Helping Schools Succeed: Lessons from Abroad

Helping SchoolsSucceed

Lessons from Abroad

Cheryl Lim and Chris Daviesedited by Sam Freedman

£10.00ISBN: 978-1-906097-19-6

Policy ExchangeClutha House

10 Storey’s GateLondon SW1P 3AY

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In recent years, the expansion of international comparativestudies such as PISA, TIMSS and PIRLS has significantlychanged the way we assess the success of any given educationsystem. Strong internal progress is no longer sufficient to merita positive evaluation. In a world where education is viewed asthe means by which nations achieve and maintain an edge overtheir competitors, success is increasingly defined vis-à-vis theperformance of other systems.

This report looks at five systems – New Zealand, Canada(Ontario and Alberta), Hong Kong and Sweden – which generallyperform better than England on counts of excellence and equity.Despite their differences, we found that the challenges faced byeach of these systems were remarkably similar. Crucially, evenwhere there were differences in approach, a closer examinationof the internal logic of each system revealed commonunderlying principles. These tenets were drawn together tocreate a proposed framework for a coherently aligned, ‘tight,loose, tight’ system.

Lessons from Abroad is the companion report to our main studyon English education reform, detailed in Helping SchoolsSucceed: A Framework for English Education.

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Helping Schools Succeed Vol1 Cover:Helping Schools Succeed Vol1 Cover 5/3/08 17:15 Page 1

HelpingSchools Succeed Lessons From Abroad

Cheryl Lim and Chris Davies

Edited by Sam Freedman

Policy Exchange is an independent think tank whose mission is to develop and promote new policy ideas which willfoster a free society based on strong communities, personal freedom, limited government, national self-confidence andan enterprise culture. Registered charity no: 1096300.

Policy Exchange is committed to an evidence-based approach to policy development. We work in partnership with aca-demics and other experts and commission major studies involving thorough empirical research of alternative policy out-comes. We believe that the policy experience of other countries offers important lessons for government in the UK. Wealso believe that government has much to learn from business and the voluntary sector.

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Helping Schools Succeed Vol1:Helping Schools Succeed Vol1 5/3/08 17:11 Page 1

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About the authors

Cheryl LimResearch Fellow, specialising in education,Policy Exchange. A former Rhodes Scholar,she graduated with an MSc inComparative Social Policy from OxfordUniversity in 2006. Prior to that, she stud-ied psychology and sociology at WesleyanUniversity in America. Cheryl also has abackground in gender advocacy work

Chris DaviesIndependent Consultant. Graduated fromExeter University with an Upper Secondin Classics and holds a PGSE and an MScin Education Management. He has 30years experience in the state education sec-tor including 12 years as a Head teacher intwo London primary schools as well asnine years experience in a Local Authority

both as an adviser and, until recently,Assistant Director. He is currently work-ing on a range of educational projects andresearch. Chris founded and now man-ages, part-time, the Lambeth e-LearningFoundation.

Sam FreedmanHead of the Education Unit, PolicyExchange. He achieved a first class degreein History from Magdalen College,Oxford. After completing a Masters degreein International History in 2004, Samjoined the Independent Schools Council asa researcher. He left three years later asHead of Research, having also completed asecond Masters degree in Public Policy andManagement at Birkbeck. Sam joinedPolicy Exchange in September 2007.

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© Policy Exchange 2008

Published byPolicy Exchange, Clutha House, 10 Storey’s Gate, London SW1P 3AYwww.policyexchange.org.uk

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Contents

Acknowledgements 4Executive Summary 6Introduction 8

1 Framework and Methodology 92 New Zealand 183 Canada: Ontario and Alberta 354 Hong Kong 605 Sweden 736 Conclusion 89

Appendix 95

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 3


Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thankCambridge Assessment and the SuttonTrust for their financial support andresearch advice, in particular: Sylvia Green,Bene’t Steinberg, James Turner and BethBlack. We are also indebted to JamesO’Shaughnessy who was a major drivingforce behind this project; Peter Hill andAlison Wolf for their input into earlierdrafts of the report; and Sam Freedman,who saw this project through to the end.The comparative dimension of our

research would not have been possiblewithout the generous support and assis-tance of officials from the New ZealandMinistry of Education; the OntarioMinistry of Education; Alberta Education;the Hong Kong Education Bureau andSweden’s Ministry of Education andResearch. We are grateful to them foragreeing to be interviewed; for helping usgain access to local schools and other stake-holders; and for providing invaluable feed-back throughout the writing and editingstage.Our research was also enriched by the

participation of individuals from theschools; government organisations; stake-holder bodies and universities that we vis-ited. We have undoubtedly incurredmany debts, only a proportion of whichwe have the space to acknowledge here.We are nonetheless extremely grateful forthe gift of your time, expertise and hospi-tality; and hope that we have done justiceto the intricacies of your system’s experi-ence.

New Zealand:Special thanks go to Tim McMahon,Gordon Stobart and Helen Timperley forgetting the ball rolling; Sam Mackay, ourMinistry liaison; and the AucklandPrincipal’s Association. We are also grateful

to Susan Warren, John Good and SaaneFaaofo-Oldehaver for arranging (and get-ting us to!) our school visits; and to BrianAnnan, Russell Burt, Steve May andMartin Connelly for their insightful com-ments on early drafts of the chapter.

Ontario:We would like to thank Carol Campbell,Linda Nicolson, Yvette Leander and theLiteracy and Numeracy Secretariat for thecritical input and organisational supportprovided throughout our research. We arealso grateful for the assistance provided bythe Ontario Principals’ Council; the YorkRegion District School Board and the YorkCatholic District School Board, in particu-lar Jeremy Hill, whose warm hospitalitywas second to none.

Alberta:Thanks go to the Alberta School BoardAssociation, particularly Marian Johnson,for graciously organising the bulk of ourinterviews with other stakeholder organisa-tions and schools. We are also grateful toDon Delaney from Edmonton CatholicSchools, Lorraine Lastiwka fromEdmonton Public Schools and SylviaLauber from Battle River School Divisionfor putting together an exciting roster ofschool visits. Above all, we are indebted toJanusz Zieminski, Greg Rudolph and sen-ior officials of Alberta Education who pro-vided feedback on early drafts.

Hong Kong:We are grateful to Professors Chi ChungLam, Man Kwan Tam and Esther Ho forsharing their in-depth knowledge of thesystem with us; critiquing earlier drafts andintroducing us to others within the com-

4



Acknowledgements

munity. Special thanks go as well toEduYoung and QualiEd College, in partic-ular Mr. Jimmy Lui and Mr. Chan Hung,for their gracious hospitality.

Sweden:We are indebted to Margareta Wennlund,Karl Ryda and Sakir Demirel for theirdogged assistance in putting togethermeetings and school visits. Thanks go aswell to Mats Bjornsson and BjornHjalmarsson who provided feedback on

early drafts, and to the latter, for steppingin when last-minute cancellations threwour schedule off track.

Finally, we would like to thank Liz Mottfor her travel support; James Swaffield andJohn Schwartz for their Excel wizardry;and Emily Dyer and Tom Shakespeare forhelping with the proofreading.

The views expressed in the report are thoseof the authors, and not necessarily of thepeople we interviewed.


Executive Summary

In recent years, the expansion of interna-tional comparative studies such as PISA,TIMSS and PIRLS has significantlychanged the way we assess the success ofany given education system. Strong inter-nal progress is no longer sufficient to merita positive evaluation. In a world whereeducation is viewed as the means by whichnations achieve and maintain an edge overtheir competitors, success is increasinglydefined vis-à-vis the performance of othersystems.

Admittedly, the way in which the resultsof these studies are reported – without ref-erence to measurement errors or explana-tions of methodological differences – oftengives rise to crude, meaningless ‘rankings’.Nonetheless, careful analysis of each suc-cessive study yields the same underlyingmessage: some systems seem to do a betterjob than others at achieving both educa-tional excellence and equity.

The latter dimension is one England hasstruggled with for decades. Despite count-less initiatives, socio-economic classremains the strongest predictor of futureeducational attainment, and our ‘long tailof underachievement’ lives on. Moreover,the latest 2006 PISA and PIRLS studiessuggest that England’s comfortable posi-tion in the cluster of countries performingabove the OECD average might be slip-ping.

In order to understand what Englandmight do differently, we turned to five sys-tems – New Zealand, Canada (Ontarioand Alberta), Hong Kong and Sweden –which have relatively successful educationsystems, and which have been steadilyworking on improving their outcomesthrough extensive reform strategies. Thesystems were spread across four continentsand encompassed a wide range of organisa-tional structures, philosophies, reform his-tories and socio-economic idiosyncrasies.

In New Zealand, school-based manage-ment reforms eliminated the middle-levelgoverning bodies between individualschools and the Ministry of Education.This highly atomised framework is boththe system’s greatest strength and weak-ness. On one hand, the autonomy given toschools and teachers has generated excitinginnovations at the local level. On the otherhand, institutional accountability remainsweak, and the central government strugglesto systemically replicate change on a largerscale.

In Canada, education is the responsibil-ity of each province and territory, therebycreating considerable internal diversity.Both Ontario and Alberta have deliberate-ly sought to develop an accountabilityframework – predicated on collectiveresponsibility and targeted support struc-tures – that is, in their own view, theantithesis of England’s big stick. Both alsoshare similar governance structures, oper-ating at least four different categories ofpublic schools, which automatically gener-ates competition within the public sector.Alberta has taken the principle of compe-tition one step further by introducingcharter schools and making school choice acentral feature of its education reforms.Ontario on the other hand, is focusing itsreform efforts on developing collaborativenetworks – an approach that perhapssprings from the province’s fractious histo-ry of education reform.

Falling school rolls in Hong Kong, notto mention its small geographical size, havehelped create a highly marketised system ofeducation. In some districts, up to 60 percent of schools have had to be closed.Correspondingly, competition for pupils isfierce, and networks of schools engage inbranding activities in an effort to carve outdistinct niches for themselves. It is particu-larly interesting that this competition tar-

6



Executive Summary

gets students of all abilities and interests,rather than just those with high academicability.

Finally, Sweden has garnered consider-able attention in recent years for the appar-ent success of its school-choice reforms,supposedly demonstrated by the rapidgrowth of the independent sector.Internally, however, it is perceived to be asystem in crisis, and comprehensivereforms are anticipated across the compul-sory and non-compulsory education phas-es. Unsurprisingly, the scale of the reformsproposed is generating a public debate onthe future of the education system, not theleast Sweden’s historic commitment to pro-viding an equivalent education for all chil-dren.

Despite these differences, the challengesfaced by each of these systems wereremarkably similar. Even where there weresignificant differences in approach, a closerexamination of the internal logic of eachsystem revealed common underlying prin-ciples. These tenets have been drawntogether in our conclusion to create a pro-posal of what we believe a coherentlyaligned system should look like.

Specifically, we suggest that an idealsystem can be characterised by the analo-gy of ‘tight, loose, tight’: clearly delineat-ed objectives, responsibilities and stan-dards; the freedom and autonomy toinnovate at the school and classroomlevel; and comprehensive mechanisms forevaluating school performance and ensur-ing institutional and professionalaccountability.

First ‘tight’: � Clarity and consistency of vision is

essential to ensure that large-scale, sys-tem-wide reforms are kept on track,and that there is an alignment of goalsand incentives across multiple levels of

governance. This would include: bring-ing all stakeholders on board as part-ners in the policy-development process;setting minimum standards; and creat-ing an expectation of constant improv -ement and growth.

Mediating the ‘loose’: � Balancing school autonomy with cen-

tral oversight enables innovation andindividualisation at the school level,while at the same time maximisingeconomies of scale and transference ofbest practice.

� Tempering competition and collabo-ration. Systems are most effective whenthere is a balance of competitive pres-sure and collaborative relationshipswithin the system. Some models ofschool organisation do a better job ofachieving this synergy than others.

� Creating a new deal for teachers,wherein teachers are promised moreautonomy, better remuneration andhigher esteem, in return for rigorousexpectations of professional accounta-bility, is essential.

� Guaranteeing a basic level of equityand excellence. Safeguards such as fairadmissions policies and differentiatedfunding schemes need to be built intothe system to ensure that the benefits ofeducation reach all students.

Second ‘tight’: � Rethinking the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of

measurement to ensure that the process-es by which schools and practitioners areheld accountable are fit for purpose anddo not create perverse incentives withinthe system. This would include develop-ing a system of reporting to the govern-ment, schools, parents and the publicwhich is accessible to all stakeholders,particularly parents.


Introduction

This report is part of a two-stage researchstudy that draws on best practice fromabroad in order to inform England’sunderstanding of how the building blocksof any given system – accountabilityframeworks; governing bodies; teachingworkforce etc. – should be aligned to pro-duce high standards for all students. Here,the phrase ‘high standards for all students’is used to refer to the twin goals of educa-tional excellence, (as measured by academ-ic standards), and equity (the extent towhich high outcomes are spread equitablyacross all demographic groups).

The first stage of our research consistedof case studies of five systems – NewZealand, Canada (Ontario and Alberta),Hong Kong and Sweden – which have pro-duced, by comparative standards, relativelysuccessful educational outcomes. The les-

sons from these systems were used to devel-op a framework of an ideal system, whichwas then tested out during interviews andfocus groups with practitioners and stake-holders in England.

This report presents the findings fromthe comparative phase of our study.Inevitably, the coverage of each system hashad to be truncated to highlight the ele-ments that we believed were of most rele-vance to the English experience. In doingso, the report is intended to serve as a com-pendium to the main report, illustratingthe rationale and good practices whichinformed our policy proposals. The reportcan also be read as a stand-alone documentand we hope that interested readers willfind in each narrative a useful starting basefor learning more about each of the sys-tems covered.

8


1Framework and Methododology

Answering the question ‘What constitutesa good education?’ is a task at once bothstraightforward and complex. On onelevel, many of us have an intuitive sense ofwhat we value in education. A short list ofbroad educational goals could include any-thing from the utilitarian objective of ‘theskills and knowledge necessary for partici-pation in a workforce’, to the philosophicalideal of ‘the development of a strong senseof self and civic responsibility’.

Complications inevitably arise, however,when we begin to consider how these aimsmight play out in a national education sys-tem. Given finite resources, how do we pri-oritise the goals we think an education sys-tem should accomplish? If conflictingvisions and objectives exist, how should wereconcile them? And even if we succeed inachieving a satisfactory consensus in thesedebates, we are still left with what is per-haps the most contentious question of all:how do we know that our education sys-tem is actually achieving its stated purpos-es?

This study represents our attempt toanswer these questions by comparing theeducation system in England with that infour other countries. In this introductorychapter we establish the parameters of ourstudy: what we were looking for; why wefocused on New Zealand, Canada, HongKong and Sweden; the limitations of inter-national comparatives in education; andhow we went about our analysis.

The following chapters focus on eachcountry in turn, and the report ends witha thematic review which presents the key

challenges for any education system andlays out the background for our compan-ion report on the English school system.Our conclusions by no means represent aGrand Unified Theory of Education. Ouranalysis does, nonetheless, begin from acommitted standpoint: that successfuleducation is an indispensable feature of ahealthy society, and that its positive impactshould be felt by all individuals, regardlessof background.

1.1 What constitutes a successfulschool system?The sociologist Daniel Yankelovich coinedthe phrase ‘the McNamara Fallacy’1 toillustrate the pitfalls often confronted inthe practice of evaluation:

The first step is to measure whatevercan be easily measured. This is OK as far as it goes. The second step is to dis-regard that which can’t be easily measured or to give it arbitrary quanti-tative value. This is artificial and misleading. The third step is to presumethat what can’t be measured eas ily really isn’t important. This isblindness. The fourth step is to say that what can’t be easily measured real-ly doesn’t exist. This is suicide.

Despite everyone’s best efforts, policy-makers and researchers are often suscepti-ble to the McNamara Fallacy. We knowthat we want systems that produce adultswith high levels of educational attainment.


1 Named after Robert S.

McNamara, former United States

Secretary of Defense (1961–8)

and former President of the World

Bank (1968–81).


We know, too, that we want school systemsthat foster social cohesion, civic-mindedindividuals, physically and emotionallyhealthy societies and so forth. Unfor -tunately, we do not always know how toaccurately measure the latter category of‘softer’ goals. It should come as no surprise,then, that the educational indicators ofmost countries centre on resource inputs2

and student attainment. At the same time, it would be unreason-

able to admonish governments for theircontinued reliance on easily measurededucational goals. While there are pressingneeds to develop better mechanisms forevaluating less tangible goals, the existingperformance indicators are still of consid-erable value. It is arguable that a systemwhich cannot ensure a minimum standardof learning for all students would be hard-pressed to achieve more complex goals.More crucially, literacy and numeracyremain the keys to successful integrationinto modern society; a system that fails toenable mastery of these skills amongst allstudents not only runs the risk of con-demning some to a life on the margins,but also squanders valuable human capi-tal.

We believe that high attainment stan-dards3 are the sine qua non of any success-ful school system. High average standardsalone, though, are by no means sufficient.The greater, and more pressing, challengeis to ensure that these high standards arespread equitably across all demographicgroups. Unfortunately, this is whereEngland, with its long tail of underachieve-ment, falters.

Given the status quo, we believe that a suc-cessful education system can, and should, bemeasured by the extent to which a country iscapable of meeting the twin objectives ofexcellence and equity.

In this study, we have chosen to defineeducational excellence as high average per-formance standards. As noted earlier, werecognise that achievement scores alone

can by no means be taken as a definitivestatement of quality. Wherever possible wehave, therefore, used other indicators, suchas the educational attainment of the adultpopulation, and employment rates by levelof educational attainment, to flesh out ourunderstanding of each country’s educationsector.

Educational equity, on the other hand,has been analysed through three maindimensions:

� The impact of students’ socio-econom-ic status on performance

� The degree of ‘between-student varia-tion’, that is, the extent of the attain-ment gap between a system’s high andlow performers

� The degree of ‘between-school varia-tion’, that is, the extent to which thereare consistent standards of attainmentacross schools

Other considerations that were taken intoaccount include the degree of social segre-gation in schools, as well as the existence ofattainment gaps based on gender, ethnicityand immigrant status.

In sum, then, this study defines a suc-cessful school system as one that produceshigh standards for all.

1.2 Is there a trade-off betweenexcellence and equity?Many educational debates seem to be con-ducted on the assumption that it is impos-sible to achieve both high performancestandards and an equitable distribution oflearning outcomes. Consider, for example,the yearly row over whether improvementsin average student performance duringkey-stage assessments are due to lowerstandards. This debate is further fuelled byrecent research illustrating that socio-eco-nomic background remains the strongestpredictor of future student success in theUnited Kingdom.4 This predicament is, of

Helping schools succeed

10

2 An arguably fallible indicator, as

international research has found

that there is no clear correlation

between educational expenditure

and learning outcomes.

3 For those not familiar with the

English educational context, the

term ‘standards’ is generally used

in reference to achievement out-

comes.

4 J. Blanden and S. Machin,

‘Recent Changes in

Intergenerational Mobility in

Britain’, Sutton Trust, December

2007.


course, not unique; in all countries, stu-dents from more advantaged family back-grounds tend to perform better.

International evidence, however, sug-gests that despite these well-known chal-lenges, it is possible to produce both equi-ty and excellence. Figure 1.1 compares theaverage performance of countries on theProgramme for International StudentAssessment (PISA) 2006 science scale andthe relationship between performance andthe PISA index of economic, social andcultural status (ESCS).5 Australia, Canada,Estonia, Finland, Hong Kong-China,Japan, Korea, Macao-China and Swedenall have above-average science scores, whilethe impact of their students’ socio-eco-nomic backgrounds on performance isbelow average. England also has an above-average performance level in science, yetthe gap between the performance of its stu-

dents and their socio-economic back-ground is comparable to the averageOECD country.

It is worth noting that there are slightdifferences in country outcomes betweenstudies, depending on which scale is usedfor comparison. Figure 1.2, for example,uses the PISA 2003 mathematics scale tocompare the relationship between per-formance and the PISA ESCS index. Usingthe 2003 data, we find that England’s per-formance has changed – the gap betweenstudent performance and socio-economicbackground is wider here than in the aver-age OECD country.6

At the same time there are systems, suchas those in Canada and Hong Kong, whichconsistently do better than other countriesin closing the performance gap betweenstudents of different socio-economic back-grounds. This suggests that excellence and


Framework and Methodology

5 The PISA index of economic,

social and cultural status takes

into consideration the following

factors: parental occupation; high-

est level of education of the stu-

dent’s parents; an index of family

wealth; an index of cultural pos-

sessions (e.g. books) in the family

home; and an index of home edu-

cational resources.

6 Due to low response rates,

England’s performance was not

included in the official compara-

tive analyses. However, the results

are accurate for many within-

country comparisons between

subgroups and for relational

analyses; hence its use here in

the comparison of performance

and the impact of student ESCS

on performance. See Learning for

Tomorrow’s World: First Results

From PISA 2003 (Paris: OECD,

2004), Annex A3, p. 328, for a

more detailed explanation.

Figure 1.1. Average performance of countries on the PISA 2006 sciencescale and the relationship between performance and the PISA index ofeconomic, social and cultural status


equity do not need to sit at opposite endsof a spectrum of achievement.

1.3 What are these internationalstudies?In 1964 the International Association forthe Evaluation of Educational Achievement(IEA) published the results of their firstcross-national initiative: The FirstInternational Mathematics Study. Encom-passing 12 countries, this landmark studyopened the policy world to systematic cross-national data collection through the use ofcommon tests. Since then, more than 20international assessments have been con-ducted by different agencies, each growingin methodological complexity and scope, intandem with increased interest in and debateover the results of these assessments.7

Arguably, the three most prominent8

cross-national studies (and indeed those

most relevant to the English context)9 are:

� The Programme for InternationalStudent Assessment (PISA), organisedby the OECD, currently with the partic-ipation of 57 countries (30 OECD, 27non-OECD).10 PISA assesses the read-ing, mathematical and scientific literaciesof 15-year-old students, as well as theirproblem-solving skills. There have beenthree cycles to date (2000, 2003 and2006), and during each cycle there is onemajor domain of investigation. In the2006 cycle, for example, science was themajor domain and more questions wereasked in this area than in the minordomains of reading, mathematics andproblem-solving.

The United Kingdom has participated inPISA since its inception. In 2003, howev-er, England was not included in the com-


12

7 For a concise treatment of the

range and growth of international

assessment studies, see T. N.

Postlethwaite, Monitoring

Educational Achievement (UNESCO

International Institute for Educational

Planning, 2004); as well as A.

Grisay, and P. Griffin, ‘What are the

main cross-national studies?’, in

Cross-national Studies of the

Quality of Education: Planning their

design and managing their impact,

ed. K. Ross and I. Genevois

(UNESCO International Institute for

Educational Planning, 2006).

8 A growing number of studies

focus exclusively on the experi-

ences of developing countries, for

instance SACMEQ (the Southern

and Eastern Africa Consortium for

Monitoring Education Quality) and

LLECE (the Latin American

Laboratory for the Assessment of

the Quality of Education.

9 We also drew on the OECD’s

educational indicators series,

Education at a Glance, and the

International Review of Curriculum

and Assessment Frameworks

Internet Archive (INCA) managed

by Eurydice.

10 PISA homepage:

http://www.pisa.oecd.org.

Figure 1.2. Average performance of countries on the PISA 2003 mathematics scale and the relation-ship between performance and the index of economic, social and cultural status.


parative analyses on the grounds that theresponse rate of its schools and pupils didnot meet the programme’s requirements.11

� Trends in International Mathematicsand Science Study (TIMSS), organisedby the International Association for theEvaluation of Educational Achiev ement(IEA), with the participation of 65 coun-tries.12 There have been four cycles todate (1995, 1999, 2003 and 2007). Aswith the PISA studies, England has beena participant since the study’s inception.

� The Programme for InternationalReading Literacy Survey (PIRLS),organised by the IEA, with the participa-tion of 35 countries.13 England has con-tributed to both study cycles (2001 and2006).

While all three studies assess student compe-tency through the use of standardised tests,there are fundamental methodological dif-ferences between these tests that can affecttheir specific results. There are three key dif-ferences:

� PISA aims to measure ‘how far studentsnear the end of compulsory educationhave acquired some of the knowledgeand skills that are essential for full partic-ipation in society’.14 Consequently,PISA’s assessment tools focus on the con-cept of ‘literacy’ – an individual’s abilityto utilise his or her knowledge of a par-ticular subject in order to fully partici-pate in society. In contrast, TIMSSassesses the extent to which studentshave mastered the core curriculum com-mon in the majority of national educa-tion systems. Countries that have moreoverlap between the content of theirnational curricula and the test questionsmay thus be at an advantage. Somecountries do appear to perform betterwith one testing body than another, forexample New Zealand’s performance inthe OECD PISA studies.

� The demographics differ. PISA uses whatis called a ‘pure age’ criterion, testing stu-dents who are 15 years old at the time ofthe study, regardless of their grade.TIMSS and PIRLS, on the other hand,assess students by grade (TIMSS tests stu-dents in US grades 4 and 8 and theirinternational equivalents, whereas PIRLStests students in the equivalents of USgrade 4 only). In studies with a pure agecriterion, it is likely that students tested atthe same age from different countriesmay have completed a different numberof years of formal schooling.

� There are no set criteria for determiningwhich students can (or should) be exclud-ed from participation in these tests. Eachcountry is responsible for establishing itsown criteria for inclusion and exclusion,therefore opening the possibility thatcountries wishing to see a rise in rankingsmay choose to exclude large numbers ofstudents with disabilities, students judgedunable to cope with the conditions of thetest (for example, immigrant studentswho may not be fluent in the language ofthe test) and so forth.

While we acknowledge that internationalcomparative assessments can be criticised ona number of counts,15 we believe that PISA,TIMSS and PIRLS comprise the best com-parative data currently available. Whereverpossible, however, we have sought to balanceand verify figures from these internationalassessments with pertinent national data.

1.4 How does England compareinternationally?Considerable research has already beenproduced analysing England’s comparativeperformance according to PISA, PIRLSand TIMSS. Interested readers should con-sult Professor Alan Smithers’ work inEngland’s Education and more recently Blair’sEducation: An International Perspective,16



11 Professor Alan Smithers, from

the Centre for Education and

Employment Research, University

of Buckingham, argues that this

omission is difficult to understand

as the response rates for the UK

and USA in both 2000 and 2003

are remarkably similar. In his

report referenced in this chapter,

Professor Smithers has thus

included the results of the PISA

2003 cycle in his analysis.

12 TIMSS homepage:

http://timss.bc.edu.

13 PIRLS homepage:

http://timss.bc.edu.

14 http://www.pisa.oecd.org

/pages/0,3417,en_32252351_322

35918_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.

15 For a summary of the common

critiques of these studies, see

Ross and Genevois (2006), chap-

ters 4,7 and 8.

16 A. Smithers, England’s

Education (London: Sutton Trust,

2004) and Blair’s Education: An

International Perspective (London:

Sutton Trust, 2007).



14

17 Multiple comparisons of mean

performance based on the read-

ing literacy scale. Knowledge and

Skills for Life: First Results from

PISA 2000 (Paris: OECD, 2001),

p. 53.

18 I. V. S. Mullis, M. O. Martin, E.

J. Gonzalez & A. M. Kennedy,

PIRLS 2001 International Report:

IEA’s Study of Reading Literacy

Achievement in Primary Schools

(Chestnut Hill, MA: Boston

College, 2003), p. 27.

19 England inserted into ranking

based on its raw score. OECD

(2004), p. 92.

20 Multiple comparisons of mean

performance based on the sci-

ence literacy scale. PISA 2006

Science Competencies for

Tomorrow’s World (Paris: OECD,

2006), p. 56.

21 I. V. S. Mullis, M. O. Martin, A.

M. Kennedy and P. Foy, PIRLS

2006: International Report

(Chestnut Hill, MA: TIMSS &

PIRLS International Study Center,

Boston College, 2007).

22 M. O. Martin, I. V. S. Mullis, E.

J. Gonzalez & S. J. Chrostowski,

TIMSS 2003 International

Mathematics Report: Findings

From IEA’s Trends in International

Mathematics and Science Study

at the Fourth and Eighth Grades


College, 2004a), p.38.

23 M. O. Martin, I. V. S. Mullis, E.

J. Gonzalez & S. J. Chrostowski,

TIMSS 2003 International Science

Report: Findings From IEA’s

Trends in International

Mathematics and Science Study

at the Fourth and Eighth Grade


College, 2004b), p. 8.

Rank PISA PIRLS PISA TIMSS TIMSS PISA PIRLS 200017 200118 200319 2003 2003 200620 200621

Maths Science(Grade 8)22 (Grade 8)23

1 Finland Sweden HK-China Singapore Singapore Finland Russian

Federation

2 Canada Netherlands Finland Korea Chinese HK-China HK-China

Taipei

3 New England Korea HK-China Korea Canada Alberta

Zealand (Canada)

4 Australia Bulgaria Netherlands Chinese HK-China Chinese Singapore

Taipei Taipei

5 Ireland Latvia Liechtenstein Japan Estonia Estonia British

Columbia

(Canada)

6 Korea Lithuania Japan Belgium Japan Japan Luxembourg

(Flemish)

7 United Hungary Canada Netherlands England New Ontario

Kingdom Zealand (Canada)

8 Japan United Belgium Estonia Hungary Australia Italy

States (Flemish)

9 Sweden Italy Macao-China Hungary Netherlands Netherlands Hungary

10 Austria Germany Switzerland Malaysia USA Liechten- Sweden

stein

11 Belgium Czech Australia Latvia Australia Korea Germany

Republic

12 Iceland New Zealand New Zealand Russian Sweden Slovenia Netherlands

Federation

13 Norway Scotland Czech Slovak Slovenia Germany Belgium

Republic Republic (Flemish)

14 France Singapore Ireland Australia New Zealand United Bulgaria

Kingdom

15 USA Russian Denmark USA Lithuania Czech Denmark

Federation Republic

16 Denmark HK-China France Lithuania Slovak Switzerland Nova Scotia

Republic (Canada)

17 Switzer- France Sweden Sweden Russian Macao- Latvia

land Federation China

18 Spain Greece England England Latvia Austria UnitedStates

19 Czech Slovak Austria Scotland Scotland Belgium England

Republic Republic

20 Italy Iceland Germany Israel Malaysia Ireland Austria

Table 1.1. England’s performance in the most recent international assessment studies

Average acheivement signific -antly higher than England / UK

Average acheivement notsignificantly differen t from England/UK

Average acheivement signific -antly lower than England/UK


both of which examine trends in perform-ance since England’s first participation in aninternational study in 1964.

In brief, the good news is that Englanddoes relatively well in assessments of science;moreover, there is evidence that England’sperformance has improved over time, partic-ularly since the introduction of the nationalcurriculum. In assessments of mathematicsperformance, however, the evidence is lessencouraging. Smithers’ analyses suggest thatEngland not only fares poorly in comparisonwith other OECD countries in mathemat-ics, but also that there has been no signifi-cant change in performance over time.24

The evidence for reading literacy is alsosomewhat discouraging. England was one ofthe highest performing countries in thePIRLS 2001 study; in 2006, however,England’s performance dropped significant-ly. While England’s average attainment wasstill above the international mean, it per-formed significantly below some OECDcountries, including Sweden, Italy andGermany. The fall in performance wasnotable across all ability levels, promptingquestions about the value of the national lit-eracy strategy.

1.5 Which countries did we choose?Critics of comparative education researchoften question the validity of comparingapples with oranges. Their concern is notunfounded: national education systems,defined as they are by the idiosyncrasies ofhistory, sociocultural norms and politics,are akin to fingerprints. Wholesale trans-portation of policy ideas from one countryto another have often backfired, at times todisastrous consequences. So why look out-ward at all?

Our answer comes from a statement ofintent, presented more than four decadesago by the group of researchers that devel-oped the first comparative assessmentstudy: ‘Custom and law define what is edu-cationally allowable within a nation, [where-

as]the educational systems beyond one’snational borders suggest what is educational-ly possible.’ 25

We are interested in the possible. Putmore specifically, we are interested in learn-ing from the countries that are rising to thechallenge of providing both educationalequity and excellence. In analysing data fromPISA, PIRLS and TIMSS, we found thatcountries that met our criteria could bedivided into four broad categories:26

� The Nordic Countries: Finland andSweden

� The Asia Pacific Rim Countries: Korea,Japan, Hong Kong-China, Macau-China and Singapore

� The Antipodean Countries: Australiaand New Zealand

� Others: Canada and the Netherlands

We anticipated that countries belonging tothe Nordic and Asian clusters, in particu-lar, would have very similar educationalcontexts owing to their shared culturalnorms. Correspondingly, we selected onecountry per cluster:

� Sweden At first glance, Sweden appearsto be an unusual choice, consideringFinland’s unquestionable position atthe top of the pack. However, thenumerous case studies of the Finnish‘wonder story’ that have arisen inrecent years27 mean that there was littlewe could add to the existing literature.Sweden was also of particular interestto us because of the attention that itsschool choice policies have received ininternational policy circles.

� Hong Kong-China Owing to linguisticbarriers, Hong Kong and Singaporewere the most feasible options. HongKong’s market system for the provisionof education, however, is especially rel-evant to recent policy debates inEngland on choice and competition.



24 While England performed well

in mathematics in the PISA 2000

study – a score that was deemed

surprising as it was out of line

with the TIMSS scores – mathe-

matics was a minor component of

the cycle. In PISA 2003, mathe-

matics was the major area of

analysis. As mentioned earlier,

England’s results were discounted

on the grounds that the participa-

tion level was too low for the

results to be meaningful.

Smithers’ analysis suggests, how-

ever, that there was a relative

decline in England’s performance

in 2003.

25 Forshay et al. (1962), p. 2,

quoted in Ross and Genevois

(2006), p. 25.

26 We excluded countries such

as Iceland and Liechtenstein that

had very small populations.

27 For a particularly comprehen-

sive and recent example, see J.

Haahr, T. Nielsen, M. Hansen and

S. Jakobsen, Explaining student

performance: Evidence from the

international PISA, TIMSS and

PIRLS surveys (Denmark: Danish

Technological Institute, 2005).


� New Zealand While New Zealand’saverage student attainment is strong, itsperformance on counts of equity ismore comparable with that of England,and both countries struggle with a longtail of underachievement. At the sametime, of all the countries under consid-eration, New Zealand’s cultural normsas well as governance structures exhibitthe most similarities with those ofEngland. We chose to proceed with theexpectation that its educational policyframeworks might prove particularlyinstructive for ongoing debates inEngland.

� Canada As with Finland, Canada wasan obvious contender as one of thehighest performing countries oncounts of equity and excellence. Sinceeducation in Canada is a provincialresponsibility, we chose to focus onthe provinces of Alberta and Ontario,as both have a reputation for cutting-edge reform.

