Hearing Transcript - 26 August 2003 Morning

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 26 August 2003 Morning

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Hearing Transcripts

1 Tuesday, 26th August 20032 (10.30 am)3 MR ANDREW MACKINLAY (called)4 Examined by MR DINGEMANS

5 LORD HUTTON: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Yes,6 Mr Dingemans.7 MR DINGEMANS: Could you tell his Lordship your full name.8 A. Yes, my Lord. I am Andrew Mackinlay. I am the Member9 of Parliament for Thurrock. I was elected in 1992 so10 I am in my third term. The first term I was a member of11 the Transport Select Committee and in the other two12 Parliaments I have been a member of the Foreign Affairs13 Select Committee.14 Q. You are now a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee?15 A. Correct.16 Q. You were party to the Foreign Affairs Committee to17 investigate the decision to go to war in Iraq?

18 A. Correct, an enthusiastic advocate that we should do that19 investigation. Some were not.20 Q. One of the suggested reasons for that investigation has21 been said to be the dispute between Mr Gilligan and22 Mr Campbell. What was your understanding of the23 situation?24 A. That is incorrect. I am pleased you asked me. The25 reason why -- and I have indicated to you I was

11 enthusiastic we should investigate this matter of the2 Government's justification for going to war -- was3 against a backdrop of many people, many very good people

4 who either were opposed to war initially or then had5 doubts afterwards. There was currency in the press and6 in the political world that the Government had7 exaggerated the case; and it seemed to me that8 Parliament had a duty to look, albeit retrospectively,9 as to whether or not the Government had exaggerated that10 case.11 Also it is against a backdrop that for the first12 time in our history Parliament actually voted an13 affirmative resolution to commit our armed forces to14 a conflict situation -- it has never happened before --15 and all 650 of us had to wrestle with our consciences on16 the time we voted in the early spring there. Whatever

17 way we voted, we were deeply, deeply troubled and18 therefore we were very much committed to this.19 The historic duty of Parliament, which perhaps we20 might return to, is one of scrutiny. It seemed to me no21 greater duty than to scrutinise this issue.22 The very final point I make on this is in a way23 after all the Prime Minister is offered no other inquiry24 in the open on this. There are thousands of people who25 were killed in that conflict and, most importantly of

21 all, some considerable number of British service2 personnel have been killed and their loved ones, I would

3 have thought, demanded there should at least be some4 review as to whether or not the sacrifice of their loved


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5 ones had been appropriate in terms of the evidence which6 the Government presented to Parliament and people. It7 was what was part of their persuasion.8 Q. Can I take you to FAC/1/43. This appears to be9 a Chairman's note. We understand this to be prepared by10 the Clerk to the Committee. If one looks under 1, this

11 is the 10th July, the decision to go to war in Iraq, to12 consider developments:13 "If I understand correctly what this is about, I am14 quite concerned that the Committee risks (a) getting15 dragged deep into the Campbell-Gilligan dispute, which16 it has very wisely avoided so far ..."17 Can I just stop there and ask you what was your18 attitude to this point?19 A. The conflict between Gilligan and Campbell, No. 10 and20 the BBC is not my business. The important thing was21 there was somebody out there, amongst others probably,22 who we know was a senior public servant -- or that is23 what was reported -- who was repeatedly uttering that

24 the Government had exaggerated the case. Mr Gilligan is25 the one who is continually reporting that. Clearly it

31 is key to our inquiry to try to seek and to probe what2 Gilligan's source is and, if we can find a source, on3 what basis is he saying the Government exaggerated the4 case for war. That was our interest.5 I could not give a damn about conflict as such6 between Gilligan and Campbell. It is the fact that the7 Gilligan man was reporting that there was somebody8 senior out there who was saying that the case had been9 exaggerated. Of course there were others printing it as

10 well. I go back to this question of currency. In my11 view we would have been failing in our duty if we had12 not pursued it, but the Gilligan/Campbell thing is13 because of what Gilligan was saying and the fact that14 there was somebody out there who I think we needed to15 see.16 Q. Did you perceive you had the cooperation you ought to17 have done from the Government?18 A. No, absolutely not.19 Q. Can I take you to FAC/3/10 and paragraph 6 of the20 report. This is the report published on 7th July. At21 paragraph 6 we can see at the top:22 "We are strongly of the view that we were entitled

23 to a greater degree of cooperation on access to24 witnesses and to intelligence material."25 That criticism is balanced lower down the page to

41 make it clear that the Foreign Secretary had seen you in2 private session?3 A. Yes.4 Q. Was that the view of the Committee in relation to5 cooperation?6 A. Well, it would be a consensus. I remember when7 Lord Hutton has his opening day of the Inquiry, he said8 words to the effect, "I and I alone will decide these

9 matters". I did mutter, my Lord, "Lucky Lord Hutton",10 because the fact is in the nature of a committee you


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11 have to reach some consensus. In the span I would be12 the other end. I could live with this:13 "We are confident our inquiry would have been14 enhanced if our requests had been met."15 I think that is an understatement, but I can live16 with that. Yes.

17 Q. There was a meeting, we have heard from Mr Anderson, on18 10th July, after your initial report has been published,19 when it was decided to call back Dr Kelly. Did you20 support the idea that Dr Kelly should be called to give21 evidence?22 A. I did, and I guess I was critical to it because there23 was a division. I think -- I am open to correction on24 this -- it went 4/3, something like that. And -- yes.25 Q. We have seen some correspondence, MoD/1/73, whereby

51 Mr Hoon writes -- sorry, there is a letter to Mr Hoon2 from Mr Anderson asking for answers.

3 A. Hmm.4 Q. Down the page, asking and saying that the Clerk is5 writing to Dr Kelly inviting him to appear.6 The further letter is at 74, that is to Dr Kelly,7 asking him to turn up, and at page 82, MoD/1/82, we have8 the reply from Mr Hoon on 11th July, whereby at the9 bottom he says:10 "Although the FAC has now completed its own inquiry11 I can understand why you also wish to see Dr Kelly."12 He says:13 "I am prepared to agree to this on the clear14 understanding that Dr Kelly will be questioned only on15 those matters which are directly relevant to the

16 evidence that you were given by Andrew Gilligan, and not17 on the wider issue of Iraqi WMD and the preparation of18 the dossier. Dr Kelly was not involved in the process19 of drawing up the intelligence parts of the dossier."20 Over the page it was noted he would have appeared21 before the ISC and asks that you restrict his time to22 45 minutes. Were you aware of those proposed23 restrictions on Dr Kelly's evidence?24 A. Yes I was. I did not agree with them. You know how25 people say: I hear what you say. My reaction to that is

61 let us hear what you say. I consider it a monumental

2 cheek of the Secretary of State to try and tell us what3 we should and could inquire into and the duration.4 I was prepared to live with it because I was prepared to5 do battle, if and when it was necessary. I would have6 challenged in Committee if we had been constrained or7 I had been constrained.8 Q. We know that Mr Gilligan had sent some e-mails to9 members of the Committee. At BBC/13/17 we can see an10 e-mail dated 30th June. This is obviously before the11 inquiry has completed its report.12 A. Hmm.13 Q. "John, as promised here is my analysis of the Campbell14 evidence. I've added some further notes at the bottom.

15 Andrew."16 He talks about the dodgy dossier, various questions


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17 that have been asked, et cetera. Were you aware of18 these communications?19 A. No, I was not until it had come out in this Inquiry some20 few days ago in relation to Chidgey.21 Q. What is your attitude to persons who themselves appeared22 before the Committee making suggestions to members of

23 the Committee?24 A. I think this highly inappropriate.25 Q. Why?

71 A. Well, a number of things. One, I think rules of natural2 justice apply and I also want to tell you what I would3 have done if I had received it. Also in relation to4 Chidgey, I notice they went to a political party, which5 seemed to me to compound the kind of problem that the6 BBC are in of being partisan -- not party political7 partisan, but to have sent it to a Liberal researcher8 compounded something which is unacceptable to me.

9 Also I would consider it an affront that I was going10 to be fed this by somebody who was so, so central to all11 the debate and discussion, absolutely outrageous, and --12 I want to tell you what I would have done if I had13 received it, because if I had received it, it would have14 been madness for him to have sent me one. I have not15 seen this --16 Q. We have seen a draft he prepared apparently to send to17 you. Did you get any e-mails?18 A. Well, not -- I will double-check --19 Q. Did you get any?20 A. Not at all. The only thing I could sort of say is I do21 not think we received this at all. I want to tell you

22 what my reaction would have been and what I would have23 done with it. When I go home, Lord Hutton, probably it24 will be on these computers, "Hutton, see this".25 I delete so much if it is not clearly obvious who the

81 person is who is -- it is out. But I do not remember2 deleting this and I have checked with my small office3 and nobody recalls it. But if I had received it,4 I would not have just mentioned it to the Chairman in5 passing, I would have told Donald and the Clerk and6 I would have insisted we debate -- it was brought to the7 attention of all members of the Committee beforehand.

8 The reason why I think Gilligan would have been mad9 to send it to me is because that is what I would have10 done. Then of course it would have opened up a whole11 new chasm, elephant trunk -- he would have been in12 a deeper hole. So that is what I would have done13 because, in a sense, once I had shared it with the14 Committee, then it would have opened up a whole range of15 things and clearly it would have been public and widened16 the whole controversy, but I can tell you that I have17 never seen this. I have not received one like this. It18 has not reached me. If I had, I would have been19 affronted and angry and I would have brought it to the20 attention of the whole Committee. I would have insisted

21 that Anderson -- I think Anderson would have agreed22 anyway, but we would have held, as we often do,


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23 sometimes, you know, quick sessions. We ask witnesses24 to wait.25 LORD HUTTON: You think you did not receive it?

