Humanitarian Law and Internal Armed Conflicts

HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNALARMED CONFLICTS

G.I.A.D. Draper*

I. INTRODUCTION

It is a singular privilege for me to be able to take part in thissymposium at the University of Georgia in honor of ProfessorDean Rusk, a distinguished statesman, jurist, and academic.

The subject with which we are concerned here is one of consider-able complexity, uncertainty, and importance. It is no less one ofcontemporary relevance. In the post-1945 period, internal armedconflicts within the territory of a single state have been frequent,with much loss of life and destruction. In a number of cases theseconflicts have assumed large proportions and have been wagedwith ferocity, often with great cruelty. During this period we haveseen the erosion of the colonial system, a process not alwaysachieved by peaceful means. We have also witnessed ideological di-visions within states which on occasion have been preceded by bit-ter internal armed struggles followed by counter-movements. Ra-cial tensions within states have also made their contribution byway of "liberation struggles," whether as part of the struggleagainst colonialism or against racist regimes. To add to the com-plexity of these internal armed contentions, we have experiencedthe "mixed" internal conflicts wherein the armed forces of thirdstates have participated either in support of the rebel elements orin support of governments seeking to quell rebellions. These con-flicts in particular have often assumed major proportions, in boththe scale of the fighting and the loss of life and destruction causedthereby.

This same period has been marked by the mass production ofhighly sophisticated and destructive conventional weapons, readilyavailable to government forces and to rebels alike. Ideological divi-sions across the world have meant that governments of third statessympathetic to the rebel cause have contributed generous suppliesof this sophisticated weaponry and provided training of rebel per-

*Former Director of Legal Services, British Army; Participant in the Nuremberg War

Crimes Trials; Specialist on the Laws of War and International Humanitarian Law.

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sonnel in the use of it. These "mixed" armed conflicts, often on thescale of major civil wars,. have had many of the external features ofinterstate armed conflicts. Sometimes the participation of thearmed forces of third states has been covert, by the device of so-called "volunteers," as in the Korean conflict.

It is to such violent events that international law has to be ap-plied if the Rule of Law in international affairs is to have anymeaning. The Charter of the United Nations did not seek to pro-vide legal principles to govern the resort to rebellion within a state.The events to which that paramount instrument of internationallaw was directed were the international, interstate armed conflictscharacterized by the Second World War of 1939 to 1945. TheCharter embodied a very explicit prohibition of resort to armedforce, or the threat of it, by one state or states against anotherstate or states. It was primarily concerned with the events that hadled to the six years of war that preceded it. This enabled the par-ticipation of third states in the post-1945 so-called "mixed" con-flicts as a method of concealed aggression, normally for ideologicalpurposes, and avoided the sharp impact of article 2(4) of theUnited Nations Charter. It may be said that the international lawof our time has proved itself ill-prepared to deal with such"mixed" forms of internal armed conflicts.

It will also be apparent that the classical international law gov-erning the conduct of government fighting forces and rebel ele-ments in all forms of internal conflict was fragmentary and inade-quate. In terms of conventional law, there was prior to 1950 noconvention governing the conduct of government and dissidentforces engaged in an internal conflict. In the absence of the recog-nition of belligerency accorded to rebel elements by third states or,more rarely, by the government of the state in which the rebellionarose, the customary law of war was not brought to bear. It wasone of the conditions requisite for the according of such recogni-tion of belligerency that the rebel elements observe the customarylaw of war. In many cases the physical capacity to observe the cus-tomary law of war on the part of rebel elements was not present.They lacked the capacity to attract recognition.

In the absence of such recognition of belligerency, which wasconditional, inter alia, upon observance of the customary law ofwar by the rebels, the modus of conducting internal warfare wasnot subject to any restraints imposed by international law. Thiswas the direct result of the principle of state sovereignty which liesat the center of the classical system of international law primarily

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INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS

governing independent territorial states. Under that system, whichis still with us in large part, a rebellion is not, as such, a violationof international law. Further, the question of how the governmentof a state quells a rebellion within its territory is a matter of themunicipal law of the state concerned, i.e. a matter within its sover-eignty. Those two principles are the points of departure fromwhich the 19th and 20th century developments in international lawhave evolved in relation to internal armed conflicts.

II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In the pre-Grotius era of international law, the law of arms, seenas part of the jus gentium, operated throughout the Holy RomanEmpire. The absence of a society based upon the existence of sov-ereign, independent, territorial states precluded any juridical di-chotomy between international and internal armed conflicts in ourmodern sense of those terms. In the Middle Ages, there were "openand public" wars to which the law of war applied, with a markeddistinction between the legal position of the prince or ruler wagingthe "just war" and his opponent, who of necessity could be wagingonly an "unjust war." Such a public war admittedly required the"avowal" of a prince, although there might be some debate as towho was a prince for that purpose.

There were also "private wars," which were not wars at all, butprivate forays and raids, the scourge of an era in which there weremany landless members of society trained for no other professionthan that of arms. Such "private wars" were under the anathemaof the Church. Above all, the legal rights which flowed from thelaw of arms did not inure to the benefit of the participants, e.g.,they had no right to take prisoners, to claim ransom, to take spoils,or to levy appatis (a form of taxation payable from the local civilpopulation as the price of being left unmolested and undespoiledin their persons and their goods). In the case of forays by freeboot-ers (routiers), there was always the risk, at least in the later MiddleAges, of being treated by their captors as brigands, murderers, andpillagers, and being summarily hanged on the spot when captured.In such a system of law and society, there was no place for a di-chotomy known to the law between international and non-interna-tional conflicts. The modern state, with its armed forces, subjects,frontiers, and organization of government, did not exist.

With the breakup of the medieval system in the 16th century, asystem of law had to be devised and given a theoretical sub-struc-ture to regulate the conduct of the new sovereign, independent,

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territorial states in relation to each other as part of the system oforder required by the law of nature, if not by the law of God. Gro-tius and his immediate predecessors and successors furnished thenew international society of states with such a system-the law ofnations. In the century preceding his great work, De Jure Belli acPacis,1 his own country, the United Provinces of the Netherlands,fought one of the greatest and earliest struggles for liberationagainst the rule of the Spanish Empire. It is curious that Grotius,with that background so close to him, was ambivalent about theright of a people to revolt against an oppressor.

