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Humes Imagined Certainty
Federico Jos T. Lagdameo
The philosophy contained in this book is very skeptical, and tends togive us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits of human
understanding. Almost all reasoning is there reduced to experience; and thebelief, which attends experience, is explained to be nothing but a peculiar
sentiment, or lively conception produced by habit.
David Hume, Abstract to A Treatise of Human Nature
David Humes theory of knowledge may yet prove to have resonance
in an age when knowledges proliferate and reason s reign is viewed as a
tyranny. For contrary to his ages faith in reason, Hume adopts a skeptical
stance and discredits such a faith. In lieu of reason, Hume subscribes to
imagination as the faculty of the mind which is responsible for our beliefs
which have important practical consequences in life, that is, those beliefs
which may be called practical knowledge. Consequently for Hume, such
knowledge cannot be rational belief, but only an imagined one. That
beliefs guarantee of being true, its certainty therefore, is only felt and
imagined, not rationally deduced.
Hume was acquainted with the dispute between the so-called
rationalists and the empiricists over the question of the origin of ideas.
The rationalists, like Descartes, Leibnitz, Malebranche, generally affirmed the
minds ability to know because of the presence of innate ideas of whose
analysis by reason leads supposedly to knowledge. On the other hand,
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empiricists like Locke and Berkeley advanced that experience supplies the
data from which knowledge is generated. In this debate, Hume has sided
with the latter: he does not agree that it is reason which justifies or grounds
our certainty in what we know.
Like his predecessors, therefore, Hume does not believe that the
rational justification of knowledge is possible. Hence, his epistemological
project is not concerned with justification. Rather, what he intends to
accomplish is to provide an account of the origin of our beliefs, and from
such an account determine what limits are there to reason and its claims toproduce knowledge. In the course of this endeavor, Hume unintentionally
anticipates the critique of reason that would be launched by so-called
postmodern thinkers. Thus, of important note is Humes effort to undermine
reasons prevalence and pervasiveness in that very age when reason was
exalted as triumphant, the Age of Enlightenment.
The intent of the present work is to discuss Humes account of
imagination as productive of belief in general, and of knowledge on matters
of fact (belief in causal relations) in particular. Its discussion begins with a
consideration of the theoretical assumptions of that account, namely,
Humes general project of elucidating a science of human nature as a
foundation for all other forms of inquiries. This is followed by an elaboration
of Humean skepticism which ensues from this new science and through
which he undermines the faith in reason. Finally, the essay regards Humes
elements of what comprise belief and knowledge.
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The science of human nature
David Humes most important writing remains to be his A Treatise of
Human Nature: Being an Attempt to introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects , a work he began at 16 years of age and
continued to labor on intermittently during the ensuing 10 years. 1 The
Treatise is composed of three books or volumes, of which the first two, Of
the Understanding and Of the Passions, were published together in
January 1739. The third volume, Of Morals, was published more than a
year later, in November 1740. The importance of the Treatise is gleaned
from the fact that Humes subsequent writings are largely the recasting and
continuation of Humes chief aim in the Treatise : the proposal of a new
science of human nature which serves to securely undergird all the other
sciences.
In the Treatise s Introduction, Hume explains this aim. He writes that
despite the seeming success of previous philosophies, we still lie under
[ignorance] in the most important questions, that can come before the
tribunal of human reason. 2 He points to the presence of controversy and
1 David Fate Norton, An introduction to Humes thought in TheCambridge Companion to Hume , Ed. David Fate Norton (Cambridge, Mass.:Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2.
2 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. David Fate Norton andMary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3.
For facility, this work would be cited as THN; moreover, citation wouldindicate the Book, the Part of the Book, the Section of the Part, andParagraph number of the Section, e.g., THN I, Part 3, Sec. 5, par. 2. In thecase of passages from the Introduction, they would be indicated as, forexample, Introduction, THN, par. 1.
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dispute in the answers to the said questions as indicative of this ignorance,
or at least, of the lack of certainty in these philosophies.
Hume directs us to consider the fact that all sciences and its
speculations are linked to human nature, and therefore, the keys to
validating the results of the sciences and other forms of inquiry are:
understanding how human nature really functions; and comporting these
sciences with human natures actual operations. In other words, Hume
believes la Descartes, that the ongoing confusion, conflict, and uncertainty
obtaining in the sciences of his day are due to false foundations: [p]rinciplestaken upon trust, consequences lamely deducd from them, want of
coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole. 3 In their lieu, he
advances to explain the principles of human nature . . . [which are] a
compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new,
and the only one upon which they can stand with any security. 4 Therefore, if
these sciences are to provide valid conclusions, they must be founded on the
science of human nature.
