In Defence of Thrasymachus

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In Defense of ThrasymachusAuthor(s): T. Y. HendersonSource: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Jul., 1970), pp. 218-228

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2/12

American Philosophical

Quarterly

Volume

7,

Number

3,

July

1970

IV.

IN

DEFENSE OF

THRASYMACHUS

T.

Y.

HENDERSON

CRITICS

and

commentators

on

the

dispute

between Socrates

and

Thrasymachus

which

occurs

in

Book

I

of

the

Republic

come

closest

to

unanimity

on

two

points

:

that

Thrasymachus'

view

is

not

consistent

throughout

the

dispute

and

that

Socrates'

arguments

are

fatal

to

Thrasymachus'

position.

Not

all

commentators

by

any

means,

however,

are

in

agreement

as

to

just

what

position

Thrasymachus

is

defending,

or

on

what

points,

precisely,

he

is inconsistent. Nor

is

there

general

agreement

as

to

how

Socrates'

arguments

refute his

position.

The

dispute

between

Socrates

and

Thrasymachus

centers around

two

major points

of

disagreement

:

(

i

)

what

the

nature

or

essential

quality

of

justice

is,

and

(2)

whether

the

just

or

the

unjust

life

is the

best

(in

the

sense

of

most

profitable)

life

for

men

to

live.

It is

not

clear

that

every

commentator

agrees

that

Plato

was

even

aware

of the different

nature

of

these

two

questions,

but

in

the

text

he has Socrates

postpone

attention

to

(2)

until

he has

silenced

Thrasymachus

on

question

(1).

An

examination

of

the

arguments

involved

in

both

of

these

questions

would

render

this

discussion

much

too

lengthy,

so

I

shall

concentrate

my

attention almost

entirely

upon

question

(

1

).

I

propose

to

offer

an

interpretation

of

Thrasymachus'

view

of

the

nature

of

justice

and

the

just

life

which,

in

its essential

points,

is

consistent

throughout

Book

I.

It

is

true

that

Socrates

forces

him

to

reformulate

his

position

in

a

couple

of

instances,

but

in

so

doing,

I

shall

argue,

Thrasyma?

chus

does

not

change

his

basic,

or

original,

position.

Not

only

do

I

believe

that

Thrasymachus

is

consistent

in

essentials

throughout

the

dispute

with

Socrates

over

the

nature

of

justice,

I

shall

also

argue

that

Socrates'

most

vigorous

attacks

fail

completely

to refute, or even seriously to damage, Thrasyma?

chus'

position.

Yet

I

want

to

be

very

clear

that

my

interpretation

of

Thrasymachus

is

not

meant

to

be

a

"contemporary

reformulation,"

in the

sense

of

claiming

that this

is

the

way

Thrasymachus

should

have

argued;

nor

am

I

claiming

either

that Plato

deliberately

had Socrates

misunderstand

Thrasy?

machus'

position,

or

that

Plato

himself

really

didn't

understand

what

Thrasymachus

was

saying.

My

claim is

stronger:

I

believe that the

interpretation

I

shall

give

is

the

position Thrasymachus

held,

that

Plato

understood

it

in this

way,

and

that

in

the

dialogue

Socrates addresses

himself

to

it

directly.

If his

arguments

fail to

refute

Thrasymachus,

as

I

think

they

do,

it

is

not

because

the

disputants

are

arguing

at

cross-purposes,

but rather

because

Socrates'

arguments

are

defective.

In

regard

to

the

question

of the essential

nature

of

justice,

Thrasymachus

is

most

often accused

of

inconsistency

on

the

following points

:

(

i

)

He

offers

two

formulations

of

his

definition

of

justice,

which

I

shall

refer

to

hereafter

as

Ja

and

Jb

:

Ja:

"I

declare

that

justice

is

nothing

else

than

that

which

is

advantageous

to the

stronger."1

Jb:

".

.

.justice

and the

just

is

really

the

good

of

another,

the

advantage

of

the

stronger

who

rules,

but

the

self-inflicted

injury

of

the

subject

who

obeys;

that

injustice

is the

opposite,

and

rules

those

very

simple

just

souls; that the

governed

serve the advantage of the

stronger

man,

and

by

their

obedience

contribute

to

his

happiness,

but

in

no

way

to

their

own

(343C2-7)."

The

alleged

inconsistency

here

is that Ja

can

be

interpreted

as

implying

that

whenever

a

strong

man

acts

justly

this will

result

in

benefit

or

profit

to

himself;

whereas

Jb

can

be viewed

as

implying

that

whoever

acts

justly,

the

strong

or

the

weak,

such

action

never

results

in

profit

to

the

agent,

but

rather

to

someone

else.

(2)

Thrasymachus

maintains

that

it is

most

often

the

case

that

the

strongest

man

in

the

state

is the

ruler, and that the rulers in every type

of

state

make

laws

which

are to

their

own

advantage

(338

e

1-5).

Thus

according

to

Ja,

if

the

subjects

obey

the law

they

should

be

acting justly.

But

Socrates

points

out

that

rulers

are

capable

of

making

mistakes

in

their

legislation

and

thus

might

mistakenly

enact

a

law

which

was

not

to

their

own

advantage

(339

c

1-38).

In

such

case

the

subjects

would

be

acting justly

if

2l8

1

Republic,

338CI-2,

tr.

A.

D.

Lindsay

(London,

1935).

All

quotations

herein

are

taken

from

this translation.

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3/12

IN

DEFENSE OF THRASYMACHUS

219

they

obeyed

the

law,

but their

actions would

not

result

in

benefit

to

the

stronger,

thus

contradicting

Ja.

(3)

Following

Socrates'

appeal

to

the

analogy

of

other

arts

to

the

"art of

ruling," Thrasymachus

refuses to draw the conclusion which Socrates

believes the

argument

entails,

but instead

appeals

to

another kind

of

"art,"

that of

shepherding.

Socrates himself

then

accuses

Thrasymachus

of

inconsistency,

in

that in

speaking

as

he

does

of

shepherds,

he

fails

to

follow

his

own

recommenda?

tion

to

discuss

only

the

practitioner,

qua

practi?

tioner,

of

an

art

exclusively.

Socrates

claims

that

instead of

discussing

the

shepherd

"in

the strict

sense,"

Thrasymachus

is

speaking

of the

shepherd

as

an

earner

of

wages

or

fees

(345b5~346d7).

Other

alleged

inconsistencies

have

to

do with

the

second

major

point

of

disagreement

between

Socrates and

Thrasymachus

(whether

the

just

or

the

unjust

life is

more

profitable)

and

will,

there?

fore,

not

be

discussed

in detail.