In his own lifetime, Europe was absorbed in the great religiousarmed contest of the Thirty Years War, 1618-1648, a war fought,certainly in its later stages, with appalling ferocity. There was vir-tual disregard of the living needs of the civilian population to anextent that the peasants, after repeated plunderings by all belliger-ents, were reduced to cannibalism. This war was, in modern par-lance, an international or interstate war. It was that experiencethat led Grotius to introduce his famous Temperaments Belli asan appendix to his work on the Law of War and Peace. Little at-tention is paid therein to the great armed struggle of the previouscentury in his own country, which led to the successful overthrowof Spanish rule. This is even more curious because Grotius was asufficiently modern thinker to envisage all law as made for the ben-efit of man. This is seen in the humanitarian ideas displayed in hiswriting. Nevertheless, the desire for order, understandable in manyways, seems to have transcended his noble ideal of humanitarian-ism. In the final analysis, law derives from order, but law cannotestablish order.

The classical law of war emerged from the older law of arms. Inthe post-Grotius era the law of war was essentially concerned withthe conduct of belligerents in wars between states. Internal armedrevolt was not the concern of international law; neither was it aviolation of it. The corollary proposition was that the sovereigntyof states, itself derived from international law, enabled the govern-ments of states to quell such revolts in the manner determined bylocal municipal law.

By the late 18th century, writers, including Vattel in his workThe Law of Nations or the Principles of International Law, pub-lished in 1756,2 had asserted that the parties to a civil war were

H. GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS (1625).M. DE VATEL, LE DROIT DES GENS (1758).

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under an obligation to observe the customary law of war in relationto the adversary. Vattel's work had considerable influence. It pre-ceded the two great revolutions of 1776 and 1789. As has beenpointed out by Professor Albert de Lapradelle, "Grotius had writ-ten the international law of absolutism, Vattel has written the in-ternational law of political liberty." The more humane ideas ofwarfare, which were a symptom of 18th century rationalism, com-bined with the idea of individual liberty to initiate a limited intru-sion of the international law of war into the conduct of rebellionsand their repression by governments. This intrusion was on a mod-est scale, primarily in cases in which the scale and organization ofthe rebellion assumed the appearance of an interstate war, butwithout the confrontation of two states.

III. CUSTOMARY LAW AND CONVENTIONS

The fundamental principles determining the recognition ofstates and governments apply also to the recognition of insurgentbelligerency, when one or more political entities that are not statesare engaged in hostilities. Such recognition amounts to a declara-tion by the recognizing state that the hostilities in question are, inits determination, of such a quality and extent as to entitle theparties thereto to be treated as if they were belligerents in a war inthe international law sense. Such recognition arises from the factsof a situation presented to the recognizing state. This principle isfacilitated by the principle that such rebellions, evoking recogni-tion of belligerency, are not violations of international law.

The conditions which came to be accepted by international lawfor such recognition of belligerency were four:

(i) an armed conflict within the State concerned, of a general,as opposed to a local character;

(ii) the insurgents must occupy and administer a substantialpart of the State territory;

(iii) they must conduct their hostilities in accordance with thelaw of war, through organized armed forces under a responsiblecommand;

(iv) circumstances exist that make it necessary for third Statesto make clear their attitude to those circumstances by a recogni-tion of belligerency.

It follows that recognition granted by a third state when such con-ditions have been met constituted no international law wrong tothe lawful government of the state in which such an armed rebel-lion occurs. These conditions find some support in the writers

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upon the American Civil War, 1861-1865. Thus, Bernard, in hiswork A Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great BritainDuring the American Civil War, states:

It is generally expedient that the ordinary rules of war shouldextend, as far as possible, to civil wars. The restraints which theyimpose are here as wholesome, their influence in making war reg-ular and humane and in confining its range are as useful ....These considerations appear to show not only that recognitionmay be conceded, but that it ought not to be withheld.'

A century earlier Vattel had provided a theoretical foundation forsuch ideas: "[WIhen a Nation becomes divided into two parties ab-solutely independent, and no longer acknowledging a common su-perior, the state is dissolved, and the war between the two partiesstands on the same ground, in every respect as a public war be-tween two different nations."'

Such ideas were reflected in the decisions of the United Statescourts during the Civil War. It has, however, been pointed out thatthe general experience of civil struggles is that after an initial pe-riod of outraged authority and reprisal acts by the rebels, the par-ties to such a struggle tacitly accept and apply most of the rules ofwarfare that have gained general consent. This is the result of con-siderations of general convenience and the fear of reprisals. Whenthe civil struggle had obtained the proportions and dimensions ofan international war, there seemed no good ground for denying theapplication of the customary law of war, even on a transitory andcontingent basis. One most important consequence was that gov-ernments felt compelled to treat captured rebels as prisoners ofwar and not as traitors awaiting trial who, upon conviction, facedthe death penalty.

So far, the question of the observance of conventions governingcivil wars does not seem to have arisen. The era of conventionsrelating to the law of war did not start until about 1856 with theDeclaration of Paris, which governed limited aspects of warfare atsea.5 The first of the series of Geneva Conventions based upon hu-manitarian principles was concluded in 1864." It would be difficult

3 M. BERNARD, A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE NEUTRALITY OF GREAT BRITAIN DURING THE

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 115-16 (London 1870).M. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 427 (Chitty-Ingraham transl. 1883).

6 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, 15 Martens Nouveau Recueil, Series 1at 791.

' Geneva Convention of 1864, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil, Series 1 at 607.

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to claim that the first of the Geneva Conventions, dealing with thesick and wounded members of the armed forces in the field, re-flected no more than the existing customary law of war. This mat-ter becomes important in the 20th century with the increase in thenumber of rules of the law of war to be found in conventions. Theborderline between tacit acceptance of usages and rules by the par-ties in a civil conflict and the sense of obligation to apply suchrules is difficult to discern. The matter is not simplified by theperpetual flux between those rules in international conventionsand customary rules reduced to conventional form.

