IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Anthony J. De Noma, Case No._ Appellant- Petitioner vs. On Appeal from: Ross County State of Ohio Fourth District Court of

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Anthony J. De Noma, Case No._Appellant- Petitioner

vs. On Appeal from:Ross County

State of Ohio Fourth District Court of AppealsAppellee-Respondent Case No. 09CA3089

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTIONOF APPELLANT ANTHONY J. DE NOMA

Anthony J. De Noma, #308-836Indigent prisoner of the State15802 State Rt. 104 North, P.O. 5500 C.C.I.Chillicothe, Ohio 45601-5500 telephone (740) 774-7080

Pro se, Appcllant

Michael M. Ater #0063517Jeffrey C. Marks #0080026Ross County Prosecuting Attorneys

72 North Paint StreetChillicothe, Ohio 45601 telephone (740) 702-3115

Attorneys for Appellee, the State of Ohio

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITEDAppendixexhibit paee

Constitutional and Civil AuthoritiesU.S. Constitution

C-1 ......................Art. I, § 10........................................................................................................14C-1 ......................Aniend. V..........................................................................................................14C-1 ............ .......... Amend. XIV, § 1...............................................................................................14

Ohio ConstitutionC-1 ......................Art. I, sec. 1.............. ....................................... ........................................ 8,10,14C-1 ......................Art. 1, sections 1, 2, 5, 10, 16 and 19............................................................8, 14C-1 ......................Art. II, see. 28....................................................................................8, 10,11, 14C-1 ......................Art. II, sections 1, 28 and 32.........................................................................8, 14C-1 ......................Art. IV, sec. 3(B)(1), and ( F)........................................................................9,14

Ohio Revised CodeC-9 .....................§ 1.01...................................................................................................................11C-9 .....................§ 1.15...................................................................................................................11C-9 ..................... § 1.47...................................................................................................................11C-9 ..................... § 1.54...............................................................................................................6,11C-9 .....................§ 1.58 ............................................................................................................... 6,11

.....................§ 2323.51..............................................................................................................8

....... .............. § 2503.03..............................................................................................................9C-1 ll ..................... § 2943 . 05 ..............................................................................................................4C-10 ..................... § 2943 .06..............................................................................................................4C.-10 ..................... § 2943 .09..............................................................................................................4C-10 .....................§ 2943.10..............................................................................................................4

.....................§ 2949.14...............................................................................................................8Chapter 2950

C-2 (pre 1996) terms of contract plea agreement at time of final judgmentC-2 ..................... § 2950.01(A).......................................................................................................11C-2 ..................... § 2950.03.............................................................................................................11C-3 (1997) House Bill 180 Megan's Law.C-3 .....................§ 2950.04.......................................................................................................11,12C-3 ..................... § 2950.09(B).....................................................................................................4, 5C-3 .....................§ 2950.09(C)....................................................................................................3, 11C-3 .....................§ 2950.09(C)(2)(a)..........................................................................................3, 12

(2003) Senate Bill 5C-4 .....................§ 2950.01(G)(4)..................................................................................................12C-5 .....................§ 2950.03(A).......................................................................................................12C-5 ..................... § 2950.04(A)(1)..................................................................................................12C-4 .....................§ 2950.09(C)(1).................... .......................................................................... 6,12

(2008) Senate Bill 10 Adam Walsh ActC-6 ..................... § 2950.01.1...................................................................................................10,12C-6-7 ..................... § 2950.031............................................................................................................7C-6-7 .....................§ 2950.031(E)...................................................................................4, 5, 7,13,15C-7 .....................§ 2950.032............................................................................................3, 8, 13,14C-7 ..................... § 2950.032(A)..............................................................................................3, 6, 8C-7 ..................... § 2950.032(E)......................................................................................................4

.....................§ 2969.25.............................................................................................................8

i

........... § 2971.01 ..............................................................................................................495,7Rules of Civil Procedure

C-11 ..........Civ. R. 3(A) .....................................................................................................................9C-11 ..........Civ. R. 3(B) and (E) ........................................................................................................4C-11 ..........Civ. R. 3(C) .....................................................................................................................5C-11 ..........Civ. R. 3(B)(C), and (E) ..................................................................................................7

..........Appellate Rule 9(C) .....................................................................................................6, 7

Case JurisprudenceD-4®5' .........State v. Cook, (1998) 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 408, 410, 422-423 ................................1, 6, 11

D-Z3-3i ..........Naples v. State, Ohio App.l l Dist., 2009 WL 2425981 {¶20} .......................................1..........Haines v. Kerner 404 U.S.519 [1] [2] ..............................................................................8..........Sherlock v. Myers Ohio Ninth Dist., 2004 WL 2244102 ................................................8..........State v. Elswick Ohio App. 1 I Dist., 2006 WL 3833868 ................................................9..........Moskal v. IJnited States (1990), 498 U.S. 103,107-108 ..................................................9..........United States v. Lanier (1997), 520 U.S. 259,266, 117 S. Ct. 1219 ................................9..........State v. Crowder, 60 Ohio St.3d 152-153 ........................................................................9.........Griffin v. Illinois(1956) 351 LJ.S. 12 ...............................................................................9.........Douglas v. California (1963) 372 U.S.353 .......................................................................9.........In re Gault, 387 U.S. l . ...................................................................................................9.........Daugherty v. Wallace, 621 N.E.2d 1374, 1375, 1380 at [3] .......................................9, 10.........Estelle v. Gamble, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290-291 .....:.................................................................9.........DeShaney, 109 S.Ct. At 1005-1006 ................................................................................9.........Jolmson v. Hendricks, 314 F.3d 159, 160, 162 at [2] and [3] ..........................................9.........Schlueler v. Varner 384 F.3d 69 at 77 ..............................................................................9.........Atkinson v. Grumman Ohio Corp, 523 N.E.2d 851 Id. At 855-856 ................................9.........Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570 ............................................ ........ 1, 10.........Arnold v.Cleveland, (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35 at 42 ..................................................1, 10

D-01 .........State v. Williams, Ohio App.IlDist., 1999 WL 76633 at *2, *3 ................................1, 10D- 1m3 .........Van Fossen v. Babcock, 36 Ohio St.3d 100, at 104-107 ................................................11

.........Mason v. Griffin, 90 Ohio St.3d 299 at 302 Id. [11 ........................................................12

.........Meeks v. Papadopulous, (1980), 62 Ohio St. 2d 187, 190 .............................................13

.........Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 70 Ohio St. 3d 460, 464 .......................................................13

.........State v. Craig, 116 Ohio St. 3d 135, ¶14 ........................................................................13

........ In re J.P. Ohio App. Fifth Dist., Slip Copy 2009 WL 2894576 .....................................13

.........State v. Bellman 86 Ohio St.3d 208, 211-212 ................................................................13

.........Hough v. Dayton Mfg. Co., (1902), 66 Ohio St. 427, 437 .............................................13

TABLE OF CONTENTSPAGE

EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS OF PUBLIC OR GREAT INTERES'TAND INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION .....................................1

STATEMF.N'T OF THE CASE AND FACTS .................................................................................2-8

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITIONS OF LAW....................................................8-14

Proposition of LawR.C. § 2950.032, being wholly ambiguous, tuu•easonable and unconstitutionallyvague, is null and void "ab initio", from the beginning since its iniplementationdeprives individuals of multiple Civil and Constitutional Rights including butnot limited to Sections 1, 2, 5, 10, 16 and 19, Article I, andSections 1, 28, and 32, Article II, of the Ohio Constitution .......................................................8

CONCLUSION and PRAYER.....................................................................................................14-15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/^FF-I DAv1 T OF TNt9rGENCy

APPENDIX ExhibitA. Supporting Affidavits for Complaint ..................................................................................A-1-6

B. The history of Hamilton County Common Pleas Case No. SP0800368-B9522321. April 6, 1995, Original Final Judgment ENTRY of Incarceration, finding no element

of' force, with concurrent sentencing ........... ........................................ .............................................. B-12. June 6, 1995, Hamilton County Clerk of Courts Cost Statement for case No. B952232,

establishing the County's record of the states knowledge of Anthony J. De Noma'sformer and present address of residence ................................................................................B-2

3. August 12, 1997, ENTRY Deferring scheduling of a Sexual Predator hearingrequested in a Civil Action by the Department of Rehabilitation and Correctionpursuant to R. C. § 2950.09(C)(1) .... ..................... .................................................................. B-3

4. October 5, 2001, ENTRY Finding Against Adjudication as a Scxual Predator,sustaining Plaintiffs prior law registration-exempt status, creating finality ofvested acquired accrued remedy, now by both final conjunctive criminal andcivil court action ....................................................................................................................B-4

5. January 2, 2008, Notice of Ex Post Facto Reclassification Action by theAttorney General imposing unconstitutional retroactive double jeopardy ofregistration, with neighbor hood community notification, in regard topast transactions, and information .........................................................................................B-5

6. February 19, 2008, Commencement of Plaintiffs claims for relief from communitynotification, claiming registration-exeniption, Case No. SP0800368 ..................................B-6

7. Apiil 11, Eight, State's wanton malicious and unjustified opposition to relief fromcommunity notification .........................................................................................................B-7

iii

Transcript pages of Proceedings documenting proper venue and officialconcession of transfer of classification to Ross County8. 1-15-09, filing of 8-07-08 transcript of proceedings ......................................................... B-89. August 7, 08, page 2, counsel's assertion of irnproper venue ............. ................................... B-9

10. 1-15-09, filing of 8-28-08 transcript of proceedings ...........................................................B-1011. 1-15-09, filing of 10-22-08 transcript of proceedings ................. ........................................ B-1112. October 22, page 23 Petitioner's assertion of transfer of classification to

Ross County for proper venue.............................................................................................B-1213. October 22, page 24, The courts acknowledgment of Transfer for proper venue ...............B-1314. October 22, page 27, The state's Testimony of actual confirmation of transfer

by conference with the Ross County Prosecutor .................................................................B-1415. October 22, page 28, The courts concession of transfer to Ross County

for proper venue ...................................................................................................................B-15Evidence of the Court's and State's illegal ex parte conspiracy and collusionin abuse of process, and malicious prosecution, without proper venue orjurisdiction to do so.

16. October 28, 08, first of two conjunctive entries, ENTRY determiningReelassification imposing registration, while concluding in favor ofPctitioner's pleading for relief from community notification ..............................................B-16

17. October 28, 08, second conjunctive ENTRY inappropriately citing newviolent sexual predator sentencing provision R.C. & 2971.01,and repealedproceedings of R.C. ^ 2950.09(B) ....... ....................................................................... ......... B-17

18. Libel tatnpering with records, forgery of sex offender registration, fraudulentposting of false residential address of 7524 Bridgetown Road, without statutorilyrequired photograph for identification, and with fraudulent data entry date .......................B-18

19. February 26, 09, Letter of complaint of elderly residential property ownersof 7524 Bridgetown Road, Hamilton County, Cincinnati Ohio ..........................................B-19

20. January 5, 2009, Appellant's Motion for extension of time, pleading forleniency,in Appeal No.CO81178 ........... ............................................................................ ..B-20

21. January 13, 09, MOTION to Dismiss App. No.C081178, implementingFraudulent and material misrepresentation, asserting improper venue,denying that Appellant had in any way been registered in Hamilton County .....................B-21

22. January 15, 09, Appellant MOTION for counsel, filing of Transcriptsand pleading for leniency .................... ................................................................................. B-22

23. January 29, 2009, Appellate Court ENTRY of Dismissal ofNo.C0801178 .......................B-2324. Febr-uary 2, 2009, Appellants MOTION for extension of time for attached

Motion Opposing Dismissal ................................................................................................B-2425. February 2, 09, Appellant's MOTION Opposing Dismissal ............................... ................ B-2526. February 12, 09, Appellant's MOTION for relief from Dismissal ........ .............................. B-2627. February 26, 09, Entry overruling Motion for relief from Dismissal..................................B-2728. February 27, 09, Attorney General's action sex offender address verification

change of address, without authority of law to do so ..........................................................B-28

29. June 3, 2009, Dismissal by the Ohio Supreme Court of App. No. 2009-0475 ...................B-2930. November 2, 2009, filing of Petition of Writ of Certiorari in the United States

Supreme Court Case No. 09-7468 .......................................................................................B-3031. November 10, 2009, docketing of Writ of Certiorari in the United States

Supreme Court Case No. 09-7468 .............................................. ......................................... B-31

iv

Relative Subsequent Dismissals of transferred Petition in Ross County Common Pleas No.08CI831, and Forth District Court of Appeals Case No. 08-CA3089.

'September 16, 2008, Petitioner's Good faith transfer to Ross CountyCourt of Common Pleas No.08CI83I for proper statutory venue, forhearing of petition contesting i•eelassification .... "t§L ..1^

33. October 21, 2008 ENTRY Denying assistance of counsel and attorney agentto Indigent Prisoner of the state. when the State retroactively imposes new lawsto affect substantive rights and acquired accrued remedy vested under prior laws............ B-33

31. October 30, 2008 States MOTION TO DISMISS, filed two days after thefiling of final Entries of the Hamilton County Court, and in apparent unlawfulex parte communication with the judge obtaining a same day order for anon oral hearing on MO1'lON to Dismiss, (as documented by Ross CoimtyCase Docket Sheet wliich was not served on Petitioner until 22days lateron 11-20-08, by the Chillicothe Correctional Institute mail room ......................................B-34

35. Ross County Case Docket Sheet for Common Pleas Case No. 08CI831,showing apparent illegal ex parte communication..............................................................B-35

36. December 10, 2008, Petitioners Opposition to Dismissal, with Motion forDefault Judgment against the state Attorney General's notice of reclassification .............. B-3b

37. December 12, 2008, EN'I'RY OF DISMISSAL, disregarding Petitioners pleadings.......... B-3y38, January 2, 2009, Motion for Reconsideration of Opposition to Dismissal

and MOTION for Default Judgment, establishing the timeliness of thecommencement of his action in Hamilton County and pursuant toR.C.§ 2950.031(E) and Civil Rule 3 ................................................... ................................ B-38

39. January 8, 2009, ApA. R. 9('C) Sfafemeh'f' of fhe Ev]dehce•••••.•••••••••••••••••••••.••••.••. B-3940 January 15, 2009 ENTRY Overruling Petitioners January 2, MOTION FOR

RECONSIDF.RATION ........................................................................................................B-4041. February 6, 2009, Motion for Leave to Pctition for relief from reclassification

exhibiting transcripts from the Hamilton County proceedings ........................................... B-4t42. March 13, 2009 ENTRY denying Petitioners MOTION for Leave to Petition

for relief from effects of actions of the Attorney Generals Reclassification ...................... B-4243, March 18, 2009 ORDER denying Petitioners March 13, MOTION for

Appointment of Appellate Counsel in appeal No. 09CA3089 ............................................B-43December8, 2009 DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY of theFourth District Court of Appeals No. 09CA3089, affirming the lower court'sdismissal and denial of Petitioner's statutory hearing of Petitionwhich had been timely commenced and transferred for proper venueto contest reclassification by the Attorney General..... afX Pafi..l^.^r rt (`t1^^^'^`t........

45. December 29, 2009, Motion for Relief form Court costs...................................................:B-4546 January 5, 2010, ORDER denying relief from court costs ............................ ...................... B-4 6

C. Constitutional and civil authorities1 U.S. Constitution

Art. I, § 10Amend. VAmend. XIV, § 1

Ohio ConstitutionalArt. I, sections 1, 2, 5, 10, 16 and 19Art. II, sections 1, 28 and 32 ..................................................................................G1

v

Ohio Revised Code Chapter 29502. Prior vested reinedy of registration-exemption of first time offenders

terms of Contract Plea Agreenient (Pre 1996) R.C. Chapter 2950§ 2950.01§ 2950.03§ 2950.04§ 2950.08 ......................................................................................................................C-2

3. (1997) I-louse Bill 180 Megan's Law§ 2950.09(C)(1) and (2) ................................................................................................C-3

4. (2003) Senate Bill 5 amendm€nts§ 2905.01(G)(4)§ 2950.09(C)(1) and (3) ................................................................................................C-4

5. § 2950.04(A)(1)§ 2950.03(A) ................................ ......... ................................ ................................ ........ C-.5

6. (2008) Senate Bill 10 Adam Walsh Act amendments§ 2950.01.1§ 2950.031(E) ............................................................................................................... C-6

7. § 2950.031(E)§ 2950.032(A) ...............................................................................................................C-7

8. § 2950.04(A)§ 2950.11(F)(2)§ 2950.12 .......................................................................................................................C-8

9. Ohio Revised Codes of statutory Construction§ 1.01§ 1.15§ 1.47§ 1.54§ 1.58 ............................................................................................................................C-9

10. Ohio Revised Codes for Pleas of former Judgments§ 2943.05§ 2943.06§ 2943.09§ 2943.10 ....................................................................................................................C-10

11. Rules of Civil ProcedureCiv. R. 3 (A), (B), (C), (E), (G) ..................................................................................C-11

D. Case law Jurisprudence1. Van Fossen v. Babcock, 36 Ohio St.3d 100, at 104-107 ..................................... .......... ..D-1-32. State v. Cook, (1998) 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 408, 410, 422-423 .... ....... ........................... ....D-4-53. State v. Williams, Ohio App.llDist., 1999 Wl, 76633 ... ......................... .......... ............. D-6-144. Doe v. Phillips, Missouri, 194 S.W. 3d 833 .....................................................................D-15-175. State v. Ferguson, (2008), 120 Ohio St.3d 7 ....................................................................D-18-226. Naples v. State, Ohio App. 11 Dist., 2009 WL 2425981 {¶72-1145} .............................D-23-31

vi

EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS OF PUBLIC OR GREAT INTEREST ANDINVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONALOUESTION

This case is evidence of a dangerous potential precedence for inconspicuous abrogation of

constitutional freedoms of Ohio citizens, the State's reasonable knowledge and purpose in colluding to

circumvent laws; 1) in arbitrary and vindictive, reckless, wantonness; 2) in misfeasance,

nonfeaseance, and malfeasatice, material misrepresentation,and abuse of process; to Interfere with, and

deprive individuals and disfavored groups of their substantive Constitutional and Civil Rights, violative

of the oath of public office.

The Supreme Court has not yet considered the constitutionality of retroactively imposed sex

offender registration where it previously was not imposed at the time contract plea agreement and final

judgment under law prior to 1996 that exempted first time offenders from registration, and where there

has been no finding, (by subsequent civil action), of future danger to society, of potential recidivism,

due to a predisposition to commit another sex offense. State v. Cook, (1998) 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 408,

422-423. 700 N.E.2d 570, 575, 585, (See appendix D-4-5), Naples v. State, Ohio App.11 Dist., 2009

WL 2425981 {V20},(See appendix D-23-31).

1.) In light of inalienable rights of Section 1, Art. I, Ohio Constitution. State v. Williams, Ohio App. i l

Dist., 1999 WI. 76633, (SeeappendiXD-6-14); quoting and following Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67

Ohio St.3d 35, and Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich(1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 684,691. 2.) Tn light of

impainnent oP contracts prohibited by Section 28, Art. II, Ohio Constitution, considering terms of prior

law remedy as implied tenns of contract plea agreement vested by Stare Decisis of final judgment

under those prior laws. Naples supera at {1137- 145 }. 3.) In light of Res Judicata and constitutional

Separation of Powers Doctrines wliich apply equally in civil (remedial) contexts as they do in criminal

punitive contexts. Naples su era at ^ 1(72-^84}.

1

AFFIDAVITSTATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

IN THE STA"I'E OF OHIO:SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED:

THF, COtJNTY OF ROSS:

I, Antlrony Joseph De Noma, duly cautioned of the penalty of perjury do hereby solemnly

declare to be true and accurate the following Statement of the Case and Facts:

In September 1994, by my own "sua sponte" volition overwhelmed with guilt, regret, and

remorse, and with sole motive of taking complete responsibility for injury I perpetrated, and to provide

for a begimring for closure to the victims, did arrest my offending conduct. And in January 1995, 1

began to disclose my offending conduct first to my wife Elizabeth J. DeNoma; then to my parents

Richard J., and Patricia A. DeNoma of 7524 Bridgetown Road Cin., Ohio, telephone (513) *82 941-

0015; Brian Spicer, the pastor and the deacons of the church, at 3267 Jesstip Road Cin., Ohio 45239,

telephone (513)923-4547, where I and my family were members; my employment supervisor Vince

Gramaglia, at Diehl Steel 800 Ross Ave., St. Bernard, Cin., Ohio 45217, telephone (513)242-8900; and

in February 1995, I contacted the Hamilton County Sheriffs Detectives and submitted my self

incriminating statement of information of offenses, the detail of which was known only to me,

establishing myself as the chief witness against inyself. Yet, on April 6, 1995, coerced, by threats of

Prosecuting Attomey Joseph T. Deters, I entered into a contract Plea agreement with the state, in good

faith , to resolve the charges, that no logical reasonable person would associate with my actual actions,

to spare my thirteen year old daughter Karen from the threats of Joseph T. Deters to further victimize,

trattmatize, and humiliate her by exposing her to cross examination in a public trial in Hamilton County

Common Pleas No. B9502232. And on April 6, 1995, ENTRY of final Judgment was made, as a first

time offender, without element of force, and concurrent sentencing, vesting remedy of existing laws,

which prohibited community notification, public inspection of all registration data information, and

exempting first time offenders from registration, creating a settled expectation for Family victims

2

privacy, and reasonable good faith hope of potential restoration of the support of a rehabilitated and

reformed father, husband, son, and brother, without fear of community ostracism, and harassment of the

state's menacing incitement of vigilante hate crimes against their name, reputation, person, and

property. (See appendix exhibits B-1, C-2, and C-9).

August 12, 1997, two years later, with the Megan's Law re-enactment of R.C. Chapter 2950,

subsequent civil action was commenced by the state, when the Department of Rehabilitation and

Correction sent their recommendation to the court for adjudication, and reclassification of Petitioner as

a sexual predator subject to registration and community notification, under R.C. & 2950.09(C). The

court deferred the action ordering the department to resubmit it's recommendation six months prior to

Petitioners release date. The court concluded in it's ENTRY of October 5, 2001, denying the

departments recommendation without a hearing , FINDING that Petitioner is not a sexual predator, not

being a danger to society, not being predisposed to or likely to commit another sex offense in the

future, essentially effectively sustaining and upholding Petitioners prior remedy of first time prior law

offender exempt from registration, as being Petitioners accrued, vested remedy acquired by conjunctive

final criininal and civil court of law judgments. In "Good Faith", though continued for ten more years

by the parole board, Petitioner continued his good faith efforts of reform, by productive participation

accomplishing every rehabilitation program available to him, at least twice, and continuing to the

present day. (See appendix exhibits B-3, and B-4).

In 2008 the Senate Bill 10, Adam Walsh Act reenacted Revised Code 2950 as a new law

composite provision, establishing in $ 2950.032(A) a specific statute of limitation of "Not later than

December 1, 2007" for serving notices of its Ex Post Facto retroactive effect on past felonies. Yet

more than thirty days past that "December 1;2007" time bar, on January, 2, 2008, Terry Collins,

Director of the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections, Robin Knab, warden of Chillicothe

Correctional Institution, and 13. Mark FIooks, Unit management Administrator, served Petitioner Notice

of Recia.ssification by the Attorney Gener?I, subjectinghim tnregistration and community notification

3

under the new law composite sentencing provisions of the (2008) Adam Walsh Act. (exhibit B-5).

On Fcbniary 19, 2008, less than forty days after receipt of said notice of F,x Post Facto

reclassification imposing duty to register, and pursuant to R.C. §§ 2950.032(E) and 2950.031(E),

Petitioner timely commenced his multiple claims for relief in Hamilton County Common Pleas No.

SP0800369-B9502232, pursuant to Civil Rule 3(B) and (E) and R.C. & 2950.031(E), claiming

Immediate Relief from Community Notification on grounds of prior law registration-exemption,

exhibiting proof of prior judgment on same information, matter and issues, pursuant to Revised Code

Sections 2943.05, 2943.06, 2943.09, and 2943.10. (See exhibits B-6, and C-6-7, C-1 U, C-11).

Without Notification, the court appointed counsel of Daniel Burke Jr., #13836, Hamilton

County Public Defender, 230 East Ninth Street, Cincimiati, Ohio 45202, telephone (513) 946-3700, to

represent Petitioner at an August 7, 2008 reclassification hearing, where, witliout probable cause pr

statutory authority to do so, the court change the nature of the proceedings in abuse of process under

repealed law proceedings of R.C. § 2950.09(B),and new law sentencing provisions R.C. § 2971.01 for

violerlt sexual predators, violative of Res Judicata and Stare Decisis, instituting malicious prosecution,

of an old Sexual Predator reclassification hearing to adjudicate Petitioner as a Sexual Predator for

purpose of subjecting him to community notification, at which time counsel assented improper venue

for matters ot' classification.

Thereafter, the court conveyed Petitioner from Ross County to Hamilton County, yet all

Petitioner's efforts of letters and phone messages to obtain communication from counsel went

unanswered. Yet obtaining transcripts from his parents of the August 7, 08 proceedings, Petitioner

learned of counsel's assertion of improper venue, for the matter of classification. Wherefore, Petitioner

moved to transfer the matter of classification to Ross County by the filing of his Septeniber 16, 2008

Petition contesting reclassification and duty to register imposed by the Attorney General.

During the October 22, 2008 proceedings of Hamilton County Comnion Pleas No. SP0800368-

B95022112, the County Prosecutor acknowledged and conceded to PQtitioner'u transfer toRoss County

4

for proper venue on the matter of classification, testifying that he actually conferred with the Ross

County Prosecutor and confirmed said transfer, and that at that time the Court also made concession

approving the transfer to Ross County for proper venue on matter of determination of Petitioner's

classification, making concluding connnents that Petitioner won. (See exhibits B-8-15).

Wherefore, in good faith, Petitioner reasonably expected that the matter of his classification

would be addressed in an oral hearing in Ross County, officially transferred for prober venue from

Hamilton County pursuant to Civil Rule 3(C) and R.C. & 2950-031(B). ( See exhibits C-6-7, and C-11).

Despite the Hamilton County Court's testimonies of concession and affirmation of transfer to

Ross Count for proper venue for the matter of Petitioner's classification, concluding also that Petitioner

won, the court proceeded in collusion to determine Petitioner's classification, imposing registration, by

two null and void conjunctive ENTRIES of October 28, 2008 violating "Res Judicata" and "Stare

Decisis", inappropriately citing repealed law proceedings of R.C. 2950.09(B) and new law sentencing

provisions R.C. § 2971.01 for violent sexual predators, ( see exhibits B-16-17), and immediately there

after Ross County moved for Dismissal of Appellant's Petition, denying its timely commencement in,

and transfer from Hamilton County. (See exhibits B-34, and B-37).

Subsequently, also in Hamilton County, First District Court of Appeals No. C0801178, the state

moved for and procured the Dismissal of Petitioner's direct statutory appeal of right, (even before

certification of the record on appeal could be transferred for de novo review, and despite the existence

of recent final appealable orders of the lower court imposing registration of new law, to affect past

resolved felonies), puiporting improper venue, fraudulently purporting that Petitioner was not in any

way registered in Hamilton County, when, in fact, he had been fraudulently registered in Hamilton

County as residing at 7524 Bridgetown Road, Cincinnati, Ohio 45248, without statutorily required

photo identifieation; and with fraudulent data entry date of 1-1-1900, over100 years ago, further

evidence of the state's abuse of process in reckless wantonness, substantially adversely affecting

Petitior 's uninvolved, innocent, elderly parc,rrts,unduly and unjustly illegally implicating them in

5

their community and world as most heinous sex offenders without photo for identification, in an act of

tampering with official state computer records, falsifying and forging the personal information of

another, without probable cause or statutory authority to do so, since the statutory process requires sex

offender registration to be accotnplished personally by each individual in person with the sheriff or his

designee, with photo for proper public identification. (B-18-19, A-1-6, and B-21, B-23). Petitioner

subsequently filed his claimed appeal of right with the Ohio Supreme Court which was dismissed, and

subsequently also his Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. (exhibits B-29-31)

In Ross County, Petitioner:

A. In good faith Petitioner opposed dismissal of his Petition for Relief in his December 10, 2008

Motion, also seeking Default Judgment against the state's null and void Notice of Reclassification

imposing registration, in following points of memorandum: ( See exhibit B-34).

1) Establishing the February 19, 2008 timely commencement of his Petition in Hamilton

County, transferred to Ross County confirmed in conference of the County Prosecutors.

3) Establishing the nullity of the Attorney General's Notice of Reclassification imposing

registration, due to the R.C. S 2950 032(A) statutory limitation time bar of "not later than

December 1, 2007," against such action, and in regard to individuals never previously subject to

registration.

11) Referring to the October 5, 2001 prior judgment on the matter, exhibited in original

September 16, 2008 transferred Petition in Ross County Coinmon Pleas No.08CI00031.

Citing authority of:

1. former (2003) R.C. § 2950.09(C)(1)2. Revised Code sections 1.54 and 1.58 and prior judicial statutory construction of

Cook 700 N.E. 2D 570

B. Again, January 2, 2009 in Motion for Reconsideration, set forth the account of the timely

commencement of his claims on February 19, 08 in Hamilton County and its transfer to Ross County,

as an indigent prisoner denied attorney agent assistance of counsel, praying for leniency and

reconsideration of his Motion Opposing Dismissal. ( See exhibit B-38)•

6

C. In his January 8, 2009 App.R. 9(C) Statement of the Evidence, Petitioner again established the

timely commencement, and transfer, of his claims exhibiting evidence of Haniilton County Prosecutor,

Patrick X. Dressing's testimony of conference with the Ross County Prosecutor confirming the transfer

of his claim from Hamilton County to Ross County, in pages of transcripts of Hamilton County

proceedings. (See exhibit B-39).

D. Furthermore, on February 6, 2009, Petitioner filed his MOTION for Leave to Petition for relief

from effects of egregiously void actions of the Attorney General, with memorandtiun in support.

In said Meinorandum, points 2 through 9, Petitioner established R.C. & 2950.03I's conspicuously

absent provision for prober venue in regard to individual prisoners who were never previously subject

to registration under prior law and its provision that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply,and that

therefore Appellant's Petition was timely commenced and legitimately transferred to Ross County from

Hamilton County,pursuant to Civil Rule 3(B)(C) and (E), again exlribiting Hamilton County transcripts

of proceedings: 8-7-08 page 2:7-25and 10-22-08, pages 23:20-25, 27:17-25, and 28:1-10 filed as the

record in Hamilton County First District Appeals No. C0801178, establishing the testimonies of:

1) counsel Daniel Burke, Jr. asserting improper venue for matter of classification;

2) Prosecuting Attorney Patrick X. Dressing confirming transfer of classification to Ross County;

3) Judge Ralph E. Winkle conceding and making concession to the same.

(See exhibit B-41).

Petitioner effectively established in the record of Ross County Common Pleas No. 08CI000831

the facts of the timely commencemcnt of his claims, (in Hamilton County pursuaut to Revised Code

sections 2950.032(E) and 2950.031(E), and of the official transfer of his Petition Contesting

Reclassification to Ross County for proper venue), by his filings of December 10, 08, January 2, 2009,

and again on January 8, 2009 (exhibiting official transcript pages of the Flamilton County Proceedings

documenting evidence of the testimony of Prosecuting Attorney Patrick X. Dressing confirming the

same assei Cing actual conferencewirai the Ross County Prosecutor who affirmed said transfer in his

7

Appellate Rule 9(C) Statement of Evidence, which the state assented to by default pursuant to AM

Rule 9(C).

