Information technology and the transformation of diplomacy

Information Technology and the Transformation of Diplomacy

Robin Brown

'Public Diplomacy ... is the Heineken factor in international relations, reaching people which conventional diplomacy cannot normally reach'l

Introduction

Over the last three months there has probably been more media discussion of public diplomacy than in the past three decades. The War on Terrorism has hauled public diplomacy from the margins o f diplomacy towards the centre o f public attention. This attention has revealed a high degree o f ambivalence towards an activity that is seen as both essential but morally questionable. This ambivalence is dramatized by reaction to the confirmation of Charlotte Beers as US Undersecretary o f State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The Los Angeles Times head- lined a report 'She Lands the Propaganda Account' alluding both to Beers ' past as an advertising executive and to one of the negative characterizations o f public diplomacy. 2 The combination of ignorance and ambivalence is a not atypical o f many diplomats and of the IR community.

Public diplomacy is often seen as irrelevant and unimportant. However, there is a growing movement to give public diplomacy a greater prominence in the conduct and study of international relations. This interest follows from an emergent view that the practice of world politics is changing: that things are being done in new ways, that new actors are important. As yet, this view is not fully formed. There is little awareness of it in the theoretical heart o f IR, but it can be found in endless American studies on the reorganization of the State Department, in the studies o f the operations of NGOs, and in the comments of diplomats and foreign ministers) Rather than a realist world of states, this consensus points to a world in which

Robin Brown is Senior Lecturer in International Communications and Director of the Institute of Communications Studies at the University of Leeds. His research and teaching focuses on the political implications of new communications technologies. He is currently conducting research on the impact of government information management strategies on U.K. media coverage of the 2003 Iraqu conflict. He may be reached at <[email protected]>.

Knowledge, Technology, & Policy, Summer 2004, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 14-29.

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international politics can be thought of in terms of a 'mediated liberalism' or an 'informational pluralism'. On one hand, this is a world with a variety of agents at work--what Philip Cerny would term plurilateralism--but where the operation of this pluralism exists is shaped by the impact of the information or communications revolution. 4

This paper falls into four sections. The first introduces the concept of public diplomacy and examines the tensions within the idea. The second argues for a broader concept of diplomacy in public that encompasses the narrower term and extends its reach. The third section examines the technological and political sources of the NPD and the fourth examines a range of mechanisms--persuasion, social influence, framing, mobilization, and agenda setting--by which it can operate.

These processes can be summarized in the idea that we are seeing the development of a 'new public diplomacy'. This idea has a double meaning. Firstly, that we are seeing diplomacy--understood in the broad sense as the conduct of international relations--taking place in public and involving the public (or the public being involved). Secondly, that the central instrument of this new diplomacy is actually public diplomacy--that is communication. The new public diplomacy implies a change in the nature of power but it also helps us to understand how power is exercised in international politics2

What Is Public Diplomacy?

The term public diplomacy came into use in 1965 when Tufts University established the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy. It defined the practice as something that

... deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communication. 6

The term increasingly came into official use, although in a narrower usage, as 'government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries.' A more recent definition is 'public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences '7

The term was being embraced in a context where 'information programmes', cultural activities and psychological warfare were already established parts of the American foreign policy armoury. With the erection of the Iron Curtain, the Ameri- can foreign policy establishment had turned to psychological warfare--in particular via international radio broadcasting--to attack the Communist hold on power in Eastern Europe. Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board in 1951 and in 1953 Eisenhower created the United States Information Agency as an entity separate from the State Department in order to facilitate such operations. In the

16 Knowledge, Technology, & Policy / Summer 2005

wake of the failure of the anti-communist uprising in Hungary in 1956, it was recognized that aggressive propaganda was counterproductive. Given the unwill- ingness of the US and its allies to come to the aid of the rebels, encouraging armed resistance to the communists only encouraged repression. 8 An alternative was to encourage the exchange of people between East and West. In particular, it was felt that this was a way of attacking the Soviet Union where the type of antipathy to the communists felt in Eastern Europe was lacking. By allowing key elites from the Soviet Union to see how Americans lived and by giving Soviet citizens some chance to meet Americans, it was hoped that doubts about the system could be implanted. Such a strategy might fatally weaken the USSR in the long run. 9

This shitt in emphasis encouraged practitioners to conceive their work in terms of achieving its objectives through the creation of trust. This led to communicating a 'warts and all' picture of the US that placed a great emphasis on the independence and objectivity of international broadcasting and cultural exchange programmes. The result was an enduring tension between those who see the func- tion of public diplomacy as producing a positive image of their country through 'objective' information activities and those who see the need for a more instrumental conception where information programmes are more tightly tied to specific political objectives. Although the USIA was separated from the State Department in part to give it more autonomy in waging the ideological struggle, over time it came to see itself more in terms of 'a kind of service disinterestedly provided by the United States to the rest of the world, with little, if any relationship to the strategic requirements of the nation.' With the election of the Reagan Administra- tion, this view came into conflict with a more instrumental view of what public diplomacy was for. ~0

A second line of enduring argument persists lies in the suspicion of the power of propaganda that, in the American context, produces a legislative ban on the use of international information activities in the domestic context. 1~ The overall result has been a fragmentation of what might be termed Public Diplomacy activities across a mixture of specialist agencies as well as ministries of foreign affairs (MFA). This fragmentation has tended to disguise the expanding scope of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is often seen as the responsibility of specialized agencies such as the Voice of America or the British Council that conduct distinct programmes such as international broadcasting or educational exchanges, but in terms of the formal definitions, it is actually a major part of the work of most diplomats. Why should public diplomacy be given renewed prominence now?