Table 1.2 offers a snapshot of key character-istics of each country and province profiledin this study. The systems vary significantlyfrom England’s both in terms of the size ofthe student population and the number ofschools. Given these differences, how canfruitful comparisons be made?

First, the objective of this study was tolearn from systems which evidence sug-gests are doing a better job than the systemin England. Priority had to be placed onfinding systems that worked, before deter-mining which options were a better matchwith England. Furthermore, on closerscrutiny, there are dimensions of eachcountry’s education system which are com-parable and relevant to the English con-text: Alberta and Sweden’s choice frame-works; New Zealand’s governance struc-ture; high rates of immigration in Ontarioand Sweden; and the marketised system ofprovision in Hong Kong.

The challenge, then, was to examinethese countries, firmly grounded in theknowledge that ‘custom and law’ will ren-


16

28 See the chapters on each

country for source of data.

29 SBM: school-based manage-

ment.

30 Tri-level governance: governing

power is shared between national,

regional and local bodies.

NZ CAN: On CAN: Alb HK SAR Sweden

Student Population 760,761 2,124,957 584,004 894,711 995,457

Number of schools 2,573 5,723 1,970 1,196 4,908

Governance System National; high Federal; tri- Federal; tri- Federal; National; tri- SBM29 level level move to level governance

governance;30 governance; SBM move to SBMvarying varyingdegrees of degrees ofSBM SBM

Expenditure on 5% of GDP 2.59% of GDP 2.25% of GDP 3.5% of GDP 4.5% of GDPEducational Institutions

Demographic Maori & High Declining Declining Intergration ofChallenges Pasifika immigration student student immigrant

population rate; population; population; students;growth; rural/urban rural/urban decliningrural/urban disparity disparity studentdisparity population

Table 1.2: Key characteristics of case studies28




der some of their policies unfeasible inEngland, and yet keenly attuned to thepotential of informed change.

1.6 What methodology does thisstudy use?

One-on-one interviews The qualitative dimension of our studyfocuses on in-depth interviews with keyinformants from two broad categories:members of the policy community andpractitioners. The former group encom-passes individuals and organisations whoare (or were) actively involved in the devel-opment and provision of national (orprovincial) policy (e.g. government offi-cials), as well as stakeholder organisationsand academics who have influencednational policy. While we identified mostof our key informants through desk-basedresearch, we also sought recommendationsfrom these informants regarding otherindividuals and organisations whose viewswould provide additional insight.

School visits and focus groupsVisits to effective schools in each countrywere organised. Here, ‘effective schools’were defined as schools ‘performing againstthe odds’, that is, performing above expec-tations despite the challenges of their stu-dent demographic (e.g. a high percentageof students from low socio-economic back-grounds). With the exception of HongKong, we identified these schools with theassistance of the respective governments.In Hong Kong, school visits were arrangedwith the assistance of two key informants(one principal, one board member of a

sponsoring body).To supplement the one-on-one interviews, focus groups with headteachers were also held during researchtours of New Zealand and Ontario.Unfortunately, due to time constraints,similar sessions were not feasible inAlberta, Hong Kong and Sweden.

IssuesThroughout our research, we have attempt-ed to ensure the representation of a broadrange of viewpoints. However, owing to thefact that participation in this study was on avoluntary basis, the size and composition ofour samples has depended on the interestand goodwill of the local education commu-nities. Where gaps in our understandinghave been perceived, we have sought to rec-tify them through further desk-basedresearch and follow-up interviews.

We acknowledge that since we workedwith a small sample of interviewees in eachcountry, our findings are not statisticallysignificant. However, we successfullygained access to the ministries of eachcountry, as well as to high-ranking officialsof key stakeholder organisations. As such,we are confident that, while not statistical-ly significant, our findings provide insightinto the education debate in each country.

These case studies are not, of course,intended to serve as a comprehensivereview of every aspect of each country’s orprovince’s policies. In what follows, wehighlight the most pertinent elements(from an English perspective) of each sys-tem. Thus, for example, while the avail-ability of effective teachers is of significantconcern in all countries profiled, it is con-sidered in detail in only two out of the fourfollowing chapters.


2New Zealand

Point England Primary School is a 450-student, decile 1 school. This designationindicates that it is in the 10 per cent ofNew Zealand schools with the highest pro-portion of students from disadvantagedsocio-economic communities.31 Ninety-five per cent of its students are Māori andPasifika32 – groups consistently over-repre-sented in New Zealand’s lower achieve-ment bands, and that historically havebeen under-served.

Fifteen years ago, Point England was astruggling school: its students were readingtwo to three years behind their chronolog-

ical age; mathematical scores were 20 percent behind the national average; and stu-dent rolls were falling due to ‘brain flight’33

Despite the best intentions of teachers andfamilies, the school community was paral-ysed by low expectations. Student per-formance, it seemed, was as good as it wasgoing to get.

Concerted strategic planning, however –driven by a motivated team and informedby cycles of goal-setting, evaluation andinnovative curriculum development – isturning things around. Point England nowcollects extensive assessment data for each

18

31 All state schools are given a

decile rating. Decile 1 refers to the

10 per cent of schools with the

highest proportion of students

from low socio-economic com-

munities, whereas decile 10 rep-

resents the 10 per cent of schools

with the lowest proportion of such

students.

32 Refers to students (commonly,

first- or second-generation immi-

grants) from the small Pacific

Island nations of Samoa, Tonga,

Fiji, Nuie and the Cook Islands.

33 http://www.tki.org.nz/r/student

_outcomes/casestudy_ptengland

_e.php.

34 Education at a Glance (Paris:

OECD, 2007), Table A1.2a, p. 37

35 Ibid., Table A1.3a, p. 38.

36 Ibid., Table B1.1b, p. 187;

expenditure is reported in equiva-

lent US dollars using purchasing

power parity (PPP) exchange

rates; for primary, secondary and

post-secondary, non-tertiary edu-

cation.

37 For primary, secondary and


cation.

38 Ibid., Table B2.1, p. 205.

39 Ibid., Table B4.1, p. 230.

Indicator New Zealand OECD average United Kingdom

Percentage of population, aged 25 to

64, that has attained at least upper

secondary education (2005)34 79 68 67

Percentage of population, aged 25 to 64,

that has attained a tertiary

qualification (2005)35 27 26 30

Annual expenditure per student on core

services, ancillary services and research

and development (2004)36 $5,815 $6,608 $6,656

Expenditure on educational institutions37

as a percentage of GDP (2004)38 5.0 3.8 4.4

Public expenditure on education as a

percentage of total public expenditure (2004)39 15.1 9.2 8.7

Table 2.1. Comparison of selected indicators


student and analyses these data on multi-ple levels (by class, age group, ethnicgroup, gender, English-as-a-Second-Language learners, etc). School leadershave also committed themselves to track-ing the value-added performance of eachstudent, with the explicit goal of ensuringthat all students operate at their chrono-logical age within three years of studying atPoint England.

In 2001, student achievement enteredthe lower band of the national average inliteracy and numeracy, a remarkableaccomplishment which continues to galva-nize further efforts towards change. In theprocess, the school has blazed an interna-tional trail in the use of digital technolo-gies to foster learning. Four days a week,students produce a sophisticated news bul-letin showcasing student work from everyclass. Weekly highlights are pulled togeth-er to create a 15-minute programme(schoolTV) that is broadcast throughoutAuckland every Wednesday evening. Since1995, the school has also published aweekly podcast on New Zealand authors(the first regular international podcastfrom a primary school). The podcast spentfour months on the iTunes Top 20Download List and, to the glee of theschool community, was at number 19 for awhile, one rank ahead of President GeorgeBush at number 20.40

Point England now collaborates withother schools in the Tamaki area onschooling improvement initiatives aimedat raising achievement. While the clusterworks in partnership with the Ministryof Education, Principal Russell Burt wasquick to note that ‘our cluster was thefirst in New Zealand to put our hand upand say, we want to cluster. We were thefirst non-government, non-top-downdriven schooling improvement initia-tive.’ Local ownership of reform, spurredby high professional motivation, is seenas an essential factor in the school’s suc-cess.

Despite the large gains that PointEngland has made over the past decade,Russell expresses serious concern over afundamental tension between the desireto move towards a ‘21st century’ digitaleducation and the education system’sconventional focus on ‘paper and pencil’literacies. Thus, while the school is com-mitted to students achieving in the foun-dational domains of literacy and numera-cy (‘because they have to’), Russellremains frustrated by the continued useof a narrow set of indicators for studentsuccess:

There are no standardised assessmentsfor the new education paradigm. So thestuff we do well at we can’t prove thatwe excel at nationally because we’re notgiven the opportunity to do so … thekids need to know that they can cele-brate and that it’s genuine, as genuineas the test that they didn’t do well at.41

These concerns are by no means novel toobservers of any post-industrial educa-tion system. The ability to strike a bal-ance between the demand for high aca-demic achievement and the developmentof other skill sets continues to elude mostsystems. Nevertheless, Point England’sstory does illustrate several notable fea-tures of the New Zealand education sys-tem: its clear focus on student outcomesthrough the collection and analysis ofstudent performance data; a real capacityto innovate at the school and classroomlevel; and the bottom-up nature ofreform that characterises the educationscene.42

2.1 Setting the scene There are approximately 2,600 schools inNew Zealand. In absolute terms, that’s afairly small number, particularly whenone considers that England alone admin-isters approximately 24,000 schools.


New Zealand

40 Point England’s podcasts and

vodcasts can be found on this

page: http://www.ptengland.

school.nz/index.php?family=1,871

41 Interview with Russell Burt

42 This representation was chal-

lenged by one of the chapter’s

reviewers, who argued that New

Zealand has a mix of both top-

down and bottom-up drivers for

reform. While not disputing the

fact that Ministry initiatives and

legislation have shaped reform

trajectories, the high level of devo-

lution to individual schools, com-

bined with the government’s

deliberate decision to limit the use

of heavy-handed, top-down man-

dates, has created an environ-

ment wherein the pace of reform

is significantly impacted by the

buy-in of individual school boards.


Relative to the size of its school-goingpopulation, however, 2,600 is a large fig-ure and one that is inflated by the logisticsof providing education in sparsely popu-lated rural areas.

Compulsory education in New Zealandlasts ten years, and is divided into threephases: primary (Years 1 to 6), intermediate(Years 7 to 8) and secondary (Years 9 to13).44 Most schools cater for a specific phase,although it is increasingly common tomerge the intermediate years with primaryor secondary education. In some rural areas,a single school, known as an area school,will provide all-through education.

The majority of students in NewZealand attend one of several types ofschools in the public sector: ‘regular’ stateschools; Kura kaupapa Māori, where teach-ing is in the Māori language (te reo Māori)and based on Māori culture and values;‘integrated schools’ (former private schoolsthat have been brought into the state sys-tem); ‘special schools’ for students withspecial education needs; and designated‘character schools’, which espouse a partic-ular ethos that is typically religious orphilosophical in nature. The private sectoris relatively small, with just 3.93 per centof the student population (29,895 stu-dents) studying in independent schools.45

As noted, all state and state-integratedschools are given a decile rating based onthe extent to which the school draws its stu-

dents from disadvantaged socio-economiccommunities. While the decile ranking wasinitially created to assist with the allocationof school funds, parents frequently use it asa short-hand indicator for school quality,leading to the stigmatisation of lower-decileschools (generally, deciles 1 to 3). The pre-vailing stereotype is that students at suchinstitutions are less academically able, andthat the schools are less effective owing to alack of first-rate personnel. Perhaps due tothis stigma, researchers have found that stu-dents tend to gravitate from low-decileschools towards high-decile schools when-ever possible.46

In general, however, New Zealand parentsreport relatively high levels of satisfactionwith the public school system. In 2006, anational survey of schools by the NewZealand Council for Education Researchreported that 79 per cent of parents are gen-erally happy with their children’s schools anda similar level was found in 2003; only 9 percent of parents were critical of the quality oftheir children’s education.47

Further information on the operationaland governance processes of the system canbe found in the appendices.

2.2 History of reform In August 1988, New Zealand launchedthe Tomorrow’s Schools agenda – a sweep-ing set of reforms which markedly reorgan-


20

43 ‘Education Statistics of New

Zealand (2006)’: http://www.

educationcounts.edcentre.

govt.nz/publications/homepages/

education-statistics/ed-stats-

2006.html.

44 Compulsory education ends at

Year 10.

45 ‘New Zealand School Roll

2006’: http://www.education

counts.govt.nz/themes/national_s

chool_roll_projections.

46 E. Fiske and B. Ladd, When

Schools Compete: A cautionary

tale (Washington, DC: Brookings

Institute Press, 2000).

47 C. Wylie, ‘School Governance

in New Zealand – How is it work-

ing?’ (Wellington: New Zealand

Council for Educational Research,

2007).

Authority No. of schools No. of pupils No. of teachers

State 2,141 647,443

State Integrated 327 83,423

Private Sector 105 29,895 2,423

Total 2,573 760,761 52,548

Table 2.2. Number of schools, pupils and teachers in the primary and secondary sector for 200643

50,125


ised the system of education governance ina move to devolve power from a centraland regional bureaucracy to each individ-ual school and its community. The speedwith which the New Zealand governmentdismantled and rebuilt its education sys-tem was unprecedented. The timeline forimplementation was set at 14 months,48 aperiod which for any large-scale bureaucra-cy constitutes an overnight change. Whatmade the remarkable scale and pace ofNew Zealand’s reforms possible?49

In 1984, amidst considerable economicuncertainty, a new Labour governmentunder David Lange was elected to powerwith a broad mandate for reform. In theensuing months, the government adoptedthe mantra of efficiency and equity, and nosector of public administration or servicewas spared its scrutiny. The Department ofEducation came under attack from mar-ginalised parents and students, high-levelbureaucrats and ministers from the power-ful Department of Labour, and theTreasury, and from the media. In July1987, Prime Minister Lange established a‘Task Force to Review EducationAdministration’, with businessman BrianPicot as its chair.50

In May 1988, the Picot task force pub-lished its recommendations, the most sig-nificant of which was the elimination of allregional administrative bodies (i.e. the dis-trict education boards) as well as theDepartment of Education. The latterwould be replaced by a notably smallerMinistry of Education whose primaryresponsibility would be to set national pol-icy guidelines. All other management oradministrative decisions would bedevolved to a school-based level on thegrounds that ‘This is where there will bethe strongest direct interest in the educa-tional outcomes and the best informationabout local circumstances.’51 The report’srecommendations were readily adopted byParliament, and work on implementationbegan immediately.

The months following these momen-tous reforms were politically tumul-tuous, as over twenty working groupsscurried to translate the Tomorrow’sSchools agenda into reality. HistoriansGraham and Susan Butterworth havenoted that this rapid pace of change wasmade possible by an extraordinary con-fluence of political will among stake-holders, not to mention Prime MinisterLange’s explicit support for the proposal.Strong public support for the idea ofparent trustees at the school level alsoderailed critics’ ability to mount aneffective counter-campaign.

The initial post-reform period wasdeeply challenging for the education com-munity. Despite the many barriers to suc-cessful implementation, research by gov-ernment and independent bodies (forexample, the New Zealand Council forEducation Research) indicates that theeducation community has fully embracedthe new governance system and has nodesire to turn back. Although decentralisa-tion policies are not uncommon amongnational educational systems (Englanditself underwent a similar policy trajectoryin the late 1980s), New Zealand is one ofthe few, perhaps the only, nation that hassteadfastly resisted reversing its devolvedmodel of governance. While the Ministryof Education has reinstated some measureof operational function in recent years (forexample, it has taken back responsibilityfor the provision of special education serv-ices), the locus of administration remainsfirmly with individual schools.

As a final note, the ambitious scope ofthe Tomorrow’s Schools agenda oftenovershadows a second and equally impor-tant wave of reform in the 1990s. LyallPerris, former Acting Education Secretaryfor New Zealand (1995–6), argues thatthis second wave was prompted by therecognition that the Tomorrow’s Schoolsagenda had less to do with actuallyimproving student learning than with


New Zealand

48 From the date the Tomorrow’s

Schools’ white paper was pub-

lished (August 1988), to the dead-

line for the closure of the existing

Department of Education (30

September 1989).

49 What follows is necessarily a

brief, and thus incomplete, sum-

mary of the events that led to the

development and implementation

of the Tomorrow’s Schools agen-

da. For a more complete discus-

sion of the complex (and

serendipitous) interplay between

stakeholders, see G. Butterworth

& S. Butterworth, Reforming

Education: The New Zealand

experience 1984–1996

(Palmerstone North: Dunmore

Press, 1998); Fiske and Ladd

(2000); and L. Perris, 1998.

Implementing Education Reforms

in New Zealand: 1987–1997,

Education Reform and

Management Series, Vol.1, No. 2

(1998).

50 G. Hawke, Education reform:

the New Zealand experience

(Auckland: New Zealand Trade

Consortium Working Paper No.

20, 2002), p.5 points out that

Picot was no novice to the public

sector, ‘having had experience in

public policy debates through the

New Zealand Planning Council

and who had experience in the

education sector through school

level governance including con-

tact with education of Māori’.Nonetheless, Picot’s appointment

was seen by some analysts (such

as Perris (1998)) as a clear signal

of the the government’s intention

to deliver education from a stand-

point of efficiency.

51 B. Picot, Administering for

Excellence: Effective administra-

tion in education (Wellington: The

Task Force, 1988).


improving the efficiency of the educationsystem’s management structure.Consequently, from 1991 to 1994, thegovernment introduced a national qualifi-cations framework which aimed to closethe division between vocational and aca-demic education and overhauled thenational curriculum.52

By contrast, the past decade has been arelatively quiet period for educationreform. While the Ministry of Educationhas adjusted some policies (for instance,rewriting student admission policies toensure greater equity in its choice system),the dominant framework has remained thesame. Currently, the most notable reformconcerns the introduction of a new nation-al qualification for secondary students, theNational Certificate of EducationAchievement (NCEA).

2.3 New Zealand in the literatureIn the international literature, NewZealand is used to argue for and against thecreation of a marketised system of choiceand competition. Advocates argue thatmarket reforms within the education sec-tor substantially improved education per-formance, expanded cost-efficiency andincreased parental voice.53 Critics, on theother hand, claim that unchecked compe-tition between schools has produced high-er rates of racial and economic segregation,and correspondingly increased polarisationbetween schools.54

A review of existing evidence reveals,however, that there is no conclusive evi-dence that choice policies have eitherraised educational standards or increasedschool segregation in New Zealand.55 Atworst, research suggests some increase insegregation, although government steps toaddress this issue (through increased con-trol over school enrolment policies) maycurb or reverse this trend. At best, theTomorrow’s Schools agenda has certainlygiven parents a greater voice within the sys-

tem, although the extent to which this hasoccurred is debatable.56

New Zealand generally performs well ininternational studies, achieving scores sig-nificantly above the international (PIRLS,TIMSS) and OECD (PISA) mean. Exam -ples of particularly strong performancesinclude:

� The results from PISA 2006, in whichonly two countries outperform NewZealand in science, three countries inreading and five countries in mathe-matics. New Zealand’s performancewas similar in each of these domains tothat of countries such as Canada andAustralia and was significantly betterthan that of the United Kingdom.

� The PISA 2003 reading tests, in which16.3 per cent of New Zealand studentsperformed at the top proficiency level –the highest level of all participatingcountries. Similarly, in 2006 both NewZealand and Finland had a larger pro-portion of students performing at thehighest proficiency level in science thanthe other 55 countries in the study.

Extended analysis of international andnational data, however, reveals seriousachievement gaps. New Zealand has ahigh proportion of students in the lowestlevels of proficiency when compared tocountries with similar average student per-formance. More pointedly, as Figure 2.1illustrates, students from Māori andPasifika backgrounds are consistentlyover-represented in the lower achievementbands of schools, regardless of the school’ssocio-economic composition. Additionally,Figure 2.2 illustrates that while the per-centage of school-leavers with no formalattainment has been steadily decreasingfor all ethnic groups, Māori and Pasifikastudents still underperform.

The performance of the Māori andPasifika populations is of particular con-cern as population growth projections


22

52 Note that these reforms built

on a major consultative curriculum

review that was carried out by the

Department of Education in

1986–7. The Tomorow’s Schools

reform agenda, however, delayed

the completion of the curriculum

redevelopment.

53 See, for example, M. Harrison,

Education Matters: Governments,

markets and New Zealand

schools (Wellington: Education

Forum, 2004).

54 See, for example, Fiske and

Ladd (2000). Note, though, that

this particular publication has itself

been heavily criticised.

55 See N. LaRocque, ‘School

Choice: Lessons from New

Zealand’, Briefing Paper No. 12,

Education Forum (2005).

56 Ibid


indicate that these groups are growing at asignificantly higher rate than thePākehā(European New Zealanders) popu-lation (29 per cent and 59 per centrespectively, compared to the Pākehāgrowth rate of 5 per cent). These groupsalso have significantly younger age struc-tures than the Pākehā population, which

will have an impact on the ethnic compo-sition of New Zealand’s school-age popu-lation.58

These ethnic disparities extend to stu-dent engagement as well. The recent 2006State of Education official documentreported that Māori students are at leastthree times as likely to be stood down, sus-


New Zealand

57 Cited in J. Hattie, Schools like

Mine: Cluster analysis of New

Zealand schools, Technical Report

14, Project asTTle (University of

Auckland, 2002).

58 Statistics New Zealand,

National Ethnic Population

Projections: 2001 (base) – 2021

update (2005):http://www.stats.

govt.nz/store/2006/07/national-

ethnic-population-projections-

01(base)%E2%80%9321-update-

hotp.htm

How do the socio-economic profiles of the different school deciles compare?

A 2001 comparison of the socio-economic profiles of schools at different deciles reveals significantvariation: ‘On average, over half of parents in decile 1 school catchments are without a school qual-ification, compared to less than a fifth of parents in decile 10 school catchment areas. Forty-two percent of parents in decile 1 school catchments received income support in the year preceding theCensus, compared to 7 per cent for decile 10 school catchment areas. Eighty-four per cent of stu-dents in decile 1 schools are Māori or Pacific Islands students, compared with just 5 per cent in decile10 schools.’57

Is there a correlation between deciles and academic performance? Given that socio-economic status is one of the strongest indicators of prior attainment, and thatdecile ratings reflect the school’s average socio-economic composition, there is a strong correlationbetween school deciles and academic achievement. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, students from the low-est quintile (quintile 1 = decile 1 and 2) schools are four times as likely to leave school with little orno formal attainment as compared to students from the top quintile (quintile 5 = decile 9 and 10)schools.

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

1 2 3 4 5

Maori

Pasifika

Asian

European/Pakeha

Total

Quintile

Per

cent

age

of s

choo

l lea

vers

Figure 2.1 Percentage of school leavers with little or no formal attainment, by ethnic group and school quintile (2006)


pended, excluded or expelled59 as theirPākehā counterparts, and four times aslikely to be frequent truants. Māori stu-dents are also 2.8 times more likely to leaveschool early.60

Accordingly, New Zealand has made theachievement of equity a fundamental cor-nerstone of the education system. TheMinistry of Education’s statement of intentfor 2007–12 reflects this priority: ‘TheMinistry of Education’s overall mission isto raise educational achievement andreduce disparity.’61 Indeed, the significantmajority of our interviewees identifiedequity as the most pressing challenge fac-ing the system.

To address the equity challenges facedby the Māori and Pasifika community, theMinistry of Education has developed adedicated education strategy for eachcommunity. Both the Māori and Pasifikastrategies explicitly recognise the needsand aspirations of each community. Forinstance, the overarching strategic out-come for the Māori education strategy is‘Māori students enjoying educational suc-cess as Māori’,62 which includes theexpectation that the education systemshould support Māori learners to con-tribute as Māori to Te Ao Māori (the

Māori world) as well as to wider societyand the world.

What is particularly unique about bothstrategies is the way in which each commu-nity’s culture has been integrated into thelearning process and curriculum. Thus, theMāori education strategy is built aroundthe Māori concept of ‘ako’.

Ako means teaching and learning wherethe educator is also learning and whereeducators’ practices are informed by thelatest research and are both deliberate andreflective. It is grounded in the principle ofreciprocity where both the teacher and thelearner give and receive.63

Two central dimensions of ako are thatculture counts (‘knowing where studentscome from and building on what studentsbring with them’) and that each stakehold-er brings to the table valuable knowledgeand expertise that can be used to build pro-ductive partnerships. Consequently, con-siderable effort has been made to engagenot just Māori students and their parents,but also other Māori whānau64 and iwi65

organisations. The Ministry has alsosought to improve the capacity and capa-bility of all staff in working with Māori soas to ensure that the goals and values of theMāori education strategy are embedded


24

59 ‘Students on stand-down are

not allowed to attend school for a

period of up to five days.

Following stand-downs, students

return automatically to school.

Students who are suspended are

not allowed to attend school until

the board of trustees decides the

outcome at a suspension meet-

ing. Students who are excluded

are not allowed to return to the

school and must enrol elsewhere.

Only students under the age of 16

can be excluded. If they are over

the age of 16, they would receive

similar treatment but it would be

classified as an expulsion’

(Ministry of Education, New

Zealand State of Education: 2006,

pp. 92–4).

60 In New Zealand, 15-year-olds

are granted early exemption if i) it

is judged that the student is

unlikely to gain further benefit

from the available schools; and ii)

students are moving on to a train-

ing programme or to employment.

While early exemption is intended

to facilitate the student’s progres-

sion to a different pathway, it can

represent a ‘Get out of jail free’

card for disengaged youth and,

presumably, hard-pressed

schools.

61 Ministry of Education,

Statement of Intent: 2007-2012,

p. 13.

62 Ministry of Education, Ka

Hikitia: Managing for Success:

The Draft Māori EducationStrategy for 2008–2012 (2007).

63 Ibid., p. 20.

64 Defined by the Ministry as:

‘Those related by close kinship

ties or united by close relation-

ships akin to the bonds of family.

As used here it includes whaka-

papa whānau (family by lineage)but does not exclude kaupapa

whānau (family through associa-tion, such as work colleagues).’

http://kahikitia.minedu.

govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/C0CCCBBC

-6C4C-4D38-8EB2-

E972D0CE1325/0/FinalKaHikitiaG

lossaryandReferences.pdf

65 Tribe.

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

45.0

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Year

Maori

Pasifika

Asian

Oth er

Europ ea n/Pakeha

Total

Per

cent

age

of s

choo

l lea

vers

Figure 2.2: Percentage of school-leavers with little or no formal attainmentby ethnic group (1993-2006)


within the larger planning framework andoperational culture.

2.4 Findings

2.4.1 Focusing on student outcomesRecent reforms have focused heavily on theimportance of data in informing practice.The Education Standards Act of 2001, forinstance, required every school board tocollect and analyse individual and aggre-gate student performance data, to setimprovement targets and goals, and toreport on progress towards achieving thosegoals. This focus on detailed, comprehen-sive assessment data was unanimouslyembraced by our interviewees, althoughthey acknowledged that analytical sophisti-cation had yet to be achieved.

Part of the problem, interviewees noted,was that New Zealand has no external, sys-tem-wide assessment of student learning(i.e. summative assessment) until Year 11(age 16) when students take the NationalCertificate of Educational Achievement(NCEA), the national qualification forsenior secondary students.66 Prior to theNCEA, schools are not required to sharethe results of their internal assessments ofstudent learning with the Ministry.

The closest thing New Zealand has to asystem of national assessment for primaryand intermediate students is the NationalEducation Monitoring Project (NEMP),which assesses Year 4 and Year 8 students.Using random samples of students, NEMPmeasures achievement across all curriculumareas (including reading, writing and math-ematics) in four-year cycles to give a pictureof progress across time. Inform ation on stu-dent motivation and attitudes is also collect-ed. As the focus of NEMP is on growth instudents’ educational achievement acrosstime and at a national level, information onindividual students and schools are notreported and information on teachers is notcollected. Thus, while NEMP is capable of

producing extremely rich snapshots of over-all student performance at a particular pointof time in the education system, it can onlyprovide broad demographic information67

on who is underperforming, where, andunder what circumstances.

Another major assessment tool in use isthe Assessment Tools for Teaching andLearning (asTTle).68 AsTTle allowsteachers to create tests to gauge individualstudents’ achievement against curriculumlevels, objectives and population norms,and was developed with the concept ofevidence-based practice in mind. Aftertests are scored, analyses can be conduct-ed on the individual, class and schoollevel to enable both teachers and studentsto identify gaps between current and tar-geted performance, so that teachers cangauge the extent of student learning ateach step.

Nevertheless, as with much of the NewZealand system, the use of asTTle remainsvoluntary. The Ministry acknowledged thatthey were keen to see further adoption (atthe time of writing it was estimated thatonly 30 per cent of schools currently use thistool). At the same time, however, theMinistry firmly believes that individualschools are best placed to identify the toolsneeded to raise their students’ achievement.An official argued: ‘Increasingly, we giveschools more sophisticated tools to use, butwe are not going to tell them which to useor how they should use them . . . unlike inthe UK, we have chosen to use differenttools for different purposes rather than mak-ing one assessment serve different purposes.’

School flexibility to conduct their ownassessments and to choose their own toolsappears to have created mixed outcomes.On the one hand, autonomy has fosteredextensive curricular and pedagogical inno-vation. One principal, for instance,referred to his teachers as ‘curriculumdevelopers’, a term that would hardly everbe used to describe English teachers. Thisautonomy has also provided the impetus


New Zealand

66 Even then, not all students

enter for NCEA as it is not a com-

pulsory qualification.

67 Demographic subgroups are

defined by ethnicity, gender, lan-

guage used at home, school type,

school size, school socio-eco-

nomic status, community size and

zone.

68 asTTle is one of several

assessment tools being devel-

oped by the Ministry that provide

national benchmarks against

which schools can measure

themselves.


for developing strong expert-practitionercollaborations in various schoolingimprovement initiatives. These collabora-tions typically bring external researchers(generally from the local university) along-side individual school leaders to formulateevidence-informed practices and to buildcapacity within the school community towork with data.

On the other hand, the lack of a nation-al reporting system means that there is noguarantee that schools are collecting,analysing and utilising information in themost effective manner. Indeed, our respon-dents frequently expressed frustration thatschools excelled at collecting data butfailed – sometimes dismally – at interpret-ing the information collected. Further -more, the absence of system-wide assess-ment prior to the NCEA (and the subse-quent public release of school and nationaldata) removes the potential for compara-tive analysis to catalyse educationalimprovement. Practitioners interviewedfrom the primary sector were therefore farless likely to identify national standards asa force for reform than practitioners work-ing in the secondary sector. Ministry offi-cials also reported that minimal data col-lection on a national level made it difficultfor the government to effectively track stu-dent progress and develop interventions.

Our interviewees varied significantly inwhat they thought needed to be done toaddress these weaknesses. Responsesranged from those desiring some form ofnational assessment from the very start ofprimary school to those adamantly

opposed to any kind of testing during theprimary phases. One primary school prin-cipal, for example, vehemently assertedthat ‘I have a problem with the word stan-dards … the phrases “High standards forall” [and] “No child left behind” send ashiver up my spine.’

Despite these differences, intervieweesuniformly expressed strong opposition tothe development of a high-stakes testingsystem. Interestingly enough, many inter-viewees were well briefed on the perverseincentives England’s high-stakes assessmentand reporting framework have created, andwere not hesitant to use this as an exampleof what they wished to avoid. Respondentsstressed that the objective of assessmentshould always be to inform student learn-ing; testing, they argued, should never be atool for simplistic national judgements oflocal school conditions. There was a broad-based reluctance to see education reducedto a narrow set of easily testable measuresand to sacrifice the considerable curriculumautonomy enjoyed by individual schools.

2.4.2 Increasing transparency andaccountabilityResearch by NZCER (New ZealandCouncil for Educational Research) sug-gests that the planning and reportingframework introduced in the EducationStandards Act 2001 has generated ‘positiveshifts in awareness of the intended out-comes for the planning and reportingprocess … schools are all now setting goalswith the learning needs of their students inmind.’69 Despite these gains, interviewswith a broad cross-section of stakeholderssuggest that these changes have yet to befully embedded within the system, andthat New Zealand may still have a way togo before the accountability levers areoperating evenly across the system.

It was therefore not uncommon to hearconflicting assessments of New Zealand’sprogress in increasing accountability. For


26

69 R. Hipkins, C. Joyce and C.

Wylie, ‘School Planning and

Reporting in Action: The Early

Years of the New Framework’

(Wellington: New Zealand Council

for Educational Research, 2007).

“ Respondents stressed that the objective of assessment

should always be to inform student learning; testing, they

argued, should never be a tool for simplistic national judge-

ments of local school conditions”


instance, one education official mused:‘We’re meant to be a tight, loose, tight sys-tem. Tight goals, loose means, tight ends.The problem is, we’re really operatingmore on a tight, loose, loose level … Wehaven’t quite come to terms with the taskof holding schools accountable.’ Otherofficials, however, strongly disagreed withthis representation, drawing on the prom-ising changes being engendered by theplanning and reporting framework.

Within the current accountability frame-work, school principals and staff are heldaccountable to their board of trustees, whoare in turn accountable to the Ministry andsubject to regular review by the EducationReview Office (ERO) as well as to parentsand local communities. Each of these ele-ments will be examined in turn.

Trustee boardsStudies indicate that there are often signifi-cant disparities in capability among schoolboards, with especially small and lower-decileschools confronted with challenges in recruit-ing suitable board candidates. For instance,the 2006 NZCER survey of secondaryschool principals found that respondents atlower-decile schools were half as likely astheir mid- to high-decile counterparts tobelieve that their board of trustees had theexpertise and skills necessary to fulfil theirgoverning role.70 Another study revealed thatboards experience particular difficulty inmonitoring curriculum delivery and studentachievement, as well as in developing coher-ent policies for reporting to parents.71

Thus, despite high ambitions, a lack ofexpertise may render boards reliant on theguidance of school principals, diminishingtheir ability to provide checks on the per-formance of professional staff. Several ofour interviewees pressed this point. Oneformer principal noted: ‘As a principal itwas my job to do the work and make itlook as if the trustees had done it . . . I hadsome great boards, but a lot of them hadno idea, and yet they were very interested

and very keen. They brought a new per-spective into the school, but they don’thave the time to commit to it.’

Nonetheless, where highly capableboards are able to exert pressure they can beimportant levers for accountability andchange. Another principal, referring to hisschool’s schooling improvement initiative,remarked more positively: ‘The reason we’vedone what we’ve done is that a group of uson the board had the passion to do it, sowe[’ve] done it . . . they may not be drivingthe bus, but they’re close to the front of it.’

Despite lingering concerns over capacityand capability, a recent report on schoolgovernance concluded that few if anyproblems with boards are ‘so deep, wide-spread, intransigent or costly to studentlearning that one would want to eithermove to another form of school gover-nance or ditch the governance layer com-pletely’.72 Indeed, officials at the NewZealand School Trustees Association(NZSTA) expressed confidence thatboards of trustees are enhancing their abil-ity to exercise accountability, and that con-cerns with the ability of school boards toanalyse and use data was board-specificrather than nationwide.

