Helping Schools Succeed: a framework for English education

Helping SchoolsSucceed

A Framework for English Education

Chris Davies and Cheryl Limedited by Sam Freedman

£10.00ISBN: 978-1-906097-20-2

Policy ExchangeClutha House

10 Storey’s GateLondon SW1P 3AY

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The past few decades of education reform have beentumultuous. Since 1997 alone, we have had six educationministers in three differently named departments. Numerouspublic bodies have been created, many of them surviving just afew years. We have seen hundreds of reviews, tens of plans andseveral ‘agendas’ – each one creating its own bureaucratic trail.

We argue that England’s struggles stem from the absence of aclear, coherent, educational vision. There is little internal logic inthe way goals and incentives are aligned; far too much centralgovernment intervention; and far too little trust in teachers asprofessionals. Drawing on research from abroad and in England,we argue that the solution lies in the development of a ‘tight,loose, tight’ framework: clear vision from the centre; thefreedom for schools and teachers to achieve the vision as theysee fit; and comprehensive accountability mechanisms toensure the vision is achieved.

This framework would support schools in achieving excellenceby harnessing the best of competitive and collaborativepractices. It would safeguard equity by emphasising the role oflocal authorities as defenders of their constituents’ right to aquality education. Finally, more autonomous schools would helpto professionalise teaching, while creating genuine diversity inthe system.

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Helping Schools Succeed Vol2 Cover:Helping Schools Succeed Vol1 Cover 5/3/08 19:16 Page 1

Helping SchoolsSucceedA Framework for English Education

Chris Davies and Cheryl Lim

Edited by Sam Freedman

Policy Exchange is an independent think tank whose mission is to develop and promote new policy ideas which willfoster a free society based on strong communities, personal freedom, limited government, national self-confidence andan enterprise culture. Registered charity no: 1096300.

Policy Exchange is committed to an evidence-based approach to policy development. We work in partnership with aca-demics and other experts and commission major studies involving thorough empirical research of alternative policy out-comes. We believe that the policy experience of other countries offers important lessons for government in the UK. Wealso believe that government has much to learn from business and the voluntary sector.

Trustees

Charles Moore (Chairman of the Board), Theodore Agnew, Richard Briance, Camilla Cavendish, Richard Ehrman,Robin Edwards, Virginia Fraser, George Robinson, Andrew Sells, Tim Steel, Alice Thomson, Rachel Whetstone.

Helping Schools Succeed Vol2:Helping Schools Succeed Vol2 5/3/08 18:58 Page 1

About the authors

Chris DaviesIndependent Consultant. Graduated fromExeter University with an Upper Secondin Classics and holds a PGSE and an MScin Education Management. He has 30years experience in the state education sec-tor including 12 years as a Headteacher intwo London primary schools as well asnine years experience in a Local Authorityboth as an adviser and, until recently,Assistant Director. He is currently work-ing on a range of educational projects andresearch. Chris founded and now man-ages, part-time, the Lambeth e-LearningFoundation.

Cheryl LimResearch Fellow specialising in education,Policy Exchange. A former Rhodes Scholar,

she graduated with an MSc inComparative Social Policy from OxfordUniversity in 2006. Prior to that, she stud-ied psychology and sociology at WesleyanUniversity in America. Cheryl also has abackground in gender advocacy work.

Sam FreedmanHead of the Education Unit, PolicyExchange. He achieved a first class degreein History from Magdalen College,Oxford. After completing a Masters degreein International History in 2004, Samjoined the Independent Schools Council asa researcher. He left three years later asHead of Research, having also completed asecond Masters degree in Public Policy andManagement at Birkbeck. Sam joinedPolicy Exchange in September 2007.

2

© Policy Exchange 2008

Published byPolicy Exchange, Clutha House, 10 Storey’s Gate, London SW1P 3AYwww.policyexchange.org.uk

ISBN: 978-1-906097-20-2

Printed by Heron, Dawson and SawyerDesigned by SoapBox. www.soapboxcommunications.co.uk


Contents

Acknowledgements 4Foreword 5Executive Summary 7Introduction 9

1 First ‘Tight’: Vision 122 Mediating the ‘Loose’: Governance and Organisation 233 Mediating the ‘Loose’: A New Deal for Teachers 324 Mediating the ‘Loose’: Safeguards 445 Second ‘Tight’: Accountability 58

Conclusion 73Indexed List of Proposals 75

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 3


Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank our fun-ders, the Sutton Trust and CambridgeAssessment. We are particularly grateful toSylvia Green, Bene’t Steinberg and JamesTurner for their committed assistance;Amanda Spielman, William Atkinson andCllr Kathy Tracey for their insightful cri-tiques of our work; and Sam Freedman forwhipping this report into shape. We arealso indebted to James O’Shaughnessywho was a major driving force behind thisproject.As with our companion study, ‘Helping

Schools Succeed: Lessons from Abroad’, thisreport benefited greatly from the input ofnumerous individuals and organisations. Wethank all those named, and unnamed, forthe generous gift of their time and expertise:

� Sir Michael Barber, McKinsey and Co.� Neville Beischer, Head Teacher� Steve Belk, The Learning Trust� Dianne Bohan, Head Teacher� Professor Tim Brighouse� Cllr Paul Carter, Kent CountyCouncil

� Evelyn Chua, Head Teacher� Giles Drew, Head Teacher� John Dunford, Association of Schooland College Leaders

� Emily Dyer, Policy Exchange� Anthony Edkins, Head Teacher� Paul Edwards, Head Teacher� Kate Frost, Teacher� Maureen Gould, Head Teacher� Barbara Harrison, Girls’ Day SchoolTrust� Helen Jeffery, Head Teacher

� Martin Johnson, Association ofTeachers and Lecturers

� Paul Kinsella, Head Teacher� Phil Leyland, Head Teacher� Sir Bruce Liddington, SchoolsCommissioner

� Mark Logan, Edison Schools� Roger Lounds, Head Teacher� Neil McIntosh, CfBT� Melody Moran, Head Teacher� Dr Dan Moynihan, Harris Federation� Professor John Nelson, University ofAberdeen

� Peter O’Dowd, Head Teacher� Tom Peryer, London Diocesan Boardof Schools

� Stewart Plowes, Head Teacher� Ryan Robson, Sovereign Capital� Steve Sinnott, National Union ofTeachers

� Eleanor Sturdy, Education Consultant� Dr Irenka Suto, Cambridge Assessment� Sir Cyril Taylor, founder and former-chairman, SSAT

� Richard Thornhill, Head Teacher� Sir Mike Tomlinson, Chief Advisor forLondon Challenge

� David Torn, Teacher� Professor Peter Tymms, DurhamUniversity

� Ben Ullmann, Policy Exchange� Sir Michael Wilshaw, Head Teacher� Alan Wood, The Learning Trust

The views expressed in the report are thoseof the authors, and not necessarily of thepeople we interviewed.

4


Forewordby Chris Davies

My introduction to Headship in a Londonborough was less than auspicious. Fouryears into a deputy headship and twentyminutes into a French lesson with a class of12 year olds the Head interrupted the les-son and offered to cover my class so thatthe borough’s chief inspector could discusswith me something I would no doubt findof interest.Surprise turned to amazement when it

transpired that the chief inspector wantedme to consider stepping in as Headteacher in one of the borough’s schoolswhere the authority had not been able torecruit a satisfactory candidate throughthe usual means. My amazement deep-ened when she replied to my enquiry as towhen she might need a response with“Well, I thought if I took a turn aroundthe playground…” The decision was onlymarginally complicated by the fact that Ihad never heard of the school, we werewithin a week of the end of term and thepost had to be filled for the start of thenext term.So it was that I started, age 32, as Acting

Head of a 500+ First and Middle school inthe early 1980s in a demanding part of aLondon borough. I was confirmed perma-nent Head on the very first day of term atan interview conducted by the ChiefEducation Officer. On day two, theNational Union of Teachers instructed itsmembers across the country to withdrawgoodwill, which meant they were not avail-able for any form of meeting or indeed anyother work, apart from lesson preparationand marking, outside of teaching hours.The embargo lasted several months.Over two headships and eight years as a

senior manager in the education depart-ment of a local authority, I have seen come(and sometimes go): local authority raceequalities units, the national curriculum

and its unmanageable assessment andreporting arrangements, the delegation ofschool budgets, Grant Maintained schools,Ofsted, the publication of test and exami-nation data, fresh start schools, academies,school choice frameworks and much morebesides.Cries for structural reform, became

“Standards not Structure” (early Blair)reverting to “Back to Structure after all(Academies and Trusts)” (late Blair) andnow look like becoming “Standards!”again. The history of educational systemdevelopment has been a roller coaster. Forall the effort, we are still left with consider-able uncertainty over the real level ofimprovement, both in absolute terms andrelative to improvement in competitorcountries or in our own independent sec-tor.Government ministers may talk about

the best generation of teachers ever, thebest examination results ever and generallyjust stopping short of reassuring us that“everything is for the best in this best ofpossible worlds”. However, it would appearthat those who have the means are not yetbuying in to the government’s Panglossianvision.For what we do know is that despite a

rise in expenditure on schools by theDCSF (previously DfES) of 123% in realterms over the period 2001 - 2006 thenumber of pupils enrolled in privateschools has increased by 6% over the sameperiod compared to a fall in state schoolnumbers of 2%. This despite independentschool fees having risen too, and by twicethe rate of inflation.This is where I am coming from. Yes,

there have been improvements andchanges for the better, but for too manypeople these improvements do not matchthe money and effort expended.



The improvements that have beenachieved overall have been relatively mod-est and are nowhere near the level ofchange needed to qualify as transforma-tion. What is more, they have been won atgreat cost to many teachers and, perhapsparticularly, head teachers. Althoughstrongly contested by the Government,professional associations claim that there isa growing crisis in the recruitment of headteachers. According to one survey1 for2007 vacancy rates reached a new recordlevel for primary schools and readvertise-ment rates for both primary and secondaryschools reached nearly 40% and 30%respectively.Nor will an elite system do. Too many of

our young people leave school withoutworthwhile qualifications and too manyare concentrated in the same schools,which lack the means to tackle the prob-lem. We are no nearer to breaking the his-toric link between attainment at school

and family background. If education everdid offer a way to opportunity for all, itcertainly does not now.Our present Prime Minister said on

entering office that “I have learned a lot inthe last 10 years. I have learned that top-down, ‘pulling the lever solutions’ are notalways the ones that are going to workbest.”2 For me this raises the question“what then are the effective levers? How dothey work and who is best placed to pullthem?” In short how might we better bal-ance the framework of drivers, incentives,powers, responsibilities and requirementsbetween all the “stakeholders” to improvethe inherent effectiveness of our schools?The Government needs to relinquish

lever pulling. But to do that the govern-ment needs certainty that those who gov-ern, manage and use our schools can berelied on to act in the best interests of boththeir children and of all children andyoung people.

Helping schools succeed

6

1 Education Data Surveys 2007

- the 22nd annual report, by

Professor John Howson

2 Interview with BBC News June

22nd 2007


Executive Summary

Whatever its merits, the English politicalsystem is not good at developing coherentand stable systems. Education is just oneexample. Since 1997 we have had six edu-cation ministers in three differently nameddepartments. Numerous public bodieshave been created, many of them survivingjust a few years. We have seen hundreds ofreviews, tens of plans and several ‘agendas’– each one creating its own bureaucratictrail.Many of these reviews, plans and agen-

das seem to work at cross-purposes. TheStandards Unit emphasises results; theEvery Child Matters Agenda emphasiseswell-being. Some curriculum reviews offermore autonomy to schools; others insistthat new subjects should be compulsory.There is confusion over whether assess-ment should be formative, summative orboth. Unsurprisingly, this has left mostpeople involved in education bewildered.This report argues that the English edu-

cation system needs a clear, coherent, edu-cational vision. There is little internallogic in the way goals and incentives arealigned, far too much central governmentintervention and far too little trust inteachers as professionals. Drawing on ourinternational comparative research (deta-iled in companion report, ‘HelpingSchools Succeed: Lessons from Abroad’),and interviews with key players in Englisheducation, we argue that the solution liesin the development of a ‘tight, loose, tight’framework:

� clear vision from the centre (first‘tight’);

� autonomy for schools and teachers toachieve that vision as they see fit (the‘loose’); and

� comprehensive accountability mecha-nisms so that the vision is achieved(second ‘tight’).

Chapter 1 looks in more detail at theabsence of ‘vision’ in our current educationsystem. Using the National Curriculum asa case study, we illustrate that there is a lackof clarity as to what schools and practition-ers ought to be achieving. We argue thatcentral government should focus on thebig picture, leaving schools, or groups ofschools, to work out the details accordingto local circumstances.

Chapter 2 focuses on the division ofpower between the centre, local govern-ment and schools. We show that whenlocal authorities act as both commissionersand providers this leads to a clear conflictof interest, and we argue that they shouldfocus on the commissioning role. We alsoexamine the ways in which schools canharness the best of both competitive andcollaborative practices, through participa-tion in school networks.

Chapter 3 looks at the barriers to devel-oping a professional workforce – the mostimportant prerequisite for a successful sys-tem. We review evidence on issues such asretention, recruitment, remuneration andworkforce management and development,arguing that there is a need for a new dealfor teachers: one that combines betterremuneration, higher status and moreautonomy with strong expectations of pro-fessional accountability.

Chapter 4 scrutinises the main mecha-nisms by which the government safeguardseducational equity – admissions, exclu-sions and school transport – with the


“ There is little internal logic in the way goals and

incentives are aligned, far too much central government

intervention and far too little trust in teachers as

professionals”


objective of producing greater consistencyin the way these safeguards are monitoredand applied. We go on to argue for a sys-tem of per-pupil differential funding,which would incentivise schools to takemore disadvantaged pupils.Finally, in Chapter 5, we argue that the

use of league tables as a driver of account-ability is crude and unhelpful. In its place,we propose the introduction of a report

card system which uses a broad range ofindicators, measures progress over timeand reports findings to parents in a clear,unambiguous manner. We also review therole of Ofsted, arguing against the practiceof routine inspections in favour of a systemof inspections as and when needed.For ease of reference, an indexed list of

proposals is provided at the end of thereport.


8


Introduction

The English education system is built on aweb of contradictions. One day a review isannounced to ‘free the curriculum’; notlong after, economic literacy and cookeryare mooted as additional compulsory sub-jects. The admissions code is strengthenedto stop schools ‘covertly selecting’, yetincreasing numbers of specialist schools areencouraged to select 10 per cent of theirintake on ‘aptitude’. A levels are threat-ened, then saved, then threatened again.In this report we step back and attempt

to view the English school system as awhole. We ask why these contradictionsare so prevalent, and how the system couldbe realigned in order to avoid them in thefuture.We began by analysing five education

systems that regularly produce betterresults than the English education systemin international assessment comparatives:those of New Zealand, Alberta, Ontario,Hong Kong and Sweden. (Our analyses areavailable in a companion report, ‘HelpingSchools Succeed: Lessons from Abroad’.)In each of these systems, comprehensiveprogrammes of reform have taken placeover the past few decades with the aim ofdeveloping coherent systems with consis-tent goals. While each approached theproblem differently, and each had flaws, wewere able to gather considerable evidenceon what works – and, crucially, the impor-tance of an overarching vision that has thesupport of all key players. We also foundthat the very best international modelscombine the goals of excellence and equity– summed up in Ontario’s tagline for theirreform programme: ‘Raising the bar, clos-ing the gap’. This stands in stark contrastto England, where all too often excellenceand equity are viewed as opposites.Next we spoke to a range of key players in

English education. These included seniorofficials at the Department for Children,

Schools and Families, former and currentgovernment advisors, head teachers, teach-ers, union leaders, academics and not-for-profit education providers. We asked eachof them a series of questions designed toexplore their views of the macro structuralfactors in the school system: funding,accountability, professional autonomy, cur-riculum, assessment and so on.At the end of this process, we found that

some diagnoses were supported across thepolitical and ideological spectrum, inmany cases unanimously:

� First, there is no clear vision for Englisheducation. Competing agendas, froman aggressive emphasis on standards, tothe social services focus of ‘Every ChildMatters’, has left everyone confused asto the role of schools in society andwhat they are expected to achieve.

� Secondly, the ‘command and control’model, whereby central governmentmicro-manages everything from thecurriculum to teacher pay, has gone toofar. Head teachers and teachers remainfrustrated by their lack of freedom.Non-governmental school providers arekeen to develop diverse school ‘brands’that will allow for real school choice.

� Thirdly, few are keen to return to thepre-1980s ‘secret garden’ in whichschools were completely unaccount-able. Everyone is frustrated, however,by the arbitrary nature of accountabili-ty at the moment – demonstrated bythe confusion over league tables (whatis more important – raw scores or the‘value-added’ measure?). Instead it isfelt that we should move to a model ofreporting that is both easier for parentsto understand and incorporates meas-ures other than exam results.



In response to these concerns we devel-oped a ‘tight, loose, tight’ framework forEnglish education: clear vision from thecentre (the first ‘tight’); autonomy forschools and teachers to achieve that visionas they see fit (the ‘loose’); and strongaccountability so that the vision is achieved(the second ‘tight’). This framework fitsclosely with the best practice we observedinternationally. In practical terms, controlover the macro elements of educationwould be realigned as follows:

� Schools would be given the opportuni-ty to exercise far more autonomy overcurriculum, staffing and governancethan is currently the case. Rather than24,000 separate ‘independent’ schools,though, we would like to see the devel-opment of networks of ‘branded’schools competing against each otherBUT collaborating with other schoolsin their network. This would allow fordiverse curricula and HR models thatcould be developed in close co-ordina-tion with teachers and head teachers(because networks would be relativelysmall) but would not force each schoolto reinvent the wheel. It would be cru-cial for membership of such a networkto be voluntary, so as not to simplyreplace one form of top-down controlwith another.

� Local authorities would take on a reg-ulatory role that reflected their status asdemocratically elected representativesof their local area. If they wished tocarry on as school providers, theywould have to set up arms-length trad-ing companies to compete with non-governmental providers on equalterms. Their primary statutory rolewould be to commission schools andprovide ‘safeguards’ for local residents.If they were no longer compromised bytheir status as providers, local authori-ties would be able to monitor the fair-ness of admissions properly, as well as

the placement of excluded pupils. Theywould also be able to focus on provi-sion for the most difficult to teach; cur-rently many of these children are ‘lost’in the system or end up in inadequate-ly funded and badly supported PupilReferral Units (PRUs).

� Central government would be respon-sible for setting a core entitlement cur-riculum that established expectationsfor schools and pupils. They would alsofund schools directly using a pupil pre-mium formula that prioritised the mostdisadvantaged pupils (and provided anincentive for school networks to focuson schools in difficult areas). Finallythey would hold schools, networks andlocal authorities accountable throughan overhaul of performance monitor-ing. League tables would be replacedwith report cards that took intoaccount far more than just exam resultsand would be easy for parents to under-stand. To streamline the accountabilityprocess, Ofsted would focus only onfailing schools and be grounded in theschooling improvement process.

Underpinning this model is the need todevelop a high quality workforce. In everysystem we studied, getting a good teacherinto every classroom was seen to be boththe most important factor for raising stu-dent performance, and the hardest toachieve. This is also true of England, wherethe development of teachers as informedprofessionals has been stymied by prob-lems relating to recruitment, retention,remuneration and workforce developmentand management. In response we proposedeveloping a new deal for teachers whichcombines increased autonomy, betterrewards and higher status with strongerexpectations of professional accountability.The interlocking proposals set out in

this report aim to provide a cohesiveframework. The model would supportschools in achieving excellence by harness-


10


ing the best of competitive and collabora-tive practices. It would safeguard equity byemphasising the role of local authorities asdefenders of their constituents’ right to a

quality education. Finally, more autono-mous schools would help to professionaliseteaching, while creating genuine diversityin the system.


Introduction


1First ‘Tight’:Vision

Education policy in England is not short ofpolarising debates. We jump from wagingwar over the academic/vocational divide tocurricular battles over knowledge versusskills. We talk about functional basic skillsand then, rather schizophrenically, fret thatthis focus has led to a dumbing down andnarrowing of the curriculum. We swingbetween internal and external accountabil-ity; between school autonomy and centralregulation; and between standards andstructures. We frequently attempt toengage with all of these debates at once.Given this situation, it is unsurprising

that Andy Hargreaves, an internationalexpert on education reform recently com-mented:

England has no inspiring social or edu-cational vision. Unlike Scotland,Northern Ireland or Wales, which haveclearer identities and are less driven bytargets and testing, it has no strong senseof who or what it is. Instead, it regress-es to arithmetical achievement gaps orvacuous claims to world-class standardsas evasions of any vision.

We argue that England’s lack of a coherenteducational vision and narrative of changeposes a major setback to our ability toimplement and sustain effective educationreform. Evidence from our research abroadsuggests that sustainable change is morelikely to occur when there is internalcoherency – a clear logic by which all inter-nal and external levers are aligned.

Consider, for instance, Ontario’s experi-ence: the McGuinty administration hassuccessfully distilled their overarchingvision of education into concrete endgoals, summed up in a single tagline:‘Raising the bar, closing the gap’. The sim-plicity of this message, and, more impor-tantly, the consistency with which it hasbeen supported by successive initiatives,creates little room for ambiguity (see‘Helping Schools Succeed: Lessons fromAbroad’, Chapter 3).4

In England, however, initiatives have atendency to be introduced with little con-sideration of how they fit into the largerpicture, and their impact on overall systemcoherency. The Every Child Matters(ECM) Agenda was intended to addressthis deficiency. Yet its slapdash introduc-tion on top of a pre-existing framework ofincentives and goals (the ‘StandardsAgenda’) has only muddied the waters.

The state of ‘vision’ in our currenteducation systemAll our interviewees responded negativelywhen questioned on whether there wassufficient clarity of vision in England as towhat schools and practitioners ought to beachieving. They were also unanimous intheir conviction that this lack of clarity wasa major barrier in the government’s attemptsto reform the system, although assessmentsof what exactly had gone wrong varied.Most acknowledged that the govern-

ment had succeeded, through their focus

12

3 A. Hargreaves, ‘We need a

new age of inspiration’, The

Times Education Supplement, 8

February 2008, pp 20–21.

4 C. Lim and C. Davies, ‘Helping

Schools Succeed: Lessons from

Abroad’ (London: Policy

Exchange, 2008).


3

on performance levels as measured bynational tests, in prioritising the goal ofraising standards of achievement. Forsome, however, this focus was ill-con-ceived. ‘I think there’s clarity,’ a formergovernment advisor noted, ‘but whetherit’s sufficient vision is another matter.’Another interviewee, a prominent govern-ment advisor, agreed, arguing that ‘it’s toonarrow a definition of what schools oughtto be achieving. And I think it runs the riskof, if you like, turning education into a sys-tem where we value only things we canmeasure, and I think a good education isconcerned with more than that. So I don’tthink we have got a clear vision in totality.’He went on to argue that the govern-

ment’s fundamental problem was itsattempt to solve every social ill with a pol-icy initiative. ‘We have a whole series of ad-hoc policies, whether today it’s about obe-sity, tomorrow about something else, andthey don’t all add up, they don’t all cohereto give you a clear picture.’ Even thoseclosely linked with the present administra-tion acknowledged that it was ‘in danger oflooking like a government that runs by ini-tiatives rather than by rolling out a coher-ent story that’s well signposted along theway.’5

The breakneck pace with which initia-tives have been churned out has made itdifficult for schools and practitioners toestablish clear priorities over a period oftime. A board member of an educationprovider explained the knock-on effect onschools as follows:

All the pieces may individually be veryclear and very good, but cumulatively itjust adds up to more than anybody cancope with, so people end up clouded … Ifyou set targets for absolutely everything,for pieces that are early in the cycle andpieces at the end, there is a lack of clarityabout whether you are really trying tocontrol inputs or the processes or the out-comes. And when you have controls and

targets applying to everything, people canno longer work out what’s important towhat’s actually just really another way ofmeasuring this.

From a policy perspective, it has also maderigorous pilot testing, evaluation and feed-back a luxury rather than a necessity. Theresearch director of a major assessmentagency argued that many of the teethingand technical problems surrounding theintroduction of the AS level examinationsand, more recently, the Progress Tests, couldhave been avoided if there had been an ade-quate period for piloting. A former govern-ment advisor expressed similar concerns inhis deliberation on the Diploma initiative(more on this in the next section) when henoted: ‘It takes five years to be trialled andtested and made to work and I think thatthe timetable was rushed, frankly.’Adding fuel to the fire, interviewees

noted that the lack of clarity within the sys-tem was not simply about an overload ofinitiatives from central government, butalso about a lack of goal alignment at vari-ous levels and from various departments.The director of an education consultancythat carries out a lot of school improvementwork noted that schools have ‘central gov-ernment requirements, national strategyrequirements, they’ve got local governmentstrategy requirements and so on’. Much ofthe consultancy’s work thus involved help-ing schools to weed through the raft of, attimes, competing guidance, in order todevelop a personalised agenda based ontheir specific needs.The discussion on competing priorities

invariably raised the issue of the Every


First ‘Tight’: Vision

5 Interview, senior department

official.

“ We have a whole series of ad-hoc policies, whether

today it’s about obesity, tomorrow about something else,

and they don’t all add up, they don’t all cohere to give

you a clear picture.”


Child Matters Agenda. The Agenda hasfive components, only one of which isdirectly related to teaching and learning(‘enjoying and achieving’). The others are:being healthy; staying safe; making a positivecontribution to society and achieving eco-nomic well-being. A significant number ofinterviewees raised concerns that ECM, inrequiring schools to address a range of devel-opmental and social issues, had created anoverly broad remit which could potentiallydetract schools from their primary functionof teaching and learning:

My greatest fear is that within the struc-tures that have been created, educationmay well be what I would call third-tierresponsibility, third-tier priority. When infact it ought to be at the top of the – I amnot saying ‘on its own’, but certainly at thetop. I mean, there is a risk that it will begiven less emphasis.

- Senior government advisor

Schools should provide [young peoplewith] opportunities to be socialised, toexercise, and get a decent lunch and so on.But the most important thing that schoolsshould do is education … and too broada focus would probably get in the way.