Since this case involves a substantial question of law, statutory construction, and constitutional

questions of Ex Post Facto retroactive application of new laws to effect past resolved felony charges,

this case therefore deserves "Certiorari" and "de novo" appellate review of the record from its

commencement on February 19, 2008 in Hamilton County No.SP0800368-B9502232. Since the

Attorney Generals Reclassification under R.C.§2950.032 is criminal in nature, imposed solely in regard

to felony charges, and the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on its constitutionality, (see Doe v. Phillins,

Missouri, 194 S.W. 3d 833, State v. Ferguson, (2008), 120 Ohio St.3d 7, and Naples v. State, Ohio App.

11 Dist.. 2009 WL 2425981 {¶72-4145},( see Appendix D-15-31)), the Ross Count Court of Appeals

acted with biased partiality, demonstrating deference to the State and the decision of the lower court,

and in manifest disregard for the General Assembly's manifest intent in R.C:^2949.14, R.C.&2323.51,

and R.Ca32969.25; which establish authority to collectcourt costs from non-indigent persons, and only

prisoners who have been found to be engaging in frivolous conduct, by its ruling to tax this indigent

Petitioning prisoner with the court costs. ( appendix exhibits B-45-46).

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITIONS OF LAWPROPOSITIONS OF LAW

R.C. § 2950.032, being wholly ambiguous, unreasonable and unconstitutionally vague,is null and void'°ab initio", from the beginning since its implementation deprivesindividuals of multiple Civil and Constitutional Rights including but not limited toSections 1, 2, 5, 10, 16 and 19, Article 1, and Sections 1, 28, and 32, Article II, of theOhio Constitution.

The state's said January two, action was wholly without authority of law to do so, being

manifestly outside of the R.C.& 2950.032jA} statute of limitation of "not later than December 1, 2007",

by more than 30 days, barring, and rendering said action null and void "ab initio". Furthermore the

statute provided no clear authority for imposing registration retroactively where it previously was not

imposed.

8

Indigent pro se litigants Petition's and filings should not be held to stringent standards imposed

upon practicing lawyers. Haines v. Kerner 404 U.S . 519 f 11 (21, see also Sherlock v. Myers Ohio Ninth

Dist., 2004 WL 2244102. The "rule of lenity" is a principle of statutory construction to ensure the

protection of individuals and their rights from arbitrary and vindictive government action, dictating that

statutory provisions be construed strictly against the state, and liberally in favor of individuals, and

their rights. Id. State v. Elswick Ohio App . 11 Dist., 2006 WL 3833868 not reported in N E 2d citing

and following Moskal v. United States (1990) 498 U S 103 107-108 111 S . Ct. 461, and United States

v. Lanier (1997), 520 U.S. 259,266 , 117 S . Ct. 1219. Nor should an indigent prisoner be denied his

right of Due process equal protection of attorney agent assistants of counsel. See State v. Crowder. 60

Ohio St.3d 152-153, Griffin v. Illinois(1956) 351 U.S . 12, Douglas v. California (1.963) 372 U.S.353,

and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1. Indeed the states duty is triggered to act affirmatively on behalf of an

indigent individuals substantive constitutional due process and equal protection, when, it takes an

individual into custody or otherwise restrains his liberty in such a manner that renders him unable to

provide for his own needs due to the limitations which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own

behalf. Id. Daugherty v. Wallace, 621 N F 2d 1374, 1375 , 1380 [31, citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U S

97 , 103-104, 97 S.Ct 285 290-291, and DeShanev, 489 U.S. At 199-200 109 S Ct At 1005-1006.

Furthermore, Equitable tolling is warranted when (1) the state has actively misled the Petitioner

(2) the Petitioner has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights, and or (3)

the Petitioner has timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum. Johnson v. Hendricks. 314

F.3d 159, 160, 162 at 121 and,[3]. Equitable tolling is warranted in extraordinary cases until such time

as through reasonable diligence Petitioner has developed the basis for his Petition or filing. Schlueler v.

Varner 384 F.3d 69 at 77. Furthermore, by interpreting Art. IV section 3(B)(I) and (F), R.C. S

2503.03, and Rule 3 (A ) , it has been concluded: "By developing a process of appellate review states

provide litigants with a property interest in the right to appeal. Clearly litigants can not be deprived of

this right without being gr?ntPd due,process of law." Atkinson v. Grumman Ohio Corp (1988) , 37 Ohio

9

St. 80. 523 N.E.2d 851 Id. At 855-856. Furthermore, when a case involves statutory interpretation,

and constitutional questions of new law retroactive application affecting resolved prior law felonies, an

appeal should not be dismissed without certiorari and de novo review of the record and merits of the

case, without difference to the state's assertions, or the lower court's judgment.

(2008) Adam Walsh Act, Senate Bill 10, amended R.C. Chapter 2950, &2950.01.1 reads:

*** All references *** to "sexually oriented offense" include ***any sexually oriented offense, *** that was not a registration-exemptsexually oriented offense, *** prior to January 1, 2008.

"Section 1 Article I., of the Ohio Constitution confers greater rights than are conferred by the

United States Constitution. Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, (1993) 89 Ohio App. 3d 684, 691 627

N.E.2d 570.

"The rights protected by Section 1, Article I are deemed to be "inalienable" *** Therefore,

Section 1, Article I is unique. Accordingly, Ohio courts may give it a unique construction under the

doctrine of "New Federalism" adopted in Arnold v Cleveland (1993) 67 Ohio St.3d 35 at 42, 616

N.E,.2d 163. *** We n-iust seek Ohio precedent to understand and apply Ohio's guarantee *** Section 1,

Article 1, the very first provision of the Bill of Rights, is one of the specific limitations on the state's

police power. DaughterYv. Wallace, (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 228, 235-236, 621 N.E.2d 1374. It

guarantees that all citizens have the right to freedom and to the protection of property and reads: "All

men are, by nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those

of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and seeking

and obtaining happiness and safety" State v. Williams, Ohio App.1lDist., 1999 WL 76633 at *2, *3,

not renorted in N.E.2d. (See appendix D-6-14)

Furthermore, "The possibility of unjustness of retroactive legislation led to the development of

two rules: *** The second rule, that of Constitutional limitation *** to include a prohibition against

laws which cotnmenced on the date of enactment and which operated in futuro, but which, in doing so,

divested rights, particularly property rights, which had been vested anterior to the time of enactment of

10

the laws.*** Section 28, Article 11 states that: " The general assembly shall have no power to pass

retroactive laws, or laws impairing the obligations of contracts" *** The essence of this constitutional

limitation and it's applicability to laws affecting substantive rights were set forth by this court as

follows: Under the constitutional prohibition, the general assembly has no power to pass retroactive

laws. Art. II. Sec. 28. Every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing

laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to

transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective or retroactive." Van Fossen v.

Babcoek, (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, at 104-107, 522 N.E.2d 489, at 494-946. See also Ohio revised

Code Sections 1.01, 1.15, 1.47, 1.54, and 1.58. (See appendix C-9 and D-1-3)

In 1995 at Appellant's final Judgment under existing laws prior to 1996, Ohio's Habitual Sex

Offender registration law excepted him from registration as a first time prior law offender, and read:

R.C. & 2950.01(A)"Habitual sex offender" includes any person who is convicted two or moretimes in separate criminal actions, *** Convictions which result from or areconnected with the same act, or result from offenses committed at the same time,shall be counted for the purpose of this section as one conviction,R.C. & 2950.03"Any habitual sex offender *** prior to discharge, parole, or release,shall be informed of his duty to register".

Furtherinore, in the constitutional analysis and statutory construction of subsequent (1997)

Megan's Law newly enacted House Bill 180, amended R.C. Chapter 2950, the Supreme Court

determined that registration was not retroactively imposed except by the comparative civil commitment

proceedings of & 2950.09(C), and reads: "The registration provision of R.C. Chapter 2950, R.C.

29§ 50.04, *** became effective July 1, 1997. The requirement applies to offenders sentenced on or

after that date". State v. Cook, (1998) 83 Ohio St.3d 404.408, 700 N.E .2d 570 575. "First R.C.

2950.09(C)(1) applies to those sex offenders who were convicted and sentenced prior to the effective

date of the statute and still imprisoned when the statute became effective. Second, the registration and

veritication requirements may be applied to certain sex offenders whose crimes occurred before the

11

effective date." Cook, supra at 410. "Pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2950, a Judge makes the determination.

***Prior conviction and a predisposition to commit a future sex offense (are) the prerequisite

requirements for registration under R.C. Chapter 2950." Cook, Supra at 422-423, 700 N.E.2d at 585.

(See appendix D-4-5).

The Court further analyzed 2950.09(C)(2)(a), "If, pursuant to division (C)(1) of this section,

the department of rehabilitation and corrections send to the court a recommendation that an offender

who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a sexually oriented offense be adjudicated as being a

sexual predator, the court is not botmd by the departrnent's recommendation... The court may deny the

recommendation and determine that the offender is not a sexual predator without a hearing". Mason v.

Griffin, 90 Ohio St.3d 299 at 302 Id. [1]. Which is what transpired in this case, when on August 12,

1997, the department of rehabilitation and corrections sent to the court their reconunendation that this

Petitioner be adjudicated as being a sexual predator, and after deferring the matter ordering the

department to resubmit their reeonunendation six months prior to Petitioners release date, the court

concluded on October 5, 2001, denying the departments reconunendation without a hearing

determining in an ENTRY finding that this Petitioner is not a sexual predator, essentially effectively

sustaining Petitioners first time prior law offender registration-exemption status.

Except by adjudication of a prior law offender as a sexual predator by a finding of predisposition of

likeliness to commit another sex offense, through the civil proceedings under former § 2950.09(C), I^.

C. Chapter 2950 includes "NO" language providing establishing authority for retroactive imposition of

registration in regard to prior law first time offenders previously exempt from registration prior to 1996

Furthermore, all subsequent legislated amendments to R.C. Chapter 2950, implemented specific

to expressing the manifest intent and purpose to sustain and uphold the first time offender registration-

exempt status of language the prior law, specifically the (2003) Senate Bi115 ^ 2950.09(C)(1), which

read:

"If a person was convictPd ef or pleaded guil.ty to a sexually oriented

12

offense that is not a registration-exempt sexually orienter offense priorto January 1, 1997.

See also specific language of (2003) Senate Bill 5 R.C. Sec6ons 2950.01(G)(4), 2950.03(A), and

2950.04(A)(1). The law's nianifest intent and purpose has further been established by R.C. § 2950.04

that sex offender registration and address verification must be accomplished personally by each

registrant, and then only with the sheriff or his designee. Furthermore, the re-enactment of

(2008)Adam Walsh Act Senate Bill 10, R.C. & 2950.01.1 with similar language sustains and upholds

the prior law registration-exemption status and reads:

***All references ***to "sexually oriented offense" include***any sexually oriented offense, *** that was not a registration-exemptsexually oriented offense, * * * prior to January 1, 2008.

"In pari materia is a rule of statutory construction the meaning of which is that the General

Assembly, in enacting a statute, is assumed to have been aware of other statutory provisions concerning

the subject matter of the enactment " Meeks v. Papadopulous, (1980), 62 Ohio St. 2d 187, 190; "'Che

general axiom of statutory construction that once words have acquired a settled meaning, that same

meaning will be applied to a subsequent statute on a similar or analogous subject." Brennaman v.

R.M.l. Co., 70 Ohio St. 3d 460, 464; "In interpreting a statute, courts can neither ignore the plain

language of the statute, nor insert words or phrases into the statute that have not been placed there by

the General Assembly." State v. Craig, 116 Ohio St. 3d 135, ¶14; "Expressio unius est exclusio

alterius, To express or include on thing implies the exclusion of the other." In re J.P. Ohio App. Fifth

Dist., Slip Copy 2009 WL 2894576.

While, from considerations arising outside of the language of the statute, the Courts might

believe there was a gap created by the statute through legislative oversight, and are convinced that the

legislature intended to enact something different from what it did in fact enact, they cannot supply what

they believe to be omissions. Id. State v. Bellman 86 Ohio St.3d 208 211-212, following Hough v.

Da ton Mfg . Co. 1902 66 Ohio St. 427, 437.

13

'fhe Egregiously unconstitutionally ambiguous implementation of R.C. 2950.032

"fhe (2008) Senate Bill 10, Adain Walsh re-enactment of Revised Code Chapter 2950, with

29S 50.032, does not provide any authority for changing prior final court determinations of individual

classification, or for retroactively imposing duty to register, but does provide for protection of a hearing

and right to appeal, for a court of law determination of whether the new registration applies at all to an

individual, pursuant to & 2950.031(E), Yet, the statute: 1) fails to provide clear proper venue for the

multiple claims of prisoners never previously subject to registration; 2) fails to establish to what extent

th Rules of Civil Procedure apply; failing to establish timely commenced and properly transferred

Petition; 3) fails to provide equal protection of attorney agent assistance of counsel for indigent and

helpless prisoners, and, renders their Petitions later that sixty days from receipt of notice of new

classification imposing registration as untimely, and void, an automatic waiver of right to claim relief

or to contest the state's Ex Post Facto actions. 4) statutory mandatory time limitation provision has not

been imposed upon the state's conduct; 5) The state's unlawful tampering with records, and forgery of

personal information.

Petitioner has resided in Ross County as a state prisoner for the past fourteen plus years, since

1995, at the Chillicothe correctional Institute, and has never before been subject to registration, and

therefore has never personally registered with any sheriff of any county. Without probable cause the

state has colluded in wanton arbitrary and vindictive "Bad Faith" with knowledge and purpose in

malicious abuse of process to defraud Petitioner of his substantive Constitutional and Civil Rights of

equal protection, and substantive and procedural Due process, recklessly causing substantial perilous

libel injury to name, reputation, and property value of innocent elderly residenGal property owners.

CONCLUSION

R.C. § 2950.032, is rendered null and void as unconstitutionally vague for the State's ambiguous

and wholly unreasonable implementation of it, violative of substantive rights under "Stare Decisis"and

"Res Judieata",and multiple constitutional rights including but not limited to: Ohio Constitution and

United States Constitution: Separation of Powers, Due Process, Prohibitions against Retroactive laws,

14

and Double Jeopardy;

Ohio ConstitationArticle I, sections 1, 2, 5, 10. 16 and 19Article II, sections 1, 28 and 32Article IV sec. 3(B)(1), and (F)tJnitsd States C'onstitutionArticle I. § 10, Atnendment V., and Amendment XIV. § 1,

PRAYER

Appellant-Petitioner hereby respectfully prays this Honorable Court to:

1. Grant a Writ of Certiorari of the record of this case from its comtnencernenl on Februaiy 19,2008,in

flaniilton County, and transfer to Ross County for proper venue.

2. Grant de novo, appellate review of the records and merits of this case.

3. Find that Petitioners prior law remedy as a first time prior law offender exempt from registration, is

sustained by both the constitution, legislated laws and RC.§ 2950.031(E).

4. Reverse the judgments of the lower courts, and issue an order restoring Petitioners

accrued and acquired registration-exemption, vested prior law remedy.

iately

5. Issue an order that the Ross County Appellate Court vacate its order taxing this indigent Petitioner

court costs and fees, pursuant to Petitioners established indigency in both the Hamilton and Ross

County Courts and also the Ohio and U.S. Suprelne Courts.

6. Grant a decision that the state and public employees involved in the unwarran

unlawful abuse of process are liable for damages.

ed and unprecedented

1, Anthony Joseph De Noma, do solemnly declare under penalty ofperjury that the forgoing Statement

of the Case and Facts is true correct and accurate.

FIJI2TIIER AF'FIAIVT SAYETH 1\'AUGIIT

Sworn to and Subscrihe.4 in nZy preseWe

?1/ti.,

13

Respectfully submitted

Anthony J. L)^ Noma #308-836Appellant-Petitioner, pro se.15802 State Rt. 104 NorthP.O. Box 5500 C.C.I.Chillicothe, Ohio 45601-5500telephone (740) 774-7080

15

day of January, 2010

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this Notice of Appeal was deposited in the inside mail-room in the

Chillicothe Correction Institute with prepayment for first class U.S. Postage, for delivery by regular

U.S. Mail, addressed to Ross County Prosecuting Attorneys, 72 Nortli Paint Street, Chillicothe, Ohio

45601, counsel for Appellee, the State of Ohio, on

this day of ch dt 1- , 2010.

Anthony J. De Noma

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIOFOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ROSS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Respondent-Appellee,

vs.

: Case No. 09CA3089

ANTHONY J. DENOMA, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT: ENTRY

Petitioner-Appellant.

APPEARANCES:

Anthony J. DeNoma, Chillicothe, Ohio, Appellant, pro se.

Michael M. Ater, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jeffrey C. Marks,Ross County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Chillicothe, Ohio, forAppellee.

McFarland, J.:

{¶1} Appellant, Anthony J. DeNoma, appeals the Ross County Court

of Common Pleas' dismissal of his petition contesting his reclassification as

a Tier III sexual offender. On appeal, Appellant raises a single assignment

of error, contending "[p]lain error of cumulative professional misconduct

defrauding and depriving Defendant of his fundamental equal protection

Constitutional and Civil Rights of fair and just Due Process of Law,

substantially prejudicing Defendant." Because we conclude, as did the trial

Ross App. No. 09CA3089

court, that Appellant's petition was time-barred, we affirm the trial court's

dismissal of Appellant's petition.

2

FACTS

{¶2} Based upon information contained in Appellant's petition for

reclassification filed below, Appellant was convicted of rape, felonious

sexual penetration and gross sexual imposition in 1995.1 He was later re-

classified a Tier III Sex Offender under new provisions enacted as part of

Ohio's "Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act" ("AWA"),

Am.Sub.S.B. 10, 2007 Ohio Laws, File No. 10. The record reveals and

Appellant admits that he received notice of this reclassification on January 2,

2008, via a letter from the Ohio Attorney General. A review of the record

further indicates that the letter, in addition to notifying Appellant of his new

classification and registration duties, also informed Appellant of his right to

contest application of the new classification and registration requirements,

pursuant to R.C. 2950.032(E). Specifically, the letter informed Appellant

that he had "sixty (60) days after receipt of this letter to file a petition in the

Court of Common Pleas in the county where [he] reside[s] in Ohio, or if [he]

1 Although Appellant's petition states that he was convicted of these offenses, a copy of a Hamilton CountyCourt of Common Pleas "Judgment Entry: Sentence: Incarceration," dated Apri16, 1995, which Appellantattached in support of his petition, states that Appellant pled guilty and was convicted of rape and felonioussexual penetration only, Additionally, AppellanYalso attached to his petition a copy of a Hainilton CountyCourt of Common Pleas "Entry Finding Against Adjudication As A Sexual Predator," dated October 5,2001.

Ross App. No. 09CA3089 3

reside[s] outside of the state, the county in which [he] work[s] or attend[s]

school."

{¶3} On September 16, 2008, Appellant commenced the action below

in the Ross County Court of Common Pleas, challenging that re-

classification on various grounds and requesting court appointed counsel.z

On October 21, 2008, the trial court filed a journal entry denying

Appellant's request for appointment of counsel. Then, on October 30, 2008,

the State filed a motion to disiniss Appellant's petition, alleging that because

Appellant had failed to contest the reclassification within sixty days after

receiving notice thereof, the petition should be dismissed. By journal entry

dated December 12, 2008, the trial court dismissed Appellant's petition

based upon Appellant's failure to comply with the time requirements set

forth in R.C. 2950.031(E). This appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

"I. PLAIN ERROR OF CUMULATIVE PROFESSIONALMISCONDUCT DEFRAUDING AND DEPRIVING DEFENDANTOF HIS FUNDAMENTAL EQUAL PROTECTIONCONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF FAIR AND JUSTDUE PROCESS OF LAW, SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICINGDEFENDANT."

2 On appeal, Appellant alleges that he timely,allhough niistakenly, filed a petition contestingreclassifcation m tlie I-Tamilton County Court of Common Pleas and attached several pleadings andtranscript pages which purport to relate to that filing. However, because this argument and thesedocuments were not brought up or made a part of the record below, we will not consider them on appeal.

Ross App. No. 09CA3 089 4

LEGAL ANALYSIS

{¶4} We construe Appellant's sole assignment of error, from his pro

se filings, as a challenge to the constitutionality of his reclassification and

reporting duties under new provisions enacted as part of Ohio's "Adam

Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act" ("AWA"), Am.Sub.S.B. 10, 2007

Ohio Laws, File No. 10. Appellant further advances two issues for our

review under this assignment of error, which we set forth verbatinl, as

follows:

"ISSUE 1.The States complicity in fraudulent material misrepresentation and frivolousconduct, obstructing official business, interfering with civil rights.

ISSUE 2.The courts prejudice and partiality, without jurisdiction denying Defendanthis fundamental constitutional and civil right to be present in a court of law,to be heard in his defense of his vested property."

{¶5} A review of the record reveals that the trial court dismissed

Appellant's petition, after holding a non-oral hearing, without addressing the

merits, based upon the fact that Appellant had failed to comply with the time

requirements in filing his petition. After reviewing the record in this case,

we agree with the trial court's decision and therefore affirm its dismissal of

Appellant's petition.

{¶6} As set forth above, by Appellant's own admission, he received

notice of his reclassification on January 2, 2008. That notice informed


Appellant of his right to contest the reclassification and also infonned

Appellant that the reclassification had to be contested within sixty days of

receiving notice and had to be filed in his county of residence. The record

further reveals that Appellant did not file a petition contesting

reclassification in Ross County, his county of residence, until September 16,

2008, well after the sixty day limit. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed

Appellant's petition as being untimely filed.

{¶7} Although Appellant contends on appeal that he filed an earlier,

timely, petition contesting reclassification in the Hamilton County Court of

Common Pleas, his prior county of residence, there is no evidence we can

properly consider to validate Appellant's contentions. Appellant did not

raise this argument as part of his petition filed in Ross County. In fact, the

pleadings and transcript, which purport to relate to that earlier filing, appear

for the first time as attachments to Appellant's brief on appeal and appear

nowhere in the record below. As such, we cannot consider them on appeal.

Appellant's further allegation that the Ross County prosecutor's office was

aware of his earlier filing and tried to conceal such from the trial court is

unsupported by the record and wholly without merit.

{¶8} Further, although not specifically set forth in his assignment of

error, in the body of his brief, Appellant contends that he was substantially


prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his request for court appointed

counsel in the matter below. In State v. Messer, Ross App. No. 08CA3050,

2009-Ohio-312, this Court recently noted that S.B. 10 "does not authorize

the appointment of counsel." citing, State v. King, Miami App. No. 08-

CA02, 2008-Ohio-2594, ¶ 4, fnl. Our reasoning was based upon our

conclusion that SB 10 remains civil in nature, as opposed to imposing

criminal punishment. Messer at ¶15. "`[L]itigants have no generalized right

to appointed counsel in civil actions."' Id., relying on, Graham v. City of

Findlay Police Dept., Hancock App. No. 5-01-32, 2002-Ohio-1215, citing

State ex Nel. Jenkins v. Stern (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 108, 515 N.E.2d 928;

Roth v. Roth (1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 768, 585 N.E.2d 482. As a result,

Appellant had no right to appointed counsel in this civil matter and the trial

court did not err in denying his request for same.

{¶9} Thus, Appellant's sole assignment of error and the issues related

thereto are wholly without nlerit and, as such, are overruled. Accordingly,

the trial court's dismissal of Appellant's petition contesting reclassification

is affirmed.

JUDGMENT AFFIRIVIED.

Ross App. No. 09CA3089

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that theAppellee recover of Appellant costs herein taxed.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directingthe Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASEUPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIALCOURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not toexceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of acontinued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohioan application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. Ifa stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of theexpiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file anotice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appealperiod pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the SupremeCourt of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses theappeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date

of such dismissal.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant toRule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.Exceptions.

Kline, P.J. and Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

BY:Judge Matthew W. McFarland

NOTICE TO COUNSELPursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a fmal

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences fromthe date of filing with the clerk.

AFFIDAVIT OF INFORMATIONTO CAUSE ARRES'T AND INVESTIGATION

In the State of Ohio :

in the county of Hamilton :Sworn and subscribed :

Being duly cautioned of the penalty of perjury we do solenanly affirm the following facts to be trueand accurate to the best of our knowledge and understanding :

We Richard J. De Noma and Patricia A. De Noina, 82 and 78 years of age respectively, are the

property owners of 7524 Bridgetown road, Hamilton County, Cincinnati, Ohio 45248, which is ourresidence of more than fifty years, where also our 29 year old grandson Joshua M. Hardig resides with

us.

We were present in the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court room in Case No. SP0800368-B952232 in support of our son Anthony J. De Noma in his Petition For Immediate Relief FromCommunity Notification, since, as a first time offender, sentenced under law prior to 1996 he wasexempt from registration, since the law in effect at that time, required registration only of habitual sexoffenders, yet thirteen years later he was now being subjected to Ex Post Facto community notificationand double jeopardy of life time registration under the new, (2008), Senate Bill 10 Adam Walsli Act.

After procuring the transcripts of said proceedings for Anthony's record on appeal, in February, wewere shocked, substantially distmbed, unnerved and severely distressed to learn of the injurious libelspoken of us in the court room and published against us on the State official computer Internetrecord, by forgery of Anthony's personal information, and fraudulent listing of our naine and privateresidential address without Photo Identification, on E.S.O.R.N., Richard Cordray Ohio AttorneyGeneral's Electronic Sex Offender Registration and Notification registry, with Notification of ourneighbors, even though Anthony won his Petition and was granted Immediate Relief from CommunityNotification.

See attached exhibited evidence

This perils libel injury , and manifest injustice against us, caused us substantial loss of ouraccumulated value in our acquired privately owned residential property, and in our name and reputationdestroying our sense of happiness, peace, safety and security in the same, by menacingly setting us upto be harassed, and ostracized , by implicating us as the most heinous sex offenders, exposing us to allthe violent vigilante hate monger perpetrators of hate crimes of the world, creating and causingunwarranted alarm among our neighbors and community, and also substantial dissension within ourown previously peaceful family, and we fear could reasonably have caused to us physical injury and ordeath, and still could, sinee there is no way of knowing how many publications were dowiiloaded anddisseminated before correction was made, and we fear if the offending conduct that perpetrated thisperils libel injury against us does not fortliwith cease and desist immediately it has the potential tocause physical injury and or death to other innocent persons.

Th.e manifest intent of Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2950 establishes that community notification isonly applicable to those offenders at risk of reoffending, and does not apply to a person not found to beeither a sexual predator or a habitual sex offender. Anthony was found not to be at risk of reoffendingand his former law registration exernption status was sustained by conjunctive civil actions of 8-12-1997 and 10-5-2001 under R.C. 2950 09 (C) (2) and pursuant to controlling statutory construction inState v. Cook (1998) 83 Ohio St. 3d at 408, 422-423, and, subsequently specifically affirmed by laterenacted R.C. 2950.09 (C)(1) and (3)_


Therefore the Hamilton County Court lacked jurisdiction of Anthony's classification, and,furthermore, both, defense counsel and the Prosecutor affinned before the bar, that the jurisdiction ofdetermination on Anthony's classification belonged in Ross County, and further, the Prosecutor testifiedbefore the bar of his conference and agreement with the Ross County Prosecutor, who confirmed thatthe Ross County Court would hold a hearing on the matter, { pursuant to R.C. 2950.031 (E)


Yet, the Hamilton County Prosecutor proceeded in opposition to Anthony's Petition, in maliciousmisuse of process, and rraudulent material misrepresentations, influencing the court in manifestdisregard for both the manifest intent and purpose of the laws, and the doctrines of "Stare Decisis"and "Res Judicata" misleading the court, and instituting an old law sexual predator reclassificationhearing, constituting malicious prosecution, in which he was unsuccessfiil in achieving his expressedobjective of having Anthony reclassified as a sexual predator, and subject to community notification.

Yet, when ordered by the court to put on the "ENTRY", the attorneys inappropriately anddeceptively cited the new law provision for sentencing of sexually violent predators R.C. 2971.01producing two conjunctive ENTRIES, imposing Retroactive EX POST F'AC'fO - Double Jeopardylifetime registration, reclassifying him under the new Senate Bill 10, Adam Walsh Act as a Tier III sexoffender.


Then without Anthony's knowledge or awareness, in acts of inter office collusion and in violationsof Ohio Revised Code sections 2913.31(A)(1)(2)and(C)(1)(c)(iii)and 2913.42 (A)(1)and(B)(4), theHamilton County Prosecutors caused the forgery of Anthony's personal information, and fraudulentlisting of the address of our residence, against the nianifest expressed mandates of R.C. 2950.04(A)(1)(a),(c) and (d), while having full awareness and reasonable knowledge of Anthony's coi-rectaddress of residence since the time of his arrest in 1995, as a state prisoner confined in Ross County,Cl-iillicothe Correction Institute, and that neither did Anthony reside with us before, at the time of hisarrest, nor when he offended. Then in a further act of deception and fraudulent materialnisrepresentation, to mislead the court, the county prosecutor purported in a motion to the First DistrictCourt of Appeals that Anthony was not registered with a Hamilton County residence, asserting againthe eourts lack of jurisdiction, on the matter ofAnthony's classification, causing the dismissal ofAnthony's statutory and lower court granted appeal of right, in the First District Court of Appeals caseNo. C0801178, thereby interfering with our civil rights and obstructing official business, violations ofOhio Revised Code sections 2921.31 (A)and(B), and 2921.45 (A)and(B).


We believe that, with reasonable knowledge, purpose and sufficient culpability, Joseph T. Deterspracticed inappropriate use of the influence of his office to propagate his material misrepresentationsand manifest disregard of the manifest intentions of the General Assembly, to wrongly misleading otherpublic officials with purpose to procure their interoffice collusion to perpetrate and peipehiate hisarbitrarily malicious scheme, and apparent wanton vendetta against sex offenders and their supportsystems, and organizing and orchestrating cumulative interoffice, reckless gross negligence per se,and nonfeasance and niisfeasance in office, with regard to inanifest expressed mandates of the law forthe protection of the people, which prohibit Retroactive, Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, and requiresthe in person registration of each sex offender's personal information, for accurate verification of hisresidential address, current photo for proper public identification, wliether community notification is

war-ranted , and date of data entry.See attached exhibited evidence

With good reason, exhibited by attached evidence, we believe, those in collusion and complicitywith Joseph Deters, knowingly or unknowingly to cause and commit this manifest injustice and perilsinjury against us, include but is not limited to the following public officials:

1. Patrick X. Dressing #0063654PHamilton County Assistant ProsecLitor, in case No. B952232-SP0800368

2. Paula E. Adams #0069036PHamilton County Assistant Prosecutor, in Appeal No. C0801178

3. Daniel Burke Jr. #13836 Defense CounselHamilton County Public Defender, in case No. B952232-SP0800368

4. Ralph E. Winkler, Judge, Hamilton County Court of Common PleasCase No. SP0800368-B952232

5. Simon L. Leis Jr. Sheriff, Hamilton County6. Richard Cordray Ohio Attorney General regional office

By all the foregoing, Joseph Deters' conduct has substantially affected the basic fairness, integrityand public reputation of the justice system. Tliereby seriously challenging the legitimacy of theunderlying judicial process itself, constituting "Plain Error" and multiple violations of the Ohio Rulesof Professional Conduct including but not limited to:

Rule III Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct3.1 Meritorious claims and contentions3.3 Candor toward the tribunal3.4 Fairness to opposing party and counsel3.5 Impartiality and decorum of the tribunal3.8 Special responsibilities of a prosecutor

Rule VIII, Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct(a) violating and attempting to violate the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct and knowingly

assisting or including another to do so, or through the acts of another.(b) Commit an illegal act tlsat reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty or trustworthiness.(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.(e) State or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to

achieve results by means that violate the Ohio Rules of Professional conduct or other laws.

