World Development Vol. 76, pp. 13–25, 20150305-750X/� 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddevhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.06.006

Hydropower, Anti-Politics, and the Opening of New Political Spaces

in the Eastern Himalayas

AMELIE HUBER a,b and DEEPA JOSHI c,*

a Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spainb Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey

c Wageningen University, The Netherlands

Summary. — Hydropower has lately been advocated by a multi-scalar public–private policy nexus for marrying objectives of greengrowth and climate mitigation. Such discursive constructions are reminiscent of a consensual development politics, which contradictsand overlooks long-standing socio-environmental controversies surrounding large dams. Here we argue that anti-political hydropowergovernance also risks fueling inherent societal antagonisms, with unexpected outcomes. Drawing on qualitative empirical research inSikkim, Northeast India, we illustrate how attempts by state and private actors to restrict contestation of hydropower projects werecountered with unprecedented voice and agency of affected communities, indicating nascent processes of politicization and democrati-zation “from below”.� 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Key words — large dams, water conflicts, environmental governance, depoliticization, India, Asia

* The authors would like to thank all the respondents in Sikkim and India

for their time and contribution, as well as Alex Bolding, Begum

Ozkaynak, Birgit Daiber, Christos Zografos, Daniella Blake, Diego

Andreucci, Ethemcan Turhan, Federico Demaria, Fikret Adaman,

Giorgos Kallis, Marta Conde, Panagiota Kotsila, Rita Calvario,

Rhodante Ahlers, and Viviana Asara for their constructive comments

on earlier versions of this paper. Writing of this paper has received funding

from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research,

technological development and demonstration (Marie Curie Actions)

under grant agreement no. 289374 (ENTITLE). The views expressed in

this paper are of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the

European Commission. Final revision accepted: June 6, 2015.

1. INTRODUCTION

Contemporary processes of environmental governanceexemplify the narrow techno-economic rationality that haslong shaped development policy and practice (Escobar, 1999;Goldman, 2001; Harriss, 2002; Li, 2007). The neoliberal ide-ologies that often drive environmental governance deliberatelysideline questions of complex, context-specific human–envi-ronment interactions through depoliticized and consensualgoverning and policy-making (Buscher, 2010). The discursiveconstruction of hydropower development as a green growthstrategy (World Bank, 2014), and the subsequent come-backof large dams in developing and newly dominant economies(Cole, Elliott, & Strobl, 2014; Pittock, 2010) are particularlycharacteristic of such consensual politics of development.

In 2000, the World Commission on Dams’ (WCD, 2000)critical appraisal of “large-dams-as-usual” as being environ-mentally unsustainable and socially unethical, marked alow-point for the global dam industry (McCully, 2001,p. xvi). The World Bank had already substantiallyreduced its lending for dam construction during the 1990s.Intense North–South civil society advocacy on the socio-environmental costs of large dams had pressured the world’sforemost traditional financier of mega-water-infrastructureto withdraw from controversial dam projects such as the Sar-dar Sarovar Project in the Indian Narmada valley (Khagram,2004), or Arun III in Nepal (Rest, 2012). Yet, within the pastdecade, controversial dam projects have again featured promi-nently in development planning, including on the WorldBank’s funding agenda (Cole et al., 2014; Pittock, 2010).According to Rachel Kyte, the bank’s vice president for sus-tainable development, “the earlier move out of hydro ‘wasthe wrong message.. . . That was then. This is now. We areback’” (Schneider, 2013).

This global hydropower boom is facilitated by a broadmulti-scalar policy consensus among donors, national andregional governments, dam-builders and large green groups,bringing together interests of green growth, private capitalaccumulation, and climate mitigation (Ahlers et al., 2015;Pittock, 2010). The dominant discourse legitimizes large hydro

13

as clean, reliable and affordable (Cole et al., 2014) and posi-tions dam development as the only “moral alternative to fossilfuel-based electricity” (Fletcher, 2010, p. 5). This consensus isinstitutionalized in climate finance arrangements such as theKyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),which enable polluting Northern parties to meet their climatecommitments (EC, 2004; Haya & Parekh, 2011), and provideeconomic and political incentives – a clean image – to privateinvestors (Newell, Phillips, & Purohit, 2011). By 2013, hydro-power made up 26% of CDM-registered projects, 1 eventhough evidence on whether, and at what scale hydropowerprojects actually off-set carbon emissions is scarce (Erlewein& Nusser, 2011; Haya & Parekh, 2011; Pottinger, 2008).

Both newly dominant economies like China, India, Turkey,or Brazil, as well as developing countries with hydropowerpotential, such as Nepal, Ethiopia, or Laos equate hydro-power development with energy security, stable growth ratesand modernization, and have liberalized their national energysectors to enable private capital to boost the rate and speed ofdam construction (Matthews, 2012; Moore, Dore, & Gyawali,2010). The fact that most of the proposed sites for new damsare located in isolated, economically marginal, and poorlydeveloped frontier regions, enables state governments to addi-tionally position hydropower as a main source of revenue tomitigate regional development discrepancies.

14 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

However, on the ground today’s large hydro projects areno less controversial and contentious than those of previousdecades. Many proposed dam sites are concentrated in eco-logically and culturally diverse regions such as the Amazon,the Nile, the Mekong River, or the Himalayas, and fre-quently in indigenous territories (Coelho & Favaretto,2008; Cole et al., 2014; Grumbine & Pandit, 2013; Orr,Pittock, Chapagain, & Dumaresq, 2012). These riverscapesare climate vulnerable ecosystems, where dam constructionis likely to exacerbate climate-related variability in waterflows and biodiversity, as well as vulnerability tohydro-climatic disasters (Shah, 2013; Vagholikar & Das,2010). As a result, accelerated hydropower developmenthas led to a multiplication of social conflicts over diverseissues such as cost–benefit distribution, hazard risks, andindigenous sovereignty among others (Baruah, 2012;Finley-Brook & Thomas, 2011; Matthews, 2012;McCormick, 2010; Sneddon & Fox, 2008).

This “manufacture” (Herman & Chomsky, 1994) of domi-nant green narratives about hydropower evokes earlier discur-sive constructions that served to legitimize controversial damprojects in the interest of powerful actors, for example theirframing as a panacea for water scarcity (Mehta, 2001). It isalso reminiscent of the shortcomings of consensual develop-ment politics in other extractive industries. Larsen andMamosso (2014, p. 62), for example, show how in Niger’s min-ing sector development cooperation “has ignored grievanceson grave environmental impacts and rampant institutionalfailures while a crisis discourse on desertification and foodinsecurity diverts attention from geopolitical interests in min-eral wealth”.

In this article we look at public–private hydropower devel-opment in the Eastern Himalayan state of Sikkim, NortheastIndia, where since 2000 the state government has proactivelyenabled private developers to implement a dozen largehydropower projects. To maximize the speed of dam con-struction, public participation in project-relateddecision-making has been undermined by hydro proponentsthrough a mix of strategies we refer to as anti-politics. Asa consequence, local resistance to hydropower developmenthas been either conspicuously absent or unprecedentedly out-spoken, calling for a nuanced analysis of such diverse expres-sions of popular political agency. The aim of this paper is toexplore how high-handed anti-political maneuvering “fromabove” clashes with the articulation of “political voices frombelow”. Our case study shows how the use of depoliticizingand coercive strategies to stifle dissent and to maximize thespeed of dam construction served to aggravate intrinsicsocial antagonisms. In the absence of legitimate channelsof expression this set in motion radical grassroots politicalprocesses.