Meanwhile, Hume furthers that this new science of human nature
which serves as the only solid foundation for the other sciences must of
itself be solidly grounded. Its own foundation is to be secured by its reliance
and employment of experimental philosophy or the subscription to the
methods of experience and observation. 5 What this entailed was that the3 Introduction, THN, par. 1.
4 Introduction, THN, par. 6.
5 Introduction, THN, par. 7.
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elucidation of the principles of human nature required the use of
empiricisms methodology and not of rationalisms. Gilson and Langan
explain that [n]egatively, it means avoiding rationalistic hypothesis about
the constitution in themselves of material and spiritual substances, and
great a priori pronouncements about the nature of our reasoning power.
Positively, . . . it means reducing the whole structure of our comportment to
its sensory, empirical, experimental beginnings. 6
The intention to provide a new and secure footing for knowledge by
establishing a new foundation for it, as well as the delineation of themethodology or approach in endeavoring this, are similarly asserted by
Hume in his later work, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , which
was published in 1748. 7 For in substance, the Enquiry is a recasting of Book I
of the Treatise , and is the result ofat least, if Humes Advertisement of it
is to be believedthe failure of his initial work to obtain commercial and
critical success from its intended audience. 8 This accord between the
Treatise and the Enquiry is apparent in Humes statement in the latter that
the only recourse against confusion, superstition or unfounded beliefs is to
enquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, and [into] . . . an6 Etienne Gilson and Thomas Langan, Modern Philosophy: Descartes to
Kant (New York: Random House, 1963), 251.
7 Originally, it was entitled Philosophical Essays Concerning HumanUnderstanding; later in the 1757 edition of the work, its title has adopted thecurrent form it has today.
8 David Hume, Advertisement in An Enquiry Concerning HumanUnderstanding, ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.,1993). Citations include Section, followed by Part (if applicable), and pagenumber.
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exact analysis of its powers and capacity. 9 Similarly, the statement in the
Enquiry which declares that there are many positive advantages, which
result from an accurate scrutiny into the powers and faculties of human
nature, 10 establishes further that close link between these two works.
There is, however, the matter about Humes later disavowal of the
Treatise in favor of the Enquiry . Again, in the Advertisement of the latter,
Hume writes that he has never acknowledged that juvenile work (the
Treatise was published anonymously) and has now desired that the
following Pieces [namely, the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, theDissertation on the Passions , and the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
Morals ] may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments
and principles. 11 How does one account for this?
John Nelsons Two Main Questions Concerning Humes Treatise and
Enquiry seems to afford a cogent answer. In this essay, Nelson addressed
the questions why Hume disowned the Treatise , and what saves the Enquiry
from a similar disavowal. 12 With regard to the first query, he examines the
obvious answer derived from Humes explications found in the
Advertisement and some of his letters, namely that the Treatises literary
style was objectionable. Nelson also contends with the arguments espoused
9 Enquiry, Sec. I, page 6.
10 Enquiry , Sec. I, page 7.
11 Enquiry, Advertisement.
12 John O. Nelson, Two Main Questions Concerning Humes Treatiseand Enquiry in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 81, No. 3 (Jul., 1972), 333.
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by other Hume scholars who subscribe to this notion that non-philosophical
but literary reasons were the source of Humes disavowal. As regards the
second question, Nelson states that its answer is determined by the
response to the first query posed.
We can briefly rehearse Nelsons answers to these questions. He
argues that Humes rejection of the Treatise in favor of the Enquiry cannot
be viewed to stem from literary reasons when one considers Humes other
declarations about this matter found in his letters. Basing his argument on
Humes correspondence with his friend and publisher, William Strahan, tenmonths before the formers death, Nelson quotes Hume explaining his
Advertisement as a compleat Answer to Dr. Reid and to that bigotted silly
Fellow, Beattie. 13 Nelson points out that these words of Hume betray no
indication that literary reasons lay at the heart of his repudiation of the
Treatise ; but in fact, upon closer scrutiny of the remark, that philosophical
reasons are at issue in Humes disavowal of the Treatise .