* *

*

In

defending Thrasymachus

against

the

above

charges

I

require

a

bit of

stage-setting:

(1)

I

shall

assume

that

Thrasymachus

and

Socrates

are

in

implicit

agreement

that

just

action

requires

for

its

occurrence

some

form of human

society. Justice

is

treated

throughout

the

dispute

as

a

social

phenomenon,

demanding

for

its

instantia?

tion

a

context

in

which

people

act

upon,

interact

with,

and in

various

ways

deal

mutually

with each

other,

and the

same

goes

for

injustice,

of

course.

The

examples

of

just

actions

appealed

to

in

the

text are

all

such

as

to

involve

normally

some

form

of

reciprocal

action

by

those

toward whom

just

action is

directed

:

the

mutual

keeping

of

contracts

and

bargains,

business

deals,

etc.

(e.g., 343d

i-e5).

(2)

It is

a

truism

to

observe

that

genuine

dis?

agreements

can occur

only

within

a

context

of

shared

views. It

is

conceivable

that

Socrates

and

Thrasymachus

share

so

few

points

of

agreement

that

their whole

dispute

is

a

series of

arguments

at

cross-purposes.

Some

commentators

implicitly

or

explicitly

presume

that this

is

just

what

happens.

I

submit that

there

is

no

direct

textual evidence

for

this

conclusion.

If it

were

true,

it

would

constitute

a

serious

indictment

of

Plato,

since

he

nowhere has

Socrates

or

any

other character

point

this

out.

What

I

propose

to

do

is

to

assume

the widest

possible

range

of shared views between

the

two

antagonists

which

is consonant

with

the

text;

that

is,

on

each

point

relevant

to

the

argument,

if

there

is

not

some

textual

reference

precluding

it,

I

shall

assume

that

Socrates

and

Thrasymachus

are

in

general

agreement.

For

example,

since

it

is

nowhere denied, I shall assume that on the whole

they

agree

as

to

the

general

types

of

actions

normally

designated

"just"

and

"unjust." Honoring

contracts,

paying

debts,

paying

taxes,

keeping

bargains

and

so

on

would

be

some

examples

of

actions

which

they

could,

and

apparently

do,

agree

are

just

actions

and

their

opposites

unjust.

Their

disagreement

is

not,

or

need

not

be,

as

to

which

types

of

acts

are

just,

but rather

as

to

the

essential

property

which

all

just

acts

share.

(3)

I shall

also

assume

that Socrates

and

Thrasymachus

both

understand

what is

meant

by

an

essential

property,

and that

they

are

not

arguing

at

cross-purposes

in

their

attempt

to

arrive

at

the

essential

property

shared

by

all

just

action,

and

only

by

just

actions,

which

is

designated

by

the

universal

term

"justice."

It

might

be

objected

that

Thrasymachus

is

not

seeking

a

definition of

justice,

but rather

presents

his conclusion

baldly

at

the

beginning.

Nevertheless,

he is

willing

to

argue

for

the

truth of

his

contention and

to

abide

by

the

outcome

of

the

argument.

It is

no

logical

error

to

state

one's conclusion first and

then

present

one's

arguments.

* * *

Does

Thrasymachus'

formulation of his

definition

of

justice

in Jb

contradict

Ja?

Perhaps,

but

not

necessarily,

and

it

is

surely

not

poor

scholarship

to

give

Thrasymachus

the

benefit of

the

doubt.

Cross

and

Woozley

interpret

Ja

to

mean

that

every

time

anyone

acts

justly

the

consequences

of such

acts

will

be

in

the

form of

some

benefit

or

profit

to

the

strong

man.2 But

in

Ja

Thrasymachus

does

not

refer

to

the

consequences

of

just

actions;

he

says

that

justice

is

nothing

else

than

.

.

.

etc.

Why

not

take him

at

his

word and

assume

that he

is

desig?

nating

what

he

believes

to

be

the essential feature

of

just

action

itself,

rather

than

the

consequences

which

accrue

from

performance

of

just

action?

If

Cross and

Woozley's

interpretation

is

accepted,

then

Thrasymachus'

account

of

justice

can

be

a

definition

only

if

one

interprets

him

as a

subjectivist

who is

claiming

that

any

action

which results in

benefit

or

profit

to

the

stronger

is,

for

that

reason,

just.

The

only

reasonable

alternative

would

be

that

2

R.

C. Cross

and A.

D.

Woozley,

Plato's

Republic:

A

Philosophical

Commentary (London,

1964),

cf.

pp.

27,

37,

38

ff.



4/12


5/12

IN

DEFENSE

OF

THRASYMACHUS

221

grand

scale

and

get

away

with

it.

Finally,

one

needs

the

courage

to

engage

in

and

pursue

such

a

program.

Thrasymachus points

to

examples

of

unjust

men

who

lack

either

the

wit

or

the

courage

or

both

to

practice

injustice

on a

grand

scale

(pickpockets,

cutpurses,

temple-breakers, etc.),

and

although

he thinks of these

as

stronger

than

their

counterparts

of

similar

station

among

just

men,

they

fall

short

of

the

ideal

strong

man

(348d5~9).

The

just

man,

on

the other

hand,

could

never

be

a

strong

man,

for he

lacks

at

least

one

necessary

quality

:

the

understanding

that

justice

is

advanta?

geous

to

the

stronger.

The

ruler

"in the strict

sense" is

defined

by

Thrasymachus

as one

who

always

makes laws

which

are

to

the ruler's

advantage

(34069-34

ia2).

He is

defined,

be

it

noted,

neither

as

an

unjust,

nor

as

a

strong

man.

Finally,

the

unjust

man,

on

Thrasymachus'

view,

is

simply

a man

who

performs

unjust

actions,

and

as

I

pointed

out

above,

since there

seems

to

be

no

textual

considerations

precluding

it,

I

am

assuming

that

Thrasymachus

and

Socrates

are

in

general

agreement

as to

which

actions

unjust

actions would

be.

It

is

true

that

Thrasymachus

argues

that rulers

of

countries,

whatever the

form of

government

might

be,

are

the real

strong

men.

Yet,

there

is

no

textual

reason

to

believe

that for

Thrasymachus

the

ruler

is

the

strongest

man

because

he

is

the ruler

of a state. Rather, the strongest man in the state is

most

likely

to

be,

or

to

become

the

ruler.

He

rises

to

the

top

naturally

because

he

takes

advantage

of

every

opportunity

to

make

an

unjust profit

and

to

further his

own

cause

at

the

expense

of

others.

Everyone

and

every group

who

deal

with

him

justly

are

exploited

by

him for his

own

profit.