91 A. I am certain Andrew Mackinlay has never received it,

2 my Lord, no.3 MR DINGEMANS: Can I turn to 15th July? What do you recall4 of Dr Kelly's appearance at the beginning of the5 session?6 A. Apart from the question he was softly spoken, I thought7 very controlled, except for -- I mention this in my8 witness statement -- two people who accompanied him and9 sat immediately behind him. To me that was quite10 significant, but I can amplify on that in a moment if11 you like.12 Q. You tell us what you want to tell us.13 A. When he came in, if you remember, I am kind of more or14 less sitting in the position I am to you, Lord Hutton.

15 The crescent is round there, but I noticed these two16 people who I would say kind of escorted him in, sat17 immediately behind him. There is nothing wrong with18 this. I immediately I think started to imagine he had19 been sort of like briefed, programmed, prepared, that20 these were the minders. At the time I did not know who21 they were. One I think has given evidence to you.22 LORD HUTTON: One of them was his line manager,23 Dr Bryan Wells. The other was a colleague in the24 Ministry of Defence.25 A. It started -- it had some -- I noticed it.

10

1 MR DINGEMANS: You did not say anything at the time?2 A. No. I wish I had actually later on. I wish I had3 literally said: Dr Kelly, can you tell me who those4 people are? I did not --5 Q. What was the temperature that day?6 A. I kept my jacket on throughout.7 Q. You kept your jacket on. Did everyone else keep their8 jackets on? Was it hot?9 A. No, I thought by the standards of that committee room it10 was the norm. You did have this wretched fan going11 which you noticed was switched off at some stage.12 Q. Can I ask you about some of your questions?13 A. Yes.

14 Q. FAC/4/15, question 105, which is towards the bottom of15 the page. You are asking him about the journalists.16 A. Yes.17 Q. "Dr Kelly: I have met very few journalists.18 "Andrew Mackinlay: I heard 'few', but who are the19 ones in your mind's eye at this moment? What are their20 names?21 "Dr Kelly: That will be provided to you by the22 Ministry of Defence."23 This continues over the page:24 "Andrew Mackinlay: No, I am asking you now. This25 is the high court of Parliament and I want you to tell

111 the Committee who you met."


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2 I think you wanted to say something in relation to3 that?4 A. Yes. My Lord, if I may.5 LORD HUTTON: By all means. Do you want to look at your6 witness statement?7 A. Yes. Thank you very much. It is against a backdrop --

8 that question is against the earlier questions where9 I had said: can you tell me the journalist? He said:10 see the Ministry of Defence. I asked him again. See11 the Ministry of Defence. I asked him again. If I could12 get to my house, my house is surrounded by journalists.13 So I say: could you let us -- by Thursday, by Thursday.14 He again said: the Ministry of Defence. I thought this15 a prevarication, unnecessary, inappropriate and in a way16 was not only unfair and unreasonable, it was a challenge17 to the whole business of Parliamentary scrutiny. Other18 people answer questions candidly, they might not find it19 easy, and it seemed to me this should not be allowed to20 rest. So I returned to it at this point.

21 You see, my Lord, just supposing in a moment,22 my Lord, you were to ask me a question and I said: see23 the chairman of my constituency party. Probably because24 you are a disciplined man not a muscle in your face25 would move. Then you asked me again and I said the same

121 thing, my Lord, and again. Then you try and help --2 LORD HUTTON: You thought Dr Kelly should answer because he3 was before a Committee of Parliament?4 A. Absolutely. Absolutely. I suspect what I am leading up5 to is even with your patience there would become a stage6 where you would have to say to yourself: what I am doing

7 here? Does Mackinlay understand the gravity of the8 situation? There are other people who answer my9 questions. There is a public responsibility. I have to10 do some way of doing it. Your style would be different11 to mine, the craft and the words, but you would indicate12 to me expectation. So I had to do that. I referred to13 the fact that it was before the high court of14 Parliament. I have indicated also in my witness15 statement the sessional orders which make it quite clear16 that it is a high crime and misdemeanour to prevaricate,17 to prevent witnesses coming, not to answer questions,18 et cetera et cetera. Also the Erskine May supporting19 thing.

20 I then went on in my witness statement:21 "The power of the House to punish for contempt is22 well-established and its origin is probably to be found23 in the medieval concept of the English Parliament as24 a primary court of justice. The power to fine or to25 imprison for contempt belongs at common law to all

131 courts of record, although the Commons is no longer2 regarded as a court of record."3 I went on:4 "The power of commitment remains exercised by the5 House, distinctly accepted by the House of Lords in

6 other case law."7 LORD HUTTON: Yes.


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8 A. But the fact is Government departments and many of our9 witnesses do not understand that every year -- not10 medieval -- every year we pass the sessional orders11 which are unequivocal in indicating it is a contempt not12 to answer, to prevaricate is a contempt, to try and13 influence witnesses or to prevent them appearing is

14 a contempt and it is a high crime and misdemeanour and15 the fact that it is ignored does not make it any less16 valid.17 MR DINGEMANS: Can I ask you some questions about your other18 questioning towards the end of the session? FAC/4/24:19 "Andrew Mackinlay: Since you wrote to your20 superiors in the way you have done, have you met21 Geoff Hoon?22 "Mr Kelly: No.23 "Andrew Mackinlay: Any ministers?24 "Mr Kelly: No.25 "Mr Pope: Any special advisers?"

141 You pick up the question:2 "Any special advisers?3 "Dr Kelly: No.4 "Andrew Mackinlay: Do you know of any other5 inquiries which have gone on in the department to seek6 the source -- to clarify in addition to you or instead7 of you or apart from you? None whatsoever?8 Dr Kelly: No."9 Perhaps you can read out your next question?10 A. That is question?11 Q. 167.12 A. "I reckon you are chaff; you have been thrown up to

13 divert our probing. Have you ever felt like a fall guy?14 You have been set up, have you not?"15 Q. Did you consider that to be a fair question?16 A. Yes, I do think it is; and because it is against17 a backdrop of where the Government had indicated they18 think that Dr Kelly is the sole source. He then comes19 along to us. He has convinced me and everybody else at20 this stage, because we have made a quantum leap, he has21 convinced me that he is not the source -- the Gilligan22 source, very impressively, very impressively indeed.23 I could take you through that if you like. I hope you24 will just take from me by this stage I am, along with25 others, absolutely convinced that he is not the source.

151 I feel very angry for him and for Parliament against the2 backdrop of what I just said, you know, about misleading3 Parliament and so on.4 LORD HUTTON: If you just elaborate a little on what you5 meant by he was "a fall guy". In what sense was he6 a fall guy?7 A. Because at that moment of time -- I now know8 differently -- at that moment of time, I think the9 Government -- I use that collective term -- was quite10 pleased for Dr Kelly to come up, hoping that the thing11 would sort of be fudged and that the thing would more or

12 less sort of die away. I can see a scenario where that13 could have happened incidentally.


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14 LORD HUTTON: It would be fudged. Did you think that the15 Government, although it believed that Dr Kelly was the16 source, that the Government hoped that your Committee17 might take a different view? Was that what was in your18 mind? I want to understand exactly what you are19 thinking about.

20 A. They would have hoped -- first of all there are actual21 limits. An inquiry cannot go on forever, you have to22 draw stumps. There was the Parliamentary recess coming23 up which I am sure had not escaped their mind. Also, if24 he gave the evidence as he did, and I do not know25 whether or not it had been rehearsed -- I do not know --

161 if he gave the evidence as he did, the Committee could2 conclude, could they not, that: well, it looks like he3 contributed to this, we will never exactly know4 precisely, and basically we draw stumps; I mean, after5 all, elsewhere in our report on the Campbell thing we

6 more or less draw stumps, do we not? We are not7 detectives. I can foresee a situation where they hoped8 this would have blurred it to such an extent and the9 controversy would die away.10 LORD HUTTON: So the Committee would not come to a definite11 view one way or the other as to whether Dr Kelly was the12 source?13 A. I can almost write the words now of a report which says:14 it is impossible for us to judge, et cetera et cetera.15 But I was very angry, as I say, for him and for16 Parliament.17 On the question of -- do you want to ask me about18 chaff, sir?

19 MR DINGEMANS: Yes.20 A. I mean, I have had lots of hating e-mails and letters21 since. A lot of people do not understand the word22 "chaff".23 Q. What did you understand?24 A. Well, chaff to a weapons expert is what is thrown out by25 our destroyers and from our fighter aircraft to deflect

171 incoming --2 Q. Exocet missiles?3 A. Absolutely. In the context of this it did not seem to4 be inappropriate. He was a defence expert. I told you

5 I thought he was set up. I told you he was the fall6 guy. I think that is self-explanatory why I think that7 is so. That was the reason for that word. No offence8 was meant. Our Committee -- the paradox, the irony was9 that my Committee did suffer from chaff because we were10 successively diverted because we then wrote very11 indignantly saying: we think he has been badly used.12 Q. Did you think that was a question that permitted of any13 ready answer from the witness?14 A. Well, I do not know about you, sir, but I think it is15 often -- I think it is fair and reasonable sometimes to16 put things in quite trenchant terms to see if a person17 gives a reaction or then comes out with more.

