IMPLEMENTATION AND POLICY CONVERGENCE

Lecture 6

2014-15

• Correct and timely implementation by the member states of common policies agreed upon at the regional level is a pre-requisite of regional integration.

• No regional integration can be achieved without homogeneous policy implementation

Implementation in regional organizations

• Regional organizations are multi-level structures.

• Policies decided at the regional level must be implemented at the level of governance of member states or lower (regions).

• The number of actor involved and of “clearance points” (Wildavski , Pressmann see lect. 4) is particularly high and therefore the probability of implementation deficits is also particularly high.

Implementation in the EU

• Steuneberg (2004) :• “the current literature on the EU tends to

emphasize the EU legislative stage in which policy is shaped by the interactions between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.

• However, from a policy perspective, such a view is insufficient and does not show how the ambitions formulated in Brussels are transformed and implemented in the national and sometimes regional and local administrations of the member states”p.315

Why is the implementation problem relevant in the EU ?

• The EU is a multi-level structure.

• Policies decided at the EU level are implemented at the level of governance of member states or lower (regions).

• EU directives normally set only the policy goals and the deadline for incorporation into national law (transposition).

• Moreover a directive may contain ambiguous provisions resulting from intergovernmental bargaining at the EU level.

• Only after transposition directives are applied at the national level.

• Implementation is also a problem for candidates to EU membership (membership is conditional on legal implementation of the acquis )

• The number of “clearance points” (Wildavski , Pressmann see lect. 4) is particularly high

Implementation in the EU

• “the black hole…..”

Interest groupsRegional governments

PARLIAMENT

Government

European policy processCommission’s proposals – Decisions of the Council

of Ministers or the European Council Role of Permanent Representative in preparation

Of decisions

State’s preferences Directivesregulations

Domestic governmentsand parliamentsTRANSPOSITION

EU legislation incorporated

into national legislation

IMPLEMENTATIONNational Burocracies, Regional Governments

MULTI-LEVEL POLICY PROCESS OF THE EU

I

M

P

L

E

M

E

N

T

A

T

I

O

NPOLICY OUTCOMES

Enforceability of EU law

• Unlike international agreements, the EU has “commitment institutions” (Mattli 1995) to enforce compliance of m.s. with EU law.

• The European Commission can instigate legal proceedings against m.s. for non compliance with the EU law, that, in case of continuing non-compliance , can end up in a judgment of the ECJ that obliges the state to comply and may impose financial sanctions .

Studying implementation of EU policies (1)

• Started late, after the re-launch of the Single Market in the late 1980s, which produced legislation that needed to be properly implemented in order to achieve the goal of single market.

• First wave of studies focus mainly on legal transposition, on the basis of the assumption that once transposed EU legislation was implemented as national legislation.

• Explaining factors: clarity of the directives, institutional framework of transposition, administrative capability

Studying implementation of EU policies Europeanization and the “goodness of fit”

thesis• Posits that the greater the similarity between EU policy

and the domestic policy traditions, the better the implementation of EU policies.

• Main assumption is that governments and administrators prefer the status quo

• When EU policies are consistent with existing policies and no major policy change is needed domestic governments and administrators are willing to comply; when fundamental changes are needed they will drag their feet .

• The thesis of misfit was meant to explain both problems of transposition and problems of application, that in fact involve different actors .

Studying implementation of EU policies (3):

• conditions that influence the implementation process.

• 1) veto players and their preferences (Tsebelis) .

• 2) administrative capabilities

Studying implementation of EU policies (3):

• Steunenberg : Identifying who the relevant actors are in process of implementation of a EU policy.

• This depends on the national legal system and the extent to which this system gives policy-making power to different political and administrative actors: in some countries transposition through law voted by national parliaments, in other governmental decrees or ministerial orders or lower-level legal instruments adopted by administrators .

Veto players

• “veto players are those actors than can block the adoption of a policy” (Tsebelis 1995, 305)

• More are the veto players that are needed to adopt a policy, more difficult is to adopt it.

• But policy preference of veto players may converge therefore making policy change possible.

• Preferences of relevant actors may be more important than policy fit/misfit

It’s the bureaucracy, stupid! (Knill, 2006)

• Implementation depends on the resources and characteristics of the national bureaucracies, in particular regarding the practical application of legislation.

• 3 characteristics of the bureaucracies are particularly relevant:

• -financial resources • -strength of the bureaucracies• -degree of fit of the administrative arrangements

with the EU requirements

financial resources

• Administrative action costs money (salaries, computers etc.)