It

could

hardly

be

the

case,

as

some

commentators

have

suggested,

that

the

ruler

is

by

definition

the

stronger,

because

Thrasymachus

admits

the

possibility

of

there

being

a

just

ruler

(343a).

A

just

ruler

would

not

be

the

strongest

man

in

the

state

in

Thrasy?

machus'

sense

of

"strong":

indeed

he

would

not,

in this sense, be

strong

at all. For

Thrasymachus

says

that the

just

ruler loses

on

all

counts:

his

business suffers

through

neglect,

and

he loses the

respect

of his

friends

and

relatives

because he will

not

grant

them

special privileges

during

his

tenure

of office.

It

should be

obvious

by

this

time

that

if

the above

interpretation

of

Thrasymachus'

position

is

ac?

cepted,

there is

no

inconsistency

between

Ja

and

Jb.

Just

action,

by

its

very

nature,

is

advantageous

to

the

stronger,

for

the

stronger

by

definition

is

one

who takes

advantage

of

all

opportunities

to

benefit

himself.

Justice

is

the

good

of

another,

in

that

acts

of

justice

afford

others the

opportunity

to

cheat

and

defraud

the

just

agent.

Injustice

is

advantageous

to

oneself, in that acts of injustice are those in which

one

takes unfair

advantage

of

others. Ja

does

not

imply,

on

my

interpretation,

that if

the

strong

man

acts

justly

it

is

to

his

own

advantage.

Rather,

Ja

entails that

just

action

always

creates

opportunities

for the

unjust

exploitation

of

just

agents,

which

is

repeated

in

slightly

different

words in

Jb.

Let

us

consider

in

more

detail what

the life

and

character of the

completely

unjust

ruler

might

be

like,

given

Thrasymachus'

view

of

the

nature

of

justice

and

injustice.

Some

commentators

seem

to

think

that the

only

sort

of

man

who

could fulfill

Thrasymachus' conception

of

such

a

ruler

would be

an

absolute dictator

who rules his

country

with

an

iron

fist,

stealing,

killing,

and

imprisoning

whenever

his

slightest

whim is

opposed.

It is

possible

that

Thrasymachus

would

agree

that

such

a

ruler

would,

or

could,

be

a

strong

man

in

his

sense

of

the

term.

But it

should

not

be

forgotten

that

he

claims

that

the

rulers

in

every

state,

no

matter

what

the form

of

government,

usually

fit his

conception

of

the

strong

man :

Well, every

government

lays

down

laws for

its

own

advantage?a

democracy

democratic,

a

tyranny

tyrannical

laws,

and

so

on.

In

laying

down these

laws

they

have made it

plain

that what is to their

advantage

is

just.

They

punish

him who

departs

from

this

as

a

law-breaker and

an

unjust

man.

And

this,

my

good

sir,

is

what

I

mean.

In

every

city

justice

is

the

same.

It is

what

is

advantageous

to

the

established

govern?

ment.

But the

established

government

is master

and

so

sound

reasoning

gives

the

conclusion

that the

same

thing

is

always

just?namely,

what

is

advantageous

to

the

stronger

(338e).

It

follows

that

even

in

a

country

where

the

ruler

is

elected

by

majority

vote,

and

where

to

retain

his

position

as

ruler,

he

must

retain

the

esteem

of

the

electorate,

the

ruler

may

still

be,

and

usually

is,

the strongest man in the state. This means that such

a

ruler

could

be

a

complete

villain,

a

man

who

believes

that

the

unjust

life is

the best

life for

man,

and that

justice

is

advantageous

to

the

stronger.

Bearing

this in

mind,

let

us

consider

a

possible

alternative

to

the

view that

Thrasymachus'

ruler

type

would

have

to

be

an

iron-fisted

dictator.

Imagine

the

following

rather

extended

hypothetical

case:

Early

in

life

a

politically

ambitious

man

named



6/12

222

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY

Setarcos

comes

to

believe

that

Thrasymachus'

position

is

entirely

correct.

Suppose

that

Setarcos is

both

intelligent

and

courageous.

While

taking

advantage

of

every

opportunity

to

profit

unfairly

and

to

advance

his

own

fortunes

at

the

expense

of

others, Setarcos is clever enough to maintain a

public

facade

of

honesty

and

integrity.

He

publicly

proclaims

his absolute

faith in

the view

that

the

just

life

is

the

best and

most

profitable

life

for

man.

"Mutual

trust

is the

cornerstone

of

society,"

he

tells

everyone,

"and mutual

trust

is

possible only

when

the citizens

of

a

state

deal

justly

with

one

another."

His

voice is

loudest

in

condemnation

of

every

unjust

and

dishonest

act

by

an

official

in

power.

He ferrets

out

or,

if

need

be,

manufactures

evidence

of

im?

morality

and

corruption against

all

those who

oppose

him

or

stand

in

the

way

of his

rise

to

power.

Eventually

he

campaigns

for

the

highest

office

in

the

land

on

a

reform

ticket,

pleading

for

a

return

to

honesty,

justice,

and

fair

dealing

in

government.

He

pledges

himself

to

the elimination

of

graft

and

corruption

in

high places.

When he achieves

power,

he

is

too

clever

to

perform

an

about-face

and

become

a

tyrant,

perpetuating

his

rule

by

force.

Rather,

he decries

the

fraud,

waste,

ineptitude,

and

corruption

which he

claims

is his

legacy

from

the

previous

administration,

and reiterates

his

belief

that

justice

is the

best

policy.

After

all,

he

is

a

just

man,

and hasn't

he

become

ruler of the land?

Once

he

becomes

the

ruler,

Setarcos

may

be

able,

if he is clever enough and bold enough, tomaintain

his

public

facade

of

justice

and

honesty

for

a

long

time

or

even

indefinitely,

while

remaining

a

thoroughly

unjust

man.

But is

this

at

all

a

plausible

account

?

If

Thrasy?

machus

is

correct,

such

a

ruler,

to

the best of his

ability,

would

always

enact

only

those laws which

are

advantageous

to

himself.

Do

we

have

to

imagine

an

entire

citizenry

so

incredibly

naive and

innocent

as

to

overlook

this fact

indefinitely

?

For

if

people

were

to

notice

that

the laws of

the land

are

of

this

nature,

would

this

not

immediately

reveal Setarcos

as

a

completely

unjust

man

?

The answer to both

questions

is :Not at all. One

of

the

strongest

reasons

for

acceptance

of

my

interpretation

of

Thrasymachus'

view

is

that

it

would

entail the

possibility

that

a

completely just

and

a

completely

unjust

ruler

might

enact

exactly

similar

sets

of laws

Thrasymachus

says

that

justice,

not

injustice,

is

advantageous

to

the

stronger,

so

that

an

unjust

ruler would be foolish

to

enact,

e.g.,

repressive

or

discriminatory

laws.

