HARVARD JOURNAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICYtomgpalmer.com/wp-content/uploads/papers/palmer-morally...• 818 HarvardJournal ofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. 13 differingconclusions. This occurs

HARVARD JOURNAL

LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

VOLUME 13, NUMBER 3 SUMMER 1990

ARE PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS MORALLY JUSTIFIED?

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND IDEAL OBJECTS

Tom G. Palmer

‘4*

ARE PATENTSAND COPYRIGHTSMORALLY JUSTIFIED?

THE PHILOSOPHYOF PROPERTYRIGHTS AND IDEAL OBJECTS

TOM G. PALMER*

I. INTRODUCTION

Argumentsfor theright ofpropertyownershiparemanifold.It is quitecommonfor asingleauthorto invokeawiderangeoftheseargumentsto supportprivatepropertyrights,asinJohnLocke’sfamouschapteron propertyin his SecondTreatiseofGov-ernnzent.Indeed,the convergenceof varying and non-contra-dicting argumentson the sameconclusiontends to makeusmoreconfidentof that conclusion.It servesasakind of “fail-safe” device in intellectual discourse:If five different but allplausibleargumentsleadto thesameconclusion,wearegener-ally morejustified in acceptingthat conclusionthanif only oneof thoseargumentssupportedit.1

Intellectualproperty,however, is a different matter. Inter-estingly, thevarious leadingargumentsthatnormallybuttresseachotherandconvergein supportofprivatepropertydivergewidely whenapplied to the conceptof intellectualproperty.For example,a theorywhereinpropertyis viewed asthejustrewardfor labor(a “deserttheory”) might very well supportintellectualpropertyrights, whileat the sametime a theoryinwhich propertyis definedasthe concretionof liberty mightnot.

Mostoftheargumentsdiscussedin this Article, both for andagainstintellectualpropertyrights, emanatefrom staunchde-fendersof a privateproperty,freemarketsystem. This is notsurprising,becausethosewho stronglyfavor liberty andprop-erty areaptto seetheconceptsa~intimately connected,andare thusmorelikely to bevery concernedwith thetheoryandapplication of property rights. With respectto intellectualproperty,however,oneshouldnot besurprisedif theycometo

* Directorof StudentAffairs andDirectorofEasternEuropeanOutreachProgram,Institute for HumaneStudies,GeorgeMasonUniversity. B.A.. St.John’sCollege,1982;Ph.D. candidate,CatholicUniversityof America, 1990.

1. See Barnett,ForeworS’ Of Chickensand Eggs—The Compatibilityof Moral RightsandConsequenhialistAnalyses, 12 H*iiv. J.L. & PUB. Pot.’v611,616-17 (1989).

• 818 HarvardJournal ofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. 13

differingconclusions.Thisoccursbecauseliberty andpropertyin this contextmay be irreconcilable;copyrightsand patentsseemto beproperty,but theyalsoseemto restrictliberty. Onewould behard-pressed,for example,to find two strongerde-fendersofliberty andpropertyin NineteenthCenturyAmericathan the abolitionist Lysander Spooner.and the JacksonianeditorialistWilliam Leggett. Yet on thesubjectofintellectualproperty rights, they each came to opposite conclusions:Spoonersteadfastlychampionedintellectual property rightswhile Leggettadvocatedwith equalforcethe unrestrictedex-changeof ideas.Although theycameto oppositeconclusions,eacharguedthat his beliefs were consistentwith his overallstancein favor of liberty, private property, and freedomoftrade.2

Sometimesthebestdevelopedargumentsin supportofintel-lectualpropertyrights areadvancedby relativelymarginalau-thors, like Spoonerfor example.This is becausethe greatpioneersof the philosophyof property rights wrote beforepropertyrightsfor authorsor inventorshadbecomea popularissue;it remainedfor lesserfigures to mold the argumentsforintellectualpropertybasedon the propertytheoriesthat hadbeendevelopedearlier by moreprominentthinkers.Conse-quently, while Locke,Hume, Kant, Hegel,and otherphiloso-pherswill figuresignificantly in this Article, attentionwill alsobedevotedto laterinterpreters,whoapplied theideasoftheseandothergreatphilosophersin new ways.

Intellectualpropertyrights arerights in ideal objects,whicharedistinguishedfrom thematerialsubstratain which theyareinstantiated.3Much of this Article will thereforebe concernedwith theontologyof ideal objects.This is becausethe subjectof intellectual property, indeed, the very idea of exercisingproperty rights over ideas, processes,poems, and the like,

2. See,e.g., Spooner,A Letterto Scientistsandinventors,on theScienceoffustice,and TheirRightof PerpetualPropertyin TheirDiscoveriesand Inventions,in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKSOF LYSANDER SPOONER 68 (C. Shively ed.1971); W. LEOOETF, DEMOCRATICK EDITORS-AL5: ESSAYS IN JACKSONIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 397-98 (L. Whiteed. 1984).