- Member of Parliament

Similar concerns were found in a recent ICMpoll of 803 primary and secondary heads.According to the survey, 90 per cent of headteachers agree that schools are havingmore ofa social services role as a result of Every ChildMatters. Fifty-six per cent of heads think thatthis shift in role is ‘unacceptable’. Moretellingly, even if funding were increased, 45per cent of heads would still find it unaccept-able because ‘schools should not have thisrole’.6

It is important to note that no one wespoke to disagreed with the principles of theECM Agenda. Good schools, they noted,already accomplish all five strands of theAgenda as a matter of course. Yet it would be

a mistake to simply write off these concernsas a form of reactionary backlash.The under-lying concern was the uncritical response thatinitiatives like these invite. After all, it can bedifficult to argue with the proposition that‘Every Child Matters’ or with the idea of‘Personalised Learning’. The consequence,however, is that these big ideas may not besubjected to the level of scrutiny and chal-lenge from within the profession that theywould benefit from.The discord surrounding the ECM

Agenda may stem in part from the fact thateven within the teaching profession there isconsiderable disagreement over what the cen-tral vision of education should be. Whenasked to prioritise a list of educational goals,we noted that there seemed to be two con-trasting perspectives. One group sawmeasur-able academic attainment as the key goal, andsofter goals such as emotional and socialdevelopment following naturally as a result ofacademic success:

I think that individual development isimportant, but if you set out to achievethat as a goal in itself then you often don’tachieve it. I think it’s a function of provid-ing a good education where people passexams and there’s an environment aroundthem that allows them to learn.

- Head teacher, academy

The other group reversed the cause-and-effect metaphor, believing that emotionaland social development was the necessaryprerequisite for the achievement of all otherobjectives:

In order to improve attainment in thoseareas which government seems to think areimportant – core skills, literacy and numer-acy and so on – you concentrate on otherareas and increase their motivation by con-centrating on the broader aspects of theireducation and get to run on [sic] their backdoor, if you understand what I’m saying.

- Union representative


14

6 http://education.guardian.co.uk

/1419education/story/

0,,2236681,00.html


Of particular significance was the fact thatthis schism fell along primary/secondarylines, with interviewees with backgroundsin secondary education being more likelyto prioritise academic attainment.Drawing in multi-agency support, offer-ing extended school days, and so on, werestrategic weapons in the war against lowstandards but not ends in themselves. Thelanguage may seem overblown, but thesehead teachers were passionate and single-minded about performance. As the headof a multi-school trust put it:

I think that schools need to get [theimportance of performance] into theirbrains, their corporate brains. Achievingthat cultural change will require clarity,this very transparent process of clarify-ing the vision and purpose of schools. Ifyour school is attainment-driven andyoung people should achieve theirpotential and there are no barriers toachieving this, if you can get a culturalunderstanding within your organisa-tion that you’re a can-do, innovative,no-barriers to underachievement, thatnobody will be tolerated to be slack; ifyou’re struggling you’ll be supported, butfundamentally we’ll look at your out-puts and ensure that you’re the rightperson for the job and support you indoing that job, but we won’t compro-mise on standards. And that’s how thecultural shift occurs.

Regardless of how they prioritised theireducational goals, all intervieweesacknowledged the necessity of ensuringthat all students achieved a ‘minimumthreshold of competence that would allowyou to operate as fulfilled individuals’.7

Disagreement only occurred when dis-cussing where exactly the bar should beset, (as with the tale of ‘Goldilocks andthe Three Bears’, the current benchmarkof 5 A*–C GCSE grades was either ‘toohigh’, ‘too low’ or ‘just right’). It is worth

noting that this focus on a minimumstandard for all reflects a trend in manyOECD countries wherein: i) functionalliteracy and numeracy skills are seen asincreasingly vital for integration into theeconomy and society; and ii) outcomes,rather than inputs and processes, are thedominant means of evaluating systemeffectiveness.

The National Curriculumas case studyWhat hinders our system’s ability to setand maintain a coherent educational visionwith clear expectations for all?Undoubtedly, the politicisation of edu-

cation has played a part. In a recent op-edpiece wryly entitled ‘A New Year of Non-stop Government Initiatives’, leading com-mentator Professor Alan Smithers lament-ed that ‘Successive governments seem sodriven by a need to make changes that theydo not leave themselves time to think themthrough … some of the education reformshave been necessary and insightful [but]other changes have been counter-produc-tive, seemingly the frenetic meddling ofbureaucrats and consultants anxious toprove their worth’.8 His comments wereechoed in an interview with a seniordepartment official who acknowledged:‘The problem with us is that we’re the civilservice but we also have ministers, andministers like initiatives and they like tointroduce things that will make a big dif-ference.’Part of the difficulty lies in the govern-

ment’s approach to policy development.During interviews, we found considerablescepticism across the board regarding thevalue of the government’s standard ‘one-size fits all’ approach to policy develop-ment. As it is, the agenda and support sys-tems for schools are the same regardless ofschool size, age of population served, orlocal and regional differences in socio-eco-nomic and cultural contexts. Given the



7 Interview, former government

advisor.

8 http://news.independent.co.uk

/education/schools/article

3322328.ece


diverse range of voices within the system,interviewees questioned whether ‘oneneeds to have the same goals necessarily ineach area’.9

The way in which these dilemmas playout in practice is perhaps best illustratedby the current debate surrounding theNational Curriculum, and by extension,the National Curriculum assessmentframework. The Education Reform Act of1988 legislated for the creation of a com-pulsory national curriculum intended toensure that all students received a broadand balanced education. Prior to the Act,curriculum design had largely been theresponsibility of individual schools andlocal authorities – a situation that hadproduced considerable patchiness indelivery and student experience. Thepromise of an ‘entitlement’ curriculumwas widely appealing and supportedacross the political spectrum.Developing a clear consensus on what

constituted ‘breadth and balance’, howev-er, was and remains significantly harder.In its earliest incarnation, the NationalCurriculum comprised ten subjects, eachmeticulously outlined to the smallest

detail. Later incarnations fared slightlybetter, featuring less exhaustive lists ofrequired topics in response to practitionerdissatisfaction over the rigidity of the cur-riculum, not to mention its lack of rele-vance to certain groups of students.However, periodic additions of ‘essential’topics and skill sets to the mandatory cur-riculum have counteracted efforts toreduce the level of central prescription.In one sense, the constant clash over

what should or should not be required isinevitable. The curriculum is a declara-tion of our values, our vision of the placeof education in a good society and ourunderstanding of what produces a goodhuman being and citizen. While there isstrong empirical evidence for the necessi-ty of certain competencies like literacyand numeracy (see box below), the deci-sion to require Subject A instead ofSubject B is very much a political one.One interviewee commented: ‘Somethinglike the National Curriculum tends to bea compromise at the outset to try andaccommodate everybody’s point of viewand all the influential people’s pet thingsto make them say yes to it. So you usual-


16

9 Interview, head teacher.

10 P. Tymms and C. Merrell,

‘Standards and Quality in

English Primary Schools over

Time: The national evidence’,

Primary Review Interim Report

(2007).

11 KPMG Foundation, ‘The

Long-term Costs of Literacy

Difficulties’ (2006); available

online at: http://www.every

childareader.org/pubs/EC

Rcosts2006.pdf

12 See, for example, R. Slavin

and N. Madden, Success for

All/Roots and Wings: Summary

of Research on Achievement

Outcomes (Washington: CRES-

PAR, 2003).

13 Ofsted,‘SEN and Disability:

Towards inclusive schools’

(2004).

Each year, approximately 40,000 students leave primary school with the reading and writing skillsof a seven-year-old. This figure has remained largely unchanged over the years, despite the govern-ment’s £500 million National Literacy Strategy.10 The government’s failure to effectively tackle poorliteracy skills is troubling given the wide-ranging ramifications for both the individual and society.According to one review: ‘Literacy difficulties are linked to costly special educational needs provision,to truancy, exclusion from school, reduced employment opportunities, increased health risks and agreatly increased risk of involvement with the criminal justice system.’ The estimated cost to the pub-lic purse was placed at £1.73 billion to £2.05 billion every year.11

Crucially, without good literacy skills, students are hard-pressed to access, let alone master, othersubjects, including mathematics. Unsurprisingly, research highlights that literacy improvement pro-grammes often generate ‘side-effect’ improvements in other subjects.12 Moreover, research demon-strates that early literacy intervention during the primary school years makes a difference, even forchildren with severe learning difficulties. (It is noteworthy that students with literacy difficulties con-stitute the largest special educational needs (SEN) group). For instance, in an Ofsted study on SEN,schools with effective literacy strategies were found to make significantly better improvements thanthose without – in some cases, pupil achievement was more than six times the expected level ofattainment.13




14 The Primary Review is an

independent review into the con-

dition and future of primary edu-

cation in England. It is support-

ed by the Esmée Fairbairn

Foundation and based at

Cambridge University. For more

information, see http://primaryr

eview.org.uk/index.html

ly end up from the very outset with stuffin it that shouldn’t really be there.’Ironically enough, the present version

of the National Curriculum, in trying tocover all bases, has failed to cover any sin-gle dimension adequately. In trying tomeet the demands of all interest groups, ithas failed to create spaces for local andregional adaptation. One way in whichthis dilemma could be resolved would beto significantly pare down the curriculumto a small core (with the understandingthat what constitutes ‘core’ curriculummay differ by key stages), with responsi-bility for ensuring a broad and balancedcurriculum being returned to schools andteachers. This would create opportunitiesfor the school to engage with local stake-holders to develop programmes of studiesthat reflect what the community requires.This was a proposition unanimously sup-ported by our interviewees.A former government advisor argued: ‘I

would restrict it to a core competence. I’mactually with Mrs Thatcher on this. Ithink the key mistake was Baker winningthe battle with Mrs Thatcher.’ Whenasked what percentage of the timetablethe core curriculum might take, hemused: ‘I don’t know – probably 25 percent … I think we’ve got a broad defini-tion of knowledge and cultural inheritedknowledge and experiences that you wantkids to have. The successful experience iscoupled with knowledge and it could beall expressed in ... four sides of A4, maybedouble that’. Schools would therefore beencouraged to adapt the broad descrip-tion to their students’ needs.The advisor’s comments match current

practice in Sweden, where the nationalcurriculum document is a slim, 18-pagebooklet outlining the fundamental valuesof the education system, with goals forschools and teachers. The goals are divid-ed into two categories: goals to beattained, which express the minimumlevel pupils should achieve upon leaving

school; and goals to strive towards, whichencourage schools to work towards a cul-ture wherein there is no ceiling on expec-tations (see ‘Helping Schools Succeed:Lessons from Abroad’, Chapter 5).Similarly, in New Zealand, the nation-

al curriculum is described in broad brush-strokes – the details of the syllabus andthe pedagogical tools utilised are left tothe discretion of the teachers, who weredescribed to us as ‘curriculum developers’(see ‘Helping Schools Succeed: Lessonsfrom Abroad’, Chapter 2). The potentialinnovation such a move could generatewas best summed up by the head of amulti-school trust in Leeds, who elo-quently argued for schools to becomemore responsive to the needs of the com-munity they served:

Schools should be given sufficient flex-ibility in their curriculum planning toaccount for local economic needs whilestill maintaining a core in the curricu-lum which allows for social mobility– so we don’t want students in miningcommunities being taught how to beminers, if you know what I mean.What we want is nevertheless somesensitive relationship between an areathat might be having an economicboom, like Leeds, the types of industrythat are emerging locally. There needsto be some sort of understanding thatsome skills are going to be needed to benestled into the local employment base… having said that, though, I’m nottalking about a utilitarian approach toeducation, because we do need thesenational benchmarks to promote socialcohesion and mobility. You need to doboth.

Further complicating the debate is thefact that most of the recent NationalCurriculum reviews are either key-stagespecific (e.g. the independent PrimaryReview)14 or subject specific (e.g. the


Dearing review on modern foreign lan-guages). While these reviews have certain-ly produced valuable insights andresearch, there is an argument for a root-and-branch review of the curriculum, notleast the matter of how successive keystages build upon and impact with oneanother, and how the delivery of the cur-riculum is supported.Consider, for instance, the state of the

reform of qualifications for 14- to 19-year-olds in England. The first few SpecialisedDiplomas will be offered from September2008 and are intended to establish a credi-ble vocational pathway. Since its inception,though, the Diploma programme has strug-gled to gain credibility. Critics have raisedconcerns over the awkward middle-trackposition the Diplomas were straddling, not-ing that similar vocational qualificationssuch as the GNVQs had never escaped theshadow of A levels, nor provided studentswith a quality of training comparable to theapprenticeship route.15 The evidence thusfar has been predominantly negative,prompting the Nuffield Review, an inde-pendent review of all aspects of educationand training for 14- to 19-year olds, to com-ment that ‘everyone involved in the reformprocess regards the first 14 lines of theDiploma as problematic.’16

We suggest however, that underlyingthese concerns is a more fundamentalquestion: at what age is a student capableof choosing their own pathway? While wehave a 14–19 curriculum, the responsibili-ty for delivery is still generally sharedbetween separate 11–16 and 16–19 insti-tutions. Consequently, the decision as towhat pathway to pursue may be delayed tothe end of KS4, which some intervieweesargued was later than necessary:

The trouble is most of our schools are11–16, so you’ve got to move school at16 and that’s really a problem. Mostpeople don’t know that half of ourschools are 11–16 because if you want

to start them on a vocational route youwant to start them at 14, not 16.

- Former government advisor

Part of the reason that people are hav-ing such trouble finding a satisfactoryshape for 14 to 19 education is the lackof ability to recognise that that’s thepoint at which pathways can andshould diverge and that there is nothingwrong with people selecting themselvesin to different pathways. And there is noreason at all why they should all be inthe same institution at that point.- Board member, education provider

This is certainly not an argument for sepa-rate middle schools. The national and inter-national evidence on these is negative. Itdoes, however, illustrate the interlinkednature of policy, and how a failure to alignlevers at all levels can negatively impact thedelivery of the overall vision. Instead, theremay well be a case for creating room formovement for 14-year-old students whofeel that their 14–19 education and trainingneeds would be better met by transferringto a different institution. It might also bepossible for an employer to take primeresponsibility for a young person at 14,such as in the Young ApprenticeshipProgrammes,17 with the school retainingsome residual monitoring and pastoral sup-port. By extension, this would mean thatthe transition from lower secondary toupper secondary would become moreimportant, with significant assessment atthe end of KS3 rather than KS4.The confusion surrounding the

National Curriculum, its goals and values,not to mention the mechanisms by whichit is delivered, is emblematic of the lack ofoverall clarity within the system. At thesame time, given that the curriculum isnothing less than ‘a blueprint for what wewant children to become’,18 resolving thisdebate would go a long way towards devel-oping a coherent vision for England.


18

15 See, for instance, Nuffield

Review of 14–19 Education and

Training, Issue Paper 1: The New

14–19 Diplomas (November

2007).

16 More recently, the government

announced that it would develop

Diplomas in science, humanities

and the languages. The introduc-

tion of these Diplomas, as well as

their description as the ‘jewel in

the crown’ of the education sys-

tem, suggests that the Brown

government may be attempting

to create what the Blair adminis-

tration refused to – a unified

framework of qualifications as set

out in the Tomlinson proposals.

(Working Group on 14-19

Reform, ‘14-19 Curriculum and

Qualifications Reform’ 2004). It is

too early to tell, however, the

extent to which the introduction

of this new line of Diplomas will

make a difference in the academ-

ic/vocational divide, particularly

since the A level is to be retained

until at least 2013 as a discrete

qualification. Nuffeld Review

(2007), p. 7.

17 A Young Apprenticeship pro-

gramme is targeted at students

in KS4 (14–16 years old) who

wish to study for their vocational

qualifications in a more hands-

on manner. Students are based

in school and continue to follow

the National Curriculum.

However, they will spend two

days a week (or the equivalent)

in college, with a training

provider, at work or in a combi-

nation of the above. For more

information, see http://www.t

eachernet.gov.uk/teachingan

dlearning/14to19/vocationaloffer/

Apprenticeships/youngapprentic

eships/

18 Mike Newby, Emeritus

Professor of Education at

Plymouth University. Quote

taken from M. Johnson et al.,

Subject to Change: New thinking

on the curriculum (London: ATL,

2007), p. 22.


How might a shared vision beachieved?Given the diverse range of interest groupsin British society today, the question ofhow common ground is to be found isworth exploring in more detail. And in thiscase, understanding what not to do may bejust as vital as understanding what shouldbe done.The Harris administration’s experience

in Ontario offers a particularly instructivelesson in political strategy (see ‘HelpingSchools Succeed: Lessons from Abroad’,Chapter 3). Their failure to bring allstakeholders on board not only damagedpublic confidence and teacher morale,but also overshadowed the positive – andnecessary – elements of their reform agen-da. The same could be said of the rushedintroduction, in this country, of theEducation Reform Act in 1988 (the con-sultation period coincided, not by chance,with school summer holidays). These les-sons, that the tenor of any given policycan have a powerful impact on how it isreceived, and that stakeholder engage-ment is critical to reform success, areworth heeding. This is particularly true ifwe accept that shared vision is less a pre-condition of successful change than a

product of concerted, honest engagementwith all partners.The challenge of course is in developing

an honest rather than superficial engage-ment with all partners. Recently, theBrown administration established aNational Council of Educational Excell-ence which would ‘act as advocates andchampions to transform expectations forthe education system and advise theGovernment on strategy and measures toachieve world-class education’.20 While theNCEE is an advisory body only, it isarguably in a good position to shape thenational vision of education in England.Unfortunately, its members are only drawnfrom universities, schools and businesses.Some of our interviewees were highly crit-ical of the fact that parents, teachers andstudents were excluded.It is worth noting that the NCEE bears

some resemblance to Hong Kong’sEducation Commission (EC), the inde-pendent advisory body that sets thenational education agenda (see ‘HelpingSchools Succeed: Lessons from Abroad’,Chapter 4). As with the NCEE, the EC iscomposed of stakeholders and academics.Unlike the NCEE, though, the EC is alsoresponsible for monitoring the progress ofgovernment reforms, in effect ensuringthat stakeholders have direct influence atboth the policy development and policyevaluation stages.In Hong Kong, the EC has helped

reduce the likelihood of having the nation-al education agenda hijacked by any onestakeholder, including political parties. It istoo early to predict, however, what impactthe NCEE will have on the system inEngland. Interviewee response rangedwidely, from those who thought it was a‘giant step’ towards improving stakeholderrepresentation in the policy developmentprocess, to those who were argued that ‘weare plagued by wildly excessive numbers ofquangos; we should be reducing them, notcreating more.’



19 The inquiry will consider: the

principle of whether there should

be a National Curriculum; how

the fitness-for-purpose of the

National Curriculum might be

improved; the management of

the National Curriculum and its

articulation with other policies

and strategies with which

schools must work.

http://www.parliament.uk/parlia

mentary_committees/

csf/csfpn040208a.cfm

20 http://www.dfes.gov.uk/

pns/DisplayPN.cgi?pn_id=2007_

0125

We welcome the Children, Schools

and Families Select Committee’s

call for an inquiry into the National

Curriculum19 and the present test-

ing and assessment framework.

As detailed research in these

areas was not within the scope of

this report, we will not put forward

specific proposals on these areas.

However, we strongly believe that

we should move towards the

Swedish model of a core entitle-

ment curriculum, with increased

flexibility for teachers and

schools.


For many interviewees, effective collab-oration among all stakeholders was lessabout the development of new bodiesthan about genuine political will withinthe government to listen, engage and taketheir concerns seriously. ‘I don’t think themechanism is important,’ one unionleader argued. ‘I mean, you can havethose structures but they don’t actuallyoperate because no one takes them seri-ously or they don’t produce any goods …Just to give you an example, there issomething called the public servicesforum in which cabinet ministers chairand discuss matters of public servicedelivery, but I mean it’s useless in so far asin that forum the government doesn’treally listen.’

Instead, the majority of our intervie-wees viewed the school as the centralagent around which a common vision ofeducation was to be developed. Whenquestioned about what could be done tochange the culture of education inEngland, interviewees made references tothe need to engage local communities, tostrengthen existing home school con-tracts, and to work with the local mediaboth to generate discussion about thepurpose of education and to ensure thatthe challenges being faced by schools arecovered in a less sensationalist (and nega-tive) manner. For these interviewees,‘bring it down to the lowest level of theschool!’ wasn’t just about practicalities,but about ensuring that schools and com-munities developed mutual ownership oftheir children’s future. As one headteacher summed up:

[Changing the culture of studentachievement] is brought about byengaging families in the process of edu-cation. In successful schools, families areinvolved in the planning cycle, the con-sultation and delivery of a curriculumplan. Parents can actually take part inthat and all the local stakeholder groupscan be involved, and that’s part of theprocesses of making sure that the offerthat you give, outcome driven as it is,actually is a relevant answer.

There already exists a mountain ofresearch on strategies for engaging parentsand communities that schools can andshould draw on. One particular area thatwe believe has been under-explored thusfar, though, is that of parental contribu-tion. During our focus groups with headteachers, we were intrigued by the factthat a significant minority of respondentsraised concerns that ‘what is free is notvalued’. For these respondents, the factthat compulsory education is free createdlittle incentive for parents to expect anddemand high standards of schools, or tosee themselves as partners in the educa-tion process.While we firmly believe that per-pupil

funding should be provided by the govern-ment for reasons of social justice, we notethe existence of a number of innovativeframeworks which encourage parental con-tributions for enhancement projects. Forinstance, the e-learning Foundation workswith schools to develop strategies toachieve high levels of home access to ICTfor all students, regardless of background.21

To enable sustainability of funding, par-ents are encouraged to participate throughdirect-debit Gift Aid donations over sever-al years. The response from parents hasbeen very encouraging: contributions forall projects currently stands at £1 millioneach year (compared to the additional£700,000 raised through other public andprivate channels) and monthly donations


20

21 http://www.e-learningfounda-

tion.com/

“ During our focus groups with head teachers, we were

intrigued by the fact that a significant minority of

respondents raised concerns that ‘what is free is not

valued’”


vary from £4 to £28 depending on localcircumstances.22

This form of parental engagementthrough modest contributions could cer-tainly be rolled out on a larger scale andused to tackle an unspoken issue withinthe public sector: the funding discrepan-cies generated by PTA fund-raising activi-ties. According to data from the NationalConfederation of Parent Teacher Asso-ciations, the average PTA raises about£4,000 a year. The range, however, is con-siderable since the spending power of par-ents and communities varies by location.One secondary school in Middlesex raisesalmost £50,000 a year from monthly carboot sales alone. Some schools struggle toget a PTA going at all and have no addi-tional source of funding.23

These funds are generally used toimprove the quality of facilities at a schoolfrom computers and ICT rooms, to payingfor school trips and restocking libraries.One interviewee reported that the school’sPTA fund was used to pay for teacherbonuses (on top of the retention andrecruitment grants obtained from the gov-ernment). Clearly schools in more affluentareas and with students from more affluentfamilies have a significant advantage.We would like to see action to facilitate

charitable giving to schools in a mannerwhich would also enable families in poorerareas to participate. A ratchet mechanismwith a multiplier effect should be devel-oped to adjust for differences in socio-eco-nomic levels. Thus, a school in the mostdeprived ward in England (e.g. measuredon the basis of the index of multiple depri-vation) might have its funds multipliedfivefold, while a school in the least deprivedward in England would not receive anymatching funds from the government.This would create new funding for

schools which would be reserved forenhancement projects alone (e.g. school vis-its, capital development). It would also pro-mote engagement and allow parents even in

very restricted circumstances the dignity ofcontributing towards the success of theirschool. As this funding is not intended toreplace per-pupil funding, it should notaffect government funding levels.

What might look such avision look like?While we recognise the need for a broadnational vision, we agree with our intervie-wees that a detailed, ‘one-size fits all’approach will not suit England. We alsosupport their argument that schools, inbeing the closest point of contact for par-ents and students, are best placed to nego-tiate the development of a shared educa-tional vision that is relevant to the commu-nity being served.We suggest, therefore, that an ideal sys-

tem can be characterised by the analogy of‘tight, loose, tight’: clearly delineatedobjectives, responsibilities and standards;the freedom and autonomy to innovate atthe school and classroom level; and com-prehensive mechanisms for evaluatingschool performance and ensuring institu-tional and professional accountability.Essentially, schools and practitioners willbe given as much room to innovate as pos-sible within the constraints of a pared-down, focused national framework.We propose that the national vision of

education refocuses on the primary goal ofteaching and learning.While schools shouldcertainly still be expected to attend to other



22 http://www.becta.org.uk/

etseminars/presentations/2005-

10-13/8/slides/slides.ppt

23 http://women.timesonline.

co.uk/tol/life_and_style/women/f

amilies/article2870492.ece

We propose that the government

facilitates the setting up of local

foundations so that parents can

contribute to enhancement projects

at their children’s school. A ratchet

mechanism with a multiplier effect

should be developed to ensure that

the impact of donating in poor

areas is multiplied to level the play-

ing field.


dimensions of individual development,such as those articulated in the Every ChildMatters Agenda, the focus should nonethe-less be on ensuring that all students achievethe minimum standard in core competen-cies such as literacy and numeracy.Additionally, every effort should be made toensure that each distinct stage of educationensures readiness for the next stage.We propose sweeping away much of the

bureaucratic structures within govern-ment, local authorities and non-depart-mental public bodies to concentrateresources into schools and to reduce exter-nal initiatives. National and local authori-ties should concentrate on ensuring clearand consistent information is available to

support parental choice, and on commis-sioning enough good school places forevery child and taking action to removepoor quality school places rapidly.Finally, we believe that a new accounta-

bility framework is required. One that isstill outcomes-driven, but that is notrestricted to a single measure of success,and that is more user-friendly for thosewho most require the information: parents.In the matter of designing education

systems and overarching structures we haveforgotten that wise maxim that sometimes‘less is more’. The rest of the chapters inthis report will explore different compo-nents of this ‘tight, loose, tight’ frameworkin greater detail.


