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7/28/2019 In Re- Suruttayyan Alias ... vs Unknown on 28 April, 1953
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Madras High Court
Madras High Court
In Re: Suruttayyan Alias ... vs Unknown on 28 April, 1953
Equivalent citations: AIR 1954 Mad 523
Author: B Aiyar
Bench: B Aiyar, C Reddy
JUDGMENT
Balakrishna Aiyar, J.
1. I agree that the conviction and sentence should be confirmed and the appeal dismissed. On the views of my
learned brother regarding the scope and content of Sections. 85 and 86, I.P.C., I express no opinion one way
or the other. I merely desire to guard myself against the possibility of its being understood that I concur with
them, for I greatly hesitate to voyage into the twilight between the confines of knowledge that is implied by
the law and statutory intention. As I look at this case, the question and problems raised by Mr. Jayarama Aiyar
do not really arise. All questions of intention apart, the acts of the accused in stabbing his father in the manner
he did is covered by the fourth clause of Section 300, I.P.C.
Chandra Reddy, J.
2. The appellant one Suruttayan alias Vayya-puri Goundan belonging to Nallipalayam village, Namakkal
Taluk, Salem district, has been convicted by the Sessions Judge of Salem under Sections. 302, 323 and 324,
I.P.C. and sentenced to death and three months' and one year's rigorous imprisonment respectively. The
offence of murder was committed on the night of the 5th of August 1952, the murdered man being no other
than the father of the appellant.
3. The prosecution case briefly is this: The deceased Marappa Goundan had two sons and two daughters, the
eldest of them being the appellant and the youngest P. W. 3. A fortnight before this occurrence there was a
partition of the family properties, at which the father was. allotted, among other things, three bulls, one
pah-valued at KB. 550 arid the other bull at Rs. 125. On the morning of 5th August 1952, when the deceasedwas working in his field, the appellant approached him and suggested that the bulls valued at Rs. 550 might be
given to him for Us. 500 and the other one valued at Rs. 125 might be sold to the younger son for Rs. 175.
The father was not agreeable to this inequitable suggestion and wanted to sell them all in a shandy. This
provoked the appellant who abused his father in filthy language. At that time, P. W. 2 the mother of the
appellant and P. W. 3 his. sister also happened to be there and his maternal uncle P. W. 1 was working in the
adjoining field. The deceased felt dishonoured by the vile Jan-guage used by the son. p. \v. 1 who was
witnessing all these came there and advised the appellant to go away promising to settle the-matt er later.
4. That evening when the deceased returned home for his night meal at about 9 o'clock P. W. 2 advised him
not to get into the house since-the appellant was drunk and was threatening to-stab him. Thereupon the
deceased fetched P. W. 1 to intercede in the matter. When P. W. 1 advised the appellant, not to quarrel with
his father but to allow him to enter the house, take his food and go away, the appellant abused him for his
interference. When P. W. 1 remonstrated, the appellant hurled an iron lock which hit the former on the
forehead and caused a bleeding injury. On this, P. W. 1 came out of the house, accompanied by the deceased
who was all the while standing outside, to apply some medicine to the wound. No sooner had they gone about
ten feet than the appellant emerged with a bichuva. from the house of one Nallammal, which adjoins that of
the appellant's family and to get into which there was a gap in the compound of the latter's house, abusing P.
