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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EAST LONDON CIRCUIT LOCAL DIVISION
CASE NO: EL1219/16
In the matter between:
HEMIPAC INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Applicant
and
THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION First Respondent
CRANE CREST INVESTMENTS 71 (PTY) LTD t/a
NOVATE PROPERTY INVESTMENTS Second Respondent
HARBOUR POINT FUELS (PTY) LTD Third Respondent
69 FRERE ROAD TRUST Fourth Respondent
BALLUSTRADE PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD Fifth Respondent
STHATHU FUNDING (PTY) LTD Sixth Respondent
FINISHING TOUCH TRADING 260 (PTY) LTD Seventh Respondent
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
MAGEZA AJ
The relief sought:
[1] This is a review application directed at the first respondent’s decision to
disqualify a bid submitted by the applicant pursuant to an advertised invitation to
tender under bid reference number: IEC/EC-04/2015 (“the tender”).
2
[2] In summary, applicant seeks the review and setting aside of the following:
[2.1] the decision of the first respondent disqualifying both the ‘BBC’
and the ‘Waverley’ bids for lack of compliance with the key
requirements of the tender;
[2.2] the decision of the first respondent awarding the tender to the
second respondent be set aside; and that
[2.3] upon setting the said award aside, first respondent’s decision be
substituted by an award to the applicant.
[3] Applicant also seeks an order that first respondent be ordered to pay costs of
this application as well as costs occasioned by an application for Interdictory relief
launched by it under case number: EL806/2016 ECD2106/2016 preceding this
review.
[4] The review is premised on several grounds set out in section 6(2) of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, No. 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”). Again in summary,
these grounds under PAJA include alleged procedural unfairness as contemplated
by section 6(2)(c); bad faith, arbitrary and capricious conduct envisaged in section
6(2)(e)(vi); that, the disqualification of the bids was not rationally connected to the
information available and before the IEC and its representatives, as envisaged in
section 6(2)(f)(ii)(cc).
3
Parties:
[5] Applicant is described as an entity whose main business is the development
and leasing out of commercial buildings and is a subsidiary of a larger group of
companies, involved in developing and leasing out commercial buildings for office
space to government institutions and public entities.
[6] First respondent is the Independent Electoral Commission (“the IEC”) a
Constitutional institution and an “organ of state” provided for in terms of section 239
of the Constitution. The function it performs involves the management of elections for
national, provincial and municipal legislative bodies.
[7] Second respondent is Crane Crest Investments 71 (Pty) Ltd t/a Novate
Property Investments, a private company cited as the successful bidder awarded the
tender. Second to seventh respondents do not oppose the review and abide the
decision of this Court.
Some principles relating to procurement rules:
[8] The progressive realisation of a bidding process involves a number of
stages. Section 1 (i) of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, 5 of
2000 mandates that for a tender to be deemed acceptable or responsive, it must as
a start, comply with all the specifications and conditions of the bid as set out in the
tender document. Non-compliance with specifications and conditions render a tender
unacceptable or non-responsive and as a result liable to disqualification from further
assessment and consideration.
[9] In Chairperson, Standing Tender Committee and Others v JFE Sapela
Electronics (Pty) Ltd 2008 (2) SA 638 (SCA) at para [14] Scott JA said the following:
4
“[14] The definition of “acceptable tender” in the Preferential Act [Preferential
Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000] must be construed against the
background of the system envisaged by s 217(1) of the Constitution, namely
one which is ‘fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and effective’. In other
words, whether ‘the tender in all respects complies with the specifications and
conditions of the tender as set out in the contract documents’ must be judged
against these values.”
[10] Leach JA in Dr JS Moroka Municipality v Bertram (Pty) Ltd 2014 (1) All
SA 545 (SCA) at paras [14] and [16] commented:
“[14] …A bid that does not satisfy the necessary prescribed minimum
qualifying requirements simply cannot be viewed as a bid ‘validly
submitted’. Moreover, the tender process consists of various stages:
first, examination of all bids received, at which stage those which do
not comply with the prescribed minimum standards are liable to be
rejected as invalid; second, the evaluation of all bids ‘validly submitted’
as prescribed in clause 3.1; and third, a decision on which of the validly
submitted bids should be accepted. The fact that all bids validly
submitted are to be taken into consideration as set out in clause 3.1
affords no discretion to condone and take into account bids not validly
submitted but disqualified.” and;
“[16] In these circumstances it is clear that there was no discretion to
condone a failure to comply with the prescribed minimum prerequisite
of a valid and original tax clearance certificate. That being so, the
tender submitted by the first respondent was not an ‘acceptable tender’
as envisaged by the Procurement Act and did not pass the so-called
‘threshold requirement’ to allow it to be considered and evaluated.