22


2Mediating the ‘Loose’:Governance andOrganisation

The past three Labour terms have seen thegovernment and education establishmentembroiled in a circuitous debate over stan-dards versus structures. The pendulum hasswung from standards (e.g. the primary lit-eracy and numeracy strategies), to struc-tures (e.g. the introduction of academies,trusts and a new role for local authorities),and back again, it seems, to standards,under Brown’s new administration. Yet this‘debate’ is a non-starter.It is certainly true that the quality of

education is primarily affected by whatgoes on within the classroom. Nonetheless,structures can facilitate or hinder thedevelopment of those underlying funda-mentals. Instead of perpetuating a falsedichotomy between standards and struc-tures, the question that we should be ask-ing is: ‘What are the structures withinwhich attributes of successful schools –strong leadership and school ethos; moti-vated and talented workforce, etc. – aremost likely to be cultivated?’This chapter takes as its starting point

the position that choice and diversity offersEngland the most promise for a system-wide rise in educational quality.The arguments in support of this positionhave been made extensively elsewhere (see,for example, Policy Exchange’s ‘MoreGood School Places’ and ‘Choice? WhatChoice?’).24 A freed-up supply-side com-bined with genuine per-capita funding andbalanced with a strong admissions codeand additional finance for pupils from

deprived areas is the model now underpin-ning both Conservative and LiberalDemocrat education policy. We shalltherefore focus on the division of powerand duties between the centre, local gov-ernment and schools; and on mechanismsfor balancing the need for both competi-tion and collaboration.

Who’s responsible for what?In England, decision-making powers overareas like staffing, budgeting, instructionalcontent and assessment practices have his-torically been shared between the school,local authority and national government.However, the past three decades has seen adeliberate shift of power towards the indi-vidual school and national government atthe expense of the local authority.The roots of this shift can be traced to

James Callaghan’s speech at RuskinCollege, Oxford in 1976. Callaghanchampioned for a core curriculum, closerlinks between education and industry andrigorous monitoring of national perform-ance – calls that, while not uncommon


24 J. O’Shaughnessy and C.

Leslie, ‘More Good School

Places’ (London: Policy

Exchange, 2005); E. Sturdy and

S. Freedman. ‘Choice What

Choice? (London: Policy

Exchange, 2007)

“ Instead of perpetuating a false dichotomy between

standards and structures, the question that we should be

asking is: ‘What are the structures within which attributes of

successful schools – strong leadership and school ethos;

motivated and talented workforce, etc. – are most likely to be

cultivated?’”


today, were revolutionary at a time whenpolicy was the province of the educationcommunity alone. For the first time, the‘secret garden’ of education had beendragged into the public and political spot-light.Through the early 1980s, the government

made tentative forays into developingstronger accountability frameworks.However, the real turning point was the1988 Education Reform Act – ‘the mostimportant piece of education legislation inthe second half of the twentieth century’.25

The Act aimed to create a market within theschool system. The central mechanism bywhich this was to be achieved was ‘localmanagement of schools’: the devolution ofpower from local education authorities toeach individual school. Beginning with thedelegation of up to 85 per cent of funding toeach school, the government quickly movedto curb the control LEAs had, introducingnew categories of schools (e.g. grant-main-tained schools and city technology colleges)which would operate independently of thelocal authority, and centralising power overkey domains of instructional content andassessment practices.More recently, the Blair government

introduced new legislation that re-envi-sioned the local authority as a ‘champion ofparents and pupils, commissioning ratherthan providing education’.26 The Educationand Inspections Act 2006 created a strategicrole for local authorities, with duties to pro-mote choice, diversity, high standards andthe fulfilment of every child’s educationalpotential. As the commissioner of schoolplaces, local authorities will be able to pro-pose expansions to all categories of schools,set the terms for school competition andtake all decisions relating to school organisa-tion. Local authorities have also been givennew powers to intervene earlier if perform-ance is poor.At the same time, central government

control, particularly over domains ofinstructional content and assessment prac-

tices, remain strong. On one hand, the newsecondary curriculum for 11- to 14-year-olds has been slimmed down to give teachersmore power and flexibility in personalisingeducation lessons for their students. On theother hand, the government remains com-mitted to national strategies for literacy andnumeracy – despite evidence from thePrimary Review that these strategies havehad a negligible impact on primary literacy(the results for primary numeracy are slight-ly better). The recent introduction of adetailed pre-primary ‘curriculum’ has alsoraised eyebrows.

Central governmentPerhaps the least ambiguous and unsurpris-ing finding to emerge from our research isthe extent of frustration among stakeholdersregarding central government’s propensityfor intervening whenever and wherever theirfancy strikes. ‘Whitehall needs to under-stand that it can’t control 24,000 schoolsfrom the centre,’ one interviewee com-plained. The charge of ‘initiative-itis’ andmicromanagement is by no means new.Educationists have long argued that thebreakneck pace of reforms flowing out of theDCSF and Whitehall have a draining anddemoralising impact on schools and teach-ers, with questionable returns for the systemas a whole.There is little reason to believe that this

tendency towards micromanagement willchange under the stewardship of Brown’sleadership team. ‘There seems to be no defi-ciency in life which the Prime Minister doesnot consider it to be his duty to address (irre-spective of the practicalities involved)’ arecent Times editorial ran, ‘and none wherethe solution involves anything other than anaction plan to be framed by ministers.’27

As much as we would wish otherwise, itwould be extremely difficult to reverse thepoliticisation of education. We can, howev-er, curb the extent to which the system isvulnerable to constant influence, by realign-


24

25 M. Barber, The Learning

Game, 2nd edn (London: Indigo,

1997), p. 49.

26 Department of Children,

Schools and Families, Higher

Standards, Better Schools for

All, White Paper (2005).

27 http://www.timesonline.

co.uk/tol/comment/leading_articl

e/article3036937.ece


ing existing powers and duties so that allschools and practitioners have the maximumautonomy to innovate and personalise thelearning experience for students.In the previous chapter, we suggested

that the national curriculum frameworkshould be pared down and that the respon-sibility for ensuring a broad and balancedcurriculum should be devolved to schoolsand professionals. In Chapter 4, we willpropose the introduction of a nationalfunding formula which will simplify thefunding process and reduce the number ofseparate grants available. The DCSF, forinstance, currently disperses up to 35 dif-ferent school standards grants (in additionto the dedicated school grant), many ofwhich overlap with one another.28

Additionally, we suggest that the bureau-cracy that schools face could be significant-ly reduced by rationalising the number oforganisations involved in education.The DfES departmental report for 2007

listed 18 non-departmental public bodies29

(colloquially referred to as quangos) cur-rently involved in education. Most of theseNDPBs are defined as ‘executive’ bodies,which means that they are established instatute, employ their own staff and are allo-cated their own budget (e.g. the Trainingand Development Agency for Schools(TDA), the Curriculum and QualificationsAuthority, and the Learning and SkillsCouncil (LSC)). The list does not includeadvisory bodies, tribunals or public corpora-tions – a decision that arguably misrepre-sents the number of agencies in play at anygiven moment.30 For instance, the GeneralTeaching Council (GTC) is classed as an‘independent, not-for-profit corporationserving public interest’31 rather than anNDPB. Unlike other not-for-profit corpo-rations, though, the GTC has statutorypower to advise the Secretary of State on allmatters of professional practice concerningteaching and learning.We believe that there is a need to review

the roles and impact of each NDPB within

the education sector. With regard to thequality of teaching, for instance, the TDAand the National College for SchoolLeadership (NCSL) both conduct researchand programmes to support workforcedevelopment. This overlapping remit is inef-ficient, not just in terms of cost to the tax-payers, but in terms of the additional contactpoints schools have to deal with when seek-ing appropriate support. Similarly, theLearning and Skills Council has a very wideremit (‘planning and funding high qualityeducation and training for everyone inEngland other than in universities’) whichclosely parallels dimensions of the work ofthe Quality Improvement Agency (‘to helppost-16 education and training providersrespond to government priorities on 14–19education and training’).32

Local government – the local authorityThroughout this report, we argue thatEnglish schools need to be given moreautonomy in order to increase innovation,engagement and overall efficiency. At thesame time, we recognise that overly atom-ised governance structures create their ownproblems. In New Zealand, for instance,the lack of any middle-level governingbodies is hampering the Government’sability to systematically replicate changesand access economies of scale (see ‘Helping


Mediating the ‘Loose’: Governance and Organisation

28 See Annex A:

http://www.teachernet.gov.uk/do

cbank/index.cfm?id=9406

29 Officially defined as: ‘a body

which has a role in the process-

es of national government, but is

not a government department or

part of one, and which accord-

ingly operates to a greater or

lesser extent at arm’s length

from Ministers.’

30 For a comparison, see the

quango database that has been

compiled by the Economic

Research Council: http://quang

os.ercouncil.org/search/

31 http://www.gtce.org.uk/

aboutthegtc/faqs/rolefaq/

32 DfES, Departmental Report

2007, p.156.

We propose a rationalisation of

national agencies with overlapping

remits so as to reduce the bureau-

cratic workload upon schools, and

the monetary costs incurred by

taxpayers. Potential mergers might

include: the TDA and NCSL; and

the LSC and the QIA. There is little

reason as well why many of the

functions of the LSC couldn’t be

merged back into the DCSF and

the DIUS (Department for

Innovation, Universities and Skills).


Schools Succeed: Lessons from Abroad’,Chapter 2).The question for England therefore is

not whether we should abolish the practiceof ‘middle management’, but whether thatfunction should continue to be played bythe local authority. This question gainsurgency in light of research from theCurriculum, Evaluation and ManagementCentre at Durham University, whichfound that ‘LEAs do not differ from oneanother in educationally important ways’once other school and pupil level factorshave been taken into account. The mini-mal impact of the LEA on student per-formance is, they argue, unsurprising giventhat LEAs simply do not have the funds todevelop distinctive, long-term initiatives oftheir own and are thus more alike than dis-similar in their behaviour.33

Our research suggests that the new leg-islation on local authorities (the Educationand Inspections Act 2006) has largely beenwelcomed by stakeholders, although notfor the same reasons. Those who view localauthorities as the ‘stakeholder in educationwho has been most badly mistreated andignored for 20 years’34 have welcomed thenew duties and powers. They argue thatthe Act has reinvigorated local authoritiesas governing units, and that this strength-ening is desirable on the grounds that: i) itis inefficient to ‘invent a whole series ofother intervening groups and authorities’;35

and ii) that local authorities as democrati-cally elected bodies are accountable to thelocal community in a way that other feder-ation models are not.The majority of our interviewees, how-

ever, felt that local authorities are ineffi-cient as education providers and welcomedthe shift of local authorities to service com-missioners. For them, the move away fromthe local authority as education providerwas necessary on the grounds that most,though not all, had failed to adapt to thedemands of the choice agenda: ‘The con-ception of the local authority is that we

will have an equitable provision of facility… fundamentally what that means is thatthere’s an attempt to have a ‘one-size fitsall’ approach, which again creates a tensionbetween the choice and diversity agenda.’36

It was felt that many local authorities arestill struggling to come to terms with whatit means to be a commissioner rather thana provider and that it is still ‘not clear howthat’s being done yet or what it means forrelationships’.37

While some of this disarray can be ratio-nalised as teething pains, considerable con-cern was expressed over the fact that theinitiative for divesting the provider role laywith local authorities themselves (e.g. localauthorities still maintain control over com-munity and voluntary controlled schools).Interviewees expressed scepticism over thewillingness of local authorities to voluntar-ily downsize and truly act as ‘champions ofparents and pupils’ if they retained a stakein being one of the education providerswithin any given borough. This conflict ofinterest was explored in greater detail inPolicy Exchange’s report ‘Choice? WhatChoice?’, particularly as it relates to theacademies programmes, and the competi-tion mechanism for new schools.

How are local authorities perceived?The Audit Commission’s Annual SchoolSurvey captures schools’ perceptions of theircouncil’s services for children and youngpeople. The survey results are used as part ofeach council’s annual performance assess-ment. In general, the 2006 survey foundthat schools are ‘generally content’ with thesupport and services obtained from theircouncil. Of 76 questions, 88 per centreceived an average rating of satisfactory orabove,38 with the best areas being child pro-tection and school improvement support,and the worst for services to the most vulner-able children and young people.Closer examination reveals notable dif-

ferences in satisfaction levels. First, satisfac-tion levels are greatly affected by phase of


26

33 P. Tymms, A. Wiggins, and C.

Merrell, ‘The Performance of

Newcastle Schools: Report 6’,

CEM Centre, University of

Durham (initial analysis in Report

2) (2005).

34 Interview, union official.

35 Ibid.

36 Interviewee, education

provider.

37 Interview, former government

advisor.

38 There were six possible

responses: very good, good,

satisfactory, poor, very poor or

unable to comment.


education. Nurseries provided the mostpositive ratings for 76 per cent of ques-tions, as compared to special schools at 14per cent, primaries at 7 per cent and sec-ondary schools at 3 per cent. In fact, sec-ondary schools gave the most negativeresponses to 83 per cent of all questions. Acomparison of primary and secondaryschools alone further sharpens this phasedistinction: primary schools were seventimes more likely to rate their council pos-itively than secondary schools.This primary/secondary distinction is

supported by other surveys39 and wasechoed during our interviews and focusgroups. Interviewees speculated that thisdivide may be due to the way schools arestructured and run. Primary school headsare far more isolated than their secondarycounterparts; they lack senior managementteams and have to deal with the sameamount of legislative process and guidanceas a head teacher at a considerably largersecondary school. Furthermore, the rangeof issues and partners that secondaryschools deal with are arguably more com-plex than primaries, given their larger sizeand the multiple initiatives that impingeupon them. (It is worth noting that of 245schools in special measures as of 31December 2007, approximately 71 percent were primaries).40

Combined, this creates a situationwherein primary schools may be morereliant on local authority support anddirection. ‘They do like the LA tellingthem what to do,’ a senior department offi-cial noted, ‘[but] the worst thing that Iwould add is that LAs all over the countryhave encouraged primary heads to do that,to rely on them, not to challenge, to do asthey are told.’ This is a powerful allegation.Unfortunately, it was not an isolated com-ment.Second, there are notable differences

across schools, depending on the type ofcouncil they were in (county, innerLondon, outer London, metropolitan dis-

trict and unitary). Inner London schoolswere the most positive, giving the best rat-ings on 57 per cent of questions, whileschools maintained by counties reportedthe lowest ratings on 64 per cent of thesurvey questions. Although a number ofinterviewees had singled out smaller localauthorities as potentially ineffective atmaximising their resources, there does notseem to be a correlation between size andratings.

What happens to poorly performing localauthorities?Since 2002, the Audit Commission hasalso conducted Comprehensive Perform-ance Assessments of local authorities,drawing on a range of performance indica-tors, assessments of corporate capacity,audit and inspection reports, and stake-holder opinions. Local authorities are ratedon a four-star basis (two being the mini-mum acceptable level of performance) andtheir ‘direction of travel’: not improvingadequately, improving adequately, improv-ing well and improving strongly.The quality of education services is

evaluated as part of a larger raft of servic-es for children and young people. Thescore for this block is provided by theAnnual Performance Review conductedby Ofsted. In 2006, three local authoritiesfailed to reach the minimum requirementexpected: Bristol, Stoke-on-Trent andSandwell.41 Of the three, Bristol andSandwell were found to be making ade-quate improvement; Stoke-on-Trent wasnot and has since been subject to exten-sive DCSF intervention.



39 See, for instance, item 2.6 in

the National Foundation for

Educational Research’s annual

survey of trends in education for

2006, ‘Have schools’ concerns

changed over time’.

40 http://www.ofsted.gov.uk

/portal/site/Internet

/menuitem.eace3f09a603

f6d9c3172a8a08c08a0c/?vgnext

oid=bc90a9438b4f7110VgnVCM

1000003507640aRCRD

41 CPA – The Harder Test:

Scores and analysis of perform-

ance in single tier and country

councils, 2006.

“ Primary school heads are far more isolated than their

secondary counterparts; they lack senior management

teams and have to deal with the same amount of

legislative process and guidance as a head teacher at a

considerably larger secondary school”


The process by which intervention isdecided upon remains somewhat opaque.According to a representative from the AuditCommission, ‘Relationships are in place toensure that things are caught early’; the pub-lished performance scores thus rarely come asa surprise to the government agencies work-ing with the council. Generally, councils thatare struggling will be supported through acombination of discussion, planning andmo-nitoring, in collaboration with other localpartners. No one agency is tasked with initiat-ing this programme of support, as it is theexpectation that this process will develop org-anically through existing interactions betweenthe council and government officers.42

There is no doubt that this fluidityrequires a high degree of initiative, trustand cooperation on the part of all parties tofunction optimally. Other education

providers, however, believe that this processis both insufficiently rigorous and unjust:

I think there needs to be a much tougherline on LAs. Academies have to sign upto funding agreements under which theschool goes into special measures, and ifthe academy doesn’t improve it signifi-cantly within 12 months, the DCSF cantake the school away, and frankly I don’tsee why local authorities should be able tocarry on controlling a school and havingit underperforming for year after year.43

It is worth noting that as of August 2007there were 246 schools in special measuresacross 95 local authorities. 40 per cent ofthese schools were located in just 15 localauthorities (with one local authority hav-ing up to 13 schools). While we recognise


28

42 We were unable to obtain

information from the DCSF as to

whether they had additional pro-

cedures in place.

43 Interview, education provider

We support a vision of LAs as commissioners leading to greater fluidity in struc-

tures with schools competing (either independently or in networks – described

in the section on competition). It is desirable that schools be given the maxi-

mum freedom to select the provider that most suits their needs. As things stand

however, the LA’s strategic role as commissioner gives them an unfair advan-

tage over other providers. We propose that:

1. All schools become the legal employer of their staff and take ownership of

their land (as is already the case for those with foundation status, in trusts or

set-up as academies). This would have two effects. First, it would remove the

logical inconsistency that sees schools possess de facto control over hiring

and firing, and health and safety while authorities retain legal responsibility.

Secondly, it would break some of the formal barriers that could stop schools

moving to other providers or operating independently.

2. Any local authority that wishes to be a school provider should set up an

arm’s length trading company to bid on contracts so as to operate on an

equal footing with non-governmental school providers. Successful compa-

nies that emerge from this process could then run schools outside of their

original authority.

3. All providers, local authority or otherwise, should be subject to clear and

transparent regulations regarding school performance. Providers that fail to

enable a school within their network to exit special measures or notice to

improve within an agreed upon time period should, as with the current regu-

lation for academies, have their school transferred to another provider, upon

the agreement of the school and the DCSF.


that these local authorities may have high-er concentrations of socio-economic depri-vation, they are clearly struggling.

Competition and collaborationOur research suggests that systems are themost effective when there are pressures forboth competition and collaboration. InCanada, for instance, the presence of atleast two public school boards (not tomention private schools) in each districtcreates a natural impetus for competitionbetween different education providerswhile providing a natural network for sup-port. Similarly, in Hong Kong, multipleschool providers compete in the same geo-graphical area for students, while sharinginnovative curriculum and professionaldevelopment within their network ofschools. (See ‘Helping Schools Succeed:Learning from Abroad’, Chapters 3 and 4,for more information.)This mix of competition and coopera-

tion – dubbed ‘co-opetition’ by Harvardand Yale academics Adam Brandenburgerand Barry Nalebuff44 – is a common busi-ness strategy for optimising productivity.More recently, however, researchers aredrawing attention to the ways in whichthis practice could be applied in otherfields. At the Staffordshire Institute forEducation Policy Research, studies onEnglish policy reform have found thatcompetition is more likely to promoteshort-run efficiency, and cooperation ismore likely to promote long-run dissemi-nation of best practice. Researchers arguefor schools to ‘collaborate … outside theirlocal market, whilst still competing withother local schools’45 – essentially, the prac-tices adopted by Canada (Alberta more sothan Ontario) and Hong Kong.In England, however, competition and

cooperation are typically seen as oppositeends of a spectrum – a paradigm perpetuat-ed by the government. A recent publicationfrom the DCSF’s Innovation Unit opened

its thought piece with the question: ‘Whatif we collaborated instead of competed?’46

Indeed, government rhetoric and policyincreasingly stresses collaboration betweenschools and businesses or university partnersas the solution for all schooling improve-ment woes. The new Children’s Plan con-tains an expectation that every secondaryschool will have specialist, trust or academystatus, and every school is to have a businessor university partner.In practice, schools are given consider-

able leeway in deciding whether these col-laborative networks are hard (i.e. resultingin different governing bodies or modes ofoperations) or soft.47 This flexibility is delib-erate: ‘These [collaborations] will workbecause they’ve been formed by themselves,and I think that that is essential becauseyou’ll only get collaboration if you get trust,’one local councillor explained. ‘I think any-thing that is insisted from the top down isalmost doomed to failure.’While the government should be credit-

ed for stepping back from their usualheavy-handed approach, our comparativeresearch suggests that some forms of col-laboration may be better than others. InNew Zealand, for instance, short-term col-laborative frameworks developed inresponse to specific funding incentives, butrarely lasted once funding stopped. In con-trast, models which built on the principleof long-term partnerships (whether withother schools and/or the local community)were more likely to get embedded into theeveryday practice of each member school(see the initiative Strengthening Educationin Mangere and Otara, in ‘HelpingSchools Succeed: Lessons from Abroad’,Chapter 2).We find the suggestion that collabora-

tion – whatever its form or costs – is inher-ently positive problematic:

The main thing is that [collaborationis] extremely time-intensive, and againthe tougher the school, the more the sen-



44 A. Brandenburger and B.

Nalebuff, Co-Opetition : A revo-

lution mindset that combines

competition and cooperation

(New York: Currency, 1997).

45 N. Adnett and P. Davies,

‘Schooling Reforms in England:

From quasi-markets to co-opeti-

tion’, Journal of Education Policy

18:4 (2003), pp. 393–406.

46 What If, Next Practice in

System Leadership, Innovation

Unit; available at:

http://www.innovation-

unit.co.uk/images/stories/files/p

df/np_systemleadership.pdf

47 The DCSF has four cate-

gories of collaboration: hard

governance federation, soft gov-

ernance federation, soft federa-

tion and informal, loose collabo-

ration. The first two forms have

to be established according to

regulations, while the latter two

are non-statutory in nature. For

information on how each model

differs in terms of governance

structure and decision-making,

see www.standards.dcsf.g

ov.uk/federations


ior people need to be in that school andthe less time they can safely spendtootling around outside, having jollyconversations about collaboration …Collaboration is lovely, but it’s actuallyvery expensive and the opportunity costof the time [collaboration] takes up, so Ithink it’s a very fashionable buzzword,but I think it should be used sparinglywhen there is a real purpose.

- Board member, academy provider

Collaboration is almost a shield againstcompetition sometimes. Collaborate forwhat purpose? On what? If it’s going toraise standards clearly, let’s do it. . . butthe word ‘collaboration’ is almost usedlike ‘apple-pie’ – it’s a good thing, whileactually it isn’t necessarily.

- Secondary school head teacher

Instead, models of collaboration whichrequire a transformation in the ways schoolsoperate were considered more effective thaninformal or loose ones. This is primarilyowing to the extensive consultations (with-in the school and with stakeholders) and‘branding’ process that schools enteringsuch governance federations have to gothrough. Interestingly, recent policyannouncements suggest that the govern-ment is favouring a model which partnershigh and low performing schools:48

� Up to £300,000 funding will be givento a high-performing school when itmerges with a less successful school tohelp deliver improvements – this couldapply to both primary and secondaryschools.

� A grant of between £120,000 and£300,000 will be given to the strongerschool to support its improvementwork with its new partner.

We express reservation over the unspokenassumption that a partnership between highand low performing schools is the best

model to follow. Not all leadership teams athigh performing schools may be able(despite the additional funds) to balanceturning around the performance of theirweaker partner, and maintaining perform-ance levels at their school. Furthermore,most of the collaborative networks beingdeveloped are geographically defined. Weknow, however, from research on the prac-tice of co-opetition, that the creation of ageographically defined network in a singlearea reduces competitive pressures, essen-tially reproducing the monopolies of theLEA era. While this reduction of competi-tive incentive may be less of an issue in ruralareas (where competition, at least within thestate sector, is generally weak to begin with),the impact on densely populated areas couldbe far more wide-ranging.The way forward may well lie in organ-

isations such as Absolute Return for Kids(ARK) and the United Learning Trust(ULT), which sponsor multiple schools(specifically academies) in more than onelocation. Both ARK and ULT have devel-oped their own educational vision andethos; they are also developing their owninfrastructure and procedures to addressissues like staff remuneration and behav-iour policies. While each school has itsown management team, the ‘branding’produced by each charity’s distinct visionand mode of operation indelibly markseach school as belonging to a larger familyand enables some comparability of experi-ence across schools. Furthermore, theresponsibility for turning around a strug-gling member school lies with the networkprovider. While the provider may certainlydraw on expertise from more successfulschools in their network, the high per-forming schools themselves will not haveto take on additional burdens.Edison Schools UK (a subsidiary of

Edison Inc., a major education servicesprovider in the United States of America)operates in a similar fashion. While its sta-tus as a for-profit company precludes it


30

48 http://findoutmore.dfes.

gov.uk/2006/11/trust_schools_u.

html


from sponsoring academies or runningschools, it is a major provider of schoolimprovement services. The Edison Designfor School Improvement is marketed as ‘aholistic framework and all-embracing pro-gramme for really effective improvement,driven by research-led design and clearoutcome measures’. Schools that subscribeto this programme (i.e. become an Edison

School Partner) are supported through astructured nine-term improvement planand have access to Edison’s extensiveresearch and development network. So,while it is not a hard federation, schoolsthat subscribe to the Edison Design princi-ples nonetheless experience many of thepartnership benefits that schools in theARK or ULT family obtain.49



49 For more information on

these organisations, see

http://www.arkonline.org/project

s/uk_education1/index.html;

http://www.ult.org.uk/;

http://www.edisonschools.co.uk/

Given that schools thrive best when there are levers for both competition and

collaboration, we propose that:

1. All schools are encouraged to be a part of a larger support network (prefer-

ably non-geographical) which would enable them to access economies of

scale and/or collaborate on pedagogical matters such as the development of

school curricula. Schools that are prospering as an independent entity would

not be required to join a network if they do not wish to do so.

2. These networks may be run by the new arm’s-length companies set up by

local authorities, or not-for-profit providers.

3. A one-off grant be provided to any provider which recruits a new school to

its existing network. Successful recruitment would be dependent on the

quality of the services and resources it offers to its member schools. To

encourage the development of non-geographically based networks, a larger

grant could be provided if the school in question is in another local authority.