He

would

want

the

citizens

to

act

toward each

other and toward

him

as

a

ruler

in

ways

which both

Thrasymachus

and

Socrates would

agree

are

just.

For

Setarcos

holds,

with

Thrasymachus,

that if the

subjects

believe that the

just

life is the

most

profitable,

and

thus

are

just

and

law-abiding

in

their

dealings

with

one another and with their government, they will

be

most

vulnerable

to

exploitation

by

the ruler.

All

states must

collect

taxes to

finance

legitimate

governmental

functions,

for

example.

If the

citizens

realize this fact

and

willingly obey

the

tax

laws

of

the

state,

they

place

themselves

in

a

perfect position

to

be

unjustly

exploited by

the ruler. It

is

often

very

hard for the

subjects

in

a

country

to

determine

whether

all

of their

tax

money

is

being

spent

wisely

and

justly

for the

purposes

for

which

it

is

collected.

Furthermore,

by

convincing

the

people

that

they

are

serving

their

own

interests

by

living

completely

just

lives,

Setarcos eliminates

a

major

source

of

expense

and

anxiety

which often

plagues

tyrants:

he does

not

have

to

employ nearly

as

large

an

internal

security

force

to

preserve

order,

enforce his

laws,

and

suppress

possible

rebellions.

It is

interesting

to

note

in

passing

that

Thrasy?

machus

might

well have

argued

that

Socrates,

who

is known for his

attempts

to

defend

the

just

life

as

the

best

and

most

profitable

life

for

man,

is

actually

playing

into

the hands

of the

unjust

ruler. Setarcos

would

want

everyone

in

the

state

(except

himself

who

knows

better)

to act

justly,

to

live

just

lives,

and

to

believe

sincerely

that in

so

doing

they

were

serving their own best interests.

It is

not

merely

because

one

sees

clearly

that

acting justly

renders

the

just

agent

vulnerable

to

exploitation

that

one

can

become

a

strong

ruler

of

a

state.

He

might

lack

the

intelligence

to

effect

a

master

plan

of

injustice

and

power-seeking,

or

else

he

might

lack the

courage

for

such

a

large-scale

operation.

In the

context

of

the

present

hypothetical

case,

our

unjust

ruler, Setarcos,

might

be ranked

as

to

his

degree

of

"strength,"

in

Thrasymachus'

sense,

on

the basis of

how well

he

was

able

to

convince

the

populace

of the

folly

of

living

un?

justly,

especially

in

their

dealings

with the

govern?

ment of their state. If Setarcos were able to

convince

everyone

in

the

state

that

he

is

a com?

pletely

just

man,

that because

he is

just

he is

happy,

that

justice

in

general

is

most

profitable

to

man

as

a

way

of

life,

while

at

the

same

time

being

able,

covertly,

to

cheat

and steal

from

the

people

systematically,

then

he would

conform

perfectly

to

Thrasymachus'

conception

of

the

strong

man.

If

Thrasymachus

were

to

prove

his

case

that the

unjust

life

is the

good

life for

man,

would

this entail



7/12

IN

DEFENSE OF

THRASYMACHUS

223

that

Socrates,

or

you,

or

I,

or

anyone

who under?

stands what he is

talking

about

ought

to

begin

living

the

unjust

life ? This

conclusion would

at

least

not

follow from

such

a

proof.

I

find

no

textual evidence

that

Thrasymachus

was

advocating

universal

injustice

as a

way

of life

for

everyone.

In

fact,

the

greater

the ratio of

just

to

unjust people

in

a

state,

the

better life

can

be for

the

unjust

few.

Even

if

everyone

were

to

begin

to

live

completely

unjust

lives,

however,

this

would

not

negate

Thrasy?

machus'

claim

that

justice

is

the

advantage

of the

stronger,

only

no one

would

then be

acting

justly.

At

any

rate,

to

describe

a

certain

way

of life

as

the

best life

for

man

is

not

equivalent

to,

nor

does

it

entail that

everyone

should,

or even

can,

live

such

a

life.

Thrasymachus

could

be

implying

no

more

than

that

Socrates and the

others

ought

to

wake

up

and

realize

that

they

are

like

sheep

being

kept

for

the

profit of the unjust man, and that sheep-like, they

assume

naively

that

to

be

fleeced

and

slaughtered

for

mutton

is

better than

wearing

warm

clothes

and

being

well-fed.

It

is

important

to

understand

that

Thrasymachus

does

not

argue

that

the

ruler of

a

country ought

to

live

an

unjust

life for

the

following

reason:

when

Thrasymachus

defines the

"ruler

in the

strict

sense"

as

the

one

who

infallibly

enacts

laws which

are

advantageous

to

the

ruler,

he

might

be

interpreted

as

meaning

that it

is

logically

impossible

for

a

just

man

to

be

a

ruler in

the

strict

sense.

If

so,

then

of

course

he

would be

inconsistent,

for

he

has

ad?

mitted

that

a

just

man

could

be

a

ruler.

But

it

would

be

a

mistake

to

interpret Thrasymachus

as

claiming

that

when

a

ruler

makes laws which

give

him

the

opportunity

to

exploit

the

people

for

his

own

profit,

that

he

ought

to

exploit

them,

and

that

if

he

does

not,

he is not

a

ruler

in

the strict

sense

at

all.

On

the

contrary,

the

just

man

certainly

could

be

a

ruler

in

the

strict

sense,

if

we

do

not

read into

Thrasymachus'

definition

something

which isn't

there

in the

text.

The

laws

which

the

just

ruler

makes,

as

pointed

out

above,

might

be

exactly

similar

to

the

set

of

laws

which

an

unjust

ruler

would

make

(even

if

neither

made

any legislative

mistakes).

Thus the

just

ruler's

laws,

like those of

the

unjust

ruler,

would

afford

him the

opportunity

of

taking

unfair

advantage

of the citizens

when

they

act

justly. Being

just,

however,

he

would

not

do

so.

But

in

failing

to

cheat

the

populace

he is

not

failing

to

do

something

which

he

ought

to

do,

if

he

is

to

be

a

ruler

in

the

strict

sense.

On

Thrasy?

machus'

view,

he

is

merely

being

stupid.

To

sum

up

briefly,

I

interpret

the

dispute

between

Socrates

and

Thrasymachus

as

a

genuine

disagree?

ment

on

issues

which

are

quite

important,

his?

torically,

for moral

philosophy.