IV. BELLIGERENT PRACTICE UNTIL 1950

No convention dealing with the law of war made any reference toconduct in internal armed conflicts until the four Geneva Conven-tions of 1949.' Throughout the 19th century the observance of thecustomary law of war was seen as a pre-condition for recognizingthe belligerency of the insurgents. Such recognition attended andwas consequential upon the application and observance of the cus-tomary law of war by the rebels. More often than not this theoreti-cal position did not prevail. If the internal armed struggle reachedcertain proportions and the insurgents attained a degree of organi-zation and control compatible with the observance of the custom-ary law of war, the parties tacitly applied that customary law if itwere found that the other party was doing the same. The bases ofcompliance were convenience and humanity. The observance wasreciprocal. If the insurgent forces treated the government forceswhen captured as prisoners of war according to the accepted us-ages of the day, the government authorities did likewise. In thatevent, there was no question of such captured rebel forces beingheld as criminals to be charged with treason. Similar considera-tions and practices prevailed in the treatment of the sick andwounded who fell into the hands of the adversary party. The rea-son is not difficult to find. Once the conditions prevailing in a civilwar assume the proportions, organization, and scale of an inter-

7 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick inArmed Forces in the Field, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick,and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-ers of War, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; GenevaConvention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done Aug. 12,1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

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state war, there was no reason why it should not be treated as sucha war. Humanitarian considerations, convenience, and the interestsof other states affected by the civil conflcit reinforced the analogy.This idea was expressed in a judicial formula by the United Statescourts during the Civil War: "When the party [sic] in rebellion oc-cupy and hold in a hostile manner certain portions of territory;have declared their independence; have cast off their allegiance;have organized armies; have commenced hostilities against theirformer sovereign, the world acknowledges them as belligerents, andthe contest a war."8

It was a difficult matter to persuade governments in advance toaccept international law obligations imposed by a convention in re-lation to rebel forces. At the time of the convention the rebel en-tity may not exist, and may for that matter never exist. It is diffi-cult to find any legal entity to which such obligations may be owedor which may have belligerent rights except when the belligerancyapproximates two de facto states engaged in armed conflict. Inthat situation all the factors are persuasive of a tacit observance ofthe customary law of war by government forces and insurgents.Not least is the consideration that the rebels of today may be thelawful government of tomorrow. That situation also suits the con-venience of third states in the application of prize law and the lawof neutrality, particularly in relation to acts of maritime warfare,such as blockades and contraband control.

Possibly the most powerful single factor for the imposition oflegal restraints upon the parties to a civil war during the 20th cen-tury has been the influence of the humanitarian movementthrough the active agency of the Red Cross organization, and espe-cially through the International Committee of the Red Cross(I.C.R.C.). This latter body was created in Geneva after the battleof Solferino in 1859. The I.C.R.C. has been, and still is, concernedprimarily with the relief of suffering in war and the better andmore humane treatment of the victims of warfare who find them-selves defenseless in the hands of the adversary. It was not likelyto be impressed by the legal dichotomy between international(interstate) and internal armed conflicts so far as the imposition ofnorms of humanitarian conduct into warfare were concerned. Onthe contrary, the very nature of a civil internal conflict accentuatedthe need for maximum humanitarian restraint. Yet, there were for-

' Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666-67 (1862).

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midable difficulties to be overcome before the governments ofstates were willing to accept in advance, in a multilateral law mak-ing convention, binding obligations of restraint in quelling a rebel-lion which by its nature threatens the existence of the governmentof the state in question. Under the classical law of war, such anundertaking had been subject to the recognition of belligerency bythe government, consequential upon the condition that the insur-gents had the capacity to, and did in fact, observe the customarylaw of war. The tacit observance, without formal recognition of bel-ligerency, was of necessity upon a reciprocal basis only. If at anytime the rebel forces declined to treat humanely wounded mem-bers of the government forces, or to accord prisoner of war statusupon captured members of such forces, then the like treatment ordenial would be accorded to the members of the insurgent forcesupon capture.

As early as 1912, in an International Red Cross conference inwhich governments of states that were parties to the Geneva Con-ventions of 1864 and 1906 took part, the I.C.R.C. sought to intro-duce a draft convention on the role of the Red Cross in armed re-bellions into the agenda of the conference. The matter was noteven discussed at that conference. However, a modest resolutionenabling National Red Cross Societies, and in default, the I.C.R.C.,to afford relief to the victims of internal conflicts was adopted atthe Red Cross Conference of 1922. This resolution, though withoutany binding effect, enabled the I.C.R.C. to persuade the parties tothe Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, to accept to some extent theprinciples of the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906, which pro-vided for the protection and proper treatment of the sick andwounded members of the government and insurgent armed forces.A more substantial resolution was adopted at the InternationalRed Cross Conference of 1938, devoted to "the role and activity ofthe Red Cross in time of civil war." Therein, the I.C.R.C. and theNational Red Cross Societies were requested to endeavor to obtain:

a) the application of the humanitarian principles ... in the Ge-neva Conventions of 1929 (POW and Sick and Wounded), theTenth Hague Convention of 1907 (Sick and Wounded inMaritime Warfare) ... ;

b) humane treatment for all political prisoners, their exchange,and as far as possible, their relase;

c) respect of the life and liberty of non-combatants;d) facilities for the transmission of news of a personal nature;e) effective measures for the protection of children.

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This resolution enabled the I.C.R.C. at the end of the SecondWorld War to start the long and difficult task of seeking to intro-duce some humanitarian provisions into the Geneva Conventionsof 1949. This was the first time that express provisions relating tohumanitarian conduct of the parties to a civil war were, after muchdebate, to find a place in an international multilateral law makingconvention. It is also pertinent to the history of this process thatthe movement for the establishment of regimes of human rights inthe post-1945 era was of some assistance to the endeavors of theI.C.R.C. at this time. The United Nations Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights had been adopted, though not as a binding instru-ment of law, by the General Assembly in 1948. The Geneva Diplo-matic Conference established the four Geneva Conventions of 1949relating to the humane treatment of persons in time of war whichcame into force in 1950. These conventions now bind about 150states.