Nelson argues that if the Enquiry was viewed by Hume as a compleat
Answer to Reid and Beattie, and both did not bother to criticize Hume for his
literary style, 14 then the Enquiry would have to constitute as a response to
13 David Hume, Letters of David Hume , ed. J. Y. T. Greig (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1932), 2, 301, quoted in Nelson, Two Main Questions,336.
14 Nelson reveals that Reid, a fellow Scotsman, had even soughtHumes comments on the formers Inquiry into the Human Mind for itsliterary style, i.e., its lack of Scotticisms. See Nelson, Two MainQuestions, 336-337.
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philosophical criticisms and not literary ones. And hence, the difference
between the Treatise and the Enquiry does not reside in literary style either.
Thus, in as much as Hume himself says that the Philosophical
Principles are the same in both [ Treatise and Enquiry ], and discounting now
the validity of literary reasons for the rejection of the Treatise , another
explanation for this must be sought. With this, Nelson turns towards his
answer: the Treatise was repudiated by Hume because he later recognized
this work as constituting yet another metaphysical account .
Nelson explains that with the scathing remark at the end of theEnquiry to commit to the flames books of metaphysics, a self-reflexive
critique took over Hume and prompted him to jettison the Treatise , not so
much because of its aim and philosophical principles (which he still
maintained in the Enquiry and other subsequent works), but because of its
manner of supposing that material reality, space and time, the self are
merely perceptions. As Nelson notes, the Treatise proposed that the
ultimate elements of the world are perception and nothing more. [And in]
contemporary terminology this is the metaphysics of neutral monism. 15
Realizing himself afflicted by that which he sought to cure in others, Hume
henceforth excised from his work those parts contaminated with
metaphysics. The result of which is an Enquiry still adhering to Humes aim
declared in the Treatise, i.e., establishing a philosophy of human nature
15 Ibid., 340.
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from which other sciences are to be founded AND to be limited, but freed
from the hubris of claiming to account for the ultimate principles of reality.
Thus, although Hume claimedquite rightlythat the Enquiry was a
recasting of the Treatise , the former does not merely improve upon the
expression and reasoning of the latter; it also expands and develops
further the insights (at times, by glossing over some lengthy discussions) of
the Treatise . For as one commentator explains it: Hume does not merely, as
he suggests, add or improve by subtraction. His recasting includes some
lengthy and important additions . . .16
In sum, beginning with his Treatise and even in later works such as the
Enquiry , Hume was concerned in providing a novel account of how human
naturehuman understandingoperates; with such an account, the moral
sciences and their claims can thus be founded, hereby preventing confusions
due to varying dogmatic speculations.
Skepticism and Rationalisms excesses
From his consideration of human natures operations, Hume was led to
adopt a skepticism directed against the prevailing rationalism of his time,
and the claims of the said theory. For noticeably, Hume has been
straightforward in his goal of limiting the excesses of rationalism and its
claims. He endeavors this by adopting two types of skepticism which are
16 Norton, An introduction, 18.
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exhibited in the Enquiry . The first is skepticism against reasons ability to
justify knowledge or a skepticism against rational belief; the second is
skepticism against rationalism and reason itself
The first type is a skepticism that is directed at reasons ability to
provide justification for our beliefs concerning the external world that we
encounter. It is a skepticism that denies a rational basis for causal
inferences. This skepticism is apparent in Humes search for what is the
nature of that evidence, which assures us of any real existence and matter of
fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses.17
Hume employs this skepticism in his account of the origin of ideas
wherein he undertakes to divide [a]ll the objects of human reason or
enquiry . . . into two kinds . . . Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact. 18 With
this distinction, Hume identifies two kinds of knowledge attendant to human
nature. Accordingly, claims or statements which are intuitively or
demonstratively certain belong to the first, e.g., a triangle has three sides.
Meanwhile, statements which declare contingent events and are not
ascertained in the same manner as those of relations of ideas, that is,
intuitively or demonstratively, belong to the category of matters of fact. 19 In
particular, knowledge on matters of fact is concerned with causal relations
supposedly existing among and between external objects.