In the long run, we envisage that these support networks will be funded through

subscriptions paid by member schools, who, because local authorities will no

longer be taking 10–15 per cent of their budget, will have the money to pay for

these services.


3Mediating the ‘Loose’:A New Deal forTeachers

Teachers matter. We know this intuitivelyfrom our experiences: inspirational teach-ers – when we are fortunate enough toencounter them – are hard to forget. Theavailable evidence on this matter is alsouncompromisingly clear: the quality ofteaching that students receive is the maindriver of student achievement at the schoollevel. Drawing on over 500 meta-analyses,researchers have found that 30 per cent ofvariance in student performance is attrib-utable to the quality of teaching received –the second-largest source of variance afterstudent ability and prior achievement.50

At the classroom level, the impact thatteachers have is stark. One large-scale, lon-gitudinal study in Tennessee found thatstudents of comparable abilities and priorachievement would see a divergence intheir performance – of up to 50 percentilepoints within a three-year period –depending on the quality of the teacherthey were assigned.51 Similarly, researchersdrawing on a state-wide student databasein Texas found that ‘having a high qualityteacher throughout elementary school cansubstantially offset or even eliminate thedisadvantage of low socio-economic back-ground’.52

It therefore came as no surprise that inevery system we visited, intervieweesrepeatedly stressed the importance of, anddifficulty in, developing a high-qualityteaching workforce. This was also true inEngland, although interviewees differedsignificantly in their identification of

where the core trouble spots were andwhat needed to be done to rectify the sit-uation. Responses ranged from improvingthe calibre of candidates being recruitedand the quality of initial teacher training;to revamping existing mechanisms formotivating, developing and retainingteachers. Still others argued for a reviewof dismissal processes and the flexibility ofthe current pay system in order to get theright people on the bus and the wrongpeople off it.The breadth of issues raised is beyond

the scope of this chapter. We will thereforeconcentrate on the experience of teachers,rather than the leadership and managerialissues related to head teachers and othersenior management team members. Thefollowing sections lay out key issues sur-rounding the recruitment and retention ofgood teachers, and what a ‘new deal’ forteachers might look like.

The challenge: developing informedprofessionalsIf the education establishment in the1970s was a ‘secret garden’ in which teach-ers operated with laissez-faire impunity,the current education climate is one ofsuffocating control and regulation. Thistransition is both a direct and indirect out-come of the education policies that vari-ous governments have put in place. AsFigure 3.153 illustrates, the earliest reformsunder the Thatcher and Major administra-

32

50 J. Hattie, ‘Teachers Make a

Difference: What is the research

evidence?’ Presented at the

Australian Council for

Educational Research, 2003;

available at:

https://www.det.nsw.edu.au/prof

learn/docs/pdf/ qt_hattie.pdf

51 W. Sanders and C. Rivers,

November 1996. ‘Cumulative

and Residual Effect of Teachers

on Future Student Academic

Achievement’ (Tennessee:

University of Tennessee Value

Added Research and

Assessment Center, 1996).

52 S. Rivkin, E. Hanushek and J.

Kain, ‘Teachers, Schools and

Academic Achievement’ (2002),

University of Texas-Dallas Press,

Texas Schools Project.

53 Developed by Sir Michael

Barber.


tions were intended to provide all childrenwith a comparable educational experience.Reforms such as the introduction of theNational Curriculum moved the locus ofpower over what happened within class-rooms from the teacher to the govern-ment.While a step forward in terms of account-

ability, policy-making during those earlyyears was hampered by a lack of research andevidence into what really worked. As educa-tional research became increasingly sophisti-cated, however, teaching began to be pro-moted by the government as a science, ratherthan as an art. The national literacy andnumeracy strategies are the best illustrationsof this wave of reform: top-down initiativesintended to enforce ‘proper’ teaching peda-gogies within each school.Practitioners and researchers argue,

however, that the years of central prescrip-tion have had a detrimental impact on theteaching workforce. An incomplete list ofconcerns would include: the stifling ofinnovation and creativity; the erosion ofpublic trust in teachers; and the decline inthe status of the teaching profession as awhole. A report commissioned by the

DCSF found that teachers’ perceptions oftheir own status declined rapidly between1967, when they rated it 4.3 out of 5, and2006, when they rated it 2.2. As for publicperception: in a comparison of 12 otherprofessions, teaching was generally per-ceived as a middle-ranking profession,most comparable to social work, ratherthan to law, medicine or business.54

Indeed, a graduate teacher on the TeachFirst scheme commented during an inter-view: ‘Initially I felt a bit embarrassed atthe idea of saying I was a maths teacher.Many of my friends are investmentbankers or work in similar high-flying pro-fessions. There is a little bit of a stigmaabout teaching; people think you do itbecause you do not know what else to do,or you want the holidays.’ A senior unionleader pressed this point in his acknowl-edgment that ‘I think there’s an issue ofteaching being seen to be the poor rela-tions of the professions within England.’The status of teaching as a profession

has in turn been linked to issues of recruit-ment and retention. Through the 1990s,the government struggled to recruit suffi-cient teachers into the workforce, with par-


Mediating the ‘Loose’: A New Deal for Teachers

54 DfES, ‘The Status of

Teachers and the Teaching

Profession in England: Views

from inside and outside the pro-

fession’, Final report of the

Teacher Status Project, 2006.

UninformedPrescription

UninformedProfessionalism

InformedPrescription

InformedProfessionalism

CentralControl

ProfessionalAutonomy

KnowledgePoor

KnowledgeRich

1985-1995 1975-1985

1995-Present The Way Forward

Figure 3.1: The development of the English teaching workforce


ticular difficulty in subjects like maths, sci-ence and ICT. While there has been someimprovement, recruitment to teacher train-ing at the secondary level is still below targetfor nine out of twelve secondary subjects.55

The profession also appears to be strugglingwith ‘wastage’ – teachers who resign andleave the profession. DfES data shows that in2003–4, 9.2 per cent of the workforce left theprofession, with only a quarter of these leav-ing due to retirement.56

Teachers believe that the best way toimprove their status would be to allow themto exercise more professional judgement. Yetthe government has been loath to relinquishcontrol. This tension between professionalautonomy on the one hand, and perform-ance accountability on the other, is encapsu-lated in Barber’s conception of the ‘informedprofessional’ – teachers who are given a freerein to exercise their professional judgementin recognition of demonstrated knowledgeand skill.

Recruitment: the who and howAs Figure 3.2 illustrates, approximately 35per cent of the current workforce is overthe age of 50; given this demographic pro-file, the rate of loss (of teachers to the pro-fession) will rise significantly over the next15 years.57 While this certainly has knock-

on effects on the quality of teachers enter-ing middle and senior management posi-tions, there are real concerns over the abil-ity of the government to recruit sufficientcandidates of calibre to compensate for thisageing workforce.The government agency charged with

raising the quality and quantity of teachertrainees is the Training and DevelopmentAgency for Schools (TDA). In addition tolaunching an aggressive and highly sophis-ticated advertising campaign, the TDA haspromoted a range of diverse routes intoteaching to support different target groups.Thus, the Teach First programme (mod-elled after Teach for America) is aimed athigh-performing graduates interested inteaching for a limited period of time beforemoving on to another career; whilstFastTrack is intended for those who desireto progress quickly into leadership andmanagement roles. As of 2006, there were32 different ways to enter the teaching pro-fession in England.58

The TDA’s strategies appear to have madesome progress in widening the backgroundof entrants to the profession. Graduate careersurveys have found that teaching is now themost popular career choice among final-yeargraduates and those considering a careerchange; ‘second career’ teachers nowmake upone-third of each batch of teacher trainees.59


34

55 D. Burghes, B. Moon, J.

O’Leary, A. Smithers and C.

Woodhead, Teaching Matters:

The recruitment, employment

and retention of teachers

(London: POLITEIA, 2007), p. 21.

56 Ibid., p. 27.

57 GTC. Profile of the teaching

profession: Annual digest of sta-

tistics 2006-07:

http://www.gtce.org.uk/shared/c

ontentlibs/gtc/141488/201080/te

ach_profile_stats_2007.pdf

58 M. Barber and M.

Mourshead, How the Worlds

Best-Performing School

Systems Come Out on Top

(London: McKinsey and

Company, 2007), p.20.

59 Teacher Development

Agency, press release, 11

August 2005.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Per

cent

age

ofte

ache

rs

Age Group

25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+Under 25

Figure 3.2: Registered and ‘in service’ teachers by age group 2006/7


The current level of teacher vacancies is at thelowest level since 1999, although there is rea-son to believe that the recent reduction intraining grants (e.g. for non-priority subjects)and the introduction of tuition fees for allundergraduates may lower recruitmentrates.60 The very latest figures from February2008 suggest that these fears are beingrealised: teaching applications are down 9 percent since 2007.61

Even if the quantity of teachers is main-tained, there are concerns over quality. Thehead teacher of an inner-city London acade-my expounded: ‘It’s no good for me to hearthe government saying we’ve got x amount ofteachers applying, it’s more than last year – it’sthe calibre . . . Are we recruiting the right cal-ibre of teachers … especially for schools likethis?’ Similarly, a head teacher told us: ‘I knowwe’re told that there aren’t shortages of teach-ers, but when you advertise for teachers andyou see the quality of applicants that come inthrough the post, it feels like there is.’This reported difficulty in recruiting good

quality teachers may be linked to the school’scircumstances. Existing evidence suggeststhat recruitment and retention is often hard-er in schools serving disadvantaged commu-nities. Research commissioned by the DCSFfound that teacher turnover is significantlyhigher in schools with low attainment, a higheligibility for Free School Meals (FSM) and ahigh proportion of non-statemented special-needs children. Furthermore, teachers in dif-ficult schools are over 50 per cent more like-ly to move to another school than teachers in‘good’ schools.62

There is reason to believe, though, that

more could be done to raise the quality ofcandidates being inducted into teacher-train-ing schemes. In 2005/2006, 21 per cent oftrainee teachers were non-graduates, and ofthese, 32 per cent had no A levels. Of thefirst-year postgraduate trainees with a UKdegree, 58 per cent held a 2:1 or first. TheTDA notes that this is an improvement fromseven years ago, when only 51 per cent of thesame group had a 2:1 or first.63 (Note that noseparate information is currently collectedcentrally on the level of education attained by‘second career’ teachers.)In contrast, a recent study by Barber and

Mourshed (2007) found that top-perform-ing systems recruit their teachers from thetop third of each graduate cohort: the top 5per cent in South Korea, the top 10 per centin Finland and the top 30 per cent inSingapore and Hong Kong. This selectivity,coupled with the provision of a good startingsalary (discussed later in the chapter), helps toraise the status of the profession, therebyattracting even more high-calibre applicants.An illustration of this virtuous cycle can be

seen in England’s experience withTeach First,a programme specifically targeted at high-fly-ing graduates. The entry requirements arehigh: a minimum 2:1 degree, 300 UCASpoints and evidence of leadership skills andinitiative. Successful applicants are placed atchallenging secondary schools for two yearsand work towards Qualified Teacher Statuson-site. Teach First teachers have been suc-cessfully branded as an elite cadre, andcompetition for places is stiff. In 2006, itwas listed number 14 in the Times’ list oftop graduate employees.64



60 The introduction of the train-

ing grant in 2000, coupled with a

slight rise in the starting wages

of teacher salaries, resulted in a

30 per cent rise in applications.

61 John Howson, ‘Monthly

Commentary’, EDS Surveys 8:1

(February 2008).

62 A. Smithers and P. Robinson,

‘Teacher Turnover, Wastage and

Movements between Schools’,

DfES, Research Report 640,

2005.

63 Training and Development

Agency, press notice, 18 July

2007.

64 http://www.top100

graduateemploy-

ers.com/top100.html

We recognise that the TDA has made advancements in improving the rates

and quality of teacher recruitment. However, we believe that the system would

benefit from making a training route based on Teach First into the default

option for new graduate teachers, and further encouraging the entry of ‘sec-

ond career’ teachers. In forthcoming research on teacher recruitment and

training, to be published this autumn, we will look at how the model could be

adapted to achieve this.


The quality of initial teacher trainingInterviewees generally agreed that the qual-ity of initial teacher training was inade-quate in preparing trainees for teaching,which in turn contributed to the high ratesof attrition among NQTs. One intervieweeargued: ‘Poorly prepared aspirant teachersare coming into the profession and they’reexiting almost immediately: within two,three, four years they’re gone!’

There was less consensus on whereexactly the perceived weakness in existingteacher-training schemes lay. Some feltthat the one-year PGCE programmewould function better if it was extendedfor another year or two, while others tookthat proposal a step further by drawingcomparisons to the training expected ofother professions: ‘At the moment thePGCE course lasts two and a half terms,whereas if one wants to become a doctor,an engineer or any other profession, one istalking about an initial degree followed byprofessional training lasting at least two orthree years.’ Note that in Finnish practice,all teachers are expected to have at least aMaster’s degree.Others argued that it was less about the

length of training and more about howteachers were trained: ‘I think all teachertraining should eventually take place in theschools … the PGCE is OK, but a lot of itis theoretical, there’s not enough practicalexperience.’ One union leader pressed thepoint, by arguing that current training isunlikely to support the development ofteachers as informed professionals: ‘Thecurrent training reflects the highly cen-tralised system that we have got. When Isay they can teach a quality lesson, theycould teach a strategies lesson, a conven-tional lesson …[however] teachers need tobe equipped to make their own profession-al decisions about what techniques to use.’As things stand, there is comparatively

little research on the relative efficacy ofeach of the 32 possible routes into teachingin England. Initial evidence suggests, how-

ever, that work-based employment routes –the most significant of which are theGraduate Teacher Programme and theOverseas Trained Teacher Programme –may have an edge. Evidence provided bythe DCSF to the Education and SkillsCommittee found that 90 per cent ofteachers training through employment-based routes gain qualified teacher status,which is considerably higher than otherroutes.Drop-out rates are also lower. Data from

the TDA (then the Teacher TrainingAgency) found that: ‘ We could lose about5% off GTP, about 11% off postgraduateand it will be higher, about 20–23% ofundergraduates off the longer courses.’65

This may not be indicative of the quality ofsupport and training in each programme,but could reflect the degree of certaintyheld by trainees before entering the pro-gramme: ‘second career’ teacher trainees,in making an active choice to switchcareers, may be less likely to change theirmind than an undergraduate who mayhave been less aware of the alternativeoptions available.Even within a particular training route,

there can be considerable variation in thequality of training provided. In one com-parison of the performance profiles of uni-versity PGCE programmes, researchersfound variations of up to 300 points(scored on the basis of entry qualifications,quality as judged by Ofsted inspectionsand the proportion of trainees known to beentering teaching) between the highest-and lowest-ranking institutions.66


36

65 House of Commons

Education and Skills Committee,

‘Secondary Education: Teacher

retention and recruitment’, Fifth

Report of Session 2003–2004,

Volume 2, Q372.

66 A. Smithers and P. Robinson,

‘Teacher Training Profiles 2007’,

Center for Education and

Employment Research,

University of Buckingham (2008).

Anecdotal evidence suggests that

there is considerable variability in

the efficacy of various training

routes. Our research to be pub-

lished later in the year will propose

a rationalisation around the routes

that work best.


Incentives: remuneration

Pay levelsThe Database of Teachers Records showsthat the average salary of full-time quali-fied secondary teachers has risen byapproximately 50 per cent from £22,200in 1995 to £33,720 in 2005, with a com-parable rate of change for primary teachers.Once adjusted for inflation, this increase isapproximately 18 per cent.67 Given thesechanges, the majority of our intervieweesexpressed satisfaction with current pay lev-els. ‘I think we are past the point of gettingany real marginal return for throwing moremoney at teachers,’ one education providernoted. The one exception was the NUT,which argued that salary rises have not ade-quately taken into account changes ininflation, and that the purchasing power ofa teacher’s salary has fallen.Research conducted by Barber and

Mourshed (2007) suggests, however, thatin countries where salaries are already veryhigh (e.g. Switzerland), further increases insalary had little impact on the number orquality of applicants to teaching. Indeed,salary is rarely stated as one of the moreimportant impetuses for entering teaching(although ensuring that starting salaries arecomparable to those of other graduate jobsdoes widen the pool of potential appli-cants). The report concludes that systemsshould pay ‘good (not great)’ startingsalaries – a finding that corresponds withthe results of our research.The challenge is determining what con-

stitutes a ‘good’ starting salary. Evidenceindicates that new graduates are enteringthe workforce with larger debts; a recentsurvey found that the average studentgraduates with £14,779 of debt, a 5 percent increase from 2005 figures. Coupledwith higher costs of living (most notori-ously sky-rocketing house prices), newgraduates arguably require more money inthe earlier part of their life to support aspi-rations for family life.

Frontloading the remuneration scheme isone possible solution.The restructuring costscould be borne by reducing incremental pro-gression: in the average OECD country, thedifference between the average starting salaryand the maximum teacher salary is 70 percent. This contrasts with 46 per cent inEngland and just 18 per cent in Finland.Barber andMourshed (2007) notes that suchrestructuring has succeeded in other coun-tries because salary progression is less impor-tant in the decision to become a teacher thanstarting salary, and teacher retention is notstrongly correlated to salary progression.68

The scheme could also be frontloaded byreducing pensions, which would also addressthe way the present system incentivises teach-ers towards the latter part of their careers tohang in, even when it is not in their bestinterests to do so.

Performance-related payFar more contentious is the government’sperformance management system (intro-duced in 2000), which links performancewith pay through a combination ofindividual goal-setting and personnel app-raisals.Some interviewees reported that the

existing system has no teeth as the expecta-tion is that anyone who applies for thresh-old pay will receive it. One head teachersaid: ‘When I was in –––, we had fifteensecondary schools and the only school thatdidn’t put everybody through was my ownschool, and they took me to a tribunal and



67 Database of Teachers

Records. Inflation adjustment (to

2006/2007 prices) calculated

using the HM Treasury GDP

deflator.

68 Barber and Mourshed (2007)

p.21

We suggest that the remuneration

scheme be frontloaded to enable

higher starting salaries, financed

through reducing incremental pro-

gression, and by reducing pen-

sions. We will explore this proposal

in greater detail in our forthcoming

report on teachers.


then they lost, but the amount of time thattook from my working life was huge.’Success rates at both the threshold assess-ment and upper pay scale progression haveindeed been very high: at over 90 per centbetween 2000 and 2004.In response to this allegation, a union

representative pointed out that there areonly 26 teachers in England who havebeen appointed to the position of ExcellentTeacher, arguing that this disproves thenotion that pay rises within the teachingsector are automatic. (The number ofteachers on the Advanced Teacher Scale isalso comparatively low – 4,000 out of500,000 teachers.)69 The legislation wasthere, he noted; there was simply strongresistance within the community to overlydifferentiated salaries: ‘I think some ofthese things aren’t used because they goagainst the culture of our schools. That thisidea of rewarding individually teachers forsomething that was a collective activity issomething that teachers don’t feel comfort-able with.’It is worth noting that similar points have

been made about the take-up rates of thefive retention and recruitment allowancespayable at the discretion of employers. Datafrom the School Teachers’ Review Bodyindicates that 95.9 per cent of teachers donot receive any type of recruitment andretention allowance. Evidence provided byteacher unions and the National Employers’Organisation for School Teachers to theEducation and Skills Committee indicate

that there is strong resistance, even hostility,within the teaching community to the useof such allowances over fears that theymight prove divisive.Complicating the issue is the fact that

evidence of the impact of performance-related pay schemes on student outcomesand teacher behaviour is mixed.70 OneEngland-based study found that schoolscould be roughly divided into two cate-gories: reformers and fire-fighters. The for-mer uses performance management as ameans of improving how schools are runand correspondingly achieve positive gainsin goal-setting and pupil attainments. Themajority of schools, however, appear to useperformance management as a form-fillingexercise to get teachers long-overdue payincreases. While this study’s research didfind suggestions of an increase in ‘reformer’schools as the scheme matured, the lack offurther research since then leaves us with lit-tle concrete data on how effectively thescheme is currently working.71

Flexibility of payGiven the paucity of conclusive evidence, acentralised overhaul of performance-relat-ed pay seems unwarranted. Instead, ourresearch suggests that a more sensible wayforward may be to give individual schoolsfar more control and flexibility over theirpayrolls in order to pay teachers whateverthe local market requires.At present, the only type of maintained

school that is exempt from following


38

69 http://www.dfes.gov.uk/

rsgateway/DB/SFR/s000743

/Addition_D_DOU.xls

70 See, for instance, O. Harvey-

Beavis, ‘Performance-Based

Rewards for Teachers: A litera-

ture review’ (Paris: OECD, 2003);

A. Strath, ‘Teacher Policy

Reforms in Sweden: The case of

individualised pay’, International

Institute for Education Planning

(Paris: UNESCO, 2004);

Community Training and

Assistance Center, ‘Catalyst for

Change: Pay for Performance in

Denver’, Final Report (2004).

71 D. Marsden and R. Belfield,

‘Pay for Performance Where

Output is Hard to Measure: ‘The

case of performance pay for

school teachers’ (London: LSE

Research Online, 2006); avail-

able at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk

/archive/00000850.

Under the system, teachers start on a ‘Main Pay Scale’. Progression on the scale could be describedas based on length of service: each September, teachers on the MPS move to the next scale point sub-ject to satisfactory performance. Teachers who have reached the top of the MPS are required to passa ‘threshold assessment’ – based on teachers’ professional development and the progress of theirpupils – before they can enter the Upper Pay Scale.Once on the UPS, progression is based on recommendations of head teachers to the governing

body. Beyond that, there are specialised pay spines for head teachers and other school leaders, and forAdvanced Skills Teachers (for teachers who wish to maintain their focus on classroom practice ratherthan leadership or management posts). More recently, the government introduced an ‘ExcellentTeacher’ position. Unlike the ASTs, ETs are on a set salary.


national guidelines on pay are the acade-mies. In a House of Common debate, JimKnight justified this decision by arguingthat: ‘Academies need to respond innova-tively to the huge challenges they face. Theability to negotiate their own pay and con-ditions to meet the particular needs of theacademy, its staff and students is part ofthe increased flexibility they need to meetthese challenges.’72 He did not, however,provide a reason why other schools in chal-lenging circumstances, or indeed allschools, were not afforded this flexibility tomeet the challenges of their community.So far, most academies have used the

parameters of the national pay system as abase, topped up with a range of incentivesand conditions. These include the power toaward staff bursaries for innovative teachingpractices, bonuses linked to pupil perform-ance, and financial support for teachers pur-suing a Master’s degree. Head teachers andsponsors of academies have fiercely defend-ed their flexibility over teacher pay andrewards, particularly in light of the demandsacademy staff work under. DanielMoynihan, the chief executive of the HarrisFederation of South London Schools,noted, for instance, that their use of bonus-es ‘recognises the fact that the working yearand working weeks are slightly longer’.73

Moynihan’s comments could just as eas-ily apply to a non-academy. By 2010, allschools are to offer core extended services,including: ‘before and after school clubs(not necessarily on the school site); activi-ties beyond the school day such as sports,arts, music clubs, study support and volun-teering; parenting support; referral tohealth and social services; and opening upfacilities to the community such as sportsgrounds and space for adult learning’.74

Given that schools have differentrequirements, it makes sense for eachschool to have far more control over salary.National pay agreements should provideguidance to schools on minimum startinglevels of pay, rather than restricting school

flexibility to pay whatever necessary toimprove performance and retain the bestteachers. Indeed, in all likelihood, they areprobably much better placed to make suchdecisions. As a former government advisornoted: ‘it’s a problem for any performancepay if central government in Whitehall istrying to deal with the pay of any individ-ual teacher, particularly in a devolvedschool. It should be left up to the school.’

Incentive: continuingprofessional developmentNumerous teacher surveys have found thatjob satisfaction is closely linked with thequality of professional development ateacher receives. Teachers who have oppor-tunities for professional development areless likely to want to leave the workforce. Asseveral interviewees noted:

I think the big challenge is keeping people,and that’s a question about them beingtrusted, about them being valued, butabove all about them being developed.75

The majority of teachers know that whenthey join the profession they know it’s notgoing to be the highest paid job that there



72 Jim Knight, Hansard, Column

1378W, 6 July 2006.

73 D. Turner, ‘Academies Push

Pay Boundaries’, FT.com, 28

November 2007.

74 http://www.governornet

.co.uk/publishArticle.cfm?topicA

reaId=28&contentId=303&page

Start=21&sortOrder=c.title

75 Interview, government advi-

sor.

National pay agreements should offer

guidance on minimum pay, limiting

automatic progression to four incre-

ments. After that, schools and net-

works should develop their own pay

structures based on the situation in

their local market. Coupled with our

proposal for a per-pupil national fund-

ing formula (see Chapter 4), this

should enable schools to create

whatever performance incentives

they believe necessary. Providers

running a number of schools will be

in an especially good position to

develop models of pay that can be

rolled out across their network.



40

is in civil services and government or inpublic service. But that can be offset bystrong professional development andbeing valued, I think.76

Correspondingly, teacher contracts now pro-vide for five no-contact days for continuingprofessional development (CPD), and allschools are expected to evaluate the qualityof CPD provided to teachers in their annu-al self-evaluation. The TDA, in collabora-tion with other partner organisations hasalso identified national CPD priorities.77

The good news is that this increased focuson the importance of CPD appears to bemaking some inroads. The annual GTC sur-veys have found that each year there is a sta-tistically significant increase in the propor-tion of teachers who feel that their profes-sional development needs are being metpartly, or in full. However, there is still a sig-nificant minority that feel that their needsare not being met at all.Additionally, interviewees were strongly

in agreement that the quality of continuingprofessional development (sometimesreferred to as in-service training) remains ‘amess’. A former government advisor noted:‘If you look at the amount of money thatwe’ve invested in the recruitment and initialtraining of teachers, just pick that one, it’shuge, it’s disproportionately the mostamount we spend if we talk about profes-sional development. We hardly spend any-thing on in-service training and yet all thestats show that it’s been grossly inefficient.’Others expressed concern that current

contractual provisions for professional devel-opment do not adequately guarantee timeand space for individual growth. ‘The trou-ble with the five no-contact days,’ a formerhead teacher noted, ‘is that they’ve been builtinto the school calendar and are eaten up byadministrative and organisational bits. Sure,there might be time set aside for staff devel-opment, but that’s whole staff rather thanindividual.’ Evidence provided to theEducation and Skills Committee also sug-

gests that funding for CPD is disproportion-ately focused on NQTs, with few opportuni-ties or programmes developed with matureteachers in mind.Our research suggests that there is strong

support for giving every teacher an entitle-ment in terms of time or money to extendtheir own professional development. Forsome interviewees, this might include theopportunity to take sabbaticals in non-edu-cational fields in order to encourage them to‘step outside their comfort zone’. The argu-ment here is that the existing vision of whatconstitutes CPD is still far too narrow, andthat teachers could benefit from experiencesoutside the educational establishment.