18 LORD HUTTON: Mr Mackinlay, may I ask you, coming back to19 your thought that Dr Kelly had been set up.


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20 A. Yes.21 LORD HUTTON: There has been evidence from a number of22 witnesses in the Government that the view which they23 took was that your Committee had been investigating24 Mr Gilligan's report, that this civil servant had come25 forward to say that he might be regarded as the source

181 and that therefore the Government was under a duty to2 inform your Committee and to let your Committee examine3 him, if they so wished, and that if they had not done4 that, they might have been charged with conducting5 a cover-up. Now what is your view on that?6 A. Yes, sir. A number of aspects there, sir.7 LORD HUTTON: Yes.8 A. May I just complete this one? Again those questions9 were against a backdrop, if you remember, of me saying:10 Dr Kelly, has there been any investigation you know of11 to find out the sources?

12 LORD HUTTON: If you would like to continue adding about13 your --14 A. Sorry, counsel, I do apologise.15 MR DINGEMANS: Do not worry. Answer his Lordship's16 question.17 A. I do not buy this business of him coming forward18 voluntarily. I think by this time the heat was on.19 I also --20 LORD HUTTON: I was asking you more about the Government's21 view that they were obliged to disclose to your22 Committee that this civil servant had come forward.23 A. Lord Hutton, you are absolutely correct, they were24 obliged to disclose this to the Committee but they did

25 not. They became aware of this I think on 30th June.

191 They in my view deliberately stalled, hoping our report2 would come out.3 I saw on your website some note from -- I forget who4 it was, one of the senior people, saying: I think they5 were already abroad. We were not already abroad. How6 he knows our discussions, our travel arrangements,7 et cetera.8 The whole thing, in my view, was designed to hope9 that they could avoid him coming before the Foreign10 Affairs Select Committee. I noticed that Sir Kevin in

11 his evidence to you argued he should not do so.12 Sir Kevin, in my view, is wrong on two counts. One,13 basic British constitution that we are entitled to14 scrutinise; I have already covered that. The second15 one, I think he is badly lacking in political antennae,16 which he is paid to have, because there is no way on17 God's earth in my view that the press would have18 allowed, once Dr Kelly became known, for him not to have19 been scrutinised in public, and I have to be candid with20 you: I for one would not have acquiesced in that by my21 silence. I think it is our duty to have Dr Kelly before22 the Foreign Affairs Select Committee.23 LORD HUTTON: So therefore is your view that once it was

24 known to the Ministry of Defence that he had come25 forward --


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201 A. Yes.2 LORD HUTTON: -- and might have been the source, they were3 then under a duty to inform your Committee and also4 to -- whether one says require or ask him to come

5 forward?6 A. As I said in my witness statement, my Lord, I think what7 they should have done immediately --8 LORD HUTTON: Just on that direct question: is it your view9 that once Dr Kelly had come forward to the Ministry of10 Defence, that they were under a duty to inform your11 Committee and also were under a duty to ask him or to12 require him to appear before your Committee?13 A. They are under a duty to inform us immediately and then14 give us the opportunity of deciding if we wanted to call15 him, which we would have done. All of this is against16 a backdrop. I do not believe they were really trying to17 find the source. That is why I go back to also the

18 questions before. They did not want to discover19 Dr Kelly. They hoped the thing would burn out, fizzle20 out, in my view. That is why I asked him if there had21 been any investigations. There clearly had not been22 rigorous or vigorous investigations.23 MR DINGEMANS: Why do you say they would have been under24 a duty to put Dr Kelly before the Foreign Affairs25 Committee?

211 A. Because Parliament has the duty to scrutinise. I do not2 accept that the Government can put conditions. I think3 the Clerk has written to you about saying the Osmotherly

4 rules -- I cannot pronounce it -- are purely Government5 decisions. They have no countenance in Parliament.6 Rightly so. As you gather, I am very jealous of that.7 What might interest you, my Lord, is I have been8 through this battle before. In the previous Parliament9 the Government tried to argue the Osmotherly rules to10 prevent us calling witnesses in relation to the11 Sierra Leone inquiry. Basically we saw them off. I can12 give you specific reference of a woman called13 Ann Grant --14 LORD HUTTON: I do not think we need go into that detail.15 A. I can write to you.16 MR DINGEMANS: Can I ask you that: on the Monday when the

17 report had been prepared, published, what then did the18 FAC want to see Dr Kelly for? They were not going to,19 and you have made it clear they were not interested in20 the dispute between Mr Campbell and Mr Gilligan.21 A. You are absolutely correct. What we wanted to know --22 we now have the public servant who is allegedly going23 round saying that the Government exaggerated the case.24 Well, that was what our inquiry was about, nothing to do25 with Gilligan or Campbell. I want to see him because

221 I want to know whether or not he has been saying that2 and if he is, is there any credence to it.

3 Q. Right. Your Committee took the view that Dr Kelly had4 been badly treated. I think you have told us about


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5 that. Can I take you to MoD/1/89 which is a letter of6 15th July from Mr Anderson to Mr Straw. The second7 paragraph:8 "The Committee deliberated ... and asked me to write9 to you, expressing their view that it seems most10 unlikely that Dr Kelly was Andrew Gilligan's prime

11 source and colleagues have also asked me to pass on12 their view that Dr Kelly has been poorly treated..."13 Why did you believe that?14 A. Because I did not think he was the main source.15 I approached the hearings in a quasi-judicial way. I do16 listen to the evidence and try to approach in17 a quasi-judicial way. At the end of that hearing, I --18 but there was unanimity actually, it was one of the19 areas where there was really consensus. We felt he was20 not Gilligan's principal source. We felt that the21 Government had known that because, although my22 colleagues do not use that term, implicitly they thought23 he was the fall guy, he had been set up. We were angry,

24 my Lord. He gave an extremely powerful, persuasive,25 convincing performance.

231 Ingrained on my mind is where Mr Pope is asking him,2 he says: I want to ask you, clearly, do you think you3 are the principal source? Dr Kelly says: no, I do not4 think that I am. It was very powerful.5 Q. After the hearing, you pursued some Parliamentary6 Questions?7 A. I did, yes.8 Q. Can I take you to drafts of the answers at TVP/2/15? We9 can see at the top from the draft the template to be

10 used for reply, so it is in draft format.11 A. Yes.12 Q. We see your question:13 "To ask the Secretary of State for Defence which14 journalists Dr Kelly has met over the past two years,15 for what purpose and when the meetings took place."16 A. Yes.17 Q. What was your purpose in pursuing those questions?18 A. Because Dr Kelly, if you remember, said: ask the19 Ministry of Defence. That is precisely what I did do.20 I am tenacious, I will not be thrown off on a thing like21 this. It seemed to me because I had no reply, he22 volunteered, if you remember, when I was grilling him,

23 he said: Susan Watts and one other. It was like24 extracting teeth from a whale I thought. I will not be25 thrown off. So I put down these questions which he told

241 me to do and it pins them down.2 Q. Then you were in the process of getting replies, as we3 know.4 A. Yes.5 Q. Is there anything else relating to the circumstances of6 Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with?7 A. Yes, there is. If you look at the draft reply on your8 website on this, in fact -- this was the last day of

9 Dr Kelly, I think, if you remember I think you had10 evidence of this. He actually does not mention


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11 Rutherford, except on one occasion. This is the man who12 I think you have had evidence for who had contacts over13 some years, 20 or 30 times, and just before Dr Kelly's14 name comes out, he, not for the first time, actually15 visited him at his house. That is not volunteered in16 the draft answer. I think that is probably is relevant.

17 Basically, the conclusion I have, and I regret to18 say this, is that Dr Kelly just dug deeper each time he19 prevaricated with his employers, with the Committee --20 Committees perhaps, although I am not privy to the other21 one, and then Mackinlay puts down this Parliamentary22 question.23 There comes a stage where, if he had said: I met24 Rutherford many times, he came to my house, that would25 have blown up the fact from what evidence I have been

251 able to ascertain from what you have received that he2 had misled his employers from those initial interviews,

3 initial but inadequate interviews in my view that he4 had. I think that is kind of quite critical. The man5 had volunteered that information, I guess, and it was6 inadequate. We do not know why the gentleman was trying7 to get him on a mobile phone. The point is he knew that8 he was now in quite deep water.9 Q. Perhaps I ought to re-phrase the question: is there10 anything that you know from your personal knowledge,11 rather than your analysis of everything else, that you12 can assist his Lordship with?13 A. May I just -- on this particular area?14 LORD HUTTON: Yes.15 A. No, I am very grateful. No.