The Education Review OfficeThe ERO inspects individual schools onaverage once every three years. While thereis a baseline of key indicators that the EROconsistently investigates, the focus of eachreview differs according both to ERO-identified national interests and to theschools’ self-identified areas for improve-ment.73 Where performance has beendeemed poor, post-review assistance ismade available and supplementary reviewsare conducted within a year. Currently,about 15 per cent of schools reviewed ineach cycle undergo supplementary reviews,and within this subset only 3 to 4 per centof schools are truly struggling.74

To date, there is no hard evidence as towhether or not inspections work. In gener-


New Zealand

70 Wylie (2007).

71 V. Robinson and H. Timperley,

‘Strengthening Education in

Mangere and Otara: Final

Evaluation Report’ (Auckland:

University of Auckland, School of

Education, 2004).

72 Wylie (2007).

73 For an in-depth explanation of

the ERO review process, see the

following ERO documents:

‘Framework for Reviews’ and

‘Evaluation Indicators for

Education Reviews in Schools’,

available at http://ero.govt.nz/ero

/publishing.nsf/Content/

Review%20Process%20-

%20Schools.

74 From interview with Education

Review Office representative.


al, however, respondents (and especiallyprincipals) were somewhat dismissive ofthe ERO’s ability to hold schools toaccount and to bolster educationalimprovement. Common critiques (whichwill be familiar to English educators)include: (i) that review criteria rely tooheavily on processes rather than outcomes;(ii) that review criteria act as a managerialchecklist rather than as a constructive eval-uation of school performance; and (iii)that changing foci of inspections detractschools from developing sustainable pro-grammes for improvement. As one princi-pal noted: ‘There is a lot of game playing… when you know you have an ERO visitcoming, you ring the last five schools, askthem what they were looking at, what theyfound, and then you go and fix thosethings for a start.’ Other concerns dealtwith the consequences of an ERO review,with some respondents arguing that therewas a lack of rigorous intervention ifschools received a poor review.75

Some respondents did, however,acknowledge that the ERO’s reports canserve as a wake-up call for poorly perform-ing schools. In fact, StrengtheningEducation in Mangere and Otara(SEMO)76 – a highly successful localimprovement initiative – was developed asa response to a 1996 ERO review thatheavily criticised the quality of school gov-ernance and student performance in thatdistrict. Furthermore, internal research byERO suggests that 90 per cent of schoolssay that ‘the impact of the ERO review andreport was high or very high’, with only 10per cent of schools saying that the ‘reviewprovided little impetus for change and therecommendations did not appear to haveany great significance for the school’.77 Itappears, therefore, that while some EROreviews can galvanise low-attainingschools, the benefits from routine, three-year review cycles of all schools are morecontested. It is questionable, for example,whether ERO’s focus on a narrow band of

indicators can successfully provide schoolsalready meeting national targets with thesupport they require in order to furtherraise the bar. Unsurprisingly, one principalof a rapidly improving school underscoredthis incapacity:

ERO comes in and basically carries outa thing that is pretty much like an auditand gives you some summative informa-tion, but really refuses to hold with youany meaningful learning conversations.And you don’t get the same people com-ing back to you next time, so that there’sno ongoing relationship so you can havea learning relationship … And theydon’t share information with you fromother contexts so that you can learn . . .it’s a really frustrating process. It’s not alearning method at all.

Reporting to parents Prior to the introduction of the planningand reporting framework, there were fewguidelines on the precise form that report-ing to students and their parents on theachievement of individual students shouldtake. In 2000, for example, one studyanalysed school reports to parents from156 schools in New Zealand. Of theseschools, only 12 included informationrelating student performance to the officialcurriculum levels, and half included noinformation on achievement relative to anyimplicit or explicit standard. With fewexceptions, the majority of students inthese schools were above-average achiev-ers.78

Two recent national surveys of practi-tioners and trustees suggest, however, thatthe situation has improved. For instance,two-thirds of primary schools now reportthe use of clear and measurable goals, anda quarter of primary schools have putprocesses in place for discussing planningwith and reporting results to parents.79 Yetinterviews with stakeholders suggest thatthere are still barriers to transparent report-


28

75 Under the Education Act, the

Secretary of Education retains the

powers to intervene and enforce

and can act on the advice in the

ERO’s reports.

76 SEMO’s work will be dis-

cussed later in the chapter.

77 ERO, Annual Report 2006.

78 R. Peddie & J. A. Hattie,

Evaluation of the Assessment for

Better Learning Professional

Development Programs (ABel)

(Report #703) (Wellington: Ministry

of Education, 2000).

79 Hipkins et al. (2007).


ing. The three most commonly identifiedbarriers are: (i) lack of understanding ofthe type of information parents expected;(ii) teachers’ unwillingness to provideinformation that could be used to criticisetheir performance; and (iii) reluctance totrust parents’ responses to informationabout their children’s underperformance.

Another recent study indicates that theproblem of developing an appropriate poli-cy for reporting to parents may be exacer-bated by technical difficulties. Robinsonand Timperley found that teachers were, infact, committed to providing parents clearand honest reporting80 but lacked the toolsto assure full clarity and comprehensive-ness. For example, some teachers regardedcurriculum levels as too broad to serve as anefficacious guideline for student progress.81

In the New Zealand curriculum, each levelspans 18+ months of progress; there istherefore no straightforward correlationbetween attainment and age.

According to the ERO representative, therationale for these broad levels (while notnecessarily advocating them herself ) is thatit helps to ‘emphasise that students withinany class will legitimately be working acrossdifferent levels’. Some argue, however, thatthe lack of a clear age-related standard mak -es accountability more contestable. As anof ficial from the New Zealand SchoolTrustees Association remarked: ‘For therun-of-the-mill parent it is very confusingand you really don’t know until your childsits NCEA (age 16) where they sit national-ly unless the school is very, very good atusing the data and pushing it down to par-ents and clearly defining what the datameans.’

The need to generate comprehensivepolicies for reporting to parents is particu-larly crucial when one considers the factthat the move to school-based manage-ment in 1989 was largely motivated byparental dissatisfaction over the unrespon-siveness of schools to their concerns andpreferences.82 If it is indeed desirable for

parents as well as local school communitiesto share responsibility for student (andschool) achievement, then words like ‘hon-esty’ and ‘clarity’ need to move beyond dis-course to practice.

As the ‘Telling it how it is’ case studyoverleaf illustrates,83 when a strong frame-work for a free flow of informationbetween parents and the school is devel-oped, the results can be transformative.

2.4.3 Building collaborationAs a result of New Zealand’s radical app -roach to school-based management, eachschool can be said to operate as a mini fief-dom. Under such circumstances, collabora-tion between schools is not just about thetransfer of good practice and the develop-ment of professional learning communities,popular as those goals are in current litera-ture. Collaboration is also about the urgentneed to build economies of scale (two ruralschools sharing teaching staff, for example).

The issue of collaboration, however,appears to unsettle principals and boards oftrustees, who remain apprehensive of anyinitiative that may result in an erosion ofschool autonomy. As early as 1998/1999,for instance, the government, in a review ofschool-based governance, proposed thedevelopment of ‘learning clusters’ toenhance teaching practice and facilitateprofessional development. But the responsefrom school leaders was unenthusiastic, andthe proposal was quietly shelved.

This defensiveness is even more appar-ent when the issue of school closures (par-ticularly relevant now as New Zealandconfronts falling rolls) is raised. As oneNZSTA official explained, by makingschools more responsive to their surround-ing communities, local ownership hasincreased. As these new, strong tiesbetween schools and community becomesacrosanct, local stakeholders exhibit areadiness to fight tooth and nail to keeptheir schools open – even when it is not


New Zealand

80 Defined here as referencing

student achievement to national

curriculum levels.

81 Robinson and Timperley

(2004).

82 cf. Taskforce to Review

Education Administration, 1988.

83 We are grateful to Brian Annan

of the Te Puna o te Matauranga

office in Manukau for the use of

this excerpt


necessarily in the best interests of their stu-dents to do so.

Furthermore, at higher levels of nation-al oversight and review, government poli-cies do not always stimulate collaborationand the consolidation of resources. Underthe current funding scheme, for instance,schools below a certain student size receivea block grant. If, however, two smallschools were to merge and their numberscross the designated threshold, then theunified school would cease to be funded bya block grant but by a per-pupil formula.The result would be an allocation of fundssignificantly lower than the amountreceived as two separate schools.

Even ‘soft’ collaboration on best practiceis not as widespread as it could be. Membersof a Ministry’s schooling improv ement team

expressed concern that voluntary collabora-tion between schools is rare. Currently, theMinistry relies on financial incentives toencourage schools to build learning net-works for professional development, topartner on schooling improvement initia-tives and to nurture other innovative collab-orative frameworks. But once the fundingstops, so too do most of the collaborativepractices. Ad hoc collaboration, when nour-ished only by piecemeal funding schemes,does not become an established feature ofeducational practice – an important mes-sage for policy-makers in England.

At the same time, all stakeholders inter-viewed felt very strongly that a top-downapproach (i.e. legislation) would create abacklash among practitioners. As a mem-ber of the Ministry’s schooling improve-


30

Telling it how it is: widening and integrating responsibility for solving under-achievement problems.

Several researchers were contracted to track and to help reform the SEMO schooling improvementinitiative. During the first year of their review, these researchers maintained a low profile, watchingthe way the project unfolded. At the end of that year, however, they delivered some hard-hitting mes-sages. School leaders, they insisted, were avoiding the difficult task of talking about underachieve-ment problems with the targeted students and their families and teachers.

This team of researchers didn’t do what most people typically think researchers do, which is tohand over their data to those confronting the problem and leave them to it. They were experts atlinking research findings to specific development strategies. They sat down and talked with theschool leaders about the findings until everyone understood what they meant. They then helpedthose people transfer the findings into practice.

One principal, for instance, returned to her school and persuaded its staff and board of trusteesthat they were hiding the truth about low reading levels from the targeted students and their fami-lies. They agreed with her view. At the next parent-teacher interviews, targeted students and theirfamilies were offered reports that compared the students’ reading levels with national norms. Thatnight, the school hall was full of upset and angry parents and targeted students who found out forthe first time that they were two to three years behind where they should have been.

As difficult as that night was for everyone involved, the principal cleverly shifted ownership of theunderachievement problem from the governors and managers of the school to students, teachers andparents. It was a master stroke in distributing responsibility for solving the problems. Parents, eagerto reverse trends in their children’s underachievement, flocked to the school to learn how they couldhelp their children catch up in reading. The principal reported that there were more parents in theschool over the next three weeks than ever before and that teachers were more willing to try new waysof doing things. Additionally, she reported that a lot of bravado among targeted students unable toread was replaced with a genuine desire to learn.


ment team noted: ‘Several overseas coun-tries have tried that approach [top-downmandating and monitoring] but it has onlyhad a small positive impact over a few yearsand then leveled off. A better way to go inNew Zealand where big sticks have beenavoided is to build on some of the learningprocesses that have helped make some ofthe schooling improvement initiatives suc-cessful.’84

Additionally, independent researchersargue that practitioners need to take own-ership of collaboration in order to achievewide-ranging success. As Timperley et al.emphasise: ‘When professionals have highlevels of operational autonomy, imposedsolutions rarely work. Treating schoolleaders and teachers as passive recipients ofothers’ expertise, who will faithfullyimplement what is required, ignores thefact that their theories and emotions willshape how they perceive and utilize thisknowledge.’85

The models of collaboration that theMinistry, supported by stakeholders, istherefore pushing are predicated on thebuy-in of school leaders and the localcommunity. The Strengthening Educa -tion in Mangere and Otara (SEMO), forinstance, began as a Ministry of Edu -cation intervention aimed at raising stu-dent achievement within the designateddistrict. Although SEMO was one of sev-eral initiatives coordinated under theMinistry’s national school support policy,it was unique in its commitment to athree-way partnership between Ministryofficials, district schools and local com-munities, which was, in turn, supportedby a group of researchers from theUniversity of Auckland.

Since its inception in 1998, SEMO hasgradually evolved and produced new part-nerships among participating schools. Oneof the more successful new multi-schoolcollaborations is the Analysis and Use ofStudent Achievement Data (AUSAD),which claims as its core philosophy ‘The

use of data to inform and improve teachingand learning’. SEMO has also yieldedimpressive gains in achievement over time,as reading assessment gaps vis-à-vis nation-al norms have narrowed within just fourschool terms. In speaking with the leadersof the SEMO and AUSAD initiatives, itwas clear that the collaborative networkhad been sustained primarily through theunrelenting dedication of each individualschool partner.

The national problem, however, is one ofreplication; SEMO’s lifespan and achieve-ments remain largely anomalous in NewZealand. How can the lessons and success-es of SEMO be expanded across the nation-al scene? Of central concern here is whetherthe Ministry-supported, bottom-up style ofcollaboration is capable of meeting thischallenge. On the one hand, New Zealand’ssmall size certainly makes a bottom-upapproach predicated on high levels of prac-titioner ownership possible. It might addi-tionally be argued that the current system iswell poised to nurture the best collaborativenetworks, which are often fluid and con-stantly evolving (as in the case of SEMO)to meet new targets and needs.

On the other hand, if consistency andspeed are of utmost importance, then amore structured framework of collabora-tion might be desirable. As yet, however,stakeholders have been unable to reach aconsensus on the terms and conditions ofsuch a model. Our interviewees stronglyresisted the idea of commercial involve-ment in the education system; the trustsand academies route that England hastaken was anathema to them (it is, ofcourse, also anathema to many in England,where the government has been less con-cerned about keeping all stakeholders onboard).

2.4.4 Developing an effective workforceResearch suggests that 30 per cent of vari-ance in student performance can be attrib-


New Zealand

84 B. Annan, Evaluation

Framework for Schooling

Improvement in New Zealand

(2007).

85 H. Timperley, B. Annan and V.

Robinson, Successful

Approaches to Innovation That

Have Impacted on Student

Learning in New Zealand

(Netherlands: Klnwer Academic

Publishers, 2006), p. 7.


uted to the quality of teaching that stu-dents receive – the second largest source ofvariance after student ability and priorachievement.86 Since teacher quality can bemeasurably influenced, the New Zealandgovernment has devoted significantresources to improving both initial trainingand continuing professional development.Despite these efforts, there was near-unan-imous agreement among interviewees thatthe availability of effective teachers, bothin terms of total supply and the actualquality of teaching provided, was the mostpressing challenge within the educationsystem. Teacher shortages are particularlyacute in the secondary sector, where vacan-cies have increased by more than 10 percent in the past five years.87

There is a panoply of contributing fac-tors behind this dilemma. For pre-servicetraining alone, respondents cited concernsabout the lack of clear standards in trainingacross institutions; the use of a one-yeartransformation course for students withother degrees; the failure of training insti-tutions to recruit candidates with theappropriate qualities; and the focus onprocesses rather than on the candidates’actual performance in a classroom. As oneinterviewee pessimistically remarked: ‘Allone needs to do to qualify is show up forclass for three years running, and that’sit.’All of these concerns will be familiar toEnglish head teachers.Interviewees also noted that teaching

had declined in social status as an occupa-tion and was less attractive to bright grad-uates. Some attributed this decline to theirbelief that ‘the remuneration structure andcareer pathway is out of kilter with othergraduate careers’. Others pointed to theembryonic nature of the education sector’sdiscourse on professionalism. The NewZealand Teachers Council Code ofEthics,88 for example, was not developeduntil 2003. Consequently, most intervie-wees disputed whether teachers were livingup to the ideal of a professional standard.

Our interviews revealed substantial sup-port for the idea that teachers should nego-tiate better pay in return for broad assentto a more rigorous definition of profession-alism centred on:

� Acting on evidence (the teacher as life-long learner)

� Accountability for student perform-ance

� Accepting flexible remuneration moreclosely linked to performance

While the first item listed above is repre-sented in the Code of Ethics, items twoand three are not. Similarly, a review of theProfessional Standards for SecondaryTeachers89 – the criteria for quality teach-ing, negotiated as part of the collectiveagreements between the Post PrimaryTeachers’ Association (PPTA) and theMinistry of Education – does not mentionanything about teachers being accountablefor student learning.Interviewees argued that it was illogical

for boards and principals to be accountablefor teaching standards when they have lit-tle authority over the teachers themselves.They expressed concern, however, that themain teaching unions would block thedevelopment of a stronger professionalaccountability framework within whichschools would have more capacity to hire,discipline and reward. Firing a teacher ongrounds of incompetence was considerednext to impossible; poorly performingteachers were often shuffled around thesystem or shut out. Even a former presi-dent of the secondary teachers’ unionacknowledged that procedures for tacklingunderperforming teachers were ‘arcane’.Interestingly enough, we observed con-

siderable consensus among stakeholderswhen they were discussing personal opin-ions rather than attempting to representthe public positions of their organisations.For example, an official at a key stakehold-er organisation, when asked what were the


32

86 J. Hattie, ‘Influences on

Achievement’ (1997):

http://www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/e

du/staff/jhattie.

87 In response to these short-

ages, the Ministry has been heavi-

ly recruiting from abroad. This sta-

tus quo appears to have pro-

duced another problem: that of

teachers whose grasp of English

for the medium of instruction is

inadequate. While acknowledging

that the hiring of foreign teachers

could be construed as a sensitive

issue, interviewees expressed

conviction that the mastery of the

English language was crucial, par-

ticularly when interacting with an

audience of young people who

may be disinclined to learn.

88 The four tenets of the code are

commitment to learners, commit-

ment parents/guardians and fami-

ly/whanau, commitment to society

and commitment to the profes-

sion. http://www.teacherscouncil.

govt.nz/ethics/code.stm.

89 http://www.ppta.org.nz/inter-

nal.asp?CategoryID=100600&

SubCatID=100601&SubCat1ID=1

00616


challenges being faced by the New Zealandeducation system, remarked: ‘Technically,I should say funding, since that’s one of thethings my organisation lobbies for. Butfunding really isn’t that much of an issue.’This discrepancy between public dogmaand personal belief could perhaps open thedoor to open, honest dialogue based onsolutions that benefit the students, ratherthan individual stakeholders.

The need for effective teachers is, unsur-prisingly, particularly acute among lower-decile schools, as other drivers for improve-ment (pressure from parents, boards oftrustees) are often less likely to be present.Practitioners who worked with disadvan-taged populations, principals and seniormanagers all emphasised the need toexpand teachers’ abilities to develop andmaintain relationships with children andtheir families. Teaching in these schoolswas seen to go beyond a neutral exchangeof knowledge and to be rooted in an emo-tional context. As one principal explained:‘At our level, our students aren’t just disen-gaged from school; they’re disengaged fromthe entire meaning of society.’

2.5 ReflectionsAlthough the education system in NewZealand operates on a significantly smallerscale than that in England, there are con-siderable similarities between the chal-lenges (structural, governance, equity,workforce). The clearest point of diver-gence lies in each central government’sapproach to confronting these problems.

In New Zealand, the government hasdeliberately eschewed a top-downapproach to reform. While there arenational frameworks, schools and profes-sionals are rarely required to adopt any oneparticular strategy. The highly voluntarynature of this ‘tight, loose, tight’ system is,in the words of a former official, ‘Ourgreatest strength and greatest weakness’.On one hand, the flexibility accorded

schools does appear to have yielded a highlevel of innovation and productive risk-taking at the local level – a far cry from thehighly prescriptive, micro-managed initia-tives that recent British governments havepropounded. Professionals have also beenaccorded a fair degree of autonomy in thedomains of curriculum, pedagogy andassessment, which has in turn imbued inthem a strong sense of ownership over thereform process. Where local knowledgeand expertise have been successfullyutilised, the outcomes (as demonstrated inthe SEMO partnership) have been verypromising

On the other hand, the atomised natureof New Zealand’s school system means thatsystem-wide change occurs at a slow pace.Collaborative frameworks have yet to besystematically built into daily practices,and efforts to develop such frameworks arelikely to be hindered by the fierce protec-tion of local autonomy. While students cantechnically vote with their feet, institution-al accountability nonetheless remains weakin terms of the degree of informationshared with parents, students and the gov-ernment. The push towards using assess-ment data to drive student learning isextremely positive. The challenge now is totake the data-informed movement one stepfurther by developing better mechanismsfor reporting.

Certain components of reform alsoappear to stimulate positive change onlywithin specific socio-economic contexts.Effective and informed pressure from par-ents and boards of trustees, for example,was a strong factor primarily in higher-


New Zealand

“ The need for effective teachers is, unsurprisingly,

particularly acute among lower-decile schools, as other

drivers for improvement (pressure from parents, boards of

trustees) are often less likely to be present”


decile schools. (Parents from lower socio-economic backgrounds exert less pressure,in part because they do not have the cul-tural capital or information required tonegotiate the system.) Change-inducingcompetition between schools also seemedprevalent only among higher-decileschools, as well as in select urban areascharacterised by a shortage of pupils rela-tive to the number of schools. This statusquo has in turn raised concerns that high-decile competition may reinforce conser-vatism, in that fear of unnerving aspiringparents may stifle a school’s potential forrisk-taking and innovation.

Under such circumstances, lower-decileschools seeking innovation and increasedachievement are often solely reliant on theintrinsic motivation of education profession-als. This reliance places a heavy burden onteachers to perform above and beyond bothexpectations and structural capacities; what ismore, even the most motivated teachers arevulnerable to burn-out. Our research sug-gests that principals face considerable chal-lenges in recruiting and maintaining the kind

of workforce they feel they need. So, whathappens when a school fails to recruit or sus-tain a motivated workforce?

Principal: In a context like ours[working with a disengaged popula-tion], it’s the intrinsic motivation ofprofessionals that matters …Interviewer: So what happens whenyour professional team isn’t–Principal: [cuts in] Oh, then you’restuffed.

This interviewee’s colourful assertion high-lights a key problem. Over-reliance on anysingle component, in this case the in trinsicmotivation of education professionals, isrisky. Instead, the various factors in theequation of educational transformationneed to be carefully aligned, both in termsof obj ec tives and execution, in order toensure that all schools participate in thebenefits of re form. New Zealand shows thevalue of ‘lo ose’ autonomy, but also why itneeds to be held in check by the govern-ment and parents.


34


3Canada

In Canada, education is the responsibility ofthe ten provinces and three territories.90

While there are numerous similarities bet w -e en the different systems, it is not possibleto speak of a single ‘Canadian’ education sy -s tem. Each jurisdiction has its own patternsof practice which reflect their distinct socio-economic, cultural and political contexts.

The lone intergovernmental body oneducational issues is the Council ofMinisters of Education, Canada(CMEC). Founded in 1967, CMEC isthe ‘national voice of education forCanada’, serving as a forum for the dis-cussion of policy issues and as a mecha-

nism for national and international col-laboration on a broad range of initiatives.Since the early 1990s there has been anincreased emphasis on intergovernmentalalignment of priorities and policies. Atpresent, CMEC has identified three mainareas of focus: aboriginal education, liter-acy and post-secondary education.CMEC also runs a pan-Canadian assess-ment of student achievement in mathe-matics, literacy and science (the Pan-Canadian Assessment Program).

Canada has performed consistently wellin international studies on counts of bothexcellence and equity. For instance, data


90 In one of the few exceptions of

federal control, the federal gov-

ernment has direct responsibility

for the education of Canada’s

aboriginal people residing on

reserves; prison inmates; and

armed forces personnel. The fed-

eral government also provides

provinces with financial support to

guarantee the provision of educa-

tion in both official languages

(French and English).

91 Education at a Glance (2007),

Table A1.2a, p. 37.

92 Ibid., Table A1.3a, p.38

93 Ibid., Table B1.1b, p. 187.

Expenditure is reported in equiva-



rates and is for primary, second-

ary and post-secondary, non-terti-

ary education.

94 Year of reference 2002. Data

from Education at a Glance

(2006), Table B1.1c (Data was not

available in the OECD 2007 ver-

sion.)



cation.


Table B2.1, p. 205.

97 Year of reference 2002. Data

from Education at a Glance

(2006), Table B2.1b, p. 206.


Table B4.1, p.230

99 Year of reference 2002.

Education at a Glance (2006),

Table B4.1, p. 228


Indicator Canada OECD average United Kingdom


that has attained at least upper secondary

education (2005)91 85 68 67


that has attained a tertiary qualification (2005)92 46 26 30



and development (2004))93 $6,48294 $6,608 $6,656


as a percentage of GDP (2004)96 3.697 3.68 4.4


percentage of total public expenditure

(2004)98 8.299 9.2 8.7


from the PISA 2006 studies show that of the57 participating countries only Korea,Finland and Hong Kong outperformedCanada in reading and mathematics. In sci-ence, the main domain of the 2006 study,Canada was ranked third after Hong Kongand Finland. These results are comparable toearlier PISA studies, where Canada was oneof the top five countries in all three domains.

The strength of the relationship betweensocio-economic status (SES) and perform-ance in Canada is also weaker than that ofthe OECD average: 10 per cent of the vari-ance in student performance in Canada isattributed to SES factors, compared to 22per cent in OECD countries in general.100

Furthermore, the proportion of betweenschool variation in Canada (15.1 per cent) isless than half that of the OECD average(33.6 per cent). This suggests that parentscan be fairly confident of consistent attain-

ment standards across the education system,and that performance is less dependent onthe particular school one attends.101

Within Canada, we have chosen tofocus on the experiences of Ontario andAlberta. Ontario was chosen because of theunique demographic challenges it faces; itis both the most populated province inCanada (Toronto, the capital, is the largestcity in Canada) and the most popular des-tination for immigrants. Alberta was aclear choice because of its outstanding per-formance in large-scale assessments. Bothprovinces have an international reputationfor cutting-edge education reforms.

3.1 Setting the sceneBoth Ontario and Alberta have severalpublicly funded education authorities: theEnglish-language Public and Catholic


36


Table A5.1, p.80

101 Minister of Industry,

‘Measuring Up: Canadian Results

of the OECD PISA study’ (2004):

http://www.pisa.gc.ca/81-590-

xie2004001.pdf.

102 Unless otherwise stated, data

for Ontario is taken from Statistics

Canada for the Year 2006:

http://www.statcan.ca/

103 Unless otherwise stated, data

for Alberta is taken from the

Government of Alberta’s Strategic

Business Plan 2007 for the year

2006.


Table A1.2a, p.37).

105 From Alberta’s Occupational

Supply Model, 2006–2010, for the

year 2006.


Table A1.3a, p. 38.

107 From Alberta’s Occupational

Supply Model, 2006–2010, for the

year 2006.

108 Expenditure is reported in

equivalent US dollars converted

using the Purchasing Power Parity

(PPP) exchange rates and is for

primary, secondary and post-sec-

ondary, non-tertiary education.

See Education at a Glance (2007),

Table B1.1b, p. 187.

109 : Figures for Ontario and

Alberta are for the school year

2004/2005 and taken from Y.

Guillemetter, School Enrolment is

Down; Spending is Up. What’s

Wrong with this Picture? CD

Howe Institute: E Brief (2005).

110 Primary, secondary and post-

secondary, non-tertiary education.


Table B2.1b, p. 206.


Table B4.1, p. 230.

Table 3.2. Comparison of selected indicators for Ontario and Alberta

Indicator Ontario102 Alberta103 OECD average United Kingdom

Percentage of population, aged

25 to 64, that has attained at least

upper secondary education (2005)104 87 77105 68 67

Percentage of population, aged

25 to 64, that has attained a tertiary

qualification (2005)106 51 49107 26 30

Annual expenditure per student

on core services, ancillary services and

research and development (2004)108 C$7,904109 C$9,702 $6,608 $6,656

Expenditure on educational

institutions110 as a percentage

of GDP (2004)111 2.59 2.25 3.8 4.4

Public expenditure on education as

a percentage of total public

expenditure (2004)112 19.3 18.9 9.2 8.7


Schools, and the French-language Publicand Catholic Schools. (In Alberta,Catholic and Protestant schools are some-times referred to as ‘separate’ schools.) Thedifferent authorities have identical gover-nance structures, although each authority(secular vs. non-secular; English vs.French) has developed a distinct ethos.Both provinces have a home-school andprivate-school sector, although onlyAlberta provides partial funding for stu-dents choosing these options. In addition,Alberta has publicly funded charterschools. (See Tables 3.3 and 3.4 for num-bers of boards, schools, pupils and teach-ers.)

Compulsory education in Albertaspans ten years, from ages 6 to 16 (Grades1 to 10). The system is comprehensive innature, and progression is fairly automat-ic up to the upper secondary phase. InGrades 11 and 12, however, progression isdependent on student achievement; stu-dents who successfully accumulate therequired credits graduate with the AlbertaHigh School Diploma.

In Ontario, the school leaving age hasrecently been extended to 18 (or gradua-tion) – incidentally inspiring the Britishgovernment to follow suit.114 As in Alberta,the system is comprehensive and progres-sion from kindergarten to Grade 8 is fairly


Canada

113 Alberta Education Data for

the School Year 2006/2007.

114 http://ogov.newswire.ca/

ontario/GPOE/2006/12/12/c6405.

html?lmatch=&lang=_e.html.

115 http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/

eng/educationFacts.html;

http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/ge

neral/elemsec/quickfacts/2004-

05/quickFacts04-05.pdf.

116 Full-time equivalent.

Table 3.3. Number of boards, schools, pupils and teachers in the primaryand secondary sector in Alberta113

Authority No. of school boards No. of schools No. of pupils No. of teachers

Public 41 1,410 413,453 24,364.91

Separate

(Catholic & Protestant) 16 344 133,721 8,218.99

Francophone 5 30 4,916 353.04

Charter 13 18 6,634 397.06

Private sector 141 168 25,280 1,505.32

Total 216 1,970 584,004 3,4839.32

Table 3.4. Number of boards, schools, pupils and teachers in the primaryand secondary sector (K-12) in Ontario (2004–5)115

Authority No. of school boards No. of schools No. of pupils No. of teachers &

administrators (FTE)116

English public 31 3,073 1,427,157 80,253.72

French public 4 116 20,866 1,468.88

English Catholic 29 1,348 604,590 34,760.44

French Catholic 8 280 68,725 4,655.84

School authorities 33 31 2,566 200.44

Independent n/a 875 117,936 11,115.28

Total 105 5,723 2,241,840 132,454.60


automatic. In Grades 9 to 12, however,progression is dependent on studentachievement; students who successfullyaccumulate the required credits graduate atthe end of Grade 12 with the OntarioSecondary School Diploma.

As the richest province and fastest-grow-ing economy in Canada, Alberta hasinvested a considerable amount of moneyin education. The province’s current budg-et stands at about $5.3 billion – a heftysum when one considers the fact that theirstudent population numbers around600,000 students. In terms of per pupilexpenditure, Alberta spends C$9,702 perstudent, the highest of all Canadianprovinces and territories; Ontario spendsC$7,904 per pupil.117

Both Alberta and Ontario’s populationsare changing rapidly. In Alberta, theschool-aged population is projected todecline over the next ten years by approxi-mately 3 to 4 per cent due to falling birthrates. Internal migration rates are, however,at a record high and account for more thanhalf of Alberta’s population growth, a fac-tor that may have an impact on the pro-jected population decline. Ontario, on theother hand, remains Canada’s most popu-lous province, with 38.9 per cent of thecountry’s people. It is also the province ofchoice for the majority of new immigrants:

in 2006, 52 per cent of immigrants endedup in Ontario.118

Within Alberta and Ontario, therural–urban divide is also increasing,although the problem is more acute in theformer. More than 60 per cent of theprovince’s 3 million people now live in theurban corridor from Edmonton toCalgary.119 Correspondingly, populationdensities in rural areas have dropped. LikeNew Zealand, Ontario and Alberta arefaced with the challenge of insufficientschools in urban centres and too manyundersubscribed schools in rural areas.

According to PISA, both Alberta andOntario (and Canada as a whole) have abelow-average impact of student socio-eco-nomic status on student performance. AsTable 3.5 illustrates, the difference betweenthose in the top and bottom quarters in theaverage OECD country is 119 points; inCanada that drops to 68 points, with 65points in Alberta and 61 points in Ontario.

That is not to say, however, that thereare no disparities in education perform-ance. In Ontario, the Ministry has founddifferences in performance by gender,native language and special needs students(see Table 3.6). Census data on the educa-tional attainment of Aboriginal peoples inOntario has also revealed significant dis-parities.120


38

117 Figures for per-pupil expendi-

ture are for the school year

2004/2005 and are taken from Y.

Guillemetter, School Enrolment is

Down; Spending is Up. What’s

Wrong with this Picture? CD

Howe Institute: E Brief (2005).

118 Statistics Canada, ‘Canada’s

Population’, The Daily, 27 Sept.

2006.

119 Alberta’s Commission on

Learning, Every Child Learns,

Every Child Succeeds (2002).


eng/aboriginal/fnmiFramework.pdf

Table 3.5: Students’ performance on the PISA 2006 science scale, bynational and provincial quarters of socio-economic status

Bottom Second Third Top Score-point difference

quarter quarter quarter quarter between the top and

bottom quarter

Alberta 519 541 560 584 65

Ontario 506 530 557 567 61

Canada 501 527 548 569 68

OECD average 430 481 512 549 119


In Alberta, the Ministry does notspecifically report equity indicators in itsannual business plan. There is evidence tosuggest, however, that significant attain-ment gaps do exist, at the very least amongAboriginal students. As an illustration, the2003 Comm ission on Learning reportedthat only 50 per cent of the Aboriginalpopulation has completed high school,and only 10 per cent go on to post-sec-ondary education. This is compared toprovincial averages of 77 per cent and 50per cent respectively.123

Alberta’s decision not to develop specif-ic equity indicators is linked to a belief that‘equity is achieved through reportingresults against standards and showing thepercentages of students that meet thesestandards.’124 Within the province’saccountability framework, each school ispresented with results for their respectiveschool district and the province; five-year

results are also presented as an indicator ofgrowth/ improvement. This focus on stan-dards-based outcomes as a key lever forchange (if not the lever) can also be seen inOntario and will be discussed in greaterdetail later in the chapter.

Further information on operational andgovernance processes can be found in theappendices.

3.2 History of reformThe 1990s was a turbulent period for theOntario and Alberta education systems.Large-scale reforms overhauled and rein-vented every aspect of education. Schoolboards were amalgamated, site-based man-agement was introduced, funding schemeswere redesigned, standardised province-wide curricula were developed, province-wide testing was stepped up and accounta-bility measures put in place.


Canada

121 English as a second lan-

guage/English literacy develop-

ment.

122 Data from EQAO

123 Alberta’s Commission on

Learning (2002).