3. This catch-allcategorycoversthe subjectmatterof patentsandcopyrights,in-cluding thosefor algorithms,computerprograms,manufacturingprocesses,inven-tions,musicalor literaryworks,pictorialorotherkindsof representations,sculptures,designs,andmore.Therelevantdifferencebetweensuchgoodsandtangiblegoodsisthat theformercanbeinstantiatedanindefinitenumberoftimes, thatis, theyarenotscarcein astaticsense,whiletangiblegoodsarespatiallycircumscribedandarescarcein both the staticandthedynamicsenseof the term.

No. 3] Are PatentsandCopyrights Morally Justified? 819

leadsdirectly to speculationabouthowsuchobjectsaresimilarto or different from otherobjectsof propertyrights, suchastrees, land, or water flows. One cannotaddresshow (orwhether)suchthings ought to be madetheobjectsof owner-ship without addressingtheir fundamentalnature.To somecriticizing thenotion that ideascouldbe madeinto exclusiveproperty, the political economistMichel Chevalier properlyrejoined:

After having fired off’ at patentsthis shot, so difficult toescape,theExposédesmolift concludesby sayingthatall this ismetaphysicson which it will not enter.An unhappyway ofrefutingitself; it is to fly from adiscussionwhich thereport-ershadopenedoftheirown accord.Should thelegislatorbeashamedofmetaphysics?On thecontrary,he oughtto be ametaphysician,for what would laws be in the absenceofwhat they call metaphysics;that is to say, recourseto firstprinciples.If the legislatordoesnot consentto be a meta-physicianin this sense,he is likely to do his work badly.4

Thus,discussionsin this Article aboutthe legal foundationsofintellectualpropertycannotproceedwithoutour taking up theontologicalfoundationsof intellectualproperty,which we willdo in part III.

Many defensesof intellectualpropertyrights aregroundedin thenatural law right to thefruit of one’slabor.5Justasonehas~aright to the cropsoneplants, so onehasa right to theideasonegeneratesandtheart oneproduces.

Anothertraditionof propertyrights argumentbasesitselfonthe necessityof propertyfor the developmentof personality.Personalitydevelopsitself in its interaction with the world;without a sphereof propertyover which we exercisecontrol,for example,moralresponsibilityis unlikely to develop.Prop-erty rights, in this tradition, mayincorporatean “economic”aspect,but it is fundamentallydistinguishedfrom othercon-

4. Chevalier,PatentsforInventionsExaminedin Iheir Relationsto thePrinciple ofFreedomofIndustrj, andThatofEqualityAmongCitizens,in COPYRIGHTAND PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS5 (R.A. Macfie ed. 1883).

5. Naturalrights argumentsandutilitarianarguments(very broadlyconceived)areclose cousins.Utilitarian theoriesareexplicitly consequentialist(and welfarist), whilenatural rights theories usually contain what Alan Ryan calls “a buriedutilitarian as-sumption.” A. RYAN, PROPERTY 63 (1987).Such“buriedassumptions”concernhumanflourishing or the attainmentof man’snaturalend.Theseconsequencesareusuallyattainedindirectly, throughrespectfor generalrights,or rulesof conduct,ratherthandirectly, as in mostutilitarian theories.Thesharpseparationin contemporarymoralphilosophybetweennaturalrights andutility, or thecommongood, is, however,anartificial one,andwouldcertainlybef~reignto manyof thegreatnaturallawtheorists.

820 HarvardJournalof Law & Public Policy [Vol. 13

ceptionsof propertyrights. Ratherthanlooking to moralde-sert, or to maximization of utility, or to the omnipresenceofscarcity, personality-basedrights theoriesbeginwith a theoryof the person.Often harkeningback to Kant’s discussionsofthenatureofauthorshipandpublicationandto Hegel’stheoryofcultural evolution,personality-basedrights theoryformsthefoundationof GermanandFrenchcopyrightlaw. Severalper-sonality-basedargumentswill be consideredin this Article. Aswe shall see,someof theseapproachesprovide a foundationfor a moreexpansiveform of intellectualpropertyrights thando moraldesertorutilitarian theories,extending,for example,to artists’ inalienable“personalrights”6 over theirproducts.

Utilitarian argumentsof varioussortscan either supportorundercutclaims for intellectual property rights. Contingentmattersof factform an especiallyimportantpartof theutilita-rian structure.As I havewritten elsewhereon theutilitarian ar-gumentsfor and againstintellectual propertyrights,7 I willlimit myselfin this Article to afewbriefremarkson thissubject.