It is

a

genuine

disagreement,

in

the

sense

that it

arises within

a

context

of

shared

opinion,

and

on

no

major point

are

they arguing

at

cross-purposes.

I

view

Socrates

and

Thrasymachus

as

being

in

broadly

general

agreement

as to

the

practical

content

of the

just

and the

unjust

lives?that

is,

as

to

the

types

or

kinds

of

actions

which

are

correctly

called

"just"

and

"unjust."

The

dispute

between them is

not

a

simple

semantic

one

regarding

the

correct

moral

designa?

tion of

various

types

of actions. There

is

nothing

in

the

text

to

suggest

that

they

would

not

both

con?

sider

just

such

actions

as

honoring

contracts,

paying

taxes,

obeying

the

law,

giving

honest

measure,

and

so

on.

I

interpret

Thrasymachus

as

claiming

that

just

action is intrinsically disadvantageous to the

performer

because

by

its

very

nature

it

places

the

just

agent

in

a

vulnerable

position

with

respect

to

those

with

whom he deals

in

practical

life.

By

acting

justly

toward

one's fellow

man,

ipso

acto,

one

places

oneself in

a

position

to

be

unjustly

taken

advantage

of.

When

Thrasymachus

says

that

"justice

is

nothing

else

than

that

which is

advanta?

geous

to

the

stronger"

he is

referring

to

this

characteristic

of

justice,

which

he

believes

to

be its

essential

property.

By

the

"stronger,"

he

means

the

person

who

sees

justice

and

the

just

life for what

he,

Thrasymachus,

believes

it

to

be,

and who

has

the

intelligence

and

the

courage

to

practice injustice

on

a

grand

scale. One who

is

truly

a

strong

man

in

his

sense

would

thus

never

voluntarily

live

a

just

life.

* * *

Let

us

now

consider the

major

criticisms

which

Socrates

offers

to

Thrasymachus'

view:

If

an

unjust

ruler

makes

a

law which

he mis?

takenly

believes

to

be

advantageous

to

himself,

aren't

the

subjects

acting justly

when

they

obey

this

law ?

If

so,

then

justice,

in

this

case,

would

not

be

advantageous

to

the

stronger. Cleitophon

and

Polemarchus

immediately

conclude

that this

criticism is

devastating

to

Thrasymachus'

stated

position

(339e9~340C4).

If the

essential

quality

of

justice

is

that it

is

always

advantageous

to

the

stronger,

then

there

could

not

be

a case

of

justice

which

was

not

advantageous

to

the

stronger.

Socrates'

criticism

seems

to

them

to

offer

a

perfect

counter-example

to

Thrasymachus'

account of

the

nature

of

justice.

?



8/12

224

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY

Gleitophon,

however,

believes

that

Thrasy?

machus

has

merely

misstated

his

view,

and

suggests

that

"...

by

what

is

advantageous

to

the

stronger

he

meant

fiwhat

the

stronger

thinks

is

to

his

advantage.'

This

is what

the weaker

must

do,

and

this is his definition of justice (34ob5~7)."

Cross

and

Woozley

argue

that

Thrasymachus

would

have done well

to

accept

Cleitophon's

reformulation

in

order

to

escape

inconsistency,

"for

while

a

ruler

may

make

a

mistake

as

to

what

actually

is

his

interest he

will

hardly

make

a

mistake

as

to

what he

believes

to

be

his

interest;

and if

it

is

right

for

subjects

to

do what

the ruler

believes

to

be

in

his

interest,

it

will

not matter

that

the ruler is

mistaken in

believing

so."4

Sparshott5 disagrees

with

this

suggestion,

and

I

believe

rightly

so.

If

Thrasymachus

had

agreed

with

Cleitophon

he

would

have been inconsistent. For

he has claimed that

justice

is

advantageous

to the

stronger,

and

Cleitophon's suggestion

entails

that

justice

is

obedience

to

the law. If

justice

is

nothing

more

nor

less than

obedience

to

the

law, however,

then

the

grounds

or

reasons

for

enacting

the

laws

(the

advantage

of

the

stronger)

drop

out as

irrelevant.

Thrasymachus,

however,

emphatically rejects

Cleitophon's

suggestion

on

the

grounds

that

in

the

strict

sense

of

ruler,

a

ruler

never

makes mistakes

(34odi~34ia2). Thrasymachus,

of

course,

is

not

here

claiming

either

that

some

rulers

are,

have

been,

or

might

be

infallible,

or

that

any

ruler

who

is

unjust

will

be infallible.

His

case

does

not

depend

upon

the

actual

existence

of

an

infallible ruler.

He

never

says, e.g.,

that

a

doctor

who

prescribes

the

wrong

medicine

on a

particular

occasion is

not

really

a

doctor,

nor

that

an

accountant

is

not

really

an

accountant

if he

sometimes

makes

mistakes

in

calculation.

He

simply

says,

in

effect,

that

our

grounds

for

calling

a man a

doctor

or

an

accountant

are

not

that

he

makes,

or

is

capable

of

making,

mistakes

in the

practice

of

his

profession,

and

the

same

holds

true

for rulers.

Thrasymachus

is,

I

suggest, doing

something

here

which is quite common in contemporary moral

philosophy:

he

is

distinguishing

a

role

or

office

from

the

man

who holds

the office

or

plays

the role. If

someone

were

to

ask

what

a

doctor

is,

and

if

we

know

of

a

particular

doctor

who has

made

a

mistake

in

the

diagnosis

of

a

certain

patient's

illness,

we

would

be

responding

in

a

misleading

and

inappropriate

way

if

we were

to answer

by

saying

that

a

doctor

is

one

whose

job

it

is

to

make

mistaken

diagnoses

of

people's

illnesses.

There

is

still

an

important

question

at

stake

here,

however

:

If

a

doctor

prescribed

a

certain medicine

on the basis of a mistaken diagnosis of a patient's

illness,

would

the

patient

be

acting

as

a

patient

should

if

he

obeyed

his

doctor?

By

analogy,

we

might

ask

Thrasymachus:

If the

unjust

ruler

makes

a

law which

he

mistakenly

believes

to

be advanta?

geous

to

himself,

would the

subjects

be

acting

justly

if

they obeyed

this law

?

We

know,

of

course,

that

normally

what

the

doctor

prescribes

is

what

a

patient

ought

to

do

to

treat

his

particular

illness

or

affliction.

It is

the

proper

job

of the doctor

to

prescribe

the

types

of

treatment

which

are

appropriate

to

the

particular

ills

and afflictions of

his

patients.