17 Enquiry , Sec. IV, Part I, 16.
18 Enquiry, Sec. IV, Part I, 15.
19 Enquiry, Sec. IV, Part I, 15.
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Hume pointed out that the proof, evidence, and justification of claims
from relations of ideas are self-evident in as much as they are contained
within the perception itself. The same, however, cannot be said of
statements from matters of fact since their contrary is possible: that today
is raining does not in any way preclude the logical possibility of today being
a cloudless day. In other words, its opposite is possible without being
demonstratively false.
From his analysis of matter of fact statements, Hume drew several
conclusions. First, [a]ll reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to befounded on the relation of Cause and Effect . 20 Second, the knowledge of
this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori ; but arises
entirely from experience. 21 Moreover, all our experimental conclusions
proceed upon the supposition, that the future will be conformable to the
past. 22 And lastly, custom or habit is the principle which makes us expect,
for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in
the past, or as Hume puts it: All inferences from experience . . . are effects
of custom, not of reasoning. 23
What Humes conclusions mean are, matter of fact statements are not
the result of deduction from or analysis of the natures of objects, but are,
instead, due to causal inferences. For no rational analysis of an objects20 Enquiry, Sec. IV, Part I, 16.
21 Enquiry, Sec. IV, Part I, 17.
22 Enquiry, Sec. IV, Part II, 23.
23 Enquiry, Sec. V, Part I, 28.
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properties can yield the conclusions obtaining in matter of fact statements,
e.g., a billiard ball would move when hit by another billiard ball, because
were that so, contrary outcomes cannot be conceived. This is clearly not the
case, however; for contrary outcomes can be conceived without incurring
logical contradiction.
From whence then do such statements acquire their truth or veracity?
Humes answer is from experience : from the experience of how a past event
unfolded or occurred, and from the regularity of its occurrence, the verity of
conclusions on future but similar events is produced. Hence, it is not reasonthat produces these conclusions or knowledge, but it is the habitual
conjunction of events as observed or experienced by an individual which
grants knowledge of events not immediately present in ones consciousness.
In the end, what this entails for Hume is that, reason cannot and does not
provide the justification for claims concerning matters of fact. For him,
reasons epistemic justification for knowledge of matters of fact is, hence,
unfounded and illusory.
Humes skepticism does not end there, however. For not only does he
deny the ability of reason to provide epistemic grounding and justification,
he also denies its primacy in moral enquiry. His skepticism extends beyond
reasons epistemological claims, for it endeavors to limit the validity of
reasons reach to quantity and number and rejects its very employment in
enquiries regarding matter of fact : Thus, he asserts that that the only
objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration [rationalist
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methodology] are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this
more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry
and illusion. 24
Quite obviously, Hume was reacting against the prevalent rationalism
of his time, which to his estimation, has overstepped its bounds. He hereby
cautions against a blind submission to reasons conclusions. He resists all
forms of rationalist dogmatism and urges a healthy doubt of its bold
declarations. Hume speaks of this in the following:
It is confessed, that the utmost effort of human reason is, to reducethe principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greatersimplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a fewgeneral causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience,and observation. But as to the causes of these general causes, weshould in vain attempt their discovery; nor shall we ever satisfyourselves, by any particular explication of them. These ultimatesprings and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity andenquiry. 25
Hume explains further the tasks his skeptical philosophy has with its
opposition to rationalism and its faith in reason: [Skeptical philosophy]
always talk[s] of doubt and suspense of judgment, of danger in hasty
determinations, of confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries of the
understanding, and of renouncing all speculations which lie not within the
limits of common life and practice. 26
24 Enquiry, Sec. XII, Part III, 112.
25 Enquiry, Sec. IV, Part I, 19.
26 Enquiry, Sec. V, Part I, 26.
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Nonetheless, while he did espouse a skeptical outlook, Hume was no
thoroughgoing skeptic. His skepticism was directed towards demolishing
rationalism and clearing its debris, and limiting its unfounded or dogmatic
speculations. It was directed towards limiting rationalisms excesses.
Perceptions, imagination, and the production of belief
Humes theory of knowledge develops the empirical epistemology of
his predecessor, John Locke. But while he adheres to Lockes position that, in
terms of data, the mind is a blank slate or a tabula rasa, Hume finds
Lockes vocabulary and identified elements of the mental world inadequate.
Hence, instead of adopting Lockean ideas, Hume proposes a more
nuanced basic element, perceptions of the mind.