Origins of the NPD

The emergence of the NPD has two roots; Firstly, processes of political change that have pluralized global politics and secondly, the emergence of a global communications infrastructure. Both of these processes have a considerable history, but over the past decade theirs has been a mutually reinforcing acceleration. The political origins of the new public diplomacy can be dealt with relatively briefly. Since the 1980s, waves of democratization and liberalization, the decline in the relative prominence of security issues for many countries, and the growth of international governance structures have all produced a more open global political field.

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Governments are more relaxed about sharing information and see the benefits of working with international and non-governmental organizations. This has both allowed the rising prominence of new political issues and the emergence of new agents. Long run processes of increasing social complexity combine with the short run consequences of the end of the cold war and the pursuit of economic and social liberalization to allow greater access to the political process. Thus, rather than diplomacy being a matter of state to state relations, we see a growing prominence of non-state actors and agenda items that involve private companies and domestic political actors. The greater the number of players involved in any issue, the more that political issues become public. As more actors become involved in an issue, the dynamics of that political processes change. To the extent that governance becomes a matter of international regimes, its workings become more public. The emphasis on global norms and legalization in world politics inevitably gives more weight to publicness.

The second dimension of change is in the new global media ecology that has emerged over the past 20 years. This has altered the context within which political interaction takes place as well as facilitating the integration of human activities across space. There is a reinforcing relationship between the political changes and the technological changes. The expanding reach of technologies facilitate the pluralization of international politics but that pluralization is not an inevitable outcome of the technological developments.

At the most basic level, there has been a major diffusion of information and communication technologies. More people in more parts of the world now have access to communications systems--of which the telephone network is the most important. Not only does the network reach more people, it has more capacity and is cheaper to use. For all the excitement about new technology, the global reach of the telephone system and the increase in teledensity is an important development in that it provides a mechanism for communication by voice and fax even without the emergence of the Internet. n The Internet combines the telephone system with the capacity to transmit and process digital data. This allows the transmission of text, sounds and pictures. To the extent that more and material exists in digital formats, it becomes easier to disseminate it.

Additionally, there are new ways to capture information that can reach into pre- viously closed realms. The most dramatic of these is the emergence of commercial surveillance satellites that allow anyone to purchase pictures of any part of the planet. In a more mundane fashion, (but currently more important) the humble video camera allows anyone to take pictures in almost any circumstance. These pictures provide evidence of all kinds of activity. 13

There are also changes in the nature of the mass media. Traditionally, the mass media operated in distinct national spaces under strict control. The small number of outlets limited who could access these channels. Over the past two decades, there has been an explosive growth in the number of channels--with an increasing demand for material. Further, privatization has tended to produce a greater degree of autonomy from the state. This gives greater weight to journalistic pursuit of a story but also to providing programming that is interesting and attractive to audiences. 14

Beyond changes at the level of national media, there is a broader trans-


nationalization of media spaces. The highest profile here goes to self-proclaimed global media such as CNN) 5 But beyond this there is the development o f regional satellite channels. In the Middle East, stations with an explicit transnational remit such as AI-Jazeera, Arab News Network, and Middle East Broadcasting Centre compete with nationally based satellite services like Egypt's Nile News for the attention of audiences across the region.16 A similar pattern is developing in the Chinese speaking world with competing satellite services) 7 Satellite also makes available other countries' domestic programming as well as a range of satellite channels in many languages.

Growing capacity on cable systems and satellites allow a greater range o f material to be accessed. International broadcasters are frequently rebroadcast on ter- restrial channels. While it is embryonic at the moment, the Internet provides new possibilities for receiving broadcasting. These developments make it easier to or- ganize across space, to transmit and receive information. They weaken boundaries between media spaces and empower new political strategies. For all the attention given to the Internet, the mass media is still a more potent way to reach large numbers of people. Further, the autonomization of the media has interesting effects on the way that events are portrayed. During the Kosovo campaign, Serbian spokesperson were frequently interviewed in the British media so that government representatives had to respond to their claims in exactly the same way that they have to deal with the comments o f interest groups or the official opposition.

This new space creates opportunities for groups to mobilize and communicate with larger audiences then ever before. Just as domestic politics has become mediated so has international politics. The rise of televisual mediation changed the strategies of domestic politics and the same is now happening in the international sphere with a new mix of media) 8 Because of the diffusion of the technology, the scope of conflict is increased--more people can become involved--but at the same time that conflict is increasingly mediatized--i t has its reality in the media in the same way that domestic politics often does.

