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INFORMATION SYSTEMS FAILURE EXPLAINED THROUGH THE LENS OF THE CULTURAL WEB David Avison ESSEC Business School, Paris, France Email: [email protected] David Wilson University a/Technology, Sydney, Australia Email: [email protected] Abstract: This paper .provides a discussion of the Australian telecommunications company One.TeI Limited. The pa~er exa~mes the information technology strategies employed by the company and assesses the extent to whl~h a fal~ure of those strategies may have contributed to, or precipitated, the downfall of the business. In particular, It looks at the company through the lens of Johnson and Scholes' (1993) cultural b Thi . . we. IS perspectJ:re provides clear evidence of failings at the company, which were likely to have led to failure in its ITIIS pohcy and applications which, in turn, at least partly explains the downfall of the business. 1 INTRODUCTION The paper represents our interpretation of documentation in the public domain about the collapse of the Australian telecommunications com,?any One.Tel, much of this being from pubhshed reports, web sites, newspaper cuttings etc., along with several interviews with an IT project manager working at One.Tel during this period. In examining the elements of the Johnson and Scholes' (1993) cultural web in this context, it quotes widely from the text of Barry (2002). This cultural web model proves to be a useful tool to understand One.TeI's failure and could be used to analyse other companies. The One.Tel company was founded in 1995, and ':e~sed trading in 2001. During its relatively brief .xistence One.TeI occupied a position in the second rank of Australian telecommunication companies. !he ~otoriety that it gained as a result primarily of Its high profile directors probably exceeded its position in the market place. One.Tel was declared insolvent in June 2001 and is now in the process of being liquidated. There is also a court case p:oceeding against Jodee Rich, one of the company directors, A history of One.Tel can be found in Avison and Wilson (2002) and Barry (2002). In brief, One.Tel Limited was founded in 1995 and grew at a very substantial rate, and accomplished a great deal in a short time. The strategy in the early years was "customers not cables" (One.Tel Annual Report, 1999), as it hired the hardware and technology from other companies. However, based on the published figures, the dramatic growth in One.Tel's subscriber base in its final 18 months of trading was achieved only by incurring losses on a grand scale. Of particular interest was the unusual culture of the company, driven by its joint managing director, Jodee Rich. It was a major differentiator compared to .the competing telecommunications companies, which are much more conventional, and it was also designed to maximise staff productivity at minimum cost. We examine the company culture later through the lens of the cultural web. One.Tel also saw itself as a very powerful ~arketer and brand builder. The company presented Itself as young, colourful, and dynamic. It claimed that the One.TeI brand was instantly recognisable in sev~n countri~s (One.TeI Annual Report, 2000). It deliberately distanced itself as far as possible from the e~tablished telecommunications companies, whose Image tends to be much more staid. It openly targeted the youth market, on the basis that young people often have no allegiance to the established carriers, were attracted by the company's youthful style, and often have substantial disposable incomes. Much has been written in the press about the reasons for One.TeI's rapid descent into insolvency. Most of the material has focused upon the apparent failings of the company's high profile joint man~ging directors, Jodee Rich and Bradley Keehng. The focus on these leading players, and Lachlan Murdoch representing News Corporation 203

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Page 1: INFORMATION SYSTEMS FAILURE EXPLAINED THROUGH THE … · Jodee Rich. It was a major differentiator compared to .the competing telecommunications companies, which are much more conventional,

INFORMATION SYSTEMS FAILURE EXPLAINED THROUGHTHE LENS OF THE CULTURAL WEB

David AvisonESSEC Business School, Paris, France

Email: [email protected]

David WilsonUniversity a/Technology, Sydney, Australia

Email: [email protected]

Abstract: This paper .provides a discussion of the Australian telecommunications company One.TeI Limited. Thepa~er exa~mes the information technology strategies employed by the company and assesses the extent towhl~h a fal~ure of those strategies may have contributed to, or precipitated, the downfall of the business. Inparticular, It looks at the company through the lens of Johnson and Scholes' (1993) cultural b Thi. . we. IS

perspectJ:re provides clear evidence of failings at the company, which were likely to have led to failure in itsITIIS pohcy and applications which, in turn, at least partly explains the downfall of the business.

1 INTRODUCTION

The paper represents our interpretation ofdocumentation in the public domain about thecollapse of the Australian telecommunicationscom,?any One.Tel, much of this being frompubhshed reports, web sites, newspaper cuttings etc.,along with several interviews with an IT projectmanager working at One.Tel during this period. Inexamining the elements of the Johnson and Scholes'(1993) cultural web in this context, it quotes widelyfrom the text of Barry (2002). This cultural webmodel proves to be a useful tool to understandOne.TeI's failure and could be used to analyse othercompanies.

The One.Tel company was founded in 1995, and':e~sed trading in 2001. During its relatively brief.xistence One.TeI occupied a position in the secondrank of Australian telecommunication companies.!he ~otoriety that it gained as a result primarily ofIts high profile directors probably exceeded itsposition in the market place. One.Tel was declaredinsolvent in June 2001 and is now in the process ofbeing liquidated. There is also a court casep:oceeding against Jodee Rich, one of the companydirectors,

A history of One.Tel can be found in Avisonand Wilson (2002) and Barry (2002). In brief,One.Tel Limited was founded in 1995 and grew at avery substantial rate, and accomplished a great dealin a short time. The strategy in the early years was

"customers not cables" (One.Tel Annual Report,1999), as it hired the hardware and technology fromother companies. However, based on the publishedfigures, the dramatic growth in One.Tel's subscriberbase in its final 18 months of trading was achievedonly by incurring losses on a grand scale.

Of particular interest was the unusual culture ofthe company, driven by its joint managing director,Jodee Rich. It was a major differentiator comparedto .the competing telecommunications companies,which are much more conventional, and it was alsodesigned to maximise staff productivity at minimumcost. We examine the company culture later throughthe lens of the cultural web.

One.Tel also saw itself as a very powerful~arketer and brand builder. The company presentedItself as young, colourful, and dynamic. It claimedthat the One.TeI brand was instantly recognisable insev~n countri~s (One.TeI Annual Report, 2000). Itdeliberately distanced itself as far as possible fromthe e~tablished telecommunications companies,whose Image tends to be much more staid. It openlytargeted the youth market, on the basis that youngpeople often have no allegiance to the establishedcarriers, were attracted by the company's youthfulstyle, and often have substantial disposable incomes.

Much has been written in the press about thereasons for One.TeI's rapid descent into insolvency.Most of the material has focused upon the apparentfailings of the company's high profile jointman~ging directors, Jodee Rich and BradleyKeehng. The focus on these leading players, andLachlan Murdoch representing News Corporation

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and James Packer representing PBL (two majorAustralian media companies that latterly took upnearly 50% of the ownership of One.Tel), thoughunderstandable from a journalistic viewpoint, hasunderplayed the impact ofIT failure.

2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THEFAILURE

The IT strategies operating within One.Tel were notadapted to meet the rapid growth that ensued. Itsuggests that the methods that had served adequatelyin the early years, were not appropriate for themiddle years. The delivery of IT systems for a full-service large-scale telecommunications companyrequires a high degree of professionalism and longterm planning.

2.1 Systems Development

Systems development at One.Tel seems to exemplifythe "initial" level of maturity described by theCarnegie Mellon University's Capability MaturityModel. The characteristics of this level are "chaotic,ad hoc, heroic; unorganised, uncoordinated; highvariance, unpredictable, crisis management" (Paulket aI, 1993). The teams of young and highly paidtechnicians at One.Tel thrived in this environment.Systems were delivered in quick time for billing, callcentre, dealer management and debt collection,among many others. Only two significant systemswere outsourced: the fmancial system and a datawarehouse application used to generate keyperformance indicators.