From 1946, the Red Cross movement was working toward thisinnovation in international law as to internal conflicts. It is of in-terest to observe that certain of the proposals made within the RedCross movement in the period 1946-1948 outran the positionreached in the latest international law instrument on the subject ofinternal armed conflicts, namely, Protocol II Additional to the Ge-neva Conventions of 1949, adopted in 1977.1 It was not easy thento assess the full nature of the I.C.R.C. achievement in the GenevaConventions of 1949, embodied, as it was, only in article 3 commonto each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Governmentsmake and conclude conventions. They were being asked by theI.C.R.C. to accept binding legal obligations restraining their ac-tions in seeking to repress an armed rebellion overtly aimed attheir overthrow and supersession, or at secession. That entailed amajor inroad upon the existing domain of state sovereignty. It alsomeant that the tacit acceptance of the principles of the customarylaw of war or the general principles of the Geneva (Sick andWounded) Convention of 1864, and possibly, the two Geneva Con-ventions of 1929 would no longer suffice.

The Red Cross movement aimed high in humanitarian terms. Aconference of National Red Cross Societies proposed in 1946 thateach of the four Conventions have an opening article which pro-vided: "In the case of armed conflict within the borders of a State

9 Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, done Dec. 12, 1977, __

U.N.T.S. -, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).

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(the Convention) shall also be applied by each of the adverse Par-ties, unless one of them announces expressly an intention to thecontrary." The I.C.R.C. was supported to a limited extent by asubsequent conference of government experts. Eventually, at theInternational Red Cross Conference of 1948, the I.C.R.C. submit-ted the following draft:

In all cases of armed conflict which are not of an internationalcharacter, especially cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or warsof religion which may occur in one or more of the territories ofthe High Contracting Parties, the implementing of the principlesof the present Convention shall be obligatory on each of the ad-versaries. The application of the Convention in these circum-stances shall in no way depend upon the legal status of the Par-ties to the conflict and shall have no effect upon that status.

The second sentence of this draft marked the rejection of the re-quirement of any recognition of belligerency on the part of thelawful government. The former tacit acceptance of observance ofthe customary law of war was now outdistanced to the extent ofthe draft proposal. This proposal was to be expressed in a conven-tion. It did not rely upon the conduct of the rebel elements. At thesame time, and no less importantly, it precluded the rebel ele-ments from asserting that they had received the benefit of recogni-tion of belligerent status by the application of the Convention asbetween them and the lawful government. This text was acceptedat the International Red Cross Conference at Stockholm in 1948 asthe draft to be submitted to the Diplomatic Conference to be heldat Geneva in August 1949, with one important deletion. The words"especially cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion"were deleted. This left the scope of the draft proposal much widerthan in its original text and was, therefore, a more pronounced de-parture from the limited ambit of the classical law of war conditionfor a recognition of the belligerency of insurgents.

V. THE "COMMON ARTICLE 3" OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF

1949

This article provoked the longest single debate of any provisionat the Diplomatic Conference of 1949. What was not foreseen bythe redactors at the Conference was the number and intensity ofthe internal armed conflicts which were to be a feature of the post-1949 period. It became apparent fairly early in the debates thatthe governments were not prepared to accept the content of thedraft article 3 with the deletion of the words above mentioned re-

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lating to "civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion." Withthat deletion, the scope of article 3 was virtually unlimited. Oncethe limitation was conferred solely by geographical location, muchemphasis fell upon the formula "armed conflicts which are not ofan international character." This lacked juridical precision and wasopen to much ambiguity of interpretation. As is so often the casewith humanitarian law instruments, this is the outcome of the de-sire for maximum width for the play of the humanitarian norms,overriding the desire for that element of certainty which legalnorms demand if they are to be effective. The value of the individ-ual rules of restraint in conflict is lost if the scope provision lackscertainty. Moreover, if the scope of such a provision is limited tocriteria close to those which had been the conditions for recogniz-ing belligerency of insurgents under the classical law of war, then itis possible to embody in that provision a comparably large numberof norms of restraint. If, however, the scope of such a provisionallows it to apply to all exchanges of violence just above civil dis-turbances or political demonstrations, then, correspondingly, thenumber of the norms of restraint must of necessity be limited andsimple in nature. Thus, in a "low level" exchange of violence, theelements opposed to the government may lack the capacity toachieve the observance of any restraints other than minimal andsimple ones. If humanitarian considerations dominate to the exclu-sion of the capacity of the insurgents in terms of some degree oforganization and capacity of control, then the proposed rules aredivorced from reality.

A reversion to the classical criteria of recognition of belligerencyas the necessary precondition for the application of the full GenevaConvention to the parties engaged in an internal armed conflictalso failed to be adopted. Many formulas to define the scope ofcommon article 3 were debated and rejected. The negotiating gov-ernments were not eager to incur legal obligations of detailed re-straints in the quelling of undefined armed rebellions, even if suchrestraints were of undoubted humanitarian caliber. The scope ofthe article and the volume and nature of its content were mani-festly related. In the end, after many failed formulas, a compro-mise was reached in which only the fundamental humanitarian re-straints were found to be acceptable to governments, with thescope formula left vague. The method adopted was to try to makecommon article 3 a "microcosm" of the remainder of each Conven-tion. This was a tall order. It required consensus as to what werethe main humanitarian principles underlying many of the remain-

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ing provisions in each Convention. These efforts of the Conferencemet with a certain measure of success. Attempts, however, to refineand give greater precision to the scope of the provision failed. Themost that could be achieved was the positive geographical elementin the definition "armed conflict . . . occurring in the territory ofone of the High Contracting Parties," and the negative juridicalelement "not of an international character." It was a debate whichproduced the ancient dilemma between over-zealous protection ofthe individual and the placing of the state in peril from disintegra-tion, discussed by Aristotle in the 4th century B.C.