By all the foregoing conduct perpetrated and caused by Joseph T. Deters, he has violated his R.C.3.23, and Article XV, sec. 17, Ohio Constitution oath of office to support the constitution and laws ofthe State, proving himself to be an enemy of the people , the state, and its constitution by knowinglyand purposefully, and unlawfully encroaching upon and depriving us of our most fundamentalconstitutional and civil rights including but not limited to : Substantive due process of law, and equalprotection under the law, and protection of our peace, happiness, privacy, and sense of safety andsecurity in our accumulated value to us in our residential property, in our name and in our reputation,guaranteed protection from vindictive and arbitrary encroachment from the government, without justcompensation, Article L sections l.and 2. Ohio Constitution. See also Ohio jurisprudence in thefollowing:Van Fossen v. Babcock (1988) 36 Ohio St. 3d 100 at 104-105; Bruestle v. Ricli (1953) 159 Ohio St.13 , 24, 110 N.E. 2D 778; Arnoid v. Cleveland (1993) 67 Ohio St. 3d 35, 42, 616 N.E. 2D 163;Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich (1993) 627 N.E. 2D 570; State v. Williams (Ohio App. 11 Dist.)1999 WL 76633

"There is no crueler tyranny than that which is exercised under cover of law, and with thecolors of justice" U.S. v. Jamioti 673 F. 2d 578, 614 ,(3rd cir. 1982). "He who knows the truth, andbellows not the truth makes himself the accomplice of lies and forgers " Judge Billings Learned HandU.S. Federal Judge 1909-1961.

By all the foregoing, with good cause and reason we believe it is through conspiracy and engagingin a pattern of corrupt activity, that Joseph T. Deters committed violations of Ohio Revised Codesections 2923.01 (A)(1)(2), 2923.31(E),(I)(2)(c), and 2923.32 (B)(1), and caused this violation ofR.C. Sec. 2739.01 Libel injury against us, constituting and culminating in multiple violations of theOhio Revised Code including but not limited to:

R.C. 2705.02 (A)and (B), Contempt of CourtR.C. 2923.01 (A)(1)(2), ConspiracyR.C. 2923.31 (E),(I)(2)(c), Corrupt activityR.C. 2913.31 (A)(1)(2)and (C)(1)(c)(iii), Forgery, a felony of the second degreeR.C. 2913.42 (A)(1)and(B)(4), Tampering with records, a felony of the third degreeR.C. 2923.32 (B)(1), Engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, a felony of the second degreeR.C. 2923.02 (A), Attempt, a felony of the first degreeR.C. 2903.02 (B), Murder, a felony of the first degreeR.C. 2923.02 (A), Attempt, a felony of the first degreeR.C. 2903.04 (A)and(C), Involuntary inanslaughter, a felony of the first degreeR.C. 2923.02 (A), Attempt, a misdemeanor of the second degreeR.C. 2903.13 (A)and(B), Assault, a misdenieanor of the first degreeR.C. 2903.22 (A)and(B), Menacing, a misdemeanor of the forth degreeR.C. 2909.07 (A)(I)and(C)(2)(a), Criminal mischief, a felony of the fifth degreeR.C. 2921.13 (A)(1)(2)(3)(7)(10)and(F)(1), Falsification, a misdemeanor of the first degreeR.C. 2921.31 (A)and(B), Obstruction of official business, a fclony of the fifth degreeR.C. 2921.44 (E)and(F), Dereliction of duty, misdemeanor of the second degreeR.C. 2921.45 (A)and(B), Interfering with civil rights, a misdemeanor of the first degreeR.C. 2923.03 (A)(1)(2)(3)(4)and(F), Complicity

We declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statement with exhibited evidence

is true and accurate according to our limited reasonable knowledge and understanding of the law.

Further Affiants Sayeth Naught

Executed on this 16 day of October, 2009.

Richard J. De Noma

Patricia A. Ae Noma

Residents and Property owners of :7524 Bridgetown Road, Hamilton CountyCincinnati, Ohio 45248phone number (513) 941-0015

subscribed in my presence on this 412 day of October, 2009.

,My oPj j'^m 9-,X- ?^ `le^ -, ^^

oiary Public 'al

^

In the STATE OF OHIO :

In the COCJNTY OF HAMILTON:Sworn and Subscribed:

AFFIDAVITOF SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Establishing nonfeasance and misfeasance in the office of Richard Cordray Ohio AttorneyGeneral, in collusion , and complicity with perverted scheme of Joseph 'I'. Deters, Hamilton CountyProsecuting Attorney, in conduct violative of multiple sections of the Ohio Revised Code, the OhioConstitution, and the United States Constitution, a potential claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Being duly cautioned of penalty of perjury, I Richard J. De Noma do solemnly state and affirmas true, correct, and accurate the :

In February, 2009, after leaming of the damages and perilous libel injuries perpetrated againstour privacy, name, reputation, peace, happiness, residential property, and substantive sense of safetyand security, we contacted the office of Richard Cordray Ohio Attomey (ieneral to have our addressdeleted from his (E.S.O.R.N.), Electronic Sex Offender Registration and Notification World WideIntemet Public notification registry.

On February27, 2009, as I talked to the deputy attorney general our address was deleted fromE.S.O.R.N., and the new address was inserted as I spoke with them, and they pulled up a copy and Iwent through it with them line for line and made changes at that moment, yet the communitynotification requirement remained, despite the Judge Ralph Winkler's October 28,2008, ENTRYORDER that community notification does not apply to Anthony J. De Noma.

Since Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2950 specifically mandates that each individuals registrationinformation is to be provided in person to the sheriff or his designee, R.C. 2950.04 (A)(1)(a)(c)(d). Itseems that is the clear manifest intent and purpose of the law, and further, the attomey general is onlyauthorized to receive registration information from the county sheriff. The logic of "ReasonableKnowledge" would set forth that if said registration is not pursuant to the law of R.C. Chapter 2950, toinclude photograph for identification, but in its place a notation that Offender is Incarcerated yet,includes a private address of residential property in Hamilton County, and further consists of a bogusdata entry date of 1-1-1900, more than a hundred years ago, then reasonable knowledge should rejectsuch registration as fraudulent, and outside the scope of employment and official responsibilities of theAttorney General to accept such bogus registration. Furthemiore there is tto provision in the law forthe attorney general to conduct actual registration or address verification, as he has done in W1s case.

Clearly the office of the Ohio Attorney General practices a custom of acquiescence andtolerance of state and federal rights violations, in manifest disregard of statutory requirements.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

RichanQ J. De Noma7524 Bridgetown RoadCincinnati, Ohio 45248telephone (513) 941-0015

lublic

LlaLea "ty°=Auft9o THE STATE OF OHIO, I7M,11LTON COUNTYcOde: GJEI

judge: 027 COURT OF COMMON PLEASform: B

:^ * * * * * * * * * ** *

E N T E R E D *

* DATE :* *

* IMAGE:

* * ,r ^ * * * ^ * * *

THE STATE OF OHIOVS.

ANTHONY J DENOMA

: T MAS H. CRUSI

NO. 952232

G.ENT ENTRY : SENTENCE:

INCARCERATION

Defendant was present in open Court with Counsel GEORGE M PARKERon the 6th day of April 1995 for sentence.

The court informed the defendant that, as the defendant well knew,the defendant had pleaded guilty and had been found guilty of the offense(s) ofRAPE, 2907.02 R.C. (AGG F-1) IN COUNT #1;FELONIOUS SEXUAL PENETRATION, 2907.12 R.C. (AGG F-1) IN COUNT #2;(Aak4AT10 NS,`:O#C E'LiifCE" Rmy'ft°.FROM CtStJNTs #1, AND ^ZYriDEFENDANm k'OUND 'COMPETENI') . -

The Court afforded defendant's counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf ofthe defendant. The Court addressed the defendant personally and asked if thedefendant wished to make a statement in the defendant's behalf, or presentany information in mitigation of punishment.

Defendant is sentenced to be imprisoned in Department of Correctionsfor a-period of TEN (10) YEARS TO A MAXIMUM OF TWENTY-FIVE (25) YEARSIN EACH OF COUNTS #1 AND #2 TO RUN CONCURRENTLY TO EACH OTHER ANDCONCURRENTLY TO SENTENCE IN CASE NUMBER B951322 WITH CREDIT OF FIFTY-SIX(56) DAYS GIVEN FOR TIME SERVED. DEFENDANT REMANDED. DEFENDANT TO PAYCOURT COSTS.

efendant was notified of the right to appeal as required by Crim. R 32(A)(2)

-a

6.=-6-95 H a

-

m^ I tCoAns EC oCuGnStTy SCTIAeTrEkM

E 0 N f T C o u r tCourt Code : BA Case-N mb ---_----_ _ ---u er 95-01322STATE OF OHIO vs. ANTHONY J DENpyyA

Filing: 0005 WARRANT ONINDICTMENT

Current Judge:027 THOMAS H. CRUSH'revious Judge: 000

Disp: 3D0C DEppRTMENTOF CORRECTI4N5

.eferred From Case::eferred To Case:

Totai Case Credits:Tota1 Case Debits: $152-20-15

Case Baianca:--------- 2^20

Accum. Disburs$.00

-----------------------La'st ActivityDate: 6- 5-95

Filing Date: 2-2I-95

Assign Date: 2-e3-95

Date:

CA600 Date:Applied Costs:

I.nitial Payment Method:

Last Bil;in D

4- 6-95

6- 5-95152.20

g ate: 5-1 RDeposit Motion Flag:ements: $152.20

-95

NO------------- ---

P A Rt Y R E F E R E N C E

arty Dropped Part ------- ----------- --- ---_____ropped Date Y- i►Party Name & Address ----- ---------------------"-- --------- __-- _ _ Attorney p Attorney

Name & AddressN D-0001ANTHONY- -p- --- - -- - -------7'6^0 R^dX gc7NFi1CINCINNA I H

46664 GEORGE M PARKER

N P-0001 cl-TATE OF OHIO

Z-9999

7UU MERCHANT STREETSUITE 222ACINCINNATI

OH 45246

----------------------•- -D-^ ^^ E T E N T R I E SocY Entry Dock Entry ---br Type -- -- - ------ _. __Ima ge Docket Descri 'Code Date Number ptionl --- "- `- "---- --------- --__ . Dncket Comment----- '__.5-.9^' Amount Applied95

942 P 6F 03MR0

3MRC 66- ^- 5- MONEYhRECEiVEItp^g1COSTan Run- "- --_- ------

344 F BILL 5-t8-95 RIt,HARD J DE NOMA PAID RY y15, YesRILLED: 20- Yes

^46 ANTS2 20 DENONA YesF $IBILL4-17-95 BILLED:

GEORGE ht PARKER45 D 7PXC $152 20 YesSO 7CRS - 6-95 SHERIFF FEES

D 4 6-g5 CRIMINAL STENc352 D GEFD 4- 6-95 507 ENTRY FINDING DEFENDANT '13.00 Yes

COMPETENT FOR PURPOSE OF ^t3.00 Ye=STANDrNRIAL54 D GJEI 4- 6-95 497 JUDGMENI ENTRY: SENTENCE:INCARCERATION: $3. 00 Yes

D TCOSTSOCEYRS^ REt1ANDED. PAY COURT

;6 D GEWP 4- 6-95 452 ENTRY b1ITHDRAtJING PLEA OF NOT

GUILTY AND ENTERING PLEA OF $3•00 YesGUILTY

S D HROE 9-10-95 REP4RTMOFFEXAMINEROAS PER2945.371 OR 290I.o1(N) REPORT

0 D OFFICE^ RIM 3l^RFILEDCOURTS

HROE 4-10-95 RE:PORT" OF EXAMINER A, PER2945.371 OR 2901.OI(N) REPORTLOCATED IN CLEt2Y OF COURTS

D HX, 3_28 49S OFFICE, RM 315 FI L^ LtSUG:ESTION OF INSA3JITY

#1.00 Yes

^t.Od Yes

i:1 .00 Yes py(^._2

COURT OF COMMON PLEASHAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO

vs.

Plaintiff

t>` IEREDAUG,t 2 997,

IMAGE I

CASE NO.

(Judge

ENTRY DEFERRING THESCHEDULING OF SEXUAL

Defendant PRF3ATnR ARtxt.

A(Inmate Number)

This matter is before the court on the receipt of the Ohio Department of

Corrections' Sexual Predator Screening Form sent pursuant to R.C. §2950.09(C),

regarding the status of the above-named offender:

And the court, finding that this matter is not ripe for scheduling a sexual predator

hearing pursuant to R.C. §2950.09(B), it being earlier than six months prior to this

offender's release date;

It is hereby ordered that the Ohio Department of Corrections' Sexual Predator

fmding regarding this offender be forwarded to this court six months prior to this

offender's scheduled release date. Upon receipt of such finding, this court will then

schedule the matter for a hearing pursuant to R.C. §2950,09(B).

Judge

Date: ^Z-T

THE STATE OF OHIO, HAMILTON COUNTY

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

STATE OF OHIO

Plaintiff

-----E R FIND^NG

AGAINST ADTUDrCATinNAS A SEXUAL PREDATOR

This matter came before this court for a Sexual Predator determination to be made

pursuant to Section 2950.09. Without a hearing, it is hereby determined that the above

named offender is not a sexual predator.

A'TC^',t1^..^^,

-1i,

3V

l ^ ^

STATE OF OHIO DENOP9A, r1NTl-'ONY J.

OFFICE OF TI-TE ATTORNEY GENERp,L00l8836

MARC DANP7, ATTORNEY GENERAG R¢c)gVel 4.m C'ti;^ticc^ e [orrecîo+,a^tJU7} /ânayz nent ,Q^nîh;sf"rafer

4M'H®NY J. DENOMA Mark I{oolcs January ,zun ^pQ^

NOTICE OF NEW CLASSIFICATION AND REGISTRATION DUTIESTIER AI SFJt GFFE(yDER IADULTI

This letter is to notfy, youof changes 10 Ohio's Sex Offender Registration and Noti ication Act (Ohie Revised Code Chapter 2950, "SORN"). Your classification anc

registration duties have changed due to Ohio Senate Bill 10, passed to implement the f derat Adam Walsh Ctiild Protection and Safety Act of 2006.CfaastffcaBon:

8eginning January 1, 2008, your new classification is Tier III Sex Offender. You will be required to register personally with the local sheriHs office every ninety (90) day:for Life.

.. . Dutl&a:

Upon release, you are required to register, in person, with the shedff of the county in which you establish residency within 3 days ot coming into that county or if temporarilydomiciled for more than 3 days.You are also required to register, in person, with fhe sheriff of the county in which you establish a place of education immed'

ratefy upancorning into that county. If you establish a place of aducation in another state but maintain a residence or temporary domicile here, you are also required to register, inperson, with the shedff or other appropriate official in that other state immediately upan coming into that state. You are also required to register, in person, with the shedff ofthe county in which you establish a place of employment if you have been employed for more Ihan

3 days or for an aggregate of 14 days in a calendar year. If youestablish a pface of employment in another state but maintain a residence or temporary domicile here, you are also required to register, in person, with the shenff or otherappropriate official in that othar stale if you have boon employed for more than 3 days or for an aggregate

of 14 days in a calendar year.After the date of in'rBal registration, you are required to pedodically verity your

residence address, place of employment and/or pface of education, in person, at the county° sheriff's office no eadier than 10 days pdor to your verification date.

If you change residertce address, place of employment and/or place of education, you shall provide wdtten notice of that change to the sheriff with whom you most recentlyregistered, and to the shedff in the county in which you intend to reside, or establish a place of employrnent and/or place of education

at least 20 days prior to any changeand no tater than 3 days after change of employment.

You shall provide wdtten notice, within 3 days, of any change in vehicle information, email addrasses, intemet identifiers or telephone numbers registered to or used byyou, to the sheriff with whom you have most recently registered.

Duhr to Reaiafer achedu(ed to terminats b®tare®n Julv 1 2007 and r

If your duty lo comply with the registraUon requirements was scheduted to terminate on or after July 1, 2007, and pdor to January 1, 2008, under the version of Ohio.07 effect Janua notMthsta terminationermin^ aed heduled purs0uant to Oh o Revised Code §2950.033, eHeclivenJuty 1f, 2007.sYo ^ re equired to comply duties,theyourotherwise modified by Court order. new ^registration hequ rements unla st

Commtniity NotiNcaOon

As a Tier III Sex Offender, you are subject to the community notlficaGon requirements under Ohio Revised Code § 2950.11. It you were previously not subject to communitynotification pdor to January 1, 2008, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 2950.11 (F;(2), the Court may make a determination that removes this requirement.

Rlohl to i.onteat euollcatlon of new rt u ron and istration^y requaemenfs

Ohio Revised C 950.032

leflerto file a petit on iÎhe2Court of (Common Pleas In ghe county where you esidesia Ohio, ordifryoutreside outs'de the staie,u thehaveschool. You must also send a copy at the petition to the county prosecutor in that county. If you fail to

file yourpetiBon within the si ^(^) days after receipt of thisounty in which you work or aftend

your dghl to contest the application of the new classification and registration requiremente. You are required to comply with the new registration requirements unlessatherwise modified by Court order,x<1 (60) day period, you have waived

Sincerely,

Steven RaubanoltDeputy Superintendent of 8CI&I

Ohio Hureau of Criminal IdenHHcatlon and lnves_t_igaNon _

P.O. Hox 365AMEMLondon, OH 43740

Telephone: (740) 845-2ppp NAnlnlematoy^.Cen,r,ep AnASCL(12egArnMreOFacsimile: (740)R45-2020 â+'rraT=,^,amnWMr ^.+^,marr..x.awr

wwcv.ag.state.oh.us

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Aah7ilfoh COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff,

V.

A hÔhy J. DQlVOhdQ

Defendant.

5(A(^Ca ao^)

Case No. B gj 223 2-

HEARING REQUESTED

MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE RELIEF FROM COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION PURSUANTTO R.C. 2850.11(F)(2)

Now comes Defendant Abfit,QTj Lle Nam pro Se,, and pursuant to R.C.

2950.11(F) and for the reasons set forth in the attached memorandum, hereby moves

this Court to make a finding and issue an order that Defendant is not subject to the

community notification provisions of R.C. 2950.11.

Respectfulty submitted,

0 le?A-k;^ 030 g _836

PO s VO}( 5Jdo CF7!{^jGO^hG ('Ohh2CfjOhQ( ^hy r,ADDRESS

FENDA - TITIONER, pro seDE

!^ , ee, U,'o J4 q-(oOc' 1 7, STATE & ZIP CODE

^ (o

THE STATE OF OHIO, HAMILTON COUNTY


NO. SP0800368

(Judge Ralph E. Winkler)Respondent

ANTF?ON!( ?.. 17e1VONJA

Petitioner

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITIONTO PETITIONER'S MOTION FORIMMEPIATE RELIEF FRONsCOMMUNITY NOTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO R.C. 2950.11(F)(2)

1. Introduction

Petitioner was convicted in Hamilton County under Case Nos. B-9502232 and

B9501322. In B9502232, he was convicted of Rape and Felonious Sexual Imposition. In

B9501322, he was convicted of Gross Sexual Imposition. Petitioner's daughters, ages 12 and

14, were the victims in these cases. At the trial court level, a suggestion of incompetency

was entered, and after examination, petitioner was found competent for purposes of

standing trial. (See Image 0508, dated 4/6/1995, B-9502232. )

Petitioner was sentenced to 10 to 25 years under B9502232, concurrent with 2 years

definite under B-9501322. Since his sentencing on Apri16, 1995, petitioner has been and

remains incarcerated on those offenses.

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

/

COIJRT OF COMMON PLEAS

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

ANTHONY DENOMA,

petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF OHIO,

Respondent.

)

)

p Y FiL,;EDCt.EftK CF CpUPoTGHAN1St3ON COUNTY

CyR'cCiUt2Y HAiiTMANNCCPa1MC)U PI..FA.S COURTj

) CASE NO. sP0800368

)

)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

16

APPEARANCES:

Daniel Burke, 7r., Esq.

On behalf of the Petitioner.

Patrick Dress-ing, Esq.

on behalf of the Respondent.

BE IT REMEMBERED that upon the hearing

of this cause, on August 7th, 2048, before the

Honorable Ralph E. winkler, a said judge of the

said court, the following proceedings were had.

25

25

2

3

PROCEEDINGS, August 7th, 2008

THE COURT: Anthony Denoma vs. the

state of ohio, SP0800368.

MR. BURKE: Judge, he is 'not here.

He's currently locked up in --

MR. DRESSING: Chillicothe.

MR. BURKE: - Ehillicothe

correctional, judge.

The issue before this court is a

petition. i got appointed by th-is

honorable Court to represent Mr: Denoma

because he filed from the Ohio Department

of corrections. Andtlie issue he's

raising, basically, in his case is the

community notification issue.

By law, by the Adam walsh Act, if

we believe it's constitutional, which i

don't, but by the Adam Walsh Act, he can

file for the community notification in

the cotrnty where his case originated,

which is Hamilton County. so he's

correctly filed that here. if he wants

tofight hisclassification, he has to

file that in the county where he's

residing, which is Ross county. This is

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ANTHONY DENOMA,

Petitioner,

)

) c3REGUF;V HARifiAANNCC3h91r1QN PLEAS COUFl75

vS. ) CASE N0. SP08003i

STATE OF OHIO, )

Respondent. )


APPEARANCES:

Daniel Burke, Jr., Esq.

on behalf of the Petitioner.

Patrick Dressing, Esq.

on behalf of the Respondent.

25


of this cause, on August 28th, 2008, before the



PROCEEDINGS, August 28th, 2008

THE COURT: Anthony Denoma vs. the

State of ohio, SP0800368. Mr. Daniel

Burke for the plaintiff.

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3

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6



ANTHONY DENOMA,

Petitioner,

)

)

C:C3PY FiL ^CLFqK OF CfJURTBtiA7NILTnN COUNTY

GRtCG(i(1 i HARHt MANNCOMMON PLEAS COURTS

Vs. ) CASE NO. SP0800368

STATE OF OHIO, )

Respondent. )


APPEARANCES:

Daniel Burke, ]r., Esq.

on behalf of the Petitioner.

Patrick Dressing, Esq.

On behalf of the Respondent.


of this cause, on October 22nd, 2008, before the



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hearings do noteven exist anymore'

according to the First oistrict Court of

Appeals, 7udge Sunderman, in State vs.

clay.

under the o l d , law thia offe.nder.was

exempt . from: regis:tration, and that has

never changed up until this point. And

.it cannot be changed now,. and I would

like to say, as I have said in my

filings, that I would 3ike to have the

opportunityto appeal this on the

discretionary hearing to the First

District Court of Appeals.

,as Mr. oressing has said, this

hearing requested by the defendant has

nothing to do with classification. I'm

not contesting my classification before

this court. I, am only, contesting tFre°

error in,subjecting me to community

notifieation: My contesting the .

classification has been filed, and i've

sent a copy of it to the court, of my

filingto contestthis classification

error in thecounty of my residence,

which is ROSS County. and I submitted a

B-1Z

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copy to the court.

Did the court get that copy?

THE COURT: I don't need it.

THE DEFENRANT: This is my filing

with aoss County on the subjectof

classification.

THE COURT: Your attorney already

put that on therecord, so I believe your

attorney that you objected to it.

THE DEFENDANT: Well, it's already

filed. I've already filed it.

THE COURT: Yourattorney already

said that, okay, at the very beginning of

the hearingwhen I was listening to your

attorney.

THE DEFENDANT: So, for a sexual

predator classification hearing,

witnesses need to be called from both

sides. And according to the supreme

Court and according to the constitution,

the defendant has the right to

cross-examine all witnesses. 50 if Dr.

Dreyer is here, I would like the

opportunity to cross-examine her since

her thing -- her report has already been

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His next hearing before the parole board

as scheduled by the Department of

Corrections is July of 2011. But then it

says the expiration of his maximum

sentence, if he would serve the max, is

February 4th, 2020.

Then he made some other arguments,

which I'm going beyond the scope of this

hearing, that he should have been

released already or sooner, but we're not

here for that today. You'd have to file

some type of an appeal on that.

Do you have an entry -- do you want

to offer any additional evidence on

whether he should be classified as a Tier

III or a Tier 1 or Tier II before --

MR. DRESSING: Judge, I think it's

appropriate that the classification

hearing be held up in Ross county.-

THE COURT: Well, I'll just

indicate that -- my feelings on the

record -- since he's been convicted of

rape, it's probably a Tier iII.

MR. DRESSING: I would concur with

that, judge. i'veactually had contact

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with the prosecutor up in that county.

don't think it's been set for a hearing

yet, but they do plan to address the =

reclassification hearing upthere.

MR. BURKE: judge, for the record,

we do have no community notification; is

that correct?

THECOURT: Not at this time,

because it's up to Ross County to

decide -

MR. BURKE: okay.

THE COURT: -- what to do. i just

ruled on the old classification, but I

needthe attorneys to put on some entry

indicating that the court made a finding

that he's a sexually oriented offender.

MR. BURKE: okay. we'll put that

entry on. Thanks, judge.

Mr. Denoma would like to appeal,

just for the record.

THE COURT: It seems like he won.:,

MR. BURKE: I think he won

everything, judge.

THE COURT: He didn't win in that I

conducted a hearing, but he won on the

:F.[AP3ITLTON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEASHAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

b,:i<:li4.' i'.^ a.3h1o

Respondent

:"Ua<<,«.iy J . DeNoma

Petitoner

CASE NO.: SP0800368

JUDGE: Ralph E. Winkler

ENTRY GRANTING PETITION FORIMMEDIATE RELIEF OFCOMMUNITY NOTIFICATION(2950.11fFN2)

Pursuant to R.C. 2950.11(F)(2), the Court has considered all relevant information andtor

testii-nony presented by all parties in this matter and finds that the Petitioner has proven by clear

ancr ::=::nvincing evidence and grants Petitioner's Motion for Immediate Relief from Community

N(otification.

Petitioner has been found to be a sexually oriented offender, and is therefore not subject

w the connnunity notification provisions under R.C. 2950.11.

Eiierefore, the Court orders that the registration requirements„as set out in R.C. 2950.04,

z,..C. 2950.05, and R.C. 2950.06 as applicable to a Tier III offender apply tothe Petitioner,and

that he is not subject to the conununity notification provisions under R.C. 2950.11.

DATE

HAMILTON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEASHAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

Respondent-6+ti

f^r i3 vriy J. DeNoma

Petitoner

CASE NO.: SPa800368

.tUDGE: Ralph E. Winkler

ENTRY ADJUDICATINGOFFENDER AS A SEXUALLYORIENTED OFFENDER

'I'his matter came before the Court for a review of a previous sexual predator

rrition by Judge Crush onOctober 5, 2001 by Entry orily, The Court ordered a Clinict u<:'^âtion and then in consideration of all relevant factors set forth in R.C. 2950:09 (B)(2)andft C. 2971.01,it

is hereby determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that the above-named

=i='ender is a Sexually Oriented Offender.

DATE

8•a /7

Vttenaer uetaus

R.I CHA R DCt) RD RAYOHIO ATTC?1tlYEY GENERAL

Offender Details

Offender/ Demographics

ANTHONY J. DENOMANickname: n/a

Date of Birth: 07/09/ 1958 Age: 50

Race: Unknown Gender: Maie

Height: O'O" Weight: n/a

Hair: Unknown Eyes: Unknown

Also Known As:n/a

Scars, Marks, Tattoos:n/a

Supervislon Status:n/a

Outstanding Warrants (Status of Warrant Subject toChange):n/a

Additional Information:Fingerprints on file with Ohio BCIDNA registered In the National CODIS system

Offense Details

Classiflcation:Tier III sex OffenderwithNotiflcation

ph4tonot

available

Photo Date:

$ubmit.A Tip I CorreotLopI

Offenderis Incarcerated

Offense(s):2907.02- Rape2907.12- REPEAtED 1996 - Felonious Sexual Penetrationr5ee 2907.01

2907,95 _Gross Sexuai ImpQr@ition

victlm(s):

Addresses Where Registered

Residentiai view ap proximete_ma p7524 ORID6ETOWN RP.CINCYNNATIr 11 OM 45210Namiiton County . ,

. LastModifledi01/01/1900

* More information on this registrant may be available at the Shenff's Office

http://www.esorn.ag.state.oh.us/Secured/p23.aspx?oid=xoM3A276Ot4= 2/5/09

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13

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIOFIRST DISTRICT, HAMILTON COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO

Respondent-Appellee

vs.

ANTHONY DENOMA

Petitioner-Appel lant

NO. C-0801178

MOTION TO DISMISS

C-Qpv FaLEC,%€R,{ (pF CbUR7SHAMIL7AN CaUNTY

JRN 13 Z009

RqTR10lA M<Ct.AtaCYGphqdClN RLEk8 COUH7S

Pursuant to R.C. 2950.031(E), the petition contesting reclassification and new registration

requirements must be filed and the hearing held in the court of conunon pleas where the Petitioner

resides or if the Petitioner does not reside in the State of Ohio in the court of common pleas of the

county where the Petitioner has registered a school or place of employment. Petitioner is currently

an inmate in F4 ChillipthwCorrectional Institution. Since^ft_:PBES^tt^tui.rently does¢'ît resideAk C.) tn c

in oren^t erw^ ^' ^^}

--^Y ^ tÎ^!Lu Le GoAIIO

Paula E. Adains, 0069036PAssistant Prosecuting Attorney

230 East Ninth Street, Suite 4000Cincinnati, Ohio 45202513/946-3228

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEI hereby certify that a copy

of this docunient was served up ch party or attorney of record in theproceedings for each party by ordinary U.S. mail on theay of Januaru, 2009.u

Paula E. Adams, 006^036PAssistant Prosecuting Attorney

I h -Ae Cout-f of' /1plqeals of ohio

tStaê- of OhioPlaihtr{'.^-Appellea

' _.4i

C ase No. -_C08-1178

._.Jvd9e J. Howard_Suhderm^»rÂnfhoh vJ._De1ltoen^ .'_ -

Defehdaht-AppellantÔrose:^!floTron( fnt Assl^h menlof Counsei,•

ehi@1 cy^ erMi55ioh ^"o Cohfinoc +o h ahdPrihf {1is bhiefs,.ô accelvf

IAppati}-- Z,oher Rereby hvw tespectfully pra^ lhts / onorQ6le Court^r1 El

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appo;nfing cowhsel f/o prosecute f%ts, his a/o/,eal ^jled in the case ,

A1,peIlanf fur^]'iet rnoves ifiis Covrtparsuanf to Rule 9(8) of 'fhe< Ohio,Pules of

Appel(afe. ^rocedure., -Ja f'i:Ie_-tliese ehclosed _transtr,`pts of fheAVgus1' 72'and

and Ccto6er 22 "-p 200$ /aroceed,'r,9s of fA„"s case 3 Ar a; folt cons,det-ql',oy af :

e cornpleterecord wben -Ae Dockef, f'lrny. and. Jourhal franscripfs sâU bea1'+-ans.m;4ed by. the Clerk oF4-lie Commow PJeas ovr4 of t•ecord,

As an.;nd;qent prisoner defendsnf^ wifhaut^-t,pisfsk,lls oraccess fo+war^.--Proces$otj who has hahd prinfed all h;s br;e{'s in t`lie Cout-l' o{ record,

is subs fanf;ve__ end .tês fed /i6erty i^zfetests a17d.lr.,raper^ riyht, encroached .

r îlin^ TeanscrÎO^s..of_Proceed^r^s^

ati,No^fRôht^s '/°e/lahf An.t^rnî^_J._L?eNomayârose,_

1ll^ 29!?3

is Ster{ôq zs '45 and ô waive -Ae r,umber of cop;es-'c Qt^^X

Fri-s^ D;strTcf^ //amilton C'oun y

reQuired,

Respectfully subm;fl'ed

au;t/}aYôhy J. De Notmc+. #3ae-83bhnd^yent Defendant hppellaart, pro sepri5on er cat,d M/ar-d ^f .^),e s{zfgP.o. 55`0o c.c,T ,Ch^!(^cotl,e, Oho y56o/

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELI.ATE DISTRICT OF OHIO


STATE OF OHIO,

Appellee,

vs.