• Administrations that are understaffed and under-resourced are less effective in implementation

strength of the bureaucracies

• Bureaucratic autonomy from the political power

• Administrative action based on clearly specified legal rules (accountability)

• Absence of corruption

degree of fit of the administrative arrangements with the EU requirements

• Effective implementation can be expected only as far as European requirements are not at odds with long established administrative styles and structures at the national level.

• Example: role of evaluation in policy making and implementation (cohesion policy)

• Effectiveness or labor inspectorates for even application of regualations on safety at work

• Law experts vs technicians

How to increase compliance

• -enforcement

• -management

• Persuasion

EnforcementThe basic assumption is that non-

implementation derives from actors preferences. The way to assure compliance is therefore to make the costs of non compliance higher than the benefits of non-compliance The level of compliance therefore depends on the probability and the severity of sanctions .

Cost-benefit calculations Compliance - logic of consequences

Infringement procedure the EU ha uncommonly strong means of ensuring compliance

through enforcement: through its infringement procedure the European Commission probably exerts more direct pressure on defecting Member States than any other international organization. When a Member State does not follow commonly agreed rules the Commission can begin an infringement procedure. It consists of four steps:

• ‘Letter of Formal Notice, • Reasoned Opinion,• Referral to the European Court of Justice• and Judgment of the ECJ’. In cases of continuing opposition to the ECJ judgment, the

procedure can be started over again and possibly lead to financial sanctions.

Normally 90% of the cases are solved before the reasoned opinion (m.s. comply) and sanctions are extremely rare events, nevertheless the provision is a rather powerful deterrent (legal transposition)

Softer enforcement tools • Increasingly used in the EU and widespread in

other organizations:

• Naming and shaming

• Scoreboards

Management

• Instrumental logicIncrease the capability for implementation of national administrations

• EX. EU : During the transposition phase of a directive, bilateral or package meetings sometimes take place. Both aim at improving the implementation of EUdirectives in the Member States and are clear-cut examples of co-operation instruments that fall under the category of management logic set up single co-ordination points responsible for the application of Community law (ex:single market).

• Capacity building Particularly relevant :EU candidate countriesNon-EU regional organizations (States with very weak

administrative capabilities)

Persuasion

• Normative Logic-promote values and ideas

• Compliance “logic of appropriateness”

• Ex: financial support of actors promoting new ideas that may influence the national discourse and in so doing change in the medium to long term.

• Processes of socialization

Policy convergence

• 'the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and performances “ (Bennett, 1991)

• Policy convergence is of importance given trends towards regional integration , particularly in the debate on the EU.

• Policy convergence may be the outcome of implementation of regional regulations, but not necessarily so (lessons drawing etc.).

What is policy convergence ? • “Policy convergence probably means one of five things. 1. it can signify a convergence of policy goals, a coming

together of intent to deal with common policy problems. 2. it can refer to policy content, defined as the more formal

manifestations of government policy - statutes, administrative rules, regulations, court decisions and so on.

3. there may be a convergence on policy instruments, i.e. the institutional tools available to administer policy, whether regulatory, administrative or judicial.

4. convergence may occur on policy outcomes, impacts or consequences - the results (positive or negative, effective or ineffective) of implementation.

5. there may be a convergence of policy style, a more diffuse notion signifying the process by which policy responses are formulated (consensual or conflictual, incremental or rational, anticipatory or reactive, corporatist or pluralist, etc.). “(Bennett, 1991, p.218)

Convergence is a process

• “Convergence should be seen as a process of 'becoming' rather than a condition of 'being' more alike: 'Convergence means moving from different positions toward some common point.” (Bennett, 1991, p.219)

Policy convergence def .

• “any increase in the similarity between one or more characteristics of a certain policy (e.g. policy objectives, policy instruments, policy settings) across a given set of political jurisdictions (supranational institutions, states, regions, local authorities) over a given period of time. Policy convergence thus describes the end result of a process of policy change over time towards some common point, regardless of the causal processes “(Knill, 2005, p. 5).

How does convergence occur?Bennet 1991

• EMULATION-lessons-drawing• THROUGH ELITE NETWORKING AND POLICY

COMMUNITIES –given the existence of shared ideas amongst a relatively enduring network of elites (political, technical, bureaucratic) regularly interacting at the transnational level.

• THROUGH HARMONIZATION –as a consequence of authoritative action by responsible intergovernmental organizations , rising from the perception of interdependence and willingness to cooperate.

• TROUGH PENETRATION when states are forced to conform to actions taken elsewhere by external actors.

Debate on policy convergence in the EU Does OMC work?

• In what conditions does the OMC provide policy convergence towards common goals?

