The first form of act ivi ty in each ease is an example of ins t inct in the t rue sense, the second form seems capable of explanat ion wi thout any reference to the word inst inct . And, finally, as to tha t gregar ious ins t inct with which so much play is made by social wri ters , does i t exis t? The activit ies which are said to emanate f rom it are, of course, very real, and they cannot be said to be the expression of an emot ion- -MeDougal l is wrong, surely, in asser t ing tha t the emotion belonging to the gregarious ins t inct is loneliness, since the activit ies concerned take shape in pa r t as aversion f rom loneliness, not as its express ion- -bu t i t would take very l i t t le courage on the par t of anyone to a t t empt to show tha t all the activit ies of the so-called ins t inct can be explained in terms of other factors. In the animals, the need of protect ion and assistance plus habi t seem to be the chief factors present in generat ing gregariousness; in man, aversion f rom loneliness, the na tu ra l pleasure got in converse with his fellows, emulation, ambition, greed and the appeti tes are all fac tors leading to his congregat ing in the cities of the world and turn ing his back upon the waste places.

NOTES BY THE WAY.

No. I.

B E A U T Y A N D GOODNESS.

"The pe rcep t ion of B e a u t y and the awe and the s t i r r i n g of p a s s i o n t o w a r d s it a r e fo r those a l r e ady in some degree k n o w i n g and a w a k e n e d ; b u t t he Good, as posses sed tong s ince and s e t t i n g up a n a t u r a l t endency , is i n h e r e n t l y p r e s e n t to even those as leep and b r i n g s t h e m no w o n d e r w h e n some day they see it, s ince it is no occas iona l r e m i n i s c e n c e bu t is a l w a y s w i t h t h e m t h o u g h in t h e i r d rowse they a r e no t a w a r e of i t ; the love of B e a u t y on the c o n t r a r y se t s up p a i n w h e n it appea r s , fo r those t h a t have seen i t m u s t pu r sue . Th i s love of Beau ty t h e n is l a t e r t h a n the love of Good, a n d comes w i t h a more soph i s t i ca t ed u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; hence we k n o w t h a t B e a u t y is s e c o n d a r y : t he m o r e p r i m a l appe t i t ion , no t p a t e n t to sense, o u r m o v e m e n t t o w a r d s o u r good, gives w i t n e s s t h a t the Good is the ear l ie r , the pr ior . . . The One precedes both, a n d t h a t in the S u p r e m e also, the Good h a s no need of the Beau t i fu l , wh i l e the B e a u t i f u l does need the Good. The Good is gent le and f r i end ly and tender , and we have it p r e s e n t w h e n we bu t will. B e a u t y is all violence and s t u p e f a c t i o n : i ts p l e a s u r e is spoi led w i t h pa in and it even d r a w s the t h o u g h t l e s s a w a y f r o m the Good as some a t t r a c t i o n wil l d r a w the chi ld f r o m t h e f a t h e r ' s s i d e . " - - F r o m S t e p h e n M a c K e n n a ' s " P l o t i n u s : The Divine Mind." P a s s a g e cited by A.E. in The Ir i sh S ta tesman , October 16, 1926.

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Instinct, emotion and appetite