In Re: CROCS, Inc. Securities Litigation 07-CV-02351 …securities.stanford.edu/filings-documents/1038/CROX_01/2012514_r01... · Case 1:07-cv-02351-PAB-KLM Document 195 Filed 05/14/12

Case 1:07-cv-02351-PAB-KLM Document 195 Filed 05/14/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 16

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 07-cv-02351-PAB-KLM (Consolidated With: Civil Action No. 07-cv-02412-MSK, 07-cv-02454-EWN, 07-cv-02465-WYD, and 07-cv-02469-DME)

In Re Crocs, Inc., Securities Litigation

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF PROPOSED PARTIAL CLASS SETTLEMENT

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiffs 1 to this Action hereby move for an order

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) for preliminary approval of a proposed Settlement,

certification of the Settlement Class, and approval of the forms of notice and other

matters related to issuing notice to the Settlement Class. 2

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that a Stipulation with exhibits, and a

proposed Preliminary Approval Order, are being filed herewith.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Plaintiffs submit this motion, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, for an Order:

(1) preliminarily approving the terms of the Settlement as set forth in the Stipulation;

(2) certifying a Settlement Class solely for the purpose of implementing the Settlement

set forth in the Stipulation; (3) approving the form and method for providing notice to the

1 All capitalized terms not otherwise defined shall carry the meaning set forth in the Stipulation and Agreement of Partial Class Settlement (“Stipulation”) dated May 14, 2012.

2 Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1, counsel for Plaintiffs has conferred with counsel for the Settling Defendants. The Settling Defendants do not oppose the relief requested in this motion. Deloitte takes no position on the motion.


Settlement Class; and (4) scheduling a Settlement Hearing at which the request for final

approval of the proposed Settlement, the Plan of Allocation, the attorneys’ fees and

expense request, and an entry of the Class Judgment will be considered.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Action commenced in November 2007 with the filing of five separate class

action complaints, which were consolidated by this Court 3 on December 19, 2007. On

September 17, 2008, the Court appointed Antonio Pedrera Sánchez and Fernando

Pedrera Sánchez (sometimes known as the Sánchez Group) as Lead Plaintiff. Lead

Plaintiff filed the Complaint on December 31, 2008, and included named plaintiffs

Harvey Babbitt and Daniel J. Lundberg. The Action seeks relief on behalf of a class

consisting of all persons or entities who purchased and/or acquired securities of Crocs,

Inc. (“Crocs”) between April 2, 2007 and April 14, 2008, inclusive, and alleges violations

of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”),

15 U.S.C. §78j(b) and §78t(a), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R.

240.10b-5(b), as well as violations of Section 20A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78t-

1, against the Settling Defendants and the excluded defendant, Deloitte. 4 The

Complaint alleges that the Defendants’ statements about Crocs’ business and its

3 This case was previously assigned to United States District Judge Robert E. Blackburn, whose recusal resulted in assignment to this Court.

4 For an extensive version of the Settling Parties’ respective recitation of facts, we refer this Court to the Complaint (Dkt. No. 87), and Defendants’ motions to dismiss the Complaint (Dkt Nos. 107-08).

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inventory and management systems during the Settlement Class Period were false. 5

The Complaint further alleges that these false statements and later revelations about

Crocs’ operations results in significant losses for investors. On March 19, 2009,

Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint. On February 28, 2011, the Court

dismissed the Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal on March 18, 2011, Case No. 11-

1116. The parties completed briefing in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth

Circuit (“Tenth Circuit”) on December 29, 2011.

The Settling Defendants deny and continue to deny all of the claims, contentions,

and allegations made in the Action, and maintain that all such claims, contentions, and

allegations lack merit.

Simultaneously, Plaintiffs have continued to defend this Court’s selection of the

Sánchez Group as Lead Plaintiff. On April 4, 2011, National Roofing Industry Pension

Plan (the “Roofers”), a member of the putative class whose motion to be appointed as

lead plaintiff had been denied by this Court and whose September 10, 2010 renewed

motion for appointment as lead plaintiff was denied as moot on February 28, 2011 (in

the same order dismissing the Complaint), filed a notice of appeal, Case No. 11-1142,

asserting that the judgment should be vacated and the case remanded for consideration

of a new lead plaintiff. The parties and the Roofers completed briefing on this appeal as

of December 29, 2011.

5 Discovery was stayed pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”). However, before filing the Complaint, Plaintiffs’ Counsel conducted an extensive investigation into the allegations contained in the Complaint, including interviewing numerous former Crocs employees.