Factors explaining policy convergence (Citi, Rhodes 2007)

• In a multi-level policy, convergence depends both on:

• Supra-national factors : common institutions, goals and policy instruments

• Domestic factors : preferences and interests of domestic actors, the costs of domestic implementation and the openness to policy transfer

External (EU level) factors explaining policy convergence

• Potential for policy convergence depends on the instruments available in the different OMC processes to promote compliance. Policy instruments can be used in combination to produce policy convergence .

• SIMPLE BENCHMARKING AND RECCOMENDATIONS

• VOLUNTARY POLICY OBJECTIVE+BENCHMARKIG AND PEER PRESSURE

• VOLUNTARY POLICY OBJECTIVE+BENCHMARKIG AND PEER PRESSURE+STRUCTURED COORDINATION PROCESS

• LEGALLY BINDING POLICY OBJECTIVE+ BENCHMARKIG AND PEER PRESSURE+STRUCTURED COORDINATION PROCESS

• LEGALLY BINDING REGULATIONS

SIMPLE BENCHMARKING AND RECCOMENDATIONS

• The weakest convergence potential

• Recommendations of the Commission no strength to compel, at best ‘moral suasion’.

• Benchmarking-national performances compared among themselves and with standards ‘naming and shaming’

• Ex: Education

VOLUNTARY POLICY OBJECTIVE+BENCHMARKIG AND PEER PRESSURE

• M.S. have explicitly committed themselves to pursue collectively defined objectives and their performance is assessed with reference to those commitments .

• Performance is assed through monitoring at the highest political level , in principle implying reactions from other national leaders (peer pressure) .

• Ex : research and innovation, pension policy

VOLUNTARY POLICY OBJECTIVE+BENCHMARKIG AND PEER PRESSURE+STRUCTURED

COORDINATION PROCESS • Mechanisms of peer review and peer pressure

regarding the comparison of national performance take place within a system of structured coordination of national policies according to common guidelines and national reform plans.

• European Employment Strategy 1997-annual cycle starting with guidelines adopted by the European Council after which every state develops a National Action Plan of reforms whose outcomes are assed by the Commission and the Council in an Employment Report including recommendations (although legally non binding) to the single states

LEGALLY BINDING POLICY OBJECTIVE+ BENCHMARKIG AND PEER PRESSURE+STRUCTURED COORDINATION PROCESS

• The strongest of non-legislative methods.

• Policy objectives are legally binding although states can choose their policies for convergence.

• Stability and Growth Pact in view of the EMU: ex: maximum threshold for national deficits at 3% of GDP

LEGALLY BINDING REGULATIONS

• Beyond open coordination- community method (implementation of legally binding rules)

Domestic factors explaining policy convergence

In which conditions is it rational for domestic actors to transfer a policy in absence of coercion?

• POLICY FAILURE,UNCERTAINITY AND INSECURITY• EXTERNAL CONDITIONALITY• FUNCTIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE• CONSENSUS AND NORMATIVE CONSITENCY• DOMESTIC RECEPTIVITY

And in which conditions is it not rational for domestic actors to transfer a policy in absence of coercion?

• WHEN THE COSTS OF POLICY TRANSFER ARE HIGHER THAN THE EXPECTED BENEFITS

POLICY FAILURE,UNCERTAINITY AND INSECURITY

• Politicians look elsewhere for solutions when they perceive that a policy is failing or they don’t know how to proceed.

• Or when their perceive that their support is evaporating and they want to assure themselves legitimacy through imitating successful models

• (lessons-drawing)

EXTERNAL CONDITIONALITY

• When they have been promised benefits in exchange for policy transfer .

• Enlargement of the EU, ENP conditionality crucial tool for influencing domestic policy

FUNCTIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE

• When two countries or more adopt policies that can be harmful for their neighbor : ex. decreasing the tax burden for enterprises to attract foreign capital, reducing workforce’s rights “race to the bottom”.

• This can justify the adoption of common regulations

CONSENSUS AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY

• Depends on the clarity of the model (ex: high for autonomy of Central Banks, less so for EES).

DOMESTIC RECEPTIVITY

• Diversity of national contexts regarding cultural and institutional differences .

• Domestic receptivity may be enhanced with processes of elite socialization. OMC processes created pan-European epistemic communities (expert sharing ideas about policy areas)

Reasons for not transfer policies:WHEN THE COSTS OF POLICY TRANSFER ARE HIGHER THAN THE EXPECTED BENEFITS

• Costs may be :

• Financial

but also

• Political (unpopularity, powerful groups defending the status quo)

References

• M.Citi, M. Rhodes, Policy convergence in the EU: Common Objectives vs. national Preferences, European Governance Papers, n.7, 2001

• http://eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC/New%20OMC%20links/egp-newgov-N-07-01.pdf