Further, most of the One.Tel staff were tied intoproductivity bonus schemes. The bonuses thatapplied to the IT development staff were linked tocode delivered by an agreed date. The normal casewas for a developer to write and test his own codeand release direct into production, all by the duedate. At this point he could get the task signed offand apply for his bonus. There was a significantincentive to deliver code by a particular date nomatter how shoddily written, often with nodocumentation, and with the most cursory testing.

It would have been more professional to havepeer code review before signing off; documentationcompleted, checked, and filed; quality assurancecompleted by testing team; user acceptance (ifrelevant/appropriate); and managed release intoproduction. Without these steps in place, such abonus system is likely to deliver large amounts ofshoddy bug-ridden code.

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2.2 Billing System

The One.Tel billing system was one of the firstsystems to be developed when the new companycommenced trading in 1995. The billing system wasdesigned and developed entirely in-house by a teamof young and enthusiastic programmers and it was aclassic representation of the One.Tel approach tobuilding systems.

In the euphoric atmosphere that prevailed withinOne.Tel in the early years, the systems developersacquired a high reputation and status. Every timesome critical new functionality was required, thedevelopment team produced a champion who wouldwork night and day to produce a result. However,specifications, documentation and standards sufferedin this atmosphere. This lack of discipline wasunderstandable and not unusual at this stage in thegrowth of the firm and its IT systems, but becameproblematical, particularly in the case of the billingsystem. Companies depend on the unfailingtimeliness and accuracy of this system for their cashflow, and One.Tel was no exception. In the longterm, some serious flaws in the billing system atOne.Tel revealed themselves. .

The first major flaw was a long-term dependenceon an inadequate design. The original system wasdesigned and developed by developers, includingprogrammers, under conditions of great stress andurgency. It should have been viewed as only a short-term solution. However, the basic system remainedin production, relatively unchanged, until thetermination of business in 2001. The system lackedflexibility, and was supported by inadequatelydesigned database tables. It became impossible toaccommodate, within the database, the complexsales plans, which were an important part ofOne.Tel's marketing strategy. The system becameincreasingly dependent upon hard-coding to providefunctionality. Consequently the individual programsbecame exceedingly complex, and the systemincreasingly difficult to maintain.

The second major flaw was a lack of checks andbalances. The system failed to provide the mostbasic financial integrity checks. It was impossible toreconcile the value of bills produced in a billing run,either backwards to the calls loaded from thecarriers, or forwards to the value fmally posted tothe General Ledger. There were no checks at eachstage of value loaded, value billed, or value posted.In the fmal year of its operation, the system wasproducing 600,000 bills per month and, apart fromthe most basic visual checking, the company had nomeans to verify their accuracy. Auditors might havedemanded more rigorous controls, but according toLecky (2001), the auditors claimed surprise at the

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company's troubles and declared that all had beenwell in June 2000.

The third major flaw was a lack of prioritisationand forward planning. Proper priority was not givento major enhancements required to the billingsystem. Two conspicuous examples of this were theimplementation of the Goods and Services Tax(GST) and the introduction of the NextGen mobileservice, both in 2000. In the case of GST, not onlywere these changes implemented one month late, butthey were so poorly executed that it caused billingrun times to increase by about 50 per cent. Thechanges to accommodate NextGen mobile wereimplemented three months behind schedule, whichcaused the first users of the new phones to wait threemonths for their first bill. It would appear thatsufficient resources were not allocated in time tomeet critical deadlines. On each occasion the billingsystem suffered from these failures to plan, and theresult was large numbers of seriously delayed andfrequently inaccurate bills.

2.3 Failure of IT Strategy

As we have seen, there was a failure to recognise theweaknesses within the billing system in sufficienttime to take effective corrective action. It is true thata great deal of remedial work took place in the lastnine months of the system's life, but this was 'toolittle, too late'.

The principal strategic failure took place in 1999when One.Tel received a massive injection offunding and started from being a junior localtelecommunications company to a full-serviceinternational operation. At this time, when fundswere plentiful, and substantial change and growthwas in prospect, it was necessary to develop a long-term plan. However, no such planning took place,the assumption presumably being that amanagement-by-crisis approach could continue todeliver systems to serve the company.

Several years must have been formulated atboardroom level as much of it was published in theAnnual Reports for 1999 and 2000. For example, thefollowing events were all clearly on the horizon:

• Significant growth on all business fronts:fixed wire, mobile, and ISP;

• Introduction of cut-price local call plans;• Introduction ofNextGen mobile;• Introduction ofGST from July 2000.

All of these changes were to have a significantimpact upon the billing system, which was unable tocope with substantial increases in volume andcomplexity. As noted by Elliott and Gluyas (2001)"One.Tel ... failed to reinvest in the advanced

customer management systems needed for a massconsumer market".

In 1999, two major projects were commencedwhich absorbed the majority of the IT funding andmost of the talented people. These were areplacement call centre system and a databasereplication/fallback system. While these projectswere not without merit, they were less fundamentalthan the billing system, which was seen as non-glamorous and technically non-challenging and wasstarved of resources.

As described above, the billing system survivedrelatively intact until the introduction of GST in July2000, but this caused run times to expand by around50%. The billing system depended upon one cyclebeing processed every three days. If the cycleprocessing time exceeded three days, bills wereinevitably produced late. After GST, it was taking 6-7 days to complete a bill cycle. Further, largenumbers of bills were calculated incorrectly andneeded to be reprinted.

While a rectification team was trying to improvethroughput, two further complications were added tothe system. Firstly, the data replication teamlaunched their solution, which further increased theload on the struggling system. Secondly, theNextGen mobile team fmally completed their inputto the billing system, three months behind schedule.This introduced yet more loading and another roundof incorrect bills, which needed re-calculation.

At this point, late in the year 2000, the companyrealised that it had a crisis on its hands andmaintenance and improvement of the billing systembecame the absolute priority. However, the systemnever recovered from the GST problems in July2000, and from that time onwards the production ofbills was always from three to six weeks behindschedule.

The progressive failure of the One.Tel billingsystem affected the business in a number of ways.Firstly, the delay of up to six weeks in despatchingbills had a dramatic effect on cash flow. Gottliebsen(2001) calculated that the six-week delay, combinedwith the normal six-week delay in receiving call datarecords from the carriers, meant that One.Tel neededat least $120 million extra in working capital tocover the cash flow gap. Secondly, One.Tel's billingsystem had a great propensity for producingincorrect bills, for reasons already described. Whilethese were sometimes identified and corrected, oftenthey were not. The One.Tel call centre wasconstantly besieged with callers making complaintsabout their bills, and caller waiting times becameintolerable. Customers with incorrect bills whocannot gain satisfaction are not inclined to pay them.Gottliebsen (200 I) further observed that slow payingcustomers meant an even greater strain on working

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capital and the amount was growing daily. When thecompany ceased trading, debtors ~t~od at $170million (Trute, 2001). Of this, $75 million was morethan 120 days old, which effectively meant thatthese debts would never be collected.

Perhaps the most damning effect of the failure ofthe billing system was that it brought the compa~yinto serious disrepute. For many customers, the billis the only regular contact that they have wi~h .theirtelecommunications supplier, and frequently It IS allthe contact they need or want. If the bills do notappear, or are suspected to be inacc~ate, then .therewill be a general loss of confidence m the busme~s.The media then fuelled this loss of confidence withmany derisory articles about One.Tel and itsproblems. Some examples of adverse press havebeen "the billing system was appalIing" (Howarth,2001) and "some customers never even got a bill"(Elliott and Gluyas, 2001). Gottliebsen (2001)summed it up: "The One.Tel billing problems werelike a fault in an aircraft. Discovered on the groundit may mean long delays, but if discovered in the airit is often fatal".

