Hearing Transcript - 12 August 2003 Morning

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 12 August 2003 Morning

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1 Tuesday, 12th August 20032 (10.30 am)3 LORD HUTTON: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. I have4 received a message from the members of the press that to5 aid them in accurate reporting they would like to see

6 copies of the documents which are presented to7 the Inquiry each day. I fully understand the reasons8 for this request and I wish to give a little more9 consideration to just the mechanics of doing that and10 I will propose to say something about that when we sit11 again after the luncheon adjournment. I am certainly12 very well aware of the interests of the press and I will13 try to facilitate them just as much as I possibly can.14 Yes Mr Dingemans.15 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, Mr Gilligan please.16 MR ANDREW GILLIGAN (called)17 Examined by MR DINGEMANS18 Q. Can you tell his Lordship your full name.19 A. Yes, it is Andrew Paul Gilligan.20 Q. What is your occupation?21 A. I am a journalist.22 Q. And who do you work for?23 A. The BBC.24 Q. In what capacity?25 A. I am the defence and diplomatic correspondent of the

11 Today Programme on Radio 4.2 Q. How long have you been employed in that capacity?3 A. Just under four years now.4 Q. What did you do before that?5 A. I was the defence correspondent of the Sunday Telegraph.6 Q. How long were you working there?7 A. In that particular job about four years and then an8 earlier year or so on the foreign desk.9 Q. That is your journalistic experience, the10 Daily Telegraph and Today?11 A. The Sunday Telegraph.12 Q. Sorry, the Sunday Telegraph.

13 A. I have also freelanced for a number of Fleet Street14 publications, local newspapers, the Cambridge Evening15 News, that kind of thing.16 Q. You met Dr Kelly on a number of occasions?17 A. Yes.18 Q. Can you tell us when you first met Dr Kelly?19 A. Yes, it was in the early months of 2001. I cannot tell20 you exactly when because I have lost my appointments21 diary for that year but it was probably in January or22 February. I was going to Iraq and I wanted to speak to23 him to discuss, you know, Iraqi related issues with him.

24 Q. How had you come on his name?25 A. He had been initially recommended to me by a colleague


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21 at the BBC, and I had then found his details in fact in2 our central contacts database. There is a computer3 database in the BBC system with a variety of contacts in

4 a number of fields. Dr Kelly has been on that since5 1988 and all his numbers are in there. His description,6 he was described as an MoD expert that journalists could7 call on.8 Q. Are you talking about the document BBC/7/33?9 A. That is the one, yes.10 Q. And that lists his London, New York and Porton Down11 telephone numbers.12 A. And his home number and indeed his address.13 Q. Did you carry out any further research before you met14 Dr Kelly?15 A. Yes, I did. I looked him up in a cuttings database16 called Neon which we have at the BBC. I found his name17 had been mentioned several times. I looked him up in18 some of the standard reference works on the subject. In19 a book called Plague Wars for instance by Tom Mangold20 and Jeff Goldberg I found quite a full description of21 him which described him as the senior adviser to the MoD22 on biological defence and one of the world's leading23 experts in biological weapons, and described his track24 record in some detail, which made me actually very25 interested indeed in his potential as a contact.

31 Q. Is that a reference to BBC/7/45?2 A. Yes, that is right. There is a sort of potted biography3 of him and it starts by saying:4 "If David Kelly were a tax inspector he would recoup5 Britain's entire national debt."6 Q. That is within the book Plague Wars written by7 Tom Mangold?8 A. Yes, it is, yes.9 Q. Did you make any notes of your first meeting with10 Dr Kelly?

11 A. Yes, I did.12 Q. Can we look at BBC/7/36? Is this a transcript of those13 notes?14 A. Yes, it is. Yes.15 Q. I think you have supplied the manuscript as well. What16 was the nature of your discussion with him on that17 occasion?18 A. It was an introductory talk really. I wanted to get to19 know him. I wanted to find out the extent of his20 expertise. I was quite keen to glean any information he21 could give to me from his knowledge about Iraq since

22 I was going to travel there in the future. It was23 a kind of first meeting a journalist has with a contact.


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24 You just want to kind of establish a relationship.25 I was particularly interested in the issue of smuggling

41 of components for weapons of mass destruction, because

2 that was something I covered.3 Q. Where did that meeting take place?4 A. I am pretty sure it was in the Charing Cross Hotel.5 I am pretty sure all my meetings with him were.6 I certainly know the last two were.7 Q. Did you make a report of any meeting -- of anything he8 had said at that meeting?9 A. Did it lead to a story on the programme?10 Q. Yes.11 A. Not directly. It did provide information, some quite12 useful information actually about smuggling and some13 further contacts and some quite useful background. But14 there was no specific story involved. It just helped me15 to flesh out a project I was already doing.16 Q. How long did the meeting that took place last?17 A. I am not quite sure but about maybe three quarters of an18 hour or thereabouts. It is difficult to remember at19 this juncture.20 Q. And did you eat together or drink together?21 A. We had a drink, yes. I cannot remember exactly what we22 had.23 Q. What was his manner to you?24 A. He was really quite open and helpful and, you know,25 often with officials they are rather cautious. Dr Kelly

51 struck me really as a sort of -- he wanted to share his2 knowledge. In a funny way he was a sort of teacher3 almost. He wanted to share what he knew about the4 subject and he was interested in people who were5 interested in it, and he was clearly very well informed.6 I felt very glad to have begun a relationship with him.7 I think he was pretty helpful.8 Q. Did he say whether or not you could report his remarks

9 at that meeting?10 A. I had said it was off the record. I said it was11 unattributable because that is the way --12 Q. Is there a difference between off the record and13 unattributable?14 A. Well, unattributable in strict terms means you can use15 the words but not attribute them to a particular16 individual. The terms are to some extent loose and17 interchangeable.18 Q. Right. Off the record does not mean you cannot use it19 at all and unattributable means you can use it but not

20 attribute it; is that a distinction?21 A. There is no set law of journalistic convention for this.


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22 Generally a phrase somebody might use, or a journalist23 might use to another person if they do not wish them to24 be reported in any way, their views to be reported in25 any way, would be deep background or background or

61 something like that. Off the record means that you can2 report it but not attribute it to that person.3 Q. But in any event you did not report anything that had4 occurred that time, that was just a meeting?5 A. No, I did not. No.6 Q. When was your next meeting with Dr Kelly?7 A. It was on the 11th April 2002.8 Q. And if we look at BBC/7/49, is that your diary entry for9 that date?10 A. That is right. It has been redacted. There are some11 other entries on those days and other days that are not12 in there, but that is my entry for my meeting with13 David.14 Q. I was going to say it seemed a remarkably empty diary15 but you have taken out the other references?16 A. Yes.17 Q. If we turn to BBC/7/53, is this the note you made of18 your meeting with him?19 A. Yes, it is. Yes. Sorry, no, that is a transcript of20 the handwritten note I made.21 Q. Right.22 A. There are a couple of mistakes in this transcript23 actually.24 Q. Perhaps if there are any material ones you can point25 them out when we go through that. Who set up this

71 meeting?2 A. I did. I always initiated our meetings.3 Q. You initiated all the meetings with Dr Kelly?4 A. Yes. I would ring him and say, "Can we meet?"5 Q. What was the reason for this meeting?6 A. It was really a general sort of wrap up. The issue of

7 Iraq was moving up the agenda a little. Most of 2001 or8 the latter half of 2001 had been spent on 9/11 and9 Afghanistan, and a good deal of the first part of 2002,10 but then in the sort of spring and summer we began to11 get clearer signals that Iraq was moving up the agenda12 of both us and the US Government. A dossier had been13 promised for publication in the spring, for instance,14 detailing Iraq's WMD threat, so it was a general meeting15 to talk about that because I regarded him as one of my16 main expert contacts on Iraq.17 Q. We can see from the note that it appears you talked

18 about the Tareq missile plant, programmes continuing,19 "quite ambitious". You did refer to the earlier dossier


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20 or proposed dossier and that is about eight lines up21 from the bottom. Can you tell us what that says?22 A. It was rather uneventful. This is the Government's23 proposed dossier which they had first -- I think24 Alastair Campbell had briefed some American journalists

25 in March. We had seen things appearing about it in the

81 papers, in February of 2002 they were going to publish2 a dossier. After about six weeks it seemed to transpire3 they were not going to publish it then after all.4 I asked him about that; you know, I asked him what was5 in it, and he said essentially not really very much that6 you as a relatively informed lay person would not know7 already. I said was that the reason it was delayed, and8 he said yes.9 LORD HUTTON: So the reference to "rather uneventful" is to10 the dossier, is it?11 A. Yes indeed.12 MR DINGEMANS: Did he describe his role in the April13 dossier?14 A. He did in outline terms. I said something like: what15 was your involvement? He said it was to advise on all16 claims relating to his expertise in the dossier.17 Q. And what did you understand his expertise to be?18 A. Chemical and biological weapons. He described himself19 to me at our earlier meeting as the chief adviser on20 biological weapons and also very knowledgeable about21 chemical weapons. He had spent a great deal of time in22 Iraq. He was pretty close to the subject.23 Q. What view did he convey to you of the Iraqi regime?24 A. He was extremely suspicious of them; and I mean he had25 been involved in many confrontations with them when he

91 was an UNSCOM inspector. Again some of the open2 literature, he would not say this himself, but some of3 the open literature described him as the inspector that4 the Iraqis most feared but at the same time respected.