124 Email correspondence with

Ministry official

Table 3.6. Comparison of selected education indicators in Ontario by gender, ESL/ELD121 learners and students with special needs (excludinggifted) (2006/2007)122

Indicator Provincial Gender ESL/ELD Special needs

average Female Male (excluding gifted)

Percentage of students meeting

the provincial standard in Grade 3

Reading 62 68 56 44 22

Writing 64 73 56 54 20

Mathematics 69 69 68 56 35



Reading 64 70 59 39 24

Writing 61 72 50 42 17

Mathematics 59 60 58 47 21



Academic Mathematics 71 69 72 61 57

Applied Mathematics 35 33 37 20 28



40

Many of these reforms mirrored oneanother – in tone, if not in content – anunsurprising occurrence given theConservative leadership in both provinces,the challenges of stagnating economies,and the prevailing political climate of theday.125 In practice, however, the reform tra-jectories have subtly branched over time,.In Ontario, the reforms were acrimonious-ly contested by the teacher unions, and thebitter public confrontations with the for-mer Harris government have left an indeli-ble mark on the education community, ashadow that continues to hang over themto this day. The Klein government inAlberta, on the other hand, appears to haveemerged relatively unscathed from therocky period of change, and Alberta hascarved a niche as the leading province forschool choice.

There are no clear explanations for thisdivergence. Nonetheless, a better under-standing of the educational contexts ofboth provinces can be gained through acloser examination of the tenures ofPremiers Ralph Klein in Alberta(1992–2006), and Mike Harris in Ontario(1995–2002).

3.2.1 Klein and AlbertaRalph Klein was elected Premier of Albertaon 14 December 1992. At the time of hiselection, the Alberta economy was in asevere downturn; the province’s debt was atan all-time high at around C$20 billion.Klein’s election platform centred on reduc-ing the deficit; within the education sys-tem, reforms were designed to reduce pub-lic spending and to increase efficiency andaccountability in the sector through thedevelopment of choice polices and privati-sation.126

From 1993 to 1996, Klein’s ProgressiveConservative Party127 introduced severalpieces of legislation, most notably theDeficit Elimination Act and the Govern -ment Accountability Act, which radicallychanged the educational landscape:

� The number of school boards werereduced from 141 to 60.

� The government removed the ability oflocal school boards to levy local taxesfor additional education funding in aneffort to equalise funding betweenjurisdictions.

� School-based management was intro-duced. Among other initiatives, eachschool was required to establish parentcouncils that would act as an advisoryboard to the school principal.

� More province-wide testing was intro-duced and schools were required toreport on parental and student satisfac-tion, in addition to student achieve-ment results.

� Legislative provisions were created forthe establishment of charter schools,128

thereby paving the way for an institu-tionalisation of choice policy withinthe larger educational framework.Alberta remains the only province inCanada to integrate charter schoolsinto the public education system.

It is worth noting that some of the reformscarried out by the Klein administration(such as those intended to increase publicaccountability) were born out of publicroundtables on education reform during theearly 1990s and thus had the educationcommunity’s tacit approval. Others, such asthe changes in tax laws, seemed to somecommentators to come out of left field.Nonetheless, despite public and practitionermisgivings over some aspects of the Kleinreforms, the changes were an important cat-alyst for a public debate over Alberta’s educa-tional goals, practices and achievements.129

More recently, Alberta has embarked onanother wave of reform. In 2002, inresponse to public demands, the govern-ment established ‘Alberta’s Commission onLearning’ to conduct a comprehensivereview of the K-12 education system. TheCommission’s final report in 2003 pro-posed that Alberta adopt as its vision of

125 In the face of severe fiscal

constraints, the political climate in

both provinces was increasingly

defined by the philosophy of new

public management – an outlook

that combined both fiscal conser-

vatism and market liberalism, and

emphasised the downsizing of

bureaucracies, the promotion of

private enterprise and (wherever

possible) budget cuts.

126 These reforms were part of a

larger ‘Klein Revolution’ that saw

similar tenets of fiscal conser-

vatism and market liberalism

applied to all public services.

127 It’s worth noting that the

Progressive Conservative

Association of Alberta has been in

power since 1971.

128 In Alberta, charter schools

must provide the provincial cur-

riculum. Schools are given a

three- to five-year contract by

Alberta Education or the local

school board. At the end of the

contract, schools are evaluated to

determine whether they have ful-

filled the objectives of their charter

and have parent and community

support. Successful schools may

have their charter renewed.

129 cf. B. Spencer and C.

Webber, ‘Education Reform in

Alberta: Where do we go from

here?’ Paper presented at the

annual meeting of the American

Education Research Association

(New Orleans, LA, 24–28 April

2000).


educational excellence the following vow:‘every child learns; every child succeeds.’Of the 95 recommendations proposed bythe Commission, all but eight have beenaccepted by the Albertan legislature andare in the process of being implemented.130

As for Klein? He finally stepped down inDecember 2006 after 14 years as Alberta’sPremier. The Progressive Conservativeparty, however, remains in power. At thisstage, there is little reason to believe thatthe new Premier, Ed Stelmach, will signifi-cantly change the direction and content ofexisting education reforms.

3.2.2 Harris and OntarioIn contrast to the relative political stabilityof the Alberta reforms, Ontario’s experi-ence over the past two decades is markedby conflict. In June 1995, a new govern-ment was formed under the leadership ofMike Harris from the ProgressiveConservative Party of Ontario.131 Harrisswept to power on a platform tagged the‘Common Sense Revolution’, promising toreduce Ontario’s deficit (which was at anall-time high) and slash tax rates. The gov-ernment was also keen to take on the fal-tering education system. Journalist andauthor John Ibbitson notes:

[Harris and top advisors] were convincedOntario’s education system was rottenand regarded transforming education asa mission as important as cutting taxes orslaying the deficit. All agreed that anytruly fundamental change to the educa-tion system required simplifying a juris-diction where power and responsibilitywere hopelessly divided between localand provincial authorities. They weredetermined, not to reform the system, butto dismantle and recreate it.132

The Harris government appears to havemodelled much of their reforms on Alberta’sexperience. As in Alberta, the Harris gov-ernment moved swiftly. Within the span of

their first two years alone (1995–7) threemajor education bills were passed:133

� The Savings and Restructuring Act,which produced funding cuts of about$400 million.

� The Fewer School Boards Act (Bill104), which cut the number of schoolboards from 129 to 72, with a ceilingon the remuneration of trustees.

� The Education Quality ImprovementAct, which shifted budgetary controlfrom school boards to the province,stripped unions of the right to negoti-ate certain working conditions, andproduced further budgetary cutsamounting to approximately $600 mil-lion. Also known as Bill 160, this wasby far the most contentious of all thereforms and prompted the province-wide teacher walkout of 1997.

The Harris government reforms were,however, met with stiff resistance fromeducators and practitioners, who were dis-mayed not only by what they perceived tobe crippling funding cuts, but also by thefact that teachers were being portrayed asthe ‘enemy’ – a particularly ironic turn ofevents since Harris himself was a formerteacher.

It is, perhaps, this difference in tonewhich sets the Harris and Klein reformsapart.134 While there were certainly con-flicts between the Klein administrationand the teacher union,135 including severalstrikes, the profession as a whole was notsubject to the same level of ill will as inOntario. One analyst described the Harrisadministration’s interactions with the fiveteacher unions in Ontario as a ‘strategy oftotal antagonism’;136 within such a climate,the potential for fruitful public dialoguewas significantly undermined.

The Klein administration’s success inriding out the turbulent period of reformmay have also been aided by the politicalstability offered by Klein’s and the


Canada

130 To download a copy of the

report, see http://www.education.

gov.ab.ca/commission/default.asp

. For an update on Alberta

Education’s progress in imple-

menting the recommendations,

see http://www.education.

gov.ab.ca/commission/ACOLStat

us2005.asp.

131 The previous government

had been led by the New

Democratic Party of Ontario.

132 Cited in B. O’Sullivan, ‘Global

Change and Educational Reform

in Ontario and Canada’, Canadian

Journal of Education 24:3 (1999),

311–25, p. 319.

133 M. Bégin, ‘Conflicting

Approaches to Education Reform:

The Royal Learning Commission

revisited’, The Jackson Lecture,

the Ontario Institute for Studies in

Education of the University of

Toronto (OISE/UT), 13 May 1999.

134 For a more comprehensive

review of the Harris reforms, see

R. D. Gidney, From Hope to

Harris: The reshaping of Ontario’s

schools (Toronto: University of

Toronto Press, 1999).

135 Unlike Ontario, Alberta has a

single union and professional

association: the Alberta Teachers

Association.

136 Bégin (1999)



42

137 Fullan was also an advisor to

the English government for the

Blair reforms of the 1990s.

138 Source for Alberta:

http://education.alberta.ca/depart

ment/surveys/education2007.aspx.

Source for Ontario: D. W.

Livingstone and D. Hart, ‘Public

Attitudes towards Education in

Ontario: The 15th OISE/UT survey’

(2004).

Progressive Conservatives Party’s unbrokentenure. During Harris’ second term inpower, however, his Party was rocked byrevelations of political and personal scan-dals. By 2002, in the face of declining sup-port, Harris stepped down from thePremiership. Without Harris’ driving lead-ership, the Progressive Conservative Partyfaltered. In October 2003, the LiberalParty under Dalton McGuinty took overthe reins of power.

In Harris’ defence, there is a strong casefor the argument that some of his adminis-tration’s structural reforms (for example,the amalgamation of school boards and theintroduction of provincial testing) wereboth beneficial and necessary – a thesissupported by many interviewees. Some,such as the funding cuts, were consideredto be poorly planned and disastrous for thehealth of the education system, however.Unfortunately for Harris and the educa-tion community, the ill will and conflictthat dogged these reforms appears to haveovershadowed all other considerations.

3.2.3 McGuinty and OntarioThe McGuinty administration inheritedan education community that was demor-alised, burnt out and wary of further gov-ernment intervention. Acutely consciousof his predecessor’s missteps, McGuintymade reconciliation with education stake-holders, particularly teachers, a top priori-ty. (The process by which consensus andcollaboration was built is discussed ingreater detail in section 3.3.2.)

Fortuitously, around the same time asthe 2003 elections, a working group at theOntario Institute for Studies of Education(OISE) published their final proposal on ablueprint for education reform in Ontario.The report’s proposals had elicited strongsupport from a broad range of stakehold-ers. In a savvy political move, McGuintyemployed one of the authors of the report,Michael Fullan, to serve as his personaladvisor.137 By extension, the OISE blue-

print developed by educationalists becamethe centrepiece of the new administration.

In the four years since the McGuintyadministration took power, they havesought to develop an overarching vision ofeducational excellence that ties togetherthe myriad of initiatives and strategies. Tothat end, the government has distilled themission of the education system into threemain objectives: i) raising student achieve-ment; ii) closing gaps in student achieve-ment; and iii) raising public confidence inthe publicly funded education system.These goals have been embedded in publicdiscourse through the catchphrase:‘Raising the bar, closing the gap’ (whichhas incidentally been adopted by theBritish Conservative Party as the title fortheir recent Green Paper). Morale isreportedly at an all-time high, and, as shallbe discussed later, the education commu-nity appears determined to make up forlost ground. McGuinty was re-elected foranother term in October 2007.

3.3 Findings

3.3.1 Examining Alberta’s success storyAlberta has gained international renownfor the high performance of its students inlarge-scale studies such as PISA, TIMSSand Canada’s own national Pan-CanadianAssessment Program (PCAP). It is the oneprovince that consistently performs abovethe Canadian average, putting its perform-ance on a par with Finland and HongKong (see Figure 3.1 for each Canadianprovince’s performance in the recent PISA2006 science domain). Large-scale surveysof public opinion also reveal very high lev-els of public satisfaction with the overallquality of basic education provision (74per cent, rising to 91 per cent for parentsof students). This is in contrast to Ontario,where public satisfaction with the publiceducation system is just 56 per cent.138

What accounts for Alberta’s high aver-


age standards? Thus far, no researchaimed at explaining Alberta’s extraordi-nary performance in the internationalassessment studies has been undertakenby or on behalf of Alberta Education. Weknow though from analyses of the PISAresults that some of the differences inaverage performance between Canada andthe OECD countries can be explained bythe lower SES of students in OECDcountries in general as compared to thatof their Canadian counterparts. We knowas well that Alberta is the richest provincein Canada, with an average socio-eco-nomic index that is significantly higherthan the national average (note thatOntario also has an SES index that ishigher than the Canadian average.)Analysis conducted by CMEC suggeststhat Alberta’s higher SES is associatedwith higher average performance.However, even when their relative socio-economic advantage is taken intoaccount, students in Alberta still performbetter on average than their counterpartsin other provinces.139

The majority of our intervieweesbelieve that the province’s strong per-

formance can be attributed to the combi-nation of a centralised curriculum andclear provincial standards. ‘We have aworld-class curriculum,’ one principalsaid. ‘We are very clear about what stu-dents should achieve in each subject,what skills they need to come away with.’Another principal emphasised this point,noting: ‘There are no surprises …whichever district you’re in, the expecta-tions of learning are the same.’

This strong focus on standard-basedoutcomes may account for the fact thatAlberta teachers are more likely to makeabsolute rather than relative assessments ofstudent performance. As an illustration,during each Pan-Canadian cyclical assess-ment of student performance, surveys ofteachers, students and schools are also car-ried out. According to the results of thePan-Canadian studies, Alberta teachers arethe least likely among all provinces to givestudents a final grade based on class atten-dance and on the extent of improvementthey’ve made over the year (see, for exam-ple, Figure 3.2)

A senior Ministry official stressed thatAlberta’s rigorous standards-based appro -


Canada

139 P. Bussiere, F. Cartwright and

T. Knighton, ‘Measuring Up:

Canadian Results of the OECD

PISA Study’ (Canada: Ministry of

Industry, 2004), pp. 59–60.

300 -

375 -

450 -

525 -

600 -

Mea

n S

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and

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erta

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Figure 3.1: Average scores and confidence intervals for provinces and coun-tries, PISA 2006 combined science scale


ach to assessment prevents grade inflationand ensures accuracy in teaching. The offi-cial noted that the percentage of studentsgiven an average mathematics or sciencemark of 70 per cent or more is lower thanin the other provinces.

The Ministry also attributes Alberta’sperformance to the overall quality of itsteaching force. Alberta is the first (and, todate, only) province in Canada to adopt ateaching quality standard. This standardestablishes guidelines for the professionalknowledge, skills and attributes expectedof all teachers. These guidelines apply tothe preparation of teachers, ongoing pro-fessional development and teacher evalua-tion throughout the province. This clarityof expectation is believed to have helpeddevelop a strong sense of professionalismamong the workforce.

It is also worth noting that there are nooverall teacher shortages in Alberta. Twodemographic situations – a reduction inthe population of 4- to 18-year-olds andan increase in the number of 19- to 25-year olds (and by extension the pool ofgraduate teachers) – have offset levels ofteacher retirement and prevented theoccurrence of excess demand.140

Additionally, Alberta teachers are thehighest paid, on average, across allCanadian provinces. This is true both for

new and experienced teachers; AlbertaEducation reports that in many casesteachers’ salaries are between 7 and 10 percent higher (see Table 3.7).141 It is perhapsno surprise then that Alberta Educationreports that their teacher numbers aresupplemented by new teachers moving toAlberta.

3.3.2 Ontario’s new vision of educationalchangeWhile Ontario is also recognised as a highperformer in the international studies ofPISA and TIMSS, it has been drawingattention in recent years for its data-driv-en reform strategies: i) capping primaryclass size; ii) the Literacy and NumeracyStrategy; and iii) the StudentSuccess/Learning to 18 Strategy, whichaims to increase high-school graduationrates in Ontario.

The Literacy and Numeracy Strategyaims to improve the literacy and numera-cy abilities of kindergarten and primary-school students. Prior to 2003, studentperformance had remained stagnant forabout five years at an achievement level ofapproximately 55 per cent of Grade 6 stu-dents meeting the provincial standard.The Literacy and Numeracy Secretariataims to raise this percentage to 75 per centby the year 2008, and additional funds


44

140 Nichols Applied

Management, Estimate of

Aggregate Supply and Demand

for Teachers in Alberta

2001–2010 (Edmonton, AB:

Alberta Learning, 2002).

141 http://www.education.gov.

ab.ca/FactsStats/teacherpaid.asp.

.0 17.5 35.0 52.5 70.0

BCABSK

MB (E)MB (F)ON (E)ON (F)QC (E)QC (F)NB (E)NB (F)NS (E)NS (F)

PENL

Percentage of Teachers

Juris

dic

tion

BC: British ColumbiaAB: AlbertaSK: SaskatchewanMB: ManitobaON: OntarioQC: QuebecNB: New BrunswickNS: Nova ScotiaPE: Prince Edward IslandNL: Newfoundland and Labrador(E): English medium schools(F): French medium schools

Figure 3.2: Percentage of teachers giving ‘quite a lot’ or ‘a great deal ofweight’ to improvement over the year or term in the final grade


have been set aside for specialised profes-sional development and to support target-ed intervention programmes. This strategyis also supported by a push to cap primaryclass size.

The Student Success/Learning to 18Strategy, on the other hand, aims toincrease high-school graduation rates inOntario. In 2003/2004, only 68 per centof students graduated with a high-schooldiploma. The province has set a target ofat least 85 per cent of students graduat-ing from high school by 2010/2011. Theslew of initiatives developed to supportthis strategy includes: the introduction ofspecialised teaching positions (StudentSuccess Teachers) in each high school towork with students; the extension of thenumber of compulsory schooling yearsfrom 10 to 12; and investment in multi-ple vocational and academic pathways.

Underpinning these strategies is a deter-mination to change the culture of the sys-tem and community, rather than focusingsolely on structural reforms. Thus, embed-ded in the mission of every provincial, dis-trict and school authority are two tenetsthat Hill and Crevola term ‘non-negotiablebeliefs’:142

� Every child can learn and achieve highstandards, given adequate time andsupport.

� Every teacher can teach effectively,given adequate support and the rightconditions.

Professional development programmesbuild on these tenets, using them to chal-lenge long-held assumptions about thetrade-offs between equity and excellence,and to reshape attitudes towards studentachievement.

Why has the McGuinty administrationchosen to emphasise cultural change?Readers familiar with the Blair reforms ofthe 1990s will have already recognised sim-ilarities between the English and OntarioLiteracy and Numeracy Strategies. Theywill also no doubt be aware of the fact thatthe English strategy saw impressive gainsinitially, but reached a plateau within a fewyears.

The Ontario Literacy and NumeracySecretariat believe that the solution to thisproblem lies in building a shared vision ofchange. Michael Fullan, in a speechlaunching the LNS,143 expounded on thelessons that needed to be learned from


Canada

142 P. Hill and C. Crevola (1999)

The role of standards in educa-

tional reform for the 21st century.

In D.D. Marsh (ed)., ASCD

Yearbook 1999: Preparing our

schools for the 21st century

(Alexandria, VA: Association for

Supervision and Curriculum

Development, 1999), pp.117-142.

Cited in M. Fullan, P. Hill and C.

Crevola, (2006) Breakthrough

(Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin

Press, 2006).

143 Webcast, 7 June2005:

https://www.curriculum.org/secret

ariat/june7.html.

Table 3.7. Average teacher salaries by province

Four years of education Six years of education

Minimum Rank Maximum Rank Minimum Rank Maximum Rank

Alberta $43,653 1 $68,967 1 $48,779 1 $74,126 1

Ontario $37,043 5 $62,625 2 $42,258 7 $73,472 2

Saskatchewan $38,700 2 $59,500 3 $43,570 5 $66,103 5

Manitoba $37,948 3 $58,737 4 $42,887 6 $65,310 6

Quebec $36,196 6 $58,633 5 $41,982 8 $63,527 7

Nova Scotia $35,906 7 $57,376 6 $44,168 4 $67,978 4

British Columbia $37,908 4 $56,743 7 $45,506 2 $70,684 3

New Brunswick $33,776 9 $52,231 8 $40,482 9 $62,292 8

Prince Edward Island $30,341 10 $46,871 9 $38,480 10 $59,657 10

Newfoundland & Labrador $34,838 8 $45,264 10 $45,280 3 $60,212 9


England’s strategy of informed prescrip-tion:144

But we said there’s a problem there.This strategy is not getting enough atthe hearts and minds of principals andteachers. It’s not deep enough. Theownership is not strong enough andtherefore it’s going to have a relativelyshort shelf life from here on. And that’swhat you see as the plateau problem …it goes up rather rapidly and it levelseach year onwards from 2004.

Building on that insight, the OntarioMinistry and the LNS made the decision tolet changes in the structure of the systemtake a back seat to developing a sharedvision of change. This line of argument wasfrequently raised during our interviews, asexemplified by the following assertionsmade by senior Ministry officials:

We need to change the culture … Whenyou have large, large systems with tradi-tional providers and traditional roles,and you’re trying to change the system tosplit roles and split responsibilities, it’s amajor culture change …The dilemmais that if you spend too much time onstructure, you lose the focus on the actu-al agenda.

I think that stability and creating anenvironment where teachers can focus onteaching, and principals on leading, ismore important [than structural change]… I think if anything, people really wantfocus, and they want time to do their corebusiness and they don’t want the distrac-tions of saying: ‘Oh, what will happen ifwe arrange the deck chairs.’

Changing the educational climate, howev-er, would first require the government todeal with one of the more problematiclegacies of the Harris era: the ‘über-unionenvironment’. In Ontario, the five teacher

federations wield significant politicalpower and have previously deployed thisstrength to their advantage. (In a numberof interviews, the teacher federations wereexplicitly characterised as militant innature.) On a day-to-day basis, principalsnote that school management issues areaffected by a wide array of regulations onworking conditions. For example, underthe collective bargaining agreement,teachers do not have to attend any meet-ings or professional development sessionsduring lunch hour or after school. Thisstatus quo renders it hard for principals todevelop opportunities for collective dia-logue and planning. Getting around theseregulations is heavily dependent on theability of principals to build positiveworking relationships and goodwill withtheir teachers.

Given this unionised environment andthe de-professionalisation of the teachingcommunity, how has the new administra-tion initiated the turnaround describedabove? The majority of intervieweesagreed that the tenor adopted by the newadministration was key. From the start,the McGuinty government made a con-scious effort to distinguish itself from itspredecessor by adopting a clear stance ofreconciliation – committing to changestrategies that were respectful of the com-munity and the community’s professionalknowledge. In discussing the journeyOntario has been on, a senior Ministryofficial reflected:

I think the renaissance we’ve experi-enced in the last few years has comeabout because of leadership, focus,respect for teachers and a conscious deci-sion at the provincial level that educa-tion is terribly, terribly important andthat it had to start with happy teachersand ambitious goals.

The administration moved to bring unionson board as partners and, where possible,


46

144 ‘They called their strategy

informed prescription … Informed

meant they did their homework –

good ideas about literacy and

numeracy and good strategies …

prescription was a lot of heavy-

handedness: you had to do it,

backed up by a lot of hard evalu-

ations.’


to eliminate existing bargaining disputes.A major breakthrough was the negotiationof a four-year contract-cycle which put anend to the wage disputes that were occur-ring almost every year. ‘When the issue ofsalaries is constantly on the table,’ one dis-trict official noted, ‘there’s really no energy,no space, for principals and teachers toplan for other things.’ The administrationhas abolished some of the more controver-sial elements of the Harris era’s policies, forexample the Ontario Teacher QualificationTest. In its place are strategies such as men-toring for new teachers and the aggressivedevelopment of professional learning com-munities aimed at enhancing teachers’ pro-fessional capacity and collegiality.145

At the same time, Ministry officialsappear to have adopted a fairly pragmaticstance towards the nature ofunion–government relations. One seniorofficial commented: ‘You’re always goingto have tensions between the governmentand the federations, so it’s really a non-starter to talk about eliminating unionpower.’ Accepting that existing contractu-al regulations are unlikely to be rescinded,the administration has chosen instead tobuild trust and goodwill between the par-ties, with the hope that flexibility in nego-tiation will arise from a more positive rela-tionship. The teacher unions have alsomade a point to reach back; a seniorMinistry official noted: ‘I think that it’s[the fallout from the Harris era] stillrecent enough that teachers rememberfirst hand how bad it can get … They mayhave been more ready to align their visionand goals with that of the current govern-ment.’

While Ontario is not unique in aspir-ing to transform the culture surroundingstudent achievement, it does appear asthough most, if not all, stakeholders havebought into the Ontario vision of excel-lence. In interviewing representativesfrom various stakeholder organisations,we were struck by the fact that intervie-

wees almost unanimously identified thesystem’s clarity of vision as a key driver inraising student and school standards. Wewere struck as well by how articulate theinterviewees were when describing theireducational vision and goals, and howconsistent the message of ‘raising the bar,closing the gap’ was across different levelsand groups.

Indeed, a number of interviewees whohad worked in the education system forseveral decades (in various capacities:teacher, principal, district official and/orMinistry official) expressed their beliefthat goal alignment among all stakehold-ers was at an all-time high and that therewas a very positive can-do climate withinthe system. A prominent academic andeducation consultant asserted that ‘theturnaround in teacher morale and atti-tudes within the last four years is nothingshort of amazing.’ A board member of theOntario Public School Board Associationconcurred, noting with satisfaction that‘we’re in a better place now than we’ve everbeen before.’

The enthusiasm among our intervieweeswas almost palpable. The million-dollarquestion, however, is whether this excite-ment actually translates into better out-comes.

Since the inception of the LNS, studentperformance has been on an upward trend(see Figure 3.3) although the latest figuresfor 2006/2007 suggest that the provincemay be hard-pressed to meet the target of75 per cent by 2008. While the percentageof Grade 3 and Grade 6 students who areperforming at or above the provincial aver-age has increased by anywhere between fiveto 14 percentage points over the past fiveyears, the gains in the past two years(2005/2006 and 2006/2007) have beenless promising. Some criticsbelieve that thegains are artificial, the result of changes inthe testing system that have made the testseasier,146 and pressure from the McGuintyadministration. There is, however, no


Canada

145 Some argue that the

McGuinty administration has

‘gone soft’ on teachers, trading in

harder accountability measures

for processes of dubious merit. At

this stage, however, there is no

research to suggest that this con-

cern is either true or false.

146 For example, time limits were

eliminated for the Grade 3 and

Grade 6 tests; students are now

allowed to use calculators in every

section of the maths test; and the

length of written responses

required in the Grade 3 and

Grade 6 tests has been reduced.


empirical research to date on changes (ifany) in standards.

On a more positive note, public confi-dence, while still low, is showing signs ofimprovement. During the Conservativegovernment’s tenure, public satisfactionwith public schools declined from the mid50s and circled around the low 40s. Since2002, satisfaction levels have increasedfrom 43 to 56 per cent. The proportion ofthe population that believe that the qualityof schooling is improving has alsoincreased – from 27 to 34 per cent withregard to elementary schooling, and from24 to 28 per cent147 for high-school educa-tion. The numbers are still, by any meas-ure, rather low, and the Ontario govern-ment still has some way to go before theMcGuinty administration’s policies can befully vindicated.

3.3.3 Visions of accountabilityAs with other countries, accountability hasbecome a central part of the discourse oneducational excellence in Canada. In Ont -ario and Alberta, however, the model ofacc o untability that is being developed isconsiderably different in tone and contentfrom that practised in England. Specifi -

cally, both provinces are philosophicallyopposed to strategies that ‘use a big stick’and both adv ocate a vision of collective,rather than individual, accountability. Inaddition, neither province has a system ofregular inspection; instead the expectationis that local government officials will,through their existing relationships withschools, monitor performance and inter-vene when necessary.

OntarioA key part of the new climate of education-al excellence is the belief that there isshared accountability – at a school, districtand province level – for student achieve-ment. A senior Ministry official describedthe government’s strategy as follows: ‘It’s apartnership … we cannot and will not askschools or districts to do anything that we[the Ministry] are not capable of support-ing … we would have no credibility if wedid so … it’s all about joint ownership.’

That commitment to joint ownershipand accountability appears to have filtereddown to other levels within the system. Aformer superintendent succinctly argued:‘We’re only as good as our lowest-perform-ing school.’ Similarly, at a school level,while all interviewees agreed that teachers


48

147 Livingstone and Hart (2004)

45

50

55

60

65

70

2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007

Year

Per

cent

age

of s

tud

ents

at l

evel

3 o

r ab

ove

Reading

Writing

Mathematics

Figure 3.3. Grade 6 assessment of reading, writing and mathematics


should take responsibility for studentlearning, they were strongly opposed to theidea that individual teachers should beheld accountable. Instead, intervieweesunanimously agreed that the burden ofaccountability needed to be shouldered bythe school as an entire unit.

The rationale here is that every teacherbuilds on the work of another. Conse -quently, it is (in the words of interviewees)‘unjust’ to place the burden of responsibil-ity for student achievement on any singleindividual. The principal of a primaryschool that has been performing highly‘against the odds’ explained: ‘The challengeis in convincing every teacher that theyhave a responsibility in raising the literacyand numeracy skills of our students. It’snot just the work of the individual subjectteachers or the literacy specialist. Everyteacher has to make an effort to learn andutilise the proper teaching techniques, oth-erwise nothing significant is going tochange.’

Those familiar with the parable of‘Everybody, Somebody, Anybody andNobody’148 might wonder whetherOntario’s concept of shared accountabilityis inadvertently creating a situation where-in no one is really accountable for any-thing. Our interviewees emphasised, how-ever, that individual teachers were stillexpected to be responsible for raising stu-dent performance. The important pointwas not to develop a practice of ‘namingand shaming’ individuals, as it was per-ceived that ‘singling out individual teach-ers for blame is counterproductive. They’llget resentful, or they’ll start cheating to getbetter student scores.’149

Principals also noted that a vision ofjoint accountability was more likely to pro-mote the development of professionallearning communities and encourage thegrowth of distributive leadership – key ele-ments of the McGuinty administration’sdevelopment strategy. As an illustration,when asked to discuss their understanding

of the phrase ‘high standards for all’, themajority of interviewees, particularly theprincipals, included expectations of theirown performance in their explanation: ‘Ifwe expect our students to perform theirvery best,’ one principal argued, ‘it’s onlyfair to expect that our teachers and ourprincipals, all of us, are also held to highstandards and expectations.’ Another prin-cipal pressed this point: ‘There’s a lot goingon right now [in terms of educationreforms], and if we’re not on top of thegame, if we, as leaders, aren’t making surethat we’re continuously learning andimproving, well, we wouldn’t be able tocope.’ Interestingly enough, in no othersystem we studied did practitioners includethemselves in the equation when asked todefine what they meant by ‘high standardsfor all’.

The Ministry is proud of the fact thatthey have developed an accountabilityframework that is not based on ‘wielding abig stick’.150 Instead, bearing in mindFullan’s discussion of accountability sys-tems as encompassing twin elements ofpressure and support, the Ontario systemhas chosen to focus on the provision ofsupport structures. Where pressure isapplied, positive rather than negativeincentives are used.

As an illustration, the Literacy andNumeracy Secretariat (the body chargedwith implementing the Literacy andNumeracy Strategy) has developed a typol-ogy of school performance. The pro-gramme Statistical Neighbours integratesdemographic data from the nationalbureau of statistics with performancemeasures from the provincial assessmenttests. It utilises a three-year model, andtrends in performance are identified bymea s uring changes in performance bet -ween the first and third year.

Based on the information gathered,schools are provided with targeted, needs-appropriate interventions. For instance,the Secretariat currently runs two different


Canada

148 “This is a story about four

people named Everybody,

Somebody, Anybody and Nobody.

There was an important job to be

done, and Everybody was asked

to do it. Everybody was sure

Somebody would do it. Anybody

could have done it, but Nobody

did it. Somebody got angry about

that, because it was Everybody’s

job. Everybody thought Anybody

could do it, but Nobody realised

that Everybody wouldn’t do it. It

ended up that Everybody blamed

Somebody when Nobody did

what Anybody could have done.

149 Interview with school princi-

pal.

150 Interview with senior official,

Literacy and Numeracy

Secretariat.


schooling improvement programmes forschools:

� Schools on the Move: targeted atschools showing improvement trends(i.e. schools that fall into the categoriesof improving lower and higher ranges).

� The Ontario Focused InterventionPartnership: targeted at schools that fallinto the ‘Always Lowest’ category andthe static categories.

The message here is that there is alwaysroom for improvement, and that schoolswill never be left to flounder alone.

Ontario’s emphasis on data-informedanalysis also appears to be increasingtransparency within the system. As one

literacy specialist noted: ‘When the resultscome out, we sit down with schools … it’san extraordinarily powerful tool to be ableto illustrate where schools are doing well,or not so well … you can’t argue withdata.’

The Ministry also clearly believes thatan emphasis on capacity-building offers amore sustainable way of addressing theproblem of struggling schools thanEngland’s ‘takeover’ model. The Ministry’schief research officer noted:

We’ve chosen to focus on capacity build-ing and partnerships. We think it’simportant that every teacher and prin-cipal has the tools to focus on studentachievement, so that if and


50

151 The Indicator used is per-

centage of students at or above

the provincial standard.

Table 3.8: Typology of School Performance.151

Category Definition

Always Highest The school’s results are at least 75% for each of the three years

Always Lowest The school’s results are less than or equal to 33% for each of the

three years

Declining Higher The school has declined by at least 10 percentage points (Y1–Y3).

Ranges Pertains to schools within the range of 65–100% inclusive.

Declining Lower The school has declined by at least 10 percentage points (Y1–Y3).

Ranges Pertains to schools within the range of 0–64% inclusive

Improving Higher The school has improved by at least 10 percentage points (Y1–Y3).


Improving Lower The school has improved by at least 10 percentage points (Y1–Y3).


Static Higher Ranges The school has improved by a maximum of 9 percentage points

(Y1–Y3). Pertains to schools within the range of 65–100% inclusive

Static Lower Ranges The school has improved by a maximum of 9 percentage points

(Y1–Y3). Pertains to schools within the range of 0–64% inclusive


when someone leaves, the successor is notleft floundering. It’s more sustainablethat way … the takeover model of theUK system is not sustainable.

Arguably, the most important measure ofthe success of any accountability frame-work is its effectiveness in driving schoolimprovement. The principals and districtofficials interviewed were unanimous inthe belief that the accountability frame-work (alongside the development ofprovincial standards) was the most signifi-cant driver behind school improvement.Principals also held a fairly positive per-spective on the accountability framework,including the role of the EducationQuality and Accountability Office(EQAO).

There are two reasons for this. First,EQAO is perceived to be a credible voicewithin the system, having consistentlysought to present its work on province-wide testing as one part of a larger storyon school performance. EQAO has, forexample, been fairly critical of instanceswhere data from the provincial tests hasbeen used for the creation of leaguetables.152 Secondly, EQAO’s in-depthanalyses of individual school and boardperformances are perceived to be veryhelpful, particularly among smaller schoolboards/authorities that do not have thecapacity to perform such breakdownsthemselves.