W. 1 and the deceased foully. Apprehending trouble, P. W. 1 caught hold of the appellant and the deceased
went towards the house of Nallammal. The appellant tried to wriggle out of the hold of P. W. 1 and when the
latter did not release him he stabbed P. W. l with his bichuva on tne right upper arm. Immediately P. W. 1
released the hold shouting out "Brother-in-law 1 I have been stabbed." Then the appellant pursued his father
who was running away and stabbed him on the neck st the oil mill in the backyard of the house of Nallammal,
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which resulted in his death within an hour. P. W. l then caught hold of the appellant and while the latter was
struggling to escape and run away, P. W- 4, the father-in-law of the P. W. 1 came there and disarmed the
appellant who ran away immediately. The whole incident was witnessed by P. Ws. 2 and 3. The Injured man
was-then taken to his house where he expired soon after. Information was then sent to the village munsif
Jiving at a distance of about a mile. The village munsif arrived at the spot at about midnight and reduced to
writing the statement of P. _W. 1 which is marked as Ex. D. l in this case. This document sets out the main
features of the-prosecution case. It refers to the partition disputes between the father and the son and to the
circumstances under which the appellant plunged his knife into the deceased Marappa Goundan. The reportprepared by the village Munsif based, on the statement of P. W. 1, was despatched at about 2 a.m. and it was
received at the Namakkal police station at 3-45 a.m. The Sub Inspector of Police P. W. 9 came to the village
at 5 a.m. held the inquest, examined all the witnesses and sent the body for autopsy to P. W. 5 the Civil
Assistant Surgeon in charge of the Government Hospital, Namabkal. The post mortem examination revealed a
gaping incised penetrating wound on the right side of the neck above the collar bone, which injured the soft
tissues, the subclavian injury and aorta. In the opinion of the doctor the injury was necessarily fatal. The same
doctor examined P- W. 1 who was found to have five injuries: (1) a penetrating wound on the right shoulder
joint with an entry and exit wound, (2) an incised wound on the right side of the forehead; (3) a punctured
wound on the middle third of right eye brow and two other superficial wounds on the thumb. Four days later
the appellant was also produced before this doctor who found a superficial incised wound on the back of his
left wrist.
5. The prosecution case rests mainly on the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3, direct witnesses to the occurrence, and
the circumstantial evidence of P. W. 4 who is said to have seized the bichuva from the appellant. P. Ws. 1 and
3 supported the prosecution case in its entirety at all the stages. But P. W. 2 who corroborated P. Ws. 1 and 3
in the Sessions Court did not speak to the actual stabbing by the appellant when he was examined by the
Magistrate under S. 164, Criminal P. C.
6. The plea of the appellant was that he did not commit the offence, that the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses was false, that he was dead drunk that night and that he did not know what had happened.
7. The Sessions Judge acting mainly on the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 3 and 4 sentenced him to death for theoffence of murder and also to various terms of imprisonment under the other two charges. An appeal is filed
by the appellant against his convictions. That appeal and the reference under Section 374, Criminal P. C. are
before us.
8. In this appeal, while not disputing that the stab injury to which Marappa Goundan succumbed was inflicted
by the appellant, it is contended for the appellant that he must have stabbed the deceased in a quarrel in which
he, the deceased and P. W. 1 took part and that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses should not be
accepted 'in toto'. The foundation for this argument is the injury found on the wrist of the appellant and the
non-mention of the detail as regards the seizure of bichuva from the appellant in Ex. P. 1. As regards the
injury it has to be mentioned that it was a very superficial one and it might have been caused either at the time
when there was a struggle between the appellant and P. W. 1 etc. after the attack on the deceased or sometime
later. Further, the doctor was told that this was caused a about 6 p. m. on 6th August. However that need not
detain us here, as it is not for the prosecution to account for any small injury that may be found on the
accused.
9. As regards the omission of particulars as regards what happened after the stabbing incident, we will refer to
it presently. The learned counsel for the appellant also urged that P. W. 4's evidence should be totally
disregarded as his evidence was inconsistent with the recitals in Ex. P. 1. He argued that according to Ex. P. 1
the appellant ran away immediately after he stabbed the deceased, while P. W. 4 now deposed that after the
stabbing incident the appellant was caught by P. W. 1 and the former was trying to escape from the hold of P.
W. 1 when he went there and seized the bichuva from him. We do not think that the omission to mention the
details subsequent to the attack on Marappa Goundan should be a ground for rejecting P. W. 4's evidence. The
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explanation offered by P. W. 1 for this omission was that he was not well at that time and was feeling giddy. It
may be recalled that P. W. 1 had as many as five injuries which have already been described. Even otherwise
that omission does not, in any way, touch the truth of the prosecution case. There does not seem to be any
valid ground for disbelieving P. W. 4. He has no axe to grind by deposing falsely against the appellant.
Further more, the evidence of P. W. 4 bears only on what has happened subsequent to the commission of the
offence and docs not materially affect the prosecution case.