The New Public Diplomacy

In a weak sense, international politics is becoming domesticated, that is, shift- ing to a situation where the key strategies are not about coercion but about communication. In this new context, strategy makes use of 'public diplomacy', attempting to shift the environment in a favourable direction through the employment of communication. These developments suggest a deliberate attempt to apply communication techniques to achieving international objectives. Here concepts are being taken from domestic political communications and from commercial marketing and PR and applied in the international realm. 19

The most obvious examples of this are the roles given to Tony Blair's official spokesperson, Alastair Campbell, and his American counterparts during both the Kosovo Crisis and the current War on Terrorism. In both cases, techniques and organiza- tional forms developed for managing the media developed during domestic political campaigns that have been applied to international crises. The current rule book for domestic political communications (largely written by Bill Clinton and his ad-

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visers) prescribes continuous monitoring of the media environment and active efforts to counter negative or damaging stories while attempting to promote a positive agenda. There is evidence that national leaders (if not Ministries of Foreign Affairs) believe that these disciplines should be applied in the international sphere. 2~

�9 The concept of states and countries as 'brands'. This view presumably originated in efforts to promote tourism but is taking on a wider resonance. The ability of a country to achieve its objectives is influenced by what people think of it. Hence countries should be able, via techniques of advertising and public relations, to change the perception of key 'publics. '2~

�9 The use of PR companies as extensions of a public diplomacy effort. The most notorious example of this is the Kuwaiti government's deployment of Hill and Knowlton to put its case to the American people and their leadership in the run up to Desert Storm. 22 However, making use of such expertise is not the sole prerogative of relatively small countries. For instance, in the first half of 2000, the British Ministry of Defence and the British Embassy in Washington both made use of American consultants. 23 Data for other countries is harder to come by for other countries, but this appears to be something that does not only occur in the US.

�9 The emergence of networking as a key political strategy. Although this has attracted most comment with the emergence of NGO networks, the importance of creating networks has also been recognized in some governments. 24 Although we can locate the emergence of transnational campaigns in civil society, the success of campaigns in achieving positive aims has been greatly assisted through collaboration with states, for instance in the landmines campaignY

�9 Additionally, states deliberately use civil society organizations as instruments of policy. While this has been the case for development efforts, it has also taken on a more directly political role. The US and the EU are estimated to have spent at least $80 million in attempting to influence the outcome of elections in Serbia. This money from both governmental and private sources was funnelled to opposition groups via foundations and commercial consultancies. Ironically, major targets for support were independent media organizations and training in mediated politics. 26

�9 Parallel to these state practices are the discovery of the importance of communications by international organizations. In a recent interview, Michel Camdessus rued his failure to pay more attention to communications, while Director General of the IMF, the UN and the WlPO are among organizations that have recognized the need to invest in public diplomacy activities. 27 This is reinforced by the recognition that communication is a central tool in making humanitarian interventions work. 28

�9 This in turn shades into the large-scale American effort to understand the implications of the information age, for the military provides an underpinning for these political developments. To the extent that information becomes central to military success, the employment of information replaces the use of weapons leading to a blurring of distinctions between the military and the political realms and between military and political action. 29

What importance should we attach to these developments?

Power and the New Public Diplomacy

To what extent do the developments discussed in the first ha l f o f this paper mark a deeper change in international relations rather than a superficial modi f ica t ion? Here, I argue that we need to link the impact o f the new environment to changing


conceptions of power in International Relations. Over the past decade, a variety of approaches have argued for the importance of ideational factors in international politics. In particular, constructivism has emphasized the importance of ideas as norms. But constructivism is only part of a broader movement that is emphasizing the power of ideas and communications in world politics, s~ The communications revolution has its impact by affecting who knows what, when and what they can do about it. This new literature suggests a range of mechanisms by which actors can exert influence that go far beyond standard accounts of power and suggest that the rise of the new public diplomacy rather than being regarded as an interesting side- show actually needs to be seen as the key mechanism of agency in international politics. While there has been an increasing acknowledgement of the power of ideas, much of this literature has treated this in structural terms without reference to agency. This section cannot provide a comprehensive discussion of all these approaches but will focus on approaches that provide insights into the operation of agency.

In this section, I review three attempts to make sense of the operation of influence in the international system. Joseph Nye's concept of soft power, Thomas Risse's concept of communicative action, Frank Schimmelfenig's discussion of rhetorical action and Alastair Ian Johnston's concept of social influence before arguing that concepts drawn from political science and political communications research; framing, agenda-setting and mobilization provide better tools for making sense of what is happening.