That is not to say, however, that the sys-tem is perfect. Critics, such as the OntarioPublic School Board Association (OPSBA)and the Ontario Teachers Federation,express concern that there has been anoveremphasis on literacy and numeracytest scores. An education consultant forOPSBA also noted that there is sometimesa real discrepancy between what schoolboards report to the Ministry and whatthey actually do in practice. He argued thatmore accountability to schools’ local com-munities is needed.

In response to this criticism, a seniorMinistry official pointed to the provincialrequirement that each school district pre-pare an annual report on student progress.This report is publicly available on theMinistry website, and parents can compareschool-board performance on a range ofindicators (for example, assessment testscores, graduation rates, financial status).153

Admittedly, the indicators are still biasedtowards test scores; however, the Ministryhopes to continue to increase the variety ofdata that is made available to the public.

AlbertaIn September 2004, Alberta Educationintroduced a new accountability frame-work154 for assessing the progress of schoolboards in achieving their educationalgoals.155 The Pillar tracks progress over 16different measures in seven categories (seeTable 3.9). Each jurisdiction is required topublish their report card at the front oftheir Annual Education Results Report,which can be obtained from the jurisdic-tion websites.

Each measure within the Pillar is evalu-ated on three bases: against the fixedprovincial standard (the achievementmeasure); against the jurisdiction’s priorthree-year average result for each measure(the improvement measure); and an overallevaluation which combines the first two.Results are then colour coded on three dif-ferent scales to highlight: performanceaccording to percentile; changes in per-formance; and whether the jurisdiction’sperformance is on target or a cause for con-cern (see Table 3.10 for sample reportcard).156

It is worth noting that the developmentof the improvement evaluation base wasintended to encourage competition withinschools rather than with otherboards/schools. One senior Ministry offi-cial157 explained: ‘I’m a big fan of competi-tion, but competition with oneself ratherthan with others. The latter discourages


Canada

152 The Fraser Institute, a centre-

right think tank, prepares a report

card for all schools in the Ontario

province. While the majority of

interviewees were dismissive of

the practice, we did note that

schools or boards that fared well

did not hesitate to work that piece

of information in during the course

of the interview.


eng/bpr.

154 The Pillar was introduced as

part of a new funding framework,

The Renewed Funding

Framework, which provides core

funding based on student enrol-

ment, and additional funding

based on particular challenges

(demographic, population) faced

in a given area. The framework

has three pillars: funding, flexibility

and accountability.

155 2007 marks the first time that

report cards will be prepared for

individual schools as well as for

boards, and when schools and

boards are evaluated on all 16

measures. Previously, there was

not enough data on measures

such as preparation for work and

citizenship to produce the three-

year jurisdiction average needed

for the improvement evaluation.

156 See the following site for in-

depth detail on the way the meas-

ures are evaluated and an expla-

nation of the coding system:

http://education.alberta.ca/media/

526352/apbrochurefinal-

nov2006.pdf

157 Alberta Education has

requested that we warn readers

that some of the quotations used

do not necessarily represent an

official position of Alberta

Education, nor are they necessari-

ly shared by other interviewees.


Table 3.9. Categories and measures used in the Accountability Pillar

Category How success is measured

Safe and caring schools Using a survey to determine the percentage of teacher, parent and

student agreement that: students are safe at school, are learning

the importance of caring for others, are learning respect for other

and are treated fairly at school.

Student learning opportunities � Annual drop-out rates.

� Annual high-school completion rates.

Using surveys to determine:

� Percentage of teachers, parents and students satisfied with

the opportunity for students to receive a broad programme of

studies, including fine arts, career, technology, and health and

physical.

� Percentage of teachers, parents and students satisfied with

the overall quality of basic education.

Student learning � Provincial achievement tests: acceptable standard.

achievement (Grades K to 9) � Provincial achievement tests: standard of excellence.

Student learning � Diploma exams: acceptable standard .

achievement (Grades 10 to 12) � Diploma exams: standard of excellence.

� Rutherford Scholarship eligibility.

� Diploma exam participation.

Preparing for life-long � Annual high school to post-secondary transition rate

learning

World of work and citizenship Using surveys to determine:

� Percentage of teachers and parents who agree that students

are taught the attitudes and behaviours that will make them

successful at work when they finish school.

� Percentage of teachers, parents and students who are satis-

fied that students model the characteristics of active citizen-

ship.

Parental involvement � Using a survey to determine the percentage of teachers and

parents satisfied with parental involvement in decisions about

their child’s education.

Continuous improvement � Using a survey to determine the percentage of teachers and

parents indicating that their school and schools in their juris-

diction have improved or stayed the same in the last three

years.


52



Table 3.10. Accoun

tability Pillar overall summary

0000 Generic School Division

Corresponding colours on actual report card: �

Green

Yellow

Orange �Blue

Jurisdiction results Provincial results

Measure Evaluation

7Measure category

Measure

Measure

Current

Prev Year

Prev 3-

Current

Prev year

Prev 3-

Achievement

Improvem

ent

Overall

category

result

result

year

result

result

year

evaluation

average

average

Goal 1: H

igh

� Safe and caring schools

Good

Safe and caring

83.5

84.4

80.9

84.2

84.4

82.7

Intermediate

Improved

Good

Quality Learning

� Student learning opportunities

Good

Program

me of studies

77.7

77.2

73.7

78.5

78.1

76.9

Intermediate

Improved

Good

Opportunities

Education quality

86.6

84.1

80.8

87.6

87.7

86.0

Intermediate

Improved significantly

Good

for All

Drop-out rate

2.5

3.2

3.6

4.7

4.9

5.3

Very high

Improved

Excellent

High-school

78.9

78.7

78.2

70.4

70.4

69.1

High

Maintained

Good

completion rate (3 yr)

Goal 2:

� Student learning

Issue

PAT: Acceptable

75.0

69.4

74.2

76.9

77.0

77.3

Low

Maintained

Issue

Excellence

achievem

ent (Grades K–9)

PAT: Excellence

12.2

12.1

11.7

19.1

19.4

19.4

Low

Maintained

Issue

in Learner

� Student learning achievement

Acceptable

Diploma: Acceptable

85.1

86.6

88.1

84.7

85.7

85.6

Intermediate

Declined

Issue

Outcomes

(Grades 10–12)

Diploma: Excellence

19.5

19.2

19.7

23.0

23.0

22.0

Intermediate

Maintained

Acceptable

Diploma exam

57.9

58.0

58.1

53.7

53.5

52.4

High

Maintained

Good

Participation rate

(4+ exams)

Rutherford Scholarship

35.2

35.3

35.1

37.2

35.3

33.9

High

Maintained

Good

eligibility rate

� Preparation for life-long learning,

Acceptable

Transition rate (4 yr)

35.1

35.2

34.2

39.5

37.0

34.6

Intermediate

Maintained

Acceptable

world of w

ork, citizenship

Work preparation

74.2

68.6

74.1

77.1

77.0

74.7

Intermediate

Maintained

Acceptable

Citizenship

75.8

74.2

70.3

76.6

76.8

74.8

Intermediate


Good

Goal 3: H

ighly

� Parental involvement

Issue

Parental involvement

71.0

74.5

70.7

77.5

77.9

76.0

Low

Maintained

Issue

Responsive

� Continuous im

provem

ent

Good

School improvem

ent

76.2

72.8

66.1

76.3

76.8

73.2

Intermediate


Good

and Responsible

Jurisdiction

(Ministry)

��


collaboration.’ Another official pressed thispoint, noting: ‘We don’t publish rankorder of schools; that’s a philosophicalstance we take. Certainly external agenciesget a hold of our data, but we don’t do thatin our department.’

Like Ontario, there is a shared percep-tion that the best way to get all stakehold-ers on board is through organic dialogueand relationship-building and not by‘holding a hammer over them’. That is notto say that there are no consequences forpoor performance. One senior Ministryofficial mused: ‘We hold children moreaccountable for their performance than wedo adults. There should not be that discon-nect … If there are no consequences for[the school’s] actions, then it’s not account-ability.’ The official went on to emphasise,however, that consequences do not neces-sarily have to be punitive in nature butmay take the form of customised schoolimprovement support. Note that thisemphasis on positive rather than negativepressure is similar to the Ontario paradigmof accountability.

Correspondingly, within Alberta, eachjurisdiction is required to address their lowor declining measure results in their three-year plans. A range of capacity-buildingsupport programmes are offered by bothAlberta Education and professional associ-ations such as the Alberta School BoardAsociation (ASBA), the College of AlbertaSchool Superintendents (CASS) and theAlberta Teachers Association (ATA). Take-up of these services is on a voluntary basis.Alberta Education has chosen not todevelop prescriptive measures on thegrounds that each school is best equippedto identify the strategies that work best intheir circumstances.

How much should we track into howthey do it? That’s the problem; I guessthat’s the challenge. I think ouraccountability framework is pretty goodon keeping on the results based, out-

comes based focus. If you meet our stan-dards then we have no business askingyou how you did it.

Senior Ministry official

The Ministry officials acknowledged thatthere have been some negative, knee-jerkreactions from other stakeholders.However, they feel that the gradual col-laborative process adopted by theMinistry (teachers have been involved inthe development of provincial standards)has been instrumental in creating a morewidespread buy-in. Other stakeholdersare more circumspect, with the majorityexpressing concern over the fact thatthere is too much emphasis on examscores despite the fact that of the sixteenmeasures used, only four are related tostudent achievement data (based on per-formance in the provincial assessmenttests and the high-school diplomaexams).

The one exception to this story is theAlberta Teachers Association, which feelsthat there is a real disconnect betweenAlberta Education’s Accountability Pillarand the province’s stated education goals.Nonetheless, the majority of intervieweesdid acknowledge and appear to appreciatethe government’s attempts to address thatissue through the development of ‘softer’indicators such as citizenship, which aremore difficult to measure.

3.3.4 Thinking about choice andcompetition In 2003, centre-right think tank the FraserInstitute developed the CanadianEducation Freedom Index to measure therelative freedom that parents in differentprovinces have to educate their children.The index (see Table 3.11) analyses privateprovision of education, and looks specifi-cally at regulations regarding homeschools, private schools and charterschools.


54


AlbertaAlberta came in first, based on the extentof financial assistance that it gives stu-dents wishing to be home-schooled (it isthe only province to do so), or to attend aprivate school. Alberta is also the onlyprovince in Canada to have legislatedcharter schools. One interviewee arguedthat Alberta’s openness to outsideproviders is a reflection of the province’ssocio-economic history: ‘I think thatAlberta, because of its oil industry, ismore open to entrepreneurial spirit, lessinto government interference … the con-cept of the individual is more prevalentout west, and certainly in Alberta.’

Despite Alberta’s supportive legislation,the overall number of private providers(charter or private) within the system hasremained fairly stable (and relativelysmall: 4 per cent of Alberta students areserved by the private sector). This stabili-ty can be partly attributed to strong oppo-sition from the teacher union and someschool boards. For example, according toAlberta legislation, charter schools, likepublic schools, have to hire certifiedteachers. However, the Alberta TeachersAssociation does not allow charter schoolteachers to be part of the Association – apersonal disincentive that makes recruit-

ment of staff for charter schools exceed-ingly difficult at times.

Dr Lynn Bosetti, in her study of the‘Alberta Charter School Experience’(2000), found that under such circum-stances, parents and communities oftenneed ‘missionary zeal’ to successfully get aschool up and running, and to ensure thatit stays running. Furthermore, despite thefact that charter schools were envisioned assites for innovation, Bosetti notes that ‘todate, charter schools in Alberta appear tobe less about competition, innovation andeducational efficiency than they are aboutchoice and community.’

Another possible explanation for theslow growth of the private sector in Albertais the fact that public and separate schoolboards have worked hard on incorporatingthe philosophy of choice into their system.For instance, Edmonton Public SchoolBoard158 has committed itself to providingeducation that meets the needs of its par-ents and students. The board has thusdiversified the types of schools provided: inaddition to the local neighbourhoodschools, they have single-sex schools, giftedschools, and specialist schools in sports,arts, social sciences, and so on. Someschool boards (particularly EdmontonPublic and Edmonton Catholic) have also


Canada

158 Some observers consider

Edmonton Public to be the most

successful example of a public

choice programme in North

America.

Table 3.11: Canadian Education Freedom Index

Catergory Home School Independent School Charter School Average Score Rank

AB 50% 75% 66% 64% 1

BC 50% 88% 0 46% 2

QC 50% 75% 0 42% 3

MB 25% 88% 0 38% 4

ON 50% 25% 0 25% 5

NB 50% 25% 0 25% 6

NS 25% 25% 0 17% 7

NF 25% 0% 0 8% 8

SK 0% 13% 0 4% 9

PE 0% 0% 0 0% 10


been fairly aggressive in co-opting success-ful private schools into the public system.(Under current legislation, private schoolsare partially funded; incorporation into thepublic sector offers schools significantfinancial gains.)

The diversity of schooling optionswithin Alberta’s public sector – an impor-tant area that was left out of the CanadianEducation Freedom Index – has createdstrong competitive pressures betweenschool boards. More crucially, these com-petitive pressures have had positive conse-quences for students. Edmonton Cath -olic’s choice programme, for insta nce, wasdeveloped in response to the fact that thedistrict had been losing students toEdmonton Public Schools. Even in ruralcommunities, competition between thetwo main sectors (public and separate) isperceived by some to be fairly strong, asituation exacerbated by falling schoolrolls.

The diversity of schooling options alsosuggests that parental voice has a strongimpact on the Alberta education system.In a survey of Canadian and Edmontonparents,159 it was found that Edmontonparents are significantly more likely thanthe average Canadian parent to supportthe concept of choice160 (92 per cent ver-sus 78 per cent). Furthermore, about 62per cent of Edmonton parents report thatthey have checked annual reports onschools’ performances, and about 42 percent of those reported using that informa-tion to make their decision, a percentagethat is significantly higher than thenational average of 45 per cent and 25 percent respectively. Interestingly enough,Alberta also has the lowest percentage ofparents who send their children to aneighbourhood school – a statistic thatAlberta Education has interpreted asproof of choice in action, and that theAlberta Teachers Association perceives toindicate a lack of good neighbourhoodschools.

OntarioApproximately 6 per cent of Ontario stu-dents are in the private sector, comparedwith 4 per cent in Alberta. Despite the pri-vate sector’s small foothold, the ‘threat’ offurther expansion is taken very seriously bythe McGuinty administration, which hasbegun to monitor enrolment rates in theprivate sector as a measure of public confi-dence in the publicly funded educationsystem. It is also noteworthy that whenMcGuinty first came to power, he can-celled a tax credit that former premierMike Harris had introduced for parentswho sent their children to private schools.(The credit, introduced in 2002, was ini-tially worth 10 per cent of tuition fees, butwas intended to grow each year until it wasworth 50 per cent of independent schooltuition fees.)

While private–public competition iscomparatively low, as in Alberta the exis-tence of four different school boards(English Public, English Catholic, FrenchPublic and French Catholic) generatescompetitive pressures. Unlike Alberta,however, in Ontario Ministry officials wereless likely to view these competitive pres-sures positively. One official noted:‘Competition between schools can oftencreate more negative outcomes … we pre-fer a model of collaboration.’ This view-point is unsurprising given the Ministry’sattempt to embed an ethos of collectiveaccountability and ownership.

Correspondingly, the Ministry hassought to increase the level of collaborationwithin the system, particularly acrossschool boards and streams. Currently,many school boards organise schools into‘families’ by geographical area. Each familyis headed by a school superintendent, andthe organisation structure is intended pri-marily for administrative purposes –although many families develop their ownprofessional learning networks and practiseeconomies of scale (e.g. the sharing of a lit-eracy specialist). The extent to which this is


56

159 P. Maguire, ‘Choice in Urban

School Districts: The Edmonton

experience’ (Society for the

Advancement of Excellence in

Education, 2006).

160 Defined here as: ‘Parents

should be able to send their chil-

dren to another school if they are

dissatisfied.’



Canada

161 For more information, see:

http://education.alberta.ca/admin/

aisi.aspx

162 N. McEven, ‘Improving

schools: Investing in our future’

(Alberta: Alberta Education, 2006).

163 As these universities are also

involved in the AISI programme,

their work may also be cate-

gorised as that of internal review-

ers. Alberta Education is in the

process of commissioning an

external review of AISI by an inde-

pendent researcher.

164 Provincial AISI Report for

Cycle 1, 2004.

165 J. C. Couture, S. Harris and

M. Hrycauk, ‘Trust for Partnership

Fidelity in School Improvement’

(2007).

Alberta Initiative for School Improvement161

While competition is certainly leveraged as a driver for change in Alberta, the government and stake-holders have also encouraged collaborative practices and networks across schools, districts and stake-holders. Interviewees were particularly proud of the impact one model of collaboration, the AlbertaInitiative for School Improvement (AISI), is having on the system.

Started in 2000, AISI aims to improve student learning through the development of projects thattake into account the particular needs and challenges of school jurisdictions and communities. AISIwas born out of an ongoing dialogue between the key players of the Alberta education system(Alberta Education, Alberta Teachers Association, the College of Alberta School Superin tendents, theAlberta School Boards Association, the Alberta Home and School Councils Association, the AlbertaAssociation of School Business Officials of Alberta, and the University Faculties of Education). Fromthe start, AISI was conceived as a model for collaborative problem-solving: ‘The AISI approach toimproving student learning is through partnerships and collaboration in a culture of continuousimprovement, inquiry and reflection.’162

Under AISI, schools apply for funding to develop individualised schooling improvement projects.Schools have to demonstrate that their proposals are grounded in current theory and evidence.However, there is no penalty if the projects fail, thereby enabling schools to take larger risks. The proj-ects are nonetheless rigorously reviewed by the School Improvement Branch of Alberta Education,which requires schools to provide data on demographics, staffing allocations, quantitative and quali-tative student indicators, budget expenditures, and analyses of student outcomes and effective teach-ing practices. The results of each AISI project are compiled in a provincial database and presented eachyear at a learning conference – steps intended to ensure the rapid dissemination of best practices.

Internal reviews of the AISI programmes suggest a significant impact on the culture of schools inAlberta, not least owing to the high rates of participation: 90 per cent of public and private schools wereinvolved in the first AISI cycle (2000–2003). The Provincial AISI Report for Cycle 1 indicates that AISIhas had a positive impact on student learning (more than 90 per cent of all projects exceeded their base-line on the majority of measures every year), has developed a shared language of school improvement, haspromoted evidence-based practice in classrooms and has enhanced the quality of professional develop-ment. Reviews by the University of Alberta, University of Calgary and University of Lethbridge lend fur-ther support to the government’s assertion that the AISI projects are serving as hotbeds of innovation.163

An official at the Alberta Teachers Association boasted: ‘There’s been a tremendous amount of sys-tem learning. You go to a conference and most of the research that you’re reading about is stuff that’sbeen done in Alberta.’

More crucially, AISI is perceived by all stakeholders to have strengthened horizontal collaboration– that is, the links across jurisdictions and partners – and to have ‘established a foundation of trustbetween government and education stakeholders’.164 On a micro level, every jurisdiction has an AISIcoordinator who acts as a ‘boundary spanner’ – helping schools to develop links with otherschools/jurisdictions that are tackling similar issues. On a systems level, the sense of ownershipamong the AISI partners has also buffered the initiative from some of the more political tensionsbetween the Ministry and stakeholders.

AISI’s initial success has prompted the government to invest more money into the project and to intro-duce further cycles. Across the board, interviewees expressed strong support and pleasure with this move.A paper presented at the 2007 American Education Research Association Conference on AISI165 positive-ly concluded that ‘AISI has been a powerful antidote to resorting to quick fixes, narrow definitions of edu-cational accountability and seeking standardised solutions to complex challenges. By building partnershipfidelity in terms of capacity and intention trust, AISI can foster hope in the place of ambivalence.’


the case, however, differs from board toboard depending on the leadership of thesuperintendent.

In practice, this viewpoint does appearto have filtered down to practitioners: dur-ing focus groups with Ontario head teach-ers (secondary and primary) in Toronto,they were more likely to emphasise thevalue of collaboration with other schools intheir school boards and in the district as adriver for improvement. This was also thecase in interviews conducted at high-attaining public and Catholic schools, withinterviewees crediting the use of collabora-tive networks (hard and soft; across pri-mary and secondary schools; betweenschools of the same phase; between differ-ent school boards) as a significant lever inthe transformation of school performance.

3.5 Reflections In many ways, the experiences of Albertamirror that of Ontario. The two provinceshave had similar reform trajectories andhave adopted comparable approaches to:

� Accountability (an emphasis on collec-tive accountability and on positiverather than negative pressure);

� Collaboration (tone of interactionbetween stakeholders is key; develop-ment of framework for cross-school/board, multiple stakeholder col-laborations);

� Governance (the devolution of autono-my of school jurisdictions and individ-ual schools; a focus on developinghuman capacity).

It is in the specific strategies and measuresthat the differences between the tworegions widen:

� Both provinces have taken significantlydifferent stances towards private educa-tion provision. Alberta has chosen toprovide partial funding to privateschools as part of its commitment tochoice and diversity. Ontario has cho-sen not to do so as the Governmentopposes the expansion of the privatesector.

� This difference in attitude is mirroredto a lesser extent in both Ministries’stance on competition. The multiplepublic-school divisions in bothprovinces, by their very nature, engen-der a certain level of competitive pres-sure. In Alberta, however, market com-petition has at times (and in certainareas) been actively used as a driver forschool improvement. The OntarioMinistry, however, actively discouragesthe notion of market competition, pre-ferring to emphasise the merits of col-laborative learning networks as a driverfor change. Thus school boards areorganised around the concept of ‘fami-lies’, and hard and soft networks of col-laboration (inter- and intra-boards) areencouraged.

Arguably, the most significant challengenow facing both Alberta and Ontario istheir ability to sustain the gains they havewrought so far. The first dimension to thisdilemma – shared by both provinces – con-cerns the pace and sustainability of change.Results from studies on change manage-ment indicate that reforms take a minimumof five years to become embedded withinany given system. The fast-paced nature ofthe Government’s reform agenda, combinedwith the Government’s focus on meetingshort-term targets, raises concerns that thesystem is not being given enough time toinstitutionalise the myriad new initiatives.


58

“ Embedding the existing reforms to ensure

sustainability and preventing teacher burnout may very

well need to be the next strategic priorities for both

governments”


As an official of a major stakeholder organ-isation noted: ‘The ministry expects positivechange in performance even before imple-mentation is completed. They want to eatthe cake before it’s baked.’

There is also concern that teachers mayfeel overloaded by the slew of initiatives. Ata high-performing secondary school inOntario, the school leadership team hadproduced a mind map illustrating thenumerous provincial, district and schoollevel initiatives that were being used (or

should be used) to further student achieve-ment. The map was a complex web ofinterlinked policies, which documentedover 40 potential initiatives. ‘We jokeabout the number of programmes thatwe’re supposed to be implementing,’ theprincipal said, ‘but it’s not really an exag-geration.’ Indeed, embedding the existingreforms to ensure sustainability and pre-venting teacher burnout may very wellneed to be the next strategic priorities forboth governments.


Canada


4Hong Kong

Tseung Kwan O New Town is one of ninenew housing developments in the NewTerritories. Walking out of the TseungKwan O MTR station, one is immediatelygreeted by the sight of towering apartmentblocks. Most of these apartments are leasedunder the government’s public housingscheme, although construction is under-way on a block of ‘for-purchase’ condo-miniums. Painted a pristine white, withborders of blue and green, the public hous-ing blocks present a stark contrast to theoften dismal conditions of social housing

estates in England. Nestled within Tseung Kwan O’s ring of

skyscraper blocks is a cluster of five schools,three secondaries and two primaries. Theschools are built in startling proximity toeach other, and the multiple elevations ofeach school block176 makes it easy to lookinto the compounds of one’s neighbouringschools. The question as to whether theegress of the schools’ combined student pop-ulation at the end of the day was difficult tomanage drew a bemused but polite negative.

This practice of clustering schools in

60


Table A1.2a, p. 37.

167 Census and Statistics

Department, ‘Hong Kong in

Figures, 2007’. Data is for the

year 2006 and is for the popula-

tion aged 15 and above.


Table A1.3a, p. 38.


Department, ‘Hong Kong in

Figures, 2007’. Data is for the

year 2006 and is for the popula-

tion aged 15 and above.

170 Education at a Glance 2007.,

Table B1.1b, p. 187; expenditure

is reported in equivalent US dol-

lars using purchasing power parity

(PPP) exchange rates; for primary,

secondary and post-secondary,

non-tertiary education.



cation.

172 Ibid., Table B2.1, p. 205.


Department, ‘Education Data for

2006/2007’.


Table B4.1, p. 230.


Department, ‘Education Data for

2006/2007’.

176 To maximise very valuable

land space, school blocks typical-

ly have anywhere between three

to seven levels. It is also not

uncommon to have school halls

of two different schools built one

on top of another to reduce the

overall footprint.


Indicator Hong Kong OECD average United Kingdom

Percentage of population, aged 25

to 64, that has attained at least upper

secondary education (2005)166 51.5167 68 67

Percentage of population, aged 25 to

64, that has attained a tertiary

qualification (2005)168 24169 26 30



and development (2004)170 n/a $6,608 $6,656


as a percentage of GDP(2004)172 3.5173 3.8 4.4


percentage of total public expenditure

(2004)174 23.3175 9.2 8.7


housing developments is certainly a testa-ment to the efficiency of its urban plan-ners. It is also a powerful visual demonstra-tion of choice and competition within theHong Kong education system. Families liv-ing in the newly built blocks of Kan HokLane have at their doorsteps the choice ofthree secondary schools:

1. QualiEd College (motto: ‘All are educa-ble’), sponsored by The EduYoungOrganisation

2. The Logos Academy (motto: ‘Theheart of education is education of theheart’), sponsored by the Hong KongChinese Christian Churches Union

3. Heung To Secondary School (motto: ‘Avalue-added school providing high-quality education and austere atmos-phere’), sponsored by the Heung ToEducation Organization Limited

Proximity, commonly cited by English par-ents as the reason for choosing their child’sschool, is not a big issue. Instead, schoolsaggressively compete to raise their profilewithin the community: hanging brightlycoloured banners advertising their latestachievements; holding open events for thecommunity; and engaging in brandingactivities that highlight each school’s dis-tinct vision of educational excellence.QualiEd College, for instance, countsamong its teaching staff several prominentlocal writers and has taken upon itself thetask of organising an annual writing com-petition to identify up-and-coming youngauthors.

Competition among schools is stiff, andfalling school rolls have raised the stakes.What is particularly interesting about theHong Kong scenario is that competitionisn’t restricted to an elite group of schoolsor students alone; QualiEd for instance, isone of a new breed of schools that arebeing set up with students from disadvan-taged socio-economic backgrounds inmind.

Of all the case studies profiled in thisbook, Hong Kong offers the mostadvanced example of a competitive systemof education provision. This chapter aimsto trace the development of Hong Kong’seducation market and the changes realisedby the territory’s most ambitious reformprogramme to date.

4.1 Historical contextHong Kong’s robust brand of free-marketcapitalism, strong Confucian tradition,British colonial inheritance and relation-ship with China has profoundly shaped theclimate and structure of its schooling sys-tem. Yet, for all its differences, as the worldconverges under the formidable power ofalways-on technology, there are discerniblesimilarities in the direction of travel.

As with many colonies, the early years ofeducation provision in Hong Kong wereclosely tied with the fortunes of missionarygroups, in this case the missionaries fromthe Roman Catholic and AnglicanChurches. From the start, the colonial gov-ernment relied heavily on these two bodiesfor the provision of education to local peo-ple in an attempt to manage (i.e. reduce)its administrative and financial costs.While the government subsidised the costof operations at these church-sponsoredschools, the day-to-day management, aswell as the provision of start-up capital,was the responsibility of the Church.177

What is unique about Hong Kong isthat this reliance on outside providersnever ceased. Following the Second WorldWar, the Government was faced with theneed to rapidly expand education provi-sion. Aware that they did not have thecapacity to take on this task, the govern-ment chose to encourage more organisa-tions (mostly charitable or religious bod-ies) to become School Sponsoring Bodies(SSBs).

Currently, only 5 per cent of publicschools are operated by the government.


Hong Kong

177 J. K. Tan, ‘Church, State and

Education: Catholic education in

Hong Kong during the political

transition’, Comparative Education

33:2 (1997), Special Number (19):

Education and Political Transition:

Implications of Hong Kong’s

Change of Sovereignty, pp.

211–32.


The other 95 per cent are subsidisedschools (also known as the aided sector),that is, public schools that receive finan-cial subsidies from the government butthat are operated by independent SSBs.There are approximately 100 SSBs, ofwhich about 30 are considered to be‘large’ bodies (i.e. run five or moreschools); a significant number of SSBsrun just one school. The Catholic andAnglican Churches remain the largest twoproviders in the public system.

This multiplicity of education providerscan be said to have created a system of sub-systems, each with a unique ethos and (forthe larger administrative bodies) adminis-trative structure. Under current legislation,sponsoring bodies define the vision andmission of their schools. They appoint andmanage all staff, and exert particular con-trol over the leadership team (principal andsenior managers).

In 1992, the government moved to intro-duce school-based management (TheSchool Management Initiative) in anattempt to increase public accountabilityand efficiency, as well as parental andteacher involvement in decision-making at aschool level. The assumption was that thesechanges would lead to an improved, andmore even, quality of education across thesystem.178 Take-up was initially voluntary innature, although the government eventuallymade the practice mandatory after receivingseveral promising evaluations of the SchoolManagement Initiative.179

Concurrent with the school-based man-agement reforms, Hong Kong was prepar-ing itself for its return to the People’sRepublic of China. Within the educationsector, educationists were aware that themove would, at the very least, necessitatesignificant curricular reforms. For instance,the medium of instruction would likely beshifted to Mandarin (Pu Tong Hua), andthe Chinese government had already indi-cated that it would mandate the introduc-tion of civic education. The time, it

seemed, was ripe for a systematic review ofthe education system.

In early 1998, the Education Com -mission (a non-statutory body that advisesthe government on education matters, andthe most important advisory body in educa-tion) started its review.180 This took over twoyears to complete and the ensuing report,‘Learning for Life, Learning through Life’,181

redefined the aims and vision of HongKong’s education system and set out anambitious ten-year programme of reformencompassing areas including governance,professional development, curriculum,assessment and admissions.

As with the other countries profiled inthis book, Hong Kong’s vision of educa-tion in the 21st century emphasises ele-ments such as all-rounded development –a love of and capacity for life-long learn-ing, and citizenship. Where Hong Konghas garnered significant interest fromresearchers in curriculum development isin its emphasis on global, not just nation-al, citizenship; and on democracy as cen-tral to the prosperity to its society:

The overall aims of education for the21st century should be to enable everyperson to … [be] willing to put forwardcontinuing effort for the prosperity,progress, freedom and democracy oftheir society, and contribute to thefuture well-being of the nation and theworld at large.182

‘Learning for Life’ also represented a water-shed in the development of Hong Kong’sunderstanding of educational excellence.Of particular note is the fact that the pro-posals represent a conscious effort to:

� move away from Hong Kong’s famed(and infamous) examination-based sys-tem to one that offers more diverseopportunities for learning

� close attainment gaps and focus oneducational equity through a commit-


62

178 Education Manpower Branch

and Education Department (EMB

& ED), School Management

Initiative: Setting the framework

for education quality I Hong Kong

school ( Hong Kong: the

Government Print, 1991).

179 Since 2000, all public

schools (government and aided)

have implemented school-based

management. More recently, how-

ever, the government has passed

a bill requiring that all schools use

a particular school-based man-

agement structure: the incorpo-

rated management committees

(IMCs). The larger SSBs, in partic-

ular the Catholic Church, are

resisting this change owing to

concerns that the new manage-

ment structure may diminish their

control over their schools. The

Catholic Church has in fact filed a

lawsuit against the government.

For a concise overview of the

development and challenges of

Hong Kong’s school-based man-

agement system, see H. Yu,

‘Implementation of School-based

Management in Hong Kong:

Recent developments and future

challenges‘, Journal of

Educational Change 6 (2005), pp.

253–75.

180 for more information, see:

http://www.e-c.edu.hk/eng/reform

/index_e.html

181 The report, as well as

updates on the implementation

progress, can be found on the

Education Commission’s website:

http://www.e-c.edu.hk/eng/reform

/index_e.html.

182 Education Commission,

‘Learning for Life, Learning

through Life’ (2000), p. 4.


ment to the principles of ‘society-widemobilisation’ and ‘no loser’.183

4.2 Hong Kong’s education systemAs mentioned earlier, the majority of govern-ment-funded schools in Hong Kong are runby non-governmental organisations (chari-ties or religious bodies). These schools areclassified as ‘aided schools’. The Governmentalso provides partial funding to independentschools known as direct subsidy schools(DSS), in an effort to increase the diversityand quality of the private sector (see p70 formore detail.) Finally, there are a small per-centage of international, fee-paying schools,of which the English Schools Foun dation(providing education based on the Englishcurriculum) is the largest provider.

Demographically, Hong Kong’s popula-tion is largely ethnically homogenous.Most immigrants come from MainlandChina, although China’s booming econo-my has rendered migration to Hong Kongless attractive than before. The decline inimmigration rates has overlapped with a

temporary dip in the territory’s birth rate.Correspondingly, the Hong Kong educa-tion system is struggling with the problemof falling school roles, a situation that isnot expected to stabilise until 2012 for theprimary sector and 2018 for the secondary.

Politically, the Hong Kong educationcommunity is peopled with numerousadvisory and representative bodies for amultitude of issues and type of schools.Public interest in education is high, andthe Chinese-language press, in particular, isnoted for its outspoken coverage of educa-tional issues and controversies. Furtherinformation on the operational and gover-nance processes of the system can be foundin the appendices.

4.3 Hong Kong in the literatureHong Kong’s schools perform very wellby international standards. In the 2006PISA assessments, Hong Kong wasranked second out of 57 countries for theperformance of its 15 year-olds in science,second only to Finland. In mathematics,

Table 4.2. Number of schools, pupils and teachers in the primary and secondary sector for 2006/2007184

Authority No. of schools No. of pupils No. of teachers

Primary 668 410,516 23,695

Government

Aided

DSS185 18

ESF186 & International 48

Secondary 528 484,195 28,634

Government

Aided

DSS 46

ESF & International 25

Total 1,196 894,711 52,329


Hong Kong

183 As the section on culture will

illustrate, this focus on equity has

proven to be somewhat con-

tentious.

184 Hong Kong Education

Bureau: http://www.edb.gov.hk

/index.aspx?langno=1&nodeid=10

38.

185 Publicly subsidised private

schools, allowed to charge top-up

fees.

186 English Schools Foundation,

the largest consortium of private,

international schools in Hong

Kong.

