IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Session 3.1 Overview of the Additional Protocol M. Derrough Senior Inspector, Division of Operations B Regional

IAEAInternational Atomic Energy Agency

Session 3.1Overview of the Additional Protocol

M. Derrough

Senior Inspector, Division of Operations B

Regional Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material for States in the Middle East with Limited Nuclear Material and Activities

Amman, Jordan, 17 to 21 January 2010

IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 2

Session Outline

• Limitations under CSAs

• The Additional Protocol

• Information on mines and concentration plants

• Information on imports/exports

• Information on future plans


Limitations under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements


Objective of Safeguards

Provide Assurances on the Correctness and Completeness

of a State’s nuclear material declarations


What kind of assurances?

• Under a CSA alone, only credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material can be provided

• More information and access is required to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for a State as a whole


Some of the limitations under CSAs

• Focuses on declared materials at strategic points in declared facilities (access limited)

• Covers only partially the nuclear fuel cycle

• No assurances of absence of undeclared nuclear material and facilities (completeness)


Political changes in 1990-1995

• Dissolution of the former Soviet Union• South Africa’s destruction of its nuclear

weapons and accession to the NPT• Discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear

programme• DPRK• Indefinite extension of NPT


IAEA Board of Governors (March 1995)

“…the safeguards system for implementing comprehensive safeguards agreements

should be designed to provide for verification by the Agency of the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations,

so that there is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and

of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities”


Strengthening Programme

June 1995 Programme 93+2 measures divided into Part I (within existing authority) and Part II (new authority needed)

June 1996An open-ended committee of the Board (Committee 24) was established to negotiate the legal instrument for additional authority


The Additional Protocol


The Model Additional Protocol

• New legal instrument approved by Board of Governors in May 1997 (INFCIRC/540)

• Concluded by States on a voluntary basis; becomes part of a State’s safeguards agreement


Objective

Provide the IAEA with better tools for verifying the

correctness and completeness of States’ declarations


Measures of the additional protocol

• State’s provision of extended declaration

• Inspector’s broader access rights• Better administrative arrangements, e.g.

visas


Coverage under a CSA

Waste Storage

Waste Storage

CSA


Expanded coverage with an AP

CSA AP

Waste Storage

Waste Storage


Extended declaration on nuclear material

• Domestically produced source material

• Imports/exports of source material for non-nuclear purposes

• Locations and uses of exempted material

• Waste containing terminated nuclear material


Extended declaration on nuclear-related facilities and activities

• Co-located nuclear infrastructure

• Other locations where nuclear material is located (mines/exempted/terminated)

• Nuclear-related research and development not involving nuclear material

• Nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material

• State’s future plans


Example

RBA, RURITANIA1 APRIL 2001

(Training Map – Artificial Information)


Broader access rights

• All places in nuclear installations or on sites

• All other places where nuclear material is located

• Decommissioned facilities

• Some locations where nuclear-related activities are conducted

• Other locations, under certain circumstances


Better administrative arrangements

• Simpler inspector designation• No visas or multi-year multiple entry

visas• Modern communications capabilities


Information on mines and concentration plants

IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 22 22

Mining

• U and Th naturally occurring

• Uniformly distributed on Earth in rock forming minerals, sands

• Various techniques:• Open Pit• Underground• In-situ leach• Tails reworking


Open Pit Mine

• Arlit mine, Niger


Underground Mine

• Shaft head frame at Dolní Rožínka, Czech Republic

• Underground at MacArthur River, Canada


In-situ Leach

25

Upper Aquifer

ImpermeableZone

MineralizedAquifer

ImpermeableZone

Evaporation ponds

Thickeners

Yellowcake drying and packaging

* Acid or alkaline depending on chemistry of Uranium layers

Reagent Supplies *

Control room

Monitoring wells

Well house

Injection well

Recovery well

Uranium deposit

Uranium Extraction


Tailings reworking


Reporting of mining materials and activities

• Safeguards activities are currently limited• Nuclear material accountancy is not applied

to uranium ore concentrates (UOC) but exports are reported

• Mine and mills sites annual production are declared under an additional protocol.


Information required under Article 2.a.(v)

• Location, operational status, and production capacity

• Approximate annual production for the State as a whole

• Annual production for individual mines or plants if requested by the Agency


Information on imports / exports


Information required under Article 2.a.(ix) - Exports of Annex II Items

• Annex II lists “nuclear use” equipment and non-nuclear material in 7 major categories

• Information required about the identity, quantity, location of intended use for each export of Annex II equipment or material

• Agency may request confirmation by importing State

• Reporting on a quarterly basis


2.a.(ix) – Reactor Components


2.a.(ix) – Non-Nuclear Material


2.a.(ix) – Reprocessing


2.a.(ix) – Fuel Fabrication


2.a.(ix) – Enrichment


2.a.(ix) – Heavy Water Production


2.a.(ix) – Uranium Conversion Plants


Information on State’s future plans


Information required under Article 2.a.(x) - Fuel Cycle Plans

Information required:

• Government approved plans for nuclear fuel cycle

• Fuel cycle R&D specifically included

• For next 10-years


Conclusion


• The Additional Protocol is an integral part of the strengthened safeguards system

• The Additional Protocol increases Agency’s ability to detect and deter undeclared nuclear material or activities


• The tools of additional protocol allows the Agency to draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, a pre-requisite for the implementation of integrated safeguards

• Close cooperation with SSACs is necessary

Documents

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Session 3.1 Overview of the Additional Protocol M. Derrough Senior Inspector, Division of Operations B Regional