Thomas Risse has drawn on Habermas's concept of communicative action to demonstrate the importance of argument in international politics. He argues that in addition to March and Olsen's'logic of consequences' and'logic of appropriateness' where actions are either taken on the basis of their strategic outcome or consistency with norms, there is what he terms a 'logic of arguing'. This applies where agents attempt to reach a common understanding of their situation. The implication of this is that they are prepared to redefine their own interests and conception of their situation. Thus, discussions focus on the truth of assertions, the appropriateness of norms that underpin arguments and the truthfulness of the speaker. 31 This is distinguished from 'rhetorical action', where an agent advances claims to persuade others but is not prepared to redefine its own interests. Risse provides examples from the negotiations over German reunification and from developments in human rights norms to demonstrate the way in which changing lan- guage redefines political interests and modifies outcomes.

This emphasis on persuasion has been criticised by Alastair Iain Johnston. Per- suasion involves agents in a cognitive reorientation by which they come to modify their understandings and preferences as a result of discursive exchange. Johnston draws on literature from psychology that emphasizes processes of 'social influence'. These are mechanisms by which individuals take a position of 'public con- formity without private acceptance'. 32 This literature argues that individuals will sustain discomfort when they diverge from group norms and that they will feel most comfortable when they interact with those who they perceive as sharing similar values. This makes them willing to conform to the requests from friends. Lastly, individuals are most comfortable when they act in ways that are seen as consistent

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with their identity and past actions and declarationsY The conclusion is that individuals will conform to group norms even in the absence of genuine persuasion.

Frank Schimmelfenig has made a related contribution with his concept of 'rhetorical entrapment'. Examining the EU's decision to enlarge to the east, he argues that rational choice models cannot account for the decision. Bringing in new members simply goes against the interest of too many existing members. Sociological institutionalism can apparently explain the outcome but lacks a causal mechanism to account for it. This gap can be closed with the idea of rhetorical entrapment. Schimmelfenig's 'rhetorical action' is defined as the 'the strategic use of norm- based arguments in pursuit of one's self-interest'. 34 This is different from Risse's conception since Schimmelfenig notices the importance of the strategic consequences of arguments--agents may simply be silenced by pointing to the inconsistency between norms and positions without actually being persuaded. In this case study, the outcome is reached because the agents have publicly embraced the norm of enlargement and inclusiveness. The applicants are able to use these norms to neutralize the position of the countries that Schimmelfenig terms the 'brakemen'. They cannot enunciate their interest based opposition without threatening the social fabric of the EU as a whole.

Risse, Johnston and Schimmelfenig are interested in explaining processes by which agents are socialized into accepting different normative regimes. What is problematic here (as with much recent international relations theory such as Wendt's theory of international politics) is that states or other international actors are col- lectivities not individuals. To what extent can these psychological processes be attributed to international situations? Psychologically based socialization arguments can be translated to the international sphere if we can assume that key leaders are socialized into particular ways of seeing. For instance G-8 meetings might come to be seen as reference groups by leaders who are socialized into particular values as a result. The difficulty is that as individuals, political leaders will spend much more time with domestic advisors and colleagues so that the expectation would be that they will be socialized into the values of those reference groups rather than those of international groups. This is not to say that processes of persuasion and social influence do not occur, but that they do not exhaust the processes at work. Rather than focussing on psychological processes we can turn to some of the political processes at work.

Transparency and consistency are key elements of a mediatized international politics. Kant made the connection between universal moral principles and publicity. While the fact that actions were public did not guarantee their justice, and a powerful agent could act with impunity in the face of criticism, there was a connection between publicity and justice. The world would be a better place if people acted on the basis of publicly known universal maxims) 5 One does not have to accept a Kantian version of ethics to note the political importance of this position. In contemporary political discourse, one of the most powerful rhetorical moves is to challenge an agent on the basis of the lack of consistency between their actions and established norms or past statements or actions. While this is a universal fea- ture of political life, it gains force in the contemporary environment for several


reasons. Firstly, access to information makes it easier to gather information on what an agent is actually doing and to challenge their actions.

Secondly, contemporary politics is to a large extent mediated politics. A large part of agents' knowledge about what is happening in the world comes to them from the news media. This knowledge is shaped by reporting practices. Given that journalists frequently have a very limited understanding of their story, one of their standard tactics to use the consistency test as way of generating a story. Is an action or statement consistent with earlier statements; is a statement by one mem- ber of a government or alliance consistent with that of another; is it consistent with norms or legal requirements? Finding inconsistency provides a story and a ground for challenging leaders. The corollary of this is the effort that political actors put into producing consistency. In the US State Department, the daily press briefing is preceded by an elaborate process that produces a guide for the briefer. This guide contains answers to all the questions that the journalists are expected to raise. The content is intended to be the authoritative statement of US policy each item of guidance must be cleared with the relevant desks--sometimes as many as seven-- who must literally sign the guidance. The need to brief frequently forces the State Department to reach an agreement on what the policy is. 36 The very existence of media coverage forces a concern with consistency but this is reinforced when offi- cials wish to promote a positive message through words and deeds. Consistency is normally regarded as one of the prerequisites of effective communication.