Perceptions, according to Hume, are of two distinct kinds, impressions
and ideas; they are differentiated from each other by their degrees of force
and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into
our thought or consciousness. 27 Impressions, Hume says, refer to all our
sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in
the soul; their presence in the consciousness is more lively and forceful. 28
Ideas, on the other hand, are faint images of impressions and are thus, dull
and less lively presences in the consciousness. Moreover, all authentic ideas
are based on impressions, that is, all ideas are faint copies or images of
impressions. Consequently, impressions are prior to ideas in as much as the
27 THN I, Part 1, Sec. 1, par. 1.; Enquiry, Sec. II, 10.
28 Ibid.
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origin of the latter is the former. Those ideas, therefore, which cannot be
traced to an impression are to be deemed false and invalid, according to
Hume; they are to be rejected since they can only cause confusions.
Hume has been careful to indicate what he means when he says that
impressions are the origin of ideas. For the question arises whether
impressions, as origin, are causes of ideas, and if so, does this not contradict
Humes own rejection of metaphysical causality as a real relation , i.e., a
relation that is not conjured by the mind but exists apart from the minds
association of its perceptions. What can be inferred as an answer to theabove is that Humes own theory of causality is consistently employed in his
account of the causal relation between impressions and ideas. Its
employment in this case results to understanding impressions as causing
their corresponding ideas only insofar as there is [t]he constant conjunction
of our resembling perceptions [that is, impressions and their corresponding
ideas]. 29 In other words, for Hume impressions do not metaphysically cause
their corresponding ideas, but are only said to cause them inasmuch as our
experience yields that the appearance of the former always precedes that of
the latter.
Meanwhile, aside from this distinction among perceptions, Hume adds
that impressions and ideas can be either simple or complex. 30 Simple
perceptions cannot be further separated into other basic perceptions, while
29 THN I, Part 1, Sec. 1, par. 8.
30 THN I, Part 1, Sec. 1, par. 2; Enquiry, Sec. II, 11.
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complex perceptions are compounds of simple ones. Further still, an
absolute correspondence exists between simple impressions and their simple
ideas; while between complex ones, such correspondence does not
necessarily obtain.
Unlike ideas, impressions are further divided into those of SENSATION
and those of REFLECTION. 31 Hume declares that the impressions due to
sensation cannot be accounted for; this is perhaps due to the fact that such
an account would admit to knowledge of objects in themselves, and as such
would directly constitute a metaphysics. Since Hume asserts that we canonly know perceptions and not objects in themselves, 32 he is restricted from
advancing an account of sensation. With regard those of reflection, Hume
says that these impressions are produced from ideas which in turn are
derived from a prior impression. Of this impression there is a copy taken by
the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an
idea. This idea . . . , when it returns upon the soul, produces the new
impressions . . . , which may properly be calld impressions of reflection
because derivd from it. 33
Now, the faculty of the mind that it is responsible for producing what
amounts to knowledge on matters of fact in Humes epistemology is the31
THN I, Part 1, Sec. 2, par. 1.32 [M]y intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or
explain the secret causes of their operations. . . I am afraid, that suchenterprise is beyond the reach of human understanding, and that we cannever pretend to know body otherwise than by those external properties,which discover themselves to the senses. See THN I, Part 2, Sec. 5, par. 26.
33 Ibid.
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imagination. In the Treatise, Hume first treats of imagination in the
discussion of the distinction between ideas present in the memory and
imagination. He observes that the imaginations ideas are not as lively and
strong as those present in memory, but instead are faint and languid and
cannot without difficulty be preservd by the mind steady and uniform for
any considerable time. 34 Further, like those of memory, none of the ideas of
imagination can make their appearance in the mind, unless their
correspondent impressions have gone before to prepare the way for them. 35
As regards its operation, the imagination unlike memory is free totranspose and change its ideas in any manner, that is, it can unite,
separate, or change an ideas order of succession. 36 Further, Hume notes
that the imagination is guided by some universal principles, which render it,
in some measure, uniform with itself in all times and places. 37 These
associative principles are distinct from the imagination and exert a gentle
force on it which is not wholly indispensable to imaginations operation. To
wit, these are the associative principles of RESEMBLANCE, CONTIGUITY, and
CAUSE & EFFECT. Hume argues that it is largely through these associative
principles of ideas that imagination is guided or is attracted towards the
formation or production of belief .