The paper is structured as follows. We first give an overviewof theoretical debates about anti-politics, depoliticization, and“the political” at the interface of development studies andpolitical ecology. This is followed by an introduction to Sik-kim’s hydropower mission and the uneven pattern of conflictit has produced, illustrated against the backdrop of the state’spolitical-economic history. The remaining three sections pro-vide detailed empirical accounts of the different anti-politicaltactics used to pre-empt popular opposition to state-led hydro-power development; new forms of politicization and popularpolitical action that have emerged; and a theoretical discussionof how these relate to one another. The final section concludeswith policy implications.

2. ANTI-POLITICS, DEPOLITICIZATION, AND ‘‘THEPOLITICAL’’

Ferguson (1990) coined the term “anti-politics machine” todescribe the international donor-driven “development appara-tus” in Lesotho, Southern Africa, which tended tore-implement development projects despite their failure. Heillustrated how development planners, their discourses, andinterventions overlooked complex political and structuralcauses of poverty, class, inefficiency and corruption, and indoing so ended up segregating development practice from dee-ply entrenched politics within and outside the state. Suchrationalizing processes in development policy and practiceallow casting political dimensions of poverty, inequity, orunemployment as “technical problems” to be addressedthrough interventions by “politically neutral”, technicalexperts (Ferguson, 1990, p. 66).

Ferguson was cognizant of the “politics” of presentingdevelopment planning as an apolitical process. However, assuch, he saw no deep-rooted “conspiracy” in the anti-politicsmachine, whose outcomes he noted to be largely unintended,and yet welcome and useful to the act of rationalization. First,because by suspending “politics” from development planning,extremely sensitive political operations could be performed,thereby extending the powers of the state administration“under cover of a neutral, technical mission to which no onecan object” (Ferguson, 1990, p. 270). Second, because bydepoliticizing both poverty and the state, planned develop-ment could effectively undermine any possible political chal-lenges to the system.

Our research findings complement the work of Ferguson butalso draw parallels with research conducted by several otherscholars, who have challenged Ferguson’s assumption aboutthe (lack of) intentionality behind anti-politics effects – espe-cially considering that failed interventions are readily repeated(Bending, 2003). Based on his review of conservation anddevelopment projects in Southern Africa, Buscher (2010,p. 33), for example, argued for the need to recognize the struc-tural relations in which anti-politics as an “essential politicalstrategy [and] intrinsic element of the wider political economyof neoliberalism” operates. Li (2007, p. 9), who analyzed therationale and effects of rural improvement schemes in Indone-sia, proposed that by “rendering technical,” developmentplanning serves to meet particular development expectations,with a deliberate objective: containing a challenge, e.g.,through public mobilization, to the status quo – the domi-nance of particular classes or groups.

Another theoretical debate, which is relevant for the case ofSikkim, questions the unidirectional, top-down, hegemonicoperation of the anti-politics machine (Nustad, 2001), point-ing to its flip-side, and the need to understand how communi-ties affected by development interventions may challenge orbecome complicit in anti-political maneuvers (Bending, 2003;Li, 2007). Thus anti-political processes can work in multipledirections, with different stakeholder groups using differentanti-political strategies to legitimize their own interpretationsof any given development project (Buscher, 2010).

On the one hand, as Robins (1998) reminds us, developmentis not necessarily perceived by its intended beneficiaries as ananti-democratic, capitalist, and imperialist agenda, as somepost-development scholars may suggest. Their concerns areoften “far more contextual and contingent and groundedwithin the more immediate and mundane contexts of theireveryday lives” (Robins, 1998, p. 1679). Li (2007, p. 11) on

HYDROPOWER, ANTI-POLITICS, AND THE OPENING OF NEW POLITICAL SPACES IN THE EASTERN HIMALAYAS 15

the other hand emphasizes the counter-hegemonic moment,when the “targets of expert schemes” come up with theirown critical analysis of development problems, thereby punc-turing expert discourse with “a challenge it cannot contain”.She calls this “the practice of politics . . . which often startsout as a refusal of the way things are”, and which opens a“front of struggle” in the process (Li, 2007).

However, whether and how anti-politics strategies result in aclosing down of political spaces, or inadvertently provoke apolitical challenge, depends on situated geographical and eco-nomic factors (Li, 2007), as well as political and institutionalconfigurations (Chhotray, 2007). Chhotray’s research in India,for example, noted how, rather than reproducing failed devel-opment projects, “the [Indian] state has more direct ways ofestablishing its power” (Chhotray, 2007, p. 1039). Chhotrayalso suggested that not all actors and agencies engage in thesame way, and with the same intentionality in developmentpolitics, i.e., there is not one anti-political project.

Similar concerns over anti-politics in environmental man-agement and governance processes have been expressed bypolitical ecologists, who criticize the depoliticizing tendenciesin contemporary debates “over what to do with natures”(Swyngedouw, 2007, p. 23). Political ecology perspectiveschallenge alleged “win–win” approaches to environmentalgovernance and the concomitant “consensualism in policingpublic affairs” (Swyngedouw, 2011b, p. 2). They do so bypointing to the political and economic roots and consequencesof environmental transformation processes, and by emphasiz-ing the underlying, unequal power relations between the actorsinvolved (see for example Blaikie, 1999; Escobar, 1999; Mehta,2001; Peet & Watts, 1996; Robbins, 2004).

The techno-managerial literature on “sustainable develop-ment”, for instance, clearly reflects this absence of politics,blurring “who formulates and implements these strategies,and in whose interest” (Bryant, 1991, p. 164). Deliberationsover “what kind of natures we wish to inhabit . . . preserve,to make . . . and how to get there” are hardly encouraged indiscussions over socio-environmental futures (Swyngedouw,2007, p. 23). This is particularly evident in contemporary sci-entific and policy discourses relating to water scarcity(Mehta, 2001) or climate change (Swyngedouw, 2011a), wherepopular, broad-brush arguments emphasize apocalyptic uni-versal threats to a singular imagining of a desirable “environ-ment”. As Swyngedouw (2011a) argued, images and concepts,such as climate change and sustainability are so carefully pre-sented as apolitical global humanitarian causes that theybecome impossible to disagree with. Yet, this obscures thatall natures are socio-ecologically co-produced, heterogeneous,and thus by definition antagonistic political constructs.