Thus

"doing

what

the doctor orders" is

commonly

accepted

as

roughly

synonymous

with

"applying

the

appropriate

treat?

ment to

the

proper

illness

or

affliction." But

this

does

not

mean

that

appropriate

treatment

for

any

given

disease

or

affliction

is

correctly

defined

as

"whatever the

doctor

prescribes."

If

I

smashed

my

toe

with

a

hammer

and

immediately

consulted

a

doctor,

his

advice

to

have

my

leg

cut

off

at

the

hip

would

not

be

acceptable

(at

least not

if

the smashed

toe

were

all

that

was

wrong

with

me).

Hence,

in the

case

of

Thrasymachus,

we

could

say

that in

one

sense,

a

vulgar

or

loose

sense,

a

man

would be

acting justly

if

he

obeys

a

law

which

a

ruler

mistakenly

thinks

to

be

to

his

own

advantage,

but

in

another

more

strict

or

absolute

sense,

he

would

not.

One

might today

want

to

contest

the

legitimacy

of such

a

distinction,

but

obviously

Plato

would

not,

since this is

a

characteristically

Platonic

way

of

arguing.

At

any

rate,

Socrates

accepts

Thrasymachus'

answer

as

satisfactory.

Subsequently,

he

speaks

only

of

the

ruler

in

the

strict

sense,

and

indeed,

as

Nettleship6 points

out,

he

thereafter identifies

the

practitioner,

qua

practitioner,

of

an

art

or

profession

with

the

art

or

profession.

Socrates next asks Thrasymachus whether the

physician,

qua

physician,

is

a

"money

maker,

an

earner

of

fees,

or

a

healer

of

the

sick,"

and

Thrasy?

machus,

of

course,

says

the

last

(341C2 ff.).

And if

a

man

is

sick,

it

is

obviously

to

his

benefit

to

have

the

services of

a

healer

available.

Socrates then

refers

to

other

examples,

each

of

which

is

designed

4

Gross

and

Woozley, op.

cit., p.

46.

5

F.

E.

Sparshott,

"Socrates

and

Thrasymachus,"

The

Monist,

Vol.

50

(1966),

pp.

424

ff.

6

Richard L.

Nettleship,

Lectures

on

the

Republic of

Plato,

2nd

ed.

(London, 1964),

p.

30.



9/12

IN DEFENSE OF THRASYMACHUS

225

to

show

that it is

the

subject

matter

of

an

art,

which

is benefited

by

the

perfect practicing

of the

art.

Thrasymachus

grudgingly

agrees

in

each

case.

Thus in

regard

to

the

ruling

of

a

state,

which

Thrasymachus

has

agreed

is

an

art,

it

would

seem

by analogy that it is the subjects as "subject matter"

of

the

art

of

ruling,

who benefit

from the

perfect

practice

of

this

art,

rather than

the ruler

who

practices

it.

It

seems

obvious

in the

text

that Socrates believes

that his

argument

from

analogy

of the other

arts

to

the

art

of

ruling

has

dealt

Thrasymachus'

account

a

death

blow.

It

is

at

first difficult

to

see

why

he

should

think

so.

The

principle

question

at

issue has

to

do with

the

nature

of

justice.

Even

if it is

true

that

the

perfect practice

of the

art

of

ruling

is

beneficial7

to

the

subjects, why

should

this

force

Thrasymachus

to

give

up

his

claim

that

justice

is

advantageous

to

the

stronger?

After

all,

he has

not

claimed

that

the ruler

is

a

strong

man,

by

definition,

nor

has

he

argued

that in

order

to

be

a

ruler, qua

ruler,

one

must

be

unjust.

Admittedly

he would

have

to

give

ground

on

some

points,

but

even

so,

why

could

he

not

rebut

Socrates'

argument

success?

fully

by saying,

"All

right,

if

a

strong

man

becomes

ruler,

he

won't

act

as

a

ruler

should,

strictly

speaking,

but he could

still be

a

great

strategist

and

an

unparalleled grafter"?

I

believe

that

the

reason

why Thrasymachus

does

not

take this line

is

that

Socrates

(or

perhaps

Plato)

has accepted a suppressed premiss which Thrasy?

machus fails

to

question

:

it

is

that

the

only

reason

why

a

practitioner

of

an

art

would

fail

to

manifest

perfectly

the definition of that

art

in

his

practice

is

that he is

ignorant.

Either he

does

not

know

the

definition,

or

else he doesn't

know

in

every

case

which action instantiates the

definition

(although

in

the

actual

dispute,

the latter

kind of

ignorance

is

seldom touched

upon).

When

Thrasymachus

first

makes

the

vulgar-sense

vs.

strict-sense

distinction,

the

examples

he

uses are

those

of

a

doctor who mis

diagnoses

a

patient's

illness and

an

accountant

who

makes

a

mistake in calculation.

It is

implicitly

assumed that the

examples

referred to are

examples

of

unintentional

errors,

and

this kind of

example

is

extended

across

the

board

to

all

the

arts,

including

the

art

of

ruling.

Thus

in

the

analogy

of the

arts,

Socrates

assumes

without

argument

that the

only

deviations

from

perfection

in

ruling

must

be

in

the

form of unintentional

errors,

due

to

ignorance

of

the

true nature

of

ruling.

Because

Thrasymachus

accepts

this

suppressed

premiss,

he

believes

himself

to

be

in

the

following

dilemma

:

Insofar

as

a

man

is

unjust,

he

is

concerned

only

with

self-aggrandizement;

anyone

who

prac?

tices

an

art

less than

perfectly

does

so

out

of

ignorance of the nature of perfect practice of that

art;

the

perfect

practice

of

the

art

of

ruling

is

advantageous

to

the

subjects,

and

not

to

the ruler.

Therefore,

an

unjust

ruler,

to

the

extent

that he is

unjust,

and

in

virtue of

the

fact that he is

unjust,

is

ignorant

of the

nature

of

ruling.

Hence

a

com?

pletely unjust

ruler would

be

completely

ignorant

of

the

art

of

ruling.

He would

be

directly analogous

to

the

man

who

knows

absolutely nothing

about

music

or

musical

instruments,

yet

who

attempts

to

attune

a

stringed

instrument

properly

(cf.

349e).

Although

Thrasymachus

can

see

no

way

out

of

this

dilemma,

Socrates'

conclusion

seems

to

fly

in

the face of obvious facts.

Thrasymachus

believes

that the

vast

majority

of

actual

rulers

are

grossly

unjust

men,

and,

far

from

being ignorant

of

the

nature

of

ruling, they

seem

to

him

much

more

knowledgeable

than

the ruler

who

has

the

oppor?

tunity

to

defraud

his

subjects

on

a

grand

scale,

but

deliberately

refrains from

doing

so.