Absence of consistency on an issue that is in the public eye will rapidly become a problem. The media will report that an administration or alliance is in 'chaos', lacking agreement on policy. Lack of consistency is a vulnerability that is ex- ploited by critics and opponents. It is noticeable that in the wake of 11 September one of the key criticisms made of the United States was 'hypocrisy' over its treatment of ' terrorism'. Even apart from political challenges reporting of this type is seen as being damaging. The result is that consistency is not simply a psychological problem but a political problem.

Of course one way of dealing with the problem of inconsistency is to be consis- t e n t - b u t this is difficult. In large organizations, different units act independently. Further, politics is a complex activity and many actions are inconsistent. Political communications (spin) becomes a way of managing these problems but the point remains that challenges to consistency remains a powerful political tool. In a more public world it becomes ever more powerful since mediated perceptions define political reality. 37

As the political realm becomes more transparent, international political communication becomes more important, and much of this is rhetorical action. As Risse points out, rhetorical action always has the possibility of becoming communicative action. 38 The best known of these alternative conceptualizations is the idea of Soft Power offered by Joseph Nye in his 1990 book Bound to Lead and developed by him in a number of subsequent articles. The idea has been widely taken up by diplomatic practitioners and by scholars working in policy related areas. It has had little impact on the theoretical discourse of IR. I want to argue that the concept of soft power is incoherent as it combines several separable mechanisms that need to be treated separately.

Bound to Lead was Nye's rebuttal of the then fashionable thesis of hegemonic

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decline put forward in books such as Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and Gilpin's War and Change in World Politics. In response Nye argued that the American position in the international system was secure. Rebutting the idea that Japan would rise and American decline, Nye emphasized the importance of Bachrach and Baratz's second face of power-- that is the idea that power can be exercised through the absence of decision. 39 Some issues do not appear on the political agenda. However, it is clear that Nye is not using this idea consistently.

A country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other countries want to follow it or have agreed to a system that produces such effects. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda and structure the situations in world politics as it is to get others to change in particular situations. This aspect of power--that is, getting others to want what you want--might be called indirect or cooptive power behaviour. It is in contrast to the active command power behaviour of getting other to do what you want. Co-optive power can rest on the attraction of one's ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preference that others express. 4~

On the following page, Nye makes the connection between the idea ofco-opt ive power and the Gramscian concept o f hegemony.

Soft co-optive power is just as important as hard command power. If a state can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow .... In short, the universalism of a country's culture and its ability to establish a set of favourable rules and institutions that govern areas of international activity are critical sources of power? l

There are two separable ideas at work here. The first is that power resides in the ability to structure decision making processes in a way that produces the desired outcomes. This is the idea ofneoliberal institutionalism found in the work o f Ruggie and Keohane. Effectively, American power in the international system is entrenched by the rules of the game. 42 . The second element is that other agents' preferences are restructured in ways that make them share American preferences and values. The difficulty is that how and why this happens is not specified. Nye makes reference to the importance of multinational corporations and American culture, but how these factors operate is not clear. 43 It is worth pointing out that Nye's appro- priation of Bachrach and Baratz tends to blur the difference between a liberal and a realist account of power. The neoliberal account o f hegemony suggested that states bought into the hegemonic order because they decided that it was in their interest to do so. In contrast, Bachrach and Baratz argued that elites maintained their dominance by preventing disaffected groups from raising issues, in the lan- guage of a later generation of social movement theorists denying them opportunities to protest. 44 Further, a redefining or preferences (i.e., persuasion) would add a third reading of hegemony.

Nye has returned to the idea on several occasions, most importantly in two For- eign Affairs articles. In 1996 in an article with William Owens he wrote


'Soft power' is the ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow, or getting them to agree to, norms and institutions that produce the desired behaviour. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one's ideas or the ability to set the agenda in ways that shape the preferences of others. If a state can make its power legitimate in the perception of others and establish international institutions that encourage them to channel or limit their activities, it may not need to expend as many of its costly economic or military r e s o u r c e s . 45

Again, this description takes on board two mechanisms. Firstly, agents may be persuaded to follow; that is, their preferences are adjusted to equate with those of another. Secondly, by agreeing to certain norms or rules they may be forced to take positions that meet the wishes of another. However, it can be suggested that agenda- setting does not necessarily impact preferences. It simply means that an agent may not be able to pursue its preferences because of the way that a political agenda is structured. This is E.E. Schattschneider's institutionalist point that certain issues are organized in to politics while others are organized out. 46 Despite this, Nye and Owens provided a narrower definition of soft power 'the attraction of American democracy and free markets. '47

In a 1998 writing with Robert Keohane, Nye returned to the subject. This time the approach draws more on rational choice theory and places greater weight on the idea of information. They draw a distinction between free information, commercial information and strategic information. The first of these is distributed without charge, whether scientific, advertising or political propaganda; the second is information that that is sold, while the third is information that is advantageous because one actor has it but not others? s They argue that

Politically, however, the most important shift has concerned free information. The ability to disseminate free information increases the potential for persuasion in world politics. NGOs and states can more readily influence the beliefs of people in other jurisdictions. If one actor can persuade others to adopt similar values and policies, whether it possesses hard power and strategic information may become less important. Soft power and free information can, if sufficiently persuasive, change perceptions of self interest and thereby alter how hard power and strategic information are used.