602

457


Hong Kong ranked at the top, alongsideChinese Taipei, Finland and Korea (i.e.the scores for these systems were not sta-tistically different). As for reading literacy,the latest PISA results show a significantimprovement in student performancesince the first study in 2000; in 2006,only Korean and Finnish students outper-formed Hong Kong students. Further -more, the relationship between studentperformance and socio-economic back-ground is weaker in Hong Kong than inthe average OECD country.The achievement gap between students

from different socio-economic back-grounds in Hong Kong is significantlysmaller than the OECD average, suggest-ing that there is greater equality in thedistribution of student performance.

For all that Hong Kong appears to bemeeting the needs of its low achievers, thepicture is not completely rosy. There is sig-nificant variation in performance betweenschools, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. These

findings suggest that the Hong Kong edu-cation system is highly segregated academ-ically, an unsurprising fact in light of theterritory’s admission system of banding(see section 4.4.2). Researchers have alsonoted disparities between first-generationimmigrant students and native students.

More worryingly for Hong Kong’svision of a society built on life-long learn-ing is the finding that students report highlevels of stress, a low sense of belonging totheir schools and low motivation in learn-ing. Indeed, in the TIMSS studies, HongKong is one of the lowest ranked partici-pating countries with regard to the indica-tor of students’ sense of belonging to theirschools.

4.4 Findings

4.4.1 CultureResearchers of East Asian education sys-tems frequently argue that the extraordi-


64

Figure 4.1. Variation in student performance (PISA 2006)

Within-school variance

Total within school varience

Within-school variance explained by the index ofeconomic, social and cultural status of students andschools

Between-school variance

Sweden

Canada

New Zealand

United Kingdom

Hong Kong-China

Between-school variance explained by the index ofeconomic, social and cultural status of students andschools

Total between-school variance

percentage of the average variance in student performance in OECD countries

40 20 0 20 40 60 80 100

OE

CD

Ave

rage

OE

CD

Ave

rage


nary academic successes of these systemscan be traced to the cultural practices andassumptions that underpin these soci-eties.187 This thesis was certainly supportedby a broad cross-section of stakeholdersand analysts within the Hong Kong sys-tem, although interviewees were also quickto point out that the territory’s Conf -ucian188 heritage can act as a double-edgedsword.

As a route to excellence, Confucian phi-losophy places heavy emphasis on the valueof learning. Education is both the meansby which one becomes a moral, uprightperson and the tool with which one servesthe larger community. The value of a goodeducation has also been carved on to theChinese mindset through historical prece-dence. Professor Kai Ming Cheng, Chairof Education at the University of HongKong, points out: ‘For more than 2,000years since the time of Confucius, exami-nations were the means of selection ornomination for high-status positions with-in officialdom. In the 1,000 years betweenthe Sung dynasty and the downfall of themonarchy in 1911, civil examinations werean important annual national exercise. Thecivil examination, and nothing else, wasthe social ladder that enabled upwardmobility.’189

Crucially, achievement in Confucianculture is generally considered to be morea product of hard work than a manifesta-tion of one’s innate ability. Stevenson andStigler, in their classic comparative study ofeducation in East Asia and North America,note: ‘Chinese and Japanese societies allowno excuses for lack of progress in school;regardless of one’s current level of perform-ance, opportunities for advancement arealways believed to be available throughmore effort. High scores on a test are inter-preted as a sign of diligence.’190 As such,parents, teachers and students themselveshold high expectations of what is possible,given adequate effort and support. Takinginto account the evidence that high expec-

tations have a strong positive impact onstudent outcomes, it is possible that thelow impact of SES on student performancein Hong Kong is a product of this cultural‘buffer’.

The practitioners we interviewed wereappreciative of the fact that Hong Kongparents are generally very supportive ofthe efforts of their children’s schools andteachers. It should be noted, though, thatparental support here is not necessarilythe same as engagement. We found thatpractitioners working at schools with lowersocio-economic compositions were morelikely to report a hands-off approach toschool management issues among parents,with support being channelled to activitieslike fund-raising. One principal noted:‘When children come to school, their par-ents give them over to us … we know that ifwe need their backup, if we scold their chil-dren, they will support [us].’

On the flip side, Hong Kong parents canbe said to overemphasise a narrow definitionof education achievement, as measured bynational public examinations and other suchstandardised assessments. Professor Chengargues: ‘The cultural priority of clearly delin-eating one’s status within the collective leadsnaturally to an educational system thatemphasises examinations and competi-tion.’ One of our interviewees, a vice-principal at a high-performing, value-added school,191 echoed Cheng’s argumentin a more tongue-in-cheek manner: ‘Inthe Chinese society we all like examina-tions [laughs], it’s true.’

The emphasis in Confucian culture onacademic achievement has contributed toHong Kong’s reputation (as that of otherEast Asian countries) as an examination-oriented system characterised by high-stakes testing and high levels of stressamong students. Indeed, educators expressconcern that students have little love oflearning, perceiving the education systemas a series of hoops to jump through in thepursuit of employment, rather than as a


Hong Kong

187 See, for example, H. W.

Stevenson and J. W. Stigler, The

Learning Gap: Why our schools

are failing and what we can learn

from the Japanese and Chinese

(New York: Summit Books, 1992);

D. Biggs and J. Watkins, The

Chinese Learner: Cultural, psy-

chological and contextual influ-

ences (Hong Kong: Comparative

Education Research Centre,

University of Hong Kong, 1996).

188 Traditional Chinese culture

has been greatly influenced by

Confucian teachings. As such, we

will be using the term ‘Confucian

culture’ rather than ‘Chinese cul-

ture’.

189 K. M. Cheng, ‘Can Education

Values Be Borrowed? Looking

into cultural differences’, Peabody

Journal of Education 73:2 (1998),

p. 16.

190 Quoted in Cheng (1998). p. 95.

191 As in England, the term

‘value-added’ is used in Hong

Kong to refer to a school’s effec-

tiveness at improving a child’s

performance, after prior student

attainment has been taken into

account.


good in itself. A member of theCommittee of Home and SchoolCooperation’s board of directors mused:

It’s difficult [to strike a balance]. HongKong parents want their children to dowell and push them hard. And our stu-dents do do well internationally [incomparative studies like PISA] … butwhere are our Nobel Prize winners?Our students don’t love learning. They study to get a job and make money, notbecause they love to.

This emphasis on academic achievement hasalso arguably led to a devaluing of vocation-al education and other applied pathways.Students who do not qualify for a pure aca-demic course of study are often classed asfailures, a source of shame for their families.Professor Ho, the Director of the Hong

Kong PISA studies centre, observed: ‘Thehigh-stakes testing system that we practise, itcreates a lot of labelling … the stigma is stillthere if you don’t get all As, if you can’t qual-ify to go on to university.’ Given the objec-tives of the Learning for Life reforms (in par-ticular the commitment to creating a systemresponsive to the needs of all students and toensure that there are ‘no losers’), altering thismindset is essential. In the introduction tothe Commission’s reform proposal, thenChairman K. C. Leung, in a pre-emptivemove, argued:

We must emphasize that the enhance-ment of the standard of students in gen-eral is never in conflict with the nurtur-ing of academic excellence. Instead, webelieve that all students have vastpotentials, and education enables themto fully develop. Excellence is essential


66

192 In Hong Kong, secondary

schools can be loosely classified

into three bands based on the

academic achievements of its stu-

dent intake. For more information,

see the section on banding and

streaming.

Jockey Club EduYoung College

EduYoung is an aided, secondary school in Tin Shui Wai, a recognised problem spot in Hong Kongdue to the high rates of unemployment and poverty. Most of the students that EduYoung recruitscome from the lower academic achievement bands and are disengaged from the traditional curricu-lum. The college has worked hard to develop and promote alternative programmes of study that theteachers and leadership team believe will better serve and resonate with their student population.(Many Band 2 and 3 schools192 are attempting to carve niches for themselves within the system bydiversifying the range of programmes offered.) The continued parental emphasis on academics is,however, creating a dilemma for these schools.

Jimmy Lui, EduYoung’s vice-principal, explains:

In our schools we try to balance what the parents ask for and what we want to do. In the past fewfive to eight years, we’ve been carrying out the education reforms, and Hong Kong schools tend tomore follow the market. If the parents do not choose the school as their option, their children do notcome to our school, the school will close down.Under this kind of market pressure, we have torespond to parents, but some parents, they’re not clear what to give to their children.

At the moment, many, many parents are only asking for academic results. But for example inour school, we set this as only one of eight targets … of course we are clear that we need to improvestudent academic performance, but at the same time we need a holistic programme to support themmorally, mentally, have vision, to let them enjoy their school life …That’s why if we only respond toparents’ demand for academic training … then it’s not good enough for our students, but we haveno choice. We must respond to parents to make them choose us and let their children get into ourschool … that’s from my point of view quite a difficult job to carry out.


for the society, but a monolithic educa-tional system can only produce elites inthe very narrow sense of the word. Theelites we need today are multifarious,and only a multifarious educational sys-tem, with diversified curricula, teach-ing methods and assessment mechanismscan produce the multi-talented peopleexpected by the society.193

Changing parental and societal expecta-tions is, however, going to pose a formida-ble challenge for the government and edu-cators, as the experience of Jockey ClubEduYoung College illustrates.

4.4.2 Banding and streamingHong Kong has a long tradition of group-ing students according to ability at the sec-ondary level, both across schools (banding)and within schools (streaming). Under thenew secondary school placement scheme,students are ranked according to meritbased on their scaled internal assessmentresults from the end of Primary 5 throughPrimary 6.194 Students are then divided intoone of three bands based on their per-centile score, with Band 1 consisting of thetop 33.33 per cent of the student popula-tion and so forth.

Parents and students can choose up to 30schools which they wish to attend. Theorder in which parental choices are matchedwith available spaces is, however, deter-mined by which band the student is in.Band 1 students are given first priority inthe school placement process, followed byBand 2, and so on. However, within eachband, students are randomly picked by thecomputer program. Thus, elite publicschools, while receiving all Band 1 students,may not necessarily receive the top 5 percent of the student population, but Band 1students that fall anywhere from the first tothe thirty-third percentile. Within schools,further streaming of students is at the dis-cretion of principals and teachers. There areno statistics on the percentage of schools

that choose to stream students according toability. Interviewees reported, though, thatadditional streaming, even at the primarylevel, is the norm.

As with New Zealand’s decile system,these bands are not meant to indicate thequality of the school but the type of studentpopulation it tends to draw from.Nevertheless, due to the emphasis on aca-demic achievement within the Confucianculture, attending a Band 3 school still car-ries a certain amount of stigma. As with NewZealand as well, there are significant differ-ences in the socio-economic composition ofschools from different bands. ResearchersSalili and Lai note that ‘In Band 1, themajority of the children come from middleor high socioeconomic backgrounds. MostBand 1 schools in Hong Kong Island andKowloon peninsula are located in moreprosperous areas, enjoy better facilities, havebetter teachers, and have more extracurricu-lar programs than higher band schools.’195

Critics argue that attainment test resultsin primary school may not be a fair indica-tor for future performance in secondaryschool, particularly for individuals who arelate bloomers. They also argue that thepractice of banding may create self-fulfill-ing prophecies, since the physical environ-ment and general culture of a school hasbeen found to have an impact on studentmotivation and learning. As an illustration,in a longitudinal study on learning andmotivation, Salili and Lai found that stu-dents in higher bands (i.e. lower-abilitygroups) ‘used fewer strategies in learning,had lower self-efficacy and lower attain-ment scores. They also had less positiveattitude, lower levels of motivation andwere more anxious in learning English.’Researchers were unable to ascertainwhether students in lower-band schoolsgenuinely had less academic ability thanstudents in higher-band schools.

Results from the PISA studies also clear-ly show that Hong Kong schools are high-ly academically segregated; the large


Hong Kong

193 Education Commission,

‘Learning for Life, Learning

through Life’ (2000).

194 Students’ internal assess-

ments are scaled using the aver-

age of the sampled results of Pre-

Secondary One Hong Kong

Attainment Test for that year, and

the Academic Aptitude Test

Results in the 1999/2000 school

year.

195 F. Salili and M. K. Lai,

‘Learning and Motivation of

Chinese Students in Hong Kong:

A longitudinal study of contextual

influences on students’ achieve-

ment orientation and perform-

ance‘, Psychology in the Schools

40:1 (2003), pp. 52–70, p. 53.


between-school variation suggests that thetype of school one ends up going to is agreater predictor of future student achieve-ment in Hong Kong than it is in the aver-age OECD country. One interviewee, aprominent academic argued: ‘The bandingsystem is problematic … [the result of ] aculture that accepts hierarchical inequitiesas natural, acceptable … but unless theyget rid of it completely, there’ll always bestratification within the system.’Among practitioners, however, the prac-

tice of banding and streaming appears tobe accepted as a pedagogical tool for effec-tive teaching. The argument posed is thatit would be extremely difficult and thusinefficient for teachers to meet the needs ofan overly diverse group of students. As it is,the number of bands has been reducedfrom five to three as part of the Learningfor Life reforms, in an effort to decrease theacademic stratification of students. As oneteacher explained:

Not everyone learns at the same pace …if we had to teach fast and slow learnersat the same time, then we’d have verybored or very lost students.

It is unclear, however, whether there is con-clusive evidence to support this belief. Onthe other hand, academics and stakeholderrepresentatives were more likely to inter-pret the practice of banding as a pragmaticcourse of action rather than as a soundpedagogical tool. Peter Hill, the SecretaryGeneral of the Hong Kong Examinationand Assessment Authority, and an interna-tional expert on education reform, noted:‘Well, when you’ve been in a situationthat’s highly banded you can’t just throw itout. The system would collapse. So mov-ing from five to three is a lot of movementfor these schools. Now, for an outsider whohas had no banding, they think, well, whydon’t you just throw it away?’ Anotherinterviewee, the chair of one of the adviso-ry councils, pressed this point, noting that

the system at present is ill prepared for acomplete removal of the banding system:‘It’s going to take a while to change. Ourteachers have never been trained to dealwith a diverse range of students … the sys-tem is not ready … until now [the prepa-ration of the system is] not sufficient.’Hong Kong academics and education-

ists remain concerned about the impactthat banding has on educational equity. Ata recent conference on Hong Kong’s per-formance in the PISA 2006 study, schoolacademic segregation was flagged as amajor policy concern. As some of ourinterviewees have suggested, though, acomplete end to the practice of bandingmay well depend on how schools areadjusting to the impact of the new second-ary school placement scheme.

4.4.3 CompetitionHong Kong schools are fiercely competi-tive, and interviewees unanimously agreethat competition between schools has beenthe most significant driver of improvedstandards in recent years. So, what factorshave produced this competitive climate?It appears as though Hong Kong’s

falling school rolls are the biggest impetusbehind the system’s competitive climate.Over the past five years, falling rolls havemade ‘school survival’ a challenging realityfor the primary sector. On average, 40 percent of schools have been closed in each ofthe nine districts in Hong Kong; in twodistricts, up to 60 per cent of schools wereclosed due to insufficient numbers.196 Thisdemographic challenge of falling rolls isnow affecting secondary school enrolment,and stakeholders are bracing themselves forsimilar rates of school closures. The grimreality of the situation is reflected in theway interviewees framed their discussionof the subject: as a matter of ‘life or death’.The high rates of closure can be attrib-

uted to the government’s strict viability cri-teria: any school that fails to recruit 23 stu-dents for a Primary One class will auto-


68

196 Information obtained from

Bureau official.


matically have their right to hold this classrevoked. More crucially, that school willhenceforth not be allowed to recruit anyadditional P1 students, in effect guarantee-ing the permanent closure of the schoolwithin a few years. Several schools havetaken the Education Bureau to court overthese school closures, but the Bureau hasheld firm on the ‘23’ magic number. (Bearin mind Hong Kong’s compact size and(remarkably efficient) public transporta-tion system. Students are by no meansrestricted to attending a neighbourhoodschool; indeed, in older housing estates,established schools need to recruit studentsfrom other areas in order to meet theirminimum student targets.)

A senior official from the EducationBureau observed:

If we give in on 23, people are going tokeep pushing and then where will it end?It’s a question of efficiency; we’ve calculat-ed the minimum number of students thateach class has to have to maximizeresources … we’re not going to back down.

Unsurprisingly, the government’s intrac -tability on this issue has raised the hacklesof the main teachers union, the HongKong Professional Teachers Union. In anewsletter to its members, an article onschool closures in the primary and second-ary sectors described Bureau officials as‘ruthless’ and ‘cold-blooded’ and the policyas having ‘totally eradicated the trustbetween teachers and Bureau’. Of morepressing concern to the union was its per-ception that competitive pressures had cre-ated a situation wherein: ‘Teachers havebecome salesmen, advertising agents, pub-licity officers, whose main task is to pro-mote their schools. Schools have becomeagglomerations of desperate teachers whoare forced to sacrifice their students’ well-being for their schools’ survival.’197

Is this posturing on the part of theunion, or an honest representation of

grass-root dissatisfaction? Certainly, inter-viewees were quick to point out the per-vasiveness of teacher concern over job sta-bility and the increased workload thatcoping with the competitive climate hadproduced. A recent study for the Bureauput average teacher workloads at morethan 55 hours a week.198 At the same time,interviewees unanimously acknowledgedthat despite the pressures on schools andteachers for ‘survival’, the competitive cli-mate had created a better outcome forstudents.

In the secondary sector, competitionbetween schools is also driven by theparental choice provisions in the studentadmission framework. To facilitate thedecision-making process, Hong Kongschools are required to publish informa-tion transparently on the web. A schoolsportal provides this service in a standard-ised form, showing staff numbers andqualifications, average length of teacherexperience, teacher to student ratio, specialprogrammes, presence of a parent-teachersassociation and a student union.

Schools have also begun to marketthemselves explicitly, producing glossycoloured brochures and small logoed trin-kets (such as bags, pens and cups). In ourvisits to schools, it was not unusual to seelarge banners hung over the front of theschool advertising the most recent achieve-ment of its students. Schools work veryhard at developing a brand for themselves,using highly evocative mottos, as alreadynoted.

What is particularly fascinating is thatthis intensity of competition and brandingis not just confined to the schools thatdraw on students from higher socio-eco-nomic classes, or that are known to be aca-demically elite. Even among Band 3schools (i.e. schools that draw their studentpopulation primarily from the lowestachievement band), competition is keen, asschools use the Bureau’s value-added indexand a range of vocational/applied pro-


Hong Kong

197 http://www.hkptu.org/ptu/

director/pubdep/ptunews/508/

ptunews.htm.

198 Study on the Effectiveness of

Public-sector Secondary Schools

(Phase 2) Cross Case Report

2001.


grammes (traditionally, Hong Kong’sweakest link) to illustrate their ability toserve a population that has typically beenleft behind within Hong Kong’s highlyacademic system. Thus, schools helpfullypoint out their ranking in the value-addedindex in their brochures, and in somecases, even in their school motto (e.g. ‘Avalue-added school providing high-qualityeducation and austere atmosphere’).

Despite the intensely competitive climate,it does not appear as though opportunities

for collaboration are spurned. Indeed, high-performing schools appear to consider it anhonour to be invited (either by a fellowschool or the Bureau) to share their lessonswith or serve as a mentor to other schools.One principal (herself a former Bureau offi-cial) explained: ‘To be so good that everyonewants to learn from us, that’s added prestige… it’s good promotion.’ Furthermore, spon-soring bodies offer an immediate supportnetwork for their schools, with joint profes-sional development training, curricular plan-


70

199 http://www.edb.gov.hk/ index.

aspx?nodeid=1475&langno=1.

200 Speech by Mrs Fanny Law,

GBS, JP Permanent Secretary for

Education and Manpower at the

Grand Opening Ceremony of the

St Margaret’s Co-educational

English Secondary & Primary

School, on Friday, 25 February

2005.

201 Interview, senior Ministry

official.

The direct subsidy schools scheme199

Competitive pressures have been further heightened by a deliberate policy of the Bureau to fosterschool diversity and choice, through the development of the private sector. Set up in 1991, the directSubsidy Schools scheme was initially open only to secondary schools; since 2001, non-governmentprimary schools have also been allowed to apply for DSS status.

Under the DSS scheme, schools are given a per-pupil subsidy and allowed to charge top-up feesof up to HK$5,000 a month. Whilst HK$5,000 is small change by English standards (approximate-ly £200), it’s worth bearing in mind that the compulsory years of schooling (Primary 1 to Secondary3) is free in a government or aided school; from Secondary 4 to 7, school fees are around $6,000 ayear.

DSS schools are also given considerable leeway in making decisions on curriculum and admissionspolicy, a move that is supposed to be ‘conducive to a better alignment between the values and expec-tations of parents and the school and provides a solid foundation for home-school cooperation’.200

One of the more attractive features is their ability to choose their own medium of instruction –English is considered by most parents to be a vital tool for future success, but the government gen-erally discourages all but the best government and aided schools from using English as a medium ofinstruction, because of China’s emphasis on Mandarin. Fundamentally, though, the scheme isintended to engender a paradigm shift within schools: ‘Because they have all sorts of power, the men-tality changes … we are talking about the mentality.’201 Ownership of their own development is seen,here, as the most powerful lever for change.

As of the 2006 school year, 64 schools have joined the DSS scheme (46 secondary, 9 primary, and9 primary and secondary schools). While the number is still far below government targets, it is worthnoting that a number of the most academically prestigious aided schools have opted to become a DSSschool. Critics of the direct subsidy scheme are concerned over the impact that it will have on equi-ty within the system. They argue that students from lower socio-economic backgrounds will nowhave less opportunity to attend the best schools in the territory as they will not be able to afford thetop-up fees.

When queried on this point, the Bureau official did not seem to perceive a potential conflict ininterest. She countered with the argument that most of these elite schools now offered scholarshipsfor poorer students, and that some DSS schools (such as QualiEd College) are specifically targetedfor students from low socio-economic backgrounds and thus charge very low fees. Owing to the factthat the direct subsidy scheme is still fairly new, there has yet to be any research on the impact thatchanging status to DSS has on student outcomes or on school segregation by socio-economic status.


ning, and so on. Specialised stakeholderorganisations (e.g. Special Schools Council)also offer a ready network for cross-schoolcollaboration.

On a national level, the Bureau has setaside HK$5 billion to set up a QualityEducation Fund. Much like the AlbertaInitiative for Schooling Improvement, thefund supports the development of individ-ualised schooling improvement pro-grammes that are research-based and thatengage multiple stakeholders. Recipients offunding are also required to present theresults of their research project at an annu-al conference.

The chairperson of a major stakeholderorganisation argued that the introductionof the fund provided not just an influx ofsorely needed money, but prompted a shiftin attitudes: ‘It breaks the philosophy thateveryone should get the same thing ...we’ve seen an increase in initiative of localbodies, and schools now have to own theirown education development.’ This pointwas emphasised by another stakeholderrepresentative, who asserted: ‘We didn’treally have a sharing culture before thefund was introduced … there’s a commit-ment now to share good practice with eachother.’ To date, however, there have beenno independent assessments of the effec-tiveness and impact of the QualityEducation Fund on education quality andstandards in Hong Kong so it is not possi-ble to verify whether or not the fund hasincreased horizontal collaboration withinthe system.

4.5 ReflectionsGiven the extent to which the Confucianculture has shaped the climate of the HongKong education system, it is legitimate toquestion the extent to which policy inter-ventions can be borrowed or lifted whole-sale for application in England.202 At thesame time, it would be erroneous to treatHong Kong as a completely alien system.

Peter Hill argues: ‘There’s nothing espe-cially unique about the Hong Kong expe-rience; the challenges they face are com-mon problems across the world.’203 Thechallenge, then, is in recognising the extentto which comparison is valid.

One such dimension would be the wayin which competition and collaborationplays out in the Hong Kong system. Dueto the confluence of a number of factors –sharp drops in the student population;Hong Kong’s small and highly urbanisedarea; and strict enforcement by theEducation Bureau – schools have beenforced to compete with one another forstudents. The stakes are high in this questfor survival, and schools have gone to con-siderable lengths to cultivate distinct iden-tities, ethoses, pedagogies and even targetpopulations. What is particularly remark-able is that these competitive pressuresoperate evenly across the system, not justamong elite schools catering to studentsfrom higher socio-economic backgrounds.At the same time, competition betweenschools has been moderated by the naturalsupport network formed by school spon-soring bodies (SSB).204 Collaborationamong schools run by the same SSB iscommon, particularly with regard to pro-fessional development. The governmentdoes, nonetheless, hope to increase collab-oration; hence the establishment of theQuality Education Fund, which ties fund-ing for schooling improvement projects tothe involvement of multiple stakeholders.

The outcome of Hong Kong’s marketsystem of provision has been fairly promis-ing for parents and students: an increaseddiversity of educational choices; improvedtransparency and reporting to parents andcommunities; and higher standards acrossthe board. Teachers and principals are, how-ever, feeling the strain, and it’s questionableto what extent they will be willing to con-tinue to work long hours under conditionsof low pay, low autonomy and high stress. Itseems reasonable to posit that the Hong


Hong Kong

202 Underlying this issue is

another, arguably more funda-

mental, question: can policy inter-

ventions alter cultural values and

norms? (Should governments

even try?)

203 Interview

204 From an English perspective,

SSBs can be understood as

quasi-federated structures.


Kong government and teaching unions willneed, in the coming years, to revisit theterms of existing teaching contracts andredefine professional expectations.

Finally, the Hong Kong case studyillustrates the powerful influence of cul-ture on attitudes towards student attain-ment. Here, the Confucian emphasis onachievement as a product of hard workrather than as a function of innate abilityhas created an environment of highexpectations of all students. This in turnmay account for the higher average stan-dards of Hong Kong’s students, and thelower impact that students’ SES has ontheir performance. (Though as the com-

parison of the SES school profiles of dif-ferent bands demonstrate, it would beerroneous to say that class is no longer afactor.)

Nurturing a similar culture of studentachievement in England will by no meansbe easy. Nonetheless, the government canbegin by promoting a consistent focus onstandards – as all the systems in this reportare doing – and by presenting an unequiv-ocal message that ‘all students can achieve’.It would also be worth revisiting the way inwhich English discourse tends to fixate onability as an innate measure of future suc-cess and the impact this has on studentmotivations and outcomes.


72


5Sweden

Rinkeby is a suburb of Stockholm notedfor its large immigrant community.Approximately 85 per cent of the dis-trict’s 14,000 residents are immigrants orof immigrant descent, and many of theseare former refugees. Unemployment ratesare considerably higher in Rinkeby thanin the other boroughs of Stockholm –only 35 per cent of the working popula-tion is employed, compared toStockholm’s average of 72 per cent – andmore than half of the residents are onwelfare.

Media representations of Rinkeby aregenerally less than complimentary. At best,it has been described as a segregatedenclave; at worst, an immigrant ghetto.Regardless, Rinkeby is a clear illustrationof the changing nature and character ofSwedish society.

At Bredbyskolan205– a 400-pupil, Grades1-9 comprehensive school – the reverbera-tions from this changing environment area part of everyday life. Ninety-eight percent of students here do not speak Swedishas a first language. While the majority of


205 Bredby School.


Table A1.2a, p. 37.

207 Ibid., Table A1.3a, p. 38.

208 Ibid., Table B1.1b, p. 187;

expenditure is reported in equiva-



rates; for primary, secondary and


cation.



cation.


Table B2.1, p. 205.

211 Ibid., Table B4.1, p. 230.


Indicator Sweden OECD average United Kingdom


to 64, that has attained at least

upper secondary education (2005)206 84 68 67


to 64, that has attained a tertiary

qualification (2005)207 30 26 30

Annual expenditure per student on

core services, ancillary services and

research and development (2004)208 $7,744 $6,608 $6,656

Expenditure on educational

institutions209 as a percentage of

GDP (2004)210 4.5 3.8 4.4

Public expenditure on education4 as

a percentage of total public

expenditure (2004)211 8.3 9.2 8.7


students are second- or third- generationSwedes, most come from families that havenot been successfully integrated into theSwedish economy and society. Petty crimeis a major problem in the borough, and theschool has been the victim of three arsonattacks in the last year alone.

At first glance, prospects for the schooland its students are not promising.According to data collected by theNational Agency for Education, the pre-dicted student achievement rates are thelowest among all schools in Stockholm. Interms of actual outcomes, however,Bredbyskolan performs above expecta-tions, and has garnered recognition as avalue-added school. Absolute performancehas also been improving, and the percent-age of students eligible for upper secondaryschool (the gymnasium) has risen from 50per cent in 2003, to 75 per cent in 2007(the national average is 89 per cent).

What accounts for this extraordinaryperformance? Principal Bjorn Hjalmarssonbelieves that the school’s upward trajectorycan be attributed to the commitment ofthe teachers in ensuring that all studentsmeet the national standards. ‘Studentshave the right to leave school with goodminimum standards,’ he says. ‘It’s our dutyto help them pass … if the teacher’s pro-gramme is presented but students don’tlearn, that’s not OK.’

To that end, the school has developed astrong focus on data. Each student’s per-formance is carefully monitored to ensurethat their progress in all subjects is on track;if students are faltering, teachers work inteams to support the student. A central ele-ment of its strategy has been the personalisa-tion of the national curriculum to make thelessons more relevant to the experiences ofBredbyskolan’s student community. Swed -en’s differential funding scheme has alsoenabled the school to hire three full-time‘maternal-language’ teachers and maintain alow teacher-student ratio – luxuries, giventhe resources of the average municipality.

The Bredbyskolan story highlights whatis perhaps the best feature of the Swedisheducation system: its traditional emphasison guaranteeing every child an equivalenteducation. ‘In Sweden, our curriculummakes clear that this is what every studentmust achieve,” Hjalmarsson argues. ‘WhenI was growing up, that was not true, somestudents pass, but some fail ... Now, there’sbeen a change in thinking …every studentcan and should pass. That’s powerful.’

As this chapter shall illustrate, however,the traditional emphasis on equity inSweden is being increasingly challenged,both by dissenters, and by socio-economicchanges within society. Indeed, theSwedish school system is perceived by theSwedish public (and certainly the media)to be in ‘crisis’ (a term interviewees them-selves used), and wide-ranging reforms arecurrently being planned. The specificnature of this ‘crisis’ and the implicationsof the upcoming reforms will be exploredin greater detail in the following sections.

5.2 Setting the sceneThere are 4,908 municipal and independ-ent compulsory schools (Years 1 to 9) inSweden (see Table 5.2). Most schools inSweden are small, particularly by Englishstandards. Sweden defines a large school asa school with more than 700 students, acategory containing just 1.4 per cent ofcompulsory schools. A third of municipalcompulsory schools have fewer than 100pupils, while approximately 55 per cent ofindependent schools have fewer than 100students.212

Since 1991, responsibility for the pro-vision of education has been devolved tolocal municipalities and county councils.In 2006, there were 290 different munic-ipalities (and, unbelievably, 3,712 schoolmanagement districts) of varying sizes;the smallest municipality, Bjurhom, has apopulation of 2,600, while the largest,Stockholm, has 761,000 residents.213


74

212 Swedish National Agency for

Education, descriptive data on

pre-school activities, school-age

childcare, schools and adult edu-

cation in Sweden 2006 (2007).

213 The larger Stockholm Urban

Area, of which the Stockholm

municipality is a part, is some-

times referred to simply as

Stockholm, a situation confusing

to outsiders. Stockholm Urban

Area has a population of about

1,200,000 people.


Unsurprisingly, this diversity has createda staggering range in outcomes, particu-larly in terms of operational capacity andstandardisation. While smaller munici-palities could arguably benefit from someform of amalgamation, interviewees notethat any form of rationalisation will behard to enact due to resistance from localauthorities who have come to prize theirautonomy.

As indicated in Table 5.2, there are anumber of different types of schools in thesystem: municipal schools (the majority ofschools within the public sector); Samischools, for Sweden’s indigenous popula-tion; national boarding schools, for stu-dents with severe handicaps; independentor free schools; and international schools.Education is compulsory from the age ofseven to sixteen, although parents canchoose to send their child to school fromthe age of six.215

Demographically, Sweden’s educationsystem is faced with two challenges. Thefirst is the fact that the system is about toexperience a significant drop in the school-going population. From 1991 to 2002, thenumber of pupils of compulsory ageincreased by approximately 20 per cent,from around 870,000 students in1991/1992 to just over 1,000,000 studentsin the year 2001/2002.216 This boom neces-sitated an increase in schools and an expan-sion of the teaching force. However, the

school-going population is starting to fallagain and population projections indicatethat by 2009/2010, the number is going todrop to 1991/1992 levels. Correspon -dingly, the sector is starting to strugglewith the reality of school closures and stafflay-offs.

The second demographic challengefaced by the Swedish system is the rise inthe immigrant population. Since 1995,levels have been rising steadily, in large partowing to Sweden’s fairly open immigrationregulations. The majority (approximatelyone-third) of immigrants are from otherScandinavian countries. Another third ofimmigrants (37.8 per cent), however, arerefugees, the majority coming from theformer Yugoslavia, Iraq and Iran.217 Withinthe school-going population, about 14 percent of students on average have a foreignbackground; a majority of these students(approximately 60 per cent) are born inSweden.218

A number of Swedish and internationalstudies have shown that students with aforeign background219 perform significant-ly worse than students born in Sweden andwith Swedish-born parents.220 The generalsocio-economic situation for immigrantsalso appears to have deteriorated, withimmigrants in the 1990s performing morepoorly in terms of employment andlabour-market participation than in the1980s.221 Correspondingly, the education


Sweden


Education, descriptive data on

pre-school activities, school-age

childcare, schools and adult edu-

cation in Sweden 2006 (2007).

215 It appears that this flexible

start age is also being reviewed.


Education, ‘Schools like any

Other? Independent Schools as

part of the system, 1991–2004’,

Summary Report in English

(2006a), p. 44.

217 UNHCR (2000), cited in

Swedish National Agency for

Education, ‘Reading Literacy and

Students with a Foreign

Background – Further Analyses

from the PISA 2000 Results’,

Summary of Report 227 (2005).

218 Ministry interview.

219 Defined here as: i) students

born in the test country but with

both parents foreign-born; and ii)

foreign-born and with both par-

ents foreign-born.

220 See, for example, Swedish

National Agency for Education

(2005).

Table 5.2. Number of municipalities, schools, pupils and teachers in com-pulsory schools (Y1 to Y9)214

Sector No. of school municipalities No. of schools No. of pupils No. of teachers

Municipal 290 4,306 919,174 75,482

Sami 4 6 138 19

Independent 172 585 74,091 5,583

International 5 8 1,800 167

National boarding school 3 3 254 24

Total 474 4,908 995,457 81,275


sector is struggling to ensure the integra-tion of immigrant students, particularlythose that were former refugees.

The latter group tends to congregate inisolated ‘pockets’. As with Rinkeby, somesuburbs of Stockholm are almost entirelycomposed of first-generation to third-gen-eration immigrants. Even among second-generation and third-generation immi-grants, Swedish is not spoken as a first lan-guage, and practitioners working withthose populations report similar culturaldifficulties in acclimatising those familiesto the Swedish school system as with first-generation immigrants.