Indeed, its acceptance would have been invalid and liable to be set
5
aside - as was held by this court in ‘Sapela Electronics’. On this basis
the appellants were perfectly entitled to disqualify the first respondent’s
tender as they did.”
[11] Tenders that have been disqualified cannot be scored. In Loghdey and
Others v City of Cape Town and Others; Advanced Parking Solutions CC and
Another v City of Cape Town and Others 2010 (6) BCLR 591 (WCC) at 607 A-B para
[48] the Court commented:
“Furthermore, by proceeding to score the tenders on the basis of
allowing the SPS tender to be treated as if it had tendered a different
device, the evaluation committee scored a tender that was not
“acceptable” within the meaning of the PPFA. In my view, the further
consideration of a tender that was manifestly non-compliant with a
material requirement of the RFP stripped the process of one of the
essential characteristics of the public procurement process:
transparency.”
Details of the tender:
[12] The genesis of the bidding process arose pursuant to a tender for offices to
accommodate the first respondent in East London and this was advertised by it in
newspapers on 31 May 2015. Following the invitation, a non-compulsory briefing
session to clarify all aspects of the tender to interested bidders was convened by first
respondent on 11 June 2015. The closing date for the submission of the bids was 3
July 2015 and it was a condition of the tender that bids would be evaluated on the
basis of the 90/10 scoring principle. Applicant submitted two bids in respect of two
buildings, the so-called ‘Waverley’ bid and the ‘BBC’ bid. Applicant did not attend the
briefing session.
6
[13] Applicant’s founding affidavit is deposed to by a duly authorised director who
confirms the submission of applicant’s tenders and that annexed to each bid was a
similarly worded covering letter dated 26 June 2015, marked for the attention of the
first respondent’s tender adjudication panel. The dispute revolves around the
interpretation of paragraph 9 on page 3 of the covering letters wherein the following
is conveyed:
“Due to the fact that we do not have your specific needs requirements for a
back-up generator, the costs thereof, have not been included in this offer. We
will however, upon receipt of your specific needs requirements for a back-up
generator, spec same and obtain a quote, the costs of which can be
amortized into the Lease Agreement, unless you choose to pay us upfront.
We however confirm that an emergency electrical power generator will be
provided.”
[14] Following the evaluation process undertaken by the bid evaluation committee
of first respondent (“the BEC”), both bids were disqualified and first respondent
awarded the bids to the second respondent in April 2016.
[15] It is not disputed by the applicant that all the key requirements with respect to
the required office accommodation and tender specifications were mandated to be
inclusive in one single tendered price. One of the specifications is an emergency
electrical power generator which had to be included in the single tendered price.
[16] The disqualification of the applicant’s bids is set out in Annexure ‘FA22’ at
p338 – 342 is the Bid Evaluation Committee (BEC) and the report conveys the
finding that:
“Hemipac Investments Ltd. - Proposal 1 – disqualified,
7
additional cost for the generator not included in rental
amount”
And item 2 –
“Hemipac Investments Ltd. – Proposal 2 – to disqualify
additional cost for generator not included in the rental “
amount”
Material tender conditions:
[17] The Bid conditions specified in clause 6 were that: –
“Tenders must not be qualified by the service provider’s own conditions of
tender. Failure to comply with this requirement shall invalidate the tender.”
Page 149 of bid Clause provides –
“Please note that tenders that do not conform to the primary compliance
criteria indicated in Section A will not be considered. The bid evaluation
criteria below must be read together with any additional evaluation criteria that
may form part of the bid specifications.”
[18] “Acceptance or Rejection of Tender” (Primary compliance verification criteria)
Legality of tender document:
8
(a) Non-compliance with tender rules – The following shall lead to
disqualification:
• …
• Any changes to the tender specifications (unless formally agreed to
by the Electoral Commission and recorded as such before the
closure of the tender).”