How do we relate to the above analyses to gain an under-standing of the everyday politics of hydropower on theground? Central to our understanding of anti-politics is thedistinction between “the political” as the antagonistic dimen-sion constitutive of human society (Mouffe, 2005), and “poli-tics” as “the power plays between political actors and theeveryday choreographies of policy making” (which includesthe practices of conventional democratic politics;Swyngedouw, 2011b, p. 4). Anti-politics, as a governmentpractice, is driven by a belief in the possibility and desirabilityof consensus. It therefore negates the importance of antago-nism in democratic politics, removing “the political” fromdebates about development and environmental interventions,and from the management process itself. It aims to abolishthe social, deliberative process of democraticdecision-making that endorses discursive contests, especiallythe contestation of political decisions and “hegemonic meta-

phoric language that disguises alternatives or constrainschoice” (Marden, 2003, p. 234). Making explicit this distinc-tion is important in our research context, where popular imag-ination tends to ascribe the terms “politics” and “political(activity)” to the domain of mass politics and factionalism,commonly associated with vested interests, power play, crimi-nal activity, and corruption (Chhotray, 2011).

We carried out fieldwork investigations between Januaryand April 2011, mostly focusing on two project areas: the areasurrounding the 510 MW Teesta V hydroelectric project(HEP) in Central Sikkim, operational since 2008; and theupper reaches of the Rathong Chu River in West Sikkim,where three dam projects (Lethang, Ting Ting and Tashiding)with a combined capacity of 292 MW were being planned atthe time of our research. We conducted 52informal/semi-structured interviews, five focus group discus-sions, and on-site observations in 17 project-affected commu-nities. Respondents were selected by snowball sampling,drawing from the group identified as “directlyproject-affected” (those who sold land to the project) andthose indirectly affected (e.g., through ecological impacts).Attention was also paid to heterogeneity in the sample withregard to physical location vis-a-vis the project infrastructure,political and economic status, and ethnicity.

The rationale behind individual and collective responses tohydropower development in its planning and implementationphases was central to the discussions, as were relationshipsbetween affected communities, state actors, and project devel-opers. Interviews were also conducted with activists (nine),journalists (two), government officials (four), NGO staff(four), company representatives/employees (two), and aca-demics (five) familiar with hydropower politics. Further infor-mation was derived from local and national newspapers,(academic) journals as well as social media (Facebook)groups.

3. HYDROPOWER AND CONFLICT IN SIKKIM – ABRIEF HISTORY

(a) The political economy of hydropower in Sikkim

Sikkim, an independent kingdom until 1975, is India’s sec-ond smallest (7,096 km2) and least populated (610,577) state(Census, 2011), located in the Eastern Himalayan borderlandbetween Nepal, Tibet/China, Bhutan, and India. The state isendowed with an entirely mountainous topography, and therivers of the Teesta basin with a steep flow gradient, whichhydropower proponents have translated into a potentialcapacity of 8,000 megawatts (MW) at peak times – NortheastIndia’s second largest (GOS, 2009b).

Sikkim’s rugged and isolated geography has permitted littleindustrial development so far, and is used to justify invest-ments in hydropower as an important opportunity forincreased revenue generation, growth, and financial indepen-dence. Since its annexation to India in 1975, Sikkim’s predom-inantly rural economy relies almost entirely on developmentassistance from the Government of India for infrastructuredevelopment, health, education, and poverty alleviation, plusa temporary non-taxation privilege (Arora, 2009).

Hydropower in Sikkim has become a national developmentpriority to the extent that it may alleviate recurring energyshortages in the country, and fuel economic growth. The“mission” to generate 5,000 MW in Sikkim by 2015 is partof the Government of India’s 50,000 MW “Hydro Initiative”,launched in 2003 (Dharmadikary, 2008). The majority of the

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new hydropower projects (more than 200) are planned for theNortheast region of which Sikkim is administratively a part.Offering more than 63,257 MW largely untapped hydropowerpotential (Vagholikar & Das, 2010), the Northeast is nowa-days known as the country’s “future powerhouse” (Menon,Vagholikar, Kohli, & Fernandes, 2003, p. 3). That this periph-eral part of the country currently lies largely outside the ambitof Indian economic development allows national as well aslocal politicians and policy-makers to position hydropoweras a vehicle for development integration.

Liberalization of the national energy sector in 2003 triggereda veritable “hydro rush” in the Northeast, as private powerproducers poured into this new resource frontier, attractedby investment-friendly policies at the state level and by enor-mous returns from the sale of electricity in the open market– mostly to urban-industrial centers of mainland India(Dharmadikary, 2008). The state governments of Sikkim andArunachal Pradesh signed numerous Memoranda of Under-standing (MoU) with private companies, many of whichlacked prior experience in the energy sector (Vagholikar &Das, 2010). By 2011, the Government of Sikkim had awardedmore than 30 hydroelectric projects 2 (for geographic distribu-tion see Figure 1) to over 20 public and private Indian firms.Currently three of these projects have been completed, whilenine are under construction and ten in various stages of plan-ning. 3

The “run-of-the-river” (R-o-R) technology proposed formost of these projects is promoted as socially and environmen-tally “benign”, due to reduced submergence and no permanentwithdrawal of water from the system. In reality, the economicand environmental sustainability of this project design is ques-tionable, considering the socio-ecological particularities of theEastern Himalayas. Most projects comprise large dam struc-tures to store water for daily peaking power generation, inaddition to underground tunnels of up to 18-km length forwater diversion. Although the water is then fed back intothe riverbed, much of the river flow deviates for long stretchesfrom its original course (Vagholikar & Das, 2010). The cumu-lative installation of 20 R-o-R projects is expected to severelyfragment riverine ecosystems, thereby threatening to reduceenvironmental flows below the prescribed minimum (Shah,2013).

Furthermore, tunnel construction by blasting has createdimmediate, visible and possibly lasting impacts on the sur-rounding mountain slopes. Affected people across the statereport an increased occurrence of landslides, drying of springsand rivulets for domestic water supply, the degradation ofland and property, as well as concerns over safety (Interviews,February–April 2011; see also Bhutia, 2012). High geologicaland seismological instability, in combination with extremeweather events (expected to increase under the influence of cli-mate change), pose hazard risks to the projects and down-stream areas (Vagholikar & Das, 2010).

Moreover, planning and construction activities haveoccurred at an excessively rapid pace, based on improper envi-ronmental impact assessments and in defiance of scientificwarnings and environmental legislation (Kohli, 2011), disal-lowing time to monitor, evaluate, and improve project imple-mentation and performance. Communities surrounding theTeesta V HEP, operational since 2008, also lamented thatwhile economic opportunities increased at first, they couldnot be sustained after project completion, and that scope forlong-term employment and skills development is minimal, asmost labor is sourced from outside the state (Interviews,February–April 2011). In summary, the adverse consequencesof hydropower development have become rapidly visible in

various project locations, leading to growing public malcon-tent.

(b) Conflict and non-conflict over hydropower in Sikkim

Despite the controversial experience with the first hydro-power projects, local responses to hydropower developmenthave been mixed. In many of the proposed project areas therehas been markedly little consolidated resistance or civil societyadvocacy challenging the state’s hydropower plans. The signif-icant presence of pro-hydro actors within many affected com-munities is one important factor accounting for divergentpopular responses (McDuie-Ra, 2011, 2013). The fact thatsome stand to gain from the project – by selling land, or byway of temporary employment – undermines effective commu-nity activism in favor of more equitable project management.