ANTHONY J. DENOMA,

Appellant.

APPEAL NO. G-081178TRIAL NO. SP-o8oo368

R"Y OF 17ISMISSAL

This cause came on to be considered upon the motion of the appellee to dismiss the

appeal.

There being no response, the Court finds the motion is well taken and is granted.

The Court further finds from the attachments to appellant's pleadings that he was not

aggrieved by the trial court's decision in that the trial court granted his petition for

immediate relief from community notification. See State v. Christian.,

All other pending motions are overruled as being moot.

It is further ordered that a certified copy of this judgment shall constitute the

mandate to the trial court pursuant to Rule 27, Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.

'I'o The Clerk:

Enter upon the Journal of the Court on per order of the Court.

By: (Copy sent to counsel)Presiding Judge

' 2008-Ohio-6304

8 -- 2:3

^n fiî^ Cour^ ^1 ^P:/0Fir^s7^ Lvs7"xt67`1

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ellee

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{â5 ^leeh 5eh^" ^y U,S, /»aif _oh ^^;s ^ 9 n- râyof c'at7uary ^.OO^^

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.

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ResiO®^:^"^dr^ su6}mifêdV. tJ-e i?enanZ.'

^}ntho J UeNowra "308-836efan t-Rnpelfant pl'p se,

1443ervt Prisoxer and ward ef -Ae 5tate

158o.z 5tafe iRt, loq Nor^{ip, o, 8ox sSooCf„lt;catke, OA,a y56o/ 5soo

M6MORANDUM lN SUppORT

Vs.

An`Fhon J. DeôwtalD^fehdaht-APPel(aht pro se

ncl 9sed -WA e^&âk a..s 7',Ww,e y ahd ef^'icfve: ttesaah se. 7'a tlie Cool-t

APpellant ►-esl7ecfful y repuesf's cohsiderafi,on e{' his extrQOrdrnar^ ei^-cumsfaxces;naliz4lion.1 and ea ►-nesly dessires altnad af/,eQia61e arder on ks,/eya^âsiîeh,

^ ^ f^-- êêcCdaa^ r^*"advan°Fayed by 6ris dependwnce ch t(+e qovern,"en44ralllrispt^`visinns.

rsl+^fio^'ra^wîes^ prAceedares aiid 5c'hedules

In 1h e Courtof Appeats ofOhioF ► Rsr DsTRrc7T, Harnilfon C'our,1^

State_ of Oh; opla)H ti f^ - ARpel%e.

A1'faeal No. C-08/178Tr41Z.J Aio, -V.-0804368

.;

MU7?oN -9or Relr=e¢ fr'om ORPER: af Disnltsscd

comes hnthony J. DeNoana., I^fehdant-Ap^nal(aal, itha se, asserfir^- '

}6t {here are yenu;,, e issues of -Adrlaw.and arqumetif inneed of ie;ng t-e,so/ved.

Appelfay'}' forAer asserts 7%wf; rt has alwap 6een his interrtion fa,o ►-eceed 76-

Mo, I^snt for^ênsian of rime .

2. 29 rahuarX ^d k,'s resPonse OVPD5 ► 7'roN accamf4tried by a canthurzhce.

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• creM qntrme^ tnaij service of%Sw( hof(ces

o F-esfrtcf access -fo #7e law librafy -& everY clfrer day dy hvi•rbet-s

I:m,fs access 16 co&s A o17ly preaPjoroved ca,sy slips ft:ansacted a weekih a.dvapiee

°A.tl tlhoVlsloF'js arL ,'jULJ(,y'G! fo zi sfiTufid{1a./SA TT ava7/ab^(1TI/

vPforfij rnem©rar,duw .

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO


STATE OF OHIO, APPEAL NO. C-o81178TRIAL NO.SP-o8oo368

Appellee,

vs.

ANTHONY J. DENOMA,

Appellant.

ENTRY OVERRULING MOTIONFOR RELIEF FROM DISMISSAL

This cause came on to be considered upon the motion of the appellant for relief from

the entry of dismissal filed on January 29, 2009.

The Court finds the motion is not well taken and is overruled.

To The Clerk:

Enter upon the Journal of the Court on FEB 2 61009

e -,H •esid

,ing Judge

per order of the Court.

(Copy sent to counsel)

V 1tY11LL^.1 111, W11J

RICHARD CORDRAYOtilt) ATTORNEY GCNERAL

Offender Details

Offender/ Demographics

ANTHONY 3. DENOMANickname: n/a

Date of eirth: 07/09/1958 Age: SO

Race: Unknown Gender: Male

Height: 0'O" Weight: n/a

Hair: Unknown Eyes: Unknown

Also Known As:n/a

Scars, Marks, Tattoos:n/a

Supervision Status:n/a

Outstanding Warrants (Status of Warrant Subject toChange):n/a

Additlonal Information:Fin9erprints on file with Ohio BCIDNA registered In the National CODIS system

PFiOtO^^not'^

available

Photo Date:

$ubmit A Tip / Cor{agngn

Offender is Incarcerated

Offense Details

Ciassiflcation:Tier III Sax Offender with NotiNcatfon

Offense(s):

2907.02- Rape2907,12- REPEALED 1996 - peionious Sexual Penotration-Seq2907,012907.05- Gross_SexuAi Impofition

Victim(s):

Addresses Where Registered

Residential view approximate map1"p2 STATE RQUTl11045tiill(^bthq Corr>ctional InslltutionCHILI,ICOTHE, OH 456Q3-8607RoaR:COu11ty

[astModified:02/27/2Q09

* More Information on thls registrant may be available at the SherifPs Office

http://www.esom.ag.state.oh.us/Secured/p23.aspx?oid=xoM3A276Ot4=

Page i ot 1

qQ.e Û11x.em.e ÔUrt af 04ta HLED

CLERK OF COURTState

of Ohio Case No. 2009-0475 SUPREME COURT OF GFIIE

V. ENTRY

Anthony J. DeNoma

Upon consideration of the jurisdictional memoranda filed in this case, the Courtdeclines jurisdiction to hear the case and dismisses the appeal as not involving anysubstantial constitutional question.

(Hamilton County Court of Appeals; No. C081178)

^

THO AS J. MOY RChief Justice

Bu-2-9

No

.ZN 7"fl ESUPR EM E CoURT oF 7-HE UNl tEn 5t-AI-F-5

4NTa -toniY ,J, PeMomA seVs,

5TATE oF 014I0 - RespoNDeNT

6>11 PFTa T/oN FOR A WRtT oF CrERTIaK'AR t Ta

Th.e Firsf bis•f ►-ict Caurt of AppeR.15•

14a nni lfo tt Couhtty Cour tho us eIOOV /vMain Sfree.t, Roarn 329ClnCihn a.'f(, ®h!4 45202

Pg'1'7 7"1 04 F"o R WRt T' F CERTIORARI

An-1-honY J, De Notncx 41--_308- 836Pe^;^ ioner PFO seih^l+êt^^ pris©ner ^fi ^fi^- s%aê

AO. 8ox 550o L 'C'..z,Chi1(irl©the; 04j0 y.56o1-^".So0Phohe (710) 7"7Y-71^80

Supreme Court of the United StatesOffice of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

November 10, 2009

Mr. Anthony J. DeNomaPrisoner ID # 308-836C.C.I.P.O. Box 5500Chillicothe, OH 45601

Re: Anthony J. DeNomav. OhioNo. 09-7468

Dear Mr. DeNoma:

Willinin K. SuterClerk of the Court(202) 479-3011

The petition for a writ of certiorari in the above entitled case was filedanNovember 2, 2Q09 and placed on the docket November 10, 2009 as No. 09-7468.

A form. is enclosed for notifying opposing counsel that the case was docketed.

Sincerely,

William K. Suter, Clerk

by

Melissa 4lalockCase Ana yst

Enclosures

COllR7 OF COMMON PLEAS

IN THE COURT OPWla[WP&A9, ROSS COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, ^ Êi)ROSS CtiUf?TY CQFlf-iQt! PLEASCLERK QF COURTS

Plaintiff/Respondent TY U. 1'rOTQI! Case No. 08CI000831

vs.

ANTHONY J DENOMA,

Defendant/PetitionerJOURNAL ENTRY

This action came on for consideration before this Court upon Defendant-Petitioner's request

to appoint counsel to represent him at the hearing on Defendant-Petitioner's contest of

reclassification pursuant to Section 2950.031 (E) of the Ohio Revised Code. Defendant-Petitioner

filed his Petition to Contest Reclassification on September 16, 2008 along with a request to appoint

counsel.

Former Section 2950.09 (B) established the requirement that the Court conduct a hearing to

determine the classification of any sexual offender. Section 2950.09 (B) (2) specifically provided that

the offender had a right to be represented by counsel at the hearing and, if indigent, the right to have

counsel appointed.

Section 2950.031 (E) establishes the requirement that the Court conduct a hearing to

determine whether the offender is subject to reclassification under the newly enacted Adam Walsh

Act (Chapter 2950 Ohio Revised Code). Although Section 2950.031 (E) specifically provides for the

presentation of evidence and argument by the offender, it is conspicuously silent on the offender's

right to counsel at a reclassification hearing. This Court concludes that it is the specific legislative

intent of the Ohio General Assembly that offenders subject to reclassification are not entitled to

counsel at reclassification hearings.

Ohio courts have consistently held that the notice and registration requirements of Chapter

2950 of the Ohio Revised Code are remedial and not punitive in nature. State v. Cook (1998) 83

: ;'Ui2I :if .i;, Pt F.

IN TIiE COURT OF COMMON PLEASROSS COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff,

-vs-

ANTHONY J. DENOMA,

Defendant.

H08Of;T 30 AN 10: 20

CASE NO. "gY Gr,0:? PLEASCLERK OF CO^JRTS

JUDGE NUSBAUky 0• i{;I{7n'i

MOTION TO DISMISS

Now comes the State of Ohio by Jeffrey C. Marks, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney

and respectfully moves this Court to dismiss the above captioned matter for reasons

more fully explained in the memorandum below.

MEMORANDiTHR

This offender attached to his petition to contest reclassification, a copy of the

letter he received from the Attorney General's Office which reclassified him as a Tier III

Offender. Written on that notice, is a notation which states that this offender received

the notification from Mark Hooks, a Management Administrator at C.C.I., on January 2,

2008.

Ohio Revised Code Sections 2950.031(E) and 2950.032(E) state that if the

offender wishes to contest the reclassification, it must be done so within sixty (60) days

of when the offender receives the notice. The offender in this matter did not file his

Petition to Contest Reclassification until September 16, 2008, nearly nine and one-half

months after he received the notice.

Based upon this failure to comply with the requirements to contest the

reclassification, this petition should be dismissed.

ROSS COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEASCase Docket Sheet

CAPTION: STATE OF OHIO VS ANTHONY J DENOMA CASE NUMBER: 08CI000831ACiION:

JUDGE:

Other Civil

SCOTT W NUSBAUM

DATE FILED: 09/16/2008

Parties Plaintiff(s)

STATE OF OHIO P- 1

0-

Defendant(s)

ANTHONY J DENOMA, D- 1#308-836 CCIPO BOX 5500CHILLICOTHE, OH 45601

0-

STATE OF OHIO VS ANTHONY J DENOMA 08C1000831 Date Filed: 09116/2008Entries

Entry Date Type Entry

09/16/2008 FILING AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY, PETITION TO CONTEST RECLASSIFICATION W/

09/23/2008 RETURN

MEMORANDUM, MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL W/ MEMORANDUMAND EXHIBITS FILED. COPY PLACED IN PROSECUTOR'S BOX.

REGULAR MAIL SERVICE RETURNED UNSERVED ON ANTHONY J. DENOMA

10/2112008 ENTRY

#308-836, AT P.O. BOX 5500 C.C.I., (A-2 007B), CHILLICOTHE, OH 45601 REASON:NOT DELIVERABLE AS ADDRESSED.

JOURNAL ENTRY FILED. SET FOR HEARING ON THURSDAY, DEC 2, 2008 AT 1:00

10/30/2008 ORDER °

PM.

ORDER FILED.' ASSIGNED ON NOV 13, 2008 AT 8:30 AM FOR NON ORAL HEARING

^^;^^ê^ ^S iEEey«ON MOTINO TO DISMISS,

pArla' Coam weoF ("ct! r°vo 5 Vit-Jrcnvr. c^ Pr-c{es37aPlq-(rtPJ Ja6rcia^l /t1&b?s o{'('oYtjucl,0/30/2008 MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM FILED.

11/07/2008 FILING

1110712008 FILING

11/07/2008 FILING

11/17/2008 MOTION

1111812008 FILING

11119/2008

12/1012008 MOTION

Printed On: Mar-25-09 10:13AM

AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCE FILED.

DEFENDANTS LIST OF WITNESSESS FILED.

DEMAND FOR DISCOVERY AND LIST OF WITNESSES FOR DEFENDANT FILED.

MOTION TIO SUPPRESS CHARGES ABD EVIDENCE FILED

TIME EXTENSION, RESCHEDULING REQUEST FILED.

ORDER FILED. MATTER IS HEREBY ASSIGNED ON DECEMBER 5, 2008 AT 8:30 AMFOR NON-ORAL HEARING ON MOTION TO DISMISS.

OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT &MEMORANDUM FILED.

Page 1

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0tiR t 15F CL^"4h1C}tT PtE AS

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, ROSS COUNTY, OHIO

'zo08DEC 12 AM fD: 26

STATE OF OHIO,

Fil._E.0ftO^S "sOJ ` r ::& ('t_EAS

Ci ^Cif Ci Ct l)î i STY 9.'.[-Ot3

Plaintiff/Respondent Case No. 08 CI 831

-vs-

ANTHONY J. DE NOMA,

Defendant/Petitioner TOURNAL ENTRY

This action came on for consideration before this Court on the 25`t' day of November, 2008, upon

the State's Motion to dismiss; the petitioner's Motion to suppress charges and evidence; and petitioner's

Motion for an extension of time within which to prepare his case. The petition to contest reclassification

specifically states that the petitioner was served with the Notice from the Ohio Attorney General on January

2"', 2008. The petition was filed on September 16`", 2008. The petitioner has failed to comply with the time

requirements set forth in Section 2950.031 (E) of the Ohio Revised Code. The State's Motion to dismiss is

sustained. The petition to contest reclassification is dismissed.

The petitioner's Motion to suppress charges and evidence and for an extension of time within

which to prepare his case is overruled.

Costs waived.

Th s ^'er• ,F `t "nwt Is ,t.x'eby direr,totl ?tTCViFZNUSBAUMsPr.^ îtr ,iF nditq

UDGE, Common Pleas Courtoss County, Ol1io

vic€Conrtroom #2

Recipients oi•`j`6ift'hal Entry:

Mr. Anthony J. De Noma#A 308-836P.O. 5500Chillicothe, OH 45601

1)1t1i31

Mr. Jeffrey MarksAssistant Prosecuting Attorney72 North Paint StreetChillicothe, OH 45601

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. . . _ ^2^ Ê ^2^ ^ êQ ^(s ^î'f'Y`m{9 C014f Eft E ^ ^êC(ii.F$I T%Ga^,1o^ tGt 9 .^ i4Prosecufor revert ecl -^ Ffê CouF-/- ^{J,t1- he taad cor^ferred -laqe•fher wt(1, 4e RessCoun-^ Proseculo- Ph AemaAr, qf urAioA -}iy,e. JudyeRa[^bWihkler cQncluded5cud proceedfhys 9Tv;tti$ leave -Fo De-Fendacst ^ ce^-lês-^ sa,4 thec/asslfi"ca`1-ioy

âtth'lî .^. dc-}ober 30^ i¢ ljossCountY 16rosecufor {;'jed his7vta^-ioh ^{o j)isrrtlss Ae{endan^s

sa^d_êîfiQh^_sivi ce i{ was no j;4led_ W.fli;h__(cczQ.(

daysAF recept_-£Aflorney Genercr/s^said e(}ers Certil~yln9 -Fltiaf oh Ocf'o6er 2y i# w2s scrved 6y U.s. vnail ô DaFen^tn^^ ^ ^ye _,. _ s^ras ho _posttârked ^[[ 22_ dqyx latet-sh _ Jd4ve,^ber 19., fhê savme da ^/,eêvht Ardered reschedufihy of ê jêcewtber ,'- 2 ^^p h^rihy ,t ^t hoh ®ra[ Mfear c,y

oh Decembe+- $, 2oc^8,.November 28 , 1êFe.ndanf nwQiJed lîs opposil-+oh 'la 1îsmTssa{, tiiis-Fakenl y sendins

h%s GoP^ .tta^} 4e mt-lginat wliich ê c%rfC 1-efurned Pos^mqrk¢^ ûrscla^ ^cewrizer ^jtê day befxre. -Hhe hoh orn,[ heariro he virih -t1{ê or' 'na/ w6' h d' fr c ^9r 5, r. were li++rvte ta ye

CQd

^ ^_.1AUb_.^,5^ oh-_pecew^_ber ,.2oa8.7.^. December ) 2 j 2oog Juê Nusbaunr .lovrna{ed h%s s^RDER fa Dlrmlss, sai^

- I ed-ifion v.lh"c^ orcler Q^zt,d f wn n lo ^,pêa s .$.^ p Decen,'tie^ 2 _cf ,De.-Fehdant ma (e d a -o ^he Cout•f {its Motr'ah f'ar Reconsiderah'or7

R'espec^^v{^y Sv^mr^d _

l / ^ lGm^t!An-FhoW ,;J pe ômcz # 3©8-836,Defeh,da,ht! .R lLan^ pra_ s^ _^hdigenfi Prise^r ahdytiJard W ¢h eS1a:fe

-_P+c?^55bo c.c,=^'(î[[icolê, ©hio !{S<o©^

5 -39

Jdp(,'Cli}R; OF ct}P°liâN PLEAS


15 AM 8: 32

STATE OF OHIO

Plaintiff-Respondent

-vs-

ANTHONY J DENOMADefendant-Petitioner

Case No. 08Gf"

JOURNAL ENTRY

" C7c1ClrN P±..L"ASi'ii; 0r"COI,i:71SYP.H:.';IUu

This action came on for consideration before this court on the 12th day of

January, 2009 upon the motion of Petition for Reconsideration. The

petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration isoverruled.

^,'^'^^'•^^^^^---_

S66TT W. N SBAUM, JUDGECommon Pleas CourtRoss County, OhioCourtroom #2

Recipients of Entry:

Michael M. Ater Anthony D--'^^ a#308-836Prosecuting Attorney Chillic, ^^ Correctional Institution72 N. Paint Street PO ^^5500Chillicothe, OH 45601 Cl_icothe, OH 45601

.Th -Ae Court of Comrnoh PleasRoss Couh-^y , Ohio

64-a1-e of ©bTo Ca se No. 08 cT f,Plainfi^-Respondan•f- :vs, t ûd9^ Nrrsbaurh

An-litony J. DeNoma

De-Fendant= Pet-4ioher, pro se : MOTlD1N -For Lea.ve •1o /'etiîoh ^"ri5:^ C ou r-t ^Por FZe-l; ef ft-om e4eo•fs of; Rct#ons of -tbe_ A•ftorney Genera,I

Now comes AnAcnfr J, L?eNovrw., Qe•Fendanf-Pe%i•h'oher ?ro se,F-esPec7'"lul(y prayiny •{/iishonorah/e Court 4 jFtwnf /eAre & 6r:sloeiri`floh c/aij„i,+y.t-e)ief ^ron, }he ef{ects of -Ae Affcrney Genemls F..ac Posfrgcfa, retroacfiveaF/rlita..'f'iolt of à.Ws, lM?oSihJ ^tqbilf^ o'f Pfe /oNy. hEyISh-atioh .perS^'onRlly eYeryt

gQ da^/.S WfTf1 ShetY7Tt Ol

/Q?fen(iA ly lfiree<alf^'ere/n{ (.ouf7fl/es, sab jectlr,,y h!i/rt

'{b fe(lon^y ohe Prison 4erms '^r hoh/cornfliance..

rn H,e -Nlowinysupporây men•ioraadum. i,tifh affached exhibi¢s, $Ationeres4Ablishes tha.t fhts acf'ioh was comrnenced +imely aad properl porsuant'lbW(o lawand R.C.9295'D, o3h(E)

Res/oect^4 subm;^dA .. ^, &WOVWL.A•46 n y" J 1?e14oirra- 308-836Defehdanf- Pefiifionei-, Pro Se

t58go2t pfut^h Rf.4/o f Na^7t,^`C SâtePa, aox 55oa c,c.T.C6T{lico{fê Oh7o ^f56D/-S,q'oo

MEMeRRN DVAq IN .50PP©.R7'

1.^

2

SeGt'ròn 16. flrt'icje Z of phios ConsfH^Ron yuca^-anfees;"'Rti courts shall be openl and ereryPerson, for an injury done I,1n, ie hisJand ,goods, person, or t-epuhLfi-on, shall have remedf, by due cout-seof law, and shal( havej'usfiee adeni ►,Ts+ei-ed wiihoatdehialofdelay.Suits may be 6rougbt aga'inst Ae s/ate iy 5uch Cour/'s and in suchinanner, as ma)r be pr-ov;ded by law,

pursuant' {a R.C. S2950, 03/ (A)60 .tnd (8) Tfie f}tlarney General wasAuhorized •{odeterrnine -Ae classi-h-ca.fiaii c(f offenders who had )-e9isl-eredwA Ae sheriff of lhe County where -Aey teside .

Z//

e

C

SC . NUSBAUM, JUDGECommon Pleas CourtRoss County, OhioCourtroom #2

Jdpt.;f;UnF tJF CJP4Mp,y PLEAS


2009 Mh R 13 AM 9: 13

STATE OF OHIO, , F'^-Et)ROSS COJrdKi Y

rCUF#MpN FtFAS

G1 ;! (:(j ;^TSPetitioner

_EF?ry U..-fN ^#se No. 08 CI 831

-vs-

ANTHONY J. DENOMA,

Respondent

ENTRY

The defendant's/petitioner's Motion for Leave to Petition for Relief from

Actions of the Attorney General is denied.

Recipients of Entry:

Michael M. AterProsecuting Attorney72 N. Paint StreetChillicothe, OH 45601

:7Anthony J.,.I569oma #308-836Chillicothe0orrectional InstitutionPO Boz^ _500Chilli-6the, OH 45601

^

13 "`t2.

f,flURl 's Ai'";.ALS

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIOFOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ROSS COUNTY2009^F; 3:49

State of Ohio,

Respondent-Appellee,

V.

Anthony J. DeNoma,


Case No. Q@Qâ089 „_Cl.l";^ i1;

MAGISTRATE'S bRDER

P{.EASS

Appellant, Anthony J. DeNoma, has filed a motion to appoint counsel. Because this

is a civil matter, appellant is not entitled to an attorney at state expense. Accordingly,

appellant's motion is DENIED.

Appellant also asks for an extension of time to file a brief. Upon consideration,

appellant's request is GRANTED. Appellant is ORDERED to file a brief on or before April

13, 2009. NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS WILL BE GRANTED ABSENT

EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.

Furthermore, appellant's request to waive the number of copies required to be filed is

DENIED. Appellant, however, may print his documents so long as they are legible.

The clerk is ORDERED to serve all counsel of record at their last known addresses.

The clerk is further ORDERED to serve appellant by certified mail, return receipt requested.

If returned unserved, the clerk shall serve appellant by ordinary mail. IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOR THE COURT

Aaron M. McHenryMagistrate

13- 43

^Yr 7Ê FOuRTH Drs7'Rfc T coUx7' pf APp f)L sCrt'os5 ^5tJt1^^ r ^j7^`D G3tF0FAPPEALS

k7y J, Dea©vna. ;Npe ljctht ^ra se. ,

A,vs, .

,5td^^ of ^11iro ;PPe 11ee.

Ca se No 109+'(A ^..50&9t^rom No, 08 ° C2 83

/v1flTlON for Rgji^ ^ror^

Cou rt C0s ts

Now covrtes Appe ll>a.v,t, Anttioiqy ,/, .UeNama- , pr0 se,

►movfi1y A;s h6nOrable, G,urf lia -IaX -tke cov4cost fa Ae Sfate ^

PuF50avff tb AffelltZwfs .;InhUarf' $, 09, arrj May ), o9, ^^^'îkdkvi fs

es-â b1,'sh;ny l^^s l^d1lency Ahd eXi^râord^h ^ry/ c14-cuMs1qMces as

a derehdQVal4AF't

nt Ward in Cus?òjy of Ae SfJe wtircA fs hj',s %a/

rn'evÔ^ruwd um.t=ov,der, as eXPaunded on f'ut-Prr 147 ^'oljowiity

orahdom

-Tf would be unlawfvl 16 fax fh,s c4Urfictisf ¢o f&s l41eo/"

prisaner of fLe Aqfe wheh ^+ere V*s lre4sona^/e^rpun^ls ôr

ikis CdcfioriI ottryd, J bq5 hot beeh 4und -^ be 7hivalbtl5. See

IjprisPr^hce- of .State -y t/,71 r"kv t" 520011 W^30$Lâ!fl/#lius

2iand 21 ;29^^,1Y^ 29 , 02 Mofir'on iq c^rreSt, .Se^ afso

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Rt 13'79 1.jyC7 OUof$ Ptj ^fhd 7âllowih

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q E$7e^1^'v't3Qkn^ttt.' 97

L9a-2}t j qnd p^S^n es^ ty95,^f at/ot?5loGlb.5, Cfi', 28S, 2:

Further rnore ;

r) V)i5 L':ouFt tla5 ôU;jJ TnQ7 4bere wet-e

lor -Gs upreal,

0s0nable p'ausd.s

I of 3 8^°q 5

COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIOFOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 2010 JAN -5 A!ii (: 00

ROSS COUNTY

RbSS COUrdTYicfOF MOfi PLEASCLERK OF COURTS

State of Ohio, Case No. 09CA3089 TY 0. HitirOH

Respondent-Appellee, MAGISTRATE'S ORDER

V.

Anthony J. DeNoma,


Appellant, Anthony J. DeNoma, has filed a motion for relief fromcourt costs.

Upon consideration, appellant's motion is DENIED.

The clerk is ORDERED to serve all counsel of record at their last known

addresses. The clerk is further ORDERED to serve appellant by certified mail, return

receipt requested. If returned unserved, the clerk shall serve appellant by ordinary mail.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOR THE COURT

^ ^ Y, Nf l k

Aaron M. McHenryMagistrate

:;2

Constitution of the United StatesArt. I § 10 NoState shall ***pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing theObligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of NobilityAmend. V No personshall be ***subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy ***norbedeprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken forpublic use, without just compensation.Amend. XIV Section 1.NoState shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges orimmunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, orproperty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protectionof the laws.

Constitution of the State of Ohio

Art. I, § 1 All men are, by nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, amongwhich are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protectingproperty, and seeking and obtaining happiness and safety.

Art. I, § 2 All political power is inherent in the people. Governrnent is instituted for their equalprotection and benefit, '1**and no special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted, that may notbe altered, revoked, or repealed by the General Assembly.Art. I, § 5 The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate,Art. I, § 10 In any trial, in any court, the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend inperson and with counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have acopy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to procure theattendance of witnesses in his behalf, and a speedy public trial by an impartial jury***No person shallbe twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.Art. I, § 16 All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods,person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administeredwithout denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state, in such courts andin such manner, asmay be provided by law.Art. I, § 19 Private property shall ever beheld inviolate,Art. II, § I The limitations expressed in the constitution, on the power of the General Assembly toenact laws, shall be deemed limitations on the power of the people to enact laws.Art. II, § 28 The general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws, or laws impairing theobligation of contracts; but may, by general laws, authorize courts to carry into effect, upon such termsas shall be just and equitable, the manifest intention of parties, and officers, by curing omissions,defects, and errors, in instruinents and proceedings, arising out of their want of conformity with thelaws of this state.Art. II, § 32 The general assembly shall grant no divorce, nor, exercise any judicial power, not hereinexpressly conferred.

trf {tabi0#^'êx "odeuii.,®

.o 295008 of t6o Rcviscd Co,

onakiinstttutta

oio4'^'oixz the Jail, wprkhouse, state correc'tônonfined ^causo of the cotinniission or attempt ôEt^ of so£bon 2o^t^ Ul af tkic êîsed ôde prior.

r^^s^txddei sevtio^s^95#i.U^ tis ^^^ ^^kê pia^ o cc^tti?iuerttcrit tir hospttai, atzd'a^ r^j^ l?e rotji►itui^ by tfi^ bure^rr af iritti

bab►tt(aF:seli offenciort ditti,^s o^êtttx^dehned by seotion 2150 6-tof the Revisecl Cad^ whsr isêle^sed:bri

todectscntence, ^hO#^^+^°Stlcl-p^Gycne#^t p' a^ê, ot' grvBn a suiên

etu^dâectious2g3aUt^to^4^ 08

;. by th^ aotart i^ whzch kdhas been`convieted, hetd ttie coart sh^^l require^h fiiim as tnr^y b^ real^red by tiie buresu of crirstinal,identiacatiaTl and._.,

9S0 (?l to= ^45 :ii$lutp c^^#ae êrsoti to regi"st^r Undur sectionsR 2

{A^ Ai^^larly drî^loy^d âc^ cir' otller.Ia^v enforc(>;j, Art aptli6rizecteri'tployee4 ttie bureau-of criminof prc^vi^lirig infohnation: tb a bbacck orperson pursu;

odts:

Qi^^ fci^lo^

titificatioiând investigatiott for the purposidivisictn (F7 of seetion =109:57 of the Revist

ohio F?evised C®de

§ 2950.09 SEXUAL PREDATORS, IIARITUAL SEX OFFENDERS

1997 14ou5e t37(l 1 Ba

(C) {1) If a person was convictod of or pleaded guiltytoa sextrally oriented offense prior to January 1, 1997,if-the person was not sentenced for the offertse on or

after- January 1, 1997, and if, on or after January 1,1997, the offender is serving a terrn of imprisonmenti:in a state correctional institution, the department ofrehabilitation and correction shall determine whetherto recommend that the offender he adjudicated as beingasexualpredator.Inmakingadeterminationunderthisdivision as to whether to recomrriend that the offenderbe adjudicated as being a sexual predator, the depart-ment shall consider all relevant factors, including, butnot limited to, all of the factnrs specified in division(B)(2) of this section. If the department determinesthat it will recoimnend that the offenderbe adjudicatedas being a sexual predator, it immediately shall sendthe recommendation to the conrt that sentenced theoffender and shall enter its deternrination and recom-mendation in the offender's institutional record, and the '..eourt shall procced in accordance with division (C)(2) ofthis section.