5 He did not trust them at all. He was extremely6 conscious of the deceit and manipulation which they7 practised on the whole series of UN weapons inspectors8 and all the lies that they had told.9 He described some suspicious sights, and that things10 had continued. They were not conclusive proof to his11 mind, but he said people we were interested in were12 maintained as teams, for instance, some equipment is13 unaccounted for; the sort of thing that also appeared in14 the UNMOVIC reports in the run-up to this year's war.15 Q. Do you recall having any other face to face meetings

16 with Dr Kelly before you met on 22nd May?17 A. No. I mean, I very much doubt I did. I have not noted


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18 it in any of my diaries. I do not always note meetings19 in my diaries but I do not recall any other meetings.20 I cannot find any other notes. It is my belief I had21 three face to face meetings with him.22 Q. And how strong is your recollection on that?

23 A. Well, pretty strong. I mean, as I say I have looked24 through all my diaries for the relevant years, apart25 from 2001 which I have lost, and I am pretty sure that

101 I had no other face to face meetings with him. I had no2 face to face meetings with him in 2002 other than this.3 Q. Can I take you to a document where Dr Kelly recorded his4 meetings with you. That is MoD/1/20 at the first5 paragraph where he said this:6 "I have not had extensive dealings with7 Andrew Gilligan. As I recall I first met him at the8 IISS 'Global Strategic Review' in September 2002 after9 the IISS dossier was published but before the10 UK Government dossier appeared. We would have discussed11 the IISS dossier since it was at the forefront of12 delegates' discussions but the detail is now forgotten."13 A. I am not sure what that refers to at all. I mean, if it14 is the event to launch the IISS dossier I can say15 I certainly was not at that. I had already received16 a copy of the dossier from the IISS and I had done it on17 the programme as far as I was concerned. I had done it18 on the programme that morning and as far as I was19 concerned, the story of that particular dossier was over20 and it was not worth going to the press conference.21 I cannot recall meeting him at any IISS event. That22 is not to say I might not have seen him across a room or23 something. I am pretty sure I only went to one IISS24 event on Iraq. It was less to do with WMD, it was more25 to do with the prospects for Iraq after the regime

111 change. I am pretty sure I did not see or speak to him2 there. I think it may be somebody else he is speaking

3 about there.4 LORD HUTTON: Is this the letter of 3rd June?5 MR DINGEMANS: I am pretty sure it is, yes.6 LORD HUTTON: To his line manager in the MoD?7 MR DINGEMANS: Yes.8 Can I ask you about another document that impacts on9 the number of meetings you had with him. That is10 BBC/6/222. This is described as an Andrew Gilligan11 debrief on 18th July 2003. If you look at the first12 paragraph, it says this:13 "Dr David Kelly was a well known contact on WMD for

14 journalists. I had four face to face meetings with him,15 the first one about two years ago."


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16 A. Yes.17 Q. This was produced on 18th July. We are not much on in18 August.19 A. I think I am wrong about that. I think it was three.20 I have checked my diaries and I have checked my

21 notebooks and I have checked my recollections and22 I think it was three rather than four. I also note here23 that I say:24 "My second face to face meeting was about 18 months25 ago, then again in May 2002."

121 Both of those are wrong as well. It is just that2 that is something I wrote on the day that he died and it3 was done from memory. I am pretty sure it was three4 rather than four. I cannot be absolutely categoric. As5 I say, at this time I had not gone through all my6 diaries and I had not looked at all my notebooks.7 Q. At that stage, before reference to your diaries, you8 thought it was four, but now you think, having looked at9 your diaries, it is three?10 A. And as well essentially this is a typed up note of11 something Richard Sambrook, the BBC's director of news,12 discussed with me on the day Dr Kelly died. I had13 a good deal on my mind on that day. I was not very14 happy.15 Q. You have told us that your meeting in early 2001 did not16 lead to any article. Did the meeting on 11th April 200217 lead to any article?18 A. I think it may have been reflected in some of the sort19 of two-way -- the general informative discussions that20 we have on the programme between reporters and21 presenters. To the best of my knowledge it did not lead22 to a specific story. Again, I could be wrong about23 that, but I have had a look. I think it is unlikely to24 have led to a specific story. It would have been25 reflected, you know, when the dossier came up and its

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1 apparent delay came up. I might have said something2 like: I have been talking to an expert within Government3 or somebody within Government and he says there is not4 very much in it. I do not think it would have led to5 a special story about it.6 Q. The Government's dossier was then published on7 24th September 2002. You reported on that for the Today8 Programme?9 A. Yes, I did.10 Q. And you I think suggested -- I am afraid we have not yet11 got the material ready to pull up on the screen, but you

12 described some tabloid headlines and new, interesting,13 sort of spicy angles; is that right?


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14 A. Can I have a look at the transcript, is that possible?15 Q. No, not until 11 o'clock. I am not being deliberately16 awkward.17 A. I think that is right. It would be nice to see the18 context.

19 Q. Perhaps we can come back to that. BBC/4/74. I am20 afraid it will not come up at the moment.21 I will come back to the September dossier and your22 comments on that. You reported, in February 2003, that23 you had received a top secret document which related to24 the absence of links between Osama Bin Laden and25 Saddam Hussein; is that right?

141 A. Yes.2 Q. Did that have anything to do with Dr Kelly?3 A. No.4 Q. Did you meet Dr Kelly in 2003 before the meeting in5 May 2003?6 A. Not to the best of my knowledge, no. Again, I cannot be7 absolutely categoric on this but I have checked the8 diaries, there is nothing in the diaries. I do not have9 any recollection or notes of such a meeting. I would10 have spoken to him on the phone maybe but not met him11 face to face.12 Q. Can we go back to MoD/1/20. This is his letter to his13 line manager about his meetings with you. The first14 paragraph again, when he has discussed his meeting with15 you in September 2002 and you can see about four lines16 down:17 "I next met him in February 2003 at his request18 because he was about to depart to Iraq to cover the19 forthcoming war. I cannot recall any contact in the20 interim and do not believe that contact was made."21 Does that help remind you of any meeting?22 A. No. I mean, I have thought quite hard about this23 because I saw his earlier evidence and I think -- I mean24 February 2003 was an extremely busy month for me.25 I spent just under a week in Munich at the Wehrkunde

151 Security Conference. That was around the weekend of the2 6th. Then more or less straight after that I came back3 to London for a couple of days, then went to New York4 for 10 days to do the debates on Iraq in the Security5 Council, and I think -- I mean I really was not even in6 the country for most of February.7 Q. Can I then turn to the meeting on 22nd May. You say you8 had been in Iraq covering the war and you had returned9 in April?

10 A. Yes.11 Q. When had you returned in April; do you recall?


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12 A. I left Baghdad on I think Easter Monday or the day13 after -- probably the day after Easter Monday, so14 whatever that was. I then spent about 10 days on sort15 of rest and recuperation in Jordan and then in Turkey.16 I think I probably actually landed back in Britain on

17 either 30th April or 1st May.18 Q. Then continued your normal duties in London?19 A. Yes.20 Q. Who was responsible for the meeting on 22nd May? Did21 you contact him or did he contact you?22 A. No, I contacted him.23 LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you something, Mr Gilligan?24 Where did you contact Dr Kelly? Did you telephone him?25 A. Yes.

161 LORD HUTTON: To where?2 A. I am not sure. I think I would have probably used his3 home number, probably his mobile.4 LORD HUTTON: That is his home number in Oxfordshire?5 A. Yes.6 LORD HUTTON: So you had both his home number in Oxfordshire7 and his mobile?8 A. Yes, I did.9 LORD HUTTON: Yes.10 MR DINGEMANS: What time did you meet, do you recall that?11 A. 4 o'clock. It was fixed for 4 o'clock. I was slightly12 late.13 Q. Can I take you to diary entry BBC/7/55? You have14 written 4 o'clock. Did you actually meet at 4 o'clock15 or could it have been afterwards?16 A. I was slightly after, you know maybe 10 or 15 minutes17 late. He was waiting when I got there.18 Q. I think you have seen his evidence where he said the19 meeting was at 5. Does that accord with your20 recollection?21 A. No, I think it was at 4. It was certainly fixed for 4,22 and I had another meeting after that, then I went on to23 something else; and I am pretty sure, you know, it would

24 not have started later than about 4.10 or 4.15. I have25 a drinks receipt, I bought drinks for us.