Socrates' view

seems

to

him

incredibly

naive. An

analogy

Thrasymachus

might

have used would be that of

a

gambling

game

between

an

honest

man

and

a

cheat,

in

which

the

cheat wins

(by cheating)

the

money, lands,

possessions,

servants,

slaves,

titles,

even the clothes on the back of the honest man. By

analogy,

Socrates'

position

would

seem

to

imply

that

the

honest

man

actually

comes

out

ahead,

because

he

plays

the

game

as

it

should

be

played,

and

that

every

time

the

cheater

cheats,

he

thereby

merely

reveals his

ignorance

of the

game.

Surely

Thrasymachus

should

have

rejected

Socrates'

suppressed premiss. Nothing

in

Thrasy?

machus'

account

requires

it.

To

accept

this

premiss

would be

to

place

in the

same

category

of

ignorance

a

young,

inexperienced

physician

who mis

diagnoses

an

illness,

and/or

mis-prescribes

treat?

ment,

on

one

hand,

and

an

experienced physician

who prescribes removal of organs and tissue which

he knows

to

be

healthy

(tonsils, appendices,

etc.),

to

gain

an

undeserved

fee,

on

the

other hand.

Nevertheless,

in

the

text

Thrasymachus

does

not

reject

Socrates'

suppressed premiss,

but

rather,

in

frustration,

turns

the

full

force

of his

scorn

and

derision

upon

him

(343a ,

ff.)

:

Socrates

needs

a

nurse

to

wipe

his

nose.

He

is

such

a

child

in

7

The

term

translated

"advantageous"

in

Ja

is

the

same

as

that

translated

"beneficial"

in

Socrates'

analogy

of the

arts

(To

Xump?ron).

Thus

his

claim could

have

been

worded,

"the

perfect

practice

of

an

art

is

advantageous

to

its

subject

matter."



10/12

226

AMERICAN

PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY

practical

matters

that he

cannot

see

that

shepherds

and

cattle

herdsmen tend

sheep

and

cattle for their

own or

their masters'

profit,

rather than for the

benefit of

the

sheep

and

cattle,

and that the

rulers

of

states

treat

their

subjects

like

sheep, caring

for

them only to gain greater profit from them.

Socrates'

answer

to

this

attack

(345b4, ff.)

is

to

chide

Thrasymachus

for

failing

to

draw the

conclusion which follows from the

former

argument

(i.e.,

that

the

art

of

ruling

is

advantageous

to

the

subjects

and

not

to

the

ruler),

and

to

maintain

that

the

same

kind of

argument

applies

to

the

"art"

of

shepherding

:a

shepherd

is

correctly

defined,

not

as

an

earner

of

wages

or

fees,

but

as one

who

cares

for

sheep.

Thus

again

it

is the

subject

matter

of this

art

(the sheep)

which

benefits from excellent

practice,

rather

than

the

practitioner.

It is

interesting

to note

that

Thrasymachus

never

actually

admits

that

Socrates

has

refuted

his claim

that

justice

is

advantageous

to

the

stronger.

Thus

we

are

left

to

decide for ourselves

whether

he

really

believed his view

to

be

defeated,

or,

alternatively,

whether

he still

believed

his

original position

to

be

perfectly

correct,

even

though

he

was

unable

at

the

time

to

see

a

mistake in

Socrates'

reasoning.

Does

Socrates

make

such

a

mistake? Even

if,

purely

for the sake of

argument,

we

were

to

grant

him

his

suppressed

premiss

(i.e.,

that

any

deviation

from

perfection

in

the

practice

of

an

art

is

uninten?

tional and due

entirely

to

ignorance

of the

true

nature of the art), has he indeed shown that, in the

appropriate

sense,

the

art

of

ruling, strictly

speaking,

is

beneficial

(advantageous)

to

the

subjects

?

It

is

not

unimportant

that,

in

the

dispute

with

Thrasymachus,

Socrates

does

not

spell

out

the

ways

in

which

the

perfect practice

of the

art

of

ruling

would be

advantageous

to

the

subjects:

he

merely

concludes

that

it

must

be

so,

because

in the

case

of

the other

arts

examined,

the

subject

matter

of

the

arts,

rather

than the

artists,

were

the beneficiaries

of

excellent

practice.

Note

also

that

it

is

absolutely

vital

to

Socrates'

case

that

the

benefits derivable

from the perfect practice of an art be seen as such

by

the

subject

matter,

in

the

sense

that the

practice

of

the

art must

provide

something

needful,

worth?

while,

or

desirable

from

the

viewpoint

of

the

subject

matter.

Granted

this

presents

a

real

difficulty

in

those

cases

in

which the

subject

matter

is

inanimate,

as

for

example,

in

the manufacture

of musical

instruments,

even

here,

by

extension,

one

might

think of the

objective

worth

of, e.g.,

a

violin

being

enhanced

by

the

skill of

a

master

craftsman,

whereas

a

hack

might

have

used the

same

materials

and

made

an

inferior

instrument.

In

fact,

Socrates does

not

focus

attention

on

those

arts

whose

subject

matter

is inanimate when

he is trying to prove his point about the art of

ruling.

His

primary example

is that

of the

physician.

A

physician

is

defined

as

a

healer

of

the sick.

Healing

the sick

is

an

activity

which

is

beneficial

to

the

patients,

in

the

sense

of

providing

a

service

which

is

needful

and desirable

from the

patients'

point

of

view.

It

is

this feature which

Socrates

believes

has

its

analogue

in

all

the

other

arts,

including

the

art

of

ruling.

But

even

though

this

may

be

true

of

medicine,

it

is

a

mistake

to

conclude

that

all

arts,

if

practiced

excellently,

are

desirable

or

needful

from

the

point

of

view

of the

subject

matter.

This

can

easily

be shown

by

appeal

to

other sorts of

practices

which would

surely

fit into

Socrates'

broadly

general

concept

of

an

art.

The

art

of

torture,8

for

example,

would

surely

fit

Socrates'

model. As

an

art,

it

can

be

practiced

well

or

badly.

The

proficient

torturer

is

the

one

who

can

keep

his victims

alive

and in

constantly increasing

agony

for

the

longest

period

of

time.

He is

the

one

who

never

fails

to extract

the

confession,

or

the

recantation,

or

the oath

of

allegiance,

or

the

suppressed

information

from

unwilling

victims.

It

follows

that,

just

as

in

the

case

of

the

physician,

one

cannot

correctly

define

a

torturer,

qua

torturer,

as

an

earner

of

wages

or

fees.