16 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed.17 A. Is that all?18 MR DINGEMANS: Is there anything else you want to say?19 A. There is, my Lord. When Dr Kelly died, I did issue20 a statement and it was difficult for us all, as you will21 understand. I said --22 LORD HUTTON: You just take your time if you want to look at23 the wording in your statement. Is it towards the end of24 your statement?25 A. I know it is ingrained on my mind, my Lord. I sort of

261 said: I deeply regret the death of Dr Kelly. If there

2 is any way that my questions contributed to his distress3 or stress, I deeply regret that, and I expressed my4 condolences to his wife and family. After that,5 my Lord, I have not had any dealings with any6 journalists. We have turned down hundreds of requests,7 avoided them and so on.8 Why I share this with you is important. The9 repeated showing of that narrow clip has resulted in an10 awful lot of hate mail and so on. I am not complaining11 about that. I think also that clip does not educate or12 inform, it misleads, because it does not give the13 backdrop of this, but it created a very bad climate and14 I have had lots of things. I have not been able to hit

15 back or defend myself. Why have I not? Three very16 important reasons:


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17 One, to talk to the press in those circumstances18 seemed to me highly inappropriate. The Doctor had not19 had his funeral. Believe it or not, I do respect and20 have a high regard for the enormous stress for his21 family at their loss.22 Secondly, I did listen to the Prime Minister. The

23 Prime Minister basically said: let us all cool down and24 shut up, or words to that effect.25 Third, probably the most important thing, was the

271 Hutton Inquiry. So I have gone to enormous lengths to2 talk to the press.3 Just to complete the picture, my local newspaper had4 daubed on its walls, "Kelly's blood on Mackinlay's5 hands". I have shown the utmost restraint and I want to6 continue to do so. It is difficult. Even yesterday7 afternoon the Today Programme phoned up my house wanting8 me to go on this morning, presumably to save you the

9 trouble of listening to me because you would have heard10 it on your way in, or, my Lord, they could have put to11 me this: Mr Mackinlay, do you not think it is bad that12 you are talking to the press before the Hutton Inquiry?13 I am not asking for your guidance or protection, but14 I want to say this: I will do everything I can15 reasonably to avoid -- I have never spun on this --16 until you report, but I hope you will also understand17 I do not have tenure. My whole basis as an MP is based18 upon reputation and I have not been able to hit back or19 to respond. But you see I am like a sprung coil this20 morning, my Lord. I am very, very angry because I think21 not only Mackinlay is at stake but the future of

22 Parliament because, my Lord, this could go either way.23 Your report could either very welcomely open up a whole24 new vista of openness in Government or it could be used25 as the Hutton rules whereby it buttresses Osmotherly and

281 all this sort of thing in the future. I think we are at2 a crossroads as regards Parliament. I am desperately3 anxious that nobody has spoken up for Parliament.4 The final thing, sir --5 LORD HUTTON: I think Mr Mackinlay I should just say, as6 I am sure you appreciate, the Bill of Rights itself7 provides that the affairs of Parliament should not be

8 commented on other than in Parliament. Therefore you9 will appreciate it will not be appropriate for me to10 express views on the affairs of Parliament. That is11 a matter for Parliament itself.12 A. In a way that makes it more difficult for me to be13 restrained, but I will continue to be restrained.14 Lord Hutton, there is one final point you might want15 to consider. The Government refused us access to16 documents and to people who we all now see. The irony17 was if they had given us the JIC assessments, by way of18 example, or access to documents, we certainly would have19 agreed, we would have compromised, we would have seen20 them in private.

21 The irony is that all these people and documents are22 given to you and I am very much pleased you have them,


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23 but you also can put them on a website. If it was so24 critical that they should not be out in the public25 domain. They will not let Parliament have them; now the

291 balloon has gone up, they are available. You are

2 rightly putting them on the website. It just shows how3 the Government do everything they can -- this Government4 is not the only one, there have been previous5 Governments -- to obstruct scrutiny. They do not like6 scrutiny. They see scrutiny as automatically going to7 be criticism, whereas it can be investigatory.8 Thank you, my Lord.9 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed.10 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Scarlett, my Lord.11 MR JOHN MCLEOD SCARLETT (called)12 Examined by MR DINGEMANS13 Q. Can you tell his Lordship your full name?14 A. John McLeod Scarlett, my Lord.

15 Q. What is your occupation?16 A. I am Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee. I am17 also head of the Intelligence and Securities Secretariat18 in the Cabinet Office.19 Q. Can you tell us, in outline, what the Joint Intelligence20 Committee does?21 A. Yes. The Joint Intelligence Committee is a real22 Committee. It meets once a week. It is chaired by23 myself. It meets in the Cabinet Office. It has sitting24 on it senior representatives of the policy and25 intelligence community, foreign, defence and security

30

1 fields, the heads of the three intelligence agencies,2 senior officials from major policy departments, Foreign3 Office, Home Office, Defence Ministry, the Chief of4 Defence Intelligence, the Deputy Chief of Defence5 Intelligence, representatives of the DTA and the6 Treasury.7 Q. Who do you report to? Do you have a boss or are you at8 the top as it were?9 A. I report to Sir David Omand, the Security and10 Intelligence Coordinator, but I was JIC Chairman11 responsible for the presentation of assessed12 intelligence to the Prime Minister and the Government.13 I have direct access to the Prime Minister.

14 Q. And can I just ask when you started to be Chairman, when15 you became Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee?16 A. Yes, on 3rd September 2001.17 Q. So in March 2002 you had been in post about five to six18 months?19 A. Yes.20 Q. We are told that there had been some previous drafts of21 the dossiers. Can you help us with that at all?22 A. Yes. The first drafts of what eventually became the23 dossier and assessment published in September 2002 were24 put together starting in February 2002. Initially there25 was a draft which covered four countries --

311 LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, Mr Scarlett, who initiated


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2 that draft? Whose decision was it that it should be3 prepared?4 A. My Lord, that was a task that we were passed by the5 Overseas and Defence Secretariat in the Cabinet Office6 on behalf of the Prime Minister's Office.7 MR DINGEMANS: So that is February 2002. What is the

8 structure of the dossier then? Are you able to say what9 it broadly was about?10 A. Yes, it was in effect four chapters, although we did not11 call them that, I think, which covered and were based on12 our intelligence assessments for those four countries,13 which included Iraq. That was one of the four14 countries.15 Q. Four separate countries, one of which was Iraq?16 A. Was Iraq.17 Q. And was that project pursued?18 A. No, it was not. In mid-March it was decided by the19 Prime Minister's Office and the Foreign Office not to20 pursue the paper on four countries; and we were asked to

21 drop that, but to carry on with the draft relating to22 Iraq.23 Q. Who told you physically that?24 A. I was told that by Alastair Campbell, speaking on behalf25 of the Prime Minister's Office and quoting

321 a conversation that he had had with the2 Foreign Secretary.3 Q. Right. So you have now dropped the other three4 countries out of it and you are concentrating on Iraq?5 A. Yes.6 Q. And does the process continue?

7 A. It does. Almost immediately we finalise the paper on8 Iraq, based on our current, then, intelligence9 assessment and I submitted that on 21st March to the10 Prime Minister's Office.11 Q. And was that dossier -- is it right to call that12 a dossier?13 A. Well, I never called it a dossier. But it was being14 called --15 LORD HUTTON: You called it a paper?16 A. I called it the assessment, my Lord.17 LORD HUTTON: Assessment, yes.18 A. But it was being called a dossier in public at that19 stage.

20 MR DINGEMANS: If we can call it a dossier. I am sorry for21 the loose use of language.22 A. I accept that.23 Q. Was that dossier published?24 A. No, it was not.25 Q. Why was it not published?

331 A. Because it was decided not for the moment to pursue the2 project for a published intelligence assessment on Iraq.3 Q. Do you know why that was?4 A. I do not know exactly why. I would not expect --5 Q. Did you pick up any indications why that might be the

6 case?7 A. My understanding at the time was that the judgment made


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8 at the political level, policy level was that the time9 was not right to put that assessment into the public10 domain. Secondly, that the document as it stood did not11 contain as much detail and information to explain the12 assessment judgments which were in it, which would have13 been informative for the public.

14 Q. Right. So your understanding was those two reasons. To15 form an understanding, you need to have evidence to form16 that understanding. What did you form that17 understanding from?18 A. That was based on one, possibly two conversations,19 I cannot quite remember exactly at that time, with the20 Prime Minister's Office.21 Q. And anyone in particular in the Prime Minister's Office?22 A. Certainly one of them was Sir David Manning.23 Q. Right. So the March dossier is decided not to be24 published. Does that mean that the process of keeping25 the dossier under review stops or not?

341 A. No, it does not. There was a difference between that2 decision, and I was clear about this, and the decision3 on the four country paper. The four country idea was4 dropped. The proposal for a dossier, a public dossier5 on Iraq was not dropped. It was just not the right6 moment, so it was kept in being.7 Q. Were various drafts produced of that dossier?8 A. It was kept under continuing review through the spring9 and early summer, with occasional updating. This is the10 draft which specifically relates to WMD in Iraq.11 Q. Can I take you to 20th June because that is the date on12 which we have a dossier. That is CAB/3/82. This is

13 headed "History of UN Weapons Inspections in Iraq". We14 can see "One Document Version 20 June 2002".15 That appears to become part 2 of the dossier16 actually published on 24th September.17 A. It forms the basis for what was eventually part 2 of the18 September dossier.19 Q. We have, over the weekend, been provided with another20 dossier dated 20th June. Can I take you to CAB/23/15?21 It does not appear to be coming up. I know someone will22 be looking at that.23 If one looks at the contents of the dossier that we24 have now got, that is also dated 20th June. The25 contents appear to be an executive summary, Iraqi

351 weapons of mass destruction, history of UN weapons2 inspections in Iraq and the Iraqi regime, crimes and3 human rights abuses.4 The history of UN weapons inspections in Iraq, we5 have seen something dated 20th June which I imagine was6 the basis for that part. But the other parts of the7 20th June version we have not seen before. Can you just8 help us with how we had got to the stage at 20th June of9 having almost, in terms of contents, the contents of the10 dossier as it is published?11 A. Right. What you have just put up on the screen was one

12 part of the dossier which was in continuous formulation13 during the spring and the summer. It was the part that


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14 related to the history of weapons inspections. But15 there was separate work going on at the same time, under16 the aegis of the Overseas and Defence Secretariat but17 led by the Foreign Office, which related to the human18 rights record of the Iraqi regime. That is also one of19 the papers that were passed to you at the weekend. Then

20 there was a third part, which was relating to WMD in21 Iraq, which was the sort of current draft of the paper22 which the assessment staff had written in March the same23 year and which I referred to earlier on.24 These three papers were brought together by the25 Overseas and Defence Secretariat and circulated on

361 4th September to senior officials, including the FCO,2 MoD and to No. 10, specifically Alastair Campbell. That3 represented in the view of the Overseas and Defence4 Secretariat the current state of the dossier as of that5 moment.