171 Q. We will come to that. Can we turn to BBC/7/56. You did2 not have something to eat this time?3 A. I do not think so. This might not have been the only4 thing I bought. We might have had some sandwiches or5 more drinks but that is the only thing I can find.6 Q. That shows a bottle of coke and a bottle of Appletise.7 That shows the time on that. Can you help me with the

8 time on that?9 A. That says 4.15, 16.15. That is the time I went to the


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10 bar to buy the drinks.11 Q. That is the only receipt you had for the meeting?12 A. Yes. It may be that I bought something else but13 I cannot remember at this distance.14 Q. You still have this receipt because I imagine you put

15 this through the BBC accounts, do you?16 A. Yes, I need to claim it back for expenses.17 Q. Is this right, it is a reasonable inference that you did18 not buy anything else or you would have kept the19 receipt?20 A. I think that is right. It is possible I have lost the21 receipt or not been able to find it.22 Q. How long did the meeting last?23 A. From my recollection probably about one and a half hours24 or so.25 Q. Dr Kelly's recollection, you have seen his evidence on

181 this, was more like 45 minutes.2 A. I think it was longer than that.3 Q. Did you make notes throughout the meeting?4 A. No. It was like our other meetings, in that it was5 intended as a general discussion of issues around Iraq.6 I started out without taking notes actually and then7 I asked to take notes when he got on to interesting8 topics.9 Q. So the meeting was intended as a general discussion10 about Iraq?11 A. Yes. I mean, I wanted to hear from him why he thought12 no weapons of mass destruction had been found. You know13 it was quite a salient issue by then. He was14 actually -- he sounded anyway, maybe he was just being15 polite -- quite keen to hear from me what my experience16 had been. Obviously Iraq had been his profession17 speciality. He had not been able to go there himself18 for four or five years. You know he was always19 interested in seeing people who had come from Iraq to,20 you know, to get their impressions.21 Q. So the meeting was as much for him to find out from you

22 as it was for you to find out from him?23 A. No, I think -- I mean, I had a great deal less to tell24 him than he could tell me. I would not put my --25 I think perhaps he was just being polite in some ways.

191 He did seem genuinely interested as we talked.2 Q. The notes you have produced of your earlier meetings,3 and we have seen the transcripts of them, they were4 handwritten. Perhaps we can look at BBC/7/51. In fact,5 if you look at the top of the page, you can recognise

6 that passage that I pointed out on the earlier7 typewritten bit: "Rather uneventful, not much in it so


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8 delayed". Where did you make those notes?9 A. I made them at the meeting.10 Q. Pen, pencil?11 A. Pen.12 Q. Into a notebook?

13 A. Yes.14 Q. Then we have seen the transcribed versions.15 A. Yes.16 Q. The notes you made on 22nd May 2003, were those made17 with a pen and pencil or with some other means?18 A. They were made on my personal organiser.19 Q. Can we turn to BBC/7/57? This is the printout from your20 personal organiser?21 A. Yes.22 Q. Did you manage to make all the notes on one page?23 A. No, I started a continuation file. I think either24 I just saved it and that takes you out of it and25 I decided to start a new file, or else this particular

201 one file was full so I started a continuation file.2 Q. Can we look at BBC/7/58? Is that the continuation file?3 A. Yes, it is. Yes.4 Q. Can we go back, then, to BBC/7/57?5 LORD HUTTON: I wonder, Mr Dingemans, would it be helpful if6 you were to ask Mr Gilligan to read out the note in full7 so that everyone is aware of its contents because it is8 in a sort of shorthand. It certainly I think would help9 me and no doubt others. Just do it at your own time10 when you think it appropriate.11 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Gilligan, whilst we are looking at the12 note, would you mind reading that out to everyone, but13 obviously where it has "wk" putting in "week".14 A. Do you want me to include my questions as well?15 Q. No, just the note at the moment.16 LORD HUTTON: I think if you just read the note exactly as17 it is without putting in any additions or insertions.18 MR DINGEMANS: Then I will come back to you and ask you19 about your questions.

20 A. The whole thing?21 Q. Yes, just reading the note through, if that is all22 right.23 A. "Transformed week before publication to make it sexier.24 The classic was the 45 minutes. Most things in dossier25 were double source but that was single source. One

211 source said it took 4 [that should be 45] minutes to set2 up a missile assembly, that was misinterpreted.3 "Most people in intelligence weren't happy with it

4 because it didn't reflect the considered view they were5 putting forward.


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6 "Campbell: real information but unreliable, included7 against our wishes. Not in original draft -- dull, he8 asked if anything else could go in.9 "Uranium from Africa -- not nuclear expert but was10 very suspect, documents certainly forged or forgeries.

11 "10 to 15 years ago there was a lot of information.12 With the concealment and deception operation there was13 far less information.14 "It was small ...", this is the programme, I think.15 "It was small because you could not conceal a large16 programme."17 LORD HUTTON: Is it "you could not" or "you do not"?18 A. "You could not".19 "... you could not conceal a large programme and20 because it was actually quite hard to import things.21 The sanctions were effective. They did limit the22 programme. No usable weapons.23 "In one of the Jan", that is a reference to one of24 the Blix reports by Hans Blix to the UN, it said there25 were some "chemical reactors which had not been

221 destroyed by UNSCOM. Glass lined chambers to promote2 chemical reactions. These were being used again by the3 Iraqis. They were recovered, they were taken to [that4 should be] Al-Munthanna [another plant] not properly5 destroyed by the UN, recovered by the Iraqis, taken to6 Fallujah and used for non-banned purposes."7 This is him discussing another thing that Blix8 overlooked.9 "The 18 chemical missiles", these were missiles with10 the potential for chemical tipped warheads although I do11 not think they actually obtained chemicals, "were12 reported by Blix but they were downplayed. Blix thought13 they were leftovers."14 I cannot read it, the type is a bit faint15 LORD HUTTON: It looks like "thin". Is it "I think"?16 A. "I think it is 30 per cent likely that Iraq had an17 active chemical warfare programme in the six months to

18 a year and likelier that there was a biological warfare19 programme."20 LORD HUTTON: Is it "chemical warfare" or "chemical21 weapons"?22 A. Either really.23 "There was not much coming out of the detainees24 [these were the people being detained in Iraq since the25 end of the war] despite financial incentives."

231 I asked about what conditions they are in. He said:

2 "They are in quite good conditions" --3 MR DINGEMANS: We will come back to the questions if you


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4 just read the note.5 A. Sure.6 "They are in quite good conditions in the7 Middle East.8 "There has been proliferation -- not in terms of

9 people walking across the Iraqi border with 20 shells,10 but supplying chain knowledge and plans."11 Then we talked about the Iraq Survey Group, which is12 the group that had been set up to look for weapons of13 mass destruction in Iraq. We talked about that.14 "ISG headed by a major general, below him two one15 stars [that is an office of brigadier, air commodore or16 commodore rank], British and Australian one stars.17 "We do not have a great deal more knowledge than we18 had before."19 Again talking about the size of the ISG here, it was20 going to be 1,500 strong, 100 British, 10 to 2021 Australians.22 "They are not all experts. About 20 of the Brits23 are."24 Then we talked about other nationalities. He said25 it is a big handicap not to be able to draw on the

241 expertise of German and Russian experts. I do not know2 what that last bit means, "isq ba".3 Q. If we continue over to BBC/7/58, your continuation file,4 perhaps you could again read that in as it were?5 A. "There is real debate as to whether the mobile labs6 [these are the mobile laboratories that were discovered7 after the -- or the alleged mobile laboratories that8 were discovered] are what they appear to be. It is an9 odd piece of kit. Feeling is it could be made into10 a fermenter but is it a fermenter?" Fermenter is an11 important part of the biological weapons programme.12 "There is an enormous quantity of documents to be13 exploited."14 Then we talk about some of the well known figures of15 the Iraqi WMD programme like Am'r al Saadi and

16 Riab Taha.17 "Saadi and Taha were taken out of the problem18 because they interfaced with the UN.19 "We have 10 to 20 in custody." These were people20 who gave themselves up or were captured. Then we asked,21 and this is something I asked him to repeat because he22 said it in the unnoted part:23 "Why didn't they use them?" Why did they not use24 the weapons of mass destruction? "Because in the early25 stages you just have to look at the weather conditions

251 [the weather was very poor]. By the end the commander


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2 control [that should be C2, it is an abbreviation for3 commander control] was in total disarray.4 "His programme was small. He could not have killed5 very many people even if everything had gone right for6 him. Not really mass destruction in true meaning of the

7 word."8 Then we just went back to the ISG and he said:9 "The British one star, the British commander is10 John Deverell and I will be the senior British inspector11 in the group", which is something else that came from an12 idea of (inaudible).13 Q. You wanted to read into that your questions. Was there14 any question that had provoked the first note on15 BBC/7/57?16 A. Yes. We started by talking about other things and then17 we got on to the dossier; and I said: What happened to18 it? When we last met you were saying it was not very19 exciting. He said: Yes, that is right, until the last20 week it was just as I told you. It was transformed in21 the week before publication. I said: To make it sexier?22 And he said: Yes, to make it sexier. Then I said: What23 do you mean? Can you give me some examples? And he24 said the classic -- he did not use the word example, he25 said the classic was the 45 minutes, the statement that

261 WMD could be ready in 45 minutes, and most things in the2 dossier were single source.3 There is a bit more in there. These are notes.4 They do not --5 LORD HUTTON: Most things in the dossier were double6 sourced, were they not?7 A. Sorry, yes, most things in the dossier were double8 sourced but that was single source. These are notes.9 They do not note everything that was said. They are not10 a verbatim transcript of the conversation. They are11 only highlights. Some words are abbreviated, some12 sentences are abbreviated. There are quite large13 portions of the conversation which I have not noted at

14 all.15 MR DINGEMANS: But those are the questions that you have16 just related to his Lordship which gave rise to the17 first paragraph, is that right?18 A. That is right.19 Q. Were there any questions giving rise to the next entry,20 "Most people in intelligence ..."?21 A. The question was something like: so how did people feel22 about this transformation? And then that answer: this23 transformed dossier, or something like that.24 Q. Then there is the entry which is just a single word,

25 "Campbell". Was there any question that gave rise to


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271 that entry?2 A. Yes, it was something like: how did this transformation3 happen?4 Q. Right.