The Bid:
[19] The bid document for Bid: IEC/EC-04/2015 details the IEC specifications and
the requirement for the inclusion of a generator falls under the column –
“ACCOMMODATION REQUIREMENTS.”
The specifications thereto are set out at page 31 of the Bid Document as follows:
‘Bid Specifications’ –
“Grade A building with approximately 1059sqm of office space and the building must
be able to accommodate requirements which include:
(i) Internal office design mostly individual offices.
(ii) Electrical requirements.
(iii) Air conditioning suitable for its ICT infrastructure.
(iv) …
(v) Emergency power generator to supply power to lights, white and red
power.
(vi) …
(vii) …
9
(viii) …
[20] The capacity of the required emergency power generator is also contained in
the IEC Bid Document at page 36 and is defined as:
“A 250KVA emergency power generator to supply lights, red and white power
sockets as well as the ICT server room air conditioner.”
The disqualification:
[21] Despite earlier enquiries about the progress of the evaluation process,
applicant only learned of the disqualification and the full reasons thereof on the 24th
June 2016. Applicant states it was provided with a copy of the BEC report setting out
the individual scoring sheets in two tranches, the first in the form of an ‘interim
response’ on the 2nd June 2016 and thereafter the rest on the 24th June 2016.
Applicant was aggrieved by the decision and resolved to challenge the outcome. A
sizeable amount of correspondence was exchanged between applicant and first
respondent but this did not resolve the dispute.
[22] The two grounds for the disqualification provided by first respondent were the
following:
“The bids did not meet the minimum key requirements with regard to
the provision of emergency power as part of the all-inclusive cost to be
tendered;
The bids did not meet minimum key requirements with regard to
tenders not to be subject to qualifications and/or conditions and/or
additional terms to be negotiated after submission.”
10
Communication after the disqualification:
[23] Following the disqualification, applicant sought an undertaking that first
respondent would not implement: -
‘…the award pending the finalisation of a possible appeal or review in view of
the fact that a contract was allegedly already concluded with Novate…’
[24] At paragraph [60.20] of its founding affidavit, applicant contends that the BEC
report provided to it did not in its view constitute a record of decision and that such a
record: -
“… goes much further than merely the BEC’s report and recommendation.
Without limiting the record of decision, one would expect in addition the
minute of the meeting of the BAC and its full report, which should, so I am
advised, include confirmation that all disqualifications are justified.”
[25] In the event, applicant advised the first respondent that it was of the view that
it had not been provided with all the required documents and that first respondent
was simply intent on implementing the bid with Novate. As a result, so the applicant
says, it was compelled to launch a 336 page long interdict application. As things
turned out, this interdict set down for the 1st September 2016 was, by agreement,
removed from the roll with costs reserved for later determination.
[26] The full reasons were provided to applicant after the initiation of the review
proceedings and the detail thereof is the following:
11
First respondent’s reasons:
“Whereas the applicant seeks to review and set aside the tender awarded by the
first respondent to the second respondent under bid reference number: IEC/EC-
04/2015 (‘the tender’) after having disqualified the applicant’s two bids referred to
in the founding papers as the BBC bid and the Waverley bid, the first respondent
gives the following reasons for the award of the tender:
1. The applicant’s bids were disqualified in that its bids, in particular as set out in
its covering letters dated 26 June 2015, reflected that:
1.1 The bids did not meet minimum key requirements with regard to the provision
of emergency power as part of the all-inclusive cost to be tendered;
1.2 The bids did not meet key requirements with regard to tenders not to be
subject to qualifications and/or additional terms to be negotiated after
submission; (my emphasis)
2. The tender was awarded by the first respondent to the second respondent as it
scored the highest points of the bidders that remained after the disqualification
of the applicant’s bids.
Dated at Johannesburg on this the 12 day of October 2014” – (meant to be 2016)
Applicant’s grounds for the review:
[27] Under the heading, ‘Hemipac’s grounds for review’ set out at para [66] of
applicant’s founding affidavit, the following averment is made:
12
“It appears, from the papers filed in the interdict application that the crisp
issue regarding this matter, pertains to whether or not Hemipac’s two bids
were lawfully disqualified by the IEC during the tender process. It furthermore
appears that, should the honourable court find that Hemipac’s bids should not
have been disqualified, it is common cause that the tender should have been
awarded to Hemipac. The IEC is invited to indicate in its answering papers
whether my understanding in this regard is correct. In order to cater for the
eventuality that the IEC does not agree that this is the case, I will deal with the
scenario in any event below under the sub-heading “Highest Points”.