Two critical dates in the history of One.Tel are17th May 2001, the date of the crisis board meeting,and 30th May 2001, the date the administrators werecalled in. Originally the major investors, News andPBL, were going to underwrite a rights issue of $132million to rescue the company. However, by the endof May they had decided that the company was notsalvageable. During this period the bilI.ing syst~mwas thoroughly scrutinised by PBL informationtechnology experts. Their conclusions were notpublished, but it is most likely that they concludedthat the system was beyond early repair. We alsoknow that the media was full of anecdotes andwitticisms about the parlous state of One.Tel'ssystems. Perhaps the One.Tel business may havebeen able to be saved, but there is a strong likelihoodthat News and PBL decided that One.Tel'sreputation had become so tarnished that t~ey nolonger wished to be associated with it. We will nowlook at the failure from the viewpoint of the culturalmodel.

4 ONE.TEL IN THE CONTEXT OFA CULTURAL MODEL

Johnson and Scholes (1993) cultural web (Figure 1)has six elements around the organisational paradigm,which describes the overalI picture of anorganisation. We wilI describe each element in tumand provide examples in the specific context ofOne.Tel.

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4.1 Organisational structures

Organisational structures are most clearly andtraditionally evidenced in an organisation chartshowing hierarchy, reporting structures and jobgrading. Management style, location of ~mployeesand patterns of informal contact can provide furtherevidence. Formal and informal organisationstructures suggest other important relationships andsupport of power structures.

Rich is quoted in Barry (2002) as saying thatOne.Tel has a 'flat management structure, nohierarchies' (P64). Organisational charts werebanned (P76). The directors worked in hands-onmode, and there was almost no middle management(One.Tel Annual Report, 2000). In the early dayseveryone sat together on 'one floor with nopartitions, offices or corridors, and everyone muckedin' (P75). Although the flat management structuremight have worked for 30 people it could not. workfor 3000 as its staff numbers became. Accordmg toBarry (P186) 'finding the person responsible fordoing a particular job could be a nightmare. Thetelephone list didn't telI you who did what, and noone had offices, so new managers found themselveswondering down the rows of [desks], asking forpeople by name. The lack of job titles ~a?e it easyfor people to claim that it was not theIr Job to dowhat was needed'.

Figure 1: Cultural web (modified from Johnson andScholes, 1993)

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INFORMATION SYSTEMS F;A.ImRE EXPLAINED THROUGH THE LENS OF THE CUIo-TUR:A-EWEB

One.Tel was an example of a 'Random'organization (Constantine, 2001). On the positiveside it tried to be egalitarian, innovative, andexciting, while on the other side it also tended to bechaotic and unstable. Management saw their role tobe that of preparing the ground for their creativepeople.

Compared to many organisations, the flatstructure at One.Tel might be assumed to have givenhigher status to information systems: the IT managerreported to Rich himself. On the other hand, the lackof management structure seemed to imply a lack ofstatus to all but Rich and his top management team.

4.2 Control systems

High status individuals and groups have control overresources and working practices, and the autonomyis reflected in the organisation's control systems.These include methods of appraisal and reward,promotion opportunities and grading, employeedevelopment, and methods of funding andevaluation. They support the organisationalparadigm to 'emphasise what is important to theorganisation, and focus attention and activity'(Johnson and Scholes, 1993). The way in whichIS/IT is funded, responsibility accounting relating toinformation systems and the way in which ISprojects are justified, might be indicative of thestatus of the IS function.

According to Barry (2002), during the period ofOne.Tel's existence, it was increasingly in chaos.Neither its managers nor its systems had kept pacewith its growth. One senior accountant argued that'it was the perfect example of how not to manage acompany. It was run like a family business or a fishand chip shop. It had 3000 employees, but it wasstill like a company with ten ... The place was a joke.There were no structures, no accounting systems, noprocesses, and no controls' (pI 85).

If budget size alone were an indication of status,then IS/IT would have high status in manycompanies. However, Earl (1989) identifies thequestion of 'how much should we spend on IT' as'the dominant concern' when attempting to resolve'the funding issue'. However, in One.Tel, it was alack of willingness to invest in a replacement billingsystem, amongst others, that proved very costly.

Regarding control of people, despite Rich'sespoused philosophy of empowering people, onlythose people that did not stand up to him werepromoted. A senior member of the fmance teamwhen discussing Rich argued that 'if you have goodmanagers, you give away decision making. If youhave yes men, you keep control. And he was acontrol freak' (Barry, 2002 p23 I).

Regarding control exercised through payment toIT staff, most of the One.Tel staff were tied intoproductivity bonus schemes. This fitted in well withtheir philosophy of driving staff to the utmost.However the bonuses that applied to the ITdevelopment staff were linked to code delivered byan agreed date. The normal case was for a developerto work flat out to write and test his own code andrelease direct into production, all by the due date. Atthis point he could get the task signed off and applyfor his bonus. There was thus a significant incentiveto deliver code by a particular date no matter howshoddily written, with no documentation, and withthe most cursory testing. Maximum productivity wasencouraged at the expense of quality andthoroughness.

4.3 Power Structures

Power structures are not necessarily made explicitby the organisation chart, which may only implypowerful groupings, devolution of authority andinfluential personalities. Decision-making may becentralised, devolved throughout the organisation orexist in pockets of authority.

In relation to information systems, a powerfulchampion for the business unit may increase itsstatus. Devolution of responsibility and authoritythroughout the organisation may provide unit headswith the ability to reflect their attitude towards IS/ITin their buying decisions. Power structures might beidentified by exploring such areas as the type ofdecisions made by information systemsprofessionals, how the IS/IT strategy is formulated,and the means by which IS strategy is linked tobusiness needs.

In the euphoric atmosphere that prevailed withinOne.Tel in the early years, the systems developersacquired a high reputation and status. Every timesome critical new functionality was required, thedevelopment team produced a champion who wouldwork night and day to deliver a result. However,specifications, documentation and standards sufferedin this atmosphere. This lack of discipline wasunderstandable and not unusual at this stage in thegrowth of the fum and its IT systems, but it wasproblematical, particularly in the case of the billingsystem.

Although the general atmosphere at One.Tel wasone of 'fantastic camaraderie' and 'one big happyfamily' with an aim to be 'fun and friendly' (Barry,2002 pp74-75), Rich's management style wasautocratic. As he told Rodney Adler, a formerpartner, 'either you're with me 100 per cent oryou're not' (p13). If goals set by Rich were seen as

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unrealistic, staff were told that 'if you can't do itthen you are not the one for the job' or, worse,'you're not a team player ... you're not a One.Telperson' (p108).

Another senior, Paul Fleetwood, remembers Richcoming to his desk with his phone light blinking andbeing asked 'Don't you want to work for thiscompany? I left you a message half an hour ago andyou haven't answered it. Don't let me ever see thatagain' (Barry, p76).

As we have seen, One.Tel's billing system couldnot do the job with so many new customers. Thesoftware designed for tens of thousands of customershad to cope with 750000. Barry (2002) argues(p192) that the obvious answer was to scrap the oldsystem and build a new one, but no one in the ITdepartment had the guts to say to Rich 'we can'tmake it work'.

The power structure was such that everyonearound Rich was simply a 'yes man - it was acompany of managers who did what they were told.'His whole style was to intimidate' says oneaccountant, 'he wondered why no one told him thetruth. That's because when they did he would tearshreds off them' (Barry, 2002 P 231).

4.4 Stories

An organisation's culture may be apparent throughits stories and myths. The stories that are retold mayreinforce the status of a group. Such stories includethose about employees who tried to 'beat thesystem', runaway projects, spectacular successes orfailures, or the project leader who never seems to gohome. The stories, through telling of the unusual,may reinforce the culture of the organisation oralienate one business unit from that culture.