Further information on the operationaland governance processes of the system canbe found in the appendices.

5.3 History of reformThe Swedish Social Democratic Party hasgoverned Sweden for 65 out of the last 74years. These six and a half decades of rulehave left an indelible mark on Swedishsociety, of which the most notable legacy isundoubtedly the social-democratic welfarestate, founded on principles of social inclu-sion, equity and the redistributive role ofthe state.

Within the education sector, these princi-ples of equity and redistribution have alsoinfused the system’s development trajectory.From the 1960s onwards, the SocialDemocratic government pursued policiesthat aimed to guarantee the right of everychild to ‘an equivalent education’. Forinstance, the introduction of comprehensiveschooling pushed back selection from theage of 10 to the age of 16; pre-school edu-cation and after-school care was developed;post-secondary education was expanded;and progressive education that emphasisednurture, individual development and civicresponsibility (and that critics argued dis-tracted from the ‘real’ objective of educa-tion: learning) was promulgated.

In 1991, the Social Democrats were

defeated by a four-party coalition led bythe conservative Moderate Party underCarl Bildt;221 Bildt came to power on aplatform of liberalising the economy (and,by extension, reforming the welfare state).In the education sector, then school minis-ter Beatrice Ask oversaw reforms thatdevolved the responsibility of school oper-ations to the municipal level, promotedparental choice, expanded the private sec-tor through the legislation of independentschools, and revamped the national cur-riculum and assessment system to the cur-rent ‘goal-oriented’ system.222

Ask’s reforms were not without prece-dent. Since the mid 1980s, the Conser -vatives and Social Democrats had beenlargely in agreement over the need todevolve power within the school system.Indeed, Asks’ decentralisation policiesbuilt on a bill that was passed in 1989delineating how responsibilities would bedistributed to each governance level. Themajor policy difference between the twoparties lay in the Conservatives’ promotionof an independent school system aimed atjump-starting what Bildt called a ‘freedom-of-choice revolution’.

The tenure of the Conservative coali-tion was short-lived; in 1994, the SocialDemocrat Party returned to power.Somewhat surprisingly, however, the partychose not to reverse the most controversialreform of the Ask and Bildt administra-tion – the move to increase choice anddiversity through the introduction ofindependent schools that were privatelyrun but publicly funded. According togovernment-sponsored analyses of thatperiod,223 the Social Democratic govern-ment, in the face of changing political andeconomic constraints, had themselvescome to recognise the merits of a choiceframework, albeit one safe-guardedagainst increased inequity. A senior analystat the Ministry of Education notes thatthe school-choice policy was very popularamong parents, so much so that the Social


76

221 The other parties in the cen-

tre-right Alliance for Sweden are

the Centre Party, the Liberal

People’s Party and the Christian

Democrats.

222 See appendices for more

detail..


Education (2006a).


Democrats would have been hard-pressedto rescind it. So the exercise of parentalchoice became a working reality in theSwedish system and the independent sec-tor expanded rapidly.

Through the 1990s and early 2000s,Sweden’s education system also grew ininternational stature, initially for its stellarperformance in international assessmentslike PISA and PIRLS, and more recentlyfor the perceived success of its devolutionand freedom-of-choice framework.

Internally, however, storm clouds werebrewing. The media regularly publishedarticles containing sentiments like the fol-lowing excerpt, about the decline of theeducation system:

Academic knowledge has been sidelinedin an approach where little is demand-ed of the students. During lower gradesstudents are often not given homework.Before the 8th grade they are not evengiven grades. Respect for teachers hasdeclined as the adults have limitedpower to deal with troublesome studentsand as disciplinary actions are veryrare.224

Growing public fears over a perceiveddecline in the quality of the education sys-tem made education a hot topic in the2006 elections – a fact that the oppositioncoalition successfully capitalised on. InSeptember 2006, after 12 years of SocialDemocratic rule, the four-party coalitionled by the Moderate Party returned topower under Fredrik Reinfeldt. This swingtowards Conservative rule was also reflect-ed on the local level in many municipali-ties, including Stockholm. On a nationallevel, the education portfolio is currentlyheld by the Liberal Party.225

It is worth noting that part of theModerate Party’s appeal was their agendaof education reform. The new schoolsminister, Jan Bjorklund (chairman of theLiberal Party), has long been one of the

fiercest critics of the Social Democrats’school policies, arguing that Swedishschools have been on the wrong track since1968 and have treated knowledge and stu-dent discipline with disdain. Correspon -dingly, the new government has a raft ofreforms planned (to be unveiled in spring2008). As of the time of publication, itappears that key initiatives will include:

� The introduction of more nationalassessment examinations. Currently,there is no compulsory national exami-nation until Year 9, the last year ofcompulsory schooling, when the stu-dent is aged 15 or 16.

� The use of grades from the age ofseven. Currently, students are not givengrades before the first term of theireighth grade in an effort to preventstigmatisation based on academic abili-ty. The Ministry also intends to intro-duce finer grading levels (from 3 to 7)to allow more differentiation in theassessment of student performance.

� A shorter inspection-cycle. Under cur-rent provisions, each school will beevaluated once every six years; theConservative Party wishes to increasethis frequency to once every threeyears.

� A re-evaluation of the national educa-tional goals. Under the current curricu-lum, teachers are given considerableflexibility to tailor the curriculum totheir students’ needs. There is concern,however, that this room for innovationhas been exercised to the disadvantageof students, and that the goals them-selves need to be less broad to avoidmisinterpretation of government objec-tives. It is likely that the list of core sub-jects will also be expanded to includeHistory.

� An overhaul of Swedish policy on stu-dent discipline and behaviour, or, moreaccurately, the introduction of a schoolpolicy on student discipline – as of July


Sweden

224 Nima Sanandaji, chief execu-

tive of free-market think tank

Captus, in The Local, 19 March

2007.

225 The Liberals are seen to be

more right wing than the tradition-

al Conservative Party (the

Moderates), which is pursuing a

more centrist path.


2007, the sector did not have one. Forexample, teachers would be authorisedto send written warnings home to par-ents and reduce grades for pupilscaught playing truant. The most con-troversial aspect of this proposalappears to be the creation of a provi-sion that would enable teachers to dis-miss pupils from the classroom at bothgrundskola (compulsory) and gymnasi-um (upper secondary) levels.

� ‘Teacher boosting’ policies aimed atimproving teachers’ education levelsand status. Part of the strategy includesa reform of existing teacher-trainingprogrammes.

5.4 Claims to fameAs with the East Asian countries, theNordic systems tend to perform well ininternational assessment studies such asPISA, PIRLS and TIMSS. Finland is themost well known and celebrated of thecountries in this group, but Sweden hasalso been successful.

In all three PISA studies, Swedish stu-dents performed significantly above theOECD average in reading literacy, andslightly better than the OECD average inmathematics, problem-solving and science.In terms of trends, Sweden’s performancein reading literacy was found to be compa-rable across the PISA studies, although acomparison of results from the PIRLS2001 and 2006 studies found a significantdecrease in student performance. Similarly,the TIMSS studies suggest that despiteSweden’s relatively high performance inmathematics and science, there has been aslight, absolute decrease in student per-formance. In 2003, Year 8 Swedish stu-dents performed less well in mathematicsthan their counterparts in 1995; their per-formance in science has also seen a margin-al drop.226

The Nordic countries also tend to per-form well on measures of equity. Sweden is

one of four countries (the others beingFinland, Norway and Iceland) with thelowest between-school variance in theOECD. Sweden also scores significantlybelow the OECD average on: i) the impactof student’s socio-economic backgroundon student performance; and ii) the degreeof variation between the high and lowachievers.

More recently, Sweden has garneredinternational attention for the perceivedsuccess of its school-vouchers system. Oneof the most common critiques of choiceframeworks is that families that exercisechoice tend to be those who are the mostable (financially and culturally) to navigatethe educational bureaucracy. Conseque -ntly, students from higher socio-economicfamilies end up opting out of strugglingschools and leaving behind poorer studentsin schools that further decline as a result ofmiddle-class flight.

Some researchers argue, however, thatSweden is for the most part circumventingthis dilemma. A recent article in TheEconomist proclaims: ‘… the strongest evi-dence against this criticism comes fromSweden where parents are freer than thosein almost any other country to spend asthey wish the money the government allo-cates to educating their children.’227 Otherachievements that are frequently laudedinclude the sector’s rapid growth, and thepositive impact that independent schoolshave had on student and school perform-ance. These claims, both positive and neg-ative, will be discussed in closer detail inthe following section.

5.5 Findings

5.5.1 Competition and choiceIn 1991, the Conservative coalition gov-ernment pushed through the Choice andIndependent School Bill. It was hoped thatcompetition from the new private, inde-pendent schools would raise standards,


78


Education (2007), p. 155.

227 http://www.economist.com

/world/international/displaystory.cf

m?story_id=9119786


empower parents and students and pro-duce hotbeds of teaching innovation.Under the legislation, companies or organ-isations apply directly to the NationalAgency for Education for permission to setup an independent school. However, fund-ing comes from the local municipalities,with each school receiving 85 per cent ofthe standard per-pupil funding; start-upcapital (for the renovation of buildingpremises, for example) is expected to beprovided by the organisation/companyrunning the school.

To reduce the threat of segregation byfinancial ability, independent schools arenot allowed to charge fees; hence the othername of independent schools in Sweden:free schools. Where the number of appli-cants exceed the number of places, inde-pendent schools are allowed to useentrance tests or queuing systems to selectstudents. Unsurprisingly, this practice hasproduced distinct trends in the composi-tion of the average independent school stu-dent body. On average, independentschools have a larger proportion of femalestudents, pupils with parents who haveattended post-secondary school, andpupils with a foreign background.Moreover, these students with a foreignbackground are more likely to have parentswith higher education qualifications thantheir counterparts in municipal schools.228

The first wave of schools that were setup tended to be primarily of a religiousnature or small community schools thatwould have otherwise been closed down bythe municipal authority. As the movementpicked up steam, more educational organ-isations with a specific philosophy came onboard – for example, the Rudolph Steinerand Montessori schools. The most recentwave of schools has seen the entry of for-profit companies into the movement, with‘generalist’ schools that tend to closely mir-ror the philosophy of Sweden state schools.Currently, generalist schools are the largestcategory of independent schools.

Since the introduction of the vouchersystem, Sweden has gained increasingprominence internationally as a choice sys-tem that works – one that raises standards,is cost effective and has had a negligibleimpact on equity. In England, too, the casestudy of Sweden has often been used toillustrate poli t i cians’ and policy-makers’conceptions of what a working choiceframework could look like.

In terms of raw data, the figures for thegrowth of the private, independent schoolsector has been impressive. The Economistreports: ‘ ... the result has been burgeoningvariety and a breakneck expansion of theprivate sector. At the time of the reformsonly around 1% of Swedish students waseducated privately; now 10% are andgrowth in private schooling continuesunabated.’ The rapid growth of the inde-pendent sector suggests, among otherthings, that there has been a correspondingcontraction in the number of publicschools owing to pressures of competition.

The actual experience on the ground is,however, somewhat different. It is of cru-cial importance to note that the introduc-tion of the voucher system coincided witha significant growth in the school-growingpopulation. As mentioned earlier, in thepast 15 years the number of pupils of com-pulsory age has increased by approximate-ly 20 per cent, from around 870,000 stu-dents in 1991/1992 to just over 1,000,000students in the year 2001/2002.229 Ourinterviewees thus noted that competitionbetween schools has yet to fully come intoeffect, since there had been a ‘surplus’ ofstudents. A 2006 study found that only 41municipalities reported having had to closeschools down because of the opening ofindependent schools.230 A senior official forthe National Agency for Education said:

It is true that there has been muchgrowth in the number of independentschools … we have not closed that manyschools, though, because the population


Sweden


Education (2006a), p. 17.

229 Ibid., p. 44.

230 Ibid., p. 27.


grew at the same time. If we had nothad the independent schools then onewould have had to open more municipalschools … there’s just too many students.

This picture is, however, changing. As pre-viously noted, the school-going populationis starting to fall again and population pro-jections indicate that by 2009/2010 thenumber of students is going to drop to1991/1992 levels. Correspondingly, mun -ic ipal (and independent) schools are start-ing to feel the pinch, with more frequentreports of failing municipal schools havingto be closed down.

A principal at a successful school ininner Stockholm noted: ‘Before, there wasno reason to change. We had more stu-dents than places!’ Another interviewee, arepresentative of Laraforbundet (the largestteachers’ union) concurred: ‘I think we’reonly just starting to see what impact com-petition between schools, not just free andmunicipal, but free and free, municipaland municipal, can do for the quality ofeducation. Now schools know that theyhave to compete for students where beforestudents would come anyway, regardless oftheir reputation.’

There is evidence that where a competi-tive environment has developed, standardshave risen. In an internal survey of munic-ipal education directors by the NationalAgency for Education, municipalities withlarger proportion of pupils in independentschools were more likely to: i) perceiverelationships between schools as charac-terised by competition; and ii) say that the

presence of independent schools in theirjurisdiction had contributed to schoolimprovement in compulsory schools intheir munipalities.232 This finding supportsthe argument put forward by CarolineHoxby, a Harvard economist, who con-cluded that successful choice reform is akinto a rising tide which lifts all boats.

Research by the National Agency forEducation and independent researchersalso suggests that students at independentschools perform better than their munici-pal counterparts. As Table 5.3 illustrates,students in independent schools havehigher average merit ratings and gradua-tion rates than pupils in municipalschools.233 While part of this variationcan be explained by factors such as differ-ences in the composition of the studentbody and the lower teacher-to-pupilratios, additional analyses suggest thatindependent schools produce betterresults in some circumstances. Forinstance, academic programmes at inde-pendent upper-secondary schools aremore successful in improving pupilattainment (even after prior attainmenthas been taken into account) than theirmunicipal equivalents.234

5.5.2 Equity

The Education Act stipulates that theeducation provided within each type ofschool should be of equivalent value,irrespective of where in the country it isprovided.

Curriculum Lpo 94, p. 4


80


Education, Educational Results

National Level Part 1, Report 274

(2006b), p. 19.


Education (2006a)., p. 26.

233 The merit rating refers to the

cumulative points for the 16 best

grades in a pupil’s leaving certifi-

cate at the end of Year 9, where

the grade Pass = 10 points, Pass

with distinction = 15 points, and

Pass with special distinction = 20

points (From Swedish National

Agency for Education (2006a), p.

8. ‘Graduation’ rates refer to the

proportion of pupils eligible for

upper secondary school.


Education (2006a), p. 39.

Table 5.3: Pupils completing Year 9 for the school year 2004/2005231

School type Average merit rating Proportion of pupils eligible for upper secondary school

Total 206.3 89.2

Municipal 204.9 88.9

Independent 226.2 93.4


The Swedish school system has traditional-ly placed a strong emphasis on an equitabledistribution of learning outcomes, typical-ly defined as an ‘equal opportunity tolearn, including a degree of compensationfor students with a less advantageous back-ground’.235 So, for example, schools dealingwith challenging populations (e.g. com-munities with high unemployment rates; aschool population with a high proportionof second-language speakers or immi-grants) receive targeted funding that candouble the amount of resources (financialand personnel) available to them.

As with East Asian societies, Swedishsociety places more value on communalismthan on individualism. Observers ofSwedish culture argue that at the heart ofthe Swedish psyche is a philosophy ormindset known as ‘lagom’. There is no cor-responding term in the English language,but it could be defined as ‘not too much,not too little’. Wallenberg argues:

So powerful is this belief in lagom thatSwedes almost religiously subscribe to aself - disciplined lifestyle that eschewsexcesses and where striving for individ-uality is looked upon as being sociallyinappropriate. In manner and thought,Swedes value an economic and socialsystem of checks and balances, free fromthe generated inequalities of unre-strained capitalism or the waste andmistakes of rigidly focused authoritari-an, centralised planning. For theSwede, lagom and ‘the middle way’ rep-resent the best that society has to offer.236

Indeed, a traditional Swedish proverb‘Lagom ar bast’ (literally, ‘Lagom is best’) istranslated in the Lexin Swedish-Englishdictionary as meaning: ‘Enough is as goodas a feast.’

Within the Swedish education system,this emphasis on egalitarianism can best beseen in: i) the legislation’s emphasis thatevery child is entitled to and should receive

an equivalent education; and ii) the highminimum standard set within the system –that every child should leave compulsoryeducation with the capacity of going on tosome form of post-secondary training.‘We’re a system focused on our low ratherthan high achievers,’ a prominent academ-ic explained. ‘The objective is to get all ourstudents past the minimum level, and mostof our resources and energies go towardsmeeting this goal.’

Indeed, 98 per cent of 16-year-oldsmake the jump from compulsory to uppersecondary education – an impressive fig-ure, particularly when one considersEngland’s own drop-out rate at age 16.237

However, of the cohort that goes on toupper secondary, only 70 to 75 per cent ofstudents graduate within four years – a fig-ure that education officials have declared‘below reasonable expectation’. TheMinistry does note, though, that approxi-mately 50 per cent of upper-secondaryschool drop-outs go on to complete theireducation through adult education class-es.238 Some commentators also argue thatSweden’s emphasis on ensuring a highminimum standard for all students hasenabled Sweden’s students to ‘do well at thetop’ – in the PISA studies, the percentageof students performing at high proficiencylevels (i.e. Levels 4 to 6) is higher than theOECD average.

It appears, however, that traditional sup-port for the goal of ensuring an equivalenteducation for all may be eroding. Duringour interviews, some interviewees madedisparaging references to what they termedSweden’s ‘culture of mediocrity’ or ‘cultureof averages’.239 For instance, a principal atan independent school (who formerlyworked in the municipal sector) noted: ‘Ithink that we tend to squash our brighteststudents. The curriculum is designed formost to reach and so those that are verysmart, once they reach that limit, don’treally have [anywhere] else to go.’ Anotherinterviewee, a political appointee within


Sweden


Education, ‘Equity trends in the

Swedish school systm’, Report

275 (2006C)., p. 6.

236 (Wallenberg, 2005) cited in

MacBeath, J. 2006. Stories of

Improvement: Exploring and

Embracing Diversity. International

Congress on School Effectiveness

and Improvement, Fort

Lauderdale, Florida

237 Note, though, that approxi-

mately 10 per cent of these stu-

dents do not meet the entry

requirements for mainstream

upper secondary school and are

instead placed in ‘individual pro-

grammes’. These individual pro-

grammes are intended to prepare

the student for transfer back into

the mainstream gymnasium lines.

Research suggests, however, that

less than 20 per cent of students

complete this transfer.

238 P. Bavner, ‘Equity in

Education Thematic Review,

Sweden Country Report’

(Stockholm: Ministry of Education

and Science, 2004).

239 One of the chapter’s review-

ers argued that there is no hard

evidence to support the opinions

outlined in this paragraph, and

thus disagreed that Sweden’s his-

torical commitment to ensuring an

equivalent access to education for

all children was being challenged.


the Stockholm municipality educationbureau, argued: ‘We have been so con-cerned about getting everyone through thesystem that we have lowered our standards.We don’t differentiate between someonedoing very well in maths, let’s say, or some-one doing very well in woodwork – itcounts the same! [For entrance to universi-ty] If Sweden is going to be competitivewe’re going to need to start pushing ourbest … we’re not all the same.’

This clash of paradigms can perhapsbest be illustrated in the arguments sur-rounding the existing grading system.Prior to 1994, grades were awarded on anorm-referenced basis wherein the distri-bution of grades (from 1 to 5) was sup-posed to follow a normal distributioncurve:

The Swedish National Agency forEducation reports, however, that in prac-tice there was a common misunderstand-ing among teachers that the distributionwas supposed to apply to each class. It wasalso rather difficult for a teacher to accu-rately anticipate where a student’s perform-

ance fell in reference to the nationalnorm.240 In a move to address the discrep-ancies in grading that arose, the govern-ment instituted a standard-referencedgrading system in 1994 as in the boxbelow.

Supporters of the new grading systemargue that whereas most teachers had pre-viously expected a certain percentage ofstudents to fail, there was now the expecta-tion that it was possible for every studentto achieve the minimum standard. A prin-cipal of a high-performing school inStockholm (himself a frequent speaker atinternational conferences on the experi-ence of the Swedish system), notes: ‘It wasa powerful change in mentality, from“some are always going to fail”, to “all canand should pass”.’ Critics argue, however,that the grading system, in flattening thedistribution curve, has at best held the topstudents back and at worst lowered stan-dards to ensure that all students are capableof passing – an argument familiar to thosewho mourn the loss of England’s norm-ref-erenced allocation of A-Level grades.

Additionaly, research by the governmentsuggests that the introduction of schoolchoice has contributed to a small rise inschool segregation.241 This trend is trou-bling, particularly for a country that pridesitself on its emphasis on equity (see Table5.4). At the same time, it would be unjustto heap the blame for increased school seg-regation solely on the choice framework. Arecent report on equity trends in the


82

240 For a more in-depth assess-

ment of the old and new grading

system, including their relative

strengths and weaknesses, cf.

Swedish National Agency for

Education, National Assessment

and Grading in Sweden (2005).

241 See Swedish National

Agency for Education (2006C) for

a review of recent research.

Grade 1 2 3 4 5

Percentage

of students

receiving

grade 7% 24% 38% 24% 7%

Grade Interpretation

- Has not attained all goals in the subject

Pass (G) Has attained all goals in the subject

Pass with distinction (VG) Has attained all goals in the subject and satisfies the

criteria for the award of pass with distinction

Pass with special distinction (MVG) Has attained all goals in the subject and satisfies the

criteria for the award of pass with special distinction


Swedish school system points out thatmost students choose to go to the schoolthat is geographically closest to their home,thereby suggesting that the increase inschool segregation is also a reflection of anincrease in residential segregation.244 Thisresidential segregation is exacerbated by

the impact of immigration. It was interesting to note that in terms

of perception, our interviewees were farmore concerned with educational inequal-ity as a result of changes in immigrationpatterns than as a result of socio-economicbackground or gender. It was not uncom-


Sweden


Education (2006c).

243 See, for example, C.

Wikstrom, C. ‘Grade Stability in a

Criterion-referenced Grading

System: The Swedish example’,

in Assessment in Education:

Principles, Policy and Practice

12:2 (2005), pp.125–44.

Table 5.4. Comparative indicators on education equity242

Indicator Sweden Direction of Change Notes

1998 2004

Between-school variation: 7.8% 11.6% Negative There has been a significant

the degree to which increase (about 50%) in bet-

attending a particular ween-school variation.It appears

school makes a difference that part of this change can

in student outcomes be attributed to the introduction

(measured in average of independent schools and the

national final grades) rise in residential segregation

Between-student variation: 60 points 66 points Negative There has been a significant

the degree of variation increase (11%) in between-stu

between low and high dent variation. This increase

performers (measured may be attributed to changes

as total deviation in in the grading system; resear-

average national final chers have also found evidence

grades) of grade inflation243

Impact of student’s socio- 35 points 37 points No Change Small, but not substantial,

economic background on increase in the impact of a

student achievement (measured student’s socio-economic

by effect of having at least one background on student per-

parent with tertiary education) formance

Degree of school segregation 17.6 points 19.4 points Negative A significant increase of approx

(measured as between-school imately 10% indicating that seg-

variation in distribution of pupils regation by socio-economic

with highly educated parents) background has increased

Impact of school’s socio- 23 points 39 points Negative A substantial increase of

economic composition on approximately 70%, suggesting

student achievement that there is a stronger impact

(measured in average on student performance due to

final national grade school’s average socio-economic

points) composition


mon to hear interviewees voice statementslike: ‘It’s important that we not be animmigrant school in Rinkeby but aSwedish school in Sweden’245 and ‘We’vegot a real problem with the experience ofimmigrant students … their performanceis shockingly poor compared to native stu-dents.’246

It appears, though, that the governmentdoes not believe it entirely possible to rec-oncile the goals of diversifying the systemand maintaining equity, suggesting thatsome degree of trade-off is necessary. In theclosing statement of the NAE report onequity, the agency states:

It should be made clear that theobserved deterioration in equity, likelydue in part to school reforms, does notnecessarily imply that the total net ben-efits of these reforms are negative.Increased freedom of choice as well as anincreased diversity of schools has gener-ated many positive effects unrelated toequity. The political question is there-fore, how much variation and freedomof choice can a school system accommo-date while claiming to maintain anequitable distribution of learning out-comes?

Overall, the picture suggests thatSweden’s equity performance is on a slightdownward trend, albeit from an extremelypositive starting point. It remains wellabove average in OECD measures of equi-ty. Whether this decline is consideredacceptable, given the benefits of choice anddiversity, may well depend on widerchanges in Swedish society.

5.5.3 Coming to grips with accountabilityThe language of accountability, as under-stood in Anglo-Saxon culture, is fairly newto the Swedish educational milieu. There isno comparable term for accountability inthe Swedish language, and we often foundthat it was necessary, during the course of

an interview, to provide our respondentswith an explanation of accountability (asunderstood in England), or to use a substi-tute phrase like ‘held responsible for’. Thisis not to say that Swedish practitioners andeducators do not understand or subscribeto the concept of accountability. Rather,the point is that they have previously dis-cussed and framed the issue in differentterms.

For instance, in going through officialdocuments and discussions with our inter-viewees, we found that they demonstrateda highly developed understanding of pro-fessional accountability. In a chapter onthe fundamental values of the Swedisheducation system, the national curriculumclearly states: ‘Education shall be adaptedto each pupil’s preconditions and needs.The Education Act stipulates that the edu-cation provided within each type of schoolshall be of equivalent value, irrespective ofwhere in the country it is provided.’

This statement of belief, that schoolsand teachers have a responsibility to adaptto student needs in order to secure success-ful outcomes,247 has very powerful implica-tions for professional accountability, as theopening case study on Bredbyskolan illus-trated. A vice-principal working at anotherRinkeby school noted: ‘You can’t put theblame on the child … never … it is up tothe teacher to ask “what do I need to dodifferently in order to help my childlearn?”’ Another principal concurred,using even stronger language to argue: ‘Asa teacher, you do not have the right to stoptrying to move students ahead.’ The lan-guage of rights and duties is striking.

To what extent is this focus on teacherand school adaptability embraced andpractised across the system? Most of ourpractitioners agreed with the emphasis onadaptability, although there was consider-able disagreement as to how widely it wasactually practised. According to the repre-sentative of Lararforbundet: ‘More andmore teachers are accepting that it is their


84


Education, ‘Equity trends in the

Swedish School System’,

Summary of Report 275 (2006c),

p. 24.

245 Vice-principal, primary school

in Rinkeby.

246 Senior manager, national

agency for school improvement.

247 This focus on child-centred

learning is very much in line with

Swedish social policy.


responsibility to make students learn …five, ten years ago, this wasn’t really thecase … it’s getting better.’ A senior analystat the Ministry of Education and Researchwas considerably less optimistic, arguingthat while most teachers gave a token nodto the idea of adaptability, in reality manydid not have the capacity or training to doso. He observed: ‘There’s no strong senseof professionalism, teachers aren’t typicallearners and schools are not learning com-munities.’

This discrepancy between intent andpractice in the process of increasing trans-parency and accountability was raised overand over again by our interviewees. Onone hand, these concerns could simply bea result of growing pains. Many of thepractices associated with accountabilityframeworks in England (e.g. inspections,league tables) are still fairly new to theSwedish system. For instance, schoolinspections were only introduced on a reg-ular basis in 2003. The National Agencyfor Education is still coming to terms withthe logistical details of ensuring a quickinspection turnaround. By that same rea-soning, the difficulties that some usershave reported in accessing school perform-ance data through the national database(SIRIS) could be attributed to the fact thatthe database is very much a work inprogress.

On the other hand, some concerns sug-gest a more serious tussle over the balanceof power in a governance system that hasprized autonomy. As an illustration, con-sider the consequences of a poor inspectionreport. The responsibility of monitoringschool reform belongs to the local munici-pality; while the NAE can request thatschools develop a schooling improvementplan, they are not able to mandate specificactions or take punitive action shouldimprovements fail to occur. As oneMinistry analyst disparagingly noted:‘“Free” schools as a paradox are more sub-ject to state governance and have thus

more accountability in the system thanmunicipal schools. The NAE can refuse torenew their grant if they don’t perform,whereas in a municipal school, the NAEcan’t strongly interfere.’

There also appears to be some profes-sional resistance to the existing accounta-bility framework. According to the unionrepresentative: ‘We do think that it is legit-imate to require inspections but we worrythat they are not inspecting the right thing… teachers are very important in theSwedish system, but they spend so littletime observing or talking to teachers.’Correspondingly, the union is currentlyadvocating more teacher input and assess-ment.

5.5.4 Teachers: Autonomy and statusUnder the Swedish system, teachers aregiven considerable autonomy in fleshingout the curriculum and choosing theappropriate pedagogical methods andtools.248 The emphasis on individualisingeducation also means that each teacher isexpected to be able to adapt to each child’sspecific learning needs (as described in sec-tion 5.5.3). Within such a framework, it isunsurprising that stakeholders raisednumerous concerns about the challengesinvolved in developing an effective teach-ing force.

Across the board, the majority of ourinterviewees felt that the availability ofqualified teachers posed a serious barrier toachieving high standards across the system.During the 1990s, the sharp rise in the stu-dent population, coupled with the eco-nomic recession, created a situation wheredemand for trained teachers outpaced sup-ply. As a stopgap solution, schools began tohire untrained personnel, and the propor-tion of untrained teachers in the system isnow fairly large. At present, 84.3 per centof the teachers in compulsory schools havehigher-education training qualifications,compared with 73.2 per cent of teachers inupper secondary schools.249


Sweden

248 Recall that the goal-oriented

framework prepared by the

national government was con-

sciously designed to allow for

considerable interpretation and

innovation on the part of the

teacher.


Education (2007).



86

250 A. Strath, Teacher Policy

Reforms in Sweden: The case of

individualised pay (Paris:

UNESCO, 2004).

251 In practice, the individualised

wage scheme has been expand-

ed in phases. The First

Agreement included a 20 per cent

stipulated increase in national

expenditure on teacher’s salaries

and a minimum salary level. In the

current incarnation, minimum

salary is only for pre-school, pri-

mary and mother-tongue teach-

ers, and guaranteed raises are

only for the first two years of the

contract (instead of all five).

252 Ibid., pp. 14–19.

253 Cited in Strath (2004).

Teacher wages reform

Since 1995, Swedish teachers have been paid according to a decentralised, individual pay scheme.The move to a performance-related pay scheme was introduced with the objectives of increasing effi-ciency (particularly in budgetary terms) and improving the quality of teaching. It was also intendedto clarify the division of responsibilities between the central and local government: municipal offi-cials were concerned that they had no control over key working conditions such as pay and hours,despite the fact that they were in charge of hiring and paying staff.

The broad conditions of employment with regard to pay and working time are agreed upon bythe two teacher unions and the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions, the organisa-tion representing the employers. In terms of implementation, the process of wage setting can occureither as a one-to-one dialogue between the teacher and school principal, or through negotiationswith the local union.

Given how contentious the issue of performance-related pay is, the obvious question in thisinstance would be: how did the government manage to abolish the fixed-pay system, which was atthat time widely supported by the teacher unions?

According to a UNESCO case study on Sweden’s reforms,250 the economic crises of the 1990s hadcreated a deadlock at the bargaining table. With little money to spare, municipalities refused toaddress an increase in teachers’ salaries without a move towards an individualised pay scheme. Theteacher unions in turn had come to perceive that an increase in wages would only be possible if theyraised the status of teachers. To that end, the unions signed a declaration that explicitly stated theirresponsibility in improving the quality of school education. The unions also hoped that competitionfor teachers at a local level would lead to a collective wage increase beyond what would be promisedin a central contract.251

Have the reforms lived up to these hopes? Existing research252 suggests that the scheme has func-tioned so far more as a labour-market instrument than as a means of rewarding performance. Thereasons are twofold. First, a shortage in the supply of teachers drove up the entry-level wages of newteachers. This, coupled with budget constraints, meant that principals were not always able to raisethe salaries of existing teachers. Second, as municipalities are still developing clear criteria for assess-ing teacher performance, there is still a tendency to evaluate teachers on the basis of effort and com-mitment rather than on actual outcomes.

Additionally, union dissatisfaction with the implementation of the national agreement is creat-ing new tensions between the teachers’ unions and the Swedish Association of Local Authorities,the body representing municipal employers. The chief assertion here is that teacher salaries andworking conditions have not improved sufficiently, or at least not as much as the unions had antic-ipated.

There is reason to believe, however, that these concerns are simply growing pains. Supportfor the individualised pay scheme has risen considerably among teachers. A survey carried outby Laraforbundet,253 the largest teachers’ union, found that over 60 per cent of their memberswere in favour of the scheme (compared to less than one-third of members in 1999). Indeed,the Laraforbundet interviewee commented: ‘We are quite supportive of the [individualisedwage] system … we think that it has been a good motivator for teachers.’ A senior Ministry ana-lyst concurred, noting: ‘We are one of the few countries with individualised pay for teachers …we haven’t gone as far … made as much of it as we could have, but it’s there … we can workon it.’


The difficulty in developing an effectiveworkforce appears (as in the other coun-tries profiled) to have two dimensions:gaps in the quality of training; and difficul-ties in recruiting the best candidates. Withregard to the former, interviewees raisedconcerns over the fact that: ‘We ask a lotof our teachers, and to do the job well it’snot enough to know something about thesubject. They need to understand the ped-agogies, the psychologies of working withchildren of different ages.’254 Anotherinterviewee, a senior official at theNational Agency for Education, concurredwith this, noting: ‘There’s an ongoinginvestigation on the qualification of teach-ers … we want to introduce some kind ofcertification, because currently training isprovided by more than twenty institutionsand there are considerable differencesbetween them.’

Does training as a teacher, and in thespecific subject being taught, really matter?Readers familiar with the English contextmay point to the effectiveness of the inde-pendent schools’ teaching force – a signifi-cant portion of which do not have formalteaching qualifications. Research conduct-ed by the National Agency for Educationsuggests, however, that there is some evi-dence for the argument that qualifiedteachers have a greater, more positiveimpact on their students. Specifically, theyfound that in two out of the three subjectsexamined (Swedish and English), studentsachieved better results with teachers whohave undergone teacher training and edu-cation in the subject. No comparable cor-relation was found for Mathematics.

The second dimension of the problem,and arguably the more serious, is thatteaching (as in the other countries pro-filed) has lost its lustre and thus fails toattract high-calibre candidates. Frequentconcerns were also raised about the degreeof remuneration afforded the teaching pro-fession in comparison to other occupa-tions. Indeed, the most recent round of

negotiations between the teacher unionsand the Swedish Association of LocalAuthorities and Regions for a new teachingagreement (see box on teacher wagesreform) has been drawn out, in no smallpart, because of union dissatisfaction overthe pace of salary increases in the last tenyears.