Managing underperforming orineffective teachersEvidence suggests that a system whichstrongly supports teachers through continu-ous professional development would reducethe rates of demotivated, underperformingteachers.78 Nonetheless, we recognise thatsuch teachers may still remain, and mecha-nisms need to be developed to manage thesituation lest it begin to impact the per-formance of other teachers. As one headteacher put it: ‘You’ve got to motivate,reward and retain the best. You won’t actu-ally do that if those teachers don’t see youdealing with underperformance andbecome demotivated themselves.’The experience of one interviewee, a

Teach First graduate, offers a vivid picture ofwhat might happen when poor performanceis ineffectively dealt with:

76 Interview, education provider.

77 For 2007–10, those priorities

are pedagogy (i.e. behaviour

management, subject knowl-

edge, supporting curriculum

change), personalisation (i.e.

equality and diversity, special

educational needs) and people

(i.e. working with other profes-

sionals, school leadership).

78 See, for example, the work

that has come out of the

Variations in Teachers’ Work,

Lives and their Effect on Pupils

(VITAE). Project website:

www.nottingham.ac.uk/educatio

n/centres/crtsd/vitae

We propose that an individual CPD

budget, based on a money entitle-

ment for service worked, be

offered to teachers. Teachers

would take responsibility for identi-

fying and planning the type of

development opportunity that

would most meet their needs.


I think I am very lucky in the school I amin. We have a strong senior managementteam and an excellent head. Talking toothers, it’s obviously not like that in everyschool. Our staff is really professionalcompared to other ones I hear about,although it’s not perfect. We have, forexample, one teacher – I don’t know howshe got employed – who just has no con-trol at all. I was blissfully unaware ofhow bad things were until I had to moveto an adjoining classroom. Her classesand tutor groups run wild, and even withmy relatively short experience I can seethat she just has not got what it takes tobe effective.

In fact we have to organise aroundher, giving her the least academicgroups who have no chance of achiev-ing anything that will affect our sta-tistics – and we are under huge pres-sure to improve these. She has been inthe school for several years and yetnobody has been able to deal with herextreme lack of effectiveness. I knowpeople have tried to support her, but itnever translates into any real improve-ment in the classroom. Maybe havingall the bottom sets will provoke herresignation!

The compliance with underperformancethat her story illustrates, not to mention thecalm acceptance of the practice of the worstteacher being given the classes that are hard-est to teach, is troubling.The difficulty facing researchers here is

the sheer absence of data. No informationis collected centrally on the number ofteachers who are dismissed each yearthrough competency procedures or whohave taken severance payments. Anecdotalevidence is rather mixed. Some of ourinterviewees argued that the accountabilityframeworks and the ‘performance culturein schools’ has changed expectations ofwhat will or will not be tolerated. They

argued that, compared to the situation inthe 1980s, and even the 1990s, the situa-tion has vastly improved.

Others argued, however, that there is stillfar too much tolerance of underperfor-mance. One interviewee, a head teacheroften contracted by the DCSF to assiststruggling schools, noted:

I know some schools where they’ve gotyear after year of teachers underper-forming and they continually allowthem to stay within the same area ofunderperformance for years … It’s likesaying to a surgeon: ‘You’re not verygood at heart bypass because you keepcutting the wrong artery, but keep try-ing because eventually you’re going toget it right.’ How many casualties arewe going to have before we actuallysay: ‘Maybe you shouldn’t do heart sur-gery?’

This toleration of underperformance wasin part attributed to a general cultural dis-approval of aggressive performance man-agement (as previously discussed).Concern was expressed, however, over thelength of the competency procedure.Under current legislation, underperform-ing teachers must first be supportedthrough an informal period of review. Theschool, with the agreement of the teacher,will set a period of time during which theteacher is expected to meet clearly outlinedimprovement goals. The teacher is alsoentitled to receive appropriate supportfrom the school towards meeting those



“ As one head teacher put it: ‘You’ve got to motivate,

reward and retain the best. You won’t actually do that if

those teachers don’t see you dealing with underperfor-

mance and become demotivated themselves’”



42

goals. Only if the teacher fails to makeprogress by the end of the informal reviewprocess will a formal hearing be heldwherein another action plan for improve-ment is laid out and a final written warn-ing provided. If there is still no progress,the teacher will be brought to a dismissalcommittee. While there is no official dataon the average length of time consumed bythis dismissal process, anecdotal evidencesuggests that a period of up to a year is notunusual. One local councillor dryly noted:‘It’s hard enough getting rid of schoolkeepers, let alone staff!’Among those who felt that the existing

framework was failing in some form oranother, there was disagreement over who(or what) was at fault – from those whowere dissatisfied with what they perceivedto be overly strong unionism:

I think the complication is the strengthof the teaching unions, so if you take ateacher on you have to be very strong-willed because you will encounter thefull force of the trade unions andthey can make life very difficult foryou. So I think dealing with ineffectiveand demotivated teachers depends onthe quality of the head and how muchthey want to do it, but also is harder inthe areas that need it most because theytend to be [the] most unionised.

To the intransigence of the local authority:

Because the LA are involved in [thecompetency procedures], and becausethey have a natural resistance to thesharper edge that the private sectormight have, I think we have far toomuch compliance with underperfor-mance.

To the head teachers:

There are teachers who get into thesystem and they are basically not cutout for the job. Performance manage-ment should sort that out. And to theextent that doesn’t happen, that’s afailure of the school managers, headsand possible local authorities in notencouraging and supporting theprocess.

Interestingly enough, there was stronginterest among head teachers for a systemto ‘buy out’ long-stay teachers who are notentirely incompetent but have burned outand are still too young to take early retire-ment. One popular possibility was a dedi-cated fund that school governors coulddraw on to cover the costs of a severancepackage. The use of a dedicated fund wasseen as particularly key since, as one headteacher told us: ‘The leadership incentivegrant was supposed to do that, but it neverdid of course. It just went into the generalbudget.’

While we recognise the need to

ensure that the competency proce-

dure an underperforming teacher

receives is fair, procedures that

drag on for months can be

extremely demoralising, not just for

the teacher in question but for the

students being taught by said

teacher. We propose that a much

shorter capability procedure

should be agreed upon once the

informal stage of the process has

been exhausted.




We propose that a fund be set up by the government specifically for the purpose

of moving out teachers who have yet to reach early retirement age but have

ceased to be effective in the classroom. Governing bodies may borrow the cost

of a severance payment from the fund (e.g. £40,000), which is then paid back

within an agreed time period through savings gained from hiring a younger

teacher, who would in all likelihood be on a lower salary point.


4Mediating the ‘Loose’:Safeguards

Any system, however carefully designed, willalways be open tomanipulation.The Englisheducation system as it currently stands seemsparticularly prone to gaming techniques – asituation, some might argue, that is largely ofour own making. Given the lack of goodschool places, parents with the means willcertainly do their utmost to secure theirchild’s desired school. And given the high-stakes nature of the test-based accountabilitysystem, is it any surprise that some schoolscherry-pick their student population?We anticipate that the model of

autonomous, non-geographical school net-works discussed in previous chapters will gosome way towards addressing these chal-lenges: by harnessing the best of competitiveand collaborative practices; speeding up thespread of good practice; and giving schoolsand teachers the autonomy to act as andwhen necessary. We acknowledge, though,that competition can lead to greater segrega-tion if adequate safeguards and counter-incentives are not put in place.This chapter therefore re-examines the

areas – admissions, exclusions and schooltransport – which will require careful mon-itoring on the part of local authoritiesshould a more competitive, flexible modelbe made to work without harming equity.Crucially, it proposes a new mechanism forfunding schools so as to incentivise schoolsto avoid ‘cream-skimming’ students fromwealthy areas.

AdmissionsAs we argued in our publication ‘Choice?What Choice?’,79 the present admissions

system is more accurately described as oneof parental preference rather than parentalchoice. The lack of good school placesmeans that popular schools are heavilyoversubscribed and a significant portionof families are disappointed. In 31 out of150 local education authorities, morethan 20 per cent of families fail to obtaina place at their first choice school.80

Unsurprisingly, the admissions process iswidely viewed (and experienced) as high-ly stressful.Concern over the admissions process is

also driven by research findings that peereffects (based on the composition of theschool’s student body) have a significantimpact on individual performance.Evidence from the PISA studies suggestthat ‘students attending schools in whichthe average socio-economic background ishigh tend to perform better than whenthey are enrolled in a school with a below-average socio-economic intake.’81 This istrue, regardless of the student’s individualsocio-economic status. Similarly, studyingat a school with a high proportion of high-achieving pupils (which is itself correlatedwith socio-economic background) has apositive impact on individual attain-ment.82 The PISA studies also suggest thatcountries with schools that are less segre-gated by socio-economic background havehigher overall performance and are moreequitable.In England, however, researchers have

found that segregation in schools is signif-icantly higher in terms of social class,income and ability than can be explained

44

79 Sturdy and Freedman (2007)

80 ‘Myths behind School

Admissions Claims Exposed’,

Daily Telegraph, 10 March 2007.

81 ‘Learning from Tomorrow’s

World – First results from PISA

2003’, (Paris: OECD, 2004), p.

189.

82 See, for instance, E.

Hanushek, J. Kain, J. Markman

and S. Rivkin, ‘Does Peer Ability

Affect Student Achievement?’

Journal of Applied Econometrics

18 (2003), pp. 527–44.


by residential segregation, particularly indensely populated areas where there aremore schools available. For instance, onaverage, voluntary aided schools take alower proportion of students on free schoolmeals (FSM) and students with specialeducational needs (SEN) than would beexpected given the composition of thecommunity. Where that has occurred,other schools in the area have, invariably,taken more pupils on FSM and SEN thanwould be expected.83 Given the fact thatschool performance is very closely relatedto the demographic composition and priorachievement of its student body, schoolswith a disproportionately high number ofstudents on FSM or SEN (in relation tothe community the school is in) areundoubtedly at a disadvantage. Researchalso suggests that the degree of segregationin England has been exacerbated by ‘gam-ing’ strategies on the part of schools andparents.In response to these concerns over fair

access, the government finally launched anew School Admissions Code (in forcesince 28 February 2007). Schools are nowrequired ‘to act in accordance with’ theCode rather than simply ‘have regard to itsguidance’, as was formerly the case.Additionally, every local authority, admis-sion authority and governing body inEngland has a statutory duty to ensure thatadmissions policies and practices promotea system wherein ‘all parents feel that theyhave the same opportunities to apply forthe schools they want for their child.’84

This includes developing In-Year FairAccess Protocols to cater for students whoneed a place outside of the regular schooladmissions round; and increasing provi-sion of advice and support for low-incomefamilies through the use of ChoiceAdvisors.By and large, the Code has been wel-

comed by practitioners and stakeholders as‘a huge step forward in stopping schoolsfrom picking children and enabling chil-

dren and families to pick schools’.85 As onehead teacher noted: ‘The new system that’sjust come in this year is much easier, it’sjust ticking the box. The subjectivity hasgone out of the window.’ Interviewees alsoapplauded the strengthening of the regula-tory aspect of the Code, in particular theduties placed upon local authorities andadmissions forums to evaluate the fairnessof admissions policies. ‘Admissions should-n’t be left to individual schools,’ anotherhead teacher approvingly remarked. ‘It’sreally important that someone is sittingoutside of the school and ensuring fairplay.’It is worth noting that several intervie-

wees cautioned against treating the Codeas a panacea to larger problems of segrega-tion and schooling inequality. Weacknowledge the validity of their point andrecognise that there is a need to balanceconsiderations of family disruption anduncertainty alongside the drive to reduceinstances of unjust gaming practices.Nonetheless, we agree that the Code is apositive step forward in promoting moreconsistency and transparency within thesystem. We suggest, however, that therestill remain a number of areas where fur-ther consideration is required.

Selection by ability vs. selectionby aptitude 86

Under current guidelines, it is unlawful fornon-grammar schools to introduce selec-tion by ability during either the generaladmissions or oversubscription phase.However, schools which have had a systemof partial selection by ability since thebeginning of the 1997/1998 school yearare allowed to maintain this practice aslong as the selection guidelines and theproportion of students selected remain thesame. No justification is provided for thisspecial dispensation.The DCSF estimates that there are some

40 schools which fall into this category,representing 1.25 per cent of all secondary


Mediating the ‘Loose’: Safeguards

83 See evidence provided to the

Children, Schools and Families

Committee on 30 January 2008.

84 School Admissions Code

2007, paragraph 1.3.

85 Interview, senior department

official

86 This section will not discuss

in any detail the issue of gram-

mar schools, as there is not suf-

ficient room in this report to do

the debate justice.


schools.87 Coupled with the 164 grammarschools, 6.15 per cent of all secondaryschools are selective by ability, albeit tovarying degrees. Additionally, secondaryschools with specialisms in physical educa-tion, the performing arts, the visual artsand languages88 may select up to 10 per centof their students based on demonstrated‘aptitude’.89 Academies may also select up to10 per cent of their students by aptitude,regardless of what subject area they specialisein.Existing empirical evidence on the effec-

tiveness of aptitude tests, particularly theirability to predict future achievement, is, how-ever, extremely thin. Despite the fact thatresearch suggests that tests of aptitude areonly useful insofar as they accurately predictlater achievement, the Department has nei-ther undertaken nor commissioned researchon this issue.90 More crucially, there is littleevidence to suggest that aptitude can beassessed independently of any reference toability. Given this paucity of data, it wasunsurprising that the Education and SkillsCommittee, in their report on SchoolAdmissions, recommended that a school’sability to admit students based on their per-formance on aptitude tests be withdrawn.91

To date, the government has favoured acombination of two arguments to defendtheir stance on selection by ability. Thefirst is that it ‘enhances educational oppor-tunity at a local level by enabling youngpeople with particular gifts and talents tohave direct access to high quality specialistprovision where oversubscription criteria

might otherwise have ruled them out’.92

This is a purely rhetorical argument, as noresearch has been produced to support thisstatement. The second is that only a smallproportion of schools actually use selectionby aptitude (since it is limited to particularsubjects for specialist schools), and that ofthe schools that select, some do so underthe special dispensation afforded to schoolsthat selected by ability/aptitude during the1997/1998 school year. The SpecialistSchools and Academies Trust (SSAT)reports that in total, only 6 per cent oftheir schools select by aptitude.Even so, as the Education and Skills

Committee noted: ‘All forms of selection atone set of schools have, as a matter of arith-metic, consequences for other schools.’93

Further, this practice is undoubtedly going toincrease alongside the push to expand thenumber of academies and specialist schools.In both declaring new forms of selection as‘unlawful’ and maintaining (indeed, expand-ing) selection in ‘special circumstances’, thegovernment’s policy on selection still appears,as chided by the Committee three years ago:‘ad hoc and without principle’.94

The government’s one concession to thestate of existing evidence was to acknowledgethat ‘where necessary’ the ‘incidental effect’ ofability testing can be screened out by ensur-ing that students selected by aptitude arespread across the whole ability range.95

Nonetheless, there remains no requirementwithin the current guidelines for schools thatpractise selection by aptitude to include suchmechanisms.


46

87 Email correspondence with

the DCSF.

88 Schools with a specialism in

design technology and ICT will

no longer be allowed to select

by aptitude from 2008. However,

schools that already select in

those subjects may continue to

do so.

89 Aptitude here is defined as ‘a

particular capacity to learn or

develop skills in that subject’.

School Admissions Code 2007,

paragraph 2.75.

90 M. Coffey and C. Wetton,

‘Aptitude Tests and Technology:

An investigation of aptitude and

its relationship with GCSE

scores’, Department for

Education and Employment

(1996).

91 House of Commons


‘Secondary Education: School

Admissions’, Fourth Report of

Session 2003–2004, Volume 1

(2004), p. 63.

92 ‘The Government’s Response

to the Education and Skills

Committee’s Report on

Secondary Education: School

Admissions’, November 2004, p.

19.

93 House of Commons





(2004), p. 4.

94 Ibid., p. 4.

95 ‘The Government’s Response

to the Education and Skills

Committee’s Report on

Secondary Education: School

Admissions’, November 2004,

p. 19.

Given the government’s objective of creating an admissions system that is more

transparent, straightforward and fair, we find it irregular that practices that are

not grounded in empirical evidence remain in use. We propose that:

1. The ‘special dispensation’ for schools that had partial selection mechanisms

(either by aptitude or ability) during the 1997/1998 school year be eliminated.

2. The practice of selection by aptitude at all state-funded schools, including

academies be stopped.


Oversubscription criteriaUnder current guidelines, any school thathas free places available is required toaccept all applicants unless, as in the caseof grammar schools and sixth-form col-leges, the applicants fail to meet the entryacademic requirements. Schools which areoversubscribed, however, are required tofollow a predetermined oversubscriptionprocess set by the admissions authority (i.e.the local authority or school governingbody).The current Code is not intended to

provide an exhaustive list for what does ordoes not constitute good practice,although paragraph 2.13 does include upto 13 common practices that have beenruled unlawful. Additionally, all schoolsare required to give priority to children incare, and to children with special educa-tional needs.96 Apart from that, schoolsmay choose from a variety of mechanismssuch as: presence of siblings in the school;distance between home and school, andease of access by public transport; catch-ment areas; banding; and random alloca-tion (lotteries).The DCSF does not cur-rently collect information on admissionauthorities’ oversubscription criteria – anoversight that needs to be remedied.A recent study97 found that oversub-

scription criteria often combine severalelements and weighting structures.Among the most significant criteria for allschools were siblings, catchment areas andproximity (the latter was generally used ifthe other criteria had failed to differenti-ate). Interestingly, only 15 per cent ofschools use faith-related criteria (e.g.church attendance), but for these schoolsit is a high priority. Under the currentCode, the use of faith-related criteria hasbeen maintained on the grounds of ethos.Given that voluntary aided faith schoolsreceive most of their funding from thestate, however, it is arguable that theyshould be obliged to take children of anyfamily which wants (for instance) a church

school education and are prepared fortheir child to participate fully in the reli-gious life of the school.

The use of faith-based criteria is not theonly mechanism to have raised concernsover gaming. There is evidence that someoversubscription mechanisms are fairerthan others. For instance, in a recent liter-ature review, CfBT found that admittingstudents by catchment areas in ‘denselypopulated urban areas where there tends tobe greater segregation and zoning of hous-ing … can reinforce postcode characteris-tics, and these in turn may limit the powerof education to offer pupils options andgive opportunities for social mobility.’98

On the flip side, random allocation by lot-tery and fair banding (the selection of anintake so that the spread of student abilityis representative of a larger population)have been advocated as fairer means ofachieving a balanced intake, albeit withcertain caveats.For instance, random allocation is only

fair when the sample size is large enough tobe representative of the local population.Similarly, fair banding can be achieved in anumber of ways, since the wider popula-tion may be the applicants to a particularschool, or the range of ability in a givenarea (local authority or national). ProfessorAnne West has argued, however, thatbanding should not be done on the basis ofapplicants to a particular school as thosethat apply to a given school may not berepresentative of the area.99 Researchershave found, for example, that in 2003, in



96 Under the Education Act

1996, schools are required to

admit a child with a statement of

special educational needs

regardless of whether they have

places.

97 J. Coldron et al., ‘Secondary

School Admissions’, Sheffield

Hallam University and National

Centre for Social Research,

Research Report DCSF-RR020

(2008).

98 CfBT, ‘Review of International

Literature on Admissions’ (2007).

99 House of Commons





(2004), paragraph 190, Q59.

“ In both declaring new forms of selection as ‘unlawful’ and

maintaining (indeed, expanding) selection in ‘special circum-

stances’, the government’s policy on selection still appears,

as chided by the Committee three years ago: ‘ad hoc and

without principle’”


the three local authorities in London wherearea-wide banding was still practised(Hackney, Greenwich and Lewisham), seg-regation was at half the level expectedwhen compared to local authorities of asimilar size and composition.100

Consequently, some, such as the IPPR,have advocated for a system of area-widebanding that applies to all schools, not justthose that are over-subscribed.Yet the decision as to which mechanism

to use is not always made on existing evi-dence alone. Political viability is also essen-tial. For instance, the use of lotteries mayalso drive children out of the state sector,which would be a perverse effect. InBrighton, the proposed introduction of alottery was extremely politically unpopularand this has put off other local authoritieswho were considering similar proposals. Itmay be the case that a shift to a pupil pre-mium funding system, discussed later inthis chapter, would help solve the segrega-tion problem without recourse to political-ly unpopular action. Schools with largenumbers of disadvantaged pupils wouldbecome richer as additional funds wouldbe attached to these pupils. This may leadthem to become more popular amongwealthier families – balancing segregationover time.

MonitoringThere is evidence that schools which aretheir own admission authorities, particu-larly voluntary aided schools, are morelikely to covertly select than communityschools whose admissions policy is set andrun by the local authority.101 The newCode, with its tighter requirements andgreater specificity, should go some waytowards addressing this issue. Yet the suc-cess of the Code will be dependent on ourability to monitor and enforce its use.There is reason to believe, however, that

the current mechanisms for monitoringcompliance could be strengthened. At pres-ent, Admissions Forums (set up by localauthorities as a platform for local stakehold-ers to discuss andmonitor the effectiveness ofadmissions procedures) have the ability topublish an annual report detailing the extentto which admission arrangements are operat-ing in a fair manner, serve the interests of vul-nerable children, have met parental prefer-ences, and affect social segregation. Thesereports are to be drawn upon by the SchoolsCommissioner in his two yearly nationalreview of fair access.The problem, however, is that while

Admissions Forums are encouraged to pro-


48

100 S. Gorard, C. Tough and J.

Fitz, Schools, Markets and

Choice Policies (London:

RoutledgeFalmer, 2003), cited in

S. Tough and R. Brooks, School

Admissions: Fair choice for par-

ents and pupils (London: IPPR,

2007).

101 See, for instance, Coldron et

al. (2008).

Given that some oversubscription

mechanisms may be better able to

achieve equitable intakes than oth-

ers, we propose that:

1. The Department begins collect-

ing information on admission

authorities’ oversubscription

criteria and the impact of each

mechanism upon the composi-

tion of a school’s student body.

Mechanisms which are found to

achieve more equitable intakes

should be promoted.

2. The issue of faith-based criteria

as an oversubscription mecha-

nism be reviewed. We suggest

that all voluntary aided faith

schools set aside a percentage

of places to students of other

faiths and no faith (the exact

percentage to be determined

during the review). Some volun-

tary aided faith schools already

do an exemplary job on this

matter, and it would be worth

studying their experiences in

greater detail to determine how

such a practice might be rolled

out on a larger scale.


duce these reports, they are not required todo so. The choice of having the reportsreviewed by the Schools Commissionerrather than the Office of the SchoolsAdjudicator also seems rather odd, giventhat the latter is responsible for determiningobjections to school admissions. There maywell be a case for strengthening the role ofthe Office of the Schools Adjudicator, byallowing it to take proactive action based onthe annual reports, rather than waiting tohave cases referred to it.

Permanent exclusions102

If school admission is one of the processesby which schools employ covert and overttactics to select their intake, then exclu-sions, some argue, is its counterpart. Theallegation here is that schools, under pres-sure to perform in academic league tables,have an incentive to exclude hard-to-teachpupils. These pupils in turn either get‘lost’ in the system, or concentrated inparticular schools, with negative conse-quences for teaching and learning. A

board member of a major education quan-go noted:

Typically what happens is a good schoolexcludes their problem children and theyall end up in these bad schools, and Idon’t think that any school, however good,can cope with more than a dozen chil-dren in a year group. If you’ve got morethan 25 or 30, you just can’t cope.

Indeed, the overall standard of discipline andbehaviour in schools, the daily grind of low-level classroom disruption, has come underincreasing fire from practitioners, parentsand the general public. As ever, the mediaremain quick to pick on new forms of disci-plinary problems like cyber-bullying andhappy-slapping. In response, ‘tough’ newpolicies have been announced by both mainparties. Earlier this year, Labour introduceda new policy that would allow teachers todiscipline students misbehaving outside theschool compound. The Conservative Party’srecent Green Paper ‘Raising the Bar, Closingthe Gap’ promised to restore authority topractitioners and set clear boundaries andsanctions.

Who should have the final say in theexclusion process?One of the more controversial proposalsput forth in the Conservative Party’sGreen Paper is the right of head teachersto exclude students, without recourse toan independent appeals panel; althoughstudents would still be able to lodge anappeal with the school’s governing body.(Currently, students can lodge an appealfirst to the school’s governing body, andthen to the Schools Adjudicators’ Panel.)The Conservatives argue that the processof permanently excluding a pupil isfraught with difficulty – that it is expen-sive, time-consuming and stressful – andfurther compounded by the fact that ‘onein four appeals is won by the appellantand half of these children return to their



102 Henceforth, the use of the

term ‘exclusions’ should be

understood to refer specifically

to permanent exclusions. We

recognise that fixed-term exclu-

sions can be a powerful tool in

the school’s behavioural policy,

and support the school’s right to

use this mechanism as neces-

sary.

Given the need to ensure compli-

ance with the Code, we propose

that:

1. The power of Admissions

Forums to publish an annual

report be made a duty. The

report should also be made

public to enable parents to

assess the extent to which

admissions arrangements in

their area are operating in a fair

manner.