10. As regards the actual crime we have the testimony of P. Ws. 1 to 3. No doubt P. W. 2 the mother did notstate in her 164 statement that she actually saw the appellant stabbing his father. The Sessions Judge attributed
this to the maternal instinct. However he was prepared to leave that evidence out of account and to rely only
on the evidence of other witnesses. We agree with the learned Sessions Judge that P. W. 2's statement to the
Magistrate that she did not directly see who stabbed her husband was prompted by motherly love. It is
unimaginable that a mother would perjure herself to magnify the case against her son which involves a capital
sentence. However we can exclude the evidence of P. W. 2 for the purpose of this case. We have got other
evidence in the case which is untainted and which can safely form the basis of a conviction. There is no
conceivable reason why P. W. 1 and P. W. 3 should implicate the appellant in a charge of murder by giving a
version totally different from what had actually happened. We see no justifiable grounds for distrusting the
evidence of these two witnesses; the evidence of P. W, 3, especially, could not be assailed in any manner. V/e
think their testimony is entitled to great weight and has to be accepted. It follows that there is sufficientevidence to bring home the charges to the appellant.
11. Mr. Jayarama Aiyar next urged that the offence committed by his client would not in any event amount to
murder and that it should be reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The learned counsel
argued that as the intention referred to in Clauses 1 to 3 to Section I. P. C. 300, I. P. C. is an essential
ingredient of an offence defined in Section 300, I. P. C. and as such intent could not be ascribed under the
provisions of Section 86, I.P.C. to the appellant who as the evidence discloses, was under the influence of
liquor the charge under Section 302, I. P.C. was unsustainable and the conviction could be only for a lesser
offence. According to him in order to present a defence of drunkenness in cases requiring a particular intent
the same degree of drunkenness as is specified in Section 85, I. P. C. need not be established since the words
qualifying intoxication in Section 85 are not found in Section 86, I. P. C. As substantiating this contention herelied on -- 'Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard', 1920 AC 479 (A).
12. In order to appreciate this contention it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal
Code. Section 85 enacts
"Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is by reason of intoxication,
incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong, or contrary to law;
provided that the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his
will."
13. It is seen that in order to get the benefit of this section, the intoxication should not have been incurred
voluntarily. Another essential requisite of the section is that the drunkenness must be such that the offender
was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law.
14. The effect of voluntary drunkenness on criminal responsibility in certain types of cases is set out in
Section 86, I. P. C. That section is in the following terms:
"In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge of intent, a person who
does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he
would have had if he had not been intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to
him without his knowledge or against his will."
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This section makes it clear that in cases where knowledge is an essential element of an offence voluntary
drunkenness makes no difference to the knowledge of the consequences of his acts with which a man is
credited. But a similar presumption is not made under this section when a particular intent is of the essence of
the crime. The question is whether on a charge of murder it is sufficient merely to show that an accused
person was intoxicated in order to plead that the necessary intent could not have existed in his mind.
15. It looks to me that the contention raised on behalf of the appellant cannot succeed. I do not think that the
state of intoxication envisaged in Section 86 is in any way different from that contemplated in the precedingsection. Both Sections 85 and 86, I. P. C. lay down the law relating to drunkenness as bearing on the wrongful
acts committed by persons, the difference between the two sections being with regard to consequences
depending upon whether the drunkenness is involuntary or voluntary. In my opinion, the absence of
qualifying words in Section 86 cannot lead to the inference that even if the insobriety is not such as to impair
the reason of the offender the requisite intent cannot be presumed. It is an ordinary rule that every man is
presumed to intend the consequences of his acts but this presumption . can be rebutted by showing that the
person concerned could not have formed the intent by reason of his drunkenness To be a sufficient answer to a
charge of a crime case involving a specific intent, it should be established not merely that the offender had
consumed liquor but as a result of it, his mind at the time in question was so obscure that he was incapable of
forming the requisite intention. It is not unusual for people committing grave crimes of violence to - prime
themselves with liquor.