5 A. And then the answer was that, one word.6 Q. He said just "Campbell"?7 A. Yes.8 Q. And what question led to the next entry?9 A. Well I was surprised and I said: What, you know,10 Campbell made it up? They made it up? And he said: No,11 it was real information but it was unreliable and it was12 in the dossier against our wishes.13 LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, Mr Gilligan, looking at14 the first paragraph, you put the question: Was it to15 make it sexier? And Dr Kelly replied: Yes, to make it16 sexier?17 A. Yes, to make it sexier, yes, so he adopted my words.18 LORD HUTTON: Now are you clear in your recollection that19 you asked how was it transformed, and that the name20 Campbell was first spoken by Dr Kelly?21 A. Yes, absolutely.22 LORD HUTTON: It was not a question by you: was Campbell23 involved in this?24 A. No, it was him. He raised the subject of the 45 minutes25 and he raised the subject of Campbell.

281 LORD HUTTON: Yes.2 MR DINGEMANS: The questions that led to the later entries3 I am not sure that I need to ask you for. But from the4 best of your recollection, those are the questions5 leading to the entries in the top four paragraphs on6 page 57, is that right?7 A. Yes.8 Q. Can we then turn to look at what you first produced for9 your Today broadcast. This is BBC/4/202. I hope now10 that BBC/4/202 should be on-line. This is a log. It11 says:

12 "Gilligan has a very good story. He has not stood13 up yet. I will explain in the meeting."14 That is ET and we are told somebody obviously has15 made an annotation. Who is ET?16 A. That is probably Eloise Twisk. She is one of the people17 on the programme.18 Q. That appears to have been made on May 24th, is that19 right, from --20 A. I think so. I mean it is difficult to tell with these21 things. That is what it says. I have not any22 recollection of this document, I would never have seen

23 this.24 LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, Mr Dingemans, I missed the


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25 reference to that; BBC?

291 MR DINGEMANS: Sorry, my Lord, it is BBC/4/202.2 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.

3 A. I am not sure this refers to this story at all. I think4 it is a different story. If it is from 24th May, I did5 not tell anyone on the programme about this story6 until -- at least I told one of the editors I met in an7 awards ceremony it was not a formal conversation. I did8 not tell anyone in the office about it until the9 Wednesday. So I think this must be another story,10 I think.11 MR DINGEMANS: Right. Now what would have been the12 Wednesday? That would have been Wednesday 28th May?13 A. 28th, yes.14 Q. Of May?15 A. Yes.16 Q. Which was some six days after the meeting?17 A. Yes.18 Q. What were you doing in the interim in relation to this19 story?20 A. The first thing I did was I sat down and did a sort of21 manuscript note of my full recollection of the22 conversation, because the trouble with making notes on23 one of these little keyboards is, as you see, they are24 abbreviated, so while it was still in fresh in my mind25 I actually sat down and did a full manuscript note of

301 what I remembered my questions had been and what his2 answers had been; and the answers, the sentences are3 slightly fleshed out a little. Some of the sentences in4 the notes were abbreviated and these sentences fleshed5 them out. So that was the first thing I did.6 Then I basically sought to corroborate the story.7 I went to see --8 Q. How did you try to do that?9 A. I went to see a couple of people. I saw the -- well,

10 I will call them senior contacts in Government; and11 I asked them about this. I did not tell them obviously12 that David Kelly had said it but I said I have been told13 this and was there any truth in it. And neither of them14 would confirm or deny --15 Q. Sorry to interrupt. What did you say you had been told?16 A. I said I had been told that the dossier had been17 transformed the week before it was published and that18 this was done at the behest of Alastair Campbell.19 Q. So those two things were what you put to the two senior20 Government contacts?

21 A. Yes, that is right.22 Q. What did they say?


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23 A. Neither of them denied it. One of them said something24 I could not take as a confirmation but said, you know:25 I think you should keep digging, something like that.

31

1 But when somebody says something like that, it is not2 a confirmation and it cannot be taken as such but it is3 obviously not a denial either. And then the others just4 refused to talk about it.5 I know both of these people -- I believe anyway both6 of these people would have been in positions to know7 about the dossier. In fact I also mentioned it to8 a couple of sort of open source type people -- people9 you can name openly. I mentioned it to Gary Samore at10 the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He11 said he had not heard this specifically but he had heard12 similar things from counterparts on the other side of13 the Atlantic. He is an American, he has quite good14 contacts in the US intelligence world. I recorded15 a clip with him, a short interview which I was planning16 to use in the item broadcast on the Thursday, but in the17 end it was dropped for reasons of space.18 Q. Was there anything else that you did to confirm or deny19 the story?20 A. Well, I went to look at the dossier itself, and to sort21 of do a sort of textual analysis of the dossier itself.22 I looked at the language of the dossier and particularly23 the sort of heart of the thing which is the chapter 3 on24 Iraqi chemical and biological weapons programmes, which25 is the main area of David Kelly's expertise.

321 Q. Yes.2 A. And I looked at that and I thought -- you know, I really3 did think that the language in that, there was evidence4 that the language had been hardened.5 Q. What, from the document itself?6 A. From the document itself. You can see that the language7 in the document is actually inconsistent.

8 Q. Is there any passage that you would like to refer us to?9 A. There is a passage on page 18 --10 LORD HUTTON: Would it help you to have a copy of the11 dossier before you?12 A. Could I please, yes.13 MR DINGEMANS: Could we have DOS/1/55 plus 18.14 LORD HUTTON: I do not know if there is a copy of the15 document Mr Gilligan might like to look at.16 MR DINGEMANS: DOS/1/73.17 Is this the page to which you are referring?18 A. Yes, yes. That is right.

19 LORD HUTTON: That is page?20 MR DINGEMANS: It is page 18 of the dossier, DOS/1/73.


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21 A. This is the right page. It starts off by saying:22 "In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq retained23 some chemical warfare agents, precursors, production24 equipment and weapons from before the Gulf War. These25 stocks would enable Iraq to produce significant

331 quantities of mustard gas within weeks and of nerve2 agent within months."3 "Would enable Iraq to produce".4 "The JIC concluded that intelligence on Iraqi former5 chemical and biological warfare facilities, their6 limited reconstruction and civil production pointed to7 a continuing research and development programme."8 Again, "research and development programme".9 "These chemical and biological capabilities10 represented the most immediate threat from Iraqi WMD",11 "the most immediate threat".12 Then paragraph 4 says:13 "In the last six months the JIC has confirmed its14 earlier judgements on Iraqi chemical and biological15 warfare capabilities ..."16 So it has confirmed those judgments that it made in17 2001.18 Then you go down to paragraph 8, this is on the next19 page, on page 19.20 Q. DOS/1/74.21 A. This is paragraph 8 now.22 Q. At the bottom.23 A. Then you see standing almost on its own a very bald24 statement shows:25 "... Iraq has continued to produce chemical agent."

341 That is not what the earlier bit says. It says it2 could produce it within weeks. This says it has3 continued to produce it.4 Also there is another reference on I think it is5 page 21 to "Iraq has continued to produce biological ...

6 agents". Neither of those references are backed up by7 any further context. They are just statements, single8 sentences on their own.9 Paragraph 12.10 Q. At the bottom of the page.11 A. "We know from intelligence that Iraq has continued to12 produce biological warfare agents."13 You know I did look at this quite carefully. I went14 back again over the chapter. Again if we go back now,15 if we could, to page 19 --16 Q. DOS/1/74.

17 A. -- there is a paragraph about recent intelligence18 somewhere. I think it is the previous page, actually,


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19 to this.20 Q. The paragraph headed "Recent Intelligence" is21 paragraph 5 on DOS/1/73.22 A. I thought okay, maybe the difference between those two23 statements was explainable by this recent intelligence.

24 If you look at what they say the recent intelligence25 consists of, there is no recent intelligence about

351 production capabilities.2 So there are inconsistencies in this document; and3 in all cases it was the harder -- the firmer statement,4 that they actually had weapons, rather than just the5 ability to produce weapons or research and development6 facilities, actual weapons, that is the statement, that7 they had actual weapons deployable or ready within8 45 minutes. Those are the statements that make it into9 the executive summary, into the Prime Minister's10 foreword, and there is no reference to this other stuff11 about the JIC assessment, actually being it is only12 about research and development.13 I thought that was interesting and I thought that it14 suggested that the foreword and the executive summary at15 least were not completely accurate reflections of16 everything that was in the dossier.17 On the 45 minutes specifically, I also saw that the18 language changed a bit. In the body of the dossier it19 says that weapons of mass destruction could be "deployed20 or deployable within 45 minutes". In the foreword it21 says they could be "ready within 45 minutes". It may be22 a semantic distinction but "ready" is a stronger word23 I think than "deployable". That is a slightly more24 debatable point, it is a semantic debate, but I think25 "ready" is a stronger word. "Deployable" just means

361 moveable.2 Q. When did you carry out this research or this analysis of3 the dossier?