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After the Settling Parties reached an agreement to settle, they moved for a partial

remand of the main appeal, Case No. 11-1116, for the limited purpose of review and

approval of the Settlement by this Court. The Settling Parties also moved for remand of

the Roofers’ appeal, Case No. 11-1142. On April 9, 2012, the Tenth Circuit issued an

order remanding both appeals on a limited basis with instructions for the district court to

consider this proposed Settlement.

I. SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND OVERVIEW OF THE SETTLEMENT

Beginning on April 27, 2011, the parties engaged in protracted settlement

discussions over approximately a seven-month period before Kyle Ann Schultz, the

Tenth Circuit Mediator. On February 27, 2012, Plaintiffs and Settling Defendants

continued those efforts by engaging in voluntary mediation before United States District

Judge Layn R. Phillips (Ret.). The mediation involved briefing on the merits of the

Action, as well as in-depth discussions with Judge Phillips about the parties’ respective

claims and defenses; the motions to dismiss filed in the Action; the briefs filed in the

Tenth Circuit, and other key factual and legal issues. Following the mediation, the

Settling Parties were able to reach an agreement to settle the Action except as to

Deloitte. 6

II. SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT

The Settlement will be funded by a $10 million payment by Crocs’ D&O insurers.

The only agreements between the Settling Parties about the Settlement are the

6 The final terms of the Settlement were concluded over the span of almost two months. The negotiations were arm’s-length and well-informed.

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Stipulation, filed herewith, and a Supplemental Agreement concerning the circumstance

under which the level of exclusions from the Settlement could give Crocs the option to

terminate the Settlement. ( See Stipulation ¶8.7) 7 The $10 million in cash, less any

attorneys’ fees8 and/or expenses awarded by the Court to Plaintiffs’ Counsel, notice and

administration expenses, and any tax expenses payable from the Settlement Fund (the

“Net Settlement Fund”), will be distributed to Authorized Claimants in accordance with

the Plan of Allocation described fully in the Notice.

ARGUMENT

I. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT SATISFIES THE CRITERIA FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL

A. Factors To Be Considered

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) requires judicial approval for any compromise of claims

brought on a class basis. Approval of a proposed settlement is within the sound

discretion of the district court. United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1491, 1495 (10th Cir.

1993). As a matter of public policy, the law favors and encourages settlements. See,

7 Other than the “Threshold Amount” of exclusions that could trigger Crocs’ option to terminate the Stipulation, all of the terms of the Supplemental Agreement are also set forth in the Stipulation. As is customary, the Supplemental Agreement is not being filed in order to keep the Threshold Amount confidential and to avoid an intentional trigger by one or more large shareholders. 8 As disclosed in the Notice, at the Settlement Hearing, Plaintiffs’ Counsel will move for an award of attorneys’ fees not to exceed 33 1/3% of the Settlement Fund in light of, inter alia ,: (i) the time and labor spent by Plaintiffs’ Counsel; (ii) the magnitude and complexities of the Action; (iii) the risk that the Settlement Class would not prevail in the Action; (iv) the quality of Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s representation; (v) the fee in relation to the Settlement; and (vi) public policy considerations. See, e.g., Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1445 n.3 (10th Cir.1995).

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e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n , 465 F.2d 1350, 1354 (10th Cir. 1972).

This is especially true in complex actions such as this. Big O Tires, Inc. v. Bigfoot 4x4,

Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1229 (D. Colo. 2001). At the preliminary approval stage,

“the court reviews the proposed terms of settlement and makes a preliminary

determination on the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the settlement terms.”

In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig ., 226 F.R.D. 186, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Armstrong

v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. , 616 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1980) .

A court must consider whether the settlement warrants preliminary approval,

providing notice to the proposed class and the scheduling of a final settlement hearing.

See Horton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. , 855 F. Supp. 825, 827

(E.D.N.C. 1994) (holding that the issue at the preliminary approval is whether there is

probable cause to justify notifying the class members of the proposed settlement).

Accordingly, at this stage the Court should determine whether the proposed Settlement

is the product of an informed, arm’s-length negotiation and free of obvious deficiencies

and, thus, whether it is within the range of what might later be found fair, reasonable

and adequate. Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 314. In other words, “preliminary approval

should be granted and notice of the proposed settlement given to the class if there are

no obvious deficiencies in the proposed settlements.” In re Med. X-ray Film Antitrust

Litig. , No. 93-5904, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21936, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1997) . The

circumstances underlying the proposed Settlement fully support preliminary approval.