One particular consequence of this new environment is the importance of credibility as a power resource. 49 This article also touches on the idea of framing without developing the concept, s~ Nye is clearly trying to extend the American debate about power and having spent considerable time within the State Department and the Department of Defense, Nye must be aware of the tendency for Americans to identify power with short term coercion--particularly using military means or via sanctions? I In doing this, soft power becomes a label for any means of influence other than the application of negative or positive sanctions.

To summarize, soft power, as deployed by Nye and his collaborators, has at various points embraced the following mechanisms:

Attraction: Agents' preferences are redefined as a result of either intentional

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actions or long term process such as the exposure to American cultural exports. This can be seen a variation of persuasion.

Institutions: the creation of, and effects of, institutions that shape political processes in desirable ways.

Agenda-setting: The existence of these institutions influence political agendas, however agenda-setting (and the cognate idea of agenda-building) goes beyond an institutional dimension. In the literature of political science and communications studies, agenda setting is recognized as a form of influence that exists independently of institutional factors; events and protest movements can influence both the agenda of the media (which may influence both public and policy agendas) and of political actors.

Framing: Framing is discussed much more extensively in the literature of political communications. It has been defined as to select

some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. 52

This is understood as key mechanism of influence. Simply put, it involves influencing how a problem is defined however framing is not the same as persuasion. In the same way, Johnston is concerned to identify mechanisms of influence that produce the effects of persuasion; without persuasion, agenda-setting and framing play the same role in the political communications literature.

Credibility: This may be seen as a reputational effect that develops over time that will tend to increase the ability to persuade, set agendas and frame problems.

These five mechanisms can be divided into those which are developed over the long term--attraction and credibility--and those that may emerge from short-term interactions.

Despite these ambiguities (or perhaps because of them), soft power is one of the few concepts from the IR literature to find its way into broader political discourse. Among those who have embraced the concept are Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the vice president of Taiwan, Annette Lu, the French foreign minister, Hubert Vrdrine, and most prominently, the former Canadian foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy. 53 Further, the idea has been broadly taken up in the US discussion on the Revolution in Military Affairs and the future of the State Department and the other foreign policy organizations. 54 What has been widely noted (and taken on board by practitioners) is the idea of power as cultural attraction particularly gener- ated by positive perceptions of particular states as being culturally or economically successful. 55

C o n c l u s i o n s : P o w e r as M o b i l i z a t i o n

While the scope and visibility of what I have termed the new public diplomacy is novel, the mechanisms that it employs are not. Persuasion, framing, and agenda


setting are the basic tools of political influence. However, focusing on them tends to change our understanding of how power operates. The changes in the political and communications context of international politics change make their operation more visible and accessible to more agents.

Power is not a magic bullet that can render the interactions of international politics immediately comprehensible, but serves as short hand for what agents do. The analysis presented above suggests that we have been looking for power in the wrong places. IR theory tends to start from the presumption that military power is the ultimate determinant of the outcomes in IR. This military bias results in power being thought of in terms of confrontations between well defined positions. The image of power can be illustrated if we think of the forces needed to move a huge boulder securely embedded in a mountainside. Yet if the boulder is already rolling down the mountain, the forces needed to push it in a new direction are very much less. We may be unable to move the boulder, but if it is already in motion, we may be able to move it onto a new course. Human society (and particularly the small sections of it that represent political organizations) are already (and always in motion), thus, a relatively minor impetus delivered at the right place and time and can change outcomes.

To think in terms o f processes is to see that the mechanisms of soft power are not exceptional but the normal tools of politics. All that the new public diplomacy is doing is allowing more people to use them in a more public way. The consequence of the age o f mixed media is that more people can do this changing the dynamics and the outcomes o f politics, and that is no small thing.

Anthony Giddens treats power and, by extension, agency, in terms of the capacity to use the rules and resources that exist in any social context to produce effects. What the new public diplomacy indicates is the way in which technological and political change is changing the possibilities to act within world politics. Power needs to be treated in terms of mobilizational processes rather in terms of structures or agents.

The changes in the global media environment affect the political strategies adopted by both states as well as non-state actors. Analysis of these developments suggests that power in the information age cannot be understood solely in terms of resources or structures without consideration of process issues such as mobilizing strategies and the ability of agents to set agendas and influence the framing of issues via the media. Such a perspective explains the ability of resource poor actors to exert influence in particular circumstances and the limitations of this influence.

Notes

1. British Council, 'Memorandum submitted to Select Committee on Foreign Affairs', 23 Febru- ary 1999 available on-line at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm 199899/cmselect/cmfaff/ 271/9022309.htm [accessed 9 August 2000].

2. Norman Kempster, 'She Lands the Public Diplomacy Account' Los Angeles Times, 1 Novem- ber 2001 available on-line at www.latimes.com/business/la- 110101 prop. story [accessed 10 De- cember 2001 ].