4 A. This is in the week between meeting Dr Kelly and the5 broadcast. I did several other things as well. I mean,6 I looked up to see what use had been made of this7 45 minute claim. It did make a great deal of impact on8 the days after the dossier's publication. It was the9 main story in the Standard on the day the dossier was10 published. The headline said something like "45 minutes11 from attack". It made a big splash in a lot of the12 other papers. Then it kind of seemed to have faded13 away.14 I did a cuttings check on Neon, this press cuttings

15 database we have, and also I did a Hansard check to see16 whether it had been mentioned in the Commons by any


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17 Ministers. I found one cutting on Neon, a speech by18 Jack Straw in February 2003 which mentioned it, and19 I found one reference by a Minister in the Commons which20 is by Baroness Simons, a trade minister, again in21 February.

22 So in all that time, in the six months between the23 45 minutes making a big splash, it had almost24 disappeared from view. Not quite, but almost. It was25 never mentioned in any of the really big set piece

371 debates in the Commons even though the Government had2 quite a lot of -- wanted to make the strongest possible3 case for taking some form of action against Iraq. But4 they did not mention it again. I sort of thought that5 was probably an indication that they were suspicious of6 it.7 It was a good search of the Hansard and the press8 cuttings. I cannot pretend it is an absolutely9 exhaustive search. I mean the Government might be able10 to turn up some other speech by some minister where he11 said it. But I considered the way it had almost12 disappeared from view for that six whole months was13 suggestive.14 Q. Notwithstanding that it had then been mentioned back in15 February?16 A. Absolutely, but it was one of the two main headlines17 from the dossier in September; and if it was as good as18 it seemed then I would have expected it to have been19 mentioned a lot more often than twice in the six months20 between the publication of the dossier and the outbreak21 of war.22 Q. So you have spoken to two contacts you have described,23 you have looked at the language of the dossier and you24 have done your research on the 45 minute claim. Was25 there anything else you did?

381 A. I knew already that the Government had embellished

2 another dossier. They published a dossier in3 February 2003 on Iraq's infrastructure of concealment,4 deception and intimidation and it had come out -- I mean5 the Prime Minister described it as further intelligence6 and intelligence reports in the Commons in fact.7 Actually I think the intelligence component of it was8 quite small and most of it -- a good part of it anyway9 was copied off the Internet. I knew also, and I had10 seen reported, that it was copied almost word for word,11 including the spelling mistakes actually in some cases,12 but one of the figures was embellished, and a couple of

13 the claims, some of the language was embellished. In14 the student's original PhD thesis, the wording --


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15 Q. What student are you referring to?16 A. This is Ibrahim al Marishi. He wrote the thesis which17 was then copied into the February dossier by the18 Government without acknowledgment. Marishi wrote the19 Iraqi Mukhabarat had a role in aiding opposition groups

20 in hostile regimes, and that was changed in the February21 dossier to supporting terrorist organisations in hostile22 regimes, which is quite a substantial change.23 Q. You relied on what had happened to the February dossier.24 Was there anything else?25 A. None of this evidence was conclusive of course. It just

391 went to -- it supported -- you know, I mean, it2 helped -- it was context and background. It made the3 claim seem more likely to be true. If they had done4 this with this earlier dossier then perhaps they could5 have done it -- if they had done it with the February6 one then they could have done it with the earlier7 dossier in September.8 What else did I do? I looked at the uranium from9 Africa claim. David Kelly had mentioned that. That was10 never mentioned again by any Government minister, not11 once as far as I could trace.12 Q. On your searches?13 A. Yes. I also knew, of course, that in March 2003 the14 International Atomic Energy Authority had been very15 critical of it and had described it as based on forged16 documents.17 What else did I do? I looked at -- I mean one of18 the things the Government used to point -- some of the19 independent evidence the Government used to justify20 military action, the Prime Minister referred to this in21 his speech on 18th March just before the war, he22 referred to the UNSCOM report, unresolved disarmament23 issues -- sorry UNMOVIC report, 173-page report. The24 impression you would have got from listening to that25 speech was that UNMOVIC inspectors had reported there

401 were actually weapons. Actually what the report says is2 that there had been weapons and that stocks were3 unaccounted for.4 I looked to see if there was anything to support5 what the dossier had said as well, to say, you know,6 that David Kelly was wrong. I did not consider that7 that, which was the main piece of independent evidence8 produced by the Government in its support, I did not9 consider it actually offered the support which the10 Government said it offered.

11 I did a press cuttings search as well. I looked to12 see if anyone had made any comments about the dossier


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13 before it was published, and I knew what Dr Kelly had14 said in April obviously and that it was not very15 eventful. I also found a couple of clippings from more16 recently. I found a clipping from The Times.17 Mike Evans, the defence editor of The Times, quoted

18 a senior Whitehall official as saying that the dossier19 was not revelatory, that was on 29th August.20 Then Richard Norton-Taylor, the Guardian security21 man, he quoted a Whitehall official on 5th September,22 but it was a conversation which had taken place a few23 days earlier, saying the dossier would no longer play24 a role because there is nothing to put in it. Obviously25 that was only three weeks before it was published. You

411 know, there was a reasonable amount -- there was2 something, anyway, that was --3 Q. So am I right in summarising the effect of your research4 as this: that you had carried out a number of researches5 and you have outlined them at some length and you6 carried out this textual analysis of the dossier and you7 have taken us through that, and that suggested to you8 that there was no recent intelligence; is that what you9 are saying? Because that is what is indicated by10 the Times article and the textual analysis. You talked11 about recent intelligence or the absence of recent12 intelligence. Is that a fair analysis of what you were13 finding?14 A. I was fairly inclined to believe Dr Kelly anyway because15 I knew of his standing and of his involvement, but it16 made me even more inclined to believe him. I mean none17 of it was of course directly corroborative evidence in18 any way, but it did make the charges he was making more19 credible.20 There were other press articles. There was several21 press articles I picked up in about February or March22 time. One of those mentioned that there were rows23 between Alastair Campbell and the intelligence agencies24 over the September dossier. Another one had

25 Menzies Campbell, the foreign affairs spokesman of the

421 Liberal Democrats, he was saying he had been told by2 intelligence agencies that they were unhappy about the3 way the Government was using their intelligence, that4 they were being selective and that context was being5 removed, which is again exactly the substance of the6 charge that Dr Kelly was making.7 LORD HUTTON: You said that it made Dr Kelly's challenges8 more credible.

9 A. Charges.10 LORD HUTTON: Challenges?


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11 A. Charges.12 LORD HUTTON: Did you regard him in his conversation with13 you on 22nd May as challenging the Government's claims?14 A. With respect my Lord I said charges rather than15 challenges. I do not think he set out to sort of take

16 on the Government in that sense. I just think he was17 expressing his professional opinion of the dossier and18 saying what he said.19 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes.20 MR DINGEMANS: But I think you have said the research you21 carried out was suggesting that there was not new22 intelligence. That was the gist of the Times article,23 that was the gist of some of the analysis you found,24 your textual analysis. But Dr Kelly had made it clear25 to you, if we go to BBC/4/198, that there was real

431 information, if we look at the fourth paragraph on that.2 BBC/4/198. Sorry, still not getting that. Well, we can3 take that in BBC/7 -- I am sorry, you will have to bear4 with me -- at 57.5 If we look at the fourth paragraph --6 A. Yes.7 Q. -- you were saying that your research was suggesting8 there was no intelligence. Someone was writing in9 The Times in August: nothing new. Indeed that is what10 you said Dr Kelly had said. In your textual analysis,11 recent intelligence, when you chased it through, did not12 actually say this. Dr Kelly is telling you here it is13 real information. Did you understand him to be talking14 about real intelligence?15 A. Yes, I mean --16 Q. But his comment on it was that it was "unreliable and17 included against our wishes".18 A. Yes, I mean to say there was nothing new to put in it,19 obviously there is new intelligence coming through all20 the time, but in order to make it into a dossier, it is21 or should have to be assessed as reliable. So I think22 that was perhaps the import of the comment in The Times

23 that there was nothing that had been assessed as24 sufficiently reliable to put in a dossier. Obviously25 there was, they do get information in all the time; but,

441 you know, not all of it is particularly reliable.2 I mean, Dr Kelly was in no doubt that there was -- and3 he said this and it was one of the things he asked me to4 say in the report -- that there was a WMD programme of5 some sort but he did not believe the level of the threat6 to the West was as great as the dossier had said.

7 LORD HUTTON: When you refer to intelligence having to be8 sufficiently assessed to be reliable, what body has to


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9 assess it? We have heard that there is the DIS which10 considers information. It then passes it on to the11 assessment group in the Cabinet Office and they then12 pass it on to the Joint Intelligence Committee. Do you13 have regard to which body assesses intelligence?

14 A. Yes, I mean, I knew roughly how the assessment system15 worked.16 LORD HUTTON: Did you know there was that sequence,17 Mr Gilligan, which we heard described in some detail18 yesterday?19 A. Yes, I did. And I mean that applies to other agencies20 as well.21 LORD HUTTON: Yes.22 A. And the assessments -- you know, the assessment staff23 and the Cabinet Office and the JIC are areas in which24 the intelligence is assessed and subsequent reports are25 produced. I mean, one other thing about the dossier

451 that struck me was that it did not look like a JIC2 report. It was described as largely the product of the3 Joint Intelligence Committee but it really did not4 look -- the language did not look like a JIC report5 I have seen historical ones and I have seen one current6 one and they are a great deal less assertive in their7 language than the dossier. They are usually more sort8 of caveated in tone and more cautious. I know a couple9 of other people who have seen them and have said similar10 things.11 LORD HUTTON: Yes.12 MR DINGEMANS: That was the research. Was there any other13 research that you carried out before you prepared the14 piece for broadcast?15 A. I did -- again, I mean, I did look to find other16 contexts and I saw a speech by Robin Cook, Robin Cook's17 resignation speech in March 2003. He said something18 like: Iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction19 in the commonly understood use of the term. And he20 would have been --

21 Q. And how did he define the commonly understood use of the22 term?23 A. A strategic device capable of hitting a -- a device24 capable of hitting a strategic sitting target, something25 like that. He would have been privy, certainly until he

461 left the job of Foreign Secretary in May 2001 he would2 have been privy to the intelligence on that. That sort3 of coincided with Dr Kelly's view that any weapons that4 there were were very small and very crude.