[28] Applicant amplifies this at para [68] and avers that from the BEC report, it
appears that both the Hemipac bids were disqualified as a result of, an “additional
cost for generator not included in the rental amount.” Applicant disputes this and
elaborates as follows:
28.1 It is apparent from Hemipac’s bid documents that it suggests a distinct
difference between the required “emergency power generator” and a
“back-up generator”;
28.2 The covering letters refer to back-up generators. According to it ‘back-
up generators’ are usually required to supply back-up electricity to non-
essential items such as office air-conditioning systems, whereas
emergency generators supply electricity to essential items such as
servers, server room air conditioning, wall-sockets, lights and the like;
(my emphasis)
28.3 Applicant argues that it complied with the bid requirements but even
went further and, in addition, tendered a back-up generator. (my
emphasis)
13
28.4 It says the reason for this is that tenants who did not initially specify
back-up generators in their tender requirements, usually request back-
up generators only after conclusion of the lease. In order to avoid any
amendments to a particular lease and for the sake of proper
administration and convenience to the parties, Hemipac offers back-up
generators up front.
First respondent’s answer:
[29] The first respondent’s answer is deposed to by its Chief Electoral Officer and
sets out the common cause facts. As a preliminary introduction to its answer,
deponent attacks the manner in which the applicant’s case is pleaded. First
respondent says nowhere in its papers, does applicant set out facts supporting its
claim and substantive legal basis for the relief it seeks in this review. First
respondent voices its frustration in the unduly lengthy and unnecessarily voluminous
application filed by applicant but in which applicant, “… has failed to plead and prove
its case as required by trite authority”.
[30] In addition first respondent affirms that the common cause facts in the matter
are ‘crisp’ and concern first respondent’s call for tenders for accommodation in two
offices in East London on clear pre-determined bid specifications, a process in which
applicant participated like all other ordinary bidders. He says both the applicant’s
bids were disqualified and the second respondent, having scored the highest points,
was awarded the bids.
[31] First respondent says the core of the issue raised by the letters is not only the
plain meaning of the words as they appear from the letters which expand on the
applicant’s bids, but central and of essence, was the interpretation to be placed on
them when applicant was fleshing out its bids. The interpretation its officials arrived
at was conveyed by first respondent in two emails. These emails are annexed to
14
applicant’s founding and supplementary affidavits as FA21; FA 22 and FA40 of the
affidavits. Annexure ‘FA40’ consists of the formal reasons filed by first respondent
and received by applicant’s attorneys on 12 October 2016.
[32] In addition, first respondent expands:
“The letters reflected, on the IEC’s interpretation, that the two bids did not
comply with the IEC’s mandatory requirements for an all-inclusive tender,
including for a generator that had to supply power to the electrical plugs,
lights, computer server, and its air-conditioning. Hence they were
disqualified.”
[33] This view, first respondent states, was always known to the applicant and was
also evident from the formal reasons provided to applicant prior to launching these
proceedings. Furthermore, first respondent emphasises that it is by law precluded
from entering into secretive negotiations on price after bids have been submitted. It
also, correctly in my view, emphasises the obligation on all organs of state to act
fairly, transparently and not to unlawfully advantage one bidder at the expense of
others.
The central dispute:
[34] The BEC disqualified both the ‘BBC’ and ‘Waverley’ bids submitted by
applicant for, among others, the reason based on price uncertainty with regards to
the specified requirement to provide a 250 KVA emergency power generator. A
perusal of the tender specifications and conditions requires that among other
outlined requirements, the offered office building must include one ‘emergency
power generator’ as described in the bid and the quoted price was to include the
generator.
15
[35] It is evident from this to any bidder participating in this tender process exactly
what the first respondent required. There is no ambiguity and the text could not have
been clearer to interested bidders. There is only one “250KVA emergency power
generator” required by the first respondent. The voltage and currency capacity is
specified and the overall bid price had to include the same.