3. For instance Project on the Advocacy of US Interests Abroad, Equipped for the Future: Manag- ing US Foreign Affairs in the 21 s' Century (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1998),

Brown 27

Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age (Washington DC: CSIS, 1998), Ronald Deibert, 'International Plug 'n ' Play?: Citizen Activ- ism, the Internet and Global Public Policy', International Studies Perspectives, 1,3 (December 2000), pp. 255-72, Lloyd Axworthy' Foreign Policy in the Information Age' Ottawa, 6 Decem- ber 1996 available online at www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignp/ciis/96 053e.htm (accessed 13 March 2001).

4. Philip G. Cerny, 'Plurilateralism: Structural Differentiation and Functional Conflict in the Post- Cold War World Order', Millennium, 22, 1 (1993), pp. 27-51.

5. I use the term power with caution. On one hand it indicates a concern with agency but as is implied in sophisticated discussions of power an adequate power analysis becomes an analysis of the entire social situation. My concern here is to identify the ways in which agency seeks to exert influence and to explain how these efforts may or may not succeed.

6. Cited in 'What is Public Diplomacy?' available on-line at www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm [accessed 8 November 2000].

7. US Department of State, Dictionary of International Relations Terms and USIA-State Depart- ment Planning Group both cited in] 'What is Public Diplomacy?'

8. Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945-61 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p. 86, Philip M. Taylor, Global Communications, Interna- tional Affairs and the Media since 1945 (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 35.

9. Hixson, Parting the Curtain, pp. 102-5.1 10. Carries Lord, 'The Past and Future of Public Diplomacy', Orbis, 42, 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 49-

72 at pp. 53-54 of course it is the perceived success of the BBC World Service and the British Council as tools of public diplomacy that underpin such views.

11. Alvin A. Snyder, 'US Foreign Affairs in the New Information Age: Charting a Course for the 21 st Century', part 2 available online at www.annenberg.nwu.edu/pubs/usfa [accessed 9 Au- gust 2000].

12. Teledensity estimates for 124 territories can be for the period 1991-2000 can be found at www.itu.int/sg3focus/teledensityA.htm, as of 2000 there were 35 countries where numbers of mobile phone subscribers exceeded fixed line subscribers. Global numbers of mobile phone subscriptions were projected to exceed fixed lines by 2005, www.itu.int/journal/200105/E/html/ update.html.

13. Obvious examples of this are the Rodney King incident, footage of American casualties in Somalia, the Canadian Airborne Regiment was disbanded after two separate tapes came to light with evidence of indiscipline and brutality, www.newsworld.cbc.ca/flashback/1996/. Also see Steven Livingston, 'Transparency and the News Media' in Bernard I Finel and Kristin M. Lord (eds.), Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency (New York: Palgrave, 2000).

14. On the issue of autonomy see Robert M. Entman, 'Declarations of Independence: The Growth of Media Power After the Cold War', in Brigitte Nacos et al. (eds.), Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century (Landham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

15. Given that elites are relatively low consumers of broadcast media one should also note the internationalization of elite newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times and the International Herald Tribune.

16. John Sinclair, Elizabeth Jacka and Stuart Cunningham (eds.), New Patterns in Global Televi- sion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), S.M.S El Kassaby, Editorial Policies of Arab News Satellite Channels, unpublished MA By Research Dissertation (Leeds: University of Leeds, 1999).

17. Mark Landler, 'The Ted Turner of China?', International Herald Tribune, 10 January 2001, p. 11. 18. On the impact of new media on domestic politics see W. Lance Bennett and Robert M. Entman

(eds.) Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Richard Davis and Diana Owen, New Media and American Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

19. For a discussion of the similarities between public diplomacy and public relations see Benno H. Signitzer and Timothy Coombs, 'Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Conceptual Convergences', Public Relations Review, 18, 2 (Summer 1992), pp. 137-47.

20. Robin Brown, Campbell Over Kosovo: Mobilization and Media Management in British For-


eign Policy, paper presented at BISA Conference, Manchester, 1999 and 'Spinning the World' in Francois Debrix and Cynthia Weber (eds.), Mediating Internationals (Minneapolis, MN.: University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming), for the War on Terrorism see Karen DeYoung, 'US, Britain. Step up War for Public Opinion', Washington Post, 1 November 2001, p. A1.

21. Mark Leonard, BritainrU: Renewing Our Identity (London: Demos, 1997), Alan Chong and Jana Valencic (Eds.), The Image, The State and International Relations, EFPU Working Papers 2001/2 (London: LSE, 2001).

22. Jarol Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), chap. 2, Yizhong Sun, The Competition of Two Lobbies: The New "China Lobby'and the "Taiwan Lobby'in the Post Cold War Era: A Comparative Study, paper presented at ISA Convention, Minneapolis, 1998).

23. US Department of Justice, Foreign Agents Registration Act, First Semi-Annual Report 2000, available on-line at www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fara [accessed 10 December 2001 ]. The extent to which such practices occur in other countries is a matter for research. The importance of the US and the complexity of its political system may make it uniquely hospitable to such activities.