6 Q. As at 20th June?7 A. No, 20th June is a misleading date in real terms.8 Q. Right.9 A. I think it is there because it is in the IT somewhere as10 being, you know, that was the date when it was logged11 in. But in terms of its current applicability on12 4th September, that was, in the view of the Overseas and13 Defence Secretariat, the current draft.14 LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, Mr Scarlett: we have been15 furnished with a dossier dated 5th September which is at16 CAB/3/7. Would that be the assessment you are referring17 to as being circulated on 4th September?18 A. My Lord, no, it is not. I am sorry for the confusion.

19 When I realised this confusion existed I asked20 immediately for the 4th September papers to be sent to21 you. The 5th September draft, written here, and the22 "5 September" written at the top there, I should say23 there that is the handwriting of a member of my staff,24 that was a draft which on the initiative of assessment25 staff was being worked on with effect from

371 3rd September. It was at their initiative, their2 attempt to begin updating the draft on Iraqi WMD, taking3 into account the statement that the Prime Minister had4 made that day.

5 LORD HUTTON: I see. Yes.6 A. It is a separate text from the text which is attached to7 the minute which was circulated by OD Secretariat on8 4th September.9 MR DINGEMANS: Sticking if we may on 20th June, we know10 because of what becomes part 2 that there is an early11 version of that part of the document. We know from the12 document that I cannot pull up on the screen at the13 moment that there is another draft that appears to14 collate everything in one format dated 20th June. Is15 what you are saying that this was at least in the16 process of being put together from June 2002 and is then17 circulated on 4th September?

18 A. June has no particular significance apart from that date19 at the top. But in real terms it has no particular


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20 significance. There was a continuous drafting process21 covering WMD, human rights and the history of weapons22 inspections which had been going on in effect from March23 and then April.24 Q. At some stage in June, it may be an IT reason, it is all25 together in one dossier, if one can call it that.

381 A. Yes.2 Q. And that document is then continued to be worked on, is3 that right, up until 3rd September?4 A. I think the only part that was worked on was that5 relating to WMD.6 Q. Right. Then on 3rd September -- I am now told I can7 show you the CAB 23s. Can I just show you the8 20th June. CAB/23/15.9 A. I cannot read it.10 Q. That is not CAB/23/15. Yes, it is. I am very sorry.11 I will come back to that.

12 LORD HUTTON: These things only came over the weekend, did13 they not, Mr Dingemans?14 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord even this morning. That still does15 not excuse it. I am sorry.16 3rd September, if I can go back to there.17 A. Yes.18 Q. 3rd September, that is the Prime Minister's19 announcement, is that right?20 A. Yes.21 LORD HUTTON: That was a public announcement, was it not?22 A. Yes.23 MR DINGEMANS: What did he say? The general gist was24 a dossier was to be published.

25 A. He said the Government's assessments of Iraq's WMD's

391 capabilities -- I cannot remember the precise words --2 would be published in the next few weeks.3 Q. And that is effectively forming the basis of the4 distribution on 4th September of the dossier?5 A. The response of OD Secretariat, who were the lead6 secretariat on this overall project at that moment, was7 to circulate the dossier in its existing form to the8 senior officials that I mentioned in advance of9 a meeting which the head of OD Secretariat knew that10 Alastair Campbell intended to hold the following day, to

11 discuss the question of presentation of what the12 Prime Minister had said.13 Q. We know that on 5th September there was then a meeting14 at 12 o'clock. Can I take you to CAB/11/16? This is an15 e-mail dated 5th September from the PA to Tom McKane.16 Can you help us with who Tom McKane is?17 A. Well, Tom McKane, he was the person who circulated the18 note and the draft dossier on 4th September. He was19 the -- I called him the head, he was the deputy head of20 Overseas and Defence Secretariat. The head was21 Sir David Manning.22 Q. Right. What was the meeting to do?23 A. The meeting was to discuss the overall presentation of

24 the Government assessment which the Prime Minister had25 referred to. So it was intended to discuss how this


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401 would be done, what the overall format -- the best2 structure for the assessment should be, and how3 responsibilities for preparing it, drafting it, taking4 it forward, should be allocated.

5 Q. Right. Who chaired that meeting?6 A. Alastair Campbell.7 Q. We can see the list of attendees there. At that meeting8 was anything considered? We have seen -- in fact the9 dossier that is dated 20th June 2002 but I still cannot10 show you, that was the dossier that people were looking11 at, is that right?12 A. That was the dossier which was on the table at that13 meeting, which is an important clarification which14 I want to understand. It was not the one which is dated15 5th September which you have been looking at previously,16 so --17 Q. The 5th September dossier we can see at CAB/3/7. This

18 is the Iraqi WMD programmes?19 A. Yes.20 Q. That assessment I think you told us someone was working21 on independently of the dossier; is that right?22 A. It was not exactly independent. It was the assessment23 staff, on their own initiative, were looking at this24 draft which they had been working on since March. They25 were anticipating having to update it and review it and

411 they set that work in motion. This draft here,2 5th September, represents the state of the drafting as3 of that day. But it was not the draft that was in front

4 of the meeting at 12 o'clock.5 Q. The draft that was in front of the meeting was the6 20th June draft effectively?7 A. Yes.8 Q. I am going to try one more time to get it on screen. It9 appears that part of the confusion is I now have two10 CAB/23/15s. If I say CAB/23/15 we now get it.11 A. That looks like it.12 Q. Can you see at the top 20th June 2003?13 LORD HUTTON: I beg your pardon, this is CAB/23?14 MR DINGEMANS: 15. It is the first CAB/23/15, my Lord.15 This is what was on the table at the meeting on16 5th June.

17 A. 5th September.18 Q. Sorry, 5th September. We can see the executive summary:19 "Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. History of UN20 weapons inspections. Crimes and human rights abuses."21 That is what everyone was looking at. What was the22 shape of the discussion on 5th September? I think we23 have heard there were no formal notes kept; is that24 right?25 A. Of that particular meeting, no, there were not. It was

421 on the table. I do not recall any study of that text or2 any detailed discussion of any kind of that text at the

3 meeting.4 Q. Right. So what was the purpose of the discussion, then,


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5 on 5th September, if it was not to look at the dossier?6 A. The purpose of the discussion was to consider how the7 Prime Minister's statement should be taken forward and8 what the structure of the dossier should now be; and, at9 some point in that meeting, probably very early on, I do10 not recall, it was effectively decided to put this

11 drafting to one side.12 Q. Right. That draft did not contain anything about13 45 minutes, is that right?14 A. It did not.15 Q. We will come back to the intelligence, if I may, in16 relation to that.17 A. Yes, of course.18 Q. Also on 5th September at CAB/11/13 there is a memo from19 John Williams. We have heard from him, he is a press20 officer in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.21 A. Head of news department.22 Q. "Iraq: Dossier.23 "I have looked at the capping piece for the Iraq

24 dossier as a newspaper sub would. I offer the following25 suggestions. I would be happy to discuss why I believe

431 they will make the document easier for Ministers to2 defend in interviews."3 You appear to be on the distribution list.4 A. Yes.5 Q. If you look at the bottom right-hand name, what was your6 view about these contributions from senior press7 personnel?8 A. Well, John Williams, at this point, was commenting on9 something which had been drafted by Tom McKane and

10 circulated along with his note of 4th September. So he11 was not commenting on anything that I or my staff had12 written.13 Q. Right.14 A. When he refers to a capping piece, that was the15 expression that Tom McKane himself used to describe his16 own draft which was intended to be -- I am not sure he17 called it that at that stage -- a sort of foreword to18 the overall document. John Williams was coming at it as19 a news expert to see whether he could amend it.20 Q. Can I take you to CAB/11/17, which is a memo sent after21 the meeting or -- if you look at the bottom of the page,22 this is an e-mail from Jonathan Powell to

23 Alastair Campbell:24 "What did you decide on dossiers?"25 Then after the meeting, 14.38, we can see the time

441 at the middle of the page, Sandra Powell appears to come2 back on behalf of Alastair Campbell:3 "Re dossier, substantial rewrite with JS and4 Julian M in charge which JS will take to US next Friday5 and be in shape Monday thereafter. Structure as per6 TB's discussion. Agreement that there has to be real7 intelligence material in their presentation as such."8 Now, what was going to be substantially rewritten?