Another factor is the culture of party-based political clien-telism (Das, 2015) that is pervasive in Sikkim. Since annexa-tion to India, successive state governments, in their functionas distributor of resources and central government develop-ment assistance, have built patron–client dependencies withindividuals and communities (Chettri, 2013). Patronage inthe form of free “hand-outs” of building materials, seeds, live-stock, food rations, water supply and sanitation facilities, oreven entire model brick-homes, is awarded under the bannerof rural poverty alleviation schemes to “conforming”, politi-cally loyal households and communities (Chettri, 2013). Thesame goes for access to government jobs, business contracts,and professional licenses, the Government of Sikkim beingthe largest employer in a state where youth unemployment isrampant (Gergan, 2014). This has perpetuated widespreadeconomic dependence on government favoritism, especiallyin rural areas, and has allowed the ruling party to build a solidsupport base, by employing a divide and rule strategy in whichdissidence becomes economically and socially unviable(Schaefer, 1995). As a result, the rooting of political agencyand democratic ethos among sections of Sikkimese 4 societyand its political establishment has been markedly slowed.

Given the near absence of any history and culture of civilsociety activism in Sikkim, it is all the more remarkable, there-fore, that hydropower development has also given rise to anumber of anti-dam struggles – unprecedented expressionsof subaltern political agency. The first anti-dam movement,Concerned Citizens of Sikkim (CCS), emerged in the 1990sin response to the construction of the 30 MW Rathong Chuproject in West Sikkim. It brought together environmentalistsand devout Buddhists concerned about the destruction of Sik-kim’s most “sacred” river and the adjoining Khangchend-zonga Biosphere Reserve. In 1997, after several publicprotests, which brought monks from monasteries around thestate to the state capital Gangtok, as well as a case fought inthe Supreme Court, the then newly elected Chief MinisterPawan Chamling canceled the project, in order “to honorthe sentiments, religion and culture of the people of Sikkim”(cited in Menon, 2003, p. 33). The movement disbandedshortly after.

Another noteworthy movement – the “Affected Citizens ofTeesta” (ACT) – emerged in 2004, mobilizing large numbersof youth activists from the Lepcha ethnic community to stageSikkim’s most fervent anti-dam struggle to date. In anunprecedented act of civil disobedience, ACT held severalrounds of hunger strikes (up to 915 days), street protests, peti-tions, and litigation against six projects planned in the tribal“reserve” Dzongu (North Sikkim; Arora, 2009). Consideredthe sacred homeland of “vanishing” Lepcha culture, and his-torically shielded from the intrusion of outsiders by law

Figure 1. Map of run-of-the-river projects proposed for the Teesta river basin (as per 2008). Source: SANDRP (http://sandrp.in/basin_maps/Teesta%

20150411.jpg).

HYDROPOWER, ANTI-POLITICS, AND THE OPENING OF NEW POLITICAL SPACES IN THE EASTERN HIMALAYAS 17

(Bentley, 2007), the government’s turn-around from protec-tion to capitalization of the Dzongu reserve became a drivingforce for the struggle, supported by regional, national, andinternational civil society groups (Little, 2010). As with theprevious anti-dam protest, concerns centered on thelarge-scale influx of non-Sikkimese laborers, related economicand health issues, cultural erosion, and destruction of Sikkim’scultural-spiritual-ecological heritage. Although ACT signifi-cantly downsized after successfully pressuring the administra-tion to scrap four of the six projects in 2008, they continue to

actively contest hydropower development in the state(McDuie-Ra, 2011).

Both movements represent a significant departure fromcommon-place political practice in Sikkim. Arguably, themobilizing power of identity has been a crucial determinantfor their strength and success, with activism centered on issuesof religion and ethnic-cultural sovereignty (Arora, 2013;McDuie-Ra, 2013; Schaefer, 1995). Disproportionate preoccu-pation with ethnicity and “indigenous/insider” identity hashistorically been characteristic for politics and governance in

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Sikkim and defines who has how much access to political rep-resentation and to the state’s economic resources (Chettri,2013). 5 Identity-based governance goes back to the 19th cen-tury, when the introduction of a large Nepali labor force bythe British colonial administration unhinged the demographicequilibrium between the various “tribal” communities in Sik-kim (Schaefer, 1995).

The political-economic dynamics which followed annexa-tion and financial dependency on the Indian state, and whichtransferred on the state administration the responsibility ofallocating central government welfare, further aggravated con-cerns over cultural erosion (Bentley, 2007) and political recog-nition of specific ethnic groups (Chettri, 2013). Ethnicassociations became and continue to be the most commonand legitimate medium through which to access and contestthe state and its resources (Chettri, 2013). Consequently, a col-lective civil society engaging with questions of development,and operating across ethnic divides never developed in Sikkim.As we discuss below, this situated political-economic contextenables anti-political maneuvering by providing the channelsthrough which the hydropower anti-politics machine operates,and makes the political activism triggered by hydropowerdevelopment significant. The following two sections illustratethe extent to which anti-political governance of hydropowerdevelopment has shaped conflict dynamics around dam pro-jects in Sikkim, both restraining and fueling resistance.

4. THE ANTI-POLITICS OF HYDROPOWER GOVER-NANCE

The rationale behind a strategic, top-down approach againstpopular opposition to hydropower is not surprising, consider-ing the important role civil society advocacy and resistanceplayed in delaying or stopping large dam projects worldwidein the past, and in the overall decline of donor funding inthe 1990s (Bosshard, 2010). Since then, gaining public accep-tance of large dams, through free, prior, and informed consentof affected communities, has been defined by international pol-icy efforts as a key criterion for ethical dam-building practice(Skinner & Haas, 2014). However, from a distributional jus-tice perspective, dams are complicated structures, character-ized by inherent contentions and uncertainties, and adheringto these criteria can considerably prolong the planning processand affect profitability of individual projects. This explainswhy hydro proponents in Sikkim sought to circumvent debateover the need for, and particularities of, the hydropower mis-sion. They did this by reproducing particular discourses abouthydropower and its merits; by selectively presenting and/orwithholding project-related information; and by denigratingdam opponents and penalizing dissent. The following sectionprovides detailed empirical accounts for each of theseanti-politics tactics.

(a) Discursive regimes of representation

The common discourse by the state government positionshydropower development as an inevitable, moral obligation,not only for the benefit of the nation, but also for the develop-ment of Sikkim and the Sikkimese. Instead of allowing theuntapped wealth of the state to be “washed away” (govern-ment officer cited in interview with NGO worker, February2011) or “let flow to waste” (Sikkim Express, 2009), ChiefMinister Chamling proposed that “utilized with wisdom, theserivers and streams could be converted into [. . .] white gold.”(Little, 2008). A similar, yet more pressing narrative describes

hydropower as the only “sensible” and “viable” developmentstrategy for Sikkim:

The State has very limited scope to raise the revenue and the [hy-dropower] sector is the best avenue to achieve it. (GOS in TheSikkim Times, 2007b).

Its development is vitally important because it will have twofold effectson the economy of the state. With the easy availability of electricity,the socio-economic condition of the people of Sikkim would favorablyrise on the one hand while on the other hand revenue from the exportof power will help the state to strengthen its revenue base. Thus, thesector has to be speedily developed to cater to the demand withinand outside the state.