5 LORD HUTTON: Would this be an appropriate time to give the6 stenographers a short break?


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7 MR DINGEMANS: It certainly would.8 (11.40 am)9 (Short Break)10 (11.45 am)11 LORD HUTTON: During the brief adjournment I have had

12 a discussion with Mr Lee Hughes, the Secretary to13 the Inquiry, and with Mr Dingemans about the enquiry of14 the press and their wish to see the documents referred15 to in evidence. As I stated when I first sat, it is our16 intention to have the documents referred to shown on the17 website at the end of the day. Now, I understand that18 at the end of the first day of evidence there were some19 technical difficulties which made it not possible to20 achieve that objective. We hope that will be achieved21 today and that the documents will be available to ladies22 and gentlemen on the website. If that is not possible23 at the end of the day, I will certainly give careful24 thought to some other method whereby you can see copies25 of the documents. We will proceed, I think, on that

471 basis today. Yes, Mr Dingemans.2 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Gilligan, I think you had concluded3 telling us about the research you carried out for this4 broadcast. Can I then take you to BBC/4/205? This is5 a typewritten version of some manuscript notes prepared6 by Miranda Holt. First of all, who is Miranda Holt?7 A. She is one of the assistant editors of the Today8 Programme. She was the day editor who was on duty that9 day. Each edition of the programme is produced by two10 different teams of people, a day team and night team.11 They change over at 8 o'clock in the evening, overlap12 for an hour between 8 and 9. She was the editor of the13 day team on the Wednesday preparing for the Thursday14 programme on which this was broadcast.15 Q. And do the first four lines of that note refer to what16 you discussed with her? Perhaps you can read them out.17 A. "WMD -- weapons of mass destruction. Gary Samore.18 "AG meeting ..."

19 Q. AG is you, is it not, Andrew Gilligan?20 A. Yes:21 "Chief British weapons inspector. 24/9 dossier22 45 minutes.23 "Until the week before -- nothing significant in the24 dossier.25 "'Sexed up' 45 minutes -- added at Campbell's

481 behest.2 "MI6 -- defector. 'To set up missile'."

3 Q. That did not refer to anything you were dealing with,4 did it?


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5 A. No. Well "to set up missile" did, he said that.6 Q. And then 1, 2 and 3.7 A. "1. IISS (International Institute for Strategic8 Studies) -- Chipman."9 Q. Who is Chipman?

10 A. He is a director of it. John Chipman is the director of11 the IISS. Gary Samore, he works for the IISS.12 "2. British Government dossier 24/9/02.13 "3. Dodgy dossier February 2003."14 Do you want me to read the rest?15 Q. Then the rest.16 A. "Seriously angry ... British inspector UNSCOM, Iraq17 survey team 1500 US/UK.18 "History was OTG info." On the ground information19 I think that means. Yes, on the ground information.20 "African uranium -- obvious -- cut and paste job --21 Niger government letterhead.22 "Bid for: John Denholm, Chris Smith, Robin Cook,23 Clare", which is probably Clare Short.24 Q. In terms of who they were hoping to have on the25 programme?

491 A. Yes.2 Q. Do you know how that came into existence, that note?3 A. No, I do not. I have spoken to Miranda about the story.4 It might be a note of my first meeting, but I do not5 know. It might be a note of the first phone call.6 LORD HUTTON: What is the reference to "seriously angry"?7 A. I do not know. I mean I might have said something in8 the phone call that the agencies were unhappy or angry9 or something like that which is based on what10 David Kelly had told me. But he did not use the words11 "seriously angry".12 MR DINGEMANS: You mentioned producing a manuscript version13 of your meeting with him after you had produced your14 Palm Pilot version. Do you still have that?15 A. No, I do not. At least I do not believe I do. I have16 looked quite hard for it but I cannot find it.

17 Q. You have looked everywhere but you cannot find that?18 A. No.19 Q. You did produce something. Can we look at BBC/4/203?20 I think we will have to try that in another file.21 BBC/7/61. What is this document?22 A. This is an EMPS message. EMPS is our internal computer23 message system at the BBC, which I sent to Miranda. She24 asked for the fuller details of what he had said. It is25 a summary of the main quotes I was proposing to use. It

50

1 is not a verbatim transcript, it was based on the2 manuscript note that I just described to you.


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3 Q. Because in inverted commas, if you look at the question4 and answer, you have:5 "Question: What about the Blair dossier (Sept6 2002)? When we last met (in spring 2002) you said the7 dossier wouldn't tell us anything we didn't already

8 know.9 "Answer: Until the week before it was just the same10 as I told you. It was transformed in the week before it11 was published, to make it sexier."12 I thought you said you were the person who first13 suggested to make it sexier.14 A. Yes, I said sexier and he said yes, to make it sexier.15 This does not purport to be a verbatim transcript, it is16 a note of the main quotes I was proposing to use on the17 programme.18 Q. Even though you had put it, as it were, in inverted19 commas?20 A. Yes.21 Q. Was there anything else that you produced in writing for22 the broadcast?23 A. Once the story had been accepted and, you know, they had24 decided to do it, I produced -- among other things I did25 a -- there were going to be two appearances of the story

511 on the programme the next day in the main body of the2 programme. The main appearance was at 7.30 and3 I produced a script for that which I then sent over to4 the -- by that time they had changed over to the night5 team. I sent that over to the night team.6 Q. Is that the document we see at BBC/4/215?7 A. No. This is a separate thing.8 Q. What is this?9 A. The other thing I produced was a script for a bulletins10 piece. There are news bulletins in Today at 6, 7 and11 8 am. They are under separate editorial control but12 they are part of the programme in the sense they fall13 within the programme time. This is the script for14 a short voice piece for the news bulletins that I sent

15 to the editor of the news bulletins. You have to send16 them a script to get it approved before you broadcast17 your piece and before you record your piece. I sent the18 news bulletin editor this script and his assistant then19 replied back saying: yes, it is all right apart from one20 thing which is the "infamous". Can you take out the21 "infamous"?22 Q. Do we see that on BBC/4/214?23 A. Yes, it is there, it is underlined.24 Q. It appears to be an exchange of e-mail traffic.25 A. Yes, these are EMPS messages. I have access to EMPS

52


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1 wherever I am and I can send messages on it and I sent2 this as a message to the bulletin editor saying this is3 a piece I would like you to consider for the morning4 bulletins. He said fine. His assistant replied saying:5 Fine, yes, we like your piece, send us the script. So

6 I sent him the script and his assistant replied saying7 "infamous" is a bit strong. I said I would delete that.8 Once I had done that then I recorded the voice piece for9 the bulletins and then sent it over to the BBC and it10 was played in the bulletins the next day.11 So there were two things that were scripted. There12 was the main item on Today itself at 7.30 and there were13 bulletin pieces for 6, 7 and 8. I think they played it14 at all those points.15 Q. There is a document at BBC/4/213 headed "Master16 Prospects for Thursday, 29th May". Is this the document17 to which you were referring?18 A. No, this is something else again. This is produced by19 the programme team. This is by way of a briefing20 between the two teams, the day team and the night team,21 that I have described. The day team produces this to22 give the night team an idea of what they have been23 working on during the day and what bids for Ministers24 and for other people have been put in and what is the25 progress on stories we have been chasing. They hand

531 over this to the night team at their handover meeting at2 8 o'clock and they discuss it as well. So this is on3 the story -- this is their entry for the story I did.4 Q. We can see halfway down the story they were looking at5 was this:6 "The dossier on Iraq which the Government produced7 last September (24th) was jazzed up at the last minute8 to include new information based on dubious sources --9 including the claim that chemical and biological weapons10 could be deployed at 45 minutes notice. LIVE 0700-073011 Andrew Gilligan illustrated two ways. Gilligan has got12 this from a senior source who shall remain anonymous --

13 his interview is with Gary Samore from IISS who backs up14 the line that intelligence sources weren't happy about15 this."16 That was the gist of the story you were proposing to17 run, is that right?18 A. Yes, I mean Samore did not back up the story that19 David Kelly gave me; as I say, he told me about20 unhappiness in the American intelligence community.21 These things do sometimes get translated when they are22 the results of phone conversations. That is essentially23 it, yes.