16. I do not think that -- '1920 A C 479 (A)' on which reliance is placed by Mr. Jayarama Aiyar lays down any
principle opposed to what is stated above. On the other hand, it furnishes an answer to the argument put
forward by Mr. . Jayarama Aiyar. The rule of law stated by the House of Lords in that case was that the
presumption that every man intends the natural consequences of his acts cannot be rebutted By evidence of
drunkenness failing short of proved incapacity to formulate intention essential to. constitute the crime and it is
not sufficient to establish that his mind was affected by drink so that he more readily gave way to some
violent-passion. Drunkenness was not accepted as a. defence in that case as it was not established that the
accused who was proved to have ravished a girl and in the furtherance of the act of rape, caused the death of
the girl by suffocation, at the time of committing the rape, was so drunk that he was incapable of forming the
intent to commit it.
17. This ruling is an authority for the position that it is only in cases where it is proved that the prisoner was in
such a condition of drunkenness that his reason was "dethroned" and was incapable of forming any intention,
that the defence of drunkenness would be available. This opinion of mine gains support from --'Sheru v.
Emperor', AIR 1926 Lah 232 (B); --'Waryam Singh v. Emperor', AIR 1926 Lah 433 (C); -- 'Nga Sein Gale v.
Emperor', AIR 1834 Rang 361 (D) & from a decision of our Court in -- 'Balasami In re', AIR 1963 Mad 821
(E).
18. Applying the principle stated above, I find that the appellant cannot present the defence-ex drunkenness.
There is no evidence that he-was so drunk that he could not have formed the intent necessary to constitute an
offence falling within paragraph 2 or paragraph 3 of Section 300, I. P. C. On the other hand, the material on
record is sufficient in our opinion to warrant an inference that the appellant had formulated a deliberate intent
to commit an offence as defined in Section 300, I. P. C. That evening he was shouting out his intention to stab
his father and when he ran out of his house in pursuit of P. W. 1 and the deceased, he armed himself with. a
bichuva. When he was caught by P. W. i to prevent him from attacking either of them with the weapon, he
extricated himself and followed after the deceased who was running away into the neighbouring house being
afraid that he might be injured, and killed him. These circumstances are consistent only with the theory that
the appellant had formed at least an intention to cause a bodily injury mentioned either in paragraph 2 or
paragraph 3 of Section 300, I. p. C. I think they are not explicable on any other hypothesis. It follows that the
crime committed by the appellant attracts the provisions of Section 300, I. P. C.
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19. Even otherwise, the offence committed by the appellant is one under Section 302 in view of the provisions
of Clause (4) of Section 300, I. P. C. which provides:
"Fourthly--if the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all
probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any
excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid."
A person who plunges his knife into the neck of another and causes an injury of the kind found on the personof the deceased must be deemed to know that the injury is likely to cause death. So the case would be covered
by this clause, unless the offender is able to show that he had an excuse for incurring the risk of causing that
injury resulting in death. It cannot be urged that the appellant had any such excuse. He pursued a defenceless
man, who was running for his life, and stabbed him on the most vulnerable part of the body.
20. It follows that the offence committed by the appellant is one of murder and his voluntary drunkenness
does not avail him to reduce the offence to one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
21. Lastly, Mr. Jayarama Aiyar pleaded that this was not a fit case for imposing the extreme penalty of law.
He submitted that in view of the fact that the appellant was under the influence of liquor and had no
premeditation this was a case where only the lesser sentence should be awarded. In support of his submission,he cited to us a decision of a Bench of which one of us was a member in -- 'Palaniswami Goundan In re', (F).
We do not think that this ruling has any
application to the facts of this case. There it was found that the accused did not have the mentality of an
ordinary sane person and that murder must have been committed in some frenzied mood or something in the
nature of ah abnormal state of mind. The circumstances of this case are altogether different and we feel that
they are not conducive to the awarding of the lesser sentence. Here when the appellant was rushing out of the
house of Nal-lammal with a bitchuva in his hand, P. W. 1 caught hold of him to prevent him from doing any
harm. After freeing himself from the hold of P. W. 1 by stabbing him, he deliberately pursued a defenceless
old man who was running away and stabbed him on the neck, which brought about his death within an hour.
This is not a case where the offender cut the deceased then and there when he first met the latter. We thereforefeel that there are no palliative circumstances in this case which can induce us to impose the lesser sentence.
22. In the result, the convictions and sentences are confirmed and the appeal is dismissed.
In Re: Suruttayyan Alias ... vs Unknown on 28 April, 1953
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