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1. The Proposed Settlement Is The Result of Well-Grounded, Good Faith, Arm’s-Length Negotiations

“A ‘presumption of fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness may attach to a

class settlement reached in arm’s-length negotiations between experienced, capable

counsel...’” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc ., 396 F.3d 96, 116 (2d Cir. 2005);

see also Lucas v. Kmart, 234 F.R.D. 688, 693 (D. Colo. 2006) . As the discussion above

indicates, the proposed Settlement is the product of extensive arm’s length negotiations

that occurred between the Settling Parties over the span of almost a year. The

Settlement was reached after lengthy settlement discussions before the Tenth Circuit

Mediator, Ms. Schultz; the exchange of comprehensive mediation statements, including

damages estimates; and after a mediation before Judge Phillips, a highly experienced

independent mediator with extensive experience in mediating securities class action

settlements throughout the country. In addition, the mediation occurred only after the

Parties had a solid understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Settlement

Class’ claims; had the benefit of a fully-briefed and decided motion to dismiss; and had

completed briefing in the Tenth Circuit. Just as important, there is every indication that

the Settlement is the product of serious, informed and non-collusive negotiations among

experienced counsel. Accordingly, it deserves preliminary approval.

2. The Proposed Settlement Warrants Notice And A Settlement Hearing

In considering whether to enter into the Settlement, the Settling Parties weighed

the value of an immediate settlement against the prospect that significant proceedings

remained ahead, including the completion of the appellate proceedings and, assuming a

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reversal by the Tenth Circuit for Plaintiffs, extensive formal fact discovery, lengthy class

certification proceeding, summary judgment proceedings, and expert discovery, trial

preparation, including Daubert motions, a trial, and probable post-trial appeals.

Additionally, many courts recognize that the opinion of experienced counsel

supporting the reasonableness of the settlement is entitled to considerable weight. 9

Here, counsel for the Settling Parties have extensive experience in securities litigation

and believe this Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate in light of the

circumstances of this case. Specifically, the Settling Parties considered: (1) the risks

inherent in the appeal and litigating a securities class action through trial; and (2) the

particular risks at issue in this Action. Securities class actions are by their nature legally

and factually complex and difficult. 10 Here, there were real risks that, even if Plaintiffs

prevailed on their appeal, the Plaintiffs would be unable to establish the required

elements of their once-dismissed Section 10(b) claims, including that the alleged

misstatements were materially false and misleading; that the Settling Defendants acted

with scienter; loss causation; or damages.

In addition, Plaintiffs considered the risk that Settling Defendants would be

unable to pay a larger recovery after trial and entry of a judgment. If the Settlement

9 See, e.g. , Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. , 472 F. Supp. 2d 830, 852 (E.D. La. 2007) (stating that counsel are the court’s main source of information about the settlement and, therefore, the Court will give weight to class counsel’s opinion regarding the fairness of settlement); Smith v. Dominion Bridge Corp. , No. 96-7580, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26903, at *21-*22 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2007). 10 See In re Luxottica Group S.P.A. Sec. Litig. , 233 F.R.D. 306, 311-12 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting the litigation being settled “involved numerous difficult legal and financial issues typical in securities class actions”); In re Sumitomo Copper Litig. , 189 F.R.D. 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

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Class prevailed at trial and proved fraud, Settling Defendants’ insurers might have

sought to disclaim coverage. In sum, Plaintiffs had a well-founded understanding of the

Settlement Class’ claims and litigation risks, and the Settlement is fair, reasonable and

adequate.

3. The Settlement Has No Obvious Deficiencies

There are also “no grounds to doubt [the Settlement’s] fairness and no other

obvious deficiencies (such as unduly preferential treatment of class representatives or

of segments of the class, or excessive compensation for attorneys). . . .” Reade-

Alvarez v. Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C. , 237 F.R.D. 26, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). The $10

million recovery constitutes a significant and certain benefit for the Settlement Class,

particularly when measured against the risks of Plaintiffs obtaining a reversal of the

dismissal of the Action and prevailing, after many more years of hard-fought litigation,

on their underlying claims. In avoiding those substantial risks and delay, Settlement

Class Members will receive a pro rata distribution from the Net Settlement Fund in

accordance with the Plan of Allocation.

In sum, nothing in the course of the settlement negotiations or the terms of the

Settlement raises any obvious doubt as to the Settlement’s fairness. Rather, the

recovery to the Settlement Class; the arm’s-length nature of the negotiations; the

involvement of independent and highly experienced mediators (both Ms. Schultz,

appointed by the Tenth Circuit, and Judge Phillips); and the participation of

sophisticated counsel throughout the litigation, compels the finding that “probable

cause” exists for finding that the proposed Settlement is sufficiently fair, reasonable and

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adequate to justify dissemination of the Notice to the Settlement Class and the

scheduling of the Settlement Hearing. Thus, Plaintiffs and the Settling Defendants

respectfully urge the Court to preliminarily approve the Settlement.

II. THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE FORM OF THE NOTICES AND PLAN FOR PROVIDING NOTICE TO THE SETTLEMENT CLASS

The Court should also approve the form and content of the proposed Notice and

Summary Notice. See Exhibits A-1 and A-2 annexed both to the proposed Preliminary

Approval Order and Stipulation. Consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) and 23(e)(1),

the Notice is written in clear, straightforward language, and the Notice uses a format

that sets out the relevant information concerning the Settlement. The Notice also

satisfies the separate disclosure requirements imposed by the PSLRA. See 15 U.S.C.

§78u- 4(a)(7); In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig. , 302 F. Supp. 2d 180, 184-

85 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing PSLRA notice requirements and approving notice where

“cover page” was actually two pages).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) requires a certified class to receive “the best notice . .

practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who

can be identified through reasonable effort.” Similarly, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1) requires

the court to “direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be

bound by [a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise].” The proposed

notice plan readily meets these standards. Plaintiffs, through an experienced

settlement claims administrator, will cause the Notice (which includes a detailed

description of the Action, the Settlement, the Plan of Allocation, and the parameters of

Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of

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expenses) and Proof of Claim form to be sent by first class mail to every Settlement

Class Member who can be identified through reasonable effort. This will be

accomplished principally by using record holder data produced by the transfer agent for

Crocs, and by direct mailing to broker-dealers for the last known names and addresses

of potential Settlement Class Members and shareholders who, like the vast majority of

investors today, holed their shares in “street-name.” The Summary Notice, which

summarizes the essential Settlement terms and informs readers how to obtain the full

Notice, will be published three staggered times via press releases issued over leading

business-oriented newswires. This form of Internet publication notice is consistent with

the class notice procedures set forth in the PSLRA itself. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a).

This proposed method of giving notice (similar if not identical to the method used

in countless other securities class actions) clearly provides Settlement Class Members

with the best notice practicable under the circumstances to be apprised of the

Settlement. See DeJulius v. New Eng. Health Care Emps. Pension Fund , 429 F.3d

935, 943-45 (10th Cir. 2005). This notice program clearly satisfies the requirements of

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23(c) and (e), and due process and should be approved by the

Court. See Barone v. Safway Steel Prods., Inc. , No. 03-4258, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

17645, at *18-*19 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2005); Peters v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. , 966

F.2d 1483, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“It is beyond dispute that notice by first class mail

ordinarily satisfies rule 23(c)(2)’s requirement that class members receive ‘the best

notice practicable under the circumstances.’”)

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III. CERTIFICATION OF THE SETTLEMENT CLASS IS PROPER AND NECESSARY

For settlement purposes only, Plaintiffs request the Court to certify the

Settlement Class. Certification of the Settlement Class for the purposes of this

Settlement will further the interests of both Settling Parties. The requirements of Fed.

R. Civ. P. 23(a) are easily met because:

(a) the Settlement Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. During the Settlement Class Period, Crocs securities were purchased by hundreds, if not thousands, of persons; 11

(b) the questions of law and fact in this Action which are common to all Settlement Class Members predominate over questions affecting individual Settlement Class Members. These common issues include whether the: (1) Settling Defendants violated §§10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder; (ii) Settling Defendants misrepresented and/or omitted material facts; (iii) Settling Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that their statements were false; (iv) statements artificially inflated the price of Crocs’ securities; and (v) extent and measure of damages suffered by the Settlement Class; 12

(c) the claims asserted in this Action by Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the other Settlement Class Members and prosecution of individual actions would create a risk of inconsistent adjudications. See Lucas, 2006 WL 722163, at *2; and

(d) Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Settlement Class because they have retained qualified and experienced counsel and have acted fairly and adequately to protect the interests of the Settlement Class . 13

11 See, e.g., In re Deutsche Telekom AG Sec. Litig ., 229 F. Supp. 2d 277, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[c]lass certification is ... appropriate in securities fraud cases involving a large number of shares traded publicly in an established market”). 12 See, e.g., Lucas v. Kmart Corp., No. 99-01923, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21521, at *6-*8 (D. Colo. Mar. 22, 2006) (commonality satisfied where claims of the plaintiffs and other class members are based on the same legal or remedial theory). 13 Lucken Family L.P., LLLP v. Ultra Res., Inc. , No. 09-1543, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80846, at *6-*8 (D. Colo. June 30, 2010) (plaintiff found to be an adequate class representative where it had no conflicts with the class members, and its counsel had significant experience litigating class actions).