[(GOS, 2010, p. 3)]

The imperative of financial autonomy for the state in theevent of future termination of preferential Central Governmentfunding is another argument often made, with little evidence ofwhether and when this will happen. Given Sikkim’s strategicgeo-political position bordering China, it is doubtful whetherthe tag and benefits of a “special state” will change any timesoon. On another note, hydropower development tends to beportrayed as a fait accompli, through claims that projects arealready in place and being implemented. In reality, only threeprojects have been completed to date and nine are under con-struction. 6 According to the Chairperson of the Sikkim Pollu-tion Control Board, during the 2006 public hearing for the1200 MW Teesta III HEP, hydropower development isnon-negotiable since it has been imposed from a higher scale:

You should reap the benefit – because no one can stop this project, nomatter which political party comes to power tomorrow. No one canstop this as the Government of India has given the orders. These pro-jects are not meant to harm or bring tension to anyone.

[(Save Dzongu, 2013)]

Such TINA (“there-is-no-alternative”) narratives are sup-ported by colored representations of the cost–benefit equationof hydropower development, which tend to overestimatepay-offs (e.g., low variable costs of generation, employment,electrification, rural infrastructure, plentiful revenues) andunderreport on potential negative consequences. Accordingto the Government of Sikkim, 15 billion Indian rupees willaccrue annually over a total of 35 years (GOS, 2010), amount-ing to yearly per capita earnings of around 405 US$ – over aquarter of India’s GDP per capita. 7 This would make Sikkim“one of the richest states in the country” (Resneck, 2010).Pledging to reinvest these royalties into the key state develop-ment objectives – infrastructure, education, employment, andpoverty eradication – the Government of Sikkim expects thatby 2015, Sikkim will be a prosperous, poverty-free “land ofopportunities with zero unemployment” (GOS, 2009a, p. 12).

Moreover, given its global appeal as a clean developmentsolution, hydropower also fits with the carefully nurturedimage of Sikkim as a “green state” (Resneck, 2010). The cur-rent ruling party prides itself on having won several nationalawards for investments in environmental protection, for exam-ple through afforestation programs, the imposition of fines onindiscriminate refuse dumping, or a state-wide ban on plasticsand agro-chemicals (Down To Earth, 1999; GOS, 2013).Hydropower development is aligned with this green agenda:

The state Government’s policy has been to synchronize developmentimperatives with environmental sustainability as our green mantraremaining extra conscious while implementing [hydropower] projects.

[(Chamling in GOS, 2010)]

In spite of Government of India’s preference for multi-purpose largedam storage [. . .] projects, the State Government has stuck to run ofthe river [. . .] projects. The world over, run of the river project is con-sidered the cleanliest and the most environment friendly source of

HYDROPOWER, ANTI-POLITICS, AND THE OPENING OF NEW POLITICAL SPACES IN THE EASTERN HIMALAYAS 19

energy. It is because of the apprehensions related to geology that theState Government has taken a stand that all the projects shall berun of the river type and no big dam shall be constructed. [. . .] all pos-sible risks have been sufficiently addressed.

[(GOS in The Sikkim Times, 2007b)]

The Energy and Power Department, in its 2008–09 annualreport, even stated that none of the R-o-R schemes wouldhave a dam or major reservoir for rated power generation dur-ing the lean season (GOS, 2009b) – a claim, which is not con-firmed by various project reports. Further, the significance ofenvironmentally disruptive impacts is downplayed, by empha-sizing priorities of development and economic growth:

Impact on the environment is mostly temporary in nature and as such,[hydropower] remains the cheapest green power available to the man-kind today. [. . .] avoiding development of [hydropower] is not the an-swer to the environmental issues.

[(Chamling in GOS, 2010)]

Aside from the fact that such discourses depoliticize theintervention by omitting important realities such as negativeimpacts, distributional issues, potential alternatives, etc., theyalso represent the only information mechanism about hydro-power at the state level. Thus except for project-specific publichearings, there are no public briefings and discussion fora toinform and consult the general population about the overallhydropower mission.

(b) The anti-politics of hydro-planning

In the planning and execution phases too, questions aboutthe desirability and modalities of particular projects were dis-abled. The responsibility of planning, construction, and oper-ation was shifted to non-state actors, such as privatedevelopers and environmental consultancies, creating the illu-sion that state bureaucrats and local authorities are to a largeextent absolved from any real responsibility, and cannot beheld accountable. During interviews with affected communi-ties and NGO workers in West Sikkim, where a cascade ofthree projects (Lethang, Ting Ting, and Tashiding) with acombined capacity of 292 MW was in planning at the timeof our research, 8 we were told that the project developershad a free hand in surveying the area and makingpre-construction arrangements, including negotiations overland acquisition with local communities.

Several villagers reported that information about the damsfirst reached them around 2008–09, when the company’s tech-nical experts, without prior notice, entered their private landfor initial surveying. Project plans had not been shared or dis-cussed with the communities until then. Discussions were ini-tially confined to landholders whose land was to be acquired,even though project implementation would affect the commu-nity as a whole. Until the public hearing in June 2009, othercommunity members had to rely on word-of-mouth for pro-ject information (Interviews with project-affected villagers,March–April 2011).

As for the advertising language employed by the planners,mandatory compensation entitlements as defined by nationalrehabilitation and resettlement policy 9 were presented locallyas advantageous individual gains. The concept of benefit shar-ing was used to link the provision of basic development ser-vices to hydropower development (Interviews withproject-affected villagers, March–April 2011), even thoughthese are public entitlements, which accrue to local communi-ties with or without a hydropower project. Such arrangements,which allow private developers to take on the state’s responsi-bility of developing rural infrastructure (including water sup-ply, roads, community halls, sanitation, and waste facilities)

have also been institutionalized through the state govern-ment’s hydropower policy, as cited in a local newspaper:

The far flung areas around the project sites mostly located in the re-mote corner of the state will benefit by way of development activitieslike road connectivity, schools, and primary health centers. [. . .] Thedeveloper [sic] of the larger projects are required to adopt one ortwo villages in the vicinity of the project sites. These villages will bedeveloped by the developer by providing all civic facilities requiredas per the concept of a model village.

[(The Sikkim Times, 2007b)]

However, transforming the logistical and financial challengeof servicing more remote areas of the state into a corporatesocial responsibility also has implications for accountability– while clearly a convenient arrangement for theimage-oriented ruling party. The fact that this amalgamationof project benefits and public welfare liabilities has not trig-gered much criticism locally may be a result of long-standingclientelism, where rural development provision is presentedas ruling party largesse and only a few citizens question howwelfare is provided and by whom.

What is more, several instances of “bribery”, through whichpower developers allegedly sought to win the goodwill of localcommunities and convince project-affected households to selltheir land, were reported. To obfuscate the rather unethicalnature of this practice, companies took advantage of tradi-tions used by vote-seeking political parties, including distribut-ing gifts, organizing picnics, and participating in communityevents, weddings, funerals, etc. (Interviews withproject-affected villagers, April 2011). In one instance, asrecounted by a local activist, even the public hearing, whichaccording to law must be organized by the State PollutionControl Board (SPCB) and without other government inter-ference, was manipulated by the power developers: “It wasthe private companies that organized and controlled the pro-grams. Even the government officials came to the hearings incars arranged by them [. . .] there was large-scale arrangementof food and entertainment” (Basu, 2010).