24. Julia Taft, 'Non-Governmental Organizations: The Voice of the People', US Foreign Policy Agenda, March 2000 available on line at usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0300/ijpe/pj5 ltaft.htm (accessed 17 April 2000), Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1998).

25. Keck and Sikkink, Activists, Deibert, 'International', B.J. Bullert, Strategic Public Relations, Sweatshops and the Making of a Global Movement, Working Paper 2000-14 (Cambridge, MA: Joan Shorenstein Center, Fall 1999).

26. Thomas Carothers, 'Ousting Foreign Strongmen: Lessons from Serbia', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief, 1, 5 (May 2001), pp. 1-7, John Lancaster, 'US Aids Milosevic Foes', International Herald Tribune, 20 September 2001, pp. 1, 6.

27. Michel Camdessus and Moises Naim, 'A Talk with Michel Camdessus', Foreign Policy, 120 September 2000, pp. 32-45 at 36, 'Global Vision, Local Voice: The Report of the Task Force on Reorientation of UN Public Information Activities', available on-line at www.un.org/reform/ track2/info/chapterl.htm [accessed 25 January 2001], World Intellectual Property Organiza- tion, Work Programme 05: Global Communications and Public Diplomacy available on-line at www.wipo.org/eng/document/govbody/budget/2000_01/pdf/05 final I .pdf [accessed 3 Decem- ber 2001 ].

28. Philip M. Taylor, Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 188-9. Pascale Combelles-Siegel, Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 1998).

29. For instance John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.), In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Con- flict in the Information Age, MR-880-OSD (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corporation, 1997).

30. Among literature that addresses these ideas are Susan Strange's concept of the 'knowledge structure' in States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy (London: Pinter, 1988), neo-Gramscian literature places weight on the importance of ideas e.g. Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders' in Robert O. Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and it Critics (New York: Columbia, 1986), Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

31. Thomas Risse, '"Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in World Politics', International Orga- nization, 54, 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 1-39 at 9-10.

32. Leon Festinger cited in Alastair lain Johnston, 'Treating International Institutions as Social Environments', International Studies Quarterly, 45, 4 (December 2001), pp. 487-515 at 499.

33. Johnston, 'Institutions as Social Environments', p. 500. 34. Frank Schimmelfenig, 'The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the East-

ern Enlargement of the European Union', International Organization, 55, 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 47-80.

35. Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual Peace' in Kant, On History (Indianapolis, IN.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), pp. 129-35.

Brown 29

36. For a description of this process see Stephen Hess, The Government~Press Connection: Press Officers and Their Offices (Washington, DC.: Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 61-72, Marlin Fitzwater, Call the Briefing (New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 95.

37. Brown, 'Spinning the World' 38. Risse, 'Let's Argue', p. 9. 39. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power', American Political Science Re-

view, 56, 4 (December 1962), pp. 947-52. 40. Nye, Bound to Lead, p. 31 41. Nye, Bound to Lead, pp. 32-3. 42. J. G. Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the

Post War Economic Order', International Organization, 36, 4 (1982), pp. 379-415, Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

43. Nye, Bound to Lead, pp. 192-3. 44. Bachrach and Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power', pp. 948-9, Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement,

2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chap. 5. 45. Joseph S. Nye and William A. Owens, 'America's Information Edge', Foreign Affairs, 72, 2

(March/April 1996), pp. 20-36 at p. 21 fn. 1. 46. E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt, Brace, 1960), p. 4. 47. Nye and Owens 'America's Information Edge', p. 20. 48. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 'Power and Interdependence in the Information Age',

Foreign Affairs, 77, 5 (September/October 1998), pp. 81-94 at 84-5. 49. Keohane and Nye, 'Power and Interdependence', p. 89-92. 50. Keohane and Nye, 'Power and Interdependence', p. 91. 51. Nye has served as both Deputy Undersecretary of State and Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Affairs. 52. Robert M. Entman, 'Framing: Toward Clarification of Fractured Paradigm', Journal of Com-

munication, 43, 4 (Autumn 1993), pp. 51-8 at 52. 53. Lee Kuan Yew, 'Asia and the World in the Twenty First Century', PacNet Newsletter, 38 (20

September 1996) available On-Line at www.phy.duke.edu/-~nyhan/kaf007.html accessed 15 July 2001, 'Taiwan, China are Different Countries: Lu', Taiwan Headlines, 27 September 2000 available on-line at www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20000927/20000927p3.html accessed 15 July 2001, Hubert V6drine, France in the Age of Globalization (Washington DC: Brookings Institu- tion, 2001), p. 44, Lloyd Axworthy, 'Foreign Policy in the Information Age' 6 December 1996 available on line at www.dfait-maeci.gc.calenglish/foreignp/ciis/96_053e.htm.

54. US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Publics and Diplomats in the Global Commu- nications Age(Washington DC: ACPD, 1998), John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Emer- gence of Noopolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1999).

55. For this usage see the comments by Yew and V6drine cited above.

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Information technology and the transformation of diplomacy