(2)(a) If, pursuant to division (C)(1) of this section,the department of rehabilitation and correction sendsto a court a recommendation that mi offender who basbeen convicted of or pleaded guilty to a sexually ori-ented offense be adjudicated as being a sexual predator,the coiirt is not bound by the deparYmerrt's tecornrnen- .^dation, aird the court may conduct a hearing to deter-minewhether theoffender is a sexual predator.Theeourtrnay deny the recornmendation and deternunethat theoffender isnot a sexual predator without ahearing but shall iiotmake adetennination that theoffender ls a'sexualpredator inany casevwithout ahcanng:'I'he court may hold the hearing and makethe determination prior to the offender's release fromimprisonment or at any time within one year followingthe offcnder's release from that imprisonment.If thecourt determines without a hearing that thc offenderis nof a sexual predatoi;it shall include its deterqiinationin the offendeis institutional record and slrall dete[-mrne whether the ofCender previously lias been con-vrcted of or pleaded guilty to a sezaally oriented offenseother than tlie offense in relation to which the courtdetermined that the offender is not a sexnal predator.

The court may make the determination as to whetlrerthe offender previously has been convicted of or',.pleaded guilty to a sexually oriented offense without ahearing, but, if the eourt determines that the offenderpreviously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty tosuch an offense, it shall not impose a requirement that '-..the offender be subject to the community notificationprovisions regarding the offeuder's place of resideneethat are contained in sections 2950.10 and 2950.11 ofthe Revised Code without a hearing. The court inayconduct a hearing to determine both whether the of-fender previously has been convicted of or pleadedguilty to a sexually oriented offense and whether toimpose a requirement that the offender be subject tothe cornmunity notification provisions as described inthis division, or may conduct a hearing solely to makettre latter determination. The conrt shall include in theoffenrier's institutional record any determination madeunder this division as to whether the offender previouslyhas been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a sexuallyoriented ofTense, and, as such, whether the offender isa habitual sex offender.

(b) If the court schedules a hearing under division(C)(2)(a) of this section, the court shall give the offenderand the prosecutor wlio prosecuted the offender fortlie sexually oriented offense, or that prosccator's suzcessor in offlce, notice of the date, thne, and place ofthe hearing. If the hearing is to determine whether theoffender is a sexual predator, it shall bo conducted inthe manner described in division ( B)(1) of this sectionregarding hearings conducted under that c6vision and,in making a determination under this divis-ion as towhether the offender is a sexnal predator, the courtshall consider all relevant factors, inclnding, but notlimite,dto, all of the factors specifred in division (13)(2) ofthis section. After reviewing all testimony and evidencepresentedatthesexualpredatorhearingandthefactorsspecified in division (B)(2) of this section, the court îshall determine by elear and convincing evidencewhether the offender is a sexual predator.If the courtdetermines that tbe offender is not a sexual predator,it also shall determine whether the offender previouslyhas been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a sexuallyoriented offense other than the offonse in relatioa to ^which the hearing is being conducted.

Upon making its determinations at the hearing, thecourt shall proceed as follows:

(i) If the hearing is to determine whether tlm offenderis a sexual predator, and if the court determines that theoffender is not a sexual predator and that the offenderpreviously has not beerr convicted of or pleaded guiltyto a sexually miented offense other than the offense inrelation to which the heariog is being condncted, it shallinclude its determinations in the offender's institutionalrecord.

(ii) If the hearing is to deterniine whether the of-fender is a sexual predator, and if the court determinesthat the offender is not a sexnal predator but that theoffender previously has been convicted of or pleadedguilty to a sexually oriented offense otlier than the of-fense in relation to which the hearing is being con-ducted, it shall include its detr.rmination that the of-fender is not a saxnal predator but is a tiabitual sexoffender in the offender's institutional record, shall at-tach the deterrninations to the offender's sentence, shallspecify that the determinations were pursuant to divi-

sion (C) of this section, shall provide a copy of thedeterrninations to the offender, to the prosecnting attor-ney, and to the department of rehabilitation and correc-tion, and may impose a requirenrent that the offenderbe subject to the community notification provisions re- .garding the offender's place of residence that are con-tained in sections 2950.10 and 2950.11 of the RevisedCode, The offeader shall nwtbe subject to those com-nrunity notification provisions relative to the sexuallyoriented offense in question if the court' does not soimpose the requirement describedin thrs division. Ifthe 'court imposes those oommunity notifrcation provisions,the offender may appeal the judge's determination thatthe offender is a habitual sex o0ender.

(iii) If the hearing is to determine whether the of-fender previously has been convicted of or pleadedguilty to a sexually orienterl offense other than tlie of-fense in relation to which ttre hearing is being conduetedand whether to impose a reqairement that the offenderbo subject to the specified comnunity notification pro-visions, and if the court determines that the offenderpreviously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty tosuch an offense, the court shall proceed as describedin division (C)(2)(b)(ii) of this section and may imposea commnnity rrotification requirement as described in

Spee;'Ac CkrJi^ca,tròf7s of later eka.cfed

(2.003) Se"aê f3i/1,.i ctcy,eyd ►Nen'ts

q^ 2950.01 SEXUALLY ORI1•;N'fED OF'F'F:NJ3.LRS

lt>) rin ottenderordeliirquent child is "adjudicateds being i sexmil predator" or ° tdjudicated a aexual

0edator" if any of the foI)owing applies and if, regard-^g a delinquent child,.that status has not been re-

moved pursuant to seetion 2152.84, 2152.85, or2950.09 of the. Revised Code:

(1) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to"eommitting, on or after January 1, 1997, a seually

miented offense that is a sexually violent offense and..: that is not a registration-exempt sexuatly oriented;.ôffense and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a

sexually violent prodator specification that was in-€luded in the indictment, count in the indietmc,nt, orinformation tlut charged the sexually violent offense,

(2) Regardless of when the sexually oriented oftensewas committed, on or after January 1, 1997, thcoffender is sentenced for a sexu:illy oriented offensethat is not a registration-exempt sexuaily otientedoffense, and the sentencingjudge cletermines pursuant

'tb division (B) of section 2950.09 of thn Revised Codethat the offender is a sexual predator.

(3) The delinquent child is adjudicated a delinquentchild for cominitting a sexually oiiented offense that isiiot a registration-exempt sexnally oriented offense, was

. fourteen years of age or older at the time of committingthe offen.se, and has been classified ajuveille offenderregistrant based on that adjudication, and the adjudi-eating judge or that judge's successor in offior. deter-inines pm'suant to division (B) of section 2950.09 orpursuant to section 2152.82, 2152.$3, 2152.84, or2152.85 of the Revised Code that ttic delinquent childis a sexual predator.

§ 2950.09 classilication ae sexual preda-tor; determination hearing; petition for removalFrom classification. _

(C)(1) Ifa persmt wa.s convicted of or pleaded guiltyto a sexually oriented offense that is not aregistratron-exempt sexuallyoriented offense pdorto january 1,1997, if the person was not sentenced for tiin offenseon or after January 1. 1997, and if, on or after Januaiy11 1997, the offender is serving a tenn of imprisoninentin a state correctional institution, the department ofrehabilitation and correction shall do whichever of thefollowing is applicable: ^

(3) The ehanges made in divfsions (C)(1) and (2) ofthis section that take effect on the effective date of thisamendment do not require a court to conduct a newheariiig under those divisions for ariy offender regard-

a sezoally oriented offenseif, prior tothe effectiveingdate of' this amendment, the court previously con-ducted a hearing under those divisions regarding thatoffense to determine whether the offender was a sexualpredator. The changes made in divisions (C)(1) and (2)of this section that take effect on the effective date ofthis autendmentdo not require a court to conductahearing under those divisions for any offender regard-ing a sexually odentod offense if, prior tdthe effectivQ'date of this amendment and pursuant to those divi-sions,the departinent of rehabilitahon and correctionrecotnmended that the ofTender be adjudicated asexual predator regarding that offense, and the courtdenied the recommendation and deterniined thattheoffender was not a sexual predator without a hearing;

(4) Prior toJanuary 1, 1997;the affenderwascAnvictedof or pleaded guilty to; and wassentencetlfor, a sexually orientedoffense that is not a registration-exempt semsally mdonted offe.nse,the offender is iin-piisoned in a state correctional institution on or afterJamiary 1, 1997, and the court determines pursnant todivision (C) of section 2950.09 of the Revised Codethat the o(fender is a sexual predator.

,ê-pClîG ÎQht rccLlioG1S Of laTeh 8hacled

(2o03) Seracite. 13ri1 S_ ameadmectts

_y _^ 2950.

-64 Dut to re cter.

(A)(1) Each of the following types of offender who isconvieted Of or pleads guilty to, or has been convictedof or pleaded guilty to, a sexually oriented offense thatis not a registration-execnpt sexually oriented offenseshall register personally with the sheriff of the countywithin five days of the offender's corriing into a countyin which the offender resides or temporarily is domi+

ciled for more than five days, shall register personallywith the sheriff of the county imtnediately upon corn-ing into a county in which the offender attends a schoolor institution of higher education on a full-tinie orpart-time basis regardless of whether the offenderresides or has a temporary domicile in this state oranother state, shall register personally with the sheriffof the coanty in which the offender is employed if theoffender resides or has a temporary domicile in thisstate and has been einployed in that eounty for morethan fourteen days or for an aggregate period of thirtyor more days in that calendar year, shall registerpersonally with the sheriff of the county in which theoffender then is ernployed if the offender does notreside or have a ternporary domicile in this state andhas been employed at any location or locations in thisstate mare than fourteen days or for an aggregateperiod of thirty or more days in that calendar yeai; andshall register with the shoriff or other appropriateperson of the other state immediately upon enteringinto any state other than this state in which theoffender attends a school or institution of highereducation on a full-time or part-time basis or uponbeing employed in any state other than this state formore than fourteen days or for an aggregate period ofthirty or more days in that calendar year regardless ofwhether the offender resides or has a ternporarydomicile in this state, the other state, or a differentstate:

(a) Regardless of when the sexually oriented ofiensewas committed, an offender who is sentenced for thesexiially oriented offense to a prison term, a tercn ofimprisonment, or any other type of confinement and,on or after July 1, 1997, is released in any manner fromthe prison term, term of imprisonment, or eonfine-ment;

(b) Regardless of'when the sexually oriented offensewas committed, an offender who is sentenced for asexually oriented offense on or after July 1,1997, and towhom division (A)(1)(a) of this section does not apply;

(c) If the sexually oriented offense was cornmittedprior to July 1, 1997, and neither division (A)(1)(a) nordivision (A)(1)(b) of this section applies, an ofFender

avho., immediately prior to July 1, 1997, was a habitualsex oftender who was required to register under Chap-t<. 9QK0 nf the Revi,ad (',nde

- _2950.03 Ivotieeto offender or delin-

quent child of duty to register and update ad-dress.

(A) Each person who has been convicted of, isconvicted of, has pleaded guilty to, or pleads guilty to asexually orie-nted offense that is not a registration-exenipt sexually oriented offense and who has a duty toregister pursuant to section 2950,04 of the RevisedCode, each person who is adjudicated a delinqaentchild for eommitting a sexually oriented offense that isnot a registration-exempt sexually ojiented offense andwho is classified a juvenile offender registrant based onthat adjudication, each person who has been convictedof; is convicted of, has pleaded guilty to, or pleadsgoilty to a child-victim oriented offense and has a duty i'to register pursuant to section 2950.041 of the RevisedCode, and each person who is adjudicated a delinquentchild for committing a child-victim oriented offenseand who is classified a juvenile offender registrant I'hased on that adjudicatinn shall be provided notice inaccordance with this section of the offender:s or delin-qaent child's duties imposed under sections 29,50.04,2950.041, 2950.05, and 2950.06 of the Revised Codeand of the offender's duties to similarly register, pro-vide notice of a change, and verify addresses in anotherstate if the offender resides, is temporarily doniiciled,attends a school or institution of higlier education, or isemployed in a state other than this state. A person whohas been convtcted of, is convicted of, has pleadedguilty to, or pleads gailtyto a sexually oiiented offensethat is a registration-exempt sexually oriented offense,and a person who is or has been adjudicated a delin-quent child for committing a sexually onented offensethat is aregistratron-exemptseaually miented offense;does not havea duty to register pnder section 2950.04of the Revised Codez based on that conviction, guiltyplea, or adjudication, and no notice is required to beprovided to that person mrder this division based onthat conviction, guilty plea, or adjudication.

I

Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2950. Sex OffendersR.C. § 2950.011 Applicability of certain definitions prior to January 1, 2008Except as specifically provided to the contrary in sections 2950.02 to 2950.99 of the Revised Code, allreferencesin any of those sections to "sexually orientedotfense"include; in addition to the violationsspecified in division A) of section 2950.01 of the Revised Code on and after January I. 2008, anysexuailyoriented ofI'znse;as that term was defined in section 2950.01 of the Revised Code prior toJanuary 1, 2008, that was committed prior to that date and that was not a tegistration exempt sexuallyoriented offense, as that term was defrned in that sectiori prior to January L. 2008.

R.C. § 2950.031 Determination of sex offender tier classification for those havingregistered a residence, school, or place of employinent address; notice; hearing(E) An offender or delinquent child who is in a category described in division (A)(2) or (B) of thissection may request as a matter of right a court hearing to contest the application to the offender ordelinquent child of the new registration requirements under Chapter 2950. of the Revised Code as itwill exist under the changes that will be implemented on January 1, 2008. The offender or delinquentchild may contest the manner in which the letter sent to the offender or delinquent child pursuant todivision (A) or (B) of this section specifies that the new registration requirements apply to the offenderor delinquent child or may contest whether those new registration requirements apply at all to theoffender or delinquent child. Ta requesl the hâririg, flte:offtdee,or delinquent child not later than thedate that is sixty days after the offender or delinquent child received the registered letter sent by theattorney general pursuant to division (A)(2) of this section shall file a petition with the court specifiedin this division. If the offender or delinquent child resides in or is temporarily domiciled in this stateand requests a hearing, the oft6d(k8r delinquent child sfial] file the petlfiaii with*'altd,tlze he^Ting shall' _'liu Yiel*1i1, the coui•t of comtncrn plex4 or, for a delinquent child, the juvenile court of cct'uitty iniarhich th^;offeitdef or-dolinquentchildxesida QrterlsporArily, is domiciledj f the offender does notreside in and is not temporarily domiciled in this state, the offender or delinquent child shall file thepetition with, and the hearing shall be held in, the court of common pleas of the county in which theoffeuder registered a school, institution of higher education, or place of enlployment address, but if theoffender has registered addresses of that nature in more than one county, the offender may file such apetition in the court of only one of those counties.

If the offender or delinquent child requests a hearing by timely filing a petition with the appropriatecourt, the offender or delinquent child shall serve a copy of the petition on the prosecutor of the countyin which the petition is filed.l'he prosecutor shall represent the interests of the state in the hearing. Jif'Aany heat=)ngund'or this divis:lon; the Rules of Civil Er6cedui'e or, if the hearing is in a juvenile court, theRules of Juvenile Procedureqliply,.^xcept to the extent that those Rules would by their nature beclearly inapplicable. The court shall schedule a hearing, and shall provide notice to the offender ordelinquent child and prosecutor of the date, time, and place of the hearing.

If an offender or delinquent child requests a hearing in accordance with this division, until the courtissues its decision at or subsequent to the hearing, the offender or delinquent child shall comply prior toJanuary 1, 2008, with Chapter 2950. of the Revised Code as it exists prior to that date and shall complyon and after January 1, 2008, with Chapter 2950, of the Revised Code as it will exist under the changesthat will be implemented on that date. If an ottender or delinquent child requests a hearing inaccordance with this division, at the hearing, all parties are entitled to be heard, and the court sliallconsider all relevant information and testimony presented relative to the application to the offender ordelinquent child of the new registration requirements under Chapter 2950. of the Revised Code as itwill exist under the changes that will be implemented on January 1, 2008. If, at the conclusion of thehearing, the court finds that the offender or delinquent child has proven by clear and convincingevidence that the new registration requirements do not apply to the offender or delinquent child in the

manner specified in the letter sent to the offender or delinquent child pursuant to division (A) or (B) ofthis section, the court shall issue an order that specifies the manner in which the court has detertninedthat the new registration requirements do apply to the offender or delinquent child. If at the concluai,axiuf the huaring thecourt finds thaf the affendeC or deliquent child has proven by clear and copvinckng,evidcnce that the ltew registration requirements do notqpply to the offender, or delinquent child, the 6court shall issue an-order that specifies thdt ihe ztew registration tequirements dq not apply to thw

divîs on upon the îsheriff with whom th offender oradel quent ohild f an order issued under this' • most recently registered under

section 2950.04, 2950.041, or 3950.05 of the Revised Code and upon the bureau of criminalidentification and investigation. The offender or delinquent child and the prosecutor have the right toappeal the decision of the court issued under this division.

If an offender or delinquent child fails to request a hearing in accordance with this division withinthe applicable sixty-day period specified in this division, the failure constitutes a waiver by the offenderor delinquent child of the offender's or delinquent child's right to a hearing under this division, and theoffender or delinquent child is bound by the determinations of the attorney general contained in theregistered letter sent to the offender or child.

R.C. § 2950.032 Determination of sex offender classification tier for those serving prison term;juvenile offender; hearing; notice(A)(1) At any time on or after July 1, 2007, and not later than December 1, 2007, the attorney generalshall do all of the following:(a) For each offender who on December 1, 2007, will be serving a prison term in a state correctionalinstitution for a sexually oriented offense or child-victim oriented offense, determine the offender'sclassification relative to that offense as a tier I sex offender/child-victim offender, a tier II sexoffender/child-victim offender, or a tier III sex offender/child-victim off'ender under Chapter 2950. ofthe Revised Code as it will exist under the changes in that chapter that will be implemented on January1, 2008, and the offender's duties under Chapter 2950. of the Revised Code as so changed and provideto the department of rehabilitation and correction a document that describes that classification andthose duties;(2) At any time on or after July 1, 2007, and not laterthan December I, 2007, except as otherwisedescribed in this division, the department of rehabilitation and correction shall provide to each offenderdescribed in division (A)(1)(a) of this section and the department of youth services shall provide toeach delinquent child described in division (A)(1)(b) of this section and to the delinquent child'sparents a written notice that contains the information described in this division. The department ofrehabilitation and correction and the department of youth services are not required to provide thewritten notice to an offender or a delinquent child and the delinquent child's parents if the attorneygeneral included in the document provided to the particular department under division (A)(1)(a) or (b)of this section notice that the attorney general will be sending that offender or that delinquent child andthe delinquent child's parents a registered letter and that the department is not required to provide tothat offender or that delinquent child and parents the written notice. The written notice provided to anoffender or a delinquent child and the delinquent child's parents pursuant to this division shall notifythe offender or delinquent child of all of the following:(a) The changes in Chapter 2950. of the Revised Code that will be implemented on January 1, 2008;

C-7

R.C. §2950.04 Manner of registering(A)(1)(a) Immediately after a sentencing hearingJs held on or after January 1, 2008, for an otTenderwho is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexually oriented offense and is sentenced to a prison tenn, aterm of imprisonment, or any other type of confinenzent and before the offender istransferred to thecustody of the department of rehabilitation and correction or to the official in charge of the jail,workhouse, state correctional institution, or other institution where the offender will be confined, the.,jcrfl'e nd;er shall register personttlly with the sherif);:or thtic sherifFs'designee, of the county in which theofl'ender was convicted of or pleaded guilty to the sexually oriented offense.(c) A law enforcernent of^cer shall be present at the"sentenc%ngheaiîng fix dtspositional hearing 4described in division (A)(1)(a) or (b) of this section to itrimediafely ttansport the offender or delirXt(uentchild who, is the subject of the hearing to the'sheriff, or tYte sheriff's desigtiez^,of the county in which theoffender or delinquent child is convicted, pleads guilty, or is adjudicated a delinquent child.(d) After an offender who has registered pursuant to division (A)(1)(a) of this section is released froni aprison term, a tenn of imprisonment, or any other type of confinement, the offender shall register asprovided in division (A)(2) of this section. After a delinquent child who has registered pursuant todivision (A)(1)(b) of'this section is released from the custody of the department of youth services orfrom a secure facility that is not operated by the department, the delinquent child shall register asprovided in division (A)(3) of this section.

R.C. § 2950.11 Community notification.of sex offender registration(F)(2) The notitication provisions of this section do not apply to a person described in division(F)( I )(a), (b), or (c) of this section ifa court finds at a hearing after considering the factors described inthis division that the person would not be subject to the notification provisions of this section that werein the version of this section thatexisted inrmediately prior to the effective date of this amendment. Inmaking the determination of whether a person would have been subject to the notification provisionsunder prior law as described in this division, the court shall consider the f'ollowing factors:

R.C. § 2950.12 Immunity from civil liability(A) Except as provided in division (B) of this section, any of the following persons shall beimrttfrom liability in a civil action to recover damages for injury, death, or loss to person or propertyallegedly caused by an act or omission in connection with a power, duty, responsibility, or authorizationunder this ehapter or under rules adopted under authority of this chapter:(B) The immunity described in division (A) of this section does not apply to a person described indivisions (A)(1) to (8) of this section if, in relation to the act or omission in question, any ol'thefollowing applies:(1) The act or omission was manifestly outside the scope of the person's employment or officialresponsibilities.(2) The act or omission was with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner:(3) Liability for the act or omission is expressly imposed by a section of the Revised Code.

The enactment ofthe Revised Code slial I notbc construed to affect a rightor liability accrued or

of the General Code shallcontinue in full Foree notwithstanding its repeal for the pttrpose of revision.

construed to relieve any pei•son froni prmishment for atr act committed in violation of any section of theGeneralCode, noi'to aCfect an indictment orprosecuticin therefor. For suchpurposes, any.such seetion

action or proceeding for the enforcement of stich rightoS liability. Such enactment shall not beinculred under any section ol'the General Code prior to tlre ef7ective date of such enactment, or an

R.C. F 1.15 Effective date; pribrity of legal rights

shall be detenninedby the tinies in the day atwhiclr they respectively occurred.

When at5 act is tatake effect or becohte operative froinand aftera day natned, no part of that day shallbe inoluded. If priority of logal rights depei?ds upon theorder oF events on the same day, such priority

R.C. & 1.47 Intentions in the enactment of stIn eriaciittg a statute, it is presumed that:(A) Compliance with the cbnst3tutioiis of the sti(B) The entire statute is intended to he effectivc(C)A just and `reasonable re.sult is inti;nded;

u

a and of the Uriited Statesis intended;

(D) A result feasibleof execution isintended.

A statute which is reenacted or anreiidedis intendedtv be a continuation of the prior statute and not anew enactment, so far as it is the sariie as the prior statt•:ite,

(4) AMdtpn^ „'^n^,Ì#r^dtrt^§ kF"Yei#iud^ in respect of any such privilege, obligation,liability, penalty,forfeiture, or punishment, att^.`t^^tinvestigation, proceeding, or ^t^)*ma^Ftînstituted, fK"(^"0;:and the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment imposed, as.lt'#,*'st.#ttitO

the amendment or repeal;

B.C. § 1.58 Effect of reenactment, amendment, or repeal of statute on existing conditions(A) Thc reenactment, amendment, orrepeai of a statute does not, except as provided in division (B) ofthis section:(1) Affect the prior operation of the statute or any prior action taken thereupder;(2) Affect any validation, cure, right, privilege, obligation, or liability previously acquired, accrued,accorded, or incurredthereunder;(3) Affect any violation thereof or penalty, forfeiture, or punishment incurred in respect thereto, prior to

(B) If the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for any offense is reduced by a reenactment or amendment

to the statute as amended,of a statute, the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment, if not already imposed, shall be imposed according.

Oltio Revised Code Chapter 2943. Double JeopardyR.C. § 2943.05 Form of plea of former convictionIf a defendant pleads that he has had former judgment of conviction or acquittal, or has been once injeopardy, he must set forthan his plea the court, time, and place of such convictaon, acquuttal, orjeopardy. No claim of former judgment of conviction or acquittal, or jeopardy may be given inevidence under the plea of not guilty.

establish the identity of such offense. If the prosecuting attorney demurs to said plea and said demuand proye that he ts the person charged in such record, and he may also introduce other evtdence to

R.C. § 2943.06 Trial of issue on plea of former convictionIf a defendant pleads a judgment of conviction, acquittal, or former jeopardy, the prosecuting attorneymay reply that there is no such conviction, acquittal, or jeopardy. The issue thus made shall be tried to ajury,'and on such trial the defendant must produce the record ofsuch conviction, acquittal, or jeopardy,

is oven•uled, the prosecuting attorney may then reply to said plea.

When a defendant has been convicted or acquitted, or has been once in jeopardy upon an indictment orinformation, the conviction, acquittal, or jeopardy is a bar to another indictment or information for theoffense charged in the fornier indictment or information, or for an attempt to commit the same offense,or for an offense necessarily included therein, of which he might have been convicted under the formerindictment or information.

R.C. § 2943.09 Conviction or acquittal of a higher offense

R.C. § 2943.10 Proceedings after verdict on plea in barIf the issue on the plea in bar under section 2943.06 of the Revised Code is found for the defendant he °shall bedischarged. If the issue is found against the defendant the case shall proceed and be disposed ofupon his other pleas.

Ohio Revised Code Title II. Rules of Civil ProcedureCiv. R. Rule 3 Commencement of action; venue(A) CommencementA civil actioji is commenced by filing a complaint with the court, if'service is obtained within one yearfl•orn such filing upon a named defendant, or upon an incorrectly named defendant whose name is latercorrected pursuant to Civ.R,_ I 5(C), or upon a defendant identified by a fictitious name whose name islater corrected pursuant to Civ.R. 15(D).

(B) Venue: where properAny action niaybe venued, commenced, and decided in any court in any county. When applied tocounty and municipal courts, "county," as used in this rule, shall be construed, where appropriate, asthe territorial limits of those courts. Proper venuc lies in any one or more of the following counties:(3) A county in which the defendant conducted activity that gave rise to the claim for relief;(12)If there is no available forum in divisions (B)(1) to (B)(10) of this rule, in the county in whichplaintifl'resides, has his or her principal place of business, or regularly and systematically conductsbusiness activity;

(13) It'there is no available forum in divisions (B)(1) to (B)(11) of this rule:(a) In a county in which defendant has property or debts owing to the defendant subject to attaclunentor garnishment;

(C) Change of venue(1) When an action has been coinmenced in a county other than stated to be proper in division (B) ofthis rule, upon timely assertion of the defense of improper venue as provided in 0v.I2._ 1the courtshall transfer the action to a county stated to be proper in division (B) of this rule.(3) Before entering a default judgment in an action in which the defendant has not appeared, the court,if it finds that the action has been coynmenced in a county other than stated to be proper in division (B)of this rule, may transfer the action to a county that is proper. The clerk of the court to which the actionis transferred shall notify the defendant of the transfer, stating in the notice that the defendant shallhave twenty-eight days from the receipt of the notice to answer in the transferred action.

(E) Venue: multiple defendants and multiple claims for reliefIn any action; brought by one or more plaintiff's against one or more defendants involving one or moreclaims for relief, the forum shall be deemed a proper forum, and venue in the forum shall be proper, ifthe venue is proper as to any one party other than a nominal party, or as to any one claim for relief.Neither the dismissal of any claim nor of any party except an indispensable party shall affect thejurisdiction of the court over the remaining parties.

(G) Venue: collateral attack; appealThe provisions of this rtile relate to venue and are not jurisdictional. No order, judgment, or decreeshall be void or subject to collateral attack solely on the ground that there was improper venue;however, nothing here shall affect the right to appeal an error of court concerning venue.

Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489**494... Ordinarily, laws are enacted to regulate,future canduct and are, in that respect, reasonablelegislative acts.,The diffi,cuity arises when such legislation attempts to regulate or prohibit that wliichhas alreasly occurred since the General Assembly may not constitutionally impose a new standard upon

past conduct:Retroactive laws and retrospective application of laws have received the near universal distrust of

civilizations. English common law, as expressed and commented upon by Bracton, Coke, Bacon andBlackstone, has fully articulated the disdain of retroactive laws. See, e.g., Smead, The Rule AgainstRetroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence (1936), 20 Minn.L.Rev. 775, 780. The lawsof all the states and the federal governnient have reflected this same attitude. See, e.g., id. at 781, and

cases collected at fn. 22.The possibility of the unjustness of retroactive legislation led to the development of two niles: one

of *105 statutory construction, and the other of constitutional limitation.'I'he rule of statutoryconstruction operated to set the ban against retroactivity upon laws affecting prior acts, events or cases.However, this principle was not applied to ban all legislation having retrospective effect. General lawsoFParlianient and of the King were, under this rule of construction, considered to have only prospectivee11'ect unless the Act expressly stated that **495 it was to be applied retrospectively. If it so stated, then,the underlying principle of justice notwithstanding, the law would receive retrospective

application.lN4FN4. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Shuter (1678), 83 Eng.Rep. 531, 2 Mod. 310, 2 Lev. 227; ef.

Kiiag u Thurston (1664), 1 Lev. 91, 83 Eng.Rep. 312.The courts of this country adopted the above rule of statutory construction, having the same form

and power as at English common law. See, e.g., cases collected in 59 Corpus Juris (1932) 1159-1172.This rule has been embodied in Ohio law by R.C:. 1.48 which states: "A statute is presunred to beprospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective."

The second rule, that of constitutional limitation, was developed first in this country and was basedupon the same principle of justice underlying the nile of statutory construction. This principle of justicewas expanded logically from the rule of statutory construction, to "include a prohibition against lawswhich commenced on the date oP enactment and which operated in futuro, but which, in doing so,divested rights, particularly property rights, which had been vested anterior to the time of enactment of

the laws."Smead, supra, at 781-782; see, also, 5ocietv for the Propacation of the Gospel v. Whceler1814 22 E.Cas. 756 (No. 13 15G . This second rule assumed constitutional proportions at an early

state in American jurisprudence. See, e.g., fletcher v_Peck (1810), 10„U S(6 Cranchl 87. 135 . 3 I..Ed.1N Story on the Constitution (1833), Sections 1398-1399.

By its Constitution of 1$5 1, Ohio has quite clearly adopted the above prohibition against retroactive =legislation. Section 28. Article II states that: "`Phe general assembly shall have no power to passretroactive laws, or laws impairing the obligation of contracts ***." (Emphasis added.) This was amuch stronger prohibition than the more narrowly constructed provision in Ohio's Constitution of1802.FN5 Accordingly, it must be concluded that Ohio has adopted both of the foregoing safeguards

against retrbspectivc legislation; xFN5. Section 16, Article VIII of that Constitution stated: "No ex post facto law, nor any lawimpairing the validity of contracts, shall ever be made," merely reflecting the terms used inSection 10, Article I of the United States Constitution.