(c) Managing popular resistance

As multiple dam projects reached their construction andcompletion phases, with the impacts and dubious governancearrangements becoming more visible, more individuals andcivil society groups started viewing the state-led hydropoweragenda critically. In response, the state government resortedto authoritarian and coercive ways of undermining popularresistance. Those openly opposing the ruling party and itsagenda were victimized 10 or threatened to be victimized, bothdiscursively through a distinct anti-protest narrative, andmaterially by withholding patronage. In his 2007 Indepen-dence Day speech, for instance, the Chief Minister made pub-lic accusations against the ACT activists as being “marginal,anti-national and anti-Sikkimese” and “politically misguidedby outside interests wanting to destabilize all development inSikkim” (Arora, 2010, p. 138). Similarly, during the publichearing for Teesta III, the Chairperson of the SPCB warnedthe affected citizens of the area:

Anyone who disturbs this project is not a Sikkimese. He might be bornin Sikkim but is a useless person if he opposes such a good project.Such people are your opposition and anti-social elements. [. . .] Becauseyou are in the opposition you are opposing the Government. Since youare opposing the Government of India you are an anti-national.

[(Save Dzongu, 2013)]

The influence of such discursive pressure carried far, asreflected in this villager’s personal account:

20 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

The majority is against the project but no one will be openly opposing.A knowledgeable person said we should not complain.Who says these things?Village leaders, members of the political party. . . Also one month agothe Chief Minister came here to give a speech. He said that project con-struction will start and we should let it go ahead.

[(Interview, March 2011)]

The material consequences of victimization include beingcut off from free government hand-outs, losing eligibility forjobs, business contracts, and licenses, or – in the case of publicemployees – being transferred to another job or placementlocation. ACT activists reported having to fear ineligibilityfor future employment in the state, and in some cases eventheir family and relatives in government service were forciblyrelocated to remote work placements (Interviews, February–April 2011). A village leader explained that political victimiza-tion can also affect entire communities by depriving them ofbasic development assistance, if they take a unitary standagainst the government or align with the opposition:

The community is against the project, most people will be opposing.The Panchayat should listen to the political leaders, but I am withthe community. We know that we will get lots of problems. They willlikely stop providing some basic services”.

[(Interview, April 2011)]

When ACT protesters staged hunger strikes in the capitalGangtok, the government discouraged the display of solidarityby stoking fears that any supporters – even visitors – would bevictimized (Little, 2009). There were also attempts to “buyout” the movement, by rewarding activists who withdrew theirsupport with employment contracts, occasionally in thehydropower sector itself (Interviews with ACT activists,February–April 2011).

In an effort to uproot and block any kind of popular mobi-lization in the state, and to reinforce its power vis-a-vis the cit-izenry, the government even went as far as placing restrictionson basic democratic rights and freedoms. Thus in 2008, whenACT activists had organized a peaceful protest rally that wasjoined by Lepchas from neighboring West Bengal, theGovernment of Sikkim invoked a British colonial emergencylaw, Section 144, that restricts free assembly, justifying it asa means to pre-empt “a law and order situation” (Little,2010). Likewise, in 2011 the state administration attemptedto pass a “Sikkim Prevention and Control of Disturbance ofPublic Order Bill” (popularly termed “black bill”), intendedto ban processions, hunger strikes, squatting, sloganeering,and other forms of public protest and agitation (TheTelegraph, 2011).

5. AN OPENING OF NEW POLITICAL SPACES?

(a) Relative silence around hydropower dams

What effects have depoliticization, disinformation, bribery,and other coercive practices had on citizen responses to hydro-power, and on state–society relations more generally? Howwell did the attempt to mask the political as “technical” and“morally imperative” hold in the contentious mission to divertthe state’s rivers through a network of hidden-away tunnels?Local silence around several proposed projects and theabsence of broad-based, state-wide resistance indicate thatthe anti-politics strategy has been effective in limiting popularopposition in many respects. First, in the planning stage, pri-vate power developers were allowed to independently negoti-ate their “own” terms of reference with the locals. Theabsence of state agencies’ regulatory authority in these negoti-

ations added to the logic of a fait accompli intervention, whileobscuring the actual locus of decision-making and account-ability. It created confusion and undermined scope for contes-tation. Debate was reduced to the issue of compensation,relevant only to those “officially project-affected”, i.e., thosewith land to sell.

Uncertainty as a result of disinformation became anotherobstacle to opposition. For those who had never seen a com-pleted hydropower project a lot was unclear, given especiallythe partly “invisible” R-o-R design of the projects: whereand how project infrastructure would be located; which areaswould be affected and how; what benefits would eventuallyaccrue and to whom, when the project would be completed,etc. In the absence of specific details, and considering theattractive gains promised, affected communities were initiallyhesitant to contest these developments.

Finally, victimization of dissenters, an established practicein Sikkim’s patronage system, helped to “enforce” consensusand curb organized resistance. A persistent victimization “fearpsychosis”, which can be traced back to the 15-year rule ofautocratic Chief Minister Bhandari (1979–94; Schaefer,1995), seems to enduringly afflict citizens across the board.Even under the current Chief Minister (in power since 1994),citizens are required to consent to the government’s decisions.Since the state is small and the likelihood of being watched oroverheard significant, political pressure can easily be exertedthrough relatively short chains of politicians, bureaucrats,middlemen, party-associates, and village leaders. Fears ofabuse of power are particularly pervasive among more vulner-able households who rely on basic livelihood assistance, oramong government employees, grassroots politicians, teach-ers, and retirees, who directly derive their income from thegovernment. As one teacher bemoaned:

At the public hearing I opposed the project and spoke out but what todo for the simple public? We don’t have any opportunity. I protestedthree times, but there was no response to my plea. The last time I final-ly agreed, because of political pressure. Many people here are em-ployed by the government and exist only through its benevolence.

[(Interview, March 2011)]

The restrictions placed on freedom of speech and politicalalignment are so engrained in popular imagination that formany adopting a critical stance is beyond consideration. A vil-lager, when asked whether he will protest, explained to us:

How can I protest? The public of this area cannot protest the govern-ment. [. . .] People are afraid of the government; they are totally depen-dent upon the government. If the people protest then they can’t get thebenefits the government is giving out”.

[(Interview, February 2011)]

ACT members reported that victimization was one of thebiggest obstacles to their mobilization, and majorly impactedthe group’s cohesion and effectiveness, by creating rifts withinfamilies and communities. This deterred some of the mostdetermined activists from further supporting the protest, even-tually contributing to the partial breakup and isolation of themovement (Interviews with ACT activists, February–April2011).

In sum, the prevailing democratic deficit and the ethnic divi-sions in Sikkimese society helped prevent a large-scale escala-tion of anti-hydro protests. Even ACT, despite its adamantcampaign and success in having four projects scrapped, didnot upscale its activities to a state-wide anti-hydro movement.As construction in many project sites is advancing, follow-updiscussions with activists, journalists, and academics in 2013revealed a general sense that the fate of the state’s rivers hadbeen decided.