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In addition, the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) are satisfied because

common questions of law or fact predominate over any questions affecting only

individual class members. Where, as here, the Complaint alleges that the Defendants

engaged in a uniform and continuous course of conduct in violation of the federal

securities laws, the issues of law and fact which flow from these activities predominate

over any individual issue in a class action. See Lucken , 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80846,

at *6-*7. A class action is also superior to other methods of adjudication. Lucas , 2006

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21521, at *15. In the settlement context, class certification criteria are

easily met because the class is unified by a common interest in a reasonable recovery.

Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor , 521 U.S. 591, 618-19 (1997). Although class action

requirements must be met when certifying a settlement class, the settlement must be

taken into account. Id. In fact, courts have viewed the creation of a settlement class as

nothing more than a “tentative assumption indulged in by the court to facilitate the

amicable resolution of the litigation.” See In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig. , 607 F.2d 167,

177 (5th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).

IV. SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

In connection with preliminary approval of the Settlement, Plaintiffs request that

the Court set the date for a Settlement Hearing. The parties request that the Court set a

date for the Settlement Hearing no earlier than one hundred and twenty (120) days after

entry of the Preliminary Approval Order accompanying this motion (the “Preliminary

Approval Order”). The proposed Preliminary Approval Order sets forth the following

schedule:

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• Mailing of the Notice and Proof of Claim to all Settlement Class Members who can be identified through reasonable effort: fifteen (15) business days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order (118(a)).

• Completion of publication of Summary Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class Action three separate times, with no less than 3 business days between each publication, twenty-eight (28) days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order (118(b)).

• Deadline for Plaintiffs’ Counsel to file one or more affidavits or declarations showing timely compliance with the mailing and publication requirements: seven (7) days prior to the Settlement Hearing (11 8(d)).

• Postmark deadline for submission of Proofs of Claim: one hundred and twenty (120) days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order (11 12).

• Deadline for requests for exclusion from the Class to be postmarked to the Claims Administrator: ninety (90) days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order (11 13).

• Deadline for any Settlement Class Member to enter an appearance in this Action, individually or, at their own expense, through counsel of their own choice: ninety (90) days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order (11 15).

• Deadline for submission of objections to the Settlement, Plan of Allocation and/or Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses: delivered ninety (90) days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order (1116).

• Deadline for filing with the Court any papers in support of final approval of the Settlement, the Plan of Allocation and Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of expenses: sixty (60) days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order (11 19).

• Deadline for filing any papers, in response to any objections, in further support of the settlement, the Plan of Allocation, or Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of expenses: seven (7) days before the Settlement Hearing (1120).

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter the

proposed Preliminary Approval Order (i) preliminarily approving the proposed

Settlement, (ii) approving the forms and methods of notice, (iii) certifying the Settlement

Class, and setting a date for a final Settlement Hearing.

Dated: May 14, 2012

/s/ Charles J. Piven Charles J. Piven BROWER PIVEN

A Professional Corporation 1925 Old Valley Road Stevenson, MD 21153 Telephone: (410) 332-0030 Facsimile: (410) 685-1300 Email: [email protected]

David A.P. Brower BROWER PIVEN A Professional Corporation

488 Madison Avenue, 8th Floor New York, New York 10022 Telephone: (212) 501-9000 Facsimile: (212) 501-0300 Email: [email protected]

Cyril V. Smith ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP 100 East Pratt Street, Suite 2440 Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Telephone: (410) 949-1145 Facsimile: (410) 659-0436 Email: [email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 14, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing (with the [Proposed] Order Preliminarily Approving Settlement and Providing for Notice) with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following e-mail addresses:

[email protected] Gerald L. Bader, Jr.

[email protected] Renee Beth Taylor

[email protected] Jeffrey Allen Berens

[email protected] Kip Brian Shuman

[email protected] Jeffrey Mark Villanueva

[email protected] Joseph C. Cohen, Jr.

[email protected] Cyril V. Smith

[email protected] Scott A. Fink

[email protected] Lionel Z. Glancy

[email protected] Matthew S. Kahn

[email protected] Danielle S. Myers

[email protected] Albert B. Wolf

[email protected] Thomas P. McMahon

/s/ Charles J. Piven

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Documents

In Re: CROCS, Inc. Securities Litigation 07-CV-02351 …securities.stanford.edu/filings-documents/1038/CROX_01/2012514_r01... · Case 1:07-cv-02351-PAB-KLM Document 195 Filed 05/14/12