[36] Indeed even a cursory reading of the bid specifications does not permit for the
contention that more than one generator (an ‘emergency’ and a ‘back-up’ power
generator) was specified, required or contemplated by the first respondent. The
specifications set out are all material and reasonable and do not accommodate more
than one power generator by any interpretation no matter how strained. In those
circumstances it is not unreasonable for a reader to impute an interpretation which
leads to the conclusion which the first respondent arrived at.
[37] Taken together with the provision that the bid must set out one composite
price, the applicants communication that - ‘…We will however, upon receipt of your
specific needs requirements for a back-up generator, spec same and obtain a quote,
the costs of which can be amortized into the Lease Agreement, unless you choose to
pay us upfront..’ introduced an impermissible invitation to negotiate a price after
closure of bids for what the first respondent viewed as the very ‘emergency’;
‘standby’ or ‘backup’ power generator required to be included in the composite bid
price.
Applicant’s belated explanations:
[38] It was only in the founding and replying affidavits that applicant sought for the
first time to elucidate on the motivations it had for extending the invitation at the time
it submitted its bid. I have detailed these at para [28] herein and these are succinctly
that:
‘(i) Hemipac’s bid documents suggest a distinct difference between the required
“emergency power generator” and a “back-up generator”;
16
(ii) That ‘back-up generators’ are usually required to supply back-up electricity to
non-essential items such as office air-conditioning systems, whereas emergency
generators supply electricity to essential items such as servers, server room air
conditioning, wall-sockets, lights and the like.’
[39] This was not the case and none of this was conveyed in the covering letter
inviting the first respondent to engage in price negotiation after bid closure. I can see
no point in raising this in the papers in the review application for the first time when
first respondent’s officials did not have the benefit of this added clarification when
they were evaluating the bids.
Attributable meaning:
[40] Applicant both in its founding affidavit and reply contended that a ‘back-up
power generator’ and an ‘emergency power generator’ are two distinct power
sources serving different purposes. The distinction offered is contrived. The noun
‘generator’ simply means ‘an engine converting energy’. Collins English dictionary
defines an ‘emergency’ as a ‘crisis; exigency or predicament’. ‘back-up’ is a phrasal
verb meaning - to support in case of a predicament or crisis. (my emphasis)
[41] The Cambridge English dictionary defines the noun ‘backup’ to mean ‘support
or help’ for example in case a main plan goes wrong. The ‘Wiktionary’ (Wikipedia
dictionary) makes no distinction between an emergency and a back-up generator. It
offers this definition:
“A stand-by generator is a back-up electrical system that operates
automatically within seconds of a utility outage an automatic transfer switch
senses the power loss, commands the generator to start and then transfers
the electrical load to the generator.”
17
[42] The emergency is in the ‘utility outage’. Applicant’s attempt to provide an inept
and laboured distinction between a ‘stand-by’ and a ‘back-up’ power generator does
not accord with the meanings attributed above. The Bid Owner’s specification
admitted of little doubt and what was required from all bidders was the provision of
an emergency power generator. This is a generator, on stand-by and backing up the
municipal electrical load to the building to be rented out to first respondent including
air-conditioning systems and similar necessities.
[43] In All Pay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief
Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency, and Others 2014 (1) SA
604 (CC) the Court warned:
“Compliance with the requirements for a valid tender process, issued in
accordance with the constitutional and legislative procurement
framework is thus legally required. These requirements are not merely
internal prescripts that SASSA may disregard at whim. To hold
otherwise would undermine the demands of equal treatment,
transparency and efficiency under the Constitution. Once a particular
administrative process is prescribed by law, it is subject to the norms of
procedural fairness codified in PAJA. Deviations from the procedure will
be assessed in terms of those norms of procedural fairness. But it does
not mean that, where administrators depart from procedures, the basis
for doing so will have to be reasonable and justifiable, and the process
of change must be procedurally fair.”