34 THN I, Part 1, Sec. 3, par. 1.
35 THN I, Part 1, Sec. 3, par. 2.
36 THN I, Part 1, Sec. 3, par. 4.
37 THN I, Part 1, Sec. 4, par. 1.
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Humes account of imagination and its significance to this theory of
knowledge includes a further contrast with memory. He states that the
distinction between imagination and memory is not by their reliance on
impressions for their simple ideas; nor are they significantly differentiated
from each other because memory preserve[s] the original order and
position of its ideas, while the imagination transposes and changes them, as
it pleases. 38 Rather, the two faculties main difference is the superior force
and vivacity of memorys ideas as compared to those of imagination. In
other words, it is a matter of feeling attending the idea that differentiatesmemory from imagination.
Now, Humes identification of the presence of force and vivacity in
the ideas of memory and imagination would have established a clear
criterion by which one faculty is distinguished from the other. He complicates
matters, however, when he acknowledges the possibility that the memorys
idea may become so weak as to be construed to be that of imagination;
conversely, it may occur that imaginations idea gain such force and vivacity
that it is taken to be an idea of memory. 39 Notwithstanding this, Humes
identification of the characteristic of force and vivacity in ideas provides
the key in understanding the relationship of imagination to belief, and
ultimately, to Humean knowledge. This is because vivacity of perceptions is
38 THN I, Part 3, Sec. 5, par. 3.
39 THN I, Part 3, Sec. 5, par. 6.
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the essential character of belief or assent. When this quality is present in an
idea, that idea becomes or is believable.
Hume construes belief therefore as a sentiment in which the mind
more vividly conceives of an object. Belief involves a more vivid, lively,
forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination
alone is ever able to attain. . . It is an act of the mind, which renders realities
. . . more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the
thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and
imagination.40
Similarly, Belief or assent , which always attends the memoryand senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present;
and that this alone distinguishes them from the imagination. 41
A difficulty emerges from such an account, however: if that which
necessitates belief is vivacity of a present perception, and this vivacity is
present in memorys ideas as that which distinguish the latter from those of
imagination, how is it that imagination are said to cause belief? How is it that
imagination, whose ideas are faint and languid; which Hume indicates to
be unable to attain a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of
an object; can produce belief? Or in other words, how does the imagination
make an idea believable, that is, forceful and with vivacity?
Humes distinction between fiction and belief is helpful in this regard. A
believed idea, by Humes account, is one which may contain all the parts and
40 Enquiry, Sec. V, Part II, 32.
41 THN I, Part 3, Sec. 5, par. 6.
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composition of a fictive idea, but its manner of being conceived is different
from that of fiction.
An opinion or belief is nothing but an idea, that is different from
fiction, not in the nature, or the order of its parts, but in the manner of its being conceived. . . . [This manner] gives [believed ideas]more force and influence; makes them appear of greaterimportance; infixes them in the mind; and renders them thegoverning principles of all our actions. 42
Waxmans amplification and clarification of this point is instructive:
Humes sense of belief should not be equated with believe to be true, i.e.
affirmation. . . . We should consider believe to be true to be, from Humes
perspective, secondary and derivative by comparison with its primary sense
of believe to be real, i.e. belief in the real existence of a content present in
sensation, reflexion, or thought. 43 To believe therefore, is primarily to assent
to the reality of what is in ones perception, which is not the case in fiction.
Since assent is due to vivacity or liveliness of an idea, Hume contends
with the question of what causes this. Proceeding with some difficulty in
identifying the cause, he nonetheless is able to state a definition of belief
which allows for the identification of that cause. Hume declares that belief is
A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT
IMPRESSION. 44 (sic) He states that the vivacity of an idea which enables
belief is brought about when the imagination is led or guided by the
associative principles of ideas to conceive an idea in a lively manner, due to42 THN I, Part 3, Sec. 7, par. 7.
43 Wayne Waxman, Humes theory of consciousness (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1994), 10.
44 THN I, Part 3, Sec. 7, par. 5.
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the presence of an object to the senses or memory. The facility which further
induces liveliness is moreover due to custom or habit of witnessing two
impressions conjoined together. In sum, Humean belief is produced when
these associations of ideas are carried out by the imagination and is aided by
the presence of the object and by custom.