Part of the difficulty is that a particular civil struggle within astate may move through many phases of expansion and diminutionover a period of time. What may start as a small group of armedindividuals may develop into the dimensions of a de facto organi-zation engaged in a full scale civil war. How could such a situationbe met? The answer was that the parties to the conflict could andshould agree between themselves to apply the whole or part of theremainder of the Convention: "The Parties to the conflict shouldfurther endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agree-ments, all or part of the other provisions of the present Conven-tion." This is a useful provision, well adapted to the shifting scaleand intensity of a civil conflict. The parties are placed under nolegal obligation, but should they find it necessary or convenient forhumanitarian or other reasons, they are free to conclude suchagreements if the position and the consensus so demand and per-mit. The weakness of this provision is that the winning party maysee no need to conclude such agreements. However, the opinion ofthe international community has to be taken into account, notleast for the reason that successful rebellion will lead to the expec-tation of recognition of any succession attained or of the new gov-ernment of the state concerned. It may also be said that, in a re-bellion in which the scale and intensity attained renders theconclusion of agreements under common article 3 advisable, theoutcome of victory or defeat is rarely certain. Accordingly, theremay be great advantage gained by the government and rebel ele-ments in concluding such agreements under common article 3whereby the whole or part of each Convention may be brought intoplay. Although these instruments are essentially humanitarian,there may be other advantages of a less lofty nature for seeking tocomply with them.

It is sometimes contended that the conclusion of such agree-ments under common article 3 will, in law, convert the armed con-

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flict into one of an international character and thereby take it outof common article 3 altogether. Common article 2, controlling in-terstate armed conflicts, would appear to preclude such a result, atleast for the purposes of the Conventions. Article 2, paragraph 3states:

Although one of the Parties in conflict may not be a party tothe present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shallremain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall, further-more, be bound by the Convention relation to the said Power, ifthe latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.

It is suggested that this provision has no application to insurgents,whether recognized as belligerents or not. The context dispels thecontrary view, and the reciprocal basis of any obligation makes itundesirable.

Article 3 discarded recognition as the criterion for its applicabil-ity: "The application of the preceding provisions shall not affectthe legal status of the Parties to the conflict." Article 3 was proba-bly the maximum that governments were prepared to accept interms of humanitarian restraints when quelling a rebellion. Theprice of that acceptance was a vagueness in the scope formula. Theabove provision means that rebels remain rebels. What is notstated in the Conventions is the legal effect of the recognition ofbelligerency. Has the conflict then lost its "internal" character andceased to be one "not of an international character"? Some writershave suggested that such recognition renders the Conventions ap-plicable in toto under common article 2. Thus, Oppenheim states:

In so far as, in consequence of the recognition of the belliger-ency of the insurgents by the legitimate Government, the conflicthas assumed an international complexion, the rules of the GenevaConventions apply in toto if the legitimate Government is a partyto them and if the recognised insurgents formally accept and ap-ply the provisions of these Conventions. Failing this, the acceptedcustomary rules of war apply in this as in other spheres.10

This may be a controversial proposition, not easy to accommo-date with the content and context of common articles 2 and 3 ofthe Geneva Conventions. By these two articles, it may be arguedthat for the purpose of the full applicability of the Conventions, ascheme of distinction between international and non-international

,0 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 211-12 (H. Lauterpacht 6th ed. 1955).

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armed conflicts is established. The learned editor of Oppenheimconfines the proposition to a case of recognition of belligerency ofthe insurgents by the government of the state concerned being aparty to the Conventions. Much will depend on the meaning to begiven to the phrase "one of the Powers in conflict" in article 2.Clearly the recognized insurgent authority cannot be a "party tothe . . . Convention" for the purposes of common article 2. Fur-ther, the scope formula of common article 3, "[in the case ofarmed conflict not of an international character occurring in theterritory of one of the High Contracting Parties," must be taken ashaving excluded conflicts in which the legitimate government ofthe state concerned has accorded recognition to the insurgents.However, it must be admitted that the scope of article 3 is far fromclear.

The rarity of recognition by the legitimate government may re-duce the frequency of the invocation of the proposition under scru-tiny. What can be said is that the many proposed formulas ad-vanced in the preparatory transactions of the Diplomatic Con-ference of 1949 included the one advanced by the learned editor ofOppenheim, but that it, with a number of others, failed to secureadoption. On the basis of the classical law of war, such recognitionwould have meant that the customary law of war applied. The ideaof applying the full contents of the Conventions as a result of sucha recognition would have marked a distinct departure, even thoughfrom the humanitarian standpoint it might be a desirable novelty.

The root of the difficulty lies in the phrase "armed conflict notof an international character." Does it mean "international" byreference to the parties engaged in the armed conflict, or by refer-ence to the legal consequences as to which rules of conduct arethen brought to bear? Alternatively, are the whole of the provi-sions of the four Conventions less article 3 applicable, or only thoserules that are contained in article 3? That matter was never re-solved at the Diplomatic Conference. It would seem that thelearned editor of Oppenheim was drawing his proposition from thetext of articles 2 and 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions,and from the true juridical juxtaposition of them. That, it is sug-gested, is a matter of controversy which is not clarified by refer-ence to the travaux preparatoires. If his proposition is to be ex-tracted from the terms of common article 2, paragraph 3, then thehumanitarian obligations that flow therefrom are reciprocal andnot unilateral. The Conventions are not based upon reciprocity ofobligation. One thing is reasonably clear and is not persuasive of

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the proposition under scrutiny. The formula in common article 2,paragraph 3, "[a]lthough one of the Powers in conflict may not bea party to the . . . Convention . . .," is not apt for recognized in-surgents. Even if they are recognized by the government to whichthey are opposed in conflict, they are not "parties to the Conven-tion" and cannot become such. It is a contention of some validitythat the purpose of article 2, paragraph 3, is to exclude the olderidea that unless all states engaged in a conflict were parties to aConvention, that instrument did not apply to any of them engagedin the conflict. The purpose of article 2 was to block that olderdevice, the clausula si omnes which had proved so debilitating tothe application of the law of war in the days before humanitarianprinciples became paramount.