Thrasymachus

himself

provides

another

example

which,

with

a

few

hypothetical amplifications,

could

also

serve

to

illustrate

Socrates'

mistake:

Suppose

it

were

the

case

that

extremely

fat

sheep

bring

the

best

price

on

the

market.

Suppose,

however,

that

very

fat

sheep

suffer from shortness

of

breath,

constant

pain

in the

lungs,

aching

ankles,

and

continual

nausea.

As

Socrates

says,

the

shepherd,

qua

shepherd,

is

defined

as

one

who

cares

for

sheep,

not

as an earner

of

wages

or

fees.

Yet in

this

case,

no

one

could

deny

that the best

shepherd

would

be the

one

who

was

able

to

bring

the

fattest

sheep to market (i.e., this is what "caring for the

sheep"

would

consist

of,

at

least

in

part).

The

above

are

only

two

of

many

possible

examples

which

could

be

given

to

illustrate

the

point

that the

perfect

practicing

of

an

art

may

not

be such

as

to

fulfill

the

needs

of,

improve,

or

in

other

ways

be desirable

from

the

point

of

view

of

the

subject

matter.

Socrates

speaks

of

the

function

of

an

art

as,

in

8

This

example

was

first

suggested

to

me

by

T. G.

Smith.



11/12

IN

DEFENSE

OF THRASYMACHUS

227

one

way

or

another,

alleviating

the

"defects"

of

its

subject

matter

(342a2,

ff.).

The

art

of

medicine has

come

into

being

because

the

human

body

is

defective. But

this

sort

of

language

unjustifiably

prejudices

the

case.

In what

sense

is

the

subject

matter of the art of torture "defective" ?Only in

the

sense

that

various

forms of

external stimuli

are

capable

of

causing

people pain.

The

art

of

torture,

then,

would

never

have

come

into

being

if

people

were

unable

to

feel

pain

and

anguish.

If

Socrates'

discussion

of

the function

and

origins

of

the

various

arts

are

purged

of such

question

begging

language,

what remains

?What

conclusion

can one

draw

from his

analogy

of the arts?

I

suggest,

merely

the value-neutral

point

that

for

any

art

or

artist

to

exist,

there

must

be

an

appropriate

subject

matter

on

which the

art

can

be

practiced.

For

there

to

be

physicians

and

an

art

of

medicine,

there

must

exist

patients

on

whom

it can

be

practiced;

i.e.,

people

with bodies

that

are

not

invulnerable

to

disease, accident,

or

infirmity.

For

the

art

of

shepherding

to

exist,

there

must

be

sheep

to

care

for. And

for there

to

be

rulers,

there

must

be

subjects

to

rule. Whether the

subject

matter

"benefits"

from

the

proficient

practicing

of

an

art,

in the

sense

of

having

something

needful

or

desir?

able

provided

for

it

or

done

to it

(from

the stand?

point

of

the

subject

matter

itself,

that

is),

is

contingent

upon

the

type

of

art

involved.

It

is

certainly

not true

of all

the

arts.

Socrates' argument that the perfect practice of

the

art

of

ruling

is

necessarily advantageous

to

the

subjects

thus fails

completely

to

refute

Thrasyma?

chus.

All that

one

is

justified

in

concluding

from

his

argument

is

that there

must

be

subjects

on

which

to

practice

this

art,

or

else

neither

art

nor

artist could

exist.

One

can now

also

draw

the conclusion

that

even

if

Socrates

is

granted

his

highly questionable

premiss

that

failure

to

conform

perfectly

to

the

definition

of

an

art

entails

ignorance

on

the

part

of

the

artist,

it

remains

possible

that

a

ruler

might

be

unjust

and

still be

a

ruler

in

the strict

sense.

If the textual Thrasymachus had seen the error

in

Socrates'

analogy

of the

arts,

he

could

have

turned

the tables

on

him

by

pointing

out

that

Socrates

is not

dealing

with

the

ruler,

qua ruler,

but

rather

with

the

ruler,

qua

just

man,

which,

of

course,

is

precisely

what Socrates

is

doing.

On

Thrasymachus'

view,

one

is

a

ruler

in

the

strict

sense

of this

term

if

he

always

makes

laws

which

are

advantageous

to

himself. As

we

have

seen,

it

would be

a

mark of

ineptitude

on

the

part

of

the

ruler if these laws

were

other than what

both

Socrates and

Thrasymachus

would

agree

were

just

laws. If

a

ruler

were

in this

sense

infallible,

he

would

be

a

just

ruler in the

strict

sense

of ruler

if

he

did

not

take unfair

advantage

of

the

opportunities

for

exploitation which are afforded him by the law

abiding

acts

of

his

subjects;

he

would be

an

unjust

ruler

in

the strict

sense

of ruler if

he did cheat and

defraud

his

subjects

in

their

just

dealings

with

him.

*

*

*

A transition

in

Socrates'

line of

argument

be?

comes

evident

at

this

point.

Socrates

obviously

believes

that the

appeal

to

the

analogy

of

the

arts

has refuted

Thrasymachus'

claim that

justice

is

the

advantage

of the

stronger,

and he

then

turns

to

the

question

whether the

just

life

or

the

unjust

life is

more

profitable,

a

very

complex

problem,

but

separate

and distinct from

the

question

of the

essential

nature

of

justice,

and thus

beyond

the

scope

of the

present

inquiry.

I believe that Plato views

Thrasymachus'

account

of the

nature

of

justice

as

plausible

and

persuasive,

and

as

one

which,

as

far

as

it

goes,

is

accurate.

Justice

as

a

way

of

life is

a

social

pheno?

menon,

as

Socrates and

Thrasymachus

implicitly

agree.

It

requires

the mutual

interaction

of

the

members

of

a

society

or a

social

group

for its

occurrence.

And

it

is

surely

true

that

just

action,

in the absence of any legal guarantees or collateral

held,

does

place

the

just

agent

in

a

position

to

be

unfairly

exploited.

And

it

further

strengthens

Thrasymachus'

case

to

point

out

that in

most

organized

societies there

are

such

guarantees.

For

this

is

an

admission

that

the

vulnerability

involved

in

acting justly

has

to

be

compensated

for

by

the

imposition

on

society

of

a

system

of

laws,

police,

courts,

and

prisons

to

protect

the

just

from the

unjust.

To

counter

Thrasymachus'

insight,

Socrates

could

have

attempted

to

show

that

a

just

man

need

not

be

so

naive

as

to

believe

that

all

the

people

with whom he deals will be just. He could have

examined the

many

ways,

both

legal

and

social,

by

which

in

Documents

In Defence of Thrasymachus