2. The role of the Office of the

Schools Adjudicator be

reviewed to determine whether

it should be given stronger

powers over the process of

monitoring and enforcing com-

pliance with the Code.


original school’. Consequently, ‘potential-ly disruptive students know heads areincreasingly reluctant to use the sanctionof permanent exclusion and so feel freer tocause trouble.’We recognise that achieving good disci-

pline is central to turning around the per-formance of struggling schools, and it isimportant to ensure that discipline poli-cies remain credible in the eyes of pupils.However, removing the right of appeal toan independent panel is a sledgehammerresponse to a minor problem. While onein four appeals was decided in favour ofthe parent, only 12 per cent of all perma-nent exclusions had appeals lodgedagainst them. In 2005/2006, that meantthat only 240 of 9,170 cases were won bythe appellant, and of that number only130 students – 1.4 per cent of all perma-nent exclusions – were reinstated in theirold school.103 No data is collected on thenumber of exclusions that are overturnedby the school’s governing body.It is unfortunate that some of these suc-

cessful appellants included pupils who hadbeen excluded for serious offences; nonethe-less these are rare exceptions rather than therule. Furthermore, there is no evidence tosupport the Paper’s insinuation that ‘headsare increasingly reluctant to use the sanctionof permanent exclusion’ because of the like-lihood of having their exclusions overturned.Indeed, as the next section shall lay out inmore detail, it is just as likely that thedecrease in permanent exclusions (and rise infixed-term exclusions) may be due to con-cern over the poor quality of alternatives tomainstream education.While some of the head teachers we

interviewed acknowledged that they wouldnot appreciate having their judgementsoverturned, they defended the right ofappeal to an independent body on thegrounds of natural justice:

I wouldn’t be happy if my judgementwas overturned, but that should be the

system because every decision that pub-lic bodies make should be subject toappeal at some stage and I think thatexclusions should be part of that.104

I’m sure I wouldn’t want to have mydecision overturned either. But the factis, people make mistakes. There must bein a public service where you’re propos-ing to take away a fundamental right,and it’s enshrined in human rights theright to education, that when you’redealing with something so fundamentalthere must be process of appeal againstthat. 105

More crucially, interviewees expressed con-cern that removing the right of appeal toan independent panel runs the risk ofincreasing instances of ‘gaming’ within thesystem. One head teacher demanded:‘What about the unreasonable schools? Iknow schools where it’s very much “let’sget rid of these children because we’relooking at our results” whereas in myauthority we only exclude as a last, lastresult. And that’s fine if everyone plays thegame, except some people are really selfishin just thinking of themselves so that won’twork.’Evidence does suggest that schools with

complete autonomy over the exclusionprocess are more likely to exclude hard-to-teach pupils. As it is, DCSF statisticsreveal that pupils with statements of SENare over three times more likely to be per-manently excluded from school than therest of the school population.106 BlackCaribbean pupils are also 2.6 times morelikely to be excluded than their whitepeers, even after SEN and FSM are takeninto account. Further, ‘excluded Blackpupils are less likely to fit the typical pro-file of excluded White pupils (such ashaving longer and more numerous previ-ous exclusions, poor attendance records,criminal records or being looked afterchildren)’. 107


50

103 National Statistics,

‘Permanent and Fixed Period

Exclusions from Schools and

Exclusion Appeals in England,

2005/2006’; released 26 June

2007.

104 Interview, secondary school

head teacher.

105 Interview, primary school

head teacher.

106 National Statistics,

‘Permanent and Fixed Period

Exclusions from Schools and

Exclusion Appeals in England,

2005/2006’; released 26 June

2007.

107 Ofsted, Race equality in

education: Good practice in

schools and local education

authorities, HMI Report 2398

(2005); cited in DfES, ‘Exclusion

of Black Pupils: Priority Review’

(2006).


What happens after a student is excluded?Our research suggests that a central con-cern for head teachers is what happens tochildren that are excluded. At present,interviewees report that local authoritiesfavour having the children reintegratedinto mainstream education as soon as pos-sible. ‘Unfortunately, at the end of the dayit all comes down to the financial implica-tions,’ a local councillor reported. ‘So longas there is a tight financial settlement thebureaucracy are going to want to put thoseyoungsters back into another secondaryschool, because obviously that is the cheap-est way to educate those youngsters.’Educating a student at a PRU costs£17,000 a year – approximately threetimes as much as the average per-pupil costat a maintained school.From September 2007, all secondary

schools (including special schools, pupilreferral units, academies and city technolo-gy colleges) are expected to work in partner-ship to improve behaviour and attendance.With regard to exclusions, schools are toagree upon In-Year Fair Access Protocols toensure that every school accepts an equalshare of pupils with prior permanent exclu-sions or with a history of challenging behav-iour. This includes consideration of fundingarrangements (i.e. whether or not money istransferred from one school to another, and

how much is transferred) and admissionnumbers (e.g. whether to set aside schoolspaces for potential in-year transfers). Notethat under the fair access protocols, schoolshave a right to refuse acceptance to a stu-dent who has been permanently excludedtwice.Schools are also being encouraged to use

managed moves as an alternative to exclu-sion. The DCSF describes this as ‘a move toanother school to enable the pupil to havea fresh start in a new school’.108 This moverequires the agreement of the governors ofboth schools concerned, the local authorityand the parent/s of the child in question. Atpresent, however, the DCSF does not col-lect statistics on how widespread the prac-tice of managed moves is, and how manystudents have been affected.The Fair Access Protocols are a positive

step in the right direction. Yet their impactmay be curtailed by the tight cap on admis-sion numbers. Under the present system,schools that have spare places cannot turnaway applicants to their school. However, theschools that are the most likely to have placesleft over after the general admissions roundare those that are already struggling or work-ing in challenging circumstances. Forinstance, the head teacher of a school with ahigh mobility rate noted that her schoolreceived a higher proportion of students from



108 DCSF. 2007. ‘Improving

Behaviour and Attendance: guid-

ance on exclusion from schools

and pupil referral units’

We support the continued rights of head teachers to permanently exclude a stu-

dent, and students to appeal to an independent panel. We believe that such a sys-

tem provides the necessary checks and balances to minimise the occurrence of

unjust exclusions. The existing legislation can nonetheless be tightened to ensure

that:

1. Any student who has been permanently excluded should not be reinstated, lest

the authority of the head teacher and school governors be undermined.

2. If the exclusion is found to be unjust by the Schools’ Adjudicators Panel, it

should not go on the student’s record. Schools which have been found to have

unjustly excluded a student on more than one occasion must undertake a

comprehensive review of their discipline and behaviour policy, with the under-

standing that further infractions may result in disciplinary action.


the local Fair Access panel simply owing tothe fact that she had free spaces: ‘I worry thatplacements are being made without takinginto account our existing needs and pressuresand lack of resources.’Ironically enough, the schools that can

least afford an unbalanced intake may wellbe the ones who are the most likely to do so.The knock-on effect, as these head teacherslament, is dire:

You have the space, so you end up with atotally unbalanced intake which under-mines your resources, undermines theeducation of your other children, demor-alises your staff and leads to resignations.

One of the MPs in my area who wouldmeet with the heads on a regular basis …one success we had was when he broughtin special legislation to prevent [assigningstudents on the basis of free spaces alone]simply because this one school in my bor-ough was getting all the difficult kids justto fill it up and it was going down anddown and down.

Similarly, a number of head teachers fromhighly effective schools (defined here as

schools that are performing above the odds)expressed concern that their schools ran therisk of ‘becoming victims of [their] own suc-cess’. Owing to the fact that they hadgained a reputation for working with hard-to-teach students, they were being pressedto take more and more on, without consid-eration of the impact such an intake wouldhave on their ability to sustain their achieve-ments.Furthermore, while there are certainly

numerous examples of good practice beingdeveloped, interviewees noted that the lackof compulsion in the system means that dis-crepancies do occur. One head teacher toldus: ‘We have a system in the authority wherewe agree to swap kids around, but there aretwo schools in the authority who are not apart of it; these are schools at the top of theleague table. They select their kids at Year 7and then will not take anyone who is per-manently excluded from another school. Ikeep asking the LA, why won’t you enforceit? But they won’t. They don’t want to rockthe boat.’109 One local councillor argued,however, that it was not an unwillingness toenforce that was the problem but the factthat ‘we have no powers to insist that otherschools take [expelled students] on.’


52

109 Note that a similar concern

was raised about the willingness

of some local authorities to chal-

lenge the admissions policies of

some of their more successful

(but covertly selective) schools.

While we recognise that schools should be given the flexibility to negotiate

agreements that take into consideration local circumstances, we believe that

certain principles should be made non-negotiable:

1. All schools must participate in their local fair-access and managed-moves

scheme; and the local authority should be given a statutory duty to enforce it.

2. To ensure that every school accepts an equal share of permanently excluded

pupils, schools should be required either to set aside an agreed-upon num-

ber of places each year to accommodate in-year transfers, or to admit chil-

dren beyond their published admissions number. This decision should be

made during consultations with the Admissions Forum.

3. The school making the exclusion should be required to transfer the Age-

Weighted Pupil Unit attached to the new institution providing the pupil with

education. The amount of money transferred to the new institution should be

prorated. If, however, the school is found to have unjustly excluded a stu-

dent, the entire AWPU allowance should be transferred.


Pupil Referral Units (PRUs)Fair-access and managed-move schemesmay not benefit all pupils. In suchinstances, alternative provision is generallyprovided by PRUs, short-stay centres forpupils who, whether because of behaviour-al, health, social or emotional difficulties,cannot be educated at maintained or spe-cial schools. They are established and runby local authorities, although each PRUhas a management committee that is akinto a school’s governing body. Currently,there are 425 PRUs catering to approxi-mately 15,000 students in England.110 Thequality of provision across these PRUs isvery patchy: the latest Annual Report of HerMajesty’s Chief Inspector found that while52 per cent are good or outstanding, 14per cent, or every one in eight units, areinadequate.111

Evidence and anecdotal reports suggestthat PRUs struggle with numerous chal-lenges, most notably inadequate accom-modation, staffing and local authority sup-port. The recent Ofsted report found, forinstance, that at a significant proportion ofPRUs, lack of space and facilities has limit-ed the curriculum which can be taught on-site. Fulfilling their commitment to abroad and balanced curriculum, not tomention the requirement of 25 lessonhours per week, requires creative wranglingon the part of a PRU – and not all of themare able to do so.112

Staffing problems are also affecting thequality of teaching on offer. Thepupil–teacher ratio has failed to improvecommensurately with the national ratio,and there has been a five-fold increase inthe number of untrained support staff.113

The latter should be of particular concerngiven research suggesting that studentswith emotional and behavioural problemsthrive best in an environment where theyare not just supported by teachers, but bytrained social workers and counsellors.Compounding these problems are issues

of governance. Unlike head teachers, the

‘Teachers in Charge’ of PRUs have signifi-cantly less autonomy: budgets and staffingremain the responsibility of the localauthority. Despite this degree of control,there is reason to believe that not all localauthorities have effectively integratedPRUs in their strategic framework for theborough. Ofsted has found, for instance,that guidance on issues such as referringstudents to a PRU, or developing a reinte-gration plan for students, varies signifi-cantly in quality. Not all local authoritieshave a system for assessing, recording andtracking pupils’ progress as they move frommainstream provision to the PRU andback again, or even internal mechanismsfor evaluating PRU performance.Perhaps the most significant challenge

facing PRUs, however, is the fact that it isincreasingly used as a long-term alternativeto mainstream provision. Part of the blamecan be traced to inadequate reintegrationprocedures on the part of the local authori-ty (e.g. the specification of a time limit forthe placement). Part of the resistance comesfrom students themselves, who may be hes-itant to return to an environment wherethey had felt alienated. Consequently, manypupils stay on for years. Students who arenot reintegrated by the end of KS3inevitably spend the rest of their educationwithin a PRU. This lack of student move-ment means that many PRUs are full andunable to offer places to in-year excludedstudents and/or full-time provision.114

Tackling the roots of student disengage-ment is certainly part of the answer. Thenew studio schools that are being devel-oped by the Young Foundation offer onepossible alternative to mainstream educa-tion provision. While not specifically tar-geted at at-risk youth, the studio schoolsdo aim to address the challenge of disen-gagement through a ‘14–19’ curriculumwhich integrates learning, entrepreneur-ship and work. What makes the studioschool concept unique is that they are tofunction as commercially viable businesses:



110 http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/

portal/site/Internet/me

nuitem.1c8478149b4a6342502b

011069f034a0/?event=searchBy

ProviderType&maxResultPerPag

e=10&currentPage=1&sortOrder

=3&providerCategoryID=262144

111 Ofsted, The Annual Report

of Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector

2006–2007 (London: The

Stationery Office, 2007), p. 25.

112 Ofsted, Establishing

Successful Practice in Pupil

ReferralUunits and Local

Authorities (London: The

Stationery Office, 2007).

113 http://education.guardian.

co.uk/egweekly/story/0,,218108

1,00.html

114 Ofsted. 2007. Establishing

successful practice in pupil

referral units and local authori-

ties. London: The Stationery

Office, p. 15


The idea of a studio school hangs on thecentral feature of a series of operatingbusinesses run by the students them-selves. As small schools closely linked toparticular industries, participant num-bers would be capped at 300 14–19-year-olds per school. The schools willlook and feel like a cluster of businesses,and the young people will be as muchworkers as students. The staff wouldcomprise a mix of teachers and non-teachers with business expertise. Inaddition to working in and running thebusinesses, the students will participatein enterprise projects either consulting tolocal businesses or starting up their ownventures.115

Similarly, other charities and non-profitsare stepping forward to offer more choicesfor those dissatisfied with mainstream pro-vision. From the London Boxing Academyin Tottenham (whose curriculum inte-grates boxing and physical activity) to theLighthouse Group, a national charity withits own alternative education schools, thisdiversification of provision is to be wel-comed and encouraged.

School transportIn England, children between the ages offive and sixteen are automatically entitledto free school transport if they attend thenearest suitable school and the school isfurther away than the statutory walkingdistance.116 The extension of the choiceframework has meant, however, that moreand more parents are looking beyond theirneighbourhood school for education pro-vision. Yet for many low-income families,the lack of affordable home-to-schooltransport (either through the public trans-portation system, as in Hong Kong, or adedicated school bus service, as in


54

115 http://launchpad.young

foundation.org/node/120

116 Defined as two miles for

pupils up to the age of eight,

and three miles for pupils aged

eight to sixteen.

In the short term, we believe that

there are small changes which

would have an immediate impact

on performance:

1. PRUs should have the option of

taking over the management of

their budgets and staffing.

2. Additional funding should be

provided to address issues of

staffing and infrastructure

development. PRUs with inade-

quate accommodation should

be given priority when planning

redevelopment (e.g. through the

Building Schools for the Future

initiative).

3. We recognise that the process

of developing alternative pro-

grammes of teaching and learn-

ing can be time-consuming and

costly. To lower the costs of

such activity and encourage

greater diversification, we pro-

pose that a one-off grant be

offered to providers or charities

developing such programmes.

As with the AISI model in

Alberta (see ‘Helping Schools

Succeed: Learning from

Abroad’, Chapter 3), the organi-

sation in question must estab-

lish and follow a rigorous evalu-

ation process in order to assess

the effectiveness of said pro-

gramme. The results of each

pilot would be made public (e.g.

through a national database) to

develop our knowledge base of

what does or does not work.

In the long term, we anticipate that

our proposals regarding school

autonomy, supply-side reform and

‘pupil premium’ funding will further

encourage the development of

alternative programmes.


Edmonton, Alberta)117 can be a significantbarrier.Correspondingly, the Education and

Schools Inspection Bill 2006 included aguarantee of free home-to-school transport(to maintained schools and academiesonly) for children from low-income fami-lies.118 Specifically:

a) for children of primary age, transportwill only be provided to the nearestsuitable school, but for those in low-income families aged eight to eleven,local authorities must ensure that freetransport is provided for children livingmore than two miles from the school.

b) for children of secondary age, localauthoritiesmust ensure that those fromlow-income families have free transportto any one of the three nearest suitableschools, where the distance travelled isbetween two and six miles. Localauthorities must also ensure that trans-port is provided to the nearest schoolpreferred on the grounds of religion orbelief where this is between two and fif-teen miles away.

However, this provision remains limitedfor secondary school students who maywell have to travel more than six miles toany ‘one of the three nearest suitableschools’. This may be particularly true forstudents living in less urbanised areas, andfor those keen to enrol at a school with aparticular specialism (bearing in mind thefact that there are eleven different types ofspecialist schools available). Researchershave found that in the densest area,London, there are on average 17 secondaryschools within a ten-minute drive of them-selves. This falls to seven in non-Londonurban areas, and just over one in ruralareas.119 What is considered a reasonabledistance and journey length may thus dif-fer considerably from one geographicalarea to another, and should be reflected innational policy.

In 2005, the Sutton Trust, PolicyExchange and the Social Market Found-ation argued for the introduction of anational yellow bus scheme in ‘No MoreSchool Run’. Drawing on evidence fromthe United States of America and pilot tri-als in England, the report illustrated thatthe benefits of such a system – rangingfrom reduced atmospheric pollution andtime savings for parents, to reductions intruancy and crime among students –would far outweigh the costs.More recently, our interviews suggest

that there is support for a more concertedtransport system. A senior official of aneducation provider that uses a yellow busscheme noted that the system was‘absolutely invaluable because a lot of thoseyoungsters could not have come to theschool without the yellow bus. It’s alsohelped to create the ethos, because almostas soon as you get on to the bus, you’re apart of the school community … it justraises that profile of “school’s happeningnow, you need to be a part of it” and so on,so I think it may well have an impact if itwere done more universally because it hasa sense of purpose about it as well.’Research conducted in England also

suggests that there is support for the intro-duction of a yellow bus scheme. In a studyof local authorities which have pilotedsuch schemes, researchers found broadsupport among parents, students andschools. The attribute of the scheme whichwas most appreciated on the grounds ofsafety and convenience was the practice ofpicking up and dropping off students closeto their home and school.120

In July 2007, transport company FirstGroup established the Yellow School BusCommission under the Chairmanship ofDavid Blunkett. The Commission is con-sulting on the potential for expanding theyellow school bus scheme and was set up inresponse to research indicating that parentsare seeking a viable alternative for theschool run and that 86 per cent of parents



117 See ‘Helping Schools

Succeed: Lessons from Abroad’,

Chapters 4 and 3.

118 Defined here as those

whose children are eligible for

free school meals or who are in

receipt of the maximum level of

Working Tax Credit

119 S. Burgess, B. McConnell,

C. Propper and D. Wilson,

‘Sorting and Choice in English

Secondary Schools’, The

University of Bristol, CMPO

Working Paper Series No.

04/111.

120 S. Davies Gleeve,

‘Evaluation of First Yellow Bus

Pilot Schemes’ (London:

Department for Transport, 2003).


would be willing to send their children toschool on a dedicated school bus.121 As partof this process, researchers at theUniversity of Aberdeen have been commis-sioned to conduct the most comprehensivereview to date of existing schemes in localauthorities across England and Wales.122

FundingIn 2005, Policy Exchange advocated in‘More Good School Places’ the introduc-tion of a financial incentive for schools totake on hard-to-teach pupils: pupils withspecial educational needs, low prior attain-ment, disciplinary problems and so on.123

This idea of an ‘advantage premium’ wasadopted by the recent Conservative Party’sPublic Services Improvement Policy Groupreport and has since been endorsed by theshadow education team. A similar propos-al, dubbed the ‘pupil premium’ and devel-oped by the CentreForum think tank, wasalso unveiled at the Liberal Democrats2007 Conference.This increased support for a system of

differentiated funding at the nationallevel is undoubtedly a reflection of grass-roots demand. At present, a portion ofthe money allocated to schools is basedon the school’s ‘additional educationalneeds’ (AEN), which is in turn deter-mined using proxy measures such as free

school meals, ethnicity, post codes andnational test data. However, this fundingis not ring-fenced at the level of the localauthority, a designation that creates inef-ficiencies and dilutes the final sum givento schools.124

Given this status quo, it is perhapsunsurprising that our interviewees wereunanimous in their agreement that areform of the existing funding systemwould be necessary if our system is to meetits commitment of providing every childwith fair and equal access to a good educa-tion:

I think it’s a very logical approach thatif schools are facing multiple disadvan-tages in terms of their socio-economiccircumstances, then I think it is logicalto resource those schools to meet thosechallenges. That’s done in a very piece-meal manner at the moment throughvarious department policy initiatives.It’s not done in a strategic way.

- Board member, stakeholderorganisation

A great deal of money, I think, has beenput into supporting disadvantagedpupils in a range of ways [but] it couldbe easier for funding to follow the stu-dent – that’s maybe one mechanism forensuring that all young people haveaccess to excellence. I mean, obviouslythere is an issue about creating organi-sational instability, but there are prob-ably ways in which that can be man-aged.- Board member, education provider

There was slightly less agreement on howmoney should be allocated and who exactlyconstituted a ‘disadvantaged’ pupil. Someinterviewees advocated a system of ‘fundingaccording to prior attainment’, while othersbelieved that there was a need to increasethe funding attached to pupils with a histo-ry of disciplinary problems: ‘You’re probably


56

121 http://www.firstgroup.com

/newsdetail.php?id=000068

122 For more information, con-

tact Professor John Nelson,

Professor of Transport Studies.

123 O’Shaugnessy and Leslie

(2005)

124 See, for example, A. West,

‘Redistribution and Financing

Schools in England under

Labour’, Educational

Management, Administration and

Leadership (forthcoming).

While some of the circumstances

surrounding the publication of ‘No

More School Run’ have changed,

we believe that the central tenets

of a national yellow bus system

that is both free to low-income

families and accessible to those

who are willing to pay for it are still

sound. We thus welcome the

establishment of the Yellow School

Bus Commission and anticipate

the forthcoming release of their

research report.


going to need some kind of voucher systemto pay schools £5,000 more just to take onthese children.’It is clear that there is growing consensus

across the political spectrum that the way inwhich schools are funded needs to be over-hauled. The key issue now is hammering outhow such a policy would work in practice.



Policy Exchange is currently work-

ing on a national funding formula

based on the principle of per-pupil

differentiated funding. The

research is anticipated to be pub-

lished by the end of 2008.


5Second ‘Tight’:Accountability

The past few decades of education reformhave seen the transformation of theaccountability framework from one basedon regulatory compliance and professionalnorms alone to one driven by results. Thisunrelenting emphasis has has led to wide-spread acceptance of the need for educatorsto be accountable to the public for studentlearning. Controversy continues to rage,however, over the means by which suchaccountability is achieved, with criticsarguing that existing measures are clumsy,overbearing and counterproductive. In oneof the more eloquent critiques of the sys-tem, noted philosopher Onora O’Neilargued:125

If [the revolution in accountability] isworking, we might expect to see indica-tions that public trust is reviving. Butwe don’t. In the very years in which theaccountability revolution has madestriking advances, in which increaseddemands for control and performance,scrutiny and audit have been imposed,and in which the performance of profes-sionals and institutions has been moreand more controlled, we find in factgrowing reports of mistrust.

In this chapter we will explore the twomajor mechanisms for public accountabil-ity within the present framework: achieve-ment and performance tables, and Ofsted.We argue that the existing measures are notfit for purpose, principally because they failthe litmus test of any public accountability

system: they are not sufficiently user-friendly for those who need it most– theparents. The existing measures have alsocreated perverse incentives which haveskewed the way schools and teachersrespond to the practice of teaching andlearning.Getting the accountability framework

right will be particularly important in themodel of increased autonomy that wehave proposed, if we are to avoid theproblems of patchy delivery that plaguedEngland in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreimportantly, if schools and teachers are toact confidently upon their expanded free-doms, they will need clear guidelines onhow their performance will be judged,and the assurance that any evaluation willbe consistent with the system’s overarch-ing goals.

College achievement andperformance tablesLeague tables, or as they are officiallytermed, ‘College achievement and per-formance tables’, were first introduced in1992 by the Conservative administrationunder John Major. While schools hadbeen publishing their results since the1980s, there had been no official compi-lation of results before then. Initiallyrestricted to secondary school examina-tion results, this publishing policy wasquickly expanded to include the report-ing of all key-stage test results. Thesetables were intended to end the ‘secret

58

125 A Question of Trust, Reith

Lectures, 2002; available at:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reit

h2002/ lectures.shtml


garden’ of education and to enable par-ents to make comparisons across schools(a necessary component of the govern-ment’s choice strategy).To this day, the use (and misuse) of

league tables remains highly controver-sial. Some of the critiques of the systemhave an ideological element, assertingthat the publication of performance sta-tistics in a ranked order creates a hierar-chy of winners and losers that pits schoolsagainst each other.126 Others argue thatthe specific performance statistics in useare not accurate measures of school effec-tiveness, making it very difficult (if notimpossible) to help parents distinguishbetween effective and ineffective schools.The use of 5 A*–C GCSE grades, forinstance, is frequently criticised on thegrounds that unadjusted ‘raw scores’reflect the prior attainment and familybackground of the student rather thanthe quality of teaching provided by theschool.127

The most serious critique of the exist-ing league-table system is based onGoodhart’s Law of Economics. This statesthat ‘when a measure becomes a target, itceases to be a good measure’ owing to dis-tortion within the system as attention isfocused towards what is measured. Whatis unmeasured gets neglected. Goodhart’sLaw becomes even more acute when oneor two performance indicators are used inisolation to construct simple leaguetables.128 (It is also worth noting thatwhen the Task Group on Assessment andTesting (TGAT) first published their rec-ommendations on a national curriculumassessment framework for England, theyexplicitly cautioned against the reportingof test scores alone, without any contex-tual information being provided aboutthe school composition and environ-ment.)In England, the government’s depend-

ence on national assessment scores as anaccountability mechanism has created

perverse incentives for schools who seekto do well in the league tables in order toavoid the stigma of failure and the veryreal threat of closure. In addition tocream-skimming practices, researchersfound that some schools have respondedto the pressure of league tables by adopt-ing ‘educational triage’ – strategies where-in resources are ‘rationed’ to borderlineC/D students (those who are most likelyto improve the school’s overall ‘score’) atthe expense of the development of ‘safe’and ‘hopeless’ students. Schools alsoreport a higher degree of test coaching,and a narrowing of the curriculum tofocus on areas that are tested by the SATsand GCSEs.129

In response to these critiques, Wales andScotland decided to stop publishing leaguetables altogether. England, on the otherhand, opted to create more sophisticated(and complex) indicators; hence the intro-duction of the value-added measure in2002 and the contextual value-addedmeasure in 2006. The former took intoaccount prior student attainment and wasa more accurate measure of school effec-tiveness than the raw-score performancestatistic. CVA was a further refinement ofthe value-added measure concept, adjust-ing student achievement scores to take intoaccount a wide range of individual factorsthat affect pupil performance.130 However,neither the CVA nor raw-score leaguetables address the dilemmas raised byGoodhart’s Law, as school performancecontinues to be based on a very narrowmeasure of educational excellence: aca-demic performance in national assess-ments.Proponents of the concept of CVA

(many of whom are practitioners) arguethat it is a fairer means of assessing schoolperformance. A recent working paper bythe Centre for Market and PublicOrganisation found, for instance, thatCVA does provide a more accurate meas-ure of school performance, although the


Second ‘Tight’: Accountability

126 To be fair, it is the newspa-

pers that publish the statistics in

rank-order format, and that often

leave out important qualifying

information such as confidence

intervals. However, the govern-

ment has not required the

broadsheets to follow publishing

guidelines. Both the

Conservative and New Labour

administrations have also

encouraged parents to use the

performance tables as measures

of school quality when selecting

schools.