In considering whether a particular law can be applied retrospectively, we must first determinewhether we should apply the rule of statutory construction or immediately engage in the constitutionalreview of the statute. In Ireland v. Palestine, Braffetsville, N.P. & N.W. Turnpike Co. (1869), 19 OhioSt. 369. 373, it was stated that no constitutional question is ripe for judicial review "where the case canbe disposed of upon other tenable grounds." The rule has been elaborated upon in a long line ofcases.FN6

D-1

FN6. See, e.g., 4ipe v. Mur h 1892 49 Ohio St. 536, 5A4 3 l N. E. 884, 886; Wigg.ins v(3abbitt 19351 130 Ohio St. 240, 241 4 0.0.263198 N.E. 873; Interstate Motor FreiahtSvstem v. Bowets f1955). 164 Ohio St. 122- 134. 57 O.O. 123. 130 128 N. E 2d 97, 104,and cases cited therein; Greenhills Home Owners Corp. v.(n•eenhills (19i)) 5 Ohio St.2d207. 212. 34 0.O.2d 40 422-423,215 N.E.2d 403. 407.

L2„j *106 The issue of whether a statute may constitutionally be applied retrospectively does not

arise unless there has been a prior determination that the General Assembly has specified that thestatute so apply. IJpon its face, R.C. 1.48 establishes an analytical threshold which must be crossedprior to inquiry under Section 28, Article L. As we pronounced in Kiser v. Colernai? (1986). 28 OhioSt.3d 259, 262 28 OBR 337, 339, 503 N_E 2d 753, 756, where "there is no clear indication of

retroactive application, then the statute may only apply to cases which arise subsequent to its

enactment." FN7 (Emphasis added.)FN7. Accordingly, the method of analysis set forth in fn. 4 of French v. Dwui gins 1984). 9Ohio St.3d 32 . 36. 9 OBR 123, 127, 458 N,E.Nd 827, 831, is mistaken. It was there statedthat "the question of whether ***[a statutel was made expressly retroactive by the

General Assembly is of no consequence ***."Moreover, to first inquire whether a statute is constitutionally permissible, by analysis of whether it

is substantive or remedial, answers only the question of wliether the General Assembly wasempowered**496 to so act in a particular instance. In no wise could such an analysis answer the moreimmediate and narrow question of whether the General Assembly intended its enactment to apply

retrospectively.[31 We now consider R.C. 4121.80(H), the recent amendment to the workers' compensation laws

effective August 22, 1986. By its terms, it applies to cases pending on the effective date of the statute,whieh includes causes of action which arose prior to the statute's effective date, "notwithstanding any

provision of any prior statute or rule of law." * * * (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, we find in thestatute a clearly expressed legislative intent that R.C. 4121.80 could be applied retrospectively.

jAI Having determined that the statute at issue meets the threshold test for retroactive applicationcontained in R.C. 1.48, we tnust now inquire whether it contravenes the ban upon retroactivelegislation setfqrth in Sectioq 28. Article li of=the Ohio Constitution. The essence ofthis constitutionallimitation and itsapplicability to laws atTecting'substantive rightswere setforth by tftis court'asfollows: "Under fhe constitutional prohibitioh,the general assembly has nopower to pass retroactivelaws.. A-t. l I sec. 2$- Everystatute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existinglaws, or creates'a new obligation, imposes a

11new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to

transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective or retroactive." Ciiicinnati v;_Scas od (1889 46 Ohib St. 296.`1343 21 N.E. 630, 633;citing Society for the Propagation of the

Gospel v. Wheeler, .supra, at 767.FN8gbyA18532 Ohio1=N8. See, also, Trustees of Cuyahova t'alls Real Estate Assn. v. McCaui

St. 152, 155. Owing to the similarity between Ohio's constitutional provision and that inWheeler, Justice Story's definition of retroactive law has consistently been followed by thiscourt. See, e.g., cases collected in 17 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1980) 70, Constitutional Law,Section 554, at fns. 50-56; Rairden v. Holden (1864). l5 Ohio St. 207L21 U; Commissionersv. Rosche Bros. (1893), 50 Ohio St.103, 111, 33 N.E. 408, 409; Goi^f v. Wqlfiuae7.li( 67 Ohio St. 144, 150, 65 N.E. 878 880: Grav v. Toledo (1909), 80 Oliio St. 445,

447, 89 N.E 72, 13; Safford v. Metro olitan Life Ins. C'o. (1928), 119 Ohio St. 332, 335-3 36, 164 N.E. 351, 352; State ex rel. Crottv v. Zangcrlc (1938). 1_33_Ohio St. 532, 535, 11_O.O. 226 228 14 N.E.2d 932, 934; Weil v. Taxicabs of Cincinnati. Inc. lf 942), 139 OhioSt. 198, 203, 22 O.O. 205, 207, 39 N.E2d 148. 151. See, also, Sturges v. Carter (1885), 114U.S. 511, 5 S.Ct. 101429 I,.Fd. 240.

Witbregard tosubstantive rights, *107 it has been more particularly held that a statute is substantivewhen it does any hf the following: iinpairs or takes away vested rights, State. ex reL South F,uclid v.

7anQCrle {1945) 1^45 Ohio St. 433. 437, 31 O O_57, 59, 62 N.E.?d.160^16 affects an accruedsubstantive right,[n re Nevius (1963), 174 Ohio St. 560, 564, 23 0.0.2d 239, 241, 191 N.I7?d 166.169-170_ imposes new or additional burdens, duties, obligations or liabilities as to a past transaction,Miller v^Tlixsc^n (1901), 64 Oliio ^t. 39, 51, 59 N.E. 749,752: State v. Cincinnati Tin & Japan Co.(19021, 66 Ohio St. 182, 212 64 N.E. 68 71 • State, ex rel. Szalay v. Zaneerle (1940), 137 Ohio St. 195,198. 17 0.,0J51, 552. 28 N.E.2d 592,, creates a new right out of an act which gave no right and =

=ilnposedna obligation when it occurtcd,,aohnson v. Bcntlev (1847). 16 Ohio 97, 99-100 I ewis v.McElvaio (1847),16 Ohio 347. 355,creates a new right, State, ex rel. C.rotty. ^. Zanêrle, supra, 133Ohio St. at 535, 11 O.O. at 228.,14 N.E.2d at 934; gives rise to ortakes away the right to sue or defendactions at law,Slnith v. NewYork CenCrat R.R. Co._C1930) 122 Ohio St. 45, 48, 170 N.E. 637, 638;State, ex rel. Slaughtcr, V. lndus. C'omm. (1937), 132 Ohio St. 537, 543, 8 O.O. 531, 534, 9 N.E.2d 505,508; Weil v. Taxicabs ofCincinnati, Inc.(1942), 139 Ohio St. 198203, 22 O.O. 205, 207. 39 N.E.2d_148, 151.

State v. Cook 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570, 1998 -Ohio- 291HISTORY AND OVERVIEW

*406 **574 the General Assembly declared that "[s]exual predators and habitual sex offenders posea high risk of engaging in f'urther offenses even after being released from imprisonment, a prison term,or other confinement and that protection of members of the public from sexual predators and habitualsex offenders is a paramount governmental interest." R.C. 2950.02(A)(2). Finally, the GeneralAssembly stated that °[a] person who is found to be a sexual predator or a habitual sex offender has areduced expectation of privacy because *407 of the public's interest in public safety and in the effectiveoperation of government." R.C. 2950.02(A)(5).

Registration and Address Verification Provisions ofR.C. Chapter295©**575 *408 The registration provision ofR.C: Chapter2950, R.C. 2950.04,' applies to all offenders in

all three classifications and became effective July 1, 1997. The requirementapplies tcr offenderssentenced on or after that date, i•egardless of when the offense occurred, and to o1f'enders whocommitted the offense before that date who were liabittial sex offenders immediately before that date.R.C. 2950.04(A)(1), (2), and (3).

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF R.C. CHAPTER 2950*410 The Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution

13], j41 First, R.C. 2950.09(C)(1) applies to those sex offenders who were convicted and sentencedprior to the effective date of the statute and are still imprisoned when the statute became effective.Second, the registration **577 and verification requirements may be applied to certain sex offenderswhose crimes occurred before the effective date. See, e.g., R.C. 2950.04(A). Third, the conlmunitynotification provisions apply regardless of when the offense was conimitted. R.C. 2950.1 1(A).Finally,failure to comply with the aegistratiiin and verification requirements constitutes a crime regardless ofwhen the underlying offense was committed. R,C. 2950.06(G)(1) and 2950.99. Consequently, we find aclearly expressed legislative intent that R.C. Chapter 2950 be applied retrospectively.

Having determined that R.C. 2950.09 meets the threshold test for retroactive application pursuant toR.C. 1.48, we must examine whether it violates Section 28, Article Il o1'the Ohio Constitutio .151 "Èvery statute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or createsa new obligation;imposesa new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions orconsiderations alrendypast, must be deemed retrospective orretroactive."' Van F'ossen. 36 Ohio St.3dat 106. 522 N.[ .2d at 496 quoting Cincumati y_ Seasongood(l889), 46 Ohio St. 296, 303, 21 N.E.630. 633.**579 [101 *414 Ttte Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution

Sectioh 10, Article I ofthe United States Constitution reads, "No State shall * * * pass any *** expost facto Law" " Expo.st facto" literally means "[a]fter the fact; by an act or fact occurring atter someprevious act or fact, and relating thereto * * *." Black's Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 581. InBeazell v:Ohio (1925). 269 U.S. 167, 4,6 S Ct. fis 70 L.E.d. 216, the United States Supreme Court stated:

"[A]ziy statute which punishes as a crime an act previously cotnniitted, which was innocent whendone, which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime;after its commission, isprohibited asex post facto." ld a t 169-170s46 S C t at 68 70 L i?d at 217.

[lil [121 "1'hepurposeofthcExPostFaetoClauseistoensurethatlegislativeacts"givefairwarning of their effect andpermit **580 individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed."Vtc airCr v: Graham H 981 Z 450 U.S. 24 28-29, 101 S.C't. 960. 964 67 t,.I:d.2d 17, 23: The clause alsoprevents the legislature from abusing its *415 authority by enacting arbitrary or vindictive legislationaimed at disfavored giroups. See Miller v. Florida (1987),482 iJ.S. 423, 429.107 S.Ct. 2446 2451, 96t..Ed.2d 351, 359.

D, q

State v. Cook 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570, 1998 -Ohio- 291x*581v417 118 1 1 19 1 R.C. Chapter 2950 essentiallq requires:that offenders determ3ned by a court

of law=to be a sexual predator, habitual sex offender, or sexually oriented oflender mtist register withthe shei'iffs office in the county in which the offender resides. R.C:. 2950.04. Registration with thesheriffs office allows law enforcement officials to remain vigilant against possible recidivism byoffenders. Thus, registration objectively serves the remedial purpose of protecting the local community.

This intent is further evidenced by the General Assentbly's narrowly tailored attack on this problem.For example, the notification provisions apply automatically only to sexual predators or, at the court'sdiscretion, tohabitual sex offenders. R.C. 2950.11(A).,2950.11(F), and 2950.09(E).1241 *422 **585 In Hendrickr, the Kansas statute allowed an offender to be involuntarily committedas a "sexually violent predator," which was defined as "àny person who has been cnnvicted qf or

charged with a sexually violent offense and who su,fJers from a mental abnormality or personalitydisorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts ofsexual violence.' "(Fimphasisadded.) ld., 521 L.J.S. at ----. 117 S.Ct. at 2077, 138 L.F,d.2d at 509, quoting Kau. Stat. t1nn. 59-_ _ ^.29a02 a. hursuant to R.C. Chapter 2950, a judge makes the determination, using certain factors theGeneral Assemblyhas provided, such as whether the offender is at future risk.to commit another sexoffense,thereby classifyingthe offender as a sexual predator. R.C. 2950.09(B)(2). Thus, the test *423in Hendricks ernbodies the same components (prior conviction aiid a predisposition to commit futuresex offenses) as the prerequisite requirements for registration under R.C. Chapter 2950.

State v. WilliamsNot Reported in N.E.2d, 1999 WL 76633 (Ohio App. I 1 Dist.)Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Lake County. No. 97-L-191. Jan. 29, 1999.OPINIONNADER.

x 1 In May of 1986, appellee, Daniel Williams, entered a plea of guilty to one count of rape, R.C.2907.02, and one count of aggravated burglary, R.C. 2911.11. He was senteiiced by the Lake CountyCourt of Common Pleas to serve a prison term of seven to twenty-five years. In March of 1997, theDepartment of Corrections recommended that appellee be adjudicated a sexual predator under Ohio'sversion of Megan's Law, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2560 (effective date January 1,1997). The record indicates that a classification hearing under R.C. 2950.09(C)(1) was scheduled.Court-appointed counsel filed a motion to dismiss the proceedings, arguing that applying Megan's Lawto those convicted under prior law violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitutionand the Retroactivity Clause in Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. The trial court agreedand granted appellee's motion to dismiss. The state has appealed.

In State v. Crawford (Sept. 25, 1998), Lake App. No. 97-L-245, unreported, this court agreed withthe argument that applying Megan's Law to those convicted under prior law was unconstitutional. Onpages 18 and 19 of the Crawford opinion, we also noted that Megan's Law may have violated Section1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. Under the authority of Crawford, we would have affirmed the trial

court's judgment.However, five days after our decision in Crawford the Supreme Court of Ohio rendered its decision

in State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N,E.2d 570, wherein the court decided that applyingMegan's Law to those convicted under prior law did not offend either the Ex Post Facto Clause or theRetroactivity Clause; therefore, the Supreme Court has rejeeted the grounds on which the trial courtrelied.

TheSupreme Court has repeatedly held that an appellate court is not authorized to reverse a correctjudgment merely because ei;roneousreasons were assigned for it. State ex rel. Fattlar v. 13oyle 1998 .83 Ohio St.3d 123, 125, 698 N.132d 987; State ex rel. McUintv v. Cleveland City Sclwol Dist. 13d. ofEdn. 199881 Ohio St.3d 283, 290,690 N.F_.Zd 1273; State ex rel. Kavlor v. Bruening (1997), 80Ohio St.id 142, 144, 684 N.E.2d 1228. In the case at bar, the trial judge harbored honest reservationsabout the constitutionality of Megan's Law and he courageously voted his conscience. Many Ohiojudges, including several members of this court, share those, concerns. We have therefore taken the trialjudge'slead, and we affirm his decision to dismiss the pending sexual predator proceedings agairistWilliams on the authority of the secondary point raised in Crawfbrd, and not considered in Cook, thatMegan's Law violates Section l, Article I of the Ohio Constitution;

*2 In Arnold v, Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d35. 616 N.E.2d 163, the Supreme Court noted atrend among state courts to rely on their own state constitutions when deciding civil liberties cases, aswell as its own reluctance, in the past, to do the same. It quoted, with approval, the statement inDavenport v. Garcia (Tex. 1992) 834 S.W.2d 4. 12 that niterpreting a state constitution as merely arestatement of the federal constitution "`both insults the dignity of the state charter and denies citizensthe fullest protection of their rights.' " Arnolcl at 42, 616 N.E.2d 163. The court therefore joined theother states, and our justices unanimously concurred in the first paragraph of the syllabus, which states:

"The Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force. In the areas of individual rights andcivildiberties; the United States Constitution, where applicable to the states, provides a floor belowwhich state court decisions may not fall. As long as state courts provide at least as much protection asthe United States Supreme Court has provided in its interpretation of the Federal Bill of Rights, statecourts are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and protections [under state constitutions] toindividuals and groups."

In State v. Robinette 1997), 89 Ohio St.3d 234, 685 N.E.2d 762, the court qualified its approach

somewhat, stating that "where the provisions [of the federal and state constitutions] are similar" andwhere "no persuasive reason for a di1£ering interpretation is presented," the court has interpreted theOhio Constitution to be co-extensive with the Constitution of the United States. Id. at 238, 685 N.E.2d

762. The Rohinette court then held that the search and seizure provisions of Seetion 14. Article I of theOhio Constitution provided no more protection than the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitutionbecause °[t1he language of [the two provisions] is virtually identical." (Footnote omitted.) Id.

The only way to reconcile the Arnold and Robinette opinions is to say that the Ohio Constitution isco-extensive with the federal constitution, and affords no greater rights, where their respectiveprovisions are "virtually" identical. Robinette. If the provisions of the Ohio Constitution differ fromthose of the federal constitution, then Ohio courts are free to interpret them as affording greaterprotections than their federal cotmterparts. Arnold.

In Preterm Cleveland v Voinovich ( 1993) 89 Ohio App 3d 684, 691, 627 N.E.2d 570, Judge'

Whiteside wrote:"Section l Article I Ohio Constitution together with Section 2, Article I.Ohio Constitution

(together origiirally contained in Section I. Ai-tiele VIII of the 1802 Ohio Cons tution , make it quite :clear thnt; wtder Ohto'sBill of Rights;'every person`has inalienable rights undec natural lavv whichc4ririot 6e, unduly.restricted by goveinment, , which is fornied for the purpose of securing and,protecting those rights, and that al! governmental powet depends upon the consent of the people;Thus, the Ohio constitutional pra"vision is broader in that it appears to recognize so-called `naturallaw,' which is not expressly recognized by the [federal] Bill of kights or any other provision of theUnited States Gctnstltutioti; although it is recognized inthe Declaration of Independence. In that 'sense, Scction I Article I ofj the Ohio Constitution confers greater rights than are conferred by theUnited States Constitution ***: ' (Emphasis added and footnote omitted.)

*3 We agree that the rights protected by Section 1, Article I are deemed to be "inalienable," wliereasthat word does not appear anywhere in the United States Constitution. Therefore, Section 1, Article I isunique. Accordingly, Ohio courts may give it a unique construction under the doctrine of "NewFederalism" adopted in Arnold. Federal constitutional law is therefore inapplicable, and we must seekOhio precedent to understand and apply Ohio's guarantee.

When the settlers in the eastern part of the Northwest'I'erritory formed our state government, theydelegated their inherent police power to the General Assembly. But the lessons of the AmericanRevolution were still fresh in their minds, so they incorporated a Bill of Rights into the nascentconstitution to make sure that the state government would not disregard human rights as the BritishParlianient had disregarded them. State v. Nieto (1920), 101 Ohio St. 409 417, 419-420, 130 N.E.d3(Wannamaker, J., dissenting). See, also, State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich^l_9531159 Ohio St. 13, 24^110

N.E.2d 778 ("one of the purposes of a constitution is to curb government power"). Section 1, Article 1,the veryfirst provision of the Bill of Itlghts, isone of the specilic7imitations on the state's policepower. Daugherty v. Wallace ( 1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 228. 235-236, 621 N.E_2d 1374. It guaranteesthat all citizens have the right to freedom and to the protection of propertyand reads:

"All men are, by nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which arethose of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, andseeking and obtaining happiness and safety;a"

In Benjamin v. Columbus(1957), 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N E.2d 854, paragraph five of the syllabus,the Supreme Court articulated principles established by its precedents interpreting Ohio's Constitutionand set forth a two-part test for the validity of police power legislation:

"Although almost every exercise of the police power will necessarily either interfere with theenjoyment of liberty or the acquisition, possession and protection of property, within the meaning ofSection 1 ofArticle I of thc Ohio Constitution, or involve an injury to a person within the meaning ofSection 16 of Article I of the [Ohio] Constitution, ***, an exercise of the police power having suchan effect will be valid if [l] it bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,

or general welfare of the public and if [2] it is not unreasonable or arbitrary."Megan's Law is clearly an exercise of the state's police powers. See State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St. at

417. 94 N.E. I I 05.FNI Some of the language in Cook can be interpreted as saying Megan's Law bearsa real and substantial relation to the legislatttre's legitimate goal of protecting the public. We agree.Repeat sex offenders represent a genuine threat to public safety. The General Assembly was right tohave tried to combat that danger.

FN1. "Pursuant to its police powers, the General Assembly has the authority to enact lawsdefining criminal conduct and to prescribe its punishment." State v. Thomkkins (1996), 75Ohio St.3d 558. 560. 664 N.G.2d 926. See, also, State v. Meycr,(1955). 163 Ohio St. 279,287, 126 N.E.2d 585 (criminal laws are enacted pursuant to police powers because "[t]heobject of a criminal penalty is to punish the accused, deter others from crime, and to protectthe public."). Therefore, Section 1. Article I of the Ohio Constitution also operates as alimitation of the General Assembly's power to create and define criniinal offenses. SeeMorgan v. Nolte (1 R81^, 37 Ohio St 23, paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus, the precedentsin the civil police power cases aie applicable in cr"iininal police power eases.

*4 The Cook opinion did not, however, address the second prong of the Benjamin test. 'That portionof the test is not mere dicta. In fact, the Supreme Court has a long and distinguished history ofinvalidating legislation on the ground that, although it may arguably bear some rational relationship tothe public health, safety, morals, or the general welfare, the enactment encroached too far onto the civilliberties of those it governed. See, e.g., Sipe v. Mur^hy (1892). 49 Ohio St 536. 31 N.E. 884(invalidating an ordinance regulating auctioneers of foreign jewelry because "its passage was not areasonable exercise of the police power") FN2; Mirick v. Ginis_(_1908) 79 Ohio St 174, 86 N.E. 88(1(invalidating a property tax levied on the number of dogs kept on the property even if the owner of theproperty does not know the dogs are there, as where they are kept by a tenant, because "To us [the tax]seems to be inequitable, arbitrary and unreasonable, unnecessarily infringing upon the natural andinalienable rights of citizens, and therefore void.") FN3; State v. Boone (1911), 84 Ohio St. 346. 95N.E. 924 (holding that, although a statute requiring midwives and physicians attending births to collectinformation useful to the Bureau of Statistics "[bore] some relation to the public welfare," the law wasnevertheless invalid because "it is within the judicial power to declare void an unnecessary andunreasonable exercise of police power."); In the Matter oJ.` Steube (1914), 91 Ohio St. 135 110 N.E.250 (invalidating a statute requiring the sale of certain food stuffs to be by whole avoirdupois weight,even where the parties have openly agreed on a fractional weight, on the ground that "this act places anunreasonable and burdensome obligation upon persons engaged in a lawful business and is anunwarranted exercise of the police power.") FN4; East Fairfield Coal Co. v. Booth (1957), 166 Ohio St.379. 143 N.L.2d 309 (agreeing with the lower courts that a zoning ordinance flatly prohibiting stripmining in an agricultural district was "unreasonable and arbitrary") FN5; Mominee v. Scherbarthj1986^L,28 Ohio S1..3d 270, 503 N.E.2d 717 (invalidating a statute providing an absolute four-yearstatute of repose on medical malpractice claims lield by children on the independent ground that it wasunreasonable and "patently arbitrary."); Gaines v. Preterin-C:leveland, Ine.^1987^ 33 Ohio St.3d 54,514 N.,G2d 709 (invalidating the same four-year statute of repose at issue in Momtnee as applied toadults who discovered their cause of action within the four years but who were left with lcss than a yearto file suit because, "[a]lthough it may be stated that this severance of rights might conceivably bear àreal and substantial relation to the * * * general welfare of the public' " by reducing tort litigation, "themeans of achieving [that end] are unreasonable and arbitrary."); Burgess v. C;li Lilly & Co. (1993L66Ohio St.3d 59, 609 N.E.2d 140 (holding that, although a statute of limitations for DES claims that ranfrom the date of injury irrespective of when the plaintiff discovered his malady bore some relationshipto the legitimate goal reducing tort litigation, the statute was nevertheless invalid because it"unreasonably and arbitrarily limits the rights of DES victims.").

FN2. Compare the Sipe case to Ilolsman v. "1'homas (1925). 112 Ohio St. 397, 147 N.E. 750(protecting the public from fraud when buying jewelry at auction is clearly within the scopeof the police power).

FN3. Compare the Mirick case to Downing v., Cook (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 149. 431 N.E.2d995 (regtilating dog ownership is clearly within the state's police power).

FN4. Compare the Steube case with Allion v. Toledo^1919), 99 Ohio St. 416, 124 N.E. 237(upholding an ordinance requiring sale of bread by whole weights in situations where aninnocent purchaser is not aware that the loaf may be of a lesser weight on the ground thatprotecting the public from fraud was a legitimate exercise of the police power).

FN5. The market value of the farm at issue in Booth was $17,000, whereas the value of thecoal underneath the farm was in excess of $1,000,000. The ordinance prohibited the coalcompany from extracting the coal, thereby reducing the practical value of the land by98.3%. Although the coal company was not deprived of all economic uses of the land, itwas the sheer magnitude of the deprivation which made the ordinance unreasonable.Compare the Booth case to Geriio, lne. v. Fairfield 1994)_ 70 Ohio St.3d 223, 638 N.E.2d53 3, where a pre-existing farm was zoned for light industrial uses. For that use, the value ofthe farm was $40,000 per acre. The farmer, however, wanted to sell his farm to developers,who would have paid $65,000 per acre to build an apartment complex. The supreme courtlield the city's zoning ordinance was not confiscatory. Id. at 228, 638 N.E.2d 533. The courtalso held it substantially advanced the city's interest in the health, safety, and welfare of thecommunity. Id. Although the argument was only implicitly addressed, we can also say thatthe magnitude of the deprivation, only 38.5%, was not unreasonable.

*5 In the third paragraph of the syllabus of the seminal case of Froelich v. Cleveland (19119), 99Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212,the Supreme Court stated that police power legislation is "unreasanable" nr'the constitutional sense if it "interfere[s] with private rights beyond the necessities of the situation" or ifit is "unduly oppressive upanindividuals:" The court used the Froelich definition in llirect PhimbingSupply Co. v. Dayton (1941), 138 Ohio St. 540, 38 N.E.2d 70, to invalidate the infamous "stickerordinance." The Dayton City Council used its police powers to enact an ordinance that requiredpurchasers of plumbing fixtttres to disclose their names, addresses, and the addresses of the residence atwhich the proposed installation is to take place; that required the sellers of the fixtures to make weeklyreports of that information to the city plumbing inspector; and that required all fixtures sold bear theinspector's sticker of approval. 'I'he court held that, although it bore some marginal relation to thelegitimate goal of enforcing other plumbing regulations, "the burdens of the [sticker] ordinance areunduly oppressive upon individuals and interfere with the rights of private property and freedom ofcontract beyond the necessities of the situation." Id. at 549, 38 N.E.2d 70.

Applying the Froelich definition of "reasonableness,"we conclude thatMegan's Law isunconstitutional on its face because it unreasonably interferes with the rights of individuals beyond thenecessities of the situation, and because in our opinion the statutory scheme is unduly oppressive.

R.C. 2950. I l(B) requires the sheriff to send a notice of the offender's pending release from prison tothe community where he intends to live. The notice must contain certain information about theoffender, including his name, the address at which he will reside, and the sexually oriented offense forwhich lie has been found to be a "predator." We note that there is no requirement that the sheriffprovide the community with a photograph of the offender. Thus, the notice does nothing to help themembers of the community to keep a watch for the "predator" in case he tries to abduct a loved one.Instead, the notice is apparently intended to trigger a response by the community to (1) seek out niore

information about their rights as potential victims, (2) counsel and educate their children as to thedangers posed by strangers, and (3) initiate "constructive" plans, whatever those may be. See R.C.29_5^ 02(A)(1)•

But these three purposes could be served by giving notice that an unspecified person who has beenconvicted of a particular crime is due to move into an unspecafied residence nearby. With such notice,the neighbors would be equally alerted to any potential danger. The unspecific notice would adequatelytrigger the legislature's desired community response to prepare themselves.

*6 Siiigling the;offenderout by name and by address and calling him a "predator" needlesslyinfringes ori the rights o£ ind-ividuals in several impertant respccts.

First„as the Caolr conri rioted,"sending notice of the offender's name, address, andcxime "could have_a detrimental effeat'on offenders; causing them to be ostracized and subjecting them to embarrassmentor barassrnent.'^ State v. Cook. 83 Ohio St3d at 418 700 N_B.2d 570.FN6 In Housh v. Peth (1956), 165Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340, the Supreme Court held that all persons ha.vea right of privacy. It quotedthe syllabus of Pavesich v. New hnQland Life Ins. Co. (1905), 122, Ua._ I90 50 S.F. 68 for theproposition that "A right of privacy is derived from natural law'°. According to Judge Whiteside,"natural law" is incorporated into Section 1 Artiole 1. Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, supra.Therefore, the right of privacy is an znalienable right that is protected by Ohio's Constitution, "I:he rightof privacy means "a right to be let alone." Housh, at the syllabus. Furtherm®re, all persons have theright to "adopt a life of seclusion with a rightt© remain undisturbed if [he ct<] she so desires." Id. at 39,133 N.F,.2d 340. If the notice, qs written, subjects the offender to harassment, they hdve beennoedlessly deprived of their constitutional right to remain undisturbed.

FN6. Note that the Benjamin v. Columfius test focuses not on the actual text of the law, buton its etlects.

Second, when given notice that a prior offender plans to move into a certain address, the neighborsmight take concerted action to prevent the otTender from obtaining title to that residence. Thus, thenotice provision needlessly interferes with the individual's right to acquire property that is guaranteedas inalienable under Section 1 , Article I of the Ohio Constitution. Ci'. Porter v. Oberlin (1965), 1 OhioSt.2d 143^ 205 N.E.2d 363 (upholding an ordinance prohibiting landlords from discriminating againstblack people on the ground that the ordinance protects their constitutional right to acquire property). Ina similar vein, if the neighbors take it upon themselves to damage or destroy the offender's house in anetI'ort to convince him to move out, then it can be said the notice provision needlessly interferes withthe individual's right to protect his property that is also guaranteed by Section 1, Article I of" the OhioConstitution.

Third, we noted in Crawford, at page 18, that the practical effect of R.C. Chapter 2950 is that theoffender may not be able to hold a certain job or to work freely in this society. The right to pursuehappiness guaranteed in Section 1, Article I oftbe Ohio Constitution has been interpreted to encompassthe right to pursue a business or occupation. Frecker v. Dayton (1950),153 Oliio St. 14 17 90 N.E?d85 1. Community notification needlessly interferes with that right.

*7 R.C. 2950J 1 (13)(1) and (2) unreasonably interferes with the privacy, property, and libertyinterestsof the individual beyond the necessities of the situation.

R.C. 2950._I 1(B)(4) requires the sheriff to state in the notice that the offender has been found to be a"predator." Webster's Third International Dictionary ( 1986), 1785 gives one of the definitions of theword "predator" as "an animal that depends on predation for its food." In essence, the GeneralAssembly has created a procedure by which human beings are publicly branded as being "animals."This is slanderous. State v, Cook. 83Ohio St:3d at 419. 700 N.E2d 570 (coinmunitynotilicationprocedure "is obviously detrimental to the reputation of the defendant, who is presumed innocent untilproven guilty."). In Kintz v. Flarringer (1919), 99 Ohio St. 240. 244, 124 N.F. 168, the court stated;

"Before we ever had an English Magna Charta, or an American Bill of Rights in the form of a

constitution, federal or state, one of the most sacred rights of the citizen was the right to a good nameand reputation and to be protected in the enjoyment of that good name and reputation."