[44] In so far as the reasonableness of the decision of the BEC, it is generally
accepted that what is required to be done by a reviewing Court is to look at the
decision of the authorised official from the prism of a simple test which is whether it
is one that a reasonable decision-maker would have taken. In other words the
overriding constitutional obligation upon decision-makers is to act reasonably. In
18
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and
Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para [45] O’ Reagan J stated:
“What will constitute a reasonable decision will depend on the
circumstances of each case, much as what will constitute a fair
procedure will depend on the circumstances of each case. Factors
relevant to determining whether a decision is reasonable or not will
include the nature of the decision, the identity and expertise of the
decision-maker, the range of factors relevant to the decision, the
reasons given for the decision, the nature of the competing interests
involved and the impact of the decision on the lives and well-being of
those affected. Although the review functions of the court now have a
substantive as well as a procedural ingredient, the distinction between
appeals and reviews continues to be significant. The court should take
care not to usurp the functions of administrative agencies. Its task is to
ensure that the decisions taken by administrative agencies fall within
the bounds of reasonableness as required by the Constitution.”
Did the disputed tender comply with the bid requirements?
[45] Without embarking on speculative hypothesis and without placing this Court in
the position of the first respondent’s evaluating team, the following considerations
self-evidently resolve this matter:
45.1 The Bid conditions specified in clause 6 of the bid that: –
“Tenders must not be qualified by the service provider’s own conditions
of tender. Failure to comply with this requirement shall invalidate the
tender.”
and furthermore: -
“… tenders that do not conform to the primary compliance criteria
indicated in Section A will not be considered. The bid evaluation criteria
19
below must be read together with any additional evaluation criteria that
may form part of the bid specifications.”
45.2 Primary compliance verification criteria pertaining to ‘legality of tender
document’ cautioned that: -
‘Non-compliance with tender rules – The following shall lead to
disqualification: -
• …
• Any changes to the tender specifications (unless formally agreed to
by the Electoral Commission and recorded as such before the
closure of the tender).’
[46] The manner in which the applicant prejudiced its own bid is in my experience
very novel and unusual. Businesses that regularly submit tenders do not expect to
communicate with an organ of state once a bid is closed. The more so for an entity
which makes the claim that it tenders all the time.
[47] If there was any doubt that first respondent required two generators instead of
the one specified, applicant had ample opportunity to clarify that before the bid
closing date either by attending the briefing session or by seeking clarification in
writing prior to 3 July 2015. This it also failed to do.
[48] In Westinghouse Electric Belgium SA v Eskom Holdings (Soc) Ltd and
Another 2016 (3) SA 1 (SCA) at 12F-H para [39], that Court stated that for a tender
process to be lawful there had to be proper compliance with it and that “a tender
should speak for itself.”
20
[49] It was with this type of matter that the Constitutional Court in All Pay had in
mind when it cautioned that:
“Proper compliance with the procedural requirements set out in procurement
bids lead to a fair process that ensures the best outcomes. Where the process
leading to the success of a bid is compromised, such a failure to adhere to all
the requirements will result in little or no certainty as regards the course the
process would have taken had the requirements been properly observed.” (All
Pay Consolidated Investment Holdings, paragraph 24); and that
[50] “… deviations from a fair process may themselves all too often be symptoms
of corruption or malfeasance in the process. In other words, an unfair process may
betoken a deliberately skewed process. Hence insistence on compliance with
process formalities has a three-fold purpose: (a) it ensures fairness to participants in
the bid process; (b) it enhances the likelihood of efficiency and optimality in the
outcome; and (c) it serves as a guardian against a process skewed by corrupt
influences.” (All Pay at paragraph 27)
[51] I cannot fault first respondent’s view that for all the reasons already set out: –
‘The bids did not meet minimum key requirements with regard to
tenders not to be subject to qualifications and/or conditions and/or
additional terms to be negotiated after submission.’
[52] In the result, the application is dismissed with costs. Costs to include the costs
of two counsel as well as the costs occasioned by the Interdict application launched
by applicant under case number: EL806/2016 ECD2106/2016.
21
____________
MAGEZA AJ
Heard: 30 March 2017 and
21 April 2017
Delivered: 12 July 2017
For the applicant: Advocate Pretorius
Attorneys for applicant: SIM & BOTSI ATTORNEYS
Tel: (011) 880 4075
Ref: M Nel
c/o GRAVETT SCHOEMAN INC
The Hub, Bonza Bay Road
Beacon Bay, East London
Ref: I Theophilus
Tel: (043) 721 2776
For first respondent: Adv DP de Villiers
Attorneys for first respondent: DMO ATTORNEYS
First Respondent’s Attorneys
Block B, 38 Grosvenor Road
Bryanston
Tel: (011) 463 6693
Ref: Mrs Oliphant
c/o ABDO & ABDO