127 See, for example, S. Gorard,

and E. Smith, ‘What is

‘Underachievement’ at School?’,

School Leadership and

Management 24: 2 (2004),

pp. 205–25.

128 L. Elton, ‘Goodhart’s Law

and Performance Indicators in

Higher Education’, presented at

the Conference on Evidence-

Based Policies and Indicator

Systens, 9–11 July 2003.

129 See, for example, D.

Gillborn and D. Youdell,

Rationing Education: Policy,

practice, reform and equity

(Buckinghamshire: Open

University Press, 2000); and D.

Wilson, B. Croxson and A.

Atkinson, ‘What Gets Measured

Gets Done: Headteachers’

responses to the English sec-

ondary school performance

management system’, Policy

Studies 27:2 (2006), pp. 153–71.

130 Specifically, the measure

takes into account prior attain-

ment, gender, ethnicity, age in

year, SEN status, free school

meals status, first language,

whether or not the pupil has

been in care, social mobility, and

the Income Deprivation Affecting

Children Index (IDACI).


practice of ranking schools (based onCVA) is spurious since approximatelyhalf of English secondary schools areindistinguishable from the national aver-age.131 Others within the educational andpolitical establishment have resisted theuse of CVA tables on the grounds that itjustifies underachievement in the mostdisadvantaged communities, ‘strips theaspiration out of education’ and ‘givesschools no incentive to help children getpast the disadvantages they may beginwith’.132

To appease both camps, the govern-ment currently publishes league tablesdetailing five good GCSE grades (i.e.A*–C); five good GCSE grades includingEnglish and Maths; five good GCSEgrades including English, Maths andScience; and CVA performance. As aschool’s standing can change significantlydepending on which league table is used,it is unsurprising that organisations work-ing with parents report confusion:

In terms of how a school is performing,then I think parents are interestedfrom a consumer point of view in howa school compares with other schools.And they are interested in leaguetables, but the problem with leaguetables is that they don’t offer parentsthe information that they want.Theyare very complex. Governmentattempts to make them more accuratehas produced more complexity.

- Board member, stakeholderorganisation

Crucially, our research suggests that thisconfusion is particularly acute amongparents who lack the resources and cul-tural capital to make use of this informa-tion – the very group who were intendedto be served by the publishing of leaguetables. A senior government advisor evenexpressed the fear that ‘the system ofaccountability has widened that divide,not narrowed it’ and that these parentsare ‘victims of the system’.Adding to the public’s confusion is the

manner in which the raw and CVA scoresare reported in the broadsheets. None ofthe major broadsheets (e.g. The Times,Telegraph, Guardian and Independent)publishes information on confidenceintervals in their performance tables. Yetsuch information is vital to take intoaccount means based on relatively smallsample sizes (particularly true for primaryschools).133 Part of the problem also stemsfrom the competing CVA models usedwithin the education establishment. Forinstance, the SSAT (Specialist Schoolsand Academies Trust) have been champi-oning David Jesson’s CVA model on thegrounds that ‘If you’re going to be using avalue-added approach, it’s got to be sosimple and clear that schools can calcu-late their own value-added.’We disagree with the argument that an

accountability measure only has value if theaverage school or layperson can replicate itscalculation. Nonetheless, in our conversa-tions with practitioners and stakeholder rep-resentatives, we were struck by the contrast-ing ways in which interviewees interpretedCVA data. This does suggest that evenamong educational experts there is a struggleto apply the information in a constructivemanner. We also note that publishing rawscores alongside CVA undermines the gov-ernment’s efforts to reduce perverse incen-tives within the system. Researchers havefound that head teachers expect that rawscores will still be the ‘headline’ figure, andremain focused on that indicator.134


60

131 D. Wilson and A. Piebalga,

‘Accurate Performance Measure

But Meaningless Ranking

Exercise? An analysis of the

English school league tables’

CMPO, University of Bristol

(2007).

132 Interview, education

provider.

133 See, for example, D.

Jesson, ‘The Use and Misuse of

CVA’ in Research Intelligence,

Volume 100. (London: British

Educational Research

Association, 2007).

134 Wilson et al. (2006).

“ As a school’s standing can change significantly

depending on which league table is used, it is

unsurprising that organisations working with parents report

confusion”


What might an alternate system ofreporting look like?In our companion report, we looked atthe reporting and accountability frame-works of five different education systems.We were particularly struck by the prin-ciples behind the frameworks in Alberta(see page 62) and Ontario, notably: i)

their emphasis on progress over timerather than performance in any singleyear; and ii) the use of performance indi-cators beyond academic results in nation-al assessment tests.The practice of measuring performance

over time enables the identification oftrends: whether or not the school isimproving, declining or coasting. Doing sonot only enables the government to devel-op targeted interventions, such as inOntario, to support the particular needs ofeach category of schools, but it alsoemphasises the objective of constantimprovement. Schools are expected tocompete not only with other schools butwith their own personal best. Furthermore,measuring performance over time reducesthe chances of a school’s report beingskewed by one-off changes such as a partic-ularly hard-to-teach cohort, or temporarydisruptions in the supply of teachers.135



135 This is particularly true for

primary schools. Owing to their

small size, their performance in

the current league tables can be

significantly affected by changes

in the cohort (since frequently

the league tables measure the

performance of a single class).

New York City’s Accountability Framework

Schools are graded from A to F, and the grades are based on three areas, each with a different weight-ing, and a fourth ‘bonus’ component:

School Environment (15% of final grade): evaluates attendance, safety, academic expectations, engage-ment with parents and students, and communication. Information derived from parent, student andteacher surveys

Student Performance (30% of final grade): evaluates student skill levels in English and Maths based onthe NY State test in elementary and middle school. At the high school level, it measures diplomasand graduation rates

Student Progress (55% of final grade): measures average student improvement in English and Mathsfrom the previous year to this year

Closing the Achievement Gap (additional credit): gives schools extra credit for exemplary gains amonghigh-need students such as special education students, and students in the lowest third city-wide

The evaluation of each measure depends on how the school does relative to the range of performanceof all schools in the city (one-third of final score), and to peer schools (two-thirds of final score).Schools that get As and Bs are eligible for monetary rewards, and may be chosen to serve as demon-stration sites for their peers. Schools with low grades face intervention, including leadership changeor closure.

Given the continued weakness of

the existing system, we propose

that the publishing of league

tables be abolished. We propose

instead that an alternative form of

reporting, which takes into

account broader measures

beyond examination results, and

that measures progress over time

rather than as a snapshot, be

introduced.



62

136 The year 2007 is the first

year that schools and boards

were evaluated on all 16 meas-

ures. Previously, there was not

enough data on measures such

as preparation for work and citi-

zenship to produce the three-

year jurisdiction average needed

for the improvement evaluation.

In September 2004, Alberta Education introduced a new accountability framework for assessing theprogress of schools and school boards in achieving their educational goals.136

The Pillar tracks progress over 16 different measures, of which only four are directly related toachievement in national assessment tests:

� Safe and caring schools: percentage of teacher, parent and student agreement that students aresafe at school, are learning the importance of caring for others, are learning respect for other andare treated fairly at school

� Annual drop-out rates

� Annual high-school completion rates

� Programme of studies: percentage of teachers, parents and students satisfied with the opportu-nity for students to receive a broad programme of studies, including fine arts, career, technolo-gy, and health and physical education

� Overall quality of education: percentage of teachers, parents and students satisfied with the over-all quality of basic education

� Percentage of students achieving an acceptable standard in the Provincial Achievement Tests:

for schools with students in kindergarten up to Grade 9� Percentage of students achieving an excellent standard in the Provincial Achievement Tests: for

schools with students in kindergarten up to Grade 9� Percentage of students achieving an acceptable standard in the Diploma Exams: for schools

with students from Grades 10 to 12� Percentage of students achieving an excellent standard in the Diploma Exams: for schools with

students from Grades 10 to 12� Percentage of students eligible for the Rutherford scholarship: a monetary award for excellent

academic achievement at the high-school level� Percentage of students participating in the Diploma Examinations

� Annual high school to post-secondary transition rate

� Work Preparation: percentage of teachers and parents who agree that students are taught the atti-tudes and behaviours that will make them successful at work when they finish school.

� Citizenship: percentage of teachers, parents and students who are satisfied that students modelthe characteristics of active citizenship

� Parental Involvement: percentage of teachers and parents satisfied with parental involvement indecisions about their child’s education

� School Improvement: percentage of teachers and parents indicating that their school and schoolsin their jurisdiction have improved or stayed the same in the last three years

Each measure within the Pillar is evaluated on three bases: against the fixed provincial standard (theachievement measure); against the jurisdiction’s prior three-year average result for each measure (theimprovement measure); and an overall evaluation which combines the first two. Results are thencolour coded on three different scales to highlight performance according to percentile; changes inperformance and whether or not the jurisdiction’s performance is on target or a cause for concern.For more information on Alberta’s Accountability Pillar, and other supporting policies, see

‘Helping Schools Succeed: Lessons from Abroad’, Chapter 3.


In terms of the set of indicators used toassess school performance, the educationestablishment seems to be particularlysusceptible to the McNamara Fallacy:137

we value what we can measure, and disre-gard that which we can’t. Alberta hasattempted to avoid this by using parent,teacher and student surveys to assess ele-ments such as the degree to which theeducation provided prepares students forwork and citizenship, and whether or notschools are teaching students respect forothers. The framework’s heavy reliance onsurveys does present methodological limi-tations, as evidence suggests that opinionsdo not always correlate with actualbehaviour. Nonetheless, Alberta’s attemptto grapple with these ‘softer’, less tangibleoutcomes does succeed in affirming thegovernment’s and profession’s commit-ment to a broad vision of education.Recent developments in New York

City’s Public Schools, specifically the intro-duction of an annual report card, also offergood reporting principles. These ProgressReports (see page 61) measure studentyear-to-year progress; compare the schoolto ‘peer’ schools (i.e. schools with compa-rable student compositions and priorattainment) and the range of all schools inthe city; and provide ‘extra credit’ toschools that improve the performance ofchildren with the greatest needs.We recognise that the relative newness of

the New York Progress Reports should because for caution, as it will doubtless takesome time to gauge the full impact of thissystem upon schools and teachers.Nonetheless, from an English perspective,the Progress Reports are fascinating in theway they incorporate both raw and value-added data, with a stronger weighting placedon the latter. Moreover, additional weight isplaced on student progress for the lowestthird of the student cohort city-wide –arguably the hardest cohort to move. Indoing so, it gives teeth to the state’s commit-

ment to closing attainment gaps betweenstudents. Similarly, while the report carddoes compare school performance againstthe city average, more weight is given to howa school does in relation to peer schools withcomparable student intakes.

As in England, however, considerableconcern has been raised (and rightly so)over the fact that 85 per cent of the gradedepends on standardised test scores. Thisyear’s Progress Reports have already pro-duced some upsets in the system, withsome schools with outstanding reputationsgetting grades as low as F. This change maycertainly reflect the Report’s weighting ofstudent progress and school performancerelative to peer schools. However, there isalso probably some truth to the argumentthat schools with excellent pastoral care orcurricular innovation (beyond English andMaths) are being short-changed.We recognise that the practice of meas-

urement can incur costs, from theresources invested in developing new soft-ware, to the staff time spent on data col-lection. As it is, however, many of theindicators that we have suggested arealready collected in some form or another(e.g. through the school self-evaluationforms and the Pupil Level Annual SchoolCensus database). In that sense, we wouldnot be developing a system from scratchbut building upon and bringing togetherexisting networks of information. Giventhe weaknesses of the present league-tablesystem, we believe that a new frameworkis an investment worth making.



137 ‘The first step is to measure

what can easily be measured.

This is OK as far as it goes. The

second step is to disregard that

which can’t easily be measured

or give it an arbitrary quantitative

value. This is artificial and mis-

leading. The third step is to pre-

sume that which can’t be meas-

ured easily really isn’t important.

This is blindness. The fourth

step is to say that what can’t be

easily measured really does not

exist. This is suicide.’ Taken from

C. Handy. The empty raincoat:

Making sense of the future. (New

York: Random House Business

Books, 1995).

“ The practice of measuring performance over time

enables the identification of trends. Doing so not only

enables the government to develop targeted

interventions but also emphasises the objective of

constant improvement.”


Quality monitoring mechanismsSince its inception in 1992 as the Officefor Standards in Education, Ofsted’s origi-nal remit as a school inspection agency hasbeen steadily expanded to include the reg-ulation of day care (in 2001)138 and, morerecently, all childcare, children’s social careand provision for learners of all ages (April

2007).139 This expansion is aimed at ensur-ing more comprehensive and strategicreviews of education and care acrossEngland.In 2004, Ofsted and the DfES set out

their vision for a new relationshipbetween the government and schools.This new relationship was intended to


64

138 In September 2001, the

Care Standards Act 2000 trans-

ferred responsibility for regulat-

ing day care from local authori-

ties to Ofsted.

139 Under the Education and

Inspection Act 2006, the new

Ofsted is a merger of four previ-

ously separate inspectorates:

the Adult Learning Inspectorate,

the Commission for Social Care

Inspection, Her Majesty’s

Inspectorate of Court

Administration and the previous

Ofsted (Office for Standards in

Education).

Building on our previous research in Alberta and Ontario, as well as develop-

ments in New York City, we propose that a new accountability and reporting

system, such as a report card, be developed. This report card is to be devel-

oped in consultation with stakeholders and should include the following princi-

ples:

1. It should use a broad range of indicators to assess school quality. We sug-

gest that the potential set of indicators might include:

i) average student progress between key stages. If the New York system of

giving extra credit for the improvement of the weakest cohort is found to

be effective, it would be worth considering a similar weighting mecha-

nism in England

ii) student performance in baseline literacy and numeracy assessments (for

secondary schools)

iii) parental, Teacher and Student Satisfaction Surveys on the:

a) overall quality of education

b) range of programme of studies on offer (for secondary schools)

c) extent to which students are being prepared for success in working

life

d) extent to which students are enabled to be active citizens

e) extent to which schools provide students with a safe and healthy

environment

f) extent to which schools engage parents and students in decisions

regarding each child’s education.

iv) teacher turnover rates (although a baseline would first need to be estab-

lished, as no turnover at all could be unhealthy for the school)

v) student absences (unadjusted for authorised absences)

vi) annual drop-out rates at 16 (for secondary schools).

2. School performance should be measured over time (e.g. three years, as in

Alberta and Ontario) to enable the identification of trends, as well as to

encourage schools to constantly raise the bar on their own performance.

3. School performance should be compared to schools with similar student

intakes and prior attainment. If comparison to the national average is

included, a weighting system such as that employed in New York’s account-

ability system should be considered.

4. The results from the set of indicators should be summed up and reported in

a clear, unambiguous manner (e.g. A–F grade, or a traffic-light system).


deliver ‘an intelligent accountabilityframework, a simplified school improve-ment process and improved data andinformation systems’.140 As part of thisreform, Ofsted introduced a light touch(i.e. Section 5) inspection framework.The main elements of its new frameworkinclude: smaller inspection teams; shorterinspection periods and cycles; increasedemphasis on schools’ self-evaluationforms to inform inspection; shorter noticeof inspection; and ‘shorter, sharper’reports. Elements of the ECM Agendahave been incorporated into the evalua-tion criteria, and schools are assigned oneof four grades: outstanding, good, satis-factory and inadequate.These changes were designed to reduce

the burden of lengthy, labour-intensiveinspections on schools and teachers.However, it is improbable that financialconsiderations played no role at all, sincethe pared-down model was developedagainst a backdrop of budget contractions.In 2003–4, the combined budget of thefour inspectorates making up the newOfsted was £266 million. Targets set by theTreasury require a reduction in cost to£186 million by 2008–2009, and Ofsted’scost – despite the cutbacks – remains anissue of contention within the educationestablishment.Whatever the rationale, Ofsted intro-

duced further measures to reduce theintensity and frequency of inspections forschools. Mid 2007, they introduced areduced tariff inspections (RTI) frame-work wherein 30 per cent of schools areallowed to undergo a reduced inspectionconducted in one day and by one inspec-tor. Schools are selected based on perform-ance data, the results of the school’s self-evaluation form and their grade in a priorOfsted inspection. More recently, Ofstedannounced that it is considering introduc-ing no-notice inspections, although no fur-ther details have been provided.In April 2007, NFER (the National

Foundation for Education Research)released the first independent evaluation ofthe new Section 5 inspection process. Theresults suggest that the majority of schoolsare satisfied with the new inspectionframework. Similarly, a recent policy paperby the Association of School and CollegeLeaders found that there is a high degree ofsatisfaction among head teachers, although‘there is a significant minority of ASCLmembers who either have complained toOfsted or feel dissatisfied but do not put ina formal complaint.’141

Our research suggests, however, that thenew inspection model is weakened by itsover-reliance on pre-obtained data. Aprominent head teacher told us: ‘Theylook at previous inspections that say good,so they go in knowing that it’s either goingto be good [or] outstanding, and theyspend half a day looking at statistics, andthey make the circles fit.’ Another intervie-wee, an executive head teacher, pressed thispoint: ‘Now you get two days and you gettwo people and they basically look at thedata of the school and then judge theschool on that, and what happens is, whatthey see in the school doesn’t really matter.’This concern – that data is sometimes usedas a substitute for inspectors’ judgements –was also flagged in both the ASCL andNFER studies.Interestingly enough, in the NFER

study, schools identified the main benefitof the new inspection framework as pro-viding external confirmation of schools’own self-evaluation, rather than as havingidentified new improvement areas.142

Indeed, Ofsted argues that the consisten-cy in the grades awarded by schoolsthemselves and inspectors confirms thevalidity of the new inspection process.Yet this is circular logic: given that schoolinspectors rely heavily on schools’ self-evaluation forms to provide the evidenceand focus of their inspections, it is unsur-prising that there is a high degree of cor-relation.



140 DfES, Ofsted, ‘A New

Relationship with Schools’

(2004); available at:

http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/assets/

3666.pdf, p. 1.

141 ASCL, ‘Next Steps: The

future of inspection of schools

and colleges’ (December 2007);

available at: http://www.ascl.

org.uk/mainwebsite/resources/d

ocument/pp45%20inspection

%20of%20schools%20and%20

colleges.pdf

142 T, McCrone, P. Rudd, S.

Blenkinsop and P. Wade.

“Impact of Section 5

Inspections: maintained schools

in England”. (Slough: NFER:

2007).


Additional concerns were raised over theloss of focus on classroom teaching withinthe new inspection framework. While pre-viously, all full-time teachers were observedby inspectors, the short two-day nature ofthe new framework means that a muchsmaller number of lessons (and even partsof lessons) are observed. As one policy-maker explained:

The problem now is that you’ve got areduced inspection framework wherepeople go into school for two days, theysee fractions of lessons. I don’t think thatgives you a good basis, and if you’ve onlyseen a fraction of a lesson, it’s muchharder for you to judge that lesson [as]unsatisfactory; it’s easier to say it’s satis-factory.

Given that teaching quality is the most sig-nificant school-level factor in studentlearning, it seems strange that an inspec-tion intended to assess education qualitydevotes so little attention to what goes onin the classroom.The reduced tariff inspections came

under particular fire from respondents.Despite the smaller inspection period andworkforce, the indicators and processremains the same, suggesting that inspec-tors will either be cramming in the sameamount of work in less time, or skimmingthrough parts of the inspection. Neitherwas seen as an acceptable option. ASCLreports that where RTI occurred, the exer-cise was too short for ‘inspectors to formsecure judgments on the basis of their ownobservations in the school’ and did not

give schools ‘a fair chance to demonstratethe quality of its work’.

What role should Ofsted play?Our research suggests that there is a needto rethink what purpose school inspectionsplay in the larger accountability frame-work. Undoubtedly, school inspections can– as our research in New Zealand demon-strated – provide a powerful wake-up callto complacent schools. This has certainlybeen true in England, where Ofsted hasbeen a pivotal player in the accountabilitymovement. While we can debate the extentto which its influence on schools has beenpositive, there is no denying that whatOfsted inspects, schools scurry to do.As the above section illustrated, howev-

er, the light-touch model functions moreas an audit given its reliance on pre-obtained data rather than on real-timeobservations of what goes on withinschools and classrooms. Even as a qualitymonitoring mechanism, however, con-cerns over the inspection process renderthe final product somewhat suspect, par-ticularly for weak schools that by theirvery definition require far more input andsupport than is currently provided.Furthermore, interviewees expressed

concern over the relationship betweenOfsted and the process of school improve-ment. Recent statements produced byOfsted and the Chief Inspector ofSchools, Christine Gilbert, emphasise thatOfsted’s role is to provide external scruti-ny rather than support and challenge, thelatter being seen as the role of the schoolimprovement partner (SIP).143 Hired bythe local authority, SIPs are intended toserve as the main (though not only)avenue for communication between thelocal authority and school on schoolingimprovement issues.The first SIP pilots were rolled out in

2004, and roll-out for secondary schoolswas completed in 2007, with all primaryschools being covered by the end of 2008.


66

143 See, for example, the oral

evidence provided to the

Education and Skills Committee

on 13 December 2006,

Questions 20–24.

“While previously, all full-time teachers were observed

by inspectors, the short two-day nature of the new frame-

work means that a much smaller number of lessons (and

even parts of lessons) are observed.”


An initial review of the pilot sites was notreleased to the public, although the firstindependent evaluation of the SIP pro-gramme is expected to be published in2008. Anecdotal evidence gleaned overthe course of our research suggests, howev-er, that the quality of SIPs (and thus theexperience of schools) varies widely.Ofsted asserts that this division between

the inspection process and support post-inspection is necessary to distance inspec-tion from judging what it might have hada hand in contributing to. Our interviewswith practitioners and stakeholder repre-sentatives suggest, however, that signifi-cant concern remains over this split. Thiswas true even among those who werebroadly positive about the direction of thenew framework. An executive member ofa stakeholder organisation argued:

Ordinary inspection teams, when theywalk into a school and say very harshand critical things about the way thatschool is presenting itself at thatmoment in time and yet offer no solu-tions … I’m not sure many companieswould pay for that. Yet schools areforced to pay for it and it is a hugelyexpensive process which takes money outof the overall education budget anddoesn’t offer enough value to schools andgoverning bodies at the moment.

Crucially, interviewees agreed that the‘best’ inspectors are those that still providethe support-and-challenge function centralto school improvement: ‘The best inspec-tors already do that, don’t they? They opena dialogue with you.’144

We believe that many of the elementscurrently reviewed in the light-touchmodel can be assessed in a less time-con-suming and costly manner through theannual report cards proposed earlier. Thenew report cards would also cover a broad-er range of indicators, thereby addressingthe fundamental weakness of the existing

accountability system – its reliance on nar-row measures of success. It would thereforebe possible to abolish the practice of rou-tine school inspections as the English sys-tem’s baseline quality monitoring mecha-nism.In its place, school inspections should

only be carried out: i) on schools that per-form poorly in the annual report cards;and ii) in response to parental complaints,as per the current practice. These inspec-tions should focus on classroom teaching,and be grounded in the school improve-ment process. Such a shift may result in anincreased inspection period and/or requirethe hiring of more experienced schoolinspectors who can provide credible schoolimprovement advice. We believe, however,that the value gained from this focusedform of inspection is worth the cost, andwould be covered by the savings gainedfrom cancelling the regular cycle of schoolinspections.Additionally, we propose that a random

sample of schools is inspected each year,with the specific purpose of estimatingthe overall quality of teaching in schools.At present, Ofsted estimates that 94 percent of teaching in secondary schools issatisfactory or better; with an even higherfigure (97 per cent) for primaries. Thisfigure is calculated on the sample of eachyear’s inspections. Our respondents, how-ever, were largely in consensus that thisfigure was an inflation owing to the ‘gam-ing’ that goes on whenever inspectorsvisit.To avoid this, we propose that these

inspections be carried out without priornotification, and should not carry anyramifications for the schools sampled. Thelatter criterion is particularly important, asit reduces the likelihood of ‘gaming’ andstress among schools and teachers. Byextension, we believe that this practice ofrandom sampling would produce a moreaccurate picture of the quality of teachingin the country.



144 Interview, head teacher


Consequences: support and pressureFor an accountability framework to haveteeth, there needs to be a proportionate sys-tem of rewards and sanctions for perform-ance. Current legislation enables localauthorities to intervene where there is evi-dence of unacceptably low absolute stan-dards or if a school is found to be perform-ing less well than expected given the cir-cumstances it operates in. In both circum-stances, schools are required to prepareimprovement plans (that take action imme-diately), and are subject to interim Ofstedinspections.Schools in special measures, however,

undergo more interim inspections and aremore likely to experience a change in lead-ership. ‘Few head teachers survive theirschool going into special measures,’ an edu-cation consultant noted. ‘It is one of thefew instances where practitioners are per-sonally accountable for what happens inschools.’ The DCSF does not currently col-lect data on the percentage of head teachersthat are moved on, although they acknowl-edge that anecdotal evidence suggests thatthis does occur with some frequency.In contrast, there is very little in the way

of rewards for schools that are high per-forming and high attaining. (Although onemight argue that simply being left alone isreward beyond measure in today’s top-down, prescriptive climate.) The SchoolAchievement Award Scheme (SAAS) was ashort-lived scheme (running from 2001 to2003) which rewarded schools that showedsignificant improvement or performedabove expectations. It differed from otherperformance-pay related measures in thatit recognised the contribution of bothteaching and non-teaching staff in schoolimprovement. Successful schools wereawarded a lump sum to be distributed aspay bonuses to the staff. Who exactlyreceived the bonus, and the amount of thisbonus, was at the discretion of the school’sgoverning body. In practice, most schoolschose to distribute the money to all staff,with rewards staggered in amount fromhead teachers down to support staff.It was purportedly cancelled due to a

lack of evidence that it had a positiveimpact on teaching, learning and schoolimprovement. Some argue, however, that itwas the controversial performance-relatednature of the scheme that led to its prema-


68

Given that a system of annual report cards would serve as a basic quality moni-

toring mechanism, we propose that

1. The practice of inspecting all schools on a regular cycle is abolished.

Instead, schools should only be inspected on a needs basis: identified

through poor performance in the annual report cards or parental complaints.