9 A. This is a reference to the overall dossier, referring to10 Iraq and WMD, but also to the other two parts. But it


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11 is a particular reference to the section on WMD. It12 related the agreement that we had reached at that13 meeting, although the agreement, in some respects, was14 not completely tied down at that stage.15 Q. We will come to the 9th September memo.16 A. That is right. For assessment staff, under

17 Julian Miller's leadership and then my leadership, to18 review the existing state of the draft and to consider19 whether, operational security considerations permitting,20 more detail could be added; whether specific reference21 could be made to individual items in a text coming from22 intelligence reporting; and I am almost certain it was23 sort of agreed at that stage whether reference could be24 made to previous JIC assessments and the history of the25 JIC assessment on this subject.

451 LORD HUTTON: Now Julian Miller is the head of your2 assessment staff?

3 A. Yes, my Lord. He is my main deputy and chief of4 assessment staff.5 LORD HUTTON: Yes.6 MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you on to 6th September, CAB/17/5.7 Here is an e-mail, and both the sender and the recipient8 have been blanked out.9 A. Hmm.10 Q. What it says is:11 "Barry, a good paper. Some minor comments from the12 BW side."13 What does "BW" mean?14 A. Biological warfare or biological weapons.15 Q. Then it makes comments such as:

16 "Not sure we can be quite as categorical as17 'never' ... intelligence refers to a maximum time of18 45 minutes. The average was 20 minutes. This could19 have important implications in the event of a conflict",20 and various other comments of a similar nature.21 Can you help us with what this document is?22 A. This is an e-mail which comes from Defence Intelligence23 Staff and is sent to a member of assessment staff. It24 is not about the public paper which we have been25 discussing. It is an e-mail about a draft which was

461 currently under work on a classified JIC assessment,

2 assessing Iraq's capability for the use of chemical and3 biological weaponry and their sort of scenarios for use.4 So this relates to the drafting process which was, at5 that point, under way for that classified assessment.6 Q. That was the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments,7 is that right, for the purposes of the dossier?8 A. No. It is important to be clear, this was a separate9 process. At this time, in the first week of September,10 the JIC was considering a classified assessment, which11 was completely separate as an exercise from a public12 assessment, of chemical and biological weaponry and13 possible scenarios for use, including in the event of14 a conflict in Iraq, or by the Iraqi regime. That

15 assessment -- or that subject had been commissioned by16 the JIC itself in late August. The normal JIC process


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17 had applied.18 There had been a meeting of the interdepartmental19 Current Intelligence Group headed, as normal, by20 a deputy head of assessment staff on 28th August, to21 consider a first draft of that classified assessment.22 That first draft had then been considered in a full

23 meeting of the JIC on 4th September, which was24 Wednesday, as normal.25 The JIC had discussed that draft, had noted that

471 important new intelligence was coming in, which was2 relevant to this subject, and had asked assessment3 staff, again as is quite normal, to go away, to4 reconsider their existing draft, in particular to5 reconsider the important new intelligence from various6 sources and to prepare a new draft.7 Assessment staff had taken that task away. On8 5th September they had produced a revised draft which

9 they had sent, as is normal, to the participating10 working level members, who would be represented in the11 Current Intelligence Group and which would include12 Defence Intelligence Staff, DIS. This e-mail is the13 response from DIS to the main drafter of the paper.14 This is part of the classified process.15 Q. Can I take you to CAB/17/3 which I think are redacted16 extracts from JIC papers. We can see the 5th September17 JIC draft which provided, at page 4, paragraph 3, final18 bullet:19 "Iraq has probably dispersed its special weapons,20 including CBW weapons. Intelligence also indicates that21 from forward deployed storage sites, chemical and

22 biological munitions could be with military units and23 ready for firing within 45 minutes."24 Was that the first time that intelligence had25 featured in the JIC assessments?

481 A. Yes, that intelligence was based on a report which was2 issued on 30th August --3 LORD HUTTON: May I ask you: issued by whom, as it were?4 A. By SIS in this case, by the Secret Intelligence Service.5 LORD HUTTON: I see, yes.6 MR DINGEMANS: On 30th August. We have heard a lot about7 whether things are single-sourced or double-sourced.

8 A. Hmm.9 Q. Was this intelligence single-sourced?10 A. This was a report from a single source. It was an11 established and reliable line of reporting; and it was12 quoting a senior Iraqi military officer in a position to13 know this information.14 Q. And were people unhappy about the use of single-sourced15 as opposed to double-sourced material?16 A. Not at all, because the use of those terms in this17 context represents a misunderstanding of the assessment18 process. The assessment process takes into account19 a large number of considerations when it is considering20 intelligence against the background of other information

21 which is available and what has already been assessed,22 and also, of course, the reliability and record of the


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23 particular line of reporting in question.24 In this particular case, it was judged straight away25 that the intelligence was consistent with established

491 JIC judgments on the command, control and logistical

2 arrangements and capabilities of the Iraqi armed forces3 and their experience and capabilities in the area of use4 of CP ammunitions. It brought an additional detail5 because for the first time in our reporting it gave6 a particular time, gave some precision.7 Q. A timescale?8 A. So against that background it was incorporated into the9 draft assessment which was sent out on 5th September.10 To answer your question, it is correct this was the11 first time that this was included in a classified JIC or12 any JIC document, and usually they are classified.13 Q. Because it had come in on 30th August?14 A. Exactly.

15 Q. We can see, then, a final assessment on the intelligence16 issued on 9th September. This assessment is separate17 from the dossier process, is that right?18 A. Completely.19 Q. We can see the terms of it which appear to be broadly20 consistent with what has been said before, but appear to21 have picked up the point about the intelligence showing22 that it was 20 to 45 minutes.23 A. Exactly.24 Q. Can I take you to a document, CAB/11/21, which is an25 e-mail from Daniel Pruce to Mark Matthews. We have

50

1 heard from others that Daniel Pruce was making2 contributions above his pay grade. What were your views3 on these type of contributions?4 A. Well, I had no view on this e-mail because I did not see5 it.6 Q. You were not copied into any of this material at all?7 A. No.8 Q. Can I just ask you this: Mark Matthews is asked:9 "I promised some quick thoughts on John's draft of10 9th September."11 We have seen drafts of the dossier, now seen12 20th June. 5th September somebody has written in in13 handwriting. I think you have said that is a member of

14 your staff?15 A. It is.16 Q. Then we have seen 10th to 11th September. Where are17 they getting the dates of the drafts from to write in in18 the handwriting?19 A. The handwriting at the top applies to a 5th September20 one, that simply is internal assessment staff21 handwriting. It has no more significance than that.22 Indeed, the 10th and 11th -- yes, the 10th September23 draft you refer to also has, I think, on the top of it24 handwriting "10th/11th September". That is handwriting25 from my staff. It is drafting being done by my staff.

511 Q. Was that done contemporaneously or just to help us?


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2 A. I do not know, I am afraid.3 Q. Because it would be difficult to remember nearly a year4 after the event when this draft was produced, unless5 there is something to help date you at the time.6 A. No, I am confident, and my staff are confident, the one7 marked 5th September represents the state of work as of

8 that date. The one marked 10th/11th September is the9 draft which was circulated outside assessment staff on10 those dates. They are the significant dates.11 LORD HUTTON: I appreciate you say you have not seen this12 e-mail, but whom do you think the reference is to13 "John"; is that you?14 A. My Lord, I have seen this subsequently of course and15 I have done some work on it. I am virtually certain16 this is a reference to work put forward by John Williams17 from the Foreign Office.18 LORD HUTTON: I see. Yes. Thank you very much. Yes.19 MR DINGEMANS: You think that might have been more of his20 beginnings of a foreword, as it were?

21 A. Well, it is more than that. I am virtually certain this22 is a reference to John Williams' draft because he did do23 some additional drafting, not just of the foreword but24 of the -- or redrafting of the text which had been25 circulated on 4th September and which was on the table

521 at the meeting of 5th September. So he was really on2 his own initiative working on that and had circulated it3 to No. 10 inter alia probably, judging by this, on the4 9th.5 Q. On 9th September we have heard from Mr Campbell that6 there is another meeting.

7 A. Indeed.8 Q. Can you tell us, so far as you recollect, who was there?9 Relevantly -- I do not need to know the identities, but10 you and Mr Campbell. Was it the Joint Intelligence11 Committee as well?12 A. Not at all.13 Q. Who else was there then?14 A. Can I just be clear on this in case there is any15 misunderstanding?16 LORD HUTTON: I am sorry, Mr Scarlett. We give a break for17 the stenographers. I think this might be a convenient18 time just before we get on to that. I will rise for19 five minutes.

20 (11.45 am)21 (Short Break)22 (11.50 am)23 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Scarlett, we were turning to the meeting24 of 9th September. Can I just pull up CAB/6/2 which is25 a memorandum from Alastair Campbell that was sent after

531 the meeting. I had asked you who was at the meeting;2 and this memo, in some respects, may assist in that,3 because it says:4 "At our discussion this morning, we agreed it would5 be helpful..."