The link between recruitment and remu-neration was underscored by an educationofficial for the Liberal Party (the party incharge of the municipality of Stockholm),who asserted: ‘There are so many spaces inthe teacher education, but it really comesdown to salaries … teacher salaries aren’tcompetitive and we need to make them so ifwe want to get the best people.’ In responseto this allegation, a Ministry official arguedthat ‘Teacher wages have been going up; theproblem is that for the work that they do,teachers still feel underpaid.’

Indeed, a number of interviewees raisedconcerns over the breadth of objectivesthat teachers and schools were expected toachieve. One academic argued: ‘Swedishteachers have broader task requirementscompared to other countries … this affectstheir ability to be effective.’ The real chal-lenge may well be revisiting the tasks thatschools are expected to achieve, and to seri-ously question how many of the currentgoals have justly been placed on the shoul-ders of teachers.

5.6 ReflectionsGiven the attention and accolades heapedon the Swedish education system (at leastin England), we were fascinated by thebelief within Sweden that the system is ina state of crisis. Granted, the extent of dis-content with the Swedish education systemappears to be: i) inversely related to the dis-tance between the individual and theschool (for example, parents and teacherswere more likely to view the system in apositive light than someone with no directlinks to a child studying at school or to an


Sweden

254 Interview with union repre-

sentative.


educator); and ii) related to one’s ideologi-cal stance. Nonetheless, we were bemusedby the number of interviewees whoexpressed genuine curiosity over our deci-sion to study Sweden, rather than theirneighbour, Finland.

Is the Swedish education system in cri-sis? No more, one might argue, than anyother country.

In a recent audit on the national assess-ment and grading system, the NationalAgency for Education reported: ‘This sys-tem is heavily reliant on the integrity andprofessional assessment capacity of school-teachers, but is also vulnerable to failure atthe local level.’255 This pronouncementneatly encapsulates the double-edgednature of the Swedish education system.On the one hand, the autonomy accordedto practitioners under the current systemhas empowered them to act as curriculumdevelopers and to capitalise on their inti-mate knowledge of their pupils and com-munity. On the other hand, in instanceswhere teachers, and schools, are not livingup to the responsibilities placed on them,the lack of an external accountabilityframework makes it difficult for theMinistry to rein them in.

The emergence of the independent sectorduring a period of considerable studentpopulation growth appears to have limitedthe impact of competition, although this

situation is likely to change with the pro-jected decline in student numbers. Where ithas had an impact, the presence of the inde-pendent sector has arguably prevented statecounterparts from being complacent andhas reshaped the terms of the debate.Additionally, the popularity of the parental-choice policy renders a return to a purelystate-school environment, or even one withstrong central control, untenable. Finding abalance between autonomy and accounta-bility will require redefining expectations onthe part of stakeholders and actors at thestate, municipality and school level.

Finally, Sweden’s historical commitmentto ensuring an equivalent education forevery child is reflected not just in officialpolicies (e.g. their differential funding for-mula, which gives schools in challengingcircumstances additional resources), butalso in professional discourse – helpinglearners learn is not simply a job function,but a duty. At the same time, there is evi-dence that education inequality is increas-ing in Sweden – a downward trend thatdemands immediate redress. Arguably, themost important challenge for the newConservative-led coalition is to preservethe best of the Social Democratic heritage– the commitment to ensuring an equiva-lent education for each child – alongsidenecessary reforms to create a more respon-sive, transparent system.


88


Education (2005), p. 28.


6Conclusion

Despite the considerable differences inorganisation, structure and philosophy, theconundrums faced by each of the systemsprofiled were remarkably similar. A basic,and by no means conclusive, list of ques-tions could include the following:

� How can governments support thedevelopment of professional autonomywhile ensuring institutional and profes-sional accountability? How might gov-ernments ensure the maximum avail-ability of effective teachers?

� How should the contract between par-ents, students and schools be framed?

� What is the optimum balance inpower-sharing which would giveschools sufficient room to innovate,but also ensure that the centre has theleverage to rein schools in where neces-sary?

� How might systems maximise the ben-efits that parents and students receivefrom competition between schools, andthat schools receive from engagementin collaborative networks?

� What is the best relationship betweenthe fee-paying and state sectors? Howcan the energy and performance of thefee-paying sector be harnessed so that itis available to as many as possible?

The countries and provinces examinedhave not always pursued similar policysolutions in their quest to square the abovecircles. Nonetheless, even where there weresignificant differences in approach, a closerexamination of the internal logic of eachsystem reveals common underlying princi-ples. In this conclusion, we will draw

together these tenets to create a frame-work, a proposal of what we believe acoherently aligned school system shouldlook like.

Specifically, we suggest that an ideal sys-tem can be characterised by the analogy of‘tight, loose, tight’: clearly delineatedobjectives, responsibilities and standards;the freedom and autonomy to innovate atthe school and classroom level; and com-prehensive mechanisms for evaluatingschool performance and ensuring institu-tional and professional accountability. Indoing so, this chapter lays the groundworkfor our follow-up report on specific policyproposals for the English context.

6.1 First ‘tight’

Clarity and consistency of visionKeeping large-scale, system-wide reformson track is, as our own experiences inEngland have taught us, a Herculean task.Changes need to be simultaneously under-taken by all stakeholders, on multiple lev-els, and sustained over long periods oftime. Without universally understood andagreed-upon objectives, it is not difficultfor those who are implementing thediverse facets of a change programme tobecome overwhelmed by ‘initiatives’, tolose sight of the overarching end goal, or,more worryingly, to clash with one anoth-er over what the desired outcomes shouldbe.

Contrast this scenario – as seen to differ-ent degrees in Hong Kong, New Zealandand Sweden – with the experience ofOntario. The McGuinty administration



has successfully distilled their overarchingvision of education into concrete endgoals, which can be summed up in a singletagline: raising the bar, closing the gap.The simplicity of this message, and theconsistency with which it has been present-ed, creates no ambiguity. There is no doubtas to what every partner in education –administrators, practitioners, parents andstudents – should be aiming for.

Having a clear and consistent messagealone, however, is but one side of the story.Researchers have long noted that policiesmutate as they travel from the top, wherethey were developed, to the bottom, wherethey are implemented at the school or class-room level. While some of this distortioncan be seen as a side effect of large bureau-cracies, some is doubtlessly also the productof resistance to the mission at hand.

The Harris administration’s experiencein Ontario offers a particularly instructivelesson in political strategy. Its failure tobring all stakeholders on board not onlydamaged public confidence and teachermorale, but also overshadowed the positive– and necessary – elements of their reformagenda. This lesson, that the tenor of anygiven policy can have a powerful impact onhow it is received, is one worth heeding.This is particularly true if we accept thatshared vision is less a precondition of suc-cessful change than a product of concerted,honest engagement with all partners.

Changing the culture of student achievementThe case studies in this book add to agrowing mountain of evidence that cultur-al contexts create powerful incentives, ordisincentives, for student achievement.The Confucian emphasis on hard work asthe determinant of success, for instance,produces high expectations – amongteachers, parents and students alike – thatevery student can, and should, achieve.This cultural norm is far removed from thestatus quo in England, where we oftenexcuse underachievement.

Changing England’s cultural attitudestowards student achievement will undoub -tedly be a complex and time-consumingprocess. Yet we cannot afford to be daunt-ed by the challenge ahead: the stakes are fartoo high. So, what can our case studies tellus about possible steps forward?

The first step is to create a rigorousfocus on standards. All four countries havecommitted themselves to measuringprogress by attainments in educationaloutcomes, although some are certainly fur-ther down the line than others. The hardertask is to develop an educational climate orcontext that makes it feasible for studentsin all schools to achieve success, whichOntario is now attempting.

Setting minimum standards and expectationsProfessor Dylan Wiliam, a specialist inassessment systems, has argued that teacherswill inevitably teach to the test; the real chal-lenge is in finding a test that is worth teach-ing to. By extension, national assessmentand qualification frameworks are only asgood as the standards they are aligned withand the curriculum that they are based on.

Sweden’s two-tiered goal-oriented cur-riculum is particularly constructive in that itboth establishes the baseline expected of allstudents upon leaving school (i.e. ‘goals tobe attained’) and sets high expectations forthe overall performance of the school com-munity (i.e. ‘goals to aspire to’). The latterprovision signals that achieving the baselinealone is an insufficient criterion for educa-tional excellence. Rather, the goal is to keeppushing boundaries and to create an expec-tation of constant improvement and growthfor every student, and the system as a whole.

6.2 Mediating the ‘loose’

Balancing school autonomy with centraloversightAll of the profiled case studies have emb -raced some form of school-based manage-


90


ment on the grounds that increased auton-omy at the school level will encourageinnovation, heighten responsiveness to stu-dent needs, empower parent and commu-nity involvement and increase overall effi-ciency. New Zealand, which has gone thefurthest in embracing the school-basedmodel of decision-making, clearly illus-trates the strengths of this hypothesis, withstrong bottom-up innovation, particularlywith regards to collaboration on schoolingimprovement initiatives.

At the same time, the difficulty that NewZealand has been facing in systematicallyreplicating changes on a large scale, and inmaximising the efficiency of theirresources, suggests that there is need forsome form of middle management. Canada(Ontario and Alberta), Sweden and HongKong have school district boards or schoolsponsoring bodies that not only enableeconomies of scale, but also provide admin-istrative support for each individual school– a task that frees up time for principals andteachers to focus on what’s really impor-tant: teaching. More pointedly, these‘expert centres’ act as ‘internal auditors’,ensuring a degree of comparability in stan-dards across schools and supporting indi-vidual school governance.

England’s existing structure for oversee-ing schools is comparable to that ofSweden and Canada. Over the years, how-ever, local authorities have had their pow-ers haphazardly removed to the pointwhere their ability and capacity to supportor hold schools accountable is question-able. The challenge is either to reinvigoratethe local authorities (e.g. by returningsome measure of control over funding sothat the local authorities have leverage withindividual schools) or to radically re-imag-ine how we formally network schools.Here, Hong Kong offers a potential wayforward, as their mid-tier governing bodiesare not defined by geographical bound-aries, but by subscription to a particularmission and ethos.

Tempering competition with collaborationThe evidence from the countries profiledstrongly suggests that systems are mosteffective when there is a balance of com-petitive pressure and collaborative relation-ships within the system. Within the pub-licly funded education sector, it appearsthat some forms of school organisation arebetter suited to achieving this balance thanothers.

For instance, in Ontario and Alberta,the presence of more than one publiclyfunded school authority in the same dis-trict (i.e. the public and separate schoolboards) automatically creates a competitiveclimate. At the same time, these boardsalso provide a natural support network forindividual schools to draw on in terms ofresource-sharing and professional develop-ment. Similarly, in Hong Kong, schoolsponsoring bodies, in not being defined bygeographical boundaries, simultaneouslycreate conditions of competition (betweenschools belonging to different SSBs) andcollaboration (among schools belonging tothe same SSBs).

In contrast, there are no comparablecompetitive pressures within the Englishpublicly funded system. Local authoritiesare essentially monopolies, and there is lit-tle incentive to compete with schools inthe same area. At the same time, localauthorities show little evidence of beingstrategic leaders in delivering benefits ofcollaboration. Far more promising are thetrust and federation models that are beingpromoted, although take-up rates wouldhave to increase significantly before anyobservable differences on the system as awhole can be assessed.

Creating a new deal for teachersGetting an effective teacher into everyclassroom is arguably the most importantand problematic of the challenges to edu-cation reform. First, recruiting the bestcandidates is difficult given the many otherattractive options for graduates, especially


Conclusion


in shortage subjects such as science. Undersuch circumstances, it is not unusual to seethe capabilities of teachers called into ques-tion, and to have high levels of central pre-scription, as has been the case in England.

Improving remuneration – whetherthrough salary increases, or the restructur-ing of existing remuneration schemes –would certainly improve the government’schances of attracting better candidates intothe profession. For instance, in England, ahigh proportion of teachers’ overall remu-neration is end-loaded through ‘gold-plat-ed’ pensions. Such structures encouragelong stay and ultimately can trap teachersin a job they no longer want to do.

The problem, however, is that adminis-trations are understandably loathe to raisesalaries without some kind of guaranteethat there will be a commensurate rise inteacher quality and performance. In allcountries, it is clear that a new deal needsto be struck with the profession whereinteachers are promised more autonomy,better remuneration and higher esteem, inreturn for rigorous expectations of profes-sional accountability within a competitiveenvironment. Ideally, this should includethe creation of a more timely mechanismfor moving on ineffective teachers and eas-ing out long-serving and demotivated butessentially competent teachers.

Striking such a deal would, however,first mean reaching a détente with thepowerful and fragmented teacher unionsand professional associations. Sweden’sgradual implementation of an individu-alised wage scheme (i.e. performance-based pay) is one possible way forward,and warrants closer examination.

Guaranteeing a basic level of equity andexcellenceGiven our objectives of developing a sys-tem that produces high standards for all,and the fact that students from particularbackgrounds (e.g. high socio-economicstatus, native-language speakers) are fre-

quently at a disproportional advantagecompared to the rest of the student popu-lation; there is a need to build in ‘equitysafeguards’.

For instance, school admission policiesmay need to be regulated by the centre inorder to prevent schools from the practiceof cream-skimming. If open boundariesare adopted, then provisions need to bedeveloped to ensure that economically dis-advantaged families have sufficient finan-cial resources to cover additional trans-portation costs (e.g. Edmonton PublicSchool District in Alberta). Differentiatedfunding schemes, such as the one used inSweden, could also be explored to encour-age schools to work with more challengingstudent populations, and to ensure thatsaid students have the support that theyneed.

Similarly, in order to guarantee that allstudents achieve the baseline set by thegovernment, minimum expectations of thequality of teaching experience provided tostudents need to be set. Examples of suchbulwarks might include the requirementthat all teachers have a minimum level oftraining and education (e.g. Alberta’sTeaching Quality Standard), and ensuringthat students have access to a broad rangeof vocational and academic pathways (NewZealand’s secondary school reforms).

6.3 Second ‘tight’

Rethinking the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of measurementThe countries we profiled have adopteddifferent approaches to ensuring institu-tional accountability. Of these case studies,Canada and Hong Kong are perhaps themost alien to the English observer. HongKong’s schools are held accountable by themarket, living or dying by their ability torecruit students. In contrast, both theprovinces of Ontario and Alberta utilise asupportive paradigm grounded in a philos-


92


ophy of collective accountability, andactively discourage any notion of ‘namingand shaming’.

Arguably, England needs to rethink itsapproach towards institutional accounta-bility, particularly since our reliance onassessment-based league tables has provento be partly counterproductive. Instead,the emphasis should be on the develop-ment of user-friendly measures which canbe understood easily by those who needthem most: teachers, parents and students.We stand to learn from systems such asAlberta, which is developing measures forevaluating progress on less tangible educa-tional goals (e.g. surveys of parental andstudent satisfaction) in addition to thestandard canon of achievement indicators.Ontario and Alberta have also developedsophisticated mechanisms for comparingschool progress over time, a system of eval-uation that emphasises competition withself rather than just between schools.

Yet developing a better set of indicatorsalone is not sufficient; the process bywhich evaluation occurs also requires re-examination. For instance, informationgathered should be fit for purpose: a sum-mative assessment of individual studentachievement at a particular point in time isnot necessarily the best or most desirableway to evaluate the performance of the sys-tem as a whole. Nor, as the experiences ofSweden and New Zealand suggest, is a reg-ular cycle of school inspections necessarilythe most effective use of resources.

Reporting to the government, schools, parentsand the publicFinally, if governments are serious aboutempowering parents and students, thenaccess to information that can be trusted isvital. Interestingly enough, however,reporting to parents and the public is anissue that all four of the countries profiledhere struggle with. In part, this difficultymay arise from the particular accountabili-ty paradigm adopted. Ontario, for exam-

ple, has a sophisticated system of measur-ing institutional accountability; however,due to the government’s philosophy of notpublicly naming and shaming boards, theamount of information that is made avail-able to the public is left to the discretion ofindividual school boards and schools.

Yet if parents and students are to beengaged as active partners in the learningprocess, more, if not all, of this informationshould be made publicly available. Having acommon public portal for accessing schoolinformation, such as that used in Swedenand Hong Kong, is one fairly straightfor-ward way of simplifying the process ofacquiring information on school perform-ance. Part of the solution will also comefrom developing measures that are straight-forward and easily understandable. Theleague-table system currently used inEngland, for instance, is now couched is somuch statistical legalese that trying tounderstand the information often createsmore chaos than clarity. In contrast, the‘traffic-light’ nature of the Alberta reportcards are intuitive, as is the reporting systemof programmes such as asTTle in NewZealand, which offers parents, at a singleglance, an understanding of how their childfares in comparison with the national mean.

6.4 Final thoughtsWhether one prefers the saying ‘God is inthe details’ or its variant, ‘The devil is inthe details’, the message is unequivocal: itis in the specifics of design and implemen-tation that the success of any policy is


Conclusion

“ We stand to learn from systems such as Alberta,

which is developing measures for evaluating progress on

less tangible educational goals (e.g. surveys of parental

and student satisfaction) in addition to the standard canon

of achievement indicators. ”


determined. Here, the increasing sophisti-cation of education research is proving tobe an invaluable ally. We now have a better(though by no means perfect) understand-ing of what does or does not work, and, aseach case study has shown, effective utilisa-tion of such knowledge can produce pow-erful results.

At the same time, policy making andimplementation never occurs in a vacuum.Beyond the staple list of socio-economicand cultural factors, politics has been anall-too-visible hand shaping the parametersof what is or is not feasible. In each system,finding a balance between autonomy andcontrol, competition and collaboration,and support and pressure was as much an

exercise in political astuteness and pragma-tism as it was in empirical know-how.

Given that elections have been won orlost on the basis of education platforms, itis unlikely that this situation will change.The point, however, is that each system hassought a balance that resonates with theiraudience and, once found, every effort hasbeen made to ensure that policies buildupon one another to achieve internalcoherency.

There may be many ways to achieveeducational equity and excellence. As thesecase studies demonstrate, however, frag-mented policies will remain just that unlessthey are grounded in a coherent narrativeof change.


94


Appendix

NEW ZEALAND

Developing Policy

National policy is set by the Ministry of Education and Parliament, in consultation with key stakeholder organ-

isations. The teacher unions and professional associations have a particularly strong lobby and have, in the

past, succeeded in blocking legislation.

Operation of Schools

Each state and state integrated school is governed by a board consisting of five or more elected parent trustees;

the principal; a staff representative; and in secondary schools, a student representative. The board sets the

school’s overall strategic direction and is responsible for the management of staff, property, finances and curricu-

lum. It is worth noting that boards do not manage the staffing budget. Instead, schools are assigned a staffing

entitlement based on size and type of school.

Finance – Budgets

Operational funding is provided by the central government based on the decile-funding formula. Schools are provid-

ed with a lump sum and it is the responsibility of the board and the principal to allocate the resources as they see fit

Curriculum

The New Zealand Curriculum sets out, in fairly broad brush strokes, a framework for learning and assessment.

It is, however, primarily the responsibility of each school (i.e. the principal and teachers) to determine how the

curriculum will be delivered. There is thus considerable scope and demand for innovation at a school-level.

Nation-wide assessment

The National Education Monitoring Project assesses samples of year 4 and year 8 students every year on a

four year rolling cycle on different aspects of the national curriculum. There is no system-wide assessment

of student learning until Year 11, when all students take the National Certificate of Educational Achievement

(NCEA).

Pedagogy and Assessment

Responsibility for pedagogy and assessment falls on teachers at a school-level. Consequently, both in-class

methods and assessment tools tend to vary significantly, although the central government is currently seek-

ing higher levels of standardisation by (i) sponsoring of research in best-practices for teaching; and (ii)

encouraging the use of standardised assessment tools like asTTle (see section 2.4.1)

Teacher Training and Registration

The New Zealand Teachers Council is an independent body responsible for registering and certifying teach-

ers. The NZTC is also responsible for approving teacher education programmes.

Staff Management – hiring, firing and appointment

School boards may autonomously hire, fire and appraise school principals. Teacher management is prima-

rily the domain of school principals, although strict union regulations make firing teachers a lengthy and ardu-

ous process.

Pupil Management – admissions and discipline

Under New Zealand’s choice framework, students can choose to attend a school in another catchment area

if the school has the capacity to accept them. The Tomorrow’s Schools agenda placed the responsibility for


Appendix


setting criteria for enrolment in oversubscribed schools in the hands of school boards. Since 2000, howev-

er, oversubscribed schools have to follow a selection criteria set by the Ministry. In addition, students now

have an absolute right to attend their local school (based on geographical zone). Discipline regulations are

set at a school level by the trustees and principa

CANADA

Developing Policy

Policy development is generally a Ministry-led process, supported by consultation with stakeholder organi-

sations. It should be noted though that stakeholders, particularly practitioners, have strong lobbies and can,

if they choose, pose a significant roadblock to the government


School boards are responsible for the number and size of schools; the building and maintenance of sites.

The day to day management of each school is handled by principals.Neither province has a formalised sys-

tem of school inspections. It is expected however that school boards will, throughout the year, maintain close

contact with individual schools through the district superintendents and other supervisory officers. Both

Ontario and Alberta have school and parent councils which provide an important bridge between school staff

and parents. These councils are advisory in nature and have no direct influence in school adminstration. They

can express their views to the principal on matters important to them, and principals must consult school

councils and report back on how s/he will proceed based on advice received.

Finance – Budgets

Ontario: The provincial government uses a funding formula to determine the amount of money allocated to

each school board/authority. Boards set and manage their own budgets, although certain amounts of fund-

ing are ‘enveloped’ for accountability purposes (i.e. to ensure that boards and schools are spending the allot-

ted money for the intended purpose)

Alberta: School boards are responsible for allocating money to schools and programmes within their juris-

diction. Each board receives a base sum that is based on its enrolment numbers (in effect a voucher sys-

tem without the name of vouchers). Additional funding is then provided based on considerations like geo-

graphic location; student population; small schools by necessity etc.

Curriculum

Ontario: The Ontario Ministry of Education sets the curriculum for the primary and secondary school sec-

tors. The provincial curriculum is regularly reviewed by subject in a 7-year cycle. Student achievement is

assessed on four levels:

L1: the student demonstrates some of the required knowledge and skills in limited ways. Achievement falls

much below the provincial standard

L2: the student demonstrates some of the required knowledge and skills. Achievement approaches the

provincial standard

L3: the student demonstrates most of the required knowledge and skills. Achievement is at the provincial

standard

L4: The student demonstrates the required knowledge and skills. Achievement surpasses the provincial

standard

Alberta: Alberta Education sets the curriculum for the primary and secondary sector. All school jurisdictions

have to use the Programs of Study (legal documents outlining expected student outcomes in each subject)


96


to ensure that students meet provincial standards. Schools do, however, have flexibility in deciding the order

in which the curriculum is taught and how it is taught.

Provincial Assessment

Ontario: Students are tested in Grades 3 and 6 on reading, writing and mathematics; in Grade 9 for math-

ematics and in Grade 10 for literacy skills. The provincial assessments are run by an independent agency,

the Education Quality and Accountability Office (EQAO). Results from the assessments in grades 3, 6 and 9

do not form part of the child’s report card. However, students have to successfully write the Ontario

Secondary School Literacy Test in order to obtain the Ontario Secondary School Diploma.

Alberta: Students are tested in Grade 3 and on reading, writing and mathematics; and in Grades 6 and 9

for reading, writing, mathematics, science and social studies. The tests are meant to measure student

achievement relative to the provincial standard and are thus closely aligned with the provincial curriculum. In

Grade 12, provincial diploma examinations are administered in the core subjects. Unlike Ontario, there is no

separate agency in charge of provincial testing; instead, a branch within Alberta Education oversees the

administration and development of the tests


Ontario: School boards determine the programme of studies and assessment tools used within their dis-

trict. Teachers have considerable leeway in choosing an appropriate methodology although the establish-

ment of the Literacy and Numeracy Secretariat has produced more standardisation in the use of ‘good prac-

tice.’ All schools are required to use a standard provincial report card that reports student’s progress vis-à-

vis the Ontario curriculum through the four levels described above.

Alberta: The programme of studies is set by Alberta Education although individual school boards have con-

trol over the method of delivery. Within schools, teachers have considerable leeway in choosing an appro-

priate pedagogy and assessment tools. In 2005, the government introduced a controversial256 initiative that

would require all schools to report the grade level achieved by students in four core subjects by the school

year 2007/2008. Under the new Grade Level of Achievement Reporting system, a student in Grade 3, for

instance, could be assessed as performing at a Grade 2 or Grade 4 level.


Ontario: The Ontario College of Teachers, an independent body, is solely responsible for setting standards

for teacher training, and for certifying teaching institutions. Teachers are trained either through a four year

teaching course, or a one-year conversion programme (after completion of a bachelors degree)

Alberta: Alberta Education is responsible for setting standards for teaching and for certifying training institu-

tions. Alberta was the first province in Canada to adopt a teaching quality standard in 1997. The Teaching

Quality Standard established guidelines for the professional knowledge, skills and attributes expected of all

teachers. These guidelines apply to the preparation of teachers, ongoing professional growth and teacher

evaluation throughout the province. More recently, Alberta Education is in the process of developing a Quality

Standard for Principals and for School Superintendents.

Staff Management – hiring, firing, appraisal

Ontario: The responsibility for hiring and firing rests at the board level, while responsibility for appraising

teachers is held at the school level based on requirements and documents issued by the ministry.

Alberta: The responsibility for hiring, firing and appraising teachers is primarily held at the school level. The

flexibility with which principals can act is however constrained by board and union regulations.


Appendix

256 With the exception of the

Alberta Teachers Association,

interviewees from stakeholder

organisations noted that the con-

troversy was less over the need

for honest and accurate reporting,

than about how the government

intended to use the information.

Concerns were raised over the

information being used in a puni-

tive ‘name and shame manner.’

The ATA on the other hand

believes that it is unfair to assess

a student against a curriculum

that they were not taught and that

reporting based on a single num-

ber diminishes the potential rich-

ness of feedback to parents.



Ontario: School boards in Ontario generally use catchment areas when determining which school a child

should go to. Boards differ however in cases where parents wish to send a child to a school beyond their

catchment area. Regardless, enrolment is open (i.e. not test based), with the exception of entry to schools

for gifted children. Similarly, student discipline policies are set at the board level.

Alberta: All school boards in Alberta guarantee the right of students to attend their neighbourhood schools.

However, due to the emphasis on parental choice, some school boards have established alternate enrol-

ment provisions for specialist schools within their jurisdiction; others, like the Edmonton Public and Catholic

School Boards, have open boundaries. Student discipline policies are set at the board level although provin-

cial legislation requires every secondary school to have a police liaison on site.

HONG KONG

Developing Policy

In 1984, a non-statutory body, the Education Commission, was set up to advise the government on educa-

tional matters. The EC is peopled by prominent educators, academics and representatives from stakehold-

er organizations. Since its establishment, the EC has consistently shaped the system’s reform agenda, cre-

ating a policy-making feedback that is arguably more bottom-up in nature than most systems.


The Education Bureau has divided Hong Kong into 18 administrative districts. Since the majority of

schools are run by sponsoring bodies, however, district officials operate more in a support and monitor-

ing capacity. As one might imagine, the larger sponsoring bodies (e.g. the Catholic Church) operate

much like school boards in Canada and Sweden, enabling economies of scale in areas like procurement

and staffing. Since 2000, all aided and government schools have switched to a system of school-based

management.

Finance – Budgets

The government uses different funding formulas for different types of schools. Aided schools receive a grant

sum for each class of students it fills. DSS schools on the other hand receive per pupil funding. Schools have

considerable leeway in deciding how they wish to allocate their funds. Schools belonging to the same spon-

soring body may also, when necessary, pool funds for shared resources

Curriculum

The curriculum is undergoing significant overhauls to become “more flexible, diverse and integrated.” Schools

and teachers have significant input in the development of curricula. Each school also has the freedom to per-

sonalize a certain percentage of their curricula to meet the needs and interests of their student population.

Territory-Wide Assessment

Schools are required to perform Basic Competency Assessments of students in the subjects of Chinese-

Language, English-Language and Mathematics. The BCA is composed of two parts: Territory-wide System

Assessments (TSAs) and Student Assessment (SA). SA is an online assessment programme that enables

teachers to closely monitor student learning, and develop immediate interventions where necessary. TSAs

are pencil and paper tests at the end of each Key Stage: Primary 3, Primary 6 and Secondary 3. TSAs are

developed by teachers and administered by the Hong Kong Examinations and Assessment Authority


98



The government is currently focused on developing teacher capacity for assessment for learning. Schools

have some leeway in making curricular and programming decisions, although DSS schools have the most

autonomy.


Teacher training institutes are certified by the Education Bureau. There are also a number of advisory bod-

ies that work on the issue of developing teaching standards, a professional code of conduct etc. Hong Kong

had considered establishing a General Teaching Council (following England’s example) but decided against

it as on the grounds that the teaching community themselves needed to, voluntarily, develop their own mon-

itoring body.


Each sponsoring body is responsible for staffing its school/s. Teachers and principals apply directly to the

school they are interested in; salaries are nonetheless standardised in government and aided schools (fol-

lowing a civil servant wage scheme). Larger sponsoring bodies may also choose to rotate its leadership

teams to get the most effective principals into struggling schools. DSS schools set their own wage scale and

are thus required to negotiate a separate contract with their teaching staff.


Student admission policies in the primary sector are set by the government. Approximately half of the places

are allocated to students with siblings or parents at the school; or who are affiliated with the sponsoring

body. The remaining places are allocated based on parental choice. Oversubscribed schools have their

places randomly allocated by a computer programme. In the secondary sector, schools are allowed to admit

up to 30% of their students according to their education philosophy. Admissions criteria and weightings

must be made public prior to the application process; schools may interview students but no tests can be

conducted. The remaining places are allocated through a process of banding257, parental choice and in over-

subscribed schools, random allocation.

SWEDEN

Developing Policy

National education policy and guidelines are formulated by the Riksdag (Parliament) and the government

(Ministry of Education and Research). The two professional associations/unions have strong political lobbies,

as do the association for independent schools.


The National Agency for Education is the central administrative authority for the Swedish public education

system from preschool up to adult education. The NAE’s role is primarily in overseeing the school system;

inspection of schools and collecting information for evaluative and monitoring purposes. The NAE is also

responsible for approving and inspecting independent schools. Provision of education is the responsibility of

the municipalities (through local boards of education) and there is significant variation in the organisational

set up of each municipality. Stockholm for instance has 18 districts and is in the process of recentralising

power by taking back certain administrative and governance duties. At the school level, parents and teach-

ers are not as involved in decision making as compared to other countries that practice school-based man-

agement. Principals traditionally have strong roles in the local school system


Appendix

257 See section on banding and

streaming, 4.4.2


Finance – Budgets

The majority of municipal education is funded through income taxes, although the state does provide a block

grant. There are no national regulations on how resources should be allocated between schools beyond the

provision of compulsory services. For the most part though, municipals distribute money on a per pupil basis

with additional resources earmarked for schools with challenging school populations (e.g. special needs,

high unemployment, immigrant) The responsibility for determining teachers’ salaries is usually decentralised

to the individual school although some municipalities prefer to negotiate contracts with the union.

Curriculum

The current national curriculum (Lpo 94) has been in place since 1995. The curriculum identifies two types

of goals:

� goals to strive towards – provides guidelines for the direction of teaching in schools

� goals to attain – the knowledge and skills that students should have developed by the end of the course

The goals are written in fairly broad brush strokes as teachers are expected to design, with student input,

an individualised programme of study for each student.

Nation-Wide Assessment

During the compulsory school years, the only compulsory national assessment is the Year 9 examinations

for Swedish, English and Mathematics. There is a Year 5 examination that is voluntary; most municipalities

have however made it compulsory so much so that 97% of schools now sit for the Year 5 examinations. The

examinations are developed by universities and teacher working groups, under the stewardship of the NAE.

Examinations are marked internally by the students’ teachers. The scores are not however counted in the

student’s final grades but instead serve as an indicator for teachers as to whether their students are on track

to completing the compulsory phase of education.


Most assessment within the Swedish system is teacher-based. Teachers have considerable autonomy in

deciding the particulars of the curriculum they wish to teach, and the pedagogy they use. In an effort to

increase student voice within the system, decisions on pedagogy and assessment are expected to be joint-

ly made by teachers and students after a discussion of relative merits etc.


The state (Ministry of Higher Education) is responsible for certifying teacher training institutes. Whilst the

Education Act requires teachers to be qualified, loopholes within the legislation have created a situation

wherein approximately 20% of teachers have no qualifications. The two teachers unions have been lobby-

ing for the government to set up a requirement for ‘authorisation’ – their equivalent of registration in the UK.

The new Conservative government has agreed to put authorisation of teachers on their agenda


Teacher evaluation is not regulated by law. However, all schools are expected to have regular ‘development

dialogues’ with their staff. The responsibility of hiring and firing of staff is generally devolved to the school

management level, with input from the municipal authority and the teacher unions.


Under the choice framework introduced in the early 90s, students are allowed to attend any school (munic-

ipal or independent) of their choice. While neither municipal nor independent schools charge fees, most

municipalities will not pay for transportation costs should a student decide to study in a school outside of

the municipality they live in. Oversubscription in the municipal and independent school sectors are

addressed on a ‘first-come-first-served’ basis although what that actually means in practice is less clear.


100


Helping SchoolsSucceed

Lessons from Abroad

Cheryl Lim and Chris Daviesedited by Sam Freedman

£10.00ISBN: 978-1-906097-19-6

Policy ExchangeClutha House

10 Storey’s GateLondon SW1P 3AY

www.policyexchange.org.uk

In recent years, the expansion of international comparativestudies such as PISA, TIMSS and PIRLS has significantlychanged the way we assess the success of any given educationsystem. Strong internal progress is no longer sufficient to merita positive evaluation. In a world where education is viewed asthe means by which nations achieve and maintain an edge overtheir competitors, success is increasingly defined vis-à-vis theperformance of other systems.

This report looks at five systems – New Zealand, Canada(Ontario and Alberta), Hong Kong and Sweden – which generallyperform better than England on counts of excellence and equity.Despite their differences, we found that the challenges faced byeach of these systems were remarkably similar. Crucially, evenwhere there were differences in approach, a closer examinationof the internal logic of each system revealed commonunderlying principles. These tenets were drawn together tocreate a proposed framework for a coherently aligned, ‘tight,loose, tight’ system.

Lessons from Abroad is the companion report to our main studyon English education reform, detailed in Helping SchoolsSucceed: A Framework for English Education.

Enriching the educationof individuals around the world

Help

ingS

chools

Succeed

:Lessons

from

Abro

adC

herylLimand

Chris

Davies

edited

by

Sam

Freed

man

Policy

Exchang

e

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Helping Schools Succeed: Lessons from Abroad