This process in which belief is produced by the imagination receives
more illumination through a consideration of knowledge as a type of belief. A
reprisal of Humes understanding of the two kinds of knowledge based on
objects of human reason is required at this juncture. It can be recalled thatin the Enquiry Hume differentiated between knowledge based on relations of
ideas and that on matters of fact. As mentioned above, 45 knowledge from
relations of ideas is intuitively or demonstratively certain . . . [since]
[p]ropositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought,
without dependence on what is any where existent in the universe. 46 Within
the ambit of relations of ideas are the truths of Geometry, Algebra, and
Arithmetic.
Knowledge on matters of fact , in the meantime, is concerned with so-
called causal phenomena in the world. Knowledge in this case means
believing in a particular causal phenomenon to be real or to certainly take
place. As such, knowledge on matters of fact is a type of belief wherein the
mind assents to the occurrence of causal phenomena.
45 See page 8.
46 Enquiry , Sec. IV, Part I, 15.
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Hume argues that such belief or knowledge is not demonstratively or
rationally certain for causal relations in themselves are not demonstrable or
rationally deduced. His arguments proceeds from an identification of
causation as the only one, that can be tracd beyond our senses, and
informs us of existences and objects, which we do not see or feel, 47 and thus
enables knowing or believing beyond the ken of immediate consciousness.
Hume then undertakes to examine how causation induces belief on matters
of fact statements. He shows the impossibility of inferring causality by sheer
analysis of the qualities of supposedly causally-related objects by arguingthat other possible effects between these objects can be logically admitted.
Thus, Hume demonstrates that the logical necessity of an effect proceeding
from a cause that is essential to causation is not inferred or discovered;
hence, this necessity is not really present in supposedly causally-related
objects.
Causation, in other words, is not rationally inferred; and belief in causal
relations between objects or causal phenomena is not rationally justified or
grounded. For Hume, our certainty in such beliefs, in such kind of knowledge,
is not guaranteed by reason. Instead, our certainty of knowledge on matters
of fact is derived elsewhere.
Humes answer to the question of from whence is certainty of this
belief or knowledge derived reveals his adherence to what Anne Jaap
Jacobson a radical idea: that in the most important aspects of human life
47 THN I, Part 3, Sec. 2, par. 3.
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over a vast range of phenomena we are and must be creatures ruled by the
non-rational in our nature. 48 Consequently, the subscription to reason and
rational argumentation as directors of our conduct in life is hereby greatly
undermined by Hume.
In the meantime, his analysis of causation continues with his
contention that it is EXPERIENCE from which causality is inferred. Further,
this analysis leads to the discovery of a new relation between cause and
effect which is constant conjunction . Hume explains that what was supposed
as necessary connection is at root, the experience of constant conjunctionof two objects. Constant conjunction alone, however, remains insufficient to
induce belief in causality; Hume thus asks whether experience produces the
idea by means of the understanding or imagination [or] whether we are
determind by reason to make the transition. 49 In other words, Hume is
asking if it is experience of constant conjunction and the imagination which
produce belief, or if it is experience with reason which effects it.
Having earlier denied the cogency of demonstrative arguments, Hume
concludes: Reason can never show us the connexion of one object with
another, tho aided by experience, and the observation of their constant
conjunction in all past instances. Instead, he asserts that it is the
imagination and the principles of association by which the mind . . . passes
48 Anne Jaap Jacobson, David Hume on human understanding inBritish Philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment: Routledge History of Philosophy, Vol. V. (New York and London: Routledge, 1996), 151.
49 THN I, Part 3, Sec. 2, par. 4.
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from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another. 50
The faculty of the mind responsible for producing belief in causal relations is
imagination which is aided by associative principles.
Imagination, however, by itself or even as it is aided by the associative
principles does not reach belief. It has to be coupled with custom: Objects
have no discoverable connexion together; nor is it from any other principle
but custom operating upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference
from the appearance of one to the existence of the other. 51 Custom is the
link of necessity binding the inference drawn from the constant conjunctionof supposedly causally-related objects. When we are accustomd to see two
impressions [cause and effect] conjoined together, the appearance of idea of
one immediately carries us [imagination at work] to the idea of the other. 52
Custom provides the idea of necessity the vivacity which makes causal
relations believable. Pithily, causality is not thought ; it is felt .