6 It is from Alastair Campbell to you and various7 people are copied in. Were all those people at the


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8 meeting?9 A. No, they were not.10 Q. Who was at the meeting?11 A. I do not have an exact recollection. There was an12 initial discussion between Alastair Campbell and myself13 and then a broader meeting which included officers from

14 SIS, and from Overseas and Defence Secretariat.15 Q. Right.16 A. And probably others but I am afraid I do not remember.17 Q. Where did this meeting take place?18 A. In Alastair Campbell's office.19 Q. Who chaired the meeting?20 A. Alastair Campbell.21 Q. What was the purpose of the meeting?22 A. It was a continuation of a discussion we had had on23 5th September. It had had the same agenda, but in this24 case to finalise the arrangements for the format, the25 structure, and sort of taking forward the presentation

541 of the Government's assessment. I would like to say2 here that both this meeting, on 9th September, and the3 meeting on 5th September, were chaired by4 Alastair Campbell because they were unique -- they were5 wholly and only concerned with those issues. There was6 no discussion of intelligence issues, intelligence7 matters, intelligence at all, at that meeting or at8 those meetings so it was wholly appropriate, in my view,9 that they should be chaired by Alastair Campbell. It10 was not, in any sense of the term at all, an11 intelligence -- neither of them were intelligence12 meetings.

13 Q. Right. We can see in the third paragraph, having made14 the point that "... this must be, and be seen to be, the15 work of you and your team, and that its credibility16 depends fundamentally upon that", in the third paragraph17 it picks up that:18 "... you are working on a new dossier, according to19 the structure we agreed at the meeting last week, to20 meet the new circumstances which have developed over21 recent weeks and months", and that people should wait to22 comment on that.23 The structure is set out towards the bottom of the24 page.25 Continuing over the page, it makes a whole series of

551 points about the presentation and the public line and,2 if one continues to the bottom of the page, the fact3 that Mr Campbell was going to chair a team that would go4 through the document from a presentational point of view5 and make recommendations to you.6 A. Yes.7 Q. That left you dealing with the intelligence, is that8 right?9 A. It left me in charge of the drafting of those parts of10 the dossier that were related to intelligence in any way11 at all or were intelligence based. I and my team were

12 responsible for that, of course answering to the JIC.13 Q. Mr Campbell I think used the expression, or it may have


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14 been in the documents one has read, of "ownership", the15 document being owned by you. What did you understand16 that to mean?17 A. Ownership, that I was absolutely to be in charge.18 LORD HUTTON: Well, you said Mr Scarlett that you were to be19 in charge of the document in any way relating to

20 intelligence.21 A. Hmm.22 LORD HUTTON: But presumably someone must have had overall23 charge and responsibility. I mean, someone must have24 been concerned with the final product. Was that to be25 you or someone else or was it the position that there

561 were a number of people who were concerned with the2 final shape of the dossier as it would be made available3 to the public?4 A. Well, my Lord, why I made the slight qualification that5 I did is for that reason, that it was almost completely

6 clear by this stage, by the time this note went out,7 that I was that person.8 LORD HUTTON: Yes.9 A. But there was still some slight ambiguity about who10 would be responsible for the parts of the dossier which11 were not going to be intelligence based. This relates12 to human rights and weapons inspections, in particular,13 where the FCO had been seen to be the lead department.14 In fact in this text here I think it says at the end:15 "Writing by Committee does not work but we will make16 recommendations and suggestions, and you can decide what17 you want to incorporate. Once they are incorporated, we18 need to take a judgement as to whether a single person

19 should be appointed to write the final version."20 There was still a slight ambiguity there as to who21 would write the final version. The reason why I had had22 discussion with Alastair Campbell at the beginning of23 the meeting on my own was to say to him that it was very24 important that only one person and one unit had25 ownership and command and control of this exercise, that

571 that should be me, that I wanted it stated clearly in2 writing; and I wanted that to be the outcome of our3 meeting, which, with the slight qualification at the end4 there, it was.

5 LORD HUTTON: Yes.6 MR DINGEMANS: The slight qualification, what, being at the7 bottom of page 3 of that?8 A. I say qualification, it is a slight ambiguity.9 Q. That he was dealing with documents from a presentational10 point of view as it were?11 A. No --12 LORD HUTTON: How does the paragraph begin?13 A. The page on my screen, it begins, the paragraph: "In the14 meantime, I will chair a team ...", that is fine. That15 was going to look at the presentational point of view,16 fine. That was going to make recommendations to me,17 fine. There is a reference as to a further judgment to

18 be made "as to whether a single person should be19 appointed to write the final version."


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20 LORD HUTTON: I see.21 MR DINGEMANS: In fact no other person was appointed, is22 that right?23 A. I made sure that was me.24 LORD HUTTON: Was there a later decision to that effect or25 was it simply understood, or in the way that matters

581 worked out it was you, was that the position?2 A. No -- well, my Lord, I do not want to make too much of3 this point because there was really not too much4 discussion about it. It is just that there was an5 ambiguity in the way that note was written. In6 practice, and I am sure it was Alastair Campbell's7 understanding at the time that I went away as the person8 in charge of the whole exercise.9 MR DINGEMANS: The dossier of 10th/11th September is10 produced. We have that at DOS/2/2. We can see in the11 top right-hand corner "10/11 September 2002", again

12 beginning with the foreword. You, in fact, produce13 a memo that we have dated 10th September at CAB/23/2.14 This is one of the new documents. Can you just help us15 with what this is?16 A. Right. This is the note I think of the 10th September17 memo.18 Q. Yes, it is dated 10th September at the bottom, if we19 scroll down. We can see that.20 A. Yes, which I sent to Alastair Campbell and I attached21 the draft, the first page of which you just had on the22 screen.23 Q. You say in paragraph 2 of the memo that it has been:24 "... significantly recast with considerable help

25 from John Williams and others in the Foreign Office. It

591 still needs further work. I cannot yet confirm that2 I am content with the overall tone of the paper and the3 balance between the main text and annexes."4 Then John Williams, it appears, was off to New York.5 When you were redrafting the dossier, is it right to6 say that Mr Williams from the Foreign and Commonwealth7 Office communications side was assisting you?8 A. Well, not really. John Williams was working on his9 redrafting which he had been doing following the10 4th September. Of course that was helpful of him to do

11 that; but I was concerned that that redrafting which was12 happening independently from me might cause confusion as13 to who was actually controlling this. It was one of the14 points I had in mind when I asked for the 9th September15 note to be issued.16 Q. We have seen other memos or e-mails that followed this17 draft when it was distributed. Can I take you to18 CAB/11/25? This is an e-mail from Daniel Pruce to19 Claire Sumner in August 2003, but the original one is20 from Philip Bassett to Daniel Pruce and21 Alastair Campbell: "Re Draft Dossier (J Scarlett version22 of 10th September)". That is your one, as it were?23 A. Yes, that is my version.

24 Q. "Very long way to go, I think. Think we're in a lot of25 trouble with this as it stands now."


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601 Were these comments ever shared with you?2 A. Not by e-mail, no.3 Q. Were they shared with you orally?4 A. Well, very briefly, only in the sense that I attended

5 a discussion on 11th September at 1800 hours in6 Alastair Campbell's office to consider the7 presentational aspects of the draft circulated the8 previous day, and the main comments made at that meeting9 I do see reflected now that I see them in some of these10 e-mails.11 Q. So the type of comments that we can see going around by12 e-mail were presented orally to you by Mr Campbell, is13 that right?14 A. Yes.15 Q. In terms of comments about structure and language16 et cetera et cetera?17 A. Well, I have no record of that discussion, but my memory

18 is that the advice from the presentational side that19 I received was that the draft, as it existed, needed to20 contain less assertion, if possible more detail, and21 less rhetoric and that was it, really.22 Q. Were members of the intelligence agencies aware of the23 input that was coming, albeit orally, to you on the back24 of these e-mails?25 A. Yes.

611 Q. Did they have any views about the propriety or otherwise2 of such comments?3 A. There were no worries of any kind expressed to me, at

4 any stage, about the propriety of the arrangement.5 Q. Was there any view that No. 10, if one uses the term6 generically, was trying to beef up the dossier at all?7 Were there any views being expressed by the members of8 the intelligence agencies as far as you were aware?9 A. None at all.10 Q. Can I take you to an e-mail which is CAB/23/15. It is11 the first CAB/23/15. This is an e-mail that, again, we12 got this morning. A lot is redacted. It is subject "Re13 Iraqi dossier questions from No. 10."14 "Dear all."15 First of all, can you tell me where this e-mail16 comes from?

17 A. This is an e-mail written by a member of my assessment18 staff in the middle of the day on 11th September, which19 is passing out to the agencies and departments who are20 contributing to the drafting process of the public21 dossier some comments, mainly questions, that according22 to this e-mail emanated from No. 10.23 Q. "We have now received comments back from No. 10 on the24 first draft of the dossier. Unsurprisingly they have25 further questions and areas they would like expanded."