VI. THE CONTENT OF ARTICLE 3

This is the sole article in each of the four Conventions that dealsexclusively with so-called "internal armed conflicts." It is the firstprovision in any convention on the law of war to do so. Apart fromthe difficulties attending its scope, other substantial juridical diffi-culties arise. The entities that are bound by the obligations speci-fied in common article 3 are described as "each Party to the con-flict." This appears to confer a limited persona on the governmentand its forces and upon the insurgent authority and its dissidentforces, distinct from the individuals comprising them. Moreover,the rebel entity was normally not in existence on the dates onwhich the various states became parties to the Convention. Fur-ther, it is not known whether there will be, in the future, such arebel faction. Certainly, a rebel faction, when it comes into exis-tence, is not a party to any of the four Geneva Conventions of1949. It is possible to advance the contention that the rebel factionenjoys that degree of persona adequate to bear the obligations im-posed by article 3. This appears to have been the basis upon whichrecognized insurgent belligerents were considered to be bound bythe customary law of war.

The content of article 3, reflecting the principles supporting themain humanitarian prescriptions in each of the four Conventions,demands a high degree of organization, administration, militarycommand, and discipline for its observance. It is not open for rebelelements or the authority which purports to represent them toagree to or decline acceptance of such part of the obligations ofarticle 3 as they find is within their capacity. The opening and con-trolling clause of article 3 makes this clear: "In the case of armed

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conflict not of an international character occurring in the territoryof one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflictshall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions. . . ." It therefore becomes critical, in arriving at the proper levelof internal conflict required to bring article 3 into operation, toconsider the nature and extent of the provisions that follow theopening clause. These are:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, includingmembers of armed forces who have laid down their arms andthose placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, orany other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion,or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

This is a wide humanitarian rule, sweeping up principles from thecustomary law of war, Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 on theLaw of War on Land, the Geneva (Sick and Wounded) Conven-tion, the Geneva (Maritime) Convention, the Prisoner of War Con-vention, and the Civilian Convention of 1949. It also embodies cer-tain principles of non-discrimination derived from the thenembryonic human rights regimes, and is, indeed, ahead of some ofthem. This provision may be called the general humanitarian ruleof common article 3, and in terms of humanitarian restraint, itmakes this article of fundamental importance. Accordingly, it be-comes critical to ascertain whether or not a particular internal con-flict falls within the scope of article 3.

Following this wide humanitarian prescription, there are a num-ber of specific prohibitions which are considered to reflect the gen-eral principles of the four Conventions:

To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibitedat any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovementioned persons:

a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,mutilation, cruel treatment and torture:

b) taking of hostages:c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating

and degrading treatment:d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of sentences

without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constitutedcourt affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized asindispensable by civilized peoples.

Now this is a formidable set of humanitarian requirements. Theyassume a high degree of organization, discipline, and control by the

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rebel faction wishing to come within the scope of article 3. It alsoaffords a considerable opportunity for governments confrontedwith an armed rebellion to contend that the rebel faction does notand cannot meet the requirements of paragraph (d) above, for ex-ample. It may well be the case that the rebel authority is not in aposition so to act. Nevertheless, it is a requirement placed upon it"as a minimum." The phrase "in all circumstances" in the prelimi-nary clause cited above reinforces the stringent nature of the obli-gations imposed upon government and rebel elements alike underthis article. It may be urged that "in all circumstances" in this con-text precludes any resort to reprisals in respect of any breach ofthe obligations imposed by article 3, although this contention maybe controversial. Paragraph (d) above tends to increase the leveland degree of organization of the insurgent movement almost tothat of a recognized belligerent in a full scale civil war under theclassical law of war. It makes manifest the intimate nexus betweenthe scope and the content of article 3.

The other specific humanitarian prescription in article 3 embod-ies the principle underlying the original Geneva Sick and WoundedConvention of 1864: "The wounded and sick shall be collected andcared for." This is a brief formula and reflects the salient princi-ples underlying the requirements of the Geneva Sick and WoundedConvention of 1949 applicable to interstate armed conflicts. Thisterseness in article 3 was deliberately framed in order to avoid im-posing upon states a series of detailed obligations which they wereprepared to accept in conflicts with other states, but not whenseeking to quell an armed rebellion within the state territory.

The salient weakness of article 3 is the method of monitoring itsimplementation and securing its enforcement. Clearly, states,through their governments, were not prepared to accept the systemof interposing a protecting power, a neutral state designated byone state belligerent and accepted by the adversary state, to lookafter the nationals and armed forces of the designating belligerentin the hands of the adversary. What is to be found in article 3? Wefind the ceiling of acceptance formulated in this clause: "An impar-tial humanitarian body, such as the I.C.R.C., may offer its servicesto the Parties to the conflict." This, it may be thought, is a fraildevice. Such offer may be refused if not by both, then by one orthe other side engaged in the conflict. It may be asked-when is agovernment likely to allow even the I.C.R.C., admittedly an impar-tial and a humanitarian body, to enter the state territory to affordhumanitarian services to rebel elements? It is true that on a num-

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ber of occasions any I.C.R.C. presence has been denied by govern-ments. In the early days after 1950, there was a tendency for gov-ernments to deny such I.C.R.C. offers on the grounds that it wouldbe tantamount to recognition before the international communitythat it was confronted with an article 3 internal conflict. This canbe avoided by an express declaration by the government made atthe time of acceptance of an I.C.R.C. presence. Lately, this anxietyby governments has not been so apparent. On the other hand, ithas been very rare that the National Red Cross or Red CrescentSociety has been allowed to offer its relief and other humanitarianservices to the government forces and to the rebel elements. Yet,on the majority of occasions the I.C.R.C. presence has been allowedin internal conflicts. Many lives have been saved and much suffer-ing reduced as the direct result of an I.C.R.C. presence with medi-caments and supplies of food.