There were many One.Tel stories, but one wasparticularly important to Rich who required that allnew recruits be able to recite. They would be askedto define a team player, to which the correct answerwas 'someone who enjoyed others' success andshared' (Barry, 2002 p75). The IT floor featured aGreek mythology theme, with a picture of Theseusand the Minotaur in the maze. Underneath was themoral of the story: don't be secretive (Barry, p78).

The stories told by Rich to many added up to adream, which later proved to be a nightmare. WhenMurdock and Packer invested in One.Tel, they hadnot insisted on having their own finance director inOne.Tel to look after their AU$710 millioninvestment. 'It appeared that they were too dazzledby the dream' (Barry, 2002 P 134).

Customers were asked to tell their One.Telstories to friends, later .these were very negative

208

stories which obviously harmed the company. In2001, the Ombudsman, John Pinnock, wrote toOne.Tel that 'it is clear that there are systemicproblems in dealing with customer complaints. I amalso most concerned that recent letters and emailsfrom various employees at One.Tel show a completelack of understanding and acceptance of One.TeI'sobligations ... to its customers'. Later he was toobserve to the press that the company 'did not seemto care'.

4.5 Rituals and routines

Pentland and Rueter (1994) suggest that routines areused to explain the inertial quality of organisationalstructure and see them as the cornerstone of theoriesof organisational learning and adaptation.'Routines ... are essentially complex patterns ofsocial interaction'. The literature on routinesencompasses the cognitive processes of individualsand structural and institutional constraints. Routinesshould not be thought of as mindless or automaticbut that they are an effortful accomplishment.Routines and rituals share common roots as anymoves are shaped by the physical and ritualdimensions of organisational structure as well as theneed to draw on cognitive resources distributedamong individuals. Pentland and Rueter (1994)argue that the enabling and continuing structures thattypify organisational work situations - such ashierarchy, division of labour task-specific andsituation-specific issues - naturally give rise toregular patterns of action, or routines.

Procedures and how they are followed, theorganisation's rituals and routines may give anindication of what is rewarded and valued by theorganisation. Martin et al. (1995) acknowledge theimportance of the rituals and routines to theinformation systems function when suggesting that'the new systems that work best are those that arealigned not only with the business but also with theway people think and work'. Rituals and routinesmight include the coffee break and the office party,but in an IS context, might also include the use orabuse of IS development methods and theconventions surrounding the interaction between ISprofessionals and users. As Avison and Fitzgerald(2003) argue, a methodological information systemsdevelopment may be appropriate for smaller firms,but can cause many problems as the company grows.

Some aspects at One.Tel could be said to beenlightened, Rich had decreed that 'softwaredevelopers should sit with the people who used [thesystem] so that they could see the problems firsthand. And this made it user-friendly, more readilyimproved and more easily fixed' (Barry p75). Later,

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however, as pressures mounted things became morehectic, and according to one senior programmer'sometimes it was not until [a software] change wentlive that we found out it wasn't working. Then wewould have to stop the whole billing system and itwould take a couple of days to correct it' (Barry,pI93).

One.Tel tried very hard to build a 'can-do'mentality, where teams were encouraged to workvery hard to achieve desired results. There isevidence that in the early years this approach metwith considerable success. Within the IT group, forexample, a number of quite sophisticated systemswere developed in an unusually short time frame.

One.Tel had written 'beliefs and values' whichwere all about caring, sharing, positive thinking andpeer review. There were no hierarchies, no job titles,no job descriptions - just missions. These statedbeliefs and values included 'add and create value ineverything you do', 'make it better', 'give youropinions' and (as we saw earlier) 'a happy teammeans happy players'. Barry (2002, p76) observesthat 'there was more than an element of a religion orcult about it all. And those who didn't follow theleader risked being challenged on their faith'.

One accountant who was interviewed for a job atOne.Tel asked for management accounts, businessplans and so on, but was told 'That's not the way wedo things' (Barry, 2002 p248). He turned down thejob 'as there were none of the disciplines needed torun the business'.

4.6 Symbols

Finally, the status of an individual or group may beevidenced in such symbols as the size and locationof their office, make and model of their company carand the like. Little attention in the IS literatureseems to be given to this.

Despite the apparent equality and camaraderie, atOne.Tel there were teams and champions, calledOne.Team and One.Champ, and the champions hadtheir pictures painted on the wall (Barry, p75). Thusthe espoused organisation structure was contradictedby the symbolic pictures showing the 'first amongequals'. Yet another cartoon on the wall was labelled'vitamin C', encouraging everyone to 'give tablets toone another', sharing what they knew. 'No secretswere allowed' (Barry, p76).

Some symbols suggested negative interpretationsof the conventional office, thus meetings were to beminimised and to suggest their short-term naturethey were known as 'huddles', perhaps arounddesks, known as 'pods'.

Later in the company's history, two generalmanagers were appointed. One, George Savva, had

been with the company since 1995. He drove aPorsche, an Alpha Romeo and a Range Rover, androde a Ducati. Rich himself was similarly keen onflashy cars and enjoyed his staff to have similarsymbols, but not if they looked more impressivethan his own prestigious transport!

4.7 Organisational Paradigm

The organisational paradigm, evident at the centre offigure I, describes the overall picture of anorganisation as supported by the cultural web. Whatdifferentiates the One.Tel case more than anything isthe 'can-do' management style. The lack of adevelopment methodology, the lack of formaldocumentation and specifications, the CMM Level Iheroics, the high level of maintenance, and thequirky operating performance were not seen asfailures ... on the contrary, they were lauded andchampioned as excellent examples of the companyethos. Only when the billing system started to causecustomer complaints and not meet accountingpractice was the paradigm questioned. However, itwas not questioned at the top: this would be seen asa symbol of weakness. Jodee Rich concentrated verymuch on the big picture. Cadzow (2001) suggestedhis attitude was 'why bother with petty concerns likefaulty billing systems ... when you can be thinkingabout global expansion'.

5 CONCLUSION

We have previously suggested (Avison and Wilson,2002) that the failure of One.Tel had much to dowith its IT failures. However, in this paper we haveargued, through the use of the cultural web, that thiswas in tum caused by the culture of the company.

Although the organisational structure had muchto commend it, being non-hierarchical and informal,this became inappropriate as the company grew andsome degree of formality became essential.Although the IT manager reported to Rich himself,the lack of management structure implied a lack ofstatus and power. In terms of control systems, therewere no structures, no accounting systems, noprocesses, and no controls. The lack of willingnessto invest in a replacement billing system, amongstothers, proved very costly. Further, One.Tel IT staffwere tied into productivity bonus schemes, and thisled to quick but poor work, again inappropriate tothe growing company. As for power structures, it

209

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JB:.:JS 2004 - HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION

would have been best to scrap the old system andbuild a new one, but no one in the IT department hadthe power to say this to Rich. In terms of stories andmyths, the IT floor featured a Greek mythologytheme, with a picture of Theseus and the Minotaur inthe maze. Underneath was the moral of the story:don't be secretive. This would be an excellent mythif Rich would have taken suggestions from the ITstaff seriously. Obvious rituals and routines in an IScontext, include formal IS development methodswhich were not used in the company. Again this isthe norm in a small company but causes manyproblems in the long run.

Thus the Johnson and Scholes model has helpedus explain how a company culture might have led toIT failings (as well as company failings). Thisanalysis suggests that the model could be used toanalyse other companies' propensity for ITIISfailure.

REFERENCESAvison, D. E. and Fitzgerald, G. (2003) Information

Systems Development: Methodologies, Techniquesand Tools, 3rd edition, McGraw-Hill, Maidenhead.