HYDROPOWER, ANTI-POLITICS, AND THE OPENING OF NEW POLITICAL SPACES IN THE EASTERN HIMALAYAS 21

(b) The emergence of popular political voice

Yet in closely scrutinizing the multiple small-scale contesta-tions of both hydropower and state power that have developedfollowing the ACT protests, one sees a gradual process ofpoliticization in Sikkim. Anti-hydro advocacy may still belocalized and largely confined within ethnic boundaries.Nevertheless, it is also evident that ACT’s visible and auda-cious resistance worked as a grassroots political precedent,breaking the myth of an unchallengeable state and enablinga new culture of speaking out. For example, in two neighbor-ing valleys near the Tibetan Plateau of North Sikkim, theLachen and Lachung communities have built up a consoli-dated resistance against hydropower. Being a popular touristdestination, this pristine alpine landscape constitutes the peo-ples’ livelihood base. Anticipating that hydropower construc-tion would damage the local economy, thesesemi-autonomous Bhutia communities have adopted a hostilestance against dams, denying even a cup of tea to any visitorapproaching them with hydropower proposals. In an open let-ter to the contracted power company, Lachen communityleaders warned of potentially “explosive” consequences forpeace and security in Sikkim,

. . . if the otherwise peace loving, simple and god fearing people ofLachen are pushed too far to the extent of losing their patience. [. . .]Let us not create another Kashmir or Nagaland by forcible implemen-tation of the project which has not been accepted by the local people.We have not signed the MoU pertaining to the Project and as such weshould not be held responsible for any untoward incident resultingfrom [its] implementation. . .

[(The Sikkim Times, 2007a)]

Unwilling to confront this adamant posture, the administra-tion has temporarily shelved the proposed projects, and theconflict has been contained since then.

In West Sikkim, the earlier mentioned cascade developmenton the Rathong Chu River has been fiercely contested for sev-eral years by Buddhist monks and the ethnic-religious interestgroups SIBLAC (Sikkimese Bhutia Lepcha Apex Committee)and NASBO (National Sikkimese Bhutia Organization), whoargue these plans will destroy a sacred landscape. TheKhangchendzonga Conservation Committee (a local environ-mental group) and several project-affected villagers filed peti-tions against the two upper projects, to be located in closeproximity to Sikkim’s largest national park, the Khangchend-zonga Biosphere Reserve.

Start of construction in 2011 on the 97 MW Tashiding HEP,the lowest of the three projects, prompted acts of protest bylocal residents, who claimed to have signed their “No Objec-tion Certificates”, “thinking it to be a developmental project”,and not realizing the “far reaching consequences” and “disas-ter that such manmade projects could bring upon them”. Thealleged eye-opener was the destruction caused in the area dur-ing the 6.9 magnitude earthquake of 2011 (Sikkim Now!,2011a). The quake, which had its epicenter in North Sikkim,made visible the risks associated with dam building in such aseismologically active region, as it provoked a particularlylarge concentration of landslides in the vicinity of hydropowertunnels 11 (Kohli, 2011). It momentarily brought hydropowerto the forefront of popular debate, including in the local newsand social media (Mazumdar, 2011).

The Tashiding controversy also saw the first manifestationof a more broad-based anti-hydro movement, with severaladvocacy groups, including ACT joining forces in the “Com-mon Platform for Joint Action against Hydropower Projects”(Sikkim Now!, 2011b). In January 2012, their lobbying efforts

effected cancelation of the upper two Rathong Chu dams,while the Tashiding HEP was put under review.

These recent mobilizations are thus not entirely disparate,issue-based, and/or ethnically fragmented, but signify anemerging collective action against an entrenched state autoc-racy and for more popular voice in environmental and politi-cal decision making. Two developments are particularlynoteworthy. First, growing popular resistance against damshas impacted hydropower governance. At least 16 projectshave either been canceled or experience significant delays inplanning/construction, due to apprehensions and (in somecases) legal action by local communities and civil societygroups. For Teesta III, in response to growing public pressure,the administration has instituted a monitoring committee withinvolvement of civil society representatives, to oversee projectimplementation. This is a small but significant step towardmore participatory hydropower governance.

Second, hydropower protests have widened the space fordissent against government high-handedness, not only indam construction, but also in other realms of governanceand politics. For example, in 2011 when the ruling party pro-posed the earlier mentioned “black bill”, the initiative causeduproar among the general public and the opposition, whowithout formal representation in the Legislative Assembly,were unable to vote against it. This backlash eventuallyprompted a recall of the proposed law (The Telegraph,2011). Rising popular demand for change was also reflectedin the growing support for the “Sikkim Revolutionary Front”(SKM) a political party founded in 2013, which garnered40.8% of votes in the 2014 Legislative Assembly elections,wresting ten seats from the ruling Sikkim Democratic Front(SDF), and ending a decade of single-party rule.

Was this emergence of popular political agency successful inchanging the political status quo? It may be too early to makesuch a stark claim. While the strong support for the new oppo-sition party was unprecedented under the current regime, itwas not sufficient to topple the hegemony of Chief MinisterChamling and his SDF party, particularly in rural areas. Iden-tity politics and money power are likely to determine votes andpolitical allegiances “from above” for some time to come. Thechances for a victory by any opposition party in turn dependon the extent to which it can present concrete and viable alter-natives – also an alternative political culture. Most impor-tantly, political change will have to be initiated “frombelow” and in the mindsets of the populace.

In this regard much depends on the younger generations andthe extent to which they can (afford to) detach from clientelis-tic practices. While open debate over issues concerning statepolitics and development is still difficult in the public sphere,some evidence of rupture with top-down restrictions of freespeech is now emerging from the social media. For example,online discussion forums such as Facebook groups havebecome preferred platforms for expressing popular and polit-ical opinions, especially among younger generations.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Nine hydropower projects are currently under constructionin Sikkim. Nevertheless, as our findings show, the anti-politicsmachine has neither been successful in ensuring a smooth,unquestioned progression of the hydropower mission, nor infully reproducing the hegemony of dominant actors – theadministration and ruling party. Instead, hydropower hasserved to catalyze a politicization of environmental and

22 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

political decision-making, a counter-hegemonic mo(ve)ment,which exposed a long-standing democracy deficit. This hap-pened for several, inter-related reasons.

First, unlike with certain rural improvement schemes(Ferguson, 1990; Li, 2007), the controversial consequencesof dam building were patently visible, even to the untrainedeye. Thus, although a depoliticized hydropower discoursemay retain credibility in the (inter)national policy domain,the politics attached to dam building are difficult to obscurelocally. This explains why even CDM-certified projects havegenerated conflicts in the Himalayas and the Northeast(Erlewein & Nusser, 2011; Yumnam, 2012). In Sikkim, notjust the visible impacts of the dams, but the disjuncturebetween what was promised and what unfolded on the groundfueled growing malcontent among sections of the population.