The number of days and inspectors allocated to these inspections should be

decided upon by Ofsted, depending on the perceived severity of the problem.

2. School inspections should be rooted firmly in the school improvement

process, and inspectors should be trained and selected with this purpose in

mind. While the responsibility for school improvement should still lie with the

head teacher and governing body, the support-and-challenge function cur-

rently played by SIPs should be reintegrated into Ofsted.

3. Random samples of schools should be inspected each year with the specific

purpose of assessing the average quality of teaching in schools. These

inspections should carry no ramification for schools or teachers in order to

reduce stress and gaming.


ture death. A review of the single researchstudy commissioned on SAAS reveals a farmore promising picture than thatdescribed by the government.145

Specifically, the study found that satis-faction was directly related to the perceivedfairness of the scheme and the success ofthe money distribution process, with onlyone in ten staff expressing dissatisfactionwith the scheme and process. The majorityfelt that the distribution process had beenfair and had not caused any divisiveness intheir schools. Indeed, three-quarters ofthose interviewed (heads and teachers)believed that the SAAS had a positiveimpact on the school’s profile/status, teamspirit/staff relationships and personal jobsatisfaction. A further 40 per cent of headsand teachers agreed that the SAAS provid-ed an extra incentive to improving pupilprogress within the school. It seems thatoffering schools a carrot can be just as pow-erful as taking the stick to them.

Reporting student performance toparentsSo far, this chapter has focused on institu-tional accountability – the mechanisms bywhich the school’s performance as a wholeis reported to parents, the public and thegovernment. For a parent, however, themost immediate concern will naturally(and rightly) be how their child is perform-ing, in both absolute and relative terms. Asthe case study from New Zealand illustrat-ed (see ‘Helping Schools Succeed:Learning from Abroad’, Chapter 2), pro-

viding user-friendly information aboutstudent performance, in both absolute andrelative terms, is crucial in engaging par-ents in tackling problems of underachieve-ment.At present, schools are required to pro-

vide parents with a written report of theirchild’s progress at least once each schoolyear. If the student has sat for a NationalCurriculum test, their results are to bereported by level; the school is under noobligation by law to disclose the marksachieved. The report must also includecomparative information about theNational Curriculum levels of attainmentof pupils of the same age, in the school andnationally.146 Additional information maybe provided at the discretion of the headteacher. It also goes without saying thatsome schools, and teachers, do establishregular parent-teacher meetings, whichprovide families with ongoing and moredetailed feedback.

Despite these mechanisms, a significantmajority of our interviewees still felt that thequality of reporting to parents could beimproved. For some, their dissatisfaction layin the type of information being reported:

What you don’t want is to just be told howyour child is doing.What you need to betold is what’s going to be done to help yourchild fix the problem. If you are parentsand you get told that your child is belowaverage but you don’t get told what todo, that’s not very helpful. Creating a dia-logue between the parents and the schools… that’s the key. I think our schools arereally bad at this actually … I mean,some schools do well at it but most don’t



145 J. Stevens, C. Simm and H.

Shaw, ‘Evaluation of the School

Achievement Award Scheme’,

MORI Social Research Institute,

Research Report No 427 (2003).

146 See http://www.qca.org.uk/

eara/default.asp for more infor-

mation on assessment and

reporting arrangements.

We suggest that there is a need to

recognise those schools that are

performing above expectation. We

thus support the reintroduction of

a scheme along the lines of the

SAAS to reward high-performing

schools, as identified through the

annual report cards.

“ The majority of interviewees believed that the use of

curriculum levels as a means of describing student

progress can be difficult for many parents to grasp”


give it enough time. You need writtenreports too, and those aren’t good enough.

Former government advisor

For others, though, the problem lay in thecomplexity of the curriculum level frame-

work used in assessment. Currently,England uses eight ‘level descriptions’ tomeasure student progress in each subject(or rather in every attainment target147 ineach subject).148 Given that one level is fair-ly broad, sub-levels (a, b and c) have been

The National Curriculum assessment framework in use today has remained largely unchanged inform since it was first developed by the Task Group on Assessment and Testing in 1987. In a histor-ical overview of TGAT’s work, Professor DylanWiliam noted that the final framework was ‘the resultof a clear priority to provide a system that allowed students to experience progression, in order topromote a view of attainment as incremental rather than fixed, and to focus on progress rather thanabsolute levels of achievement’.149 Research had shown that students either see ability as fixed or incre-mental; those who saw ability as incremental were more likely to engage in tasks (however challeng-ing) in order to improve their ability. Those who saw ability as fixed were likely to ‘opt out’ if theybelieved their chances of succeeding at a task were low, preferring to appear lazy rather than dumb.150

TGAT thus decided against the use of independent reporting scales at the end of each key stage(e.g. five levels of attainment for each key stage, graded A–E) since it was recognised that a child mayget the same grade (e.g. B) at each key stage even though they were making absolute gains. It wasfeared that such an outcome might reinforce a belief in ability as fixed and demotivate students.Instead, TGAT decided upon on a ten-point scale (see Figure 5.1)

Having 10, rather than 5 or 20 levels, represents a compromise … if there are too few, then studentsdo not change levels during a key stage, and thus the whole scheme is de-motivating …With 20 lev-els, most students would be able to achieve one level a year but distinguishing levels in any mean-ingful way would be very difficult, especially in process oriented subjects.151

In 1994, the Dearing Review of the National Curriculum Assessment recommended that the ten-point scale be rationalised to an eight-point scale, and that ‘level descriptions’ be used to measure stu-dent progress for each subject. The Review chose not to propose a significant overhaul of the systemon the grounds that there was a lack of clearly superior alternatives.152

10 -

9 -

8 -

7 -

6 -

5 -

4 -

3 -

2 -

1 -

7-

8-

9-

10-

11-

12-

13-

14-

15-

16-

Leve

ls

Age (years)


70

147 Defined as ‘the knowledge,

skills and understanding which

pupils of different abilities and

maturities are expected to have

by the end of each key stage’;

http://www.nc.uk.net/nc_resourc

es/html/ ks1and2.shtml

148 Students with special edu-

cational needs, who are working

below Level 1 of the National

Curriculum, use a separate ‘P

level’ scale.

149 D. Wiliam, ‘Level best?

Levels of attainment in national

curriculum assessment’ (2001),

ATL, p. 5; available at:

http://www.atl.org.uk/atl_en/reso

urces/publications/research/level

_best.asp

150 See, for example, the work

of American psychologist Carol

Dweck.

151 D. Wiliam, ‘Value Added

Attacks: Technical Issues in

Reporting National Curriculum

Assessments’, British

Educational Research Journal

18: 4 (1992), pp. 329–41, p. 330.

152 The four main options con-

sidered by the Dearing commit-

tee were: a retention of the ten-

level scale for all foundation

subjects; modifying the scale to

minimise its imperfections;

abandoning and replacing the

ten-level scale with KS grading

scales; and using a modified

ten-level scale for some subjects

(where there is a progressive

build-up of knowledge and skills)

and KS grading scales for others

(R. Dearing, ‘National Curriculum

Assessment: Final Report’,

Paragraph 7.12 (1994)).

153 Note that according to the

TGAT level framework (see para-

graph 104 of the final report),

this should technically be Level

1.5 at the end of KS1, Level 3.5

at the end of KS2, and Level 5

at the end of KS3.

Table 5.1: Expected attainment of

students by key stages

Range of levels Expected attain-

within which the ment for the

great majority of majority of pupils

pupils are expected at the end of the

to work key stage153

KS1 1–3 KS1 2

KS2 2–5 KS2 4

KS3 3–7 KS3 5/6

Figure 5.1: The original ten-point

scale proposed by TGAT


developed by the Qualifications andCurriculum Authority to provide moregradated information on progress. (See boxfor om page 70 more background on thedevelopment of the curriculum levels.)However, the majority of interviewees

believed that the use of levels as a means ofdescribing student progress can be difficultfor many parents to grasp. One local coun-cillor responded: ‘No, I’m sure they don’t[understand] … the trouble is, what is anacceptable level for their child to be per-forming at? And the difference betweenhaving a Level four and Level five in anational assessment test is difficult to under-stand.’ Another interviewee, the director ofan education provider, pressed the point:‘It’s a messy system, and this thing of havinga level for every two years and sub-levels andthe confusion between content knowledgeand the ability to analyse and work withmaterial, trying to cram those into a singlescale . . . it has done some good things, butthere are all sorts of problems with using theNational Curriculum levels as the basis formeasurement.’Some will doubtlessly argue that the

degree of parental confusion can be addre-ssed by providing better explanations to par-ents by teachers and schools on how pro-gress is assessed, what the benchmarks arefor each curriculum level, and so on.We cer-tainly agree that better relationships betweenparents and teachers would create opportu-nities for dialogue that engage parents aspartners in the learning process. Never-theless, our research suggests that this diffi-culty in understanding may also be linked tostructural problems with the NationalCurriculum assessment framework.Recent years have seen serious concerns

raised about the validity and reliability ofthe existing national assessment framework,not to mention the negative impact the test-based accountability system has created.154

These concerns have led to an inquiry bythe Children, Schools and Families SelectCommittee into testing and assessment.

With regard to the use of the curriculumlevels, researchers have noted that the prac-tice of dividing scores by levels create seriousproblems because of the breadth of eachlevel and the impact of measurement errors.Consider the following illustration:

Both Child A and B are classed as Level 5,although in absolute terms, Child B and Care closer in performance. When levels areoverlaid upon test scores, the cut-off scorechosen to demarcate one level from anoth-er can significantly affect the percentage ofstudents achieving particular levels. Oneestimate, by Professor Dylan Wiliam, sug-gests that up to 30 per cent of students atkey stage 2 and 40 per cent of students atkey stage 3 may be awarded a level higheror lower than they should have owing tomeasurement errors.Assessment specialists from Cambridge

Assessment further note: ‘If Child C pro-gresses to the position of Child B over aperiod of learning, they have increased byone level. However, if Child B progressesto the same position as Child C, they haveprogressed further than Child A over thesame time, but they do not move up alevel. Introducing sub-levels has helped insome ways (4A, 4B, etc.) but the essentialproblem remains.’155

Adding to the difficulty in understandingstudent progress is the fact that cross-key-stage comparability is not possible withinthe current system. One study on the com-parability of pupils’ writing across key stagesfound that levels were not equivalent for a



154 See http://www.public

ations.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmc

hilsch.htm#memo and http://

www.publications.parliament.uk/

pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmedus

ki/memo/test&ass/contents.htm

155 Memorandum on testing

and assessment, submitted to

the Children, Schools and

Families Select Committee in

June 2007: http://www.publi

cations.parliament.uk/pa/cm200

607/cmselect/cmeduski/mem

o/test&ass/ucm4402annexb.htm

Level 5 upper boundaryChild A

Child BLevel 4 upper boundaryChild C

Level 3 upper boundary


range of reasons, including differences intest focus, programmes of study and changesin standards.156 This lack of alignment,Professor Wiliam, argues, is inevitable as thecurrent assessment system is based on eachsubject’s programme of study rather than onthe attainment targets or level descrip-tions.157 Since each key stage’s programmesof study are significantly different, it is notpossible to compare results or determineprogression based on levels. It is thus notpossible – as is frequently done – to assumethat having x number of students achievingLevel 4 at the end of KS2 would automati-cally lead to at least x number of studentsachieving Level 5/6 at the end of KS3.Given these discrepancies, we believe

that the time is ripe for a review of the cur-

riculum levels, which includes a considera-tion of how the assessment framework canbe made more accessible to parents andstudents. Is there a case, for instance, forrealigning the levels so that each year cor-relates to one level? How might we addressthe issue of cross-key-stage comparabilityand translate that information into a formthat is sufficiently user-friendly for theaverage layperson?The Children, Schools and Families

Select Committee is currently conductingan inquiry into assessment and testing, andis about to launch an inquiry into theNational Curriculum. We look forward toreceiving the results of these inquiries andhope that some of the issues that we haveraised will be addressed.


72

156 S. Green, A. Pollitt, M.

Johnson and P. Sutton,

‘Comparability Study of Pupils’

Writing from Different Key

Stages’, University of Cambridge

Local Examinations Syndicate,

paper presented at the British

Educational Research

Association Conference

University of Edinburgh, 11–13

September 2003.

157 Interestingly enough, Wiliam

further argues that this system

was not deliberately conceived

but a result of minor (and major)

missteps during the implementa-

tion phase of the National

Curriculum. See Wiliam (2001).


Conclusion

Our visits to schools abroad suggested, andour research in England confirmed, thatthe English school system lacks a clearvision built on consistent principles. Wefound that heads and teachers feel harriedby a government that does not trust them;school providers are frustrated by theirinability to create diverse ‘brands’ in anoverly centralised system; and everyone isconfused by the contradictions inherent inleague-table performance management.Our response is based on our observa-

tions of successful international systems(explored in our companion volume,‘Helping Schools Succeed: Lessons fromAbroad’) and conversations with key play-ers in English education. We have tried todesign a framework that promotes bothequity and excellence – goals that have toooften been seen as opposites in the past.Our model aims to:

� support excellence by increasing com-petition while encouraging collabora-tion through school operating net-works

� increase autonomy for teachers, leadingto better rewards and higher status inreturn for a more professional attitudetowards remuneration and tenure

� promote diversity in provision whilesafeguarding equity through a fundingformula that would see additionalmoney attached to students from dis-advantaged areas.

We propose that the levers of education bealigned as follows:

Nationally the government, through itsagencies, would set out a core entitlementcurriculum and the regulatory frameworkcovering exclusions and admissions. Thegovernment would also be responsible foraddressing overarching issues of retention,

recruitment, and workforce managementwhich presently restricts the availability ofgood teachers – the most important pre-requisite for successful reform. The detailsof curriculum, staffing and governanceshould however be left to schools.The government would assist the

development of school operating networks.These would be non-commercial trustswhich offer real expertise to schools indeveloping distinct curricula, implement-ing IT, offering a range of services such asHR and replicating good practice effec-tively. Such school operators would bringa brand to their networks, helping toestablish consistency and potentiallyoffering a level of assurance to parents inchoosing a school. Parents would reap thebenefits of competition between networkswhile teachers would benefit from collab-oration across networks. Schools and net-works would be incentivised to work withdisadvantaged communities through anational funding formula that wasweighted for socio-economic deprivationand that was distributed directly toschools.League tables would be replaced with

report cards that parents can understandand that give information not only onexam results but also on other aspects ofschools. Ofsted inspection would focus onschools where this data gives rise to con-cern and would leave the rest alone. Ofstedwould also extend its research responsibili-ty to gather information through anony-mous low-stakes visits to classrooms.

Locally authorities would focus on strate-gic commissioning for the local communi-ty, not on running schools. Their perspec-tive would be that of the user, not that ofthe provider. Should an authority wish tobe a provider either of schools or of servic-es to schools, then it must set up a not-for-



profit company to trade without advantagein fair competition with other providers.Authorities would be judged by the

extent to which they are successful inensuring the provision of world-classschools for all. In particular, authoritiesshould exercise imagination in stimulatingthe supply of settings for children whosebehaviour and emotional issues renderthem impossible to educate in mainstreamschools.Authorities would also be responsible

for regulating admissions and for ensuringprovision for excluded pupils. This wouldoften mean a negotiated fresh start, or itmay mean a non-school setting, wheremore innovative and specialised approach-es are possible.The authority would also oversee the

provision of education for pupils with astatement of special needs. Where this isbest provided for in special schools, theauthority should commission them fromproviders.Governments and authorities would

work together to promote the develop-ment of school network operators, build-ing on the work pioneered by establishedand emergent operators such as KingEdward VI Foundations, Specialist SchoolsNetwork, United Learning Trust, theHarris Federation, ARK Education, andthe Mercers’ Association of Schools.Schools should be given ownership of

their land and responsibility for theiremployees. They should be encouraged tojoin a network operated by a licensedprovider, who will offer risk transfer, servic-es and an identifiable brand. While state

funding would be required to develop andscale up this new market, in the medium tolong term school operators would stay inbusiness by the quality of their offer toschools who would buy into the network.Some schools will wish to remain complete-ly independent, and as long as they offer agood service they should be able to do so.

Schools would have as few constraints asnecessary, and these would relate to corecurriculum, admissions and exclusions pro-tocols, and the publication of information.As a consequence of this kind of ratio-

nalisation, we believe that there would beconsiderable scope to downsize the num-ber and range of many educational bodiesand in time release a greater proportion ofmoney to flow through to delegated schoolbudgets (and away from quangos and stan-dards funds). It is essential to ensure thatthe greatest proportion of funding possiblegets through to improving classroom pro-vision.

The current system constrains schools andprofessionals across the board. Our modelwould offer the freedom to developdiverse, creative and excellent schools. Butit would also keep the necessary safeguardsand incentives in place to reduce segrega-tion and keep schools accountable to par-ents and taxpayers. Most of all, it is coher-ent, and coherence is something the cur-rent system is conspicuously lacking.Coherence can only come when govern-ment takes a step back, focuses on thevision and stops micromanaging schoolsthrough endless initiatives.


74


Indexed list ofproposals

On national governance, we propose that:

1. The government moves towards theSwedish model of a core entitlement cur-riculum, giving increased flexibility forteachers and schools. (pp. 15-19)

2. National agencies with overlappingremits be rationalised. Potential mergersmight include: the Training and Dev-elopment Agency for Schools and theNational College for School Leader-ship; and the Learning and Skills Coun-cil and the Quality ImprovementAgency. (pp. 24-25)

3. A national funding formula based onthe principle of per-pupil differentiatedfunding be used. (pp. 56-57)

On local governance, we propose that:

4. Any local authority that wishes to be aschool provider should set up an arm’slength trading company to bid on con-tracts so as to operate on an equal foot-ing with non-governmental schoolproviders. (pp. 25-28)

5. All providers, local authority or other-wise, be subject to the same regulationsregarding school performance. Providersthat fail to enable a school within theircontrol to exit special measures or noticeto improve within an agreed upon timeperiod should, as with the current regu-lation for academies, have their schooltransferred to another provider, uponthe agreement of the school and DCSF.(pp. 25-28)

On schools and school networks,we propose that:

6. All schools become the legal employer oftheir staff and take ownership of theirland (as is already the case for those with

foundation status, in trusts or set-up asacademies). (pp. 25-28)

7. All schools be encouraged to join alarger support network (preferablynon-geographical) which would enablethem to access economies of scaleand/or collaborate on pedagogical mat-ters such as the development of schoolcurricula. (pp. 29-31)� These networks may be run by thenew arms length companies set upby local authorities, or not-for-prof-it providers.

� Schools that are prospering as anindependent entity would not berequired to join a network if theydo not wish to do so.

� A one-off grant would be providedto any provider which recruits anew school to its existing network.To encourage the development ofnon-geographically based networks,a larger grant could be provided ifthe school in question is in anotherlocal authority.

8. The government facilitates the setting upof local foundations so that parents cancontribute to enhancement projects attheir children’s school. (pp. 19-21)� A ratchet mechanism with a multipli-er effect would be used to ensure thatthe impact of donating in poor areasis multiplied to level the playing field

On teachers, we propose that:

9. A training route based on Teach Firstbe made the default option for newgraduate teachers and further encour-aging the entry of ‘second career’ teach-ers. (pp. 34-35)

10.The various training routes be rationalisedaround those that work best. (p. 36)



11.The remuneration scheme be front-loaded to enable higher startingsalaries, financed through reducingincremental progression and by reduc-ing pension. (p. 37)

12.National pay agreements offer guid-ance on minimum pay, limiting auto-matic progression to four increments.After that schools and networks shoulddevelop their own pay structures basedon the situation in their local market.(pp. 37-39)

13.An individual budget for continuingprofessional development based on amoney entitlement for service workedbe offered to teachers. (pp. 39-40)

14.A much shorter capability procedurebe agreed upon once the informalstage of the process has been exhaust-ed. (pp. 40-43)

15.The government sets up a severancefund. Governing bodies may borrow thecost of a severance payment from thefund which would then be paid backwithin an agreed time period. (pp. 40-43)

On quality monitoring and reporting, wepropose that:

16.A new accountability framework whichsupports the following principles bedeveloped: (pp. 58-64)� It should use a broad range of indi-cators to assess school quality.

� School performance should bemeasured over time

� School performance should be com-pared to schools with similar studentintakes and prior attainment.

� The results should be reported in aclear, unambiguous manner (e.g. A-F, traffic light system)

17.The practice of inspecting all schoolson a regular cycle be abolished.Instead, schools should only beinspected on a needs basis: either iden-tified through poor performance in the

annual report cards, or by parentalcomplaints. (pp. 64-68)� The support and challenge functioncurrently played by School Improv-ement Partners should be reinte-grated into Ofsted.

18.The average quality of teaching in schoolsbe assessed through the inspection of ran-dom samples of schools. These inspec-tions should carry no ramification forschools or teachers in order to reducestress and gaming. (pp. 64-68)

19.An initiative along the lines of theSchool Achievement Award Scheme bereintroduced to reward high perform-ing schools. (pp. 68-69)

On admissions, we propose that:

20.The ‘special dispensation’ for schoolsthat had partial selection mechanisms(either by aptitude or ability) duringthe 1997/1998 school year be eliminat-ed. (pp. 44-46)

21.The practice of selection by aptitude atall state-funded schools including acad-emies be stopped. (pp. 44-46)

22.The Department begins collectinginformation on admission authorities’oversubscription criteria and theimpact of each mechanism upon thecomposition of a school’s student body.Mechanisms which are found toachieve more equitable intakes shouldbe promoted. (pp. 47-48)

23.All voluntary aided faith schools setaside a percentage of places to studentsof other faiths and no faith (the exactpercentage should be determined dur-ing a national review). (pp. 47-48)

24.The Admissions Forums’ power to pub-lish an annual report be made a duty.The report should also be made publicto parents. (pp 48-49)

25.The role of the Office of the SchoolsAdjudicator be reviewed to determinewhether it should be given strongerpowers over the process of monitoring


76


and enforcing compliance with theCode. (pp 48-49)

On permanent exclusions and pupilreferral units (PRUs), we propose that:

26.Any student who has been permanent-ly excluded should not be reinstated,lest the authority of the head teacherand school governors is undermined.(pp. 49-51)� If the exclusion is found to beunjust by the Schools’ AdjudicatorPanel, it should not go on the stu-dent’s record

� Schools which have unjustlyexcluded a student should under-take a comprehensive review oftheir discipline and behaviour poli-cy, with the understanding that fur-ther infractions may result in disci-plinary action

27.All schools participate in their localfair-access and managed movesscheme; and the local authorityshould be given a statutory duty toenforce it. (pp. 51-52)� To accommodate in-year transfers,every school should be required toset aside an agreed upon number ofplaces each year; or to admit chil-dren beyond their published admis-sions number.

28.Any school excluding a pupil berequired to transfer the prorated Age-

Weighted Pupil Unit to the new insti-tution providing the pupil with educa-tion. (pp. 51-52)� If, however, the school is found tohave unjustly excluded a student,the entire AWPU allowance shouldbe transferred.

29.As with schools, PRUs should have theoption of taking over the management oftheir budgets and staffing. (pp. 53-54)

30.Additional funding is provided toaddress immediate shortfalls in staffingand infrastructure development. PRUswith inadequate accommodationshould be given priority when planningredevelopment (e.g. through theBuilding Schools for the Future initia-tive). (pp. 53-54)

31.Providers and charities be encouragedto develop alternatives to mainstreameducation through the provision of aone-off grant. (pp. 53-54)� To qualify for the grant, the organisa-tion in question must establish andfollow a rigorous evaluation processin order to assess the effectiveness ofsaid programme.

On school transport, we propose that:

32.The viability of a national yellow bussystem that is both free to low-incomefamilies and accessible to those whoare willing to pay for it, be explored.(pp. 54-56)


Indexed list of proposals


Helping SchoolsSucceed

A Framework for English Education

Chris Davies and Cheryl Limedited by Sam Freedman

£10.00ISBN: 978-1-906097-20-2

Policy ExchangeClutha House

10 Storey’s GateLondon SW1P 3AY

www.policyexchange.org.uk

The past few decades of education reform have beentumultuous. Since 1997 alone, we have had six educationministers in three differently named departments. Numerouspublic bodies have been created, many of them surviving just afew years. We have seen hundreds of reviews, tens of plans andseveral ‘agendas’ – each one creating its own bureaucratic trail.

We argue that England’s struggles stem from the absence of aclear, coherent, educational vision. There is little internal logic inthe way goals and incentives are aligned; far too much centralgovernment intervention; and far too little trust in teachers asprofessionals. Drawing on research from abroad and in England,we argue that the solution lies in the development of a ‘tight,loose, tight’ framework: clear vision from the centre; thefreedom for schools and teachers to achieve the vision as theysee fit; and comprehensive accountability mechanisms toensure the vision is achieved.

This framework would support schools in achieving excellenceby harnessing the best of competitive and collaborativepractices. It would safeguard equity by emphasising the role oflocal authorities as defenders of their constituents’ right to aquality education. Finally, more autonomous schools would helpto professionalise teaching, while creating genuine diversity inthe system.

Enriching the educationof individuals around the world

Help

ingScho

olsSucceed

:AFram

ework

forEng

lishEducatio

nChris

Davies

andCherylLim

edited

bySam

Freed

man

Policy

Exchang

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Helping Schools Succeed: a framework for English education