Avison, D. E. and Wilson, D (2002) IT Failure and theCollapse of One.Tel, In Traunmuller, R (Ed)Information Systems: The e-Business Challenge,KIuwer, pp 31-46.

Barry, P. (2002) Rich kids, Bantam, Milsons Point, NSW.Cadzow, J. (2001): That Rich Bloke, The Australian, 4

August.Constantine, L. (200 I) The Peopleware Papers. Prentice

Hall.Earl, M.J. (1989) Management Strategies for Information

Technology. Prentice Hall, Hemel Hempstead.Elliott G. and Gluyas R. (2001): One.Tel: disconnected,

The Australian, 31 May. http://www.news.com.auGottliebsen, R. (2001): Billing system starved One.Tel of

cash, The Australian, 15 June.http://www.theaustralianit.com.au/common/storyPage/

Howarth, B. (2001): We all lose from One.Tel, BusinessReview Weekly, 13 July.http://www.brw.com.au/updates/codel.asp

Johnson, G. & Scholes, K. (1993) Exploring CorporateStrategy. 3rd Edition. Prentice Hall, HemelHempstead.

Lecky, S. (2001): Auditors are called to account, 2 June.http://www.srnh.com.au/news/Ol 06/02/biztech/biztech2.html

210

Martin, B.L, Batchelder, G., Newcomb, J.,. Rockart, J.F.,Yetter, W.P. & Grossman, J.H. (1995) The End ofDelegation: IT and the CEO. Harvard BusinessReview (September-October 1995).

One.Tel Annual Report (1999): One.Tel Limited, Sydney.One.Tel Annual Report (2000): One.Tel Limited, Sydney.Paulk, M. c., Curtis, B., Chrissis, M. B. and Weber, C. V.

(1993): Capability Maturity Model, Version 1.1, IEEESoftware, 10 (4), July, ppI8-27.

Pentland B & Rueter H., (1994), Organizational Routinesas Grammars of Action, Administrative ScienceQuarterly, 39, 484-510.

Trute, P. (2001): One.Tel to close within 21 days, DailyTelegraph, 6 June. http://www.news.com.au

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I,,,,,,1m,.",... C,.IE"'CE ,.i

.. ..... . . ..... . IE.rEI',IIII.",.,rll. IrsrE.,... .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . I

...

PORTO, PORTUGAL' APRIL 14-17, 2004

HOSTED BY ORGANIZED BY IN COLlABORATION WITH

UNIVERSIDADEPOR1UCALENSE

INSTICCINSTITUTE FOR SYSTEMS and

TECHNOLOGIES OF INFORMATION,CONTROL and COMMUNICATION

ACM, AMI, IEICE andAPPIA

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Organization and Steering Committees

Honorary PresidentJorge Reis Lima, Universidade Portucalense, Portugal ([email protected])

Conference co-ChairsIsabel Seruca, Universidade Portucalense, Portugal ([email protected])

Joaquim Filipe, Escola Superior de Tecnologia de Setubal, Portugal([email protected])

Program co-ChairsSlimane Hammoudi, Ecole Superieure d' Electronique de I' Ouest. France

([email protected])Jose Cordeiro, Escola Superior de Tecnologia de Setubal, Portugal

([email protected])

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Senior Program Committee

Luis Amaral, University of Minho, PortugalPeter Begh Andersen, University of Aalborg, DenmarkRicardo Baeza-Yates, University of Chile, ChileJean Bezivin, University of Nantes, FranceEnrique Benson, University of Huelva, SpainJoao A. Carvalho, University of Minho, PortugalAlbert Cheng, University of Houston and Rice University, United States of AmericaHelder Coelho, FC - University of Lisbon, PortugalMiguel Delgado, University of Granada, SpainJan Dietz, Delft University of Technology, The NetherlandsFrank Dignum, Utrecht University, The NetherlandsAntonio Figueiredo, University of Coimbra, PortugalMark S. Fox, University of Toronto, CanadaGoran Goldkuhl, Linkoping University, SwedenThomas Greene, MIT, United States of AmericaNuno Guimaraes, University of Lisbon, PortugalJatinder Gupta, The University of Alabama in Huntsville, United States of AmericaJean-Paul Haton, University Henri Poincare, FranceAlberto Laender, Federal University of Minas Gerais, BrazilMaurizio Lenzerini, University La Sapienza of Rome, ItalyMichel Leonard, University of Geneve, SwitzerlandKecheng Liu, University of Reading, United KingdomPeri Loucopoulos, University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology, UnitedKingdomPaul Luker, Bournemouth University, United KingdomKalle Lyytinen, CaseWestern Reserve University, United States of AmericaYannis Manolopoulos, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, GreeceJose Legatheaux Martins, New University of Lisbon, PortugalMasao Matsumoto, Kyushu Sangyo University, JapanJames Odell, James Odell Associates, United States of AmericaLuis Moniz Pereira, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, PortugalAlain Pirotte, Catholique University of Louvain, BelgiumKlaus Pohl, University of Essen, GermanyColette Rolland, University of PARIS-1, FranceBernadette Sharp, Staffordshire University, United KingdomAlexander Smirnov, St. Petersburg - SPIlRAS,RussiaRonald Stamper, Staffordshire University, United KingdomZahir Tari, RMIT University, AustraliaMiguel Toro, University of Sevilla, SpainJose Tribolet, INESC/IST - Tecnhical University of Lisbon, PortugalFrancois Vernadat, European Commission, LuxembourgMerrill Warkentin, Mississippi State University, United States of AmericaHans Weigand, Tilburg University, The NetherlandsRoel Wieringa, University of Twente, The Netherlands

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General Information

Secretariat ContactsICEIS2004 SecretariatUniversidade PortucalenseDepartamento de InformaticaRua Dr. Antonio Bernardino de Almeida, 541-6194200 - 072 Porto - Portugal

Tel: +351 22 557 2512Fax: +351 22 5572015E-mail:[email protected]://www.iceis.org

Registra tionWorkshops: Tuesday, April 13th, 8:00 AM- 8:30 AM.Conference: From Wednesday, April 13th, to Saturday, April 17th

, at 8:00 AM.The registration Desk will be open every day during the conference.

MealsLunches will be served to all registered participants from 1:00 PMto 2:30 PMat theUniversity Restaurant.

CommunicationsDuring the conference, the secretariat will accept messages for participants. There willbe computer rooms with Internet access available for all registered participants.

6

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Track 5: Human-Computer Interaction

Room 309 - Wednesday, 14 - 5:00 PM-7:00 PM538 UNOBTRUSIVE ACQUSmON OF USER INFORMATION FOR E - COMMERCEAPPUCATIONSOshadi Alahakoon, S eng Loke and Arkat!J Zaslavsky775 AN INNOVATIVE VOCAL INTERFACE FOR AUTOMOTIVE INFORMATION SYSTEMSGennaro Costagliola, Sergio DiMartino, Filomena Ferrucci, Giuseppe Olivero, Umberto Montemuf1V and Alessandro Paliotti435 REAL WORLD SENSORIZATION AND VIRTUAUZATION FOR OBSERVING HUMANACTIVITIESKoji Kitamura, Yoshifumi Nishida, Makoto Kimura and Hiroshi Mi!{!lguchi132 USER INTERFACE DESIGN FOR VOICE CONTROL SYSTEMSWo#iang Tschirk

Room 105 -Thursday, 15-9:30 AM-10:30 AM182 ASSESSMENT OF E-LEARNING SATISFACTION FROM CRITICAL INCIDENTSPERSPECTIVENian-Shing Chen, Kan-Min lin and Kinshuk738 PERSONALISED RESOURCE DISCOVERY SEARCHING OVER MULTIPLE REPOSITORYlYPES: USING USER AND INFORMATION PROVIDER PROFIUNGBoris Rousseau, Parisch Browne, Paul Malone, Paul Foster and Venura Mendis