Second, through an unprecedented public display of politi-cal voice and indignation, the young ACT activists exposedSikkim’s democracy facade. The high-handed, coercive tacticsemployed to undermine ACT’s resistance exposed the contra-dictions between government discourse – “In Sikkim, demo-cratic decorum prevails uninterrupted” (Sikkim Now!, 2012)– and what was practiced – for example the suspension ofdemocratic rights to non-violent protest. This ruptured thestate’s fragile democratic sutures, enabling antagonisms sur-rounding hydropower and state power to emerge.

Our findings reflect what scholars of post-politics (e.g.,Mouffe, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2011b) have argued: that “thepolitical” cannot be suppressed. It may be latent, but eventu-ally re-emerges, often triggered by excesses of coercion. Bydenying recognition to inherent societal antagonisms andclaims for egalitarian political spaces, anti-politics tactics exac-erbate the latter’s’ tendency to resurface in diverse, ofteninsurgent and/or violent ways.

It is evident then, that anti-politics is not a one-way affair,an absolute form of ideological domination penetrating alllayers of (rural) society, as Ferguson’s (1990) analysis had sug-gested. The anti-politics machine never operates in a vacuum.It is either co-opted by “intervention subjects” for their ownpurposes (Bending, 2003), or more or less vehemently resisted(Li, 2007; Scott, 1985). It thus constitutes a continuous, neverstraightforwardly unidirectional struggle (Buscher, 2010). Thepolitical agency of those confronted with the anti-politicsmachine – here those affected by hydropower and state power– is no less important. In Sikkim, civil society groups and com-munities subverted the “logical” consequences of anti-politicalmaneuvering, to defend their role in decisions overecological-cultural commons and territorial sovereignty.

Our study aims to advance the debate on anti-politics in sev-eral ways: first, by moving beyond the dominant conceptual-ization of an “unintentional” anti-politics machine. Our casestudy demonstrates how complex politically disabling strate-gies serve vested interests at multiple levels: global carbontrading, national energy security, local revenues and privatecapital accumulation. Second, our findings emphasize thatlarge infrastructure projects, based on the exploitation ofnatural resources for development elsewhere, are necessarilycontentious, and visibly so. Masking and/or legitimizing suchprojects is more difficult than with many other rural improve-ment schemes. Third, our research shows the state, rather thanother development actors, as a major development broker andprotagonist of the anti-politics machine. Finally, we have pro-posed a reading of anti-politics that goes beyond the idea of“depoliticization by rendering technical”, encompassinginstead a range of discursive and material practices that curbcontestation, including coercive, politically disabling, and fun-damentally undemocratic strategies.

What do these analyses imply for the development ofhydropower dams and other large infrastructure projectselsewhere? First, it is evident that anti-politics operates acrossscales to facilitate the revival of large dams. Hydropowerprojects currently receive enormous political and financialsupport, as multiple actors with diverse interests hold highstakes in their construction. In debates between governments,donor agencies, private sector companies, and even largegreen groups, such as during the recent World Water Week2014 in Stockholm, the dominant focus has shifted fromdams as a problematic development solution to dams asclean, favorable, and inevitable. That large hydro remainssocially and environmentally contentious, a reality flaggedby this paper, is hardly a subject of discussion in these policycircles. The prevalent anti-political hydropower discourse dis-allows and/or ignores the concerns, lived experiences andalternative voices “from below”, which contradict and chal-lenge popular imageries of dams as win–win developmentsolutions.

Ill-considered, rushed and shoddy planning of dam projectsappears to be a problem in many dam-building countries. Siteselection for dams is often “dominated by political and fiscalconsiderations, lobbying, corruption, and compromise”(Cole et al., 2014, p. 84). Another big area of concern is thelack of consideration of climate change impacts in dam plan-ning, even though predictions for an increase in extreme cli-mate events and reduced precipitation in certain areas couldaffect the viability of large hydro (Cole et al., 2014; Iimi,2007; Pottinger, 2009).

But project-affected communities are not oblivious to thecomplexities of hydropower development. Many of ourinterviewees in Sikkim were of the opinion that hydropowercan be an engine for “development” and an importantsource of revenue. Similar to what Robins (1998, p. 1680)found in a case study on development politics in Zimbabwe,“opposition to [development projects] was not the result ofpeasant resistance to modernization, but was instead aresponse to the social, cultural, economic, political and eco-logical disruptions that the intervention unleashed”. Therewas a strong sense in Sikkim that the problem lay in howthings were done, and that the government’s major preoccu-pation was with fast-tracking hydropower development,instead of adhering to consultative processes and ethicalprocedures.

A relevant question therefore is whether we have not learntanything about how (not) to do dams? The WCD (2000)guidelines – apart from sounding an ecological alarm bell –clearly called for more ethical and sustainable processes ofdam development, emphasizing consultation with local com-munities and the need to obtain their free, prior, and informedconsent to proposed projects. Yet, while some companies insome projects attempt to adhere to some voluntary standards,best practices in many cases are not even aimed at, in princi-ple. Business continues as usual – with deficiencies recordedeven for dam projects certified under the CDM (Erlewein &Nusser, 2011; Yumnam, 2012).

Lastly and most importantly, our case study testifies to thelatent “political” which exists and can resurface, even in highlycoercive situations and among subjugated local communities,suggesting that the outcomes of anti-political maneuvering incontentious development projects are never quite as straight-forward as they may have been assumed. It is high time there-fore that environmental and development plannersacknowledge that the ecological is always political, and thatwe cannot work toward and co-construct differently imaginedsocio-ecological futures in top-down fashion.

HYDROPOWER, ANTI-POLITICS, AND THE OPENING OF NEW POLITICAL SPACES IN THE EASTERN HIMALAYAS 23

NOTES

1. UNEP Risoe CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database, 31 May 2015(http://cdmpipeline.org/).

2. Twelve projects had been planned and/or allotted but were subse-quently canceled or withdrawn, “since the developers were not able toadhere to the deadlines specified in the agreement due to resistance to thedevelopment of the projects by the local people on religious/social/environmental grounds” (GOS, 2012).

3. Numbers received from Energy and Power Department, Governmentof Sikkim, 11.5.2015.

4. “Sikkimese” is used in this article to refer to all citizens of Sikkim, notto an ethnic citizen category, which would be a more common usage of theterm.

5. See Chettri (2013) for an elaborate discussion of the role of ethnicpolitics and identity in Sikkim’s democratic transition process.

6. Numbers received from Energy and Power Department, Governmentof Sikkim, 11.5.2015.

7. GDP as per 2013 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD), exchange rate as per 9 September 2014.

8. In 2012, the Lethang and Ting Ting HEPs were eventually canceled.At the time of writing, the final decision on implementation of theTashiding HEP, which is under construction, was pending with theMoEF.

9. This includes monetary payments for leased/acquired land; one jobper fully project-affected household; 1% of the revenues generated for localarea development; project-related employment according to skills, etc.(GOI, 2007).

10. The term victimization is used a lot in common parlance in Sikkimand refers essentially to a scare tactic discouraging “non-aligned” behaviorthrough threats of political and economic discrimination.

11. A common assumption is that tunnel blasting prior to the quake haddestabilized mountain slopes to such an extent that it simply needed astrong rattle to bring the bulk of boulders and debris rolling toward thevalley.

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