The final clause of article 3 would appear to be the one uponwhich governments at the Diplomatic Conference of 1949 insistedas the price of acceptance of the presence of article 3 in the fourConventions. It sought to avoid the difficulties that had normallyimpeded any recognition of belligerency accorded to insurgents bythe government or by third states. This clause, it will be recalled,provides: "The application of the preceding provisions shall not af-fect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict." This was a boldendeavor on the part of the redactors to sever the political natureof recognition from the humanitarian purposes of article 3. Thisclause means that article 3 operates quite separately from the ac-cordance or denial of recognition of belligerency by the govern-ment or by third states to the insurgent elements. Does it mean inparticular that rebels remain rebels, with all the municipal lawconsequences of that unenviable and criminal status if the rebel-lion should prove a failure? It would seem that in the absence of ageneral amnesty proclaimed by the government when it is thevictor, such would be the strict legal result, although there may bemany political and other reasons which may well render acting onthat municipal law basis unwise if not dangerous. If the struggle isinconclusive, it may be possible for an armistice to be followed bysome form of general political settlement between the governmentand the insurgents. A general amnesty might well find a place insuch a settlement. It is normally one of the concomitants of aninternal struggle that there is little intercourse of a pacific naturebetween the parties and little impetus to negotiate. Likewise, if therebel faction becomes the government of the state in question,

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there may be a vengeance taken. That vengeance might amount toa series of illegal acts, for example, by enactment of retroactivepenal law. Such conduct is not likely to draw the benefit of recog-nition of the new government by third states. It must, however, beadmitted that rebels may not find it persuasive to observe the obli-gations imposed by article 3 if the result is exposure to the fullimpact of the penal law of treason in the event of their defeat.

World opinion may, on occasion, have much impact upon the ob-servance of humanitarian restraints in an internal armed conflict.The standards in article 3 may have some educational, if not cau-tionary, effects. All the world can see the standards and mark de-partures from them by governments, by rebels, or by both. Also,the presence and insistent persuasion of the I.C.R.C. is frequentlynot without its effect. Yet, it must be admitted that there is notonly uncertainty about the scope of application of common article3, but also an element of fragility in the very limited mechanismsfor the implementation and enforcement of the fundamental hu-manitarian principles in the remainder of each Convention. Thenormal response to this debility is for humanitarian bodies tomake claims that more than article 3 is applicable in internal con-flicts, without regard to the poverty of machinery for monitoringapplication and for enforcement, within the terms of article 3 it-self. This attitude does not enhance respect for the rule of humani-tarian law in internal armed conflicts. Such considerationsprompted the I.C.R.C., with the support of the United NationsGeneral Assembly, to try to improve upon common article 3 at theDiplomatic Conference for the Reaffirmation and Development ofInternational Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts held in Ge-neva from 1974-1977. This established two Protocols additional tothe Geneva Conventions of 1949.11 Originally framed for that Con-ference as working texts, the two Protocols preserved the dichot-omy between international and non-international armed conflicts.Protocol I dealt with the former and Protocol II with the latter. Aseventually established in the Final Act of the Conference, thatneat dichotomy was partially eroded. It is, therefore, necessary toconsider the scope of both Protocols.

" Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, done Dec. 12, 1977, -

U.N.T.S. -, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977); Protocol II, supra note 9.

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VII. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS I AND II

It became apparent very early in the discussions at the Diplo-matic Conference on the scope provision of Protocol I, which re-lates to international armed conflicts, that there was a strongmovement to include "national liberation" armed struggles withinits ambit. There was a further, but much weaker, movement to dis-solve the traditional dichotomy built into the four Geneva Conven-tions of 1949 by common article 3, and to make one instrumentserve all armed conflicts on the grounds that humanitarian princi-ples, and to a lesser extent, human rights principles, are equallyvital and properly applicable irrespective of their international ornon-international character. The latter view failed, but the formermovement secured a lodgement in article 1(4), reinforced by article96(3) of Protocol I.

It is our purpose here to consider the effects of that insertion inProtocol I upon the scope of Protocol II. Article 1(4) of Protocol Ias established in 1977 provides:

The situations referred to in (common article 2 of the GenevaConventions of 1949) include armed conflicts in which people arefighting against colonial domination and alien occupation andagainst racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-deter-mination, as enshrined in the Charter of the U.N. and the Decla-ration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Re-lations . . . among States in accordance with the Charter of theU.N.

Now, Protocol I was not only additional to the Geneva Conven-tions of 1949, but also to section II of the Hague Regulations ap-pended to Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 dealing with "Hostili-ties." 2 It was the express purpose of Protocol I to exploit thearticles in section II in a humanitarian direction.

Protocol I, as established by the Final Act of the Conference,contained 102 articles, of which nine dealt with "Methods andMeans of Warfare" while nineteen dealt with the "Protection ofCivilians Against the Effects of Hostilities." The aim of certaingovernments was to include in Protocol II, which was a develop-ment of the law contained in common article 3 of the Geneva Con-ventions of 1949, as much as possible of the content of Protocol I,not least in regard to the conduct of hostilities in conflicts not of

" Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex § 2,Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 539.

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an international character. For the greater part of the Conferencethere was preoccupation with the "threshold" or level of internalconflicts with which Protocol II should seek to deal. It was real-ized that the "higher" that "threshold," the greater could be thesimilarity in the volume and content of the humanitarian norms inProtocol I that might properly find a place in Protocol II. Con-versely, the "lower" the "threshold" of Protocol II, the more diffi-cult it would be to make it bear the load of detailed and sophisti-cated humanitarian rules introduced into Protocol I, not least fromthe perspective of monitoring implementation and of enforcement.

At diplomatic conferences, the unexpected is normal. It was ap-parent that once "national liberation" struggles had found a criti-cal place in Protocol I as international armed conflicts, there was adistinct falling off in the interest in, and enthusiasm for, ProtocolII by the majority of states, particularly on the part of those whichhad secured the extension of the scope of Protocol I into what hadtraditionally been considered forms of conflict "not of an interna-tional character." Among some of that group of states there wasevidence of hostility toward Protocol II, irrespective of the attitudetoward its "threshold."