Room 105 -Thursday, 15 -11:00 AM-1:00 PM615 EMOTION SYNTHESIS IN VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTSAmaryllis Raouzaiou, Kostas Korpouifs and Stefanos Kollias381 THE MEETING OF GESTALT AND COGNITIVE LOAD THEORIES IN INSTRUCTIONALSCREEN DESIGNDempsey Chang and Juhani E. Tuovinen485 VERBS & TOPIC MAPS: A PROPOSAL FOR LEGAL DOCUMENTATION FROM THEDOCUMENT CONTENT ANALYSIS PERSPECTIVEMiguelAngel Marza4 Carmen Bolanos, Jorge Morato and Francisco Calzada740 USER ADAPTATION IN A PEDESTRIAN GUIDANCE SYSTEM FOR THE BLINDVivien Guillet, Beatrice RJtmpler and Jean-Marie Pinon

Room 105 - Thursday, 15 - 2:30 PM-4:30 PM630 ACCESSIBIUTY AND VISUALLY IMPAIRED USERSAntOnio Ramires Fernandes, Jor;geRibeiro Pereira and Jose Creissac Campos254 A METHODOLOGY FOR INTERFACE DESIGN FOR OLDER ADULTSMary Zeyicek195 CABA2LA BUSS PREDICTIVE COMPOSITION ASSISTJ\NT FORAAC COMMUNICATIONSOFTWARENicola Gatti and Matteo Matteucci552 ACCESSIBLE COMPUTER INTERACTION FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABIUTIES: THE CASE OFQUADRIPLEGICSPaula Kotze, Mariki EIofJ, Ayodele Adesina-Ojo and Jan Eloff

Room 105 - Thursday, 15 - 5:00 PM-7:00 PM582 A CONTACT RECOMMENDER SYSTEM FOR A MEDIATED SOCIAL MEDIAMichel Pitt, Layda Agosto, Laurence Vignollet and Jean-Charles MartY205 MANAGERIAL OPENNESS AND THE ADOPTION OF DISTRIBUTED GROUP SUPPORTSYSTEMS: THE CASE OF WEBWIDE PARTICIPATIONJohn Rohrbaugh506 USABIU1Y HEURISTICS FOR XML-BASED WEB DEVELOPMENTMarta Fernandez de Arriba and Jose A. LOpez Brugos330 INTERACTIVE 3D PRODUCT ASSEMBLER FOR THE WWW - A CASE STUDY OF A 3DFURNITURE STORESophia MK S 00 and Stephen Chan

29

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Room 105 - Friday, 16 - 9:30 AM-10:30 AM566 ROBUST SPOKEN DOCU11ENT RETRIEVAL BASED ON MULTILINGUAL SUBPHONETICSEG11ENT RECOGNITIONS hi-wook Lee, Ka~o Tanaka and Yoshiaki [toh484 AUTOMATIC NAVIGATION AMONG MOBILE DTVSERVICESChengyuan Peng; Petri Vuorimaa

Room 105 - Friday, 16 -11:00 AM-1:00 PM565 A FLEXIBLE INTERFACE ARCHITECTURE FOR DIGITAL TALKING BOOKSCarlos Duarte, Luis Carrifo and Hugo Simoes656 CONTENT ENRICHMENT THROUGH DYNAMIC ANNOTATIONGeorge Weir, George Lepouras and Costas Vassilakis664 MODULAR PRODUCTION OF RICH DIGITAL TALKING BOOKSLuis Carriio, Carlos Duarte, Nuno Guimarlies, AntOnio Serra/heiro and Isabel Trancoso805 COllABORATING TO IMPROVEERP USABILITYTamara Babaian, Went!>'Lucas and Heikki Topi278 HEURISTICS SUPPORTING USABLE AUTHORING TOOLSPaula Kotze and Elsabe Cloete

Room 105 -vSaturday, 17 -9:30 AM-10:30 AM263 DEFECTS, USEFULNESS AND USABILITY OF ETHICS THEORIES IN IS ETHICSEDUCATIONTero V'artiaine» and Mikko T. Siponen253 MANAGING EMOTIONS IN SMART USER MODELS FOR RECOM1\ffiNDER SYSTEMSGustavo Gonzalei? Beatriz LOpeZ and Josep Uuis de Ia Rosa

Room 105 - Saturday, 17 -11:00 AM-1:00 PM495 PREDICTING THE USER ACCEPTANCE OF PERSONALIZED INFORMATION SYSTEMS:CASE 11EDICAL PORTAL.Seppo Pabniia209 INFORMATION SYSTEMS FAILURE EXPLAINED THROUGH THE LENS OF THECULTURAL WEBDavidAvison and David Wi/son704 TOWARDS A MODEL FOR PERSONALIZED COMMUNICATION SERVICES BASED ONUSER PERCEPTIONClaudia Ribeiro, Nelson Rosa and Pau/Q Cunha725 USING VISUALS TO CONVEY INFORMATIONLuis Borges Gouveia371 A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF ACTIVITY-BASED 11ETHODS FOR INFORMATIONSYSTEMS DEVELOP11ENTAmanda Quek and Hanifa Shah

POSTERS - Thursday, 15 - 2:30 PM-4:30 PM162 AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REQUIRE11ENTS FORAN E-LEARNING SYSTEMYaen Yaacov Softr and Steve B. McIntosh434 LEARNING BY DOING AND LEARNING WHEN DOING: DOVETAILING E-LEARNINGAND DECISION SUPPORT WITH A DATA MINING TUTORKlaus P. Jantke, Steffen Lange, Gunter Grieser, Peter Grigoriev, Bernhard Thalheim and Bernd Tscbiedel494 BASIC STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE TELEOPERATION PLATFORMS THROUGH THEINTERNETJuan Esaibano, J. A. Cerrada, Ruben G~mez and Carlos Cerrada499 MODELLING DIALOGUES WITH EMOTIONAL INTERACTIVE AGENTSCteta Martinovska and Stevo BoiJnovski

30

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POSTERS - Saturday, 17 - 2:30 PM-4:30 PM699 ACCESSING HYPERMEDlA SYSTEMS EFE01VENESS IN LEARNING CONTEXTSS ilvina Santana and Alexander Silva789 USABILI1Y OF VISUAL DATA MINING TOOLSEdwige P. Fangseu Badjio and FranfOis Paule:821 A MULTIMEDIA WORKFLOW-BASED COLLABORATIVE ENGINEERlNG ENVIRONMENT:INTEGRATING AN ADAPTATIVE WORKFLOW WITH A MULTIMEDIA COLLABORATIONSYSTEM AND A COLLABORATIVE VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENT FOR PETROLEUMENGENEERlNGIsmae! Santos, Carla Valle, Alberto Raposo and Marcello Gattass876 DICHOCOA COMMUNICATOR - SUBSYSTEM FOR BIOMEDICAL HOME SYSTEMRudolf Volner and Lubomir Pousek

Special Session: Digital Libraries

Room 205 - Friday, 16 -11:00 AM-1:00 PM966 PERSONALIZING DIGITAL LIBRARIES FOR EDUCATIONFforiana Esposito, Oriana licchel/i, Pasquale Lops and Giovanni Semeraro994 E-LIBRARY TECHNICAL SOLUTION: AN EXAMPLE OF ETU "LETI"Yury Isaeu andAlexry Niskovslrg1081 TOOL SUPPORT FOR LEGAL ENQUIRY: FOCUS ON SPATIAL-PLANNING LAWErik! S neiders1191 DIGITAL LIBRARY: DESIGN AND SECURI1Y CONSIDERATIONSStanislav Mikuleckj