Furthernaore, the court called'the right to rcputatiorl a"primary and precious right solemnly proclaime'* "' ]d. at 245, 124 N.L. 1 CB.Er o.dn peopTe **.in Holy Writ, in the lives and literature of ou 3/ We

understand these comnients to mean that a person's right to the enioyment of his reptttation isasfundamentat as the right of privacy recognized"in Housh. It; too, is a"natural law" right that isprotected-by Seetion 1 Article I of the Ohio C onstitution. The right to one's reputation is alsoexplicitlyprotected in Section 16 rticle I. Surely, the Ueneral Assembly can accompli"sh its stated purposes towarnthepublic without name-calling. R.C. 2950.1 I(B)(4) unreasonably interferes with theconstitutional righfs of the ihdividuaLin the erijoymentand protection of his reputation to a degreebeyond the neeessities of the situation.

FN7. The exact holding of Kintz was that a person may sue another who has givenmaliciously false and slanderous testimony before a grand jury. In Taplin-Rice-C'lerkin Co.v. I tower (1931) 124 Ohio St. 123, 177 N.E. 203, the court changed its mind, and held thatgraud jury testimony is privileged. The latter court, however, did not retract the statementsin Kintz regarding the nature of the right to protect one's reputation.

The Housh court also held that any conduct that would cause shnine or htimiliation to a person ofordinarysensibilities or that would subject him to public harassment is anactionable tort.'td. at 39 133N t~.2d 340. In addition, Seetion 16,Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantees that, for any injurydone to a person's reputation, he shall have a remedy by due course of law. The General Assembly hasauthorized the county sheriffs to broadcast notices that a certain person is an "animal," a practice whichundoubtedly causes shanie and humiliation, and which injures the reputation of the person mentionedin the notice. Yet, R.C. 2950.12 cloaks the sheriffs with immunity from liability for any act under R.C.Chapter 2950. 'The immunity provision unreasonably interferes with the individual's constitutional rightto a redress of his legal grievances beyond the necessities of the situation.

*8 The General Assembly may not completely repeal the fandamental and inalienable rights of anyparticular class ofpersons.In Colunrbus v. DeLona (t962), 173 Ohio St. 81, 83. 180 N.E.2d 158, theSupreme Court observed that "a prostitute, no matter how reprehensible her mode of life, is a humanbeing with rights protected by the Constitution." We do not believe this statement is merely emptyrhetoric. A sex offender is equally human and is no less deserving of the protections afforded toeveryone.

For these reasons, we hold the conimunity notification provisions in 2950.11(B) are unreasonableand constitute an invalid exercise of the police power.

R.C. 2950.11(A) requires the sheriff to give a written notice regarding the "predator" to theexecutive officer or hiring coordinator of community agencies listed in R.C. 2950.11(A)(2) through (7).These are public children services agencies, the boards of education of the local school district, privateschools, preschool programs, day-care centers, and colleges. Again, no photograph of the "predator" issent to these agencies, so they cannot be expected to keep watch for him in case he tries to abduct achild or college student. These notices are apparently designed to warn the executive officers and thepersonnel coordinators not to hire the "predator." But this purpose can be accomplished withoutslandering potential applicants. A simple background check should uncover whether an applicant foremployment has ever been convicted of a sex offense. Broadcasting a notice to the agencies aboutevery person who has been convicted of a sex offense regardless of whether or not they have appliedfor employment unreasonably interferes with the reputation, liberty, and privacy rights of the individualbeyond the necessities of the situation.

R.C. 2950.06(B)(1) requires sexual "predators" to verify their current residence every ninety days.

D' 11

Verification, like the initial registration, "allows law enforcement officials to remain vigilant againstpossible recidivisni by the offender." State v. C-ook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 417. 700 N.E.2d 570. Suchfrequent verification is unnecessary, however, because R.C. 2950.05(A) also requires "predators" to filea written notice of any change of address with the sheriif. There was no verification requirement in the1963 version of the Habitual Sexual Offender statute. See Am.Sub.S.B. No. 160,130 Ohio Laws 669.The offender was required to register his address with the sheriff upon being released from prison, andto file a notice when that address changed. Between those times, it can logically be inferred that theoffender is still living at the address originally given. Requiring a"predator" to verify his address everyninety days tells the sheriff what he already knows. 'I'hus, the ninety-day verification requirement doesnothing to enhance the infonnation already possessedby law enforcement officials. And yet thepredatozs" are required to personally appear aiid fill out verification forms to give the sheriff^

redundant information. The ninety-day verification requirement for the offender's current address inR.C. 2950.06(B)(1) unreasonably interferes with the liberty of the individual beyondthe necessities ofthe situation.

*9 R.C. 2950.06(C) requires the "predator" to personally appear at each ninety day verification. Butthat statute also gives the sheriff discretion to mail the "predator" a "non-forwardable"address/employment verification form. The "predator" is required by law to complete the form and takeit personally to the sheriff. He may not inail the form back. The underlying purpose of the law, toprovide the sheriff with information, can be achieved equally well if the "predator" mails the forni tothe sheriff. Requiring the "predator" to personally appear has no furtetional purpose other thanharassing and inconveniencing him. The personal appearance provisions o€R.C 2950.06(C) relating toverification unreasonably interfere with the liberty of the individual beyotadthe necessities of thesituation:

R.C. 250.07(C) provides that if the "predator" is in the future convicted of another sex crime, andis labeled a"predator" with respect to that other crime, he is to independently comply with theregistration and verification schedule of each offense. lf those schedules do not co-coincide, the"predator" is required, in essence, to double the frequency with which he appears and verifies hisaddress and employment. Instead of giving the sheriff redundant information four times a year, he isrequired to do so eight times a year. The independent compliance provision of R.C. 2950.07(C)unreasonably interferes with the liberty of the individual beyond the necessities of the situation.

We also think it unreasonable for the General Assembly to require that county governments maintainsuch elaborate record-keeping and ministerial procedures without a correspondingly worthwhile benefitto public safety. The law is unduly and unnecessarily burdensome upon government agencies.

The combined effect of the foregoing provisions, and several more cited below, shows that Megan'sLaw is unduly oppressive upon the individual.

By this statute,the legislature hasessentially proclaimed (to paraphraseHolmes FN8) that thetypical sex offender is a degenerate, bound toimpose himself onothers by as deep-seated an organicnecessity as that which makes the rattlesnakebite, and that it is idle to talk about reforming hischaracter by traditional methods of punishment. See R.C: 2950.02(A)(2). The legislature has thereforeprovided various mechanisms by which he can be de-humanized in a court of law and branded as beinga"predator," which is commonly understood as meaning he is an "animal. R.C. 2950.09(A); (B) and(C).

FN8. See Holmes, ThePath of the Law (1897 ,101-Iaiw.L.Rev. 457. 470.

The procedures so established are not reserved merely for the likes of the killer of Megan Kanka. Aperson who commits any type of sex offense is subjected to the same treatment. Even comparativelypetty offenders, like those convicted of misdemeanor offenses such as pandering sexually orientedmatter involving children, corrupting a minor, or child endangering, are equated to serial rapists andmurderers. See R.C_2950.0 1,(D)(2). They are all "animals" under this statute, irrespective of whether or

not their crime was violent. And it does not take more than one conviction to earn that appellation, forit can apply even to first-time offenders. See R.C. 2950.01(E).

*10 After the prior offender has served his prison seritence for the underlying sex offense, andthereby has paid his debt tosociety, the General Assembly does not let him return quietly to the law-abidinglife which, presumably, he wllblead. "fhe prior otTender is made to appear personally at theoffice of his local sheriff, or perhaps at the county jail, R.C. 2950.04(A)(1), and there to sign a paperstating he is an "animal." R.C. 2950.04(C)(1). IHe is made to surrender certain information regardingwhere he intends to make his home and where he intends to work. R.C. 2950.04(C). He also mustsurrender the license plate numbers of any vehicles he owns. R.C. 2950.04(C)(2).

Soon after, certain officials broadcast a warning to the members of his community. R.C. 2950.1 1(A).The community is told that an "animal" is on his way, R.C. 2950.11(B)(4), and that they should takewhatever measures as are necessary to protect themselves. He is singled out in the notice. His name andaddress are there for all to see. R.C. 2950..l 1(B)(I) and (2). His neighbors are thereby enabledto harassand annoy him. Avandal or an arsonist can easily flnd his residence. Vigilantes can find him andlor hisfamily, who suffer thie same invasions as he,Like Hester Prynne in Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter

(1850), he and hisfamily are exposed to shame, humiliation, and"the stingof public'censure": State v.Cook 83 Ohio St.3d at 423, 700 NjE.2d 570.

If the climate in his neighborhood becomestoo hostile, he cannot simply move elsewhere, because =the local iauthorities of other communities will again announce hisi coming. R.C. 2950.11(A).

Even though public ofîciats continually commit actionable torts upon him, the prior offender isdenied access tothe courts, and he may not sue them for his damages, R.C. 2950.12.

In the meantime, the prior offender is required every ninety days to personally appear at the officesof the sheriffs department, or perhaps at the county jail, and to re-submit information regarding hisresidency and employment. R.C. 2950.06(A) and (D). He is made to do this not for any good reason,for the officers there already have that information; but to surround him with a police presence, and toremind him, in the words of George Orwell, that "BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU." 1984(1949). If he fails to appear on schedule, he is to be charged with an independent crime, R.C. 2950.99,and the sheriff is commanded to seek a warrant and to immediately hunt him down and arrest him. R.C.2950.0G(G)(2)(b). If he is again convicted, he is made to double the number of times he is to appear.

R.C. 2950.07(C).Although the prior offender may try and throw himself on the mercy of the court which adjudicated

him to be an "animal," R.C. 2950.09(D)(1), he cannot easily obtain judicial relief. He is required bystatute to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it is unlikely that he will commit another offense.

Id. The legislature has declared that there is a high chance that he will re-offend; lie has done so at leastonce before. No expert can del3nitively prove that he will never again do the same. Once placed on the

rolls of sexual "predators," he has little real hope of getting off.*11 If lie fails his first attenlpt, he cannot apply again for official absolution for another five years.

R.C. 2950.09(D)(1)(b). If he cannot marshal the requisite evidcnce of his innocence, he is condemnedto live out the rest of his days under the burdens of thestatute. E.C. 2950.07(B)(1):

This is not sonie fanciful tale appearing in a work of fiction. This is the reality of life in Ohio forsome of her citizens created in the aftermath of Megan's Law. If the legislature's treatment of sexofI'enders is constitutionally permissible, then nothing stops it from enacting similar provisions for anyother kind of person whom the General Assembly finds undesirable. In thatsense; we act not only toprotect the rights of those persons convicted of sex offenses, but we act to protect the rights of

everyone.When considering the validity of Megan's Law, we are called upon to decide the tenor of the society

in which we are going to live. 'I'his legislation sailed through the General Assembly with only tokenopposition in the Ilouse of Representatives and none at all in the Senate.FN9 It was propelled by anincredible gale of public outrage and frustration over the inability of the criminal justice system to deal

with sex offenders. Those who succumbed to the political winds and supported Megan's Law areapparently willing to tolerate an accelerated legislative pace, to accept the consequences of ill -eonsidered 1aws, and consequently to live in a paranoid society that approaches a police state. If weacquiesce in this, there is no telling what personal li,berties are next to be sacrificed. Courts must standas the bulwark against the constant pressure to erode our constitutional rights

FN9. H.B. No. 180 was passed in the House by a vote of 94 to three. House Journal,Wednesday, May 24, 1995. Al133 Senators voted in favor of Megan's Law. Senate Journal,Wednesday, May 29, 1996. Although one nzember of the standing Judiciary Committeevoted against recommending its passage, he voted with the majority on the floor. TheHouse voted 98 to one to concur in the Senate's changes. House Journal, Thursday, May 30,1996.

The unconstitutional portions of R.C. Chapter 2950 are so connected with the general scope of thewhole statute that striking them would fundamentally disrupt the statutory scheme. See Creiger v_Geiger (1927), 117 Ohio St. 451, 4661 N.E. 28, followed in State ex rel. Maurer (1994), 71 OliioSt,3d 513 , 523-524, 644 N.E.2d 369,Therefbrk, R.C. Chapter 2950 as applied to sexual "predators"isvoid in its entirety:.

For all of the foregoing, the trial court's judgment dismissing the sexual predator proceedings ishereby affirmed on alternative grounds.

Dy lq

194 S. W. 3d 833Supreme Court of Missouri,

Ln Banc.

Jane DOE 1, et al., Appellants, v. '1'hoinas PHILLIPS, et al., Respondents.

No. SC 86573. Junc 30, 2006.

Holdings: '1'he Supreme Court, Laura Denvir Stith, J., held that:WMcgan's Law did not violate ca post facto or due process clauses of state constitution;U Law did ttot violate state's coustitutional prohibitiotrs of hills of attainder and special laws; but(3) portions of Law impositig aftirmative duty to register based solely ot1 pleas or convietions forconduct committed prior to enactment of Law violated state's constitutional prohibition of laws"retrospective in operation," andthus: l.aw's registrationi-equirements could not be enforced as personswho wereeottvicted or pled guilty prior to Law's effective date. .

J_4JAstatiite cannot supersecle a cottstitutional provision, and neither thc language of the statute norjudicial interpretation tliereof can abrogate a constitutional riglit.

j31]-Portions of Megan's Law imposing affirtnative cttdy to register based solely on pleas orconvictionsPor conduct connnitted prior to enactment ot' Law violated state's constitutional prohibitionof laws "retrospective in operation," and thus, I.aw's regis[ratiori requii•enients could not be enforced aspersons who wereconvicted or pled guilty priot• to I,t.iw's effeetivedate; registration requirementrequired residentsto fulfill new obligation and imposed new duty to registerand to maintain and updateregistration regularly, base(i solelyon their Offenses prior to Law's enactment, and thus, violatedconstitutional bar on laws retrospective in operation. VA.A1 S. CqnSt.Art. I$ 13; V.A.1V1.S^589.400-589.425.

F. Missouri's Niegan's Ldtrv is Retrosgtective in Its ®peration as to PersonsConvicted or Pleadin^Cruiit^^ E'rior tc^ t^'a_:stt e.

j31 j_ In the same st,ntenec that bars ez post fiicto laws, Missouri's Constitution provides, "that no ...law ... retrospective in its operation ... can be enac7ecl." Mo. Const. art I. sec. 13. This provision has noanalogue in thetlnitedStates Constitution and is contained in the constitutions of only a handfut ofother states.FN16 The Does argue it precludes application of*850 Megan's Law to those who pledguilty or were found guilty prior to the act's.Ianuary I, 1995. effective date.

FN1(.See, e.g lcun_Con,t art.1 titc') ("no retrospective law ... shall be made"); Oh..Const <ttt. 11,_src _?8 (legislature "shail have no power to pass retroactive laws"); Colo.(;onst ar1. 11,sec. I I ( n o laws "i-etrospective in ... operation°'); N l l. (;onst. tiart 1, art 23("Retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive, and unjust. No such laws ... shouldbe made, eitlier for the decision oPcivil causes, or the puuishtncnt of offenses").

'fhe constitutional bar on civil laws retrospective in their operation has been a part of Missouri lawsince this State adopted its first constitution in 1820. FN t7 17ie 1875 constitutional debates note thisbar is broader than the ex post fuclo bars in other states:

FN 17. The 1820 constitution stated, "no e.x post,facto law, nor law inipairing the obligationof contracts, or retrospective in its operation, can be passed...." Mo. Const, art. 13, sec. 17(1820), RSMo 1825, vol. I at 60. "I'he 1875 coustitution employed nearly identicallanguage. Mo. Const. art. 2. sec. 15 (1875). RSMo 1879, vol. I at 56.

[T]he prohibition of retrospective lcgislation or forbidding the General Assembly to pass a lawretrospective in its character did at one breath accomplish the prohibition of a more extensive kind ofa more comprehensive nature than was to be linmd in any oPthe constitutions of but three states inthe Union. So that the pi-ohibition oFan act retrospective in its operation in the Constitution of 1820rendered it nearly supertluous to add the prohibition ol'an cx post frcto law or of a law impairing theobligation of contracts, or of a(aw impairing vcsted rights....Debates of ttte Missouri Constitutional Convention 1875, vol. IV at 95 (Isidor Loeb & Floyd C.Shoemaker, e(is., State Historical Soc'y of Mo., 1938).In inteipreting Missouri's broad constitutional bar, rhis Court said:A retrospective law is one which creates a new obligation, imposes a new daty, or attaches a new

disability with respect to transactions or considerations already past. It must give to somethingalready done a different effect from that which it had whcn it tianspired.

S uaw Cyeek Draiuagc 1)ist, \ 11nicv "^5 Mo 80. 118 5 u. 1 2 , 16 (1911). The language used to bar-- ---laws retrospective in operation remained the same in the 1945 constitution. Mo. Const art. I, sec. 13.

Jerry--RuS.elf Bli,s v. Ilaztrdous w rtc, t02 _*, lt."?d 77 (Mo_banc 1985) sets out types of situationsin which a law will be found to be retrospective in operation, stating that a new law may not "impairvested rights acquired under existing laws, or create a new obligation, impose a new duty, or attach anew disability in respect to transactions ... already past." t(i. at$1- (quotation omitted). Bliss argued thatan act prohibiting issuancc of a hazardous waste management license to habitual violators of pasthazardous waste (aws violated the prohibition on retrospective laws *851 since the violations occurredprior to the act's passage.

Doe v. R o m 1 n Cathulic I)iqctw hi, i`tit d;3t> banc 1993) hcld that a law adopting adiscovery rule for cases oi'childhood sexual abuse involving, for example, repressed memories,didviolate the prohibition on laws reU-ospeetive in their operation by providing, "This sectionshall apply to any action commenced on or attei- [the act's e£lective date] inchrding any actionwhich would have been barrcd by the application ol'ttio statute of limitation applicable prior tothat date." Ici. at 340. Doc held that "oncc the original statute of limitations expires and bars theplaintiffs action, the defendant has acquired a vested riglrt to be free fi-om suit, a right that issubstantive in nature, and theref'orc, arlictc 1, scctxm I." prohibits the legislative revival of thecause of action." Id_ai 3 } 1- (emphasis in originat). "17ie ciear legislative intent to apply the lawretrospectively could not supersede the specific prohibition on retrospective laws. [d.Here, however, the Does arc not complaining that tltey have been held or will be held criminallyliable for failing to register. They arc complainiog about application of the registrationrequirement to them, based solely on their pre-act criminal conduct. As to all but Jane Doe III,who was not eonvicted until 1998, the application of that requirement truly is retrospective in itsoperation. It looks solely at thcir p, st conduct and uses that conduct not merely as a basis forfuture decision-making by the state- in rcgard io things such as the issuance of a license, or as abar to certain firture conduct by the Does, such as voting. Rather, it specifically requires the Doesto fulfill a new obligation and imposes a new dut,v to i-egister and to maintain and update theregislration regrdarly, based soliay on thcu- oHenses prior to its enacttnent. This violates thestandard set out in Rliss and violat(,s our constitutionat i.âr ou laws retrospective in operation.

IV CONCLUSION

Missouri's eonstitutional bar on laws ren-o>;pective in thcir operation compels this Court to invalidateMegan's Law's registration requiremcnts as to- cnd onh- as to, those peisons who were convicted orpled guilty prior to the law's Januauy I. 11)95, etTectivc date. This ruling applies only to the registration

requiremenls. All other provisions of Megan's Law rcmain in effect as to ttiese and all other personssubject to it. Further, the Iaw is fully in eltect as to all persons whose pieas or judgtnents of convictionwere entered on oratter its''853 effective datc of.lanuary 1, 1995, niore than ll years ago, or whocommitted additional crimes subject to Megari'.s f.aw thcreafter, and is flttty effective as to SVPs.

The judgment is affinned in part and reversed in part, and the oase is remanded.All concur.

194 S.W.3d 833

120 Ohio St.3d 7,896 N.E.2d 110, 2008 -Ohio- 4824

LANZINGER, J., dissent

Supreme Court of Ohio.

The STATE OF OHIO; Appellee,' ...V.

FERGUSON, Appellant:

No. 2007-1427.';ubmiiitcd Ylay 6, 2008:Decided Oct. 1, 2008:

9•

{41441 BecauSCI maintain that the2003 amenc(ments to R.C. Chapter 2950 when applied

retroactivply viqlate the Bx Post Facto Clause of the Unikcd StatesConstitution and Section 10,!§rticle

R.C. Chapter 2950 Has Evolvedfi•om Remedial to Punitive

^09 700^l S t^ (' I' 19981 83 Ohio St ^^d 404t â c 1 oo ( .,{¶ 4S}Aithough the malortty conutiues to re y on .N.1^:.2d 570 the first case that considered retroactive application of R t"950.09(B), R.C. Chapter

R.C. Chapter 2950 has bcen transforined fi•omsemedtalto pututzve as I have prevtously arguedr

* 18 111 46} `' I'he followina comnarisons show that the current laws are more complicated andrestrictive than those at issue in VVtlliatns and('ook. First, the label `sexual predator'is now permanentfor adultoffenders; R C. ?950.07(B)(I). uheceas previotisly, offen(fers had the possibility of having itremoved. FormerR C.. 2950,09(l)), Am,Sub.Il.B.lxto. 180, 146 Ohio haws;l'art 11, 2560, 2621-2623;

Second, registration duties ;it•e now mote dcntanding and thereforeare no longer comparable to theinconvenience ofrenewinga drivct'sltuensc, as t`ttok had analogized. Coaky83 OhioSt.3d at418 700N.E.2d 570. Persoiis classified as sex ofl'endcts mList nowpersolially regisler with thesherifl'of thecounty in which they reside, work, and go to school R C". 2950_04(A). Sexual predators mustpersonally registerwith potentially threc difterent thertffs every 90 days, R.C 2950.06(B)(1)(a), whichis hardly comparable to the slight inconvenience of having oue's (Iriver's license renewed every fouryears. Third, community notification has expanded to ihe extent that atiy statemetits, infornlation,photographs, or fttigerprints that an oflênder is required to provide are public record and ** 121 muchof that material is now included in tYte sex-offender database maintained on the Intemet by the attorneygeneral. R('()5t).081. In C'oc k we considercc( it signiticant that the information provided to sheriffsby sex offenders could be disseininated to only a restricwd group of peaple. Cook, 83 Ohio St. 3d at

422, 700 N.E.`?d 570. Fourth, new restrictions have beenadded to R.C. Chapter 2950:Enactedinitially

as part ofSuh.S.B.No. 5, 125th General Assembly, approved July 31, 2003, R.C. 2950.031 prohibits

all classified sex offettders, rtot just tliose convictcd of scx offenses against children, from residiug

within 1,000 feet of any school, premises. And fi fth, a sheriff is now permitted to request that the sex

offender's landlord or the manager of tho sex offender's residence verify that the 5ex o`fender currently

resides at#he regisicred address. lt.(". '?.95t1.111(A)( t). Aecording to R.C. 2950 11 t(C), `(A] sheriff or

designee of a sheriff is not linrited in the number of requests that may be made under, this section

regarding any registrption, pfovision of notice, Ar veritication, or in the number of times that the sheriff

or designee may attempt to coniirtn, in manners other than the manner provided in this section;that an

offender *** currently resides at the address in questior3.'

{¶ 47) "While protectiori of thc public is thc avowedgoa of R.C. Cltapter 2950, we eannotdenythat severe obligations are-iitrposed upon thosc c[assifiedas sex offenders.All sexual predatorsandmost habitual sex offenders are expected; for the retnainder oftheir lives, ta register thcir residencesancl their` eanpiayment with 1o.,al she; ilfs. IVtorepver, this itkformafian will be accessible to all. Thestlgma.atâched Go êx offendccs is î^ru1 icairt,^nd the pateirtial eîsts for o^tracism'and harass(nent, as `the.Ccro_l^ court reeognizeci. td ^^ Ctliio ^t: l at 41_8y7{Jt) 'J.Ii ?c1 i70;, Thcrefore, I"clo not believe thatwe can.continue lo_label tlicsc pr§cceefmgti as-civii in,hatute: These resttainfs on liber€y arte the19ebnsequences of sjêZific crint±nal convrctrons and shoulcl be recogrurcd as part of thc punishment tliat

is imposed as a resttit of theblTcnder's actions." `,tate,v. Wilsvn, l 1 i C)hi^ _St.3d 382 2007-Ohio-2202.865 N.1::2d 1264,1t45u46 (l.anringcr; J., concurring in part and dissenting ih part).

The C;eneral Assemkr(y`s Expressed Intenl

{lf481 The majority agrees that tne residenwy re3triction may not be applied retroactively, ]3 ly e y.

Porter. 117 dhio St3d t65,' 0 if8 bhiil 54?, StR r;y I's 2dSy9, buteoncludesthat retroactive applicationof Fetgason's other chalienged anienclrnentsdoes not violate the Constitution. Much is made ofilieGeneralAssembly's intent: ta protectthe public from all sex offenders. But to overcome tiiepresumption that a statute applies prospectively, a statute must "ctearly proclaim" itstetroactiveapplication State ( onsifi<,, 114 Ohio Sf.3d 2952007-016o41G3, 871 N3:.2d 11(r7, paragraph one of

the syllabus.

{¶ 49} Anew and unwara'antcd rule is announeed toda,a: Because the cqtirthas interpreted earlierstatutes as permissib(y, rretroactive (iti('ook ), and the GeneralAssembly "declined to override" thecourt's iitterpretation, the newly amciided statute must also be retroactive. This is notthe analysis weused most recctrtiy in Hy le, 117 Ohio St3d165 2008-( )hro 5.1?,'8g2 N L 2d 899. In Hyle retroactivity

was found not to be expressed with tospect to foir,ier t2.1 29,;t). 31, I50Ohio Lawsx Part IV, 6558,6657, one of the ainendnients rtiade by d.13. 5. ld. at y'24.

{1( 50} We have explained that "fw]e do ndtaddressttic question of constitutionatretroactivityunlessand until we determine that ttie (icnei•al Assembly expressly made ** 122 the statute retroaetive."liylc l i.7 Ohio $tid 165,20(i8-Ghiii 542. ^48'l N.f,.2d $99,'^ Yet in deterntniing that 1Ei.C; 2950.081,150 Ohio Laws, Yart IV, 6558. 6686-6687, andt0'9,50 09, 150 nllio Laws, PartIV, at 6687, areretroactive, the majority does not piripoint any{anguage used byxhe General Assembly within thosesections that speaks aboutretroac.tivity.

0^ 511, Even if I could he persuaded that there is an expressed intent to have these statutes applied

retroactively, I cannot accept that the challenged amendments are "merely remedial" and do not impair

vested, substantial tights. "I'hc CiencralAssembly's statedintent-to protect the public-is not the only

point to discuss in determining whether a statute is remedial. The punitive effect rnustbe considered as

11521 rTo begin with, theclassifieation atldnotificatioil siatutesare partof our criminal code. This

plaeementsuggestsa punitive hrtent. See Ku;,as v. Ilendricks (1997), ^21 (LS 316 361. 117 S.Ct.2072. 138a..Ed.2d 5 01. We have alsoheld that a sex offender's failure to register under R.C.295 0.06(Ej is itself,a criminal offense.4Ea te v. W itliams, 114 0 12io St.3et 1_03 2007-Uhio 3268, 868

N.L.2d969. Al 1. We have acknoNyledgcd that the simple registration processand *20 notificationprocedures considered in C'cok are now differetit. yy'i7liains at ' 9, And coming close to acknowledgingthe ehanged nature of the neiu s(atutozy sehe,ne,we stated, "Whileprotection of the public is theavowed goal of R.C. Chapter 2950, we cannot deny that adclitionul obligatirirxs arenaw irnposed upoq

those classitied as sex offentlcrs." (Lmphasis added.) IcL

An offender's classif ication as a sexual predator is a direct consequence of the ofTender'sc,riminal aets. We cannot say {hat registratton dirties are collateral to a crimirfal conviction-they existonly as a direct restilt of this (ype of conviction.As such, "they are punitive. As Justice Stevens noted:`f[Al sancfionthat (1) is impt?sed on everyone vvlio comtnits.a crinainal offense, (2) is not imposed on

anyone else, and (3) severelxirr4pairs a person'siibct^y ispunishment" Siliithy. Doe(20t?3), 538 US. =84, 113, 1,r3,S.Ct. j140, 155 1],d.2d 164 (Stevens, J., dissenting): Simply oalling a statutory scheme"regtdatoiy" does not make it so. No dne except those convicted ol a sex offense niust register, issubject toclassificatiotr andcommunity notificiition, oriS t,onGnedby residency restrictions pursuant to

R.C. C'hapter 2950.

RetroactivelyImposedPunishmeat Viotatesthe Ex Post F'actoClause

{1[ 541 hi the majority's view, if thelavy i3 ren .,dia:, i: cannot be cleemed unconstitutional onex post sfacto grotinds.

{j; 55} The General Assembly's intent nottopunish is nondispositive of whether a statute isremedialor punitive if thc cbnsequences of thestattrte are punitivc.If the intention wds to enact aregulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive,it must be examined further to see wltether thestatutory scheme is:" `so pimitive eiflier in purpiise or effect as to negate [tha State's] intention' to deemit `civiL'" (13racketed material sic.)1 lEnch icks.,5? 1 1 I.S. at 361, 117 ;i.l't. 2072. 38 L TLd.2d 50l,

q

{l(

oting IJmted Stirti 5 ti War<t j 198(1Z448 r).S; '742 144-249. 10 ttl S C.t 1_Fi3b, 65 L.E,d.24742.

{1C 56) `Phe United States 5upretne Court has suggested thai t)le guidelines of ICertn_eI+ Mendoza-

Martinez 41963). 372 tt.S. 144133 SCt 554 9 1 2.d.2d t 44. sliould be considered in deterrnining thelegislative intent as to the penal nat ne of a statiite Smitlt; 5 38 U,5_a197, 123 S Ct, 1140 155 L.b;d.2d

164. These factors iriclude"* 123 whcthcr "the s<in,^tioit invoives an affirmative disability or restraint,whether it has historically been regarded as a puriishrnent, whether it comes into play only onafindipgof scienter, whellier its operation will prnmote the traditional aims of punishtnent-retribution anddeterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is alrcady a crime, whether an atternati.ve purposeto which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relationto the alternative purpose assigned." (fo ,fros°s ('r=-itted.) hlmdoz_a Vlnrtinez 37U.S. at 168-169; 83S C^t. 554 9 1..Ed.2d 644.

*21 11 571 Using the iylendoi i-N1attinez factors as a ntcasure, I would hold R.C. Chapter 2950

D .A2-0

punitive iti effect. 7'hrough classiliealion and re-Ostration;; itn affirinative disability is imposed. Throughclassification, liietime reportiirg obligations areimposed;and regiStrants and their families are exposedto profound hunvliation andcommuti{fy-wi(le ostracism.

(¶ 581 The registration and reportii-ig ptrovisions are comparable to conditions of sitpcrvised releaseor parole; the public notification, which places the registtant's face on a web page turder the label"Registered Sex Of1'ender," calls to niind sharning punishments once used to tnark an offenderassomeone to be shunned. Il is a past conviction tilone that triggers all obligations. SecIV17ndoca=

tii^z37^ U.S.:at tf29-177 83 .C_t SS^k, 9I l;d,i'd 644. Admittcdly, S.B. 5 has a legitimate civilpurpose: to promote public sAi'ety by aiet-ting the public to potentially recidivist sex offenders in thecommunity. But its scope niiiiibly e.v.cecds this pt,rpose.