Protocol II received the full but brief attention of the Confer-ence in its closing stages. It very nearly failed to be established. Ina hurried, almost frenzied, effort to secure its survival by consen-sus, the Protocol suffered drastic reduction in volume of content.At the same time, the already heightened "threshold" was left un-disturbed. The scope provision of Protocol II as established in theFinal Act is:

(1) This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3common to the Geneva Conventions of ... 1949 without modify-ing its existing conditions of application, shall apply to all armedconflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of ... (Protocol I)and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Partybetween its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other or-ganised armed groups which, under responsible command, exer-cise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them tocarry out sustained and concerted military operations and to im-plement this Protocol.

(2) This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal dis-turbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic actsof violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armedconflicts.

The outcome of this formulation of scope may have added some

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clarity to the application of the humanitarian rules contained inthe Protocol, but at the price of rendering more numerous andcomplex the types of internal conflicts now known to the law.

We now consider "national liberation" struggles, as defined inProtocol I, article 1(4), as international armed conflicts insofar asthe humanitarian law of war is concerned. Then we have the classi-cal forms of civil war in which recognition of belligerency has beenaccorded to the rebel elements by the government of the state con-cerned or by third states. This category will bring down upon it thecustomary law of war, which includes the Hague Convention No.IV of 1907, and may possibly now include the Geneva Conventionsof 1949, having regard to the fact that about 150 states are nowparties to them. Also, we have Protocol II applicable to internalconflicts as defined in article 1 thereof. Therein the capacity crite-rion has been adopted. Further, we have common article 3 conflictswithout any modification of the former application of that article.It would appear that, although this may be the strictly juridicalposition, article 3 will normally be overtaken in relation to the Pro-tocol II type of internal conflicts, except to the extent that thereare many norms in article 3 which cannot be found in Protocol II.Finally, we have those minor disturbances defined in article 1(2) ofProtocol II which are shut off from all of the categories of internalarmed conflicts. These disturbances will be governed by humanrights regimes where applicable.

Different humanitarian law rules will apply in each of the differ-ent types of internal conflicts set out above. There seems to havebeen an augmentation of internal conflicts which overlap to someextent. In terms of humanitarianism, this may be a gain because ofthe cumulative increase of humanitarian norms. In terms of thesimplicity of the juridical categories of armed conflicts, there seemsto have been retrogression. Nothing was said in Protocol II aboutthe "mixed" armed conflicts in which armed forces of third statesparticipate on one side or the other in an otherwise internal con-flict. Moreover, an examination of the humanitarian content ofProtocol II as established displays a poverty compared with thecontent of Protocol I. On the other hand, there is a scope provision(article 1) in Protocol II comparable with a full scale classical civilwar with recognition accorded to the rebels. This imbalance inscope and content is the outcome of the almost frantic endeavor to"save" Protocol II from being lost, and to attain a minimal analogywith the content of Protocol I.

Nevertheless, there has been a gain in the humanitarian content

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of Protocol II. The instrument has now attracted about twenty-three ratifications or accessions. It had been considerably enrichedby provisions for the benefit of civilian wounded and sick, on theanalogy with Protocol I, and of the protection of medical and reli-gious personnel. It has only five articles dealing with the protectionfrom hostilities of civilians, civilian objects, cultural objects, andrelief actions. These are a pale reflection of the contents of Proto-col I. They are, however, an improvement upon the starkness ofcommon article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The provisions forsupervision of implementation and for enforcement are noticeableby their absence, except that there is a modest provision, article19, for wide dissemination of the instrument. It cannot be denied,however, that Protocol II, as established, is severely debilitated.States are not yet willing to obliterate the distinctions between in-ternal and international armed conflicts insofar as the applicationof the law of armed conflicts is concerned. The inclusion of "na-tional liberation" conflicts in Protocol I had a dissuasive influenceupon the adoption of Protocol II, which was designed to echo thecontent of Protocol I. The certainty of application of Protocol IIhas been enhanced in some respects and blurred in others. Thejuridical nexus between the humanitarian law of internal armedconflicts and the regimes of human rights is still an uncharted areaof law. The corresponding human rights rules in Protocol II are tobe found mainly in Part II-"Humane Treatment," articles 4 to 6.This is an invaluable part of the instrument for setting standardsin internal conflicts. Unfortunately, there is no method of super-vised implementation or of enforcement to be found in the instru-ment. Reliance will have to be placed upon the persuasive powersof the I.C.R.C., when present, and meta-legal forces for thosepurposes.

VII. CONCLUSION

It is a gain that there is now an instrument of international lawdevoted exclusively to securing humane treatment for those en-gaged in an internal armed conflict within a state and for the civil-ians affected by such a conflict. The climate of international opin-ion is not yet such that the same instrument can govern bothinternational and non-international armed conflicts, even in thearea of humanitarian law confined to the treatment of war victims.Those parts of the Fourth Geneva (Civilians) Convention of 1949,and of the Hague Regulations of 1907 which deal with occupiedterritory, present difficulties in relation to internal armed conflicts.

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1983] INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 277

It may be that the skein of humanitarian law now governing inter-nal armed conflicts has a number of different strands, composed ofthe customary law of war, the general principles of the four GenevaConventions of 1949, some borrowing by Protocol II from ProtocolI, and fortified by norms of conduct borrowed from the varioushuman rights regimes now extant. This is some progress, both inthe volume and detail of substantive law. Even by making themaximum use of dissemination, devices to ensure implementationand enforcement are pitifully weak. The I.C.R.C., which was givena fragile stance under common article 3, is not mentioned in Proto-col II. That stance would appear to be preserved together withcommon article 3 so as to enable the I.C.R.C. to offer its humanita-rian services to the parties to a conflict governed by Protocol II.

International humanitarian law still lacks the strength necessaryto restrain the savageries that are often the concomitant of inter-nal armed struggles. The remedy lies with governments.

Documents

Humanitarian Law and Internal Armed Conflicts