Room 205 - Friday, 16 - 2:30 PM-4:30 PM1199 A NEW GENERATION OF DIGITAL LIBRARY TO SUPPORT DRUG DISCOVERYRESEARCHE4Y S. liongosari, Anatole v: Gershman and Mit« Singh1205 TOWARDS THE SCHEMA HETEROGENEI1Y IN DISTRIBUTED DIGITAL LIBRARIESHao Ding and Ingeborg T. S elvberg1232 SEMANTIC INTEGRATION OF DIGITAL LIBRARIESJose Francisco .Aldana-Montes, Ismae! Navas-Delgado and Maria del Mar Roldtin-Garcfa452 SUPPORTING COURSE SEQUENCING IN A DIGITAL LIBRARY: USAGE OF DYNAMICMETADATA FOR LEARNING OBJECTSRaul Morales S alcedoand Yano Yoneo

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SIXTH /IITlRIIAT/OIIAI COIIIEREIICE OillIlTERPR/SE /IIIORMAT/Oll SYSrEMS

Volume 5PORTO, PORTUGAL· APRIL 14-17, 2004

HOSTED BY ORGANIZED BY IN COLLABORATION WITH

UNIVERSIDADEPORTUCALENSE

INSTICCINSTITUTE FOR SYSTEMS and

TECHNOLOGIES OF INFORMATION,CONTROL and COMMUNICATION

ACM, AMI, IEICE andAPPIA

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This volume contains the proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Enterprise InformationSystems (lCEIS 2004), organized by INSTICC (Institute for Systems and Technologies of Information,Control and Communication) in collaboration with PORTUCALENSE UNIVERSI1Y, who hosted theevent.

Following the line started in 1999, ICEIS aims at becoming a major point of contact between researchscientists, engineers and practitioners on the area of business applications of information systems.This year, five simultaneous tracks were held, covering different aspects related to enterprisecomputing, including: "Databases and Information Systems Integration", ''Artificial Intelligence andDecision Support Systems", "Information Systems Analysis and Specification", "Software Agentsand Internet Computing" and "Human-Computer Interaction". All tracks focus on real worldapplications and highlight the benefits of Information Systems and Technology for industry andservices, thus making a bridge between the Academia and the Enterprise world.

Following the success of 2003, ICEIS 2004 also has a number of satellite workshops, related to thefield of the conference. This year we collaborated in the organization of the following ten internationalworkshops: 4th International Workshop on Pattern Recognition in Information Systems; 3rdInternational Workshop on Wireless Information Systems;2nd International Workshop on Verificationand Validation of Enterprise Information Systems; 1st International Workshop on Software Auditand Metrics; 1st International Workshop on Natural Language Understanding and Cognitive Science;1st International Workshop on Ubiquitous Computing; 2nd International Workshop on Security InInformation Systems; 1st International Workshop on Computer Supported Activity Coordination;2nd International Workshop on Web Services: Modeling, Architecture and Infrastructure; and the1st International Workshop on Tele-Care and Collaborative Virtual Communities in Elderly Care.

A Doctoral Consortium (DCEIS) was also prepared and held, which enabled the reunion of a set ofPhD students and supervisors, interested in the topics of Enterprise Information Systems.

lCElS 2004 received 605 paper submissions from 81 different countries, from all continents. 82papers were published and presented as full papers, i.e. completed work (8 pages in proceedings /30' oral presentations), 195 papers, reflecting work-in-progress or position papers, were accepted forshort presentation and another 127 for poster presentation. These numbers, leading to a "full-paper"acceptance ratio below 15%, show the intention of preserving a high quality forum for the nexteditions of this conference. Additionally, as usual in the lCElS conference series, a number ofinvited talks, including keynote lectures, case studies and technical tutorials were also held. Thesespecial sessions, presented by internationally recognized specialists in different areas have definitelycontributed to increase the overall quality of the Conference and to provide a deeper understandingof the Enterprise Information Systems field.

A short list of papers willbe selected for a book, "Enterprise Information SystemsVI", to be publishedby Kluwer Academic Publishers during 2004. It will be the sixth book in the series ofICElS selected-papers books.

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The program for this conference required the dedicated effort of many people. Firstly, we mustthank the authors, whose research and development efforts are recorded here. Secondly, we thankthe members of the program committee and t:he additional reviewers for their diligence and expertreviewing. Thirdly, we thank the invited speakers-fur-their invaluable contribution and for taking thetime to synthesise and prepare their talks. Fourthly, we thank the workshop chairs whose collaborationwith ICEIS was much appreciated. Finally, special thanks to all the members of the organisingcommittee in Porto, who collaborated admirably with the steering committee.

We wish you all an exciting conference and an unforgettable stay in the lovely city of Porto. We hopeto meet you again next year in Miami (United States) for the 7th ICEIS, details of which will beshortly made available at http://www.iceis.org.

Isabel Seruca

Portucalense University/Porto

Joaquim Filipe

EST /Setlibal

Slimane Hammoudi

ESEO / Angers

Jose Cordeiro

EST /Setubal

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INVITED SPEAKERS

KEYNOTE LECTURES

ENGAGING STAKEHOlDERS IN THE DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS IS-3PERIaES LoUCOPOULOS

LARGE SCALE REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING IN ACTION: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OFFUNCTIONAL AND POLITICAL ECOLOGIES IN SITU IN SPACE MISSION PROGRAMS IS-5KAtiE LYITINEN

EVOLUTIONARY PROJECT MANAGEMENT: MULTIPLE PERFORMANCE, QUALITY AND COSTMETRICS FOR EARLY AND CONTINUOUS STAKEHOLDER VALUE DELIVERY IS-7TOMGILB

MANAGING COMPLEXITY OF ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS IS-9LEszEKMAOASZEK

ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERNS: BEYOND TECHNOLOGY TO PEOPLE IS-ISJAMES COPUEN

COLLABORATION@WORK:3RDWAVEOFINTERNETTOFOSTERCOLLABORATIONBE1WEEN INDIVIDUALS ON THE SEEM IS-17ISIDROUSO

TUTORIALS

COMPETITIVE ENGINEERING: A TOTALLY METRICS-BASED SYSTEM-DEVELOPMENT METHOD IS-31TOMGILB

MODEL CHECKING AND THEOREM PROVING-BASED VERIFICATION OF EISJUANCARwsAuGUSTO

IS-33

FROM COMPONENTS TO WEB BASED SERVICESBAUJIRS. BARN

IS-35

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VOL. V - HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION

UNOBTRUSIVE ACQUSITION OF USER INFORMATION FOR E - COMMERCE APPUCATIONSOshadiAlahakoon, SengLoke andArka4J Zaslavsk:J 3

AN INNOVATIVE VOCAL INTERFACE FOR AUTOMOTIVE INFORMATION SYSTEMSGennaroCostagliola,SergioDiMartino, FilomenaFerrucci,GiuseppeOlivero,UmbertoMontemurroandAlessandroPaliotti 9

REAL WORLD SENSORIZATION AND VIRTUALlZATION FOR OBSERVING HUMANACTIVITIESKojiKitamura,YoshifumiNishida, Makoto KimuraandHiroshiMizoguchi 15

USER INTERFACE DESIGN FOR VOICE CONTROL SYSTEMSWolfgangTschirk 21

ASSESSMENT OF E-LEARNING SATISFACTION FROM CRITICAL INCIDENTS PERSPECTIVENian-Shing Chen, Kan-MinLi« andKinshuk 27

PERSONAUSED RESOURCE DISCOVERY SEARCHING OVER MULTIPLE REPOSITORY TYPES:USING USER AND INFORMATION PROVIDER PROFIUNGBorisRousseau,PariscbBrowne,PaulMalone,PaulFosterand VenuraMendis 35