24 Q. That then prepares you for the publication the next day,25 the broadcast the next day?


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541 A. How it worked on that day was that there were a series2 of phone calls with Miranda Holt. The first one was3 I described the story to her. I think that is probably

4 the note you flashed up a few documents ago. She then5 said: Okay, sounds like quite a good story, I will6 discuss it with Kevin, who is the overall editor of the7 programme. Then she came back asking for more8 information and a summary of what the guy had said; and9 then they wanted to know who the source was; and I told10 her -- I did not tell her his name, I told her his11 position; and then they said: right, well, Kevin has12 agreed to do the story. How should we handle the13 Government response? We discussed that for a bit.14 I mean there was a series of phone calls.15 Q. What was the gist of your discussion in relation to16 that?17 A. There was already another story, another reporter's18 story on cluster bombs on the programme for the next19 day. We had invited Adam Ingram, who is the defence20 minister, on to discuss that. Their decision was that21 we should "extend the bid" in the jargon -- the bid is22 a request for Government Ministers or anybody -- we23 should extend that to cover the dossier; and that was24 what we decided. They said they would make calls to the25 Ministry of Defence to that effect. I think they did.

551 I said I would also speak to the MoD, tell them2 a bit about the story so Ingram was prepared to answer3 on it. So that was the sort of MoD side of things.4 Then, as I say, once we had done that I then spoke to5 the night editor Chris Howard once he had taken over and6 I told him more about the story and I said I would7 script the main item because it was to include voiced up8 clips of David Kelly, obviously anonymous, which would9 need to be voiced up in the office by one of the10 production team, and I would need to write a script

11 because they would need to know when to play the clips12 in.13 So once I did that, and once I had also spoken to14 the bulletins people, I wrote the script for the 7.3015 item, I sent that to Chris Howard -- this would have16 been in the early hours of the morning by now -- for his17 approval, he approved it and got the clips voiced up and18 then we were ready to go the next morning. They told me19 also that Adam Ingram had accepted or the Ministry of20 Defence had accepted on Ingram's behalf the bid to talk21 about WMD.

22 Q. So who was the person who had contacted someone to talk23 from the Government side about this story?


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24 A. Well, the contact with -- deciding how the programme25 should get a Government response is the responsibility

561 of the office team. They said they would speak to the

2 MoD about Ingram. Now I think one of the producers on3 the team -- each item is assigned a producer and the4 assigned producer spoke to the Ministry of Defence and5 told them about the story. As I say, I also spoke to6 the MoD. I spoke to Kate Wilson, who is the chief press7 office at the MoD, on my mobile phone about 7.30 and8 I told her.9 Q. And what did you tell her?10 A. I cannot remember exactly what I told her because it was11 a mobile phone and I did not take notes of my12 conversation.13 Q. You have no notes of that conversation?14 A. No, but I took her through the story in outline.15 Q. And what was the gist of the outline that you gave to16 her?17 A. I cannot remember the exact words I used, to be18 absolutely honest, because so much has happened since19 then and it was one of dozens and dozens of calls I made20 that day to MoD press officers. I know I took her21 through the outline of the story. I said that Ingram22 would be asked about it the next day.23 LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you this, Mr Gilligan: when you24 refer to the Government response, this is a response25 after your report has been broadcast; is that correct?

571 A. Yes, that is right. I mean, the way Today works is that2 typically -- and this is like this for a number of3 programmes, Newsnight is quite similar -- they will do4 a report and then have a minister on straight afterwards5 to give the Government response to it. That is quite6 common on our programme and on other sort of programmes7 like Newsnight.8 In this case Ingram was not on straight after, he

9 came on at 8.10 because he was discussing something else10 as well, and he was on about 40 minutes after the11 original broadcast of my piece.12 LORD HUTTON: Suppose the report on the Today Programme13 could be viewed as being a serious criticism of the14 Government or some other body or a person, is the person15 who is going to be criticised given a chance to point16 out what they might regard as inaccuracies or17 unfairnesss in the report before the report is broadcast18 at all?19 A. We did not name a particular individual.

20 LORD HUTTON: You did not?21 A. We did not name a particular individual in this report;


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22 but I think had we named a particular individual I think23 we would have. But we regarded this I think as24 a development of a story that we had been pursuing for25 some time anyway, and we did ensure that the Government

581 view was very fully reflected, and the Government did2 have the opportunity, several times, to get its views3 across. We started the main item with a Government4 denial saying nothing in this was not the work of the5 intelligence agencies, and then we had Adam Ingram on6 for probably about 15 minutes, of which half of that was7 on this. So the Government did get its views across --8 LORD HUTTON: When you say you started with a Government9 denial or a Government explanation, at what time was10 that broadcast?11 A. This is at 7.30. We started the main item at 7.30 with12 a Government denial.13 LORD HUTTON: But your first broadcast was at 6 or 7 am, was14 it?15 A. That is right.16 MR DINGEMANS: Can I return to the contacts before I ask you17 to deal with the broadcast itself?18 A. Yes.19 Q. Can I ask you to look at CAB/1/390.20 This is a letter written by Richard Sambrook dated21 29th June to Ben Bradshaw, MP for Wrexham. He said22 this:23 "Thank for your letter yesterday asking for24 a correction to our assertion that the MoD were25 forewarned of the WMD story we broadcast on 29th May.

591 My understanding, from contemporaneous programme notes,2 is as follows:3 "At 5 pm on May 28th the Today Programme put in4 a bid to the MoD for an interview on cluster bombs5 [which I think you told us about].6 "At 6.30 pm Andrew Gilligan spoke to Kate O'Connor,

7 the MoD press officer, about the cluster bomb interview8 and added there would be another story running on WMD."9 Is that the gist of your conversation?10 A. Well, no, I did not say -- I cannot remember exactly11 what I said but I am pretty sure I did not speak mainly12 about the cluster bomb story because it was not my13 story, you see. I did not know about it. It was14 another reporter's story, and I would not discuss15 another reporter's story with the MoD.16 Q. Although in some of the correspondence it suggested you17 have a particular interest in cluster bombs, is that

18 right?19 A. Only in as much as it is a defence issue and I am


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20 interested in all defence issues. I do not how much of21 the conversation we spoke about cluster bombs. It was22 a seven and a half minute conversation and I would not23 have spoken about it for that whole time because it was24 not my story.

25 Q. To conclude the bullet points:

601 "Between 6.30 pm and 7 pm producer Martha Findlay2 spoke to MoD press officer Richard Walley and confirms3 the bid has widened from cluster bombs to include WMD.4 "Between 8 and 8.30 pm the MoD calls the Today5 Programme and confirms an interview with Adam Ingram on6 cluster bombs but does not confirm that he will speak7 about WMD.8 "At 9.45 pm the MoD press office rings the Today9 Programme to confirm Mr Ingram will speak about WMD as10 well."11 Then can I take you to the next letter at CAB/1/403.12 This is the first page of a three-page letter written by13 Geoff Hoon, Secretary of State, to Richard Sambrook. He14 says he has seen the letter in paragraph 1, and it says:15 "During his interview on the Today Programme with16 Ben Bradshaw on 28 June John Humphreys said that17 Andrew Gilligan 'checked with the Ministry of Defence'18 before broadcasting his story. This is simply not true,19 as the record below makes clear.20 "Shortly after that interview was broadcast, at 8.5021 am, Andrew Gilligan called the MoD duty press officer.22 Two press officers were present as this was during the23 handover period. Mr Gilligan said he was calling to24 'note that he had spoken to the Chief Press Officer25 before the programme was broadcast and that was what he

611 had said'. He then rang off without offering any2 explanation.3 "I deduce from this call that the basis for John4 Humphreys' claim that the story was 'checked with the

5 MoD' is the conversation Mr Gilligan had with the Chief6 Press Officer at approximately 6.30 pm on 28 May."7 Continuing on page 404, their note is this:8 "As we have already made clear, the conversation on9 28 May was actually about a piece on the use of cluster10 bombs in Iraq and a possible interview bid for11 Adam Ingram. Mr Gilligan did not discuss any other12 story. He was asked whether he was working on anything13 else for the programme. He then mentioned that he was14 working on something else about WMD. He did not discuss15 any detail of this story, he did not put any questions

16 about it to the MoD and most importantly, he said that17 this was not a story for the MoD. By his own admission


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18 he did not regard MoD as the relevant Government19 department. I cannot see how this can be described as20 'checking the story'."21 Is that a fair analysis of the conversation?22 A. No, I do not believe so. I mean, as I said, I would not

23 have spent seven and a half minutes discussing another24 reporter's story. I did not know what the cluster bomb25 story was; and I would not have done it anyway. You

621 know, it would have been a breach of protocol to talk to2 a Government press officer about another reporter's3 story. I think it is correct to say -- I did not ask4 the MoD press office to go away and seek specific5 responses to these specific points. I simply wanted to6 forewarn them about what was going to be in the7 broadcast so that Adam Ingram was equipped to discuss it8 the following day. But I certainly did not spend the9 whole time talking about cluster bombs.10 Q. Did you put some of the specific allegations that you11 made in the broadcast? In the early morning broadcast,12 the 6 o'clock broadcast, you have referred to the13 Government knowing that the 45 minute claim was wrong14 before it was put in. Did you put that allegation to15 the Ministry of Defence press officer?16 A. I do not believe I did put those specific words, no. As17 I say, I cannot remember exactly what I said. I gave18 them an outline of the story, a summary of the story.19 But I cannot remember exactly what I said to them.20 Q. Did you put the other perhaps major allegation, that21 Downing Street had ordered the dossier to be sexed up22 and more facts to be discovered as broadcast; did you23 put that to the MoD press officer?24 A. Yes, again I may not have used those exact words because25 I cannot remember which words I used. But I put the

631 gist of the story, which was that the dossier had been2 exaggerated at Downing Street's behest.