{¶ 59}S.f3: 5 applies to all eonvtctesl sex oifirndecs, without regard to their future dangerousness."Contrary to popular publicopitiion, the recidivisnt rate for sex crimes is noworse than the recidivismrate for otber crimes, In fact; aex oll'anse tecic;isiism is extreine(y li>w eompared to recidivism for othercrimes: According to the De{tartment ttf .tustice's statistics of sex offencler recidivisin, 5.3 percent of sexoffenderswere rearrested for a sex o&nse witlqtr tnree years ol'their release. Porty-three percent ofeonvietedsex offerrders were arrested jor all crimes dudng this 5ahie period; but the averwhelming°trtajority, of those arrests were for otlier uon-sexual allegtitions." (Footrlotes omitted.) Lester, nff to

Elba! The l,cîtiuzac.y iot:cx t)tdci Re,sr+lerice aif tiioloytizettttZestrictions {2007 4U_AkronL Rev. 3^9 349.tN7 The broad appfic;atton of S.B. 5 also overlooks criticaldiflerenees amongthoseclassifedas sexual offendeis. "Fvenadult sexual offenders are nof the hotnogenouR group assumed bylegislatures. Manysex oficnders do not suffer front sexual pathoiogies." Vitiello, I'unishin Sex()flenciers When (iooef Intentions (ioP,id t`lt).}f;)10 lrMSt I.J. (;.>1.677.

FN7. Although the niajority drseokmts the r+.,searehdone regarding therecidivism rate ofsexual offentlers, it is relevanr for determii?ing whether the scope of the legislation exceedsits civil purpose.

{ j160}The reporting requirements themselvc,^^ arc exorbitant: S.B. 5 requires sexual predators toi hi hft hfi n w ce countyy reporting to the sheta o tengageirt perpetual quarterl}s reporting b,y personal

they reside, work, and go to s hoo!, t=...^ if 1.heir ;^cr.,onal information has not changed. Former R.C.2950.04(A) and 2959.06(B)(1), 150 E)ttio Laws; Part IV,h558, 6657-6661, 6673-6674. Aud meritingheaviest weight in my judgtixent. S'i. "t makc., no prr,visiUn whatever for the possi,bili.ty ofrehabilitalion. Offenders caii.not shorten their regi:,tration or notification period, even an the clearestdemonstration ofrehabilitation or coi_y; ,,v, "%2 prcxtfcii'°'*12-] hhysical incapacitation. Former R.C.

150 Ohio Iavas, Part I`s ;655& 068t-G6 '=. Prior to S.B, 5, a sexual predator had the2550.07(I3)(1) ,opporttuiity to remove that label. Foitmer P.C. 2-950.(}9(I)), Am.Sub.H.F;. No. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, PartII, 2560,2621-2623. However plainit rnay t-e that a fornier sex offender currently poscs no threat of

g terur,?r.on;tcrit7g and inr;scapabiehumiliation.recidivism, he will rernzin subject to io.t"

z¶ 611 In a venerable case that c,•n dcri:d the Ex Post F'acto C;arse, .lustice Chase characterizedfour types of laws that violate that o.r.,titutuonal z>rohibition: " 1 st.Every law that makes an action,dorie before the passing oftEie law, and wltichwas innocentwhetidone, critninal, andpunishes suckaction. 2nd. Every lawYhat aggravates a crime, oi' niake,sit greater than it was, whencommitted: 3rd.Every law thcztchctnge.r thei>atni:,hrncrtl an l a givtaler punishmeru, than the law annexedto thecrime, when committed. 4th. F:very iaw that alters the legal rules ofevidence, and receives less, ordifterent, testintony, than the law required at the time of the comn;ission of the ofFence, in order to

convict the offender. All these, and similar tadded.} t!<ilder ti. 13u11 {1'79h} ^ t!, 5.^k(72950 retrnactively increases the punisllinwith the prohibition against ex post facto

s; are manifestly uajust and cippressive;" (Emphasis

_39 I, 3 i)ali. 386. I 643: To apply R.C. Chapterona-crinTinaa'defenrlait and, therefore, isincompa:tible

Conclttsio:

62}I respectfully dissent and wou(d r,when applied retroactively, S.B. 5 antGnttnîof the Uriited States Constitution and :scetioConstitution.

PFEI f+ ER and LUNDBF ilCx STRrhÌ'

vei•se the Juiigment of the courtof appeals by holding that7tsto R.C. t`:hapter 2950 violate the Ex Post Facto Clause =r 10, ArticleI aad Section 28.1krticle 11 of the Ohio

flN, J.ir., ncu

Ohio,2008:State r.

'Perg uson

1•20 (11► io St,3d 7, 896 N.F:2d 110, ÔQR -Ohia- 4824

he foiegoing opinton:

py22,

Naples v. State 2009 WL 2425981 (Ohio App. 11 Dist.), 2009 -Ohio- 3938DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.

{¶ 72} In his third assignntent of error, Naples arguesthat his reclassification violates the separationof powers doctrine by interfering with a prior judicial adjudication regarding his sex offender status.Naples further argues that the "legislature's attempts to heap additional obligations upon the Appellantalso violates the Doctrine of Res Judicata." Moreover, "such interference with previous judicialadjudications impermissibly encroaches on judicial authority and violates the separation of powers

doctrine."

{l( 73 }"Although the Ohio Constitution does not contain explicit language establishing the doctrineof separation of powers, it is inherent in the constitutional framework of government defining the scopeof authority conferred upon the three separate branches of goveniment." State v. Sterling, 113 OhioSt.3d 255 2007-Ohio 1790, at 1[ 22, "The essential principle underlying the policy of the division ofpowers of govemment into tliree departments is that powers properly belonging to one of thedepartments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments,and further that none of them ought to possess directly or indirectly an overruling influence over theothers." State ex rel. Bryaut v. Akron Metro. Park Dist. 1929) 120 Ohio St. 464, 473.

(¶ 76} However, "[t]he administration of justice by the judicial branch of the government cannot beimpeded by the other branches of the government in the exercise of their respective powers." State exrel. ;lohnston v. 'laulbee 1981), 66 Ohiq St.2d 417 at paragraph one of the syllabus. "[I]t is well settledthat the legislature cannot annul, reverse or modify ajudgment of a court already rendered." Bartlett v. Ôhio 1905) 73 Ohio St. 54, 58; Plaut v, Spendtllrift Fai1n, Ine 1995), 514 U.,S. 211, 212 (Congressmay not interfere with the power of the federal judiciary "to render dispositive judgments" by

"command[ing] the federal courts to reopen final judgments") (citation omitted). "A judgment which isfinal by the laws existing when it is rendered cannot constitutionally be made subject to review by astatute subsequently enacted: " Gompf v. Wolfinger {19021. 67 Ohio St. 144 at paragraph three of thesyllabus. "Ì'hat the conclusions are uniform upon the proposition that ajudgment whicli is final by thestatutes existing when it is rendered is an end to the controversy, will occasion no surprise to those whohave reflected upon the distribution of powers in such governments as ours, and have observed theuniform requirement that legislation to affect remedies by which rights are enforced must precede their

final adjudication." Id. at 152-153.

* 12 {¶ 77) A determination of an offender's classification under former R.C. Chapter 2950

constituted a final order. Stale v.. Washington, 11th Dist. No. 99-L-015, 2001-Ohio-8905 2001 Ohio

App. L1 XI5 4980 at *9 ("a defendant's status * * * arises from a finding rendered by the trial court,which in turn adversely affects a defendant's rights by the imposition of registration requirements");

State v. Dobrski, 9th Dist. No. 06CA008925, 2007-Ohio-3121, at til 6("[i]nasmuch as a sexual predator

classification is an order that affects a substantial right in a special proceeding, it is final andappealable"). Accordingly, if either party failed to appeal such a determination within thirty days, asprovided for in App.R. 4(A, the judgment became settled. Subsequent attempts to overturn suchjudgments have been barred under the principles of res judicata. See State v. Lucerno, 8th Dist. No.

89039, 2007-Ohio-5537, at 9 (applying res judicata where the State failed to appeal the lower court'sdetermination that House Bill 180/Megan's Law was unconstitutional: "the courts have barred sexualpredator classifications when an initial classification request had been dismissed on the grounds that thecourt believed R.C. Chapter 2950 to be unconstitutional") (citation omitted).

3

{¶ 80} It does not matter that the current Sex Offender Act formally amends the underlying law anddoes not order the courts to reopen final judgments. The fact remains that the General Assembly"cannot annul, reverse or modify a judgment of a court already rendered: " Bartlett, 73 Ohio St. at 58. ;Naples' reclassification, as a practical matter, nullifies that part of the court's September 8, 2000Judgment determining Naples to be a sexual predator and ordering him to register as a sexual predatorfor life. To assert that the General Assembly has created a new system of classification does not solvethe problem that Naples' original classification constituted a final judgment. Thereis noexception tcvthi*`ralèthat final judgtnents may not be legislativelyattnulled or rnodified in situations where theF;t;g,islature has enacted ne.w legislation. ,

* 13 {¶ 811 It is also argued that the Ohio Supreme Court has characterized the registration andnotification requirements of the Sex Offender Act as "a collateral consequence of the offender'scriminal acts," in which the offender does not possess a reasonable expectation of finality. State v.Fergu.son, 110 Ohio St.3d 7. 2008-Ohio-4824. at ¶ 34 (citations omitted); Linville 2009-Ohio-313, at 1r

24 (citation omitted).

{¶ 82} This argument also is unavailing. In Ferguson, as in Cook, the Supreme Court did notconsider the argument that the enactment of House Bill 180/Megan's Law overturned a valid, final ijudgment. Rather, the Court was asked to determine whether the retroactive application of the SexOffender Act violated the ex post facto clause or the prohibition against retroactive legislation. Thecourt did not consider the arguments based on separation of powers and res judicata raised herein.^

{¶ 83 } Relianee uptin the Supreme CourE's reasottYiig in Cook and Fergusott is fuither misplaced

;since the separation of powers and res judicata doctrines apply equally in civil (remedial) contexts as

they do in criminal (punitive) contexts:;4kron u Smith, 9th Dist. Nos. 16436 and 16438, 1994 Ohio

App. LEXIS 1859, at *4 (°[t]he doctrine of res judicata * ** applies equally to criminal and to civil

litigation") (citation omitted).

{¶ 84} The General Assembly's purpose in enacting the Adam Walsh Act, "to provide increasedprotection and security for the state's residents from persons who have been convicted of, or found tobe delinquent children for committing, a sexually oriented offense or a child-victim oriented offense,"is properly realized in its application to cases pending when enacted and those subsequently filed.Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, Section 5. Naples' sentence, however, had become final several years prior to theAdam WalshAct. As such, it is beyond the power of the Legislature to vacate or modifytFN2 "1"heUnited States Supreme Court has stated that the principle of separation of powers is violated bylegislation whicli "depriv[es] judicial judgments of the conclusive effect that they had when they wereannounced" and "when an individual final judgment is legislatively rescinded for even the very best of

reasons." Ylaut: S 1411.8. at 228 (emphasis sic). To the extent the Adam Walsh Act attempts to modifyexisting final sentencing judgments, such as Naples' sentence, it violates the doctrines of separation ofpowers and finality of judicial judgments, despite the good intentions of the Legislature. As such, thatportion of the Act is invalid, unconstitutional, and unenforceable as applied to Naples.

FN2, Moreover, as a final judgment, Naples' sentence also is beyond the authority of the

courts to vacate or modify. State v. Srnith (1989). 42 Ohio St.3d GO at paragraph one of the

syllabus; Jurasek v. Gould Elecs., Inc., 11 th Dist. No.2001-L-007, 2002-Ohio-6260, at ¶ 15

(citations omitted).

{¶ 87} For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment Entry of the Trumbull County Court of Common >Pleas, granting Summary Judgment, is reversed. However, Naples shall continue registering as a sexualpredator pursuant to the trial court's September 8, 2000 Judgment Entry. Costs to be taxed against

appellee.

COLLEEN MARY O'TOOLE, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, with a Concurring/Dissenting

Opinion.{¶ 88} I concur with the majority's disposition that the application of the AWA to appellant violates

the doctrine of separation of powers, thus requiring us to reverse. However, I disagree and writeseparately with respect to the following issues.

{¶ 89} Initially, this writer notes that under the new legislation, the basic system for sexual offenderclassification was altered considerably. Prior to S.B. 10, if a criminal defendant was found guilty of asexually oriented offense which was not exempted from any registration, he could be classified as asexually oriented offender, a habitual sex offender, or a sexual predator. The prior statutory scheme alsoprovided that a defendant's designation under the three categories was to be predicated upon the natureof the underlying offense and findings of fact made by the trial court during a sexual classification

hearing.

{¶ 90} Pursuant to the new law, the foregoing three "labels" for a sexual offender are no longerapplicable. [nstead, a defendant who has committed a sexually oriented offense cau only be designatedas either a sex offender or a child-victim offender. Furthermore, the extent of the defendant'sregistration and notification requirements will depend upon his placement in one of three "tiers" ofsexual offenders. The determination of which tier is applicable to a given defendant tunis solely uponthe exact crime or offense he has committed.

{¶ 911 The second major change of the sexual offender system concerns the duration of theregistration and notification requirements. Prior to S.B. 10, the governing law generally provided forthe following: (1) if a defendant was deemed a sexually oriented offender, he was required to registeronce each year for a period of ten years, but there was no notification requirement; (2) if he was labeledas a habitual sex offender, he had to register once every six months for twenty years, and thecommunity could be given notice of his presence at the same rate; and (3) if he was designated a sexualpredator, the duty to register was once every three months for life, and notification could also takeplace at the same rate for life. Under the new scheme, the registration and notification requirements aresubstantially different: (1) if the defendant's sexual offense places him in the "Tier I" category, he isrequired to register once every year for a period of fifteen years, but there is no community notification;(2) if the defendant's offense falls under the "Tier II" category, registration must take place once everysix months for twenty-five years, and there is still no notification requirement; and (3) if the sexualoffense places the defendant in the "Tier III" category, the requirements are essentially the same as fora sexual predator, in that there is a duty to register once every three months for life, and communitynotification can occur at that same rate for life.

* 15 {1[ 92} Although the Tier III requirements are essentially the same as for a sexual predator, thiswriter notes that the new tier structure classifies sex offenders based on their convictions rather than onfactors as with the previous law. Also, the registration requirements for sex offenders, including sexualpredators, have now become more stringent due to the new law.

{¶ 93 } As to the specific requirements of registration, the original version of the "sexual offender"law stated that the defendant only had to register with the sheriff of the county where he was a resident.See Cook; supra, at 408. Under the latest version of the scherne, though, the places where registration isrequired has been expanded to now include: (1) the county where the offender lives; (2) the countywhere he attends any type of school; (3) the county where he is employed if lie works there for a certainnumber of days during the year; (4) if the offender does not reside in Ohio, any county of this statewhere he is employed for a certain number of days; and (5) if he is a resident of Ohio, any county ofanotlier state where he is employed for a certain nurnber of days. Similarly, the extent of theinformation which must be provided by an offender has increased. As part of thegeneral registrationform;the offender must indicate: his full name and any aliases, his social security number and date ofbirth; the address of his residence; the name and address of his employer; the name and address of anytype of school he is attending; the license plate number of any motor vehicle he owns; the license platenumber of any vehicle which he operates as part of his employment; a description of where his motorvehicles are typically parked; his driver's license number; a description of any professional oroccupational license which he may have; any e-mail addresses; all internet identifiers or telephonenumbers which are registered to, or used by, the offender; and any other information which is requiredby the bureau of criminal identification and investigation.

{J[ 94} Ex Post Facto

11951 Ex post facto challenges will only lie against criminal statutes. See, e.g., Swank, supra, at T69. When considering such challenges, courts must apply the "intent-effects" test. ld

{¶ 96} "fhe ex post facto clause extends to four types of laws:

{¶ 97} "`"I st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which wasinnocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, ormakes it greater than it was, when committed.3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts agreater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters thelegal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony than the law required at the time of thecommission of the offense, in order to convict the offender." `(Emphasis added.) Roaers v. Tennessee,(2001), 532 U.S. 451, 456, ***, quoting Calde• v. Bull (1798), 3 U.S. 386, 390L* **(seriatumopinion of Chase, J.)" State v. F,lswic•k 11th Dist. No.2006-L-075, 2006-Ohio-7011, at1117-18.(Parallel citations omitted.)

{¶ 101 } In this case, the Ohio General Assembly specifically denominated the rernedial purposes of

S.B. 10. See, e.g ., Swank, supra, at 1173-80. In Smith, the United States Supreme Court found similardeclarations by the Alaskan legislature highly persuasive. Id at 93. However, a closer reading of S.B.10's provisions casts doubt upon the legislature's declaration.

{¶ 102} First, there is the simple fact that S.B. 10 is part of Title 29 of the Revised Code. TheUnited States Supreme Court rejected the notion that a statute's placement within a criminal code issolely determinative of whether the statute is civil or criminal in Smith. Id at 94-95. However, it is

clearly indicative of the statute's purpose. See, e.g., ]hlikaloff'v Walsh (N.D. Ohio Sept. 4, 2007), Case

No. 5:06-CV-96, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65076 at 15-16.

{¶ 103 } Second, those portions of S.B. 10 controlling the sentencing of sex offenders indicate thatthe classification is part of the sentence imposed-and thus, part of the offender's punishment. See, e.g.,

R.C. 2929.01(D)(D) and (E)(E).

* 17 {¶ 104} Both the placement of S.B. 10 within the Revised Code, and the language of the statute,indicates a punitive, rather than remedial, purpose. FN3 Further, as Judge James J. Sweeneyof theEighth Appellate District recently notcd regarding th^ intent of S:1i. 10;

FN 3. I am indebted to my colleague, Judge '1'imothy 1^. Cannon, for theso insights into theintent of S.B. 10.

{¶ 1 05 }"*** the General Assembly expressed a remedial intent in the legislation. However, thestated purpose of protecting the public from those likely to reoffend is substantially undermined by thetotal removal of any discretion or consideration in applying the tier labels to a particular offender. Thefact of conviction alone controls the labeling process, but simply is not in and of itself indicative of arealistic likelihood of a person to recidivate. In addition, the severity of the potential penalty forviolating [the registration and notification] provisions of [S.B. 10] depends upon the underlying offensethat serves as the basis for the offender's registration or notification conditions." State v.. Onaiecinski,8th Dist. No. 90510, 2009-Oliio-1066. at ¶ 91. (Sweeney, J., dissenting in part.)

{¶ 106} Consequently, I believe that the intent of S.B. 10 is punitive, rather than remedial.

{¶ 107} Moreover, an exploration of the effects of S.B. 10 reveals that it is a punitive, criminalstatute, rather than remedial and civil. When considering whether a statute's effects are punitive underthe ban of ex post facto laws, courts are required to consider the factors set forth by the United StatesSupreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra. ('ook, supra, at 418. These include: (1)whether the law imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it imposes what hashistorically been viewed as punishment; (3) whether it involves a finding of scienter; (4) whether itpromotes the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deteiTenee; (5) whether the behavior towhich it applies is already a critne; (6) whether it promotes some rational purpose other thanpunishment; and (7) whether it is excessive in relation to this other rational purpose.

{¶ 108} Regarding the first factor, S.B. 10 clearly imposes significant affrrntative disabilities uponoffenders. They must register personally with the sheriffs of any county in which they live, work, orattend school, as of'ten as quarterly. Failure to do so may result in felony prosecution-even if theoffender is, for instance, hospitalized, and unable to go to the sherifl's office.

{¶ 109} Vast amounts of personal information must be turned over by offenders to the sheriffs'departments with which they register. Some of this information bears no relationship to anyconceivable matter of public safety, such as where the offender parks his or her automobile. Some ofthe information is so vaguely described as to render compliance impossible. What, for instance, isincluded amongst automobiles regularly "available" to an offender, or telephones "used" by anoffender? Is an offender required to report to the sheriff when he or she has a loaner from the auto bodyshop? Is an offender required to report if he or she stopped in a mall and used a public phone? Must anoffender register the cell phone number of a spouse or child, which the offender only uses on rareoccasions?

* 18 {¶ 1101 S.B. 10 significantly lintits where an offender may live. The right to live where onewishes is a fundanrental attribute of personal liberty, protected by the United States Constitution.Omiecinski, supra, at ¶ 82. (Sweeney, J., dissenting in part.)

{¶ 111 } S.B. 10 requires offenders to surrender any information required by the bureati of criminalidentification and investigation-or face criminal prosecution. Consequently, it grossly invadesoffenders' rights to be free of illegal searches and to counsel, at the very least.

{¶ 112} Thus, S.B. 10 imposes significant disabilities and restraints upon offenders, which indicatesit is an unconstitutional ex post facto law under the first Kennedyfactor. 1)

â2_y7

{¶ 113 } The second Kennedy factor requires us to consider whether S.B. 10 imposes conditionsupon oflenders traditionally regarded as punishment. Clearly it does. The a£firmative duties to registerconstantly with law enforcement, and turn over to them vast ainounts of private information, thelimitations upon where an offender may live, and the duty to answer any question posed by the BCIrenders the registration requirements of S.B. 10 the fiinetional equivalent of community controlsanctions.

{¶ 114} Under the third Kennedy factor, we must consider whether the registration and notificationrequirements of S.B. 10 only come into play upon a finding of scienter. Clearly they do not. There arestrict liability sex offenses, such as statutory rape. Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court ofAlaskaremarked in considering this factor in a challenge to Alaska's version of Megan's Law, the vast majorityof sex offenses do require a finding of scienter. Doe v Alaska (20081, 189 P.3d 999. 1012-1013. Ibelieve, as did the Alaska court, that this factor provides some support for the punitive effect of S.B.10. Cf. id. at 1013.

{¶ 115) The fourth Kennedy factor requires us to determine whether the registration and notificationrequirements of S.B. 10 fulfill two of the traditional aims of punishment: retribution and deterrence.`Retribution is vengeance for its own sake. It does not seek to affect future conduct or solve anyproblein except realizing "justiee." Deterrent measures serve as a threat of negative repercussions todiscourage people from engaging in certain behavior. Remedial measures, on the other hand, seek to

solve a problem (* * *) [.]' " Doe, supra, at 1013, fn. 107, quoting Artway v Attorne y Cren. of N.J.(C.A.3. 1996), 81 F.3d 1235, 1255.

{¶ 116} There are certain retributive factors in the registration requirements: i.e., the necessity ofregistering personally and the mandate that all personal information of any type be tumed over, uponrequest, to the BCI. These do not affect future conduct or solve any problem. They simply imposeburdens upon offenders. Similarly, the prohibition upon offenders living within a certain proximity ofschools, pre-schools, and day care facilitics is a form of retribution, since it applies across the board,and not simply to violent offenders or child-victim offenders.

* 19 {T 117} Further, offenders' personal information is available online, from the Attorney General,to the entire world. This creates a deterrent effect, both in the embarrassment and shame, whichencourages people so tempted not to commit sex offenses, and by allowing the public to identifypotential dangers to themselves and their families.

{¶ 1181 Thus, S.B. 10's requirements fulfill the traditionally punitive roles of retribution anddeterrence.

{¶ 119) The fifth Kennedy factor questions whether the conduct to which a law applies is already acrime. I find the reasoning of the court in Doe, supra, at 1014-1015, persuasive. That court noted thelaw in question applied only to those convicted of, or pleading guilty to, a sex offense: not to those, forinstance, who managed to plead out to simple assault, or found not guilty due to an illegal search andseizure. Ultimately, the court held:

{¶ 1201 "In other words, [the law] fundamentally and invariably requires a judgment of guilt basedon either a plea or proof under the criminal standard. It is therefore the detennination of guilt of a sexoffense beyond a reasonable doubt (or per a knowing plea), not merely the fact of the conduct andpotential for recidivism, that triggers the registration requirement: Because it is the criminal conviction,and only the criminal conviction, that triggers obligations under [the law], we conclude that this factorsupports the conclusion that [the lawl is punitive in effect." Doe, supra, at 1015. (Footnote omitted.)

{¶ 121 } Sitnilarly, only conviction for, or a guilty plea to, a sex offense (and kidnapping of a minor)triggers the provisions of S.B. 10. Consequently, the fifth Kennedy factor supports the conclusion thatS.B. 10 is punitive in effect.

{¶ 122} Under the sixth Kennedy factor, we consider whether the law has some rational purposeother than punishment. Clearly S.B. 10 has an important reniedial purpose, by keeping law enforcementand the public aware of potential recidivists amongst sex offenders. But the seventh Kennedy factorrequires analysis of whether the law in question is excessive in relation to that alternate purpose. S.B.10 is excessive. It punishes offenders by requiring personal registration, in a day of instantcommunications. It punishes by requiring offenders to turn over personal information bearing norational relationship to the remedial purpose of the law. It punishes offenders by restricting them fromliving near schools and day care facilities, even if their crime had no relationship to children. Itpunishes offenders by requiring them to submit to any questioning, on any subject, by the BCI.

{¶ 1231 S.B. 10's intent is punitive. Its effect is punitive. S.B. 10 violates the federal constitutionalban on ex post facto laws.

{¶ 124) Retroactivity(11125) Article 11, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "[t]he general

assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws, or laws impairing the obligation of contracts **

*20 {¶ 126) "`The analysis of claims of unconstitutional retroactivity is guided by a binary test. Wefirst determine whether the General Assembly expressly made the statute retrospective. State v.Consilio, 114 Uhio St.3d 295. 2007-Ohio-4163,1( 10 ***. If we find that the legislature intended thestatute to be applied retroactively, we proceed with the secotid inquiry: whether the statute restricts asubstantive right or is remedial. Id. If a statute affects a substantive right, then it offends theconstitution. Van Fossen (v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. ( 1988)), 36 Ohio St.3d (100,) at 106 ** *.' [Statev] Fergus•on, supra, at ¶ 13." Swank supra, at ¶ 91. (Parallel citations omitted.)

{¶ 127) A statute is "substantive" if it: (1) impairs or takes away vested rights; (2) affects an accruedsubstantive right; (3) imposes new burdens, duties, obligations or liabilities regarding a pasttransaction; (4) creates a new right from an act formerly giving no right and imposing no obligation; (5)creates a new right; or (6) gives rise to or takes away a right to sue or defend a legal action. Van Fossen,supra, at 107.

{¶ 128) The foregoing establishes that S.B. 10'is an unconstitutional retroactive law, as applied toappellant. By its terms, it applies retroactively. Second, it attaches new burdens and disabilities to a pasttransaction, since it violates the constitutional protections against ex post facto laws.

{¶ 129) Double Jeopardy{¶ 130) The Supreme Court of Ohio has held:

{¶ 13 1 }"The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that `no person shall (* **) be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.' Similarly, Section 10.Article 1, Ohio Constitution provides, `No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.' "State v. 7ima, 102 Ohio St.3d 61. 2004-Oliio-1807, at ^j

{¶ 132) Here, in 2000, appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of rape. He was sentenced for theseoffenses and adjudicated a sexual predator. Additional punitive measures have now been placed onappellant, as he is required to comply with the new, more stringent registration requirements.Essentially, appellant is being punished a second time for the same offense. 'I'he application of thecurrent version of R.C. 2950 to appellant violates the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Ohio and UnitedStates Constitutions.

D .,29

{¶ 137} Breach of Contraet{¶ 138^ Again, Aiticle II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution provides in pertinent part: "[t]he

general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws, or laws impairing the obligation of

contracts * * *[.]"

{¶ 139} Analysis under Section28.Article lt; is incomplete, without inquiring whetherS,B: 10, asapplied to appellant, violates the ban against laws impairing the obligation of contract. I find it does.

{¶ 1401 When analyzing whether a law violates the ban against the impainnent of contracts, this

court applies a tripartite test. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Conimrs. v. Warren (2001). 142 Ohio App.3d 599,602-603. First, there must be a determination if a contractual relation exists. Id. at 602. If it does, we

must ascertain whether a change in the law impairs that relationship. Id. at 602-603. Finally, we mustdetermine if that impairment is substantial. Id. at 603.

{¶ 141 }"lt iswetl established that a plea agreement is viewed as a contract between the State and acriminal defendant. Santobc,llov: New Ytirk (1971) 404 IJ:S.257, ***. Accordingly, if one sidebreaches the agreement, the other side is entitled to eitlter resc.ission or specific performanee of the plea ,agreement. Id at 262." Slate v. Walker, 6th Dist. No. L-05-1207, 2006-Ohio-2929, at 11 13. (Parallelcitations omitted.) Ohio courts have noted that, in the main, the contract is completely executed oncethe defendant has pleaded guilty, and the trial court has sentenced him or herr See, e.g., State v McMinn(June 16, 1999), 9th Dist. No. 2927-M, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2745, at 11; accord, Pointer, supra, at ¶9.1 Iowever, to the extent the plea agreeinent contains further promises, the contract remains executory,and may be enforced by either party. See, e.g., Parsons v. Wilkinson (S.D. Ohio 2006), Case No. C2-05-527, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEX1S 54979 (allegation by inmate that plea agreement superseded parole board'sauthority regarding timing of parole hearing sufficient to withstand state attorney general's motion todismiss in Section 1983 action), citing Layne v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 97 Ohio St.3d 456, 2002-Ohio-6719, at t 28; see, also, McMinn, supra, at 11, fn. 6.

*22 {¶ 142} Clearly, appellant's plea agreement contained further terms, beyond his agreement to 1plead guilty to a certain charge, followed by sentencing by the trial court. The st,ft implied tbos9 tetrn#irito;tlteagr@ement 4 a.matter of law;;Iaursuant to fornier R.C, £;hapter'2950..

{¶ 1431 Thus, I believe that appellant's plea agreement with the state remained an executorycontract at the time of his reclassification under S.B. 10, meeting the first requirement for determiningif a law breaches the ban on impairment of contracts. '1'rumbull Cty. Bd. of Commrs., supra, at 602.

{¶ 144} It appears that the second part of the test-whether a change in the law has impaired thecontract established between appellant and the state, Trumbull Ciy. Bd of Commrs. at 602-603, is also

met by S.B. 10. Further, the third part of the test for determining if a law unconstitutionally impairs acontract is whether the impairment is.substantial, Trumbull Cty. Bd of Commrs. at 603. Although the

Tier III requirements are essentially the saine as for a sexual predator, this writer notes that the new tierstructure classifies sex offenders based on their convictions rather than on factors as with the previouslaw. Also, the registration requirements for sex offenders, including sexual predators, have now become

more stringent due to the new law.

{^ 145} Consequently, I believe that the application of S.B. 10 to appellant violates theprohibitionin Atiiele ti,Section 28 of'the Ohio Constitution against laws impairing the obligation of Contracts:FN4

FN4_ I recognize that other appellate courts have reached contrary conclusions. Thus, inSigler v. State, 5th Dist. No. 08-CA-79, 2009-Ohio-2010, the Fifth District rejected a breachof contract argument on the basis that members of one branch of government (i.e.,prosecutors, representing the executive) cannot bind fiittire actions by the legislature. Thisseems beside the point: of course the legislature can change the law. I merely believe itcannot change substantially the terms of a civil contract previously entered by the statewithout consideration. Z'he Sigler• court further relied upon the doctrine of"unmistakability" in reaching its conclusion. That doctrine holds that a statute will not beheld to create contractual rights binding on future legislatures, absent a clearly statedintention to do so. Again, this argument seems not to deal with the question presented. I amnot holding that former R.C. Chapter 2950 created any contractual rights at all on the partof persons classified thereunder. Rather, I believetbat the valid plea agreements entered bythe state with defendants are contracts incorporating the terms of the classification made.

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Anthony J. De Noma, Case No._ Appellant- Petitioner vs. On Appeal from: Ross County State of Ohio Fourth District Court of