Finally, Hume attaches the notion of probability to this type of
knowledge. Knowledge of matters of fact , that is, knowledge drawn from
causalityHume reiteratesis never rationally justified. Instead, because of
its origin in the operation of the imagination, it can only be probable . Hence
ultimately, it is the probability and not the rationality of belief that accounts
for knowledge. For as Hume puts it, probability is the concurrence of several
views in one particular event . . . . [which] fortify and confirm it to the50 THN I, Part 3, Sec. 6, par. 12.
51 THN I, Part 3, Sec. 8, par. 12.
52 THN I, Part 3, Sec. 8, par. 10.
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imagination, beget[s] that sentiment which we call belief , and gives its object
the preference above the contrary event. 53
With this account of belief and causal knowledge, reason with its
grounding and justification is rejected by Hume. Belief in causality, that on
which a substantial area of the practical conduct of human life is based, is
not guaranteed by reason. For Hume, we know, that is, we believe in causal
phenomena not because we reasoned or analyzed the properties of given
objects. Rather, it is because our imagination is led by natural associative
principles to construct lively ideas whose vivacity custom has facilitated.Hence, our certainty of causality cannot be based on reason. Our certainty
can only be imagined.
~0~
Gilles Deleuze once remarked of Hume as a genius who among his
most essential and creative contribution to the history of philosophy is the
supplanting of knowledge with the latters concept of belief. Deleuze infers
the important consequence of this replacement: if the act of thinking is
belief, thought has fewer reasons to defend itself against error than against
illusion. 54 An implication can be drawn: the mind is not reason whose
singular function is to oppose itself to error, to falsehood, to mistaken
judgments. The mind, that which constitutes human nature, is largely non-
53 Enquiry, Sec VI, 39.
54 See Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on HumesTheory of Human Nature , trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1991), ix-x.
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rational. This is not to say that the issue of veracity, of truth, is unimportant
in Hume. This is only to indicate the poverty of thought attending the
equation of mind with reason.
As Deleuze reads Hume, the danger is illusion . We can recall that
Hume makes the distinction between belief and illusion in his explanation of
imaginations ideas. Hume sought to provide a distinguishing mark for
believable ideas in contrast to fictive ones. Hume, and Deleuze stresses this,
opposes belief to fiction, to illusions. For Deleuze, it would seem, Humes
imagined certainties need to be constantly guarded, not against from beingmistaken, false or different, but from blurring into imagined illusions.
Hume does unseat reason as the minds faculty for knowing and
replaces it with imagination, a capacity that is less unfettered and nearly
limitless in its power. Certainly however, Humes conception of reason can
be faulted for being restrictive, having relied largely on Lockes and
Berkeleys conceptions of it. Reason has been limited largely to deductive
and inductive functions. Humes replacement and limited view of reason are
apparent in his moral and political philosophies where he declares reason to
be but a slave to the passions and that it can never be a motive to any
action of the will.
What is very significant with Humes replacement is the engendering of
a new set of problems that need to be confronted, one centering on how the
imagination is governed (or guided) by the association of ideas which in
themselves are not universal principles of necessary connections. These
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associations are conventional and customary , given largely by ones culture:
the transition of the perception of beer to that of ice cubes in a glass is
naturally smooth for a Filipino, whereas it would be jarring for a German or a
Scotsman, for instance. Despite the difference of associations, the imagined
certainty of the Filipino would not be opposed to those of the German or the
Scot in this case. Varied imagined certainties can exist simultaneously
without contradicting (logically or rationally) each other.
The difficulty, if Deleuze is to be believed, lies elsewhere.
The danger of imagined illusions or of certainties becoming illusions ischaos. The imagination, tasked with the production of knowledge crucial to
practical and social life, is capable of conjuring fantasies that may not cohere
with the uniformity of nature, with experience. As Hume puts it, one can
imagine billiard ball B being hit by ball A to remain unmoved, to remain at a
standstill. Nothing can impede the imagination from supposing this
occurrence. But in the face of experience, this is illusory and may have an
unwanted consequence (losing a bet, for instance). In the more significant
areas of practical life, such imagined illusions will prove disastrous if not
fatal. They will undermine much of social and political life, as well as the
ethical.
In this, Humes imagination seems to refuse the unbridled creativity or
re-imagining of the world that some postmodern thinkers like Lyotard,
Foucault, and even Deleuze undertake. He refuses or is unable to concede to
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chaosto dis -orderwhich allows for a new order of things. It may well be
because the certainties of Humes time do not allow him to.
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