3 Q. Can I complete the correspondence on this issue. At4 CAB/1/409 Richard Sambrook replied to Mr Hoon:5 "Dear Geoff, I am now in a position to respond to6 your letter of 2 July.7 "As you know, I asked Stephen Whittle, Controller,8 Editorial Policy, to look at what happened on the night9 of may 28th. The Today Programme team again made clear10 to him that it is their belief that at least three calls11 were made to MoD press officers. They believe that12 between them those calls covered sufficiently both the13 allegations made by the source about WMD, as well as the

14 extension of the bid for the interview with Adam Ingram.15 However, we acknowledge that it would have been better


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16 if our logs about this were more specific as there is17 a clear conflict over exactly what was said."18 And there was then subsequently a meeting between19 Mr Hoon and Mr Sambrook on 8th July, but if that is20 right, I would propose to deal with Mr Sambrook and

21 Mr Hoon on that.22 Can we then turn to the broadcast itself? I think23 we have this on tape. What you are going to hear is24 your broadcast at about 7.40 and your subsequent25 broadcast on Radio 5 Live which I hope is a fair

641 analysis of what was broadcast.2 (Broadcast played)3 MR DINGEMANS: I think now we are going to hear the next4 version at 7.40.5 (Broadcast played)6 A. This is the wrong report actually. This is not the7 right report. This is the wrong report.8 Q. Sorry, you were saying something?9 A. The one you just played there was two days after, that10 was on 31st May.11 MR DINGEMANS: That was on 31st May. Do you have the second12 broadcast on 28th May?13 That was the broadcast I think you put out on14 31st May, was it not?15 A. That is right, that one you just heard.16 LORD HUTTON: It begins I think with Mr Humphreys saying "2817 minutes to 8 ..."18 MR DINGEMANS: Can we look at BBC/1/5. Slightly less19 dramatically, could you be Andrew Gilligan at the bottom20 and I will be Mr Humphreys. If we pick it up halfway21 down the page:22 "Mr Humphreys: 28 minutes to 8. Tony Blair had23 quite a job persuading the country and indeed his own24 MPs to support the invasion of Iraq; his main argument25 was that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction that

65

1 threatened us all. None of those weapons has been2 found. Now our defence correspondent, Andrew Gilligan,3 has found evidence that the government's dossier on Iraq4 that was produced last September was cobbled together at5 the last minute with some unconfirmed material that had6 not been approved by the Security Services. Now you7 told us about this earlier on the programme Andy, and8 we've had a statement from 10 Downing Street that says9 it's not true, and let me just quote what they said to10 you: 'Not one word of the dossier was not entirely the11 work of the intelligence agencies'. Sorry to submit you

12 to this sort of English but there we are. I think we13 know what they mean. Are you suggesting, let's be very


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14 clear about this, that it was not the work of the15 intelligence agencies?"16 A. "No, the information which I'm told was dubious did come17 from the agencies, but they were unhappy about it,18 because they didn't think it should have been in there.

19 They thought it was -- it was not corroborated20 sufficiently, and they actually thought it was wrong,21 they thought the informant concerned had got it wrong,22 they thought he'd misunderstood what was happening."23 Q. At the top of page 6 you continue.24 A. "I mean let's go through this. This is the dossier that25 was published in September last year, probably the most

661 substantial statement of the government's case against2 Iraq. You'll remember that the Commons was recalled to3 debate it, Tony Blair made the opening speech. It is4 not the same as the famous dodgy dossier, the one that5 was copied off the internet, that came later. This is6 quite a serious document. It dominated the news that7 day and you open up the dossier and the first thing you8 see is a preface written by Tony Blair that includes the9 following words."10 Then the words in quotes were voiced up,11 Tony Blair's words were voiced up by somebody on the12 production team. Those words were:13 "Saddam's military planning allows for some weapons14 of mass destruction to be ready within forty five15 minutes of an order to deploy them."16 Then it is back to me again:17 "Now that claim has come back to haunt Mr Blair18 because if the weapons had been that readily to hand,19 they probably would have been found by now. But you20 know, it could have been an honest mistake, but what21 I have been told is that the Government knew that claim22 was questionable, even before the war, even before they23 wrote it in their dossier.24 "I have spoken to a British official who was25 involved in the preparation of the dossier, and he told

671 me that until the week before it was published, the2 draft dossier produced by the Intelligence Services,3 added little to what was already publicly known. He4 said ..."5 Again, this is a voice up. This is a different6 person saying these words, but I will say them:7 "It was transformed in the week before it was8 published, to make it sexier. The classic example was9 the statement that weapons of mass destruction were

10 ready for use within forty five minutes. That11 information was not in the original draft. It was


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12 included in the dossier against our wishes, because it13 wasn't reliable. Most things in the dossier were double14 source, but that was single source, and we believe that15 the source was wrong."16 That is the end of David Kelly's first quote. Then

17 it is me again:18 "Now this official told us that the transformation19 of the dossier took place at the behest of20 Downing Street, and he added ..."21 Again, this is a voice up. Again, this is22 David Kelly's quote:23 "Most people in intelligence weren't happy with the24 dossier, because it didn't reflect the considered view25 they were putting forward."

681 Then me again:2 "Now I want to stress that this official and others3 I've spoken to, do still believe that Iraq did have some4 sort of weapons of mass destruction programme."5 Another quote from David Kelly voiced up:6 "I believe it is about 30 per cent likely there was7 a chemical weapons programme in the six months before8 the war and considerably more likely, that there was a9 biological weapons programme. We think Hans Blix10 downplayed a couple of potentially interesting pieces of11 evidence, but the weapons programmes were12 small: sanctions did limit the programmes."13 That is the end of David Kelly's quote. Then it is14 me again:15 "The official also added quite an interesting note16 about what has happened as a result, since the war, of17 the capture of some Iraqi WMD scientists."18 And him again:19 "We don't have a great deal more information yet20 than we had before. We have not got very much out of21 the detainees yet."22 That is the end of his quote. It is back to me:23 "Now the forty five minutes really is not just a

24 detail, it did go to the heart of the Government's case25 that Saddam was an imminent threat, and it was repeated

691 a further three times in the body of the dossier, and2 I understand that the Parliamentary Intelligence and3 Security Committee is going to conduct an Inquiry into4 the claims made by the British Government about Iraq,5 and it is obviously exactly this kind of issue that will6 be at the heart of their investigation."7 Q. "Mr Humphreys: Andrew Gilligan, many thanks."

8 That concluded the second broadcast.9 A. That is right.


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10 Q. I think we do have Radio 5 Live.11 (Broadcast played)12 Q. That concluded, effectively, your contribution to the13 BBC Radio 5 Live?14 A. No, I mean those three pieces were -- I have gone back

15 through the files and as far as I can tell, and it is16 difficult to tell at this distance, but I can trace at17 least 19 items I did on this story --18 Q. Yes.19 A. -- between 29th May and 5th June, and there were several20 more on that day as well on all the various BBC21 networks, News 24, the World Service, Radio 2, Radio 522 bulletins, the news bulletins on Radio 4. So those were23 three of 19 that you heard.24 Q. But those were the broadcasts that started the story25 going?

701 A. The very first one that we heard was the first -- no it2 was not actually. There was another one, a news3 bulletin piece at 6 which we have not heard. So the4 first one you heard in the court today was the second5 and then the principal one was the one we had not found6 the tape of that I had to read. That was the principal7 appearance of that story on Today that morning.8 Q. The 7.40 one?9 A. Yes.10 Q. Can we go back to BBC/1/4, which is the transcript for11 your first broadcast which I think took place shortly12 after 6 in the morning, is that right?13 A. Yes, this is in fact the second appearance of the story14 in the programme. There had already been an appearance15 in the news bulletin on the programme. This was16 immediately afterwards at 6.07.17 Q. Was this contribution to the programme scripted?18 A. No, it was not.19 Q. So this was you speaking from the studio or from home?20 A. From home. I have an ISDN line at home because it is an21 early morning programme. This is me speaking live and

22 unscripted.23 LORD HUTTON: You are speaking?24 A. Speaking live and unscripted.25 MR DINGEMANS: Live and unscripted.

711 A. Yes.2 Q. Can I take you to five lines down on your AG which was3 this:4 "... and what we've been told by one of the senior5 officials in charge of drawing up that dossier was that,

6 actually the Government probably, erm, knew that that7 forty five minute figure was wrong, even before it


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8 decided to put it in."9 Now, we have all been through the note you say you10 made of Dr Kelly's meeting; it does not appear to be in11 that note.12 A. No, I mean the word "wrong" appears in the manuscript

13 note that I did on the day after and that formed the14 basis of the note to Miranda Holt. This is not intended15 to be a direct quote from David Kelly. I make it clear16 that on one occasion when I do quote him directly in17 this piece, I make it clear by bracketing him with the18 words something like -- where are we? Where is it?19 Yes, here we are: "because to quote the source, he said"20 and then at the end I say, "that is a quote from our21 source".22 That is the only time in the broadcast when I am23 actually quoting directly from the source. I was trying24 to make a distinction by using those forms -- it is25 obviously more difficult on radio because you cannot put

721 quote marks on a page. It w

Documents

Hearing Transcript - 12 August 2003 Morning