EMOTION SYNTHESIS IN VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTSAmaryllis Raouzaiou,KostasKarpouiJsandStefanosKollias 44

THE MEETING OF GESTALT AND COGNITIVE LOAD THEORIES IN INSTRUCTIONALSCREEN DESIGNDempseyChangandJuhaniE. Tuovinen 53

VERBS & TOPIC MAPS: A PROPOSAL FOR LEGAL DOCUMENTATION FROM THEDOCUMENT CONTENT ANALYSIS PERSPECTIVEMiguelAngel Marza4 CarmenBolanos,JorgeMoratoandFranciscoCalzada 63

USER ADAPTATION IN A PEDESTRIAN GUIDANCE SYSTEM FOR THE BUNDVivien Guillet,BeatriceRumplerandJean-MariePinon 69

ACCESSIBIUTY AND VISUALLY IMPAIRED USERSAntOnio RamiresFernandes,JorgeRibeiroPereiraandJoseCreissacCampos 75

A METHODOLOGY FOR INTERFACE DESIGN FOR OLDER ADULTSMary Zqjicek 81

CABA2L A BUSS PREDICTIVE COMPOSITION ASSISTANT FOR AAC COMMUNICATIONSOFTWARENicola Gatti andMatteoMatteucci 89

ACCESSIBLE COMPUTER INTERACTION FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABIUTIES: THE CASE OFQUADRIPLEGICSPaulaKotze,Mariki EIoff,AyodeleAdesina-OjoandJan Elrff 97

A CONTACT RECOMMENDER SYSTEM FOR A MEDIATED SOCIAL MEDIAMichelPle, Iqda Agosto,u:urence VignolletandJean-CharlesMarty 107

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MANAGERIAL OPENNESS AND THE ADOPTION OF DISTRIBUTED GROUP SUPPORTSYSTEMS: THE CASE OF WEBWIDE PARTICIPATIONJohn Rohrbaugh 115

USABIUTY HEURISTICS FOR XML-BASED WEB DEVELOPMENTMarta Fernandez deArriba and Jose A. LOpez Brugos 121

INTERACTIVE 3D PRODUCT ASSEMBLER FOR THE WWW - A CASE STUDY OF A 3DFURNITURE STORESophia MK Soo and Stephen Chan 126

ROBUST SPOKEN DOCUMENT RETRIEVAL BASED ON MULTIUNGUAL SUBPHONETICSEGMENT RECOGNITIONShi-wook Lee, KaZflYo Tanaka and Yoshiaki Itoh 134

AUTOMATIC NAVIGATION AMONG MOBILE DTV SERVICESChengyuan Peng, Petri Vuorimaa 140

A FLEXIBLE INTERFACE ARCHITECTURE FOR DIGITAL TALKING BOOKSCarlos Duarte, LtEs Carrico and Hugo Simoes 146

CONTENT ENRICHMENT THROUGH DYNAMIC ANNOTATIONGeorge Weilj GeorgeLepouras and Costas Vassilakis 152

MODULAR PRODUCTION OF RICH DIGITAL TALKING BOOKSLuis Carrico, Carlos Duarte, Nuno Guimariies, .Antdnio Se1Talheiroand Isabel Trancoso 158

COlLABORATING TO IMPROVE ERP USABIUTYTamara Babaian, Wen4J Ltcas and Heikki Topi 164

HEURISTICS SUPPORTING USABLE AUTHORING TOOLSPaula Kotze and Elsabe Cfoete 169

DEFECTS, USEFULNESS AND USABiliTY OF ETHICS THEORIES IN IS ETHICS EDUCATIONTero Vartiainen and Mikko T. Siponen 179

MANAGING EMOTIONS IN SMART USER MODELS FOR RECOMMENDER SYSTEMSGustavo Gonzale~ Beatriz LOpez and J osepUuis de Ia Rosa 187

PREDICTING THE USER ACCEPTANCE OF PERSONAUZED INFORMATION SYSTEMS: CASEMEDICAL PORTAL.Seppo Pahnila 195

INFORMATION SYSTEMS FAILURE EXPLAINED THROUGH THE LENS OF THE CULTURALWEBDavid Avison and David WiLson 203

TOWARDS A MODEL FOR PERSONAUZED COMMUNICATION SERVICES BASED ON USERPERCEPTIONClaudia Ribeiro, Nelson Rosa and Paulo Cunha 211

USING VISUALS TO CONVEY INFORMATIONLuis Borges Gouveia 216

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A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF ACTIVITY-BASED METHODS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMSDEVELOPMENTAmandaQuek and Hanifa Shah 221

AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN E-LEARNING SYSTEMYaen Yaacov Sofer and Steve B. McIntosh 233

LEARNING BY DOING AND LEARNING WHEN DOING: DOVETAILING E-LEARNING ANDDECISION SUPPORT WITH A DATA MINING TUTORKlaus P. Jantke, Ste.ffenLange, Gunter Grieser,Peter Grigoriev,Bernhard Thalheim and Bernd Tschiedel 238

BASIC STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE TELEOPERATION PLATFORMS THROUGH THEINTERNETJuan Escribano,J. A. Cerrada, Ruben Gomez and Carlos Cerrada 242

MODELLING DIALOGUES WITH EMOTIONAL INTERACTIVE AGENTSCvetaMarlinovska and Stevo BO'{jnovski 246

ACCESSING HYPERMEDIA SYSTEMS EFECTIVENESS IN LEARNING CONTEXTSSilvina Santana and Alexander Silva 250

USABILITY OF VISUAL DATA MINING TOOLSEdwige P. Fangseu Ba4fio and Franfois Poulet 254

A MULTIMEDIA WORKFLOW-BASED COLLABORATIVE ENGINEERING ENVIRONMENT:INTEGRATING AN ADAPTATIVE WORKFLOW WITH A MULTIMEDIA COLLABORATIONSYSTEM AND A COLLABORATIVE VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENT FOR PETROLEUMENGENEERINGIsmael Santos, Carla Valle, Alberto Raposo and Marcello Gattass 259

DICHOCOA COMMUNICATOR - SUBSYSTEM FOR BIOMEDICAL HOME SYSTEMRudo!fVolner and Lubomir Pousee 263

TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GENERAL-PURPOSE DIGITAL REPOSITORYDimitrios A. Koutsomitropoulos,Anastasia A. Tsako«, Dimitrios K Tsolis and TheodoreS. Papatbeodorou 271

PERSONALIZING DIGITAL LIBRARIES FOR EDUCATIONFloriana Esposito, Oriana Licchell~ PasqualeLops and Giovanni Semeraro 279

E-LIBRARY TECHNICAL SOLUTION: AN EXAMPLE OF ETU "LETI"Yury Isaeu and Alexty Niskovslg 285

TOOL SUPPORT FOR LEGAL ENQUIRY: FOCUS ON SPATIAL-PLANNING LAWEriks Sneiders 289

DIGITAL LIBRARY: DESIGN AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONSStanislavMikuleckj 295

A NEW GENERATION OF DIGITAL LIBRARY TO SUPPORT DRUG DISCOVERY RESEARCHEc!YS. Liongosari,Anatole V Gershman and Mitu Singh 301

TOWARDS THE SCHEMA HETEROGENEITY IN DISTRIBUTED DIGITAL LIBRARIESHao Ding and IngeborgT. S~/vberg 307

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SEMANTIC INTEGRATION OF DIGITAL LIBRARIESJoseFranciscoAldana-Montes,IsmaelNavas-DelgadoandMaria delMar Roldan-Garcia 313

SUPPORTING COURSE SEQUENCING IN A DIGITAL LIBRARY: USAGE OF DYNAMICMETADATA FOR LEARNING OBJECTSRaul MoralesSalcedoand Yano Yoneo 319

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