621 Those comments had been received by you orally from2 Mr Campbell, is that right?

3 A. I do not know. I mean, we have located this e-mail in4 assessment staff and have submitted it because it says


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5 what it says. The person drafting it only recalls that6 I said to him that further comments had been received on7 these points from No. 10. I --8 Q. Sorry, you were going to say something.9 A. I have no recollection of it and I have no record,10 myself, of receiving them and I do not know who they

11 were received from.12 Q. But it seems that the main comments that had been passed13 to you were that they like the use of a specific14 personality, Miss Taha, in the paragraphs on chemical15 warfare.16 "2. Is there any intelligence that Iraq has17 actively sought to employ foreign experts, in particular18 in the nuclear field?19 3. They want more details on the items procured for20 their nuclear programme. How many did they buy? What21 does this equate to?22 "Can we say how many chemical and biological weapons23 Iraq currently has by type! If we can't give weapon

24 numbers can we give any idea on the quantity of agent25 available!" by which I take it to mean that he thought

631 that was being a bit hopeful.2 A. Yes.3 Q. Then he says this:4 "I appreciate everyone, us included, has been around5 at least some of these buoys before..." buoys in terms6 of navigation marks.7 A. Indeed.8 Q. "... but particularly item 4. But No. 10, through the9 Chairman, want the document to be as strong as possible

10 within the bounds of available intelligence. This is11 therefore a last! call for any items of intelligence12 that agencies think can and should be included.13 "Responses needed by 1200 tomorrow."14 It appears to betray an attitude that pressure is15 being brought to bear to get anything good by way of16 intelligence for the dossier. Is that a fair analysis?17 A. No, it is not a fair analysis. This is simply part of18 the work in progress. In effect these questions are19 questions seeking more detail to support statements or20 areas of discussion which are in the draft. This is21 entirely consistent with what the original tasking22 comprised of. It was entirely consistent with what

23 I wanted to do, and the fact that it was wanted for the24 document to be as strong as possible was also what25 I wanted -- strong in the sense of it being

641 comprehensive, as detailed as possible as the2 intelligence allowed and as informative as possible.3 LORD HUTTON: In your view, Mr Scarlett, would there be4 anything wrong with No. 10 -- I use that term5 generically -- informing you or the assessment staff6 that they wanted as much intelligence in the dossier as7 was possible, on the basis that anything that could go8 in would in fact be valid intelligence in the judgment

9 of the intelligence community?10 A. My Lord, I saw and see nothing wrong in that at all. It


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11 was up to our judgment, my judgment and eventually the12 judgment of the JIC whether it was safe to include13 intelligence and whether that intelligence was soundly14 based and consistent with our assessments. That was our15 judgment.16 LORD HUTTON: Yes, of course. Yes.

17 MR DINGEMANS: Would people at a level below the Joint18 Intelligence Committee at the time have understood, as19 it were, there to be at least a desire for more20 intelligence, genuine intelligence which could be used21 in the dossier and quite a lot of activity in the last22 couple of weeks leading up to the publication of the23 dossier?24 A. Well, the people involved in the drafting process, and25 the people receiving e-mails of that kind and other

651 messages, because there were telephone calls and2 informal meetings as well as formal meetings, they would

3 have known at that time that there was quite a lot of4 work going on, and that the assessment staff, the5 drafters were attempting to identify intelligence which6 could safely, in all respects, be used in the draft7 dossier, in the interests of making it more informative.8 That was consistent with our overall objective. So they9 would have felt -- they would have been conscious of10 that search, as it were, for further releasable11 information.12 Q. Did you know, at the time, of any involvement Dr Kelly13 may have had in commenting on in particular biological14 and chemical weapons?15 A. No, I did not.

16 Q. We have seen an e-mail, it is CAB/3/21, where he appears17 to comment, through someone else, about growth media and18 I know you have seen it subsequently. Did you see that19 at the time?20 A. No, I did not.21 Q. That is because it would have gone through a reporting22 source before you would be addressed on that, is that23 right?24 A. This is a working level e-mail being taken by the25 drafters in assessment staff.

661 Q. In the assessment staff?

2 A. Yes.3 Q. This had got up, as it were, to JIC assessment level but4 would not be sent on to you?5 A. I would not have expected to see this particular e-mail.6 Q. We have seen I think at the same time some other7 comments that were made. I think you have seen those.8 For example, there is someone who says that he was ADIST9 at the time who was an expert on Iraqi weapons of mass10 destruction who reported unhappiness within the DIS.11 Were you aware of any of these expressions of12 unhappiness?13 A. No, I was not.14 Q. And that is because it is all dealt with within the DIS?

15 A. Those expressions of unhappiness, as I understand them16 now, relate to specific issues which were under


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17 discussion between DIS and the central drafters several18 days after this. They related to particular points that19 were in the drafts. They were discussed within the20 formal drafting group, particularly on 17th September.21 They were dealt with within that process and they were22 not brought forward by the DIS senior management to the

23 level of the JIC.24 Q. On 12th September we know that Mr Miller is going to25 come and see Mr Smith, Godric Smith, CAB/11/35, to

671 "...show someone the latest thinking on the dossier2 tomorrow without getting into circulating copies, just3 so as they are on the right track."4 What would you say about people at this stage going5 with drafts of the dossier back to Mr Smith or6 Mr Campbell in No. 10?7 A. Well, on this particular instance I was not in London8 that day. I have spoken to Julian Miller subsequently.

9 He recalls telephoning Godric Smith and it would be10 normal for him to be talking to Godric at his level. He11 does not recall meeting him, as it turns out.12 Q. On 16th September 2002 we get another draft of the13 dossier. We can see that at DOS/2/58. You can see,14 again, the handwriting in the top right-hand corner?15 A. Yes. Yes.16 Q. If we turn to DOS/2/72, we have towards the bottom of17 the page the comment:18 "Iraqi military may be able to deploy chemical or19 biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do20 so."21 I will not take you through the language between all

22 the dossiers if that is all right, but the language23 between the dossier of 10th/11th September and24 16th September seems to have become less strong. Is25 there anything you can comment on in relation to that?

681 A. That is true, but only partly true. In the2 16th September text that we have here, I think this3 point is mentioned four times in the overall text. It4 is mentioned once in the executive summary as5 a judgment.6 LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, Mr Scarlett: in the copy7 of the 16th September dossier which we have --

8 A. Yes my Lord.9 LORD HUTTON: -- the contents page is at DOS/2/59. It sets10 out the executive summary. Certainly my next page in11 the dossier is 60 which begins with part 1 and the12 executive summary does not appear to be there. Would it13 have been the same as the executive summary in the14 preceding dossier?15 A. Well, I thought, my Lord, that you had been and16 the Inquiry had been supplied with the executive17 summary. I am sorry.18 MR DINGEMANS: They have come in this morning as well. I am19 not sure they have got to his Lordship yet.20 A. I am sorry about that.

21 LORD HUTTON: Not at all. Am I right then in assuming that22 the executive summary, or perhaps not, in the dossier of


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23 16th September was the same as in the earlier dossier of24 10th and 11th September?25 A. You are, my Lord. As it happens, I have it written down

691 in front of me here that the executive summary on

2 16th September on this point said that Iraq has military3 plans for use of chemical and biological weapons some of4 which could be ready within 45 minutes of an order to5 use them. I think that is right.6 LORD HUTTON: You said there were, what, two other places?7 A. Then in the text itself it is mentioned twice. On8 page 15 under the heading of "Main Conclusions".9 LORD HUTTON: That is in the text of the dossier itself, is10 it?11 A. In the dossier itself.12 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Give me a moment. "The Iraqi military13 may be able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of14 a decision to do so". Yes.

15 A. On page 17, my Lord, almost exactly the same. So before16 it was main conclusions, now it is in the text itself.17 There I think it says, instead of saying "these18 weapons", it says "chemical and biological weapons".19 LORD HUTTON: Mr Dingemans had taken you to the penultimate20 line in page 17, but is there an earlier reference in21 that page?22 A. No, on page 15, sir, now page 17.23 LORD HUTTON: That is the wording "may be able to deploy".24 A. On page 15 I think it says "may be able to" as well.25 MR DINGEMANS: I just took the wording to illustrate what it

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1 said in the text. We did not have the foreword.2 A. But there is also a conclusion which is attached to this3 draft.4 Q. Right.5 A. At the end.6 LORD HUTTON: That is what page in the dossier itself?7 A. I am afraid I do not know the page number for that.8 LORD HUTTON: Well we will try to find it.9 MR DINGEMANS: I think that is another document that we have10 just received, as it were.11 LORD HUTTON: I see. Yes.12 A. I am sorry, but I can --13 MR DINGEMANS: We will get all the documents and drafts.

14 A. May I just say that in the conclusion it says "some15 weapons" -- and it is specified in the way the16 conclusion is drafted that this is chemical and17 biological weapons -- "could be deployed within18 45 minutes of an order". The reason I am going over19 this is I am saying in this particular draft there are20 four different references. Two of them use the language21 which was used in the 10th and 11th, two of them use22 slightly different language.23 Q. The conclusion, in the text, we know that is drafted by24 you effectively, is it not, the dossier?25 A. Yes.

711 Q. The conclusion was drafted by you as well, is that


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2 right?3 A. Yes.4 Q. But the foreword, that was not you?5 A. Not the foreword. This is the executive summary,6 drafted by us.7 Q. So the executive summary was also by you?

8 A. Yes.9 LORD HUTTON: Just before we leave this, Mr Scarlett, it is10 a difference in wording --11 A. Yes.12 LORD HUTTON: -- and these dossiers or drafts are obviously13 very carefully prepared. I mean, a possible view is14 that whoever drafted this page, 17, deliberately used15 that language "may be able to deploy". Is it possible16 that there was some debate as to whether it was too17 strong to say "could be deployed" and therefore a person18 drafting this particular page decided to use the words19 "may be able to deploy"?20 A. My Lord, I have discussed this draft in detail with the

21 officers who drafted it and who work on my staff. They22 have no memory of changing the wording. They have no23 recollection of any particular reason for changing the24 wor

Documents

Hearing Transcript - 26 August 2003 Morning