Attemptshavealsobeenmadeto deriveintellectualpropertyrights from the retentionof certaintangibleproperty rights.Thus, ownershiprights to tangibleobjectsareconstitutedby abundleof rights that may be alienatedor rearrangedto suitcontractingparties.In sellingor otherwisetransferringapieceof property,like a copyof abook for example,someof theserights may be reserved,such asthe right to makeadditionalcopies.Theownerof thematerialsubstratumin whichan idealobject is instantiatedmayreservethe right to usethe materialsubstratumfor the purposeof copying the ideal object. Thisargumentmightbe labelledthe“piggy-back” theory:Theintel-lectualpropertyright obtainsits moral force from its depen-denceon a moreconventionalright of property.

I will taketheopportunityin partsII throughV of this Arti-cle to presentasclearlyandfairly aspossibleeachof thesefourkinds of propertyarguments.In turn, I will offer criticismsof

6. Ordroit moral,sometimesconfusingly translated simply as “moral rights.”7. SeePalmer,intellectualPropertyRights:A Non-PosnenanLaw and EconomicsApproach,

12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261 (1989).Thisessayalsoreviewsthehistory ofintellectualprop-erty. considerstheproblemof whethercommon-lawcopyrightextendsafter theactofpublication,reevaluatestheeconomicsof publicgoodsandpropertyrights,andexam-ineshow marketsfor idealobjectswithout intellectualpropertyrights function. Forcriticism ofmy position, seeGordon, An Inquirj into theMenisofCopyright: TheChallengesof Consistency,Consent,and Encouragement,41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989).

No. 8] ArePatentsand CopyrightsMorallyJus4fied? 821

eachof thesearguments’internal structuresand thenattemptto applythemto ideal objects.In partII, I will takeup thelabortheoryof property,and in part III, the personalitytheory. InpartIV, I will addressutilitarian concerns,but, asI havestated,only briefly. InpartV, I will discusstheattemptto deriveintel-lectualpropertyrights indirectly, that is, “piggy-backing” onrights to tangibleproperty.TheconcludingsectionsoftheAr-ticle, partsVI andVII, presentmy owncasefor aprivateprop-erty systemthatdoesnot recognizecopyrightsand patents.8

I make no claims to an exhaustivetaxonomy of propertyrights theories.Otherimportanttheoriesofpropertyandothertheoreticalconcernsarenot dealt with here,becauseI havechosento concentrateon thosemostrelevantto theproblemofintellectualproperty.Further,I will havelittle to sayabouttheactualhistoricalgenesisof intellectualproperty;while intellec-tual propertyoriginatedin grantsof monopolyfrom thestateandreceivedits legitimacy from that source,the,public debateoverits legitimacyshiftedradicallyin the late EighteenthCen-tury. As Fritz Machiup and Edith Penrosenote, “those whostartedusing theword propertyin connectionwith inventionshadavery definitepurposein mind: theywantedto substituteawordwith arespectableconnotation,‘property,’ for awordthathad an unpleasantring, ‘privilege.’ “~ Given this shift in thepopularconceptionofpatentsandcopyrights,I intendto ques-tionwhethertheyare legitimate forms ofpropertyat all.

II. LABOR AND THE NATURAL RIGHT TO PROPERTY

LysanderSpoonerwas surely one of the most remarkableAmericanmenof lettersof theNineteenthCentury.Hewas aconstitutionalscholar,a ferventcrusaderfor the abolition ofslavery,an entrepreneurwho succeededthroughcompetitionin forcing theAmericanpostalserviceto lower its rates,a phi-losopher,a writer on economicmatters,andmore,

Spoonerbeginshis book, TheLawofIntellectualProperty: orAnEssayon the RightofAuthorsandInventorsto a PerpetualPropertyinT/zeirldea.s,’°by establishingthestatusof immaterialobjectsas

8. As will bedemonstrated,however, theapproachI setforth would include trade-marksandtradesecretsaslegitimate.Trademarksandtradesecretshaveroots in thecommonlawandenjoyacontractualor quasi-contractualmoralgrounding.

9. Machlup& Penrose,The Patent Controversyin theMneteenthCentury, 10 J. ECON.HIs~r.I, 16 (1950).

10. Spooner, TheLaw ofIntellectualProperty: or AnEssayon theRightofAuthorsandIn-

822 HarvardJournal ofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. 18

wealth. “Everything,” writes Spooner, “whether intellectual,moral,or material,howevergross,orhoweversubtle;whethertangible or intangible, perceptibleor imperceptible,by ourphysical organs—ofwhich the humanmind can take cogni-zance,and which, either as a means,occasion,or end, caneither contributeto, or of itself constitute,the well-being ofman, is wealth.” This obviously includesideas,which areoften the objects of economic transactions.Property, asSpoonerdefinesit, is “simply wealth, that is possessed—thathasanowner,”2Theright ofpropertyis the“right of domin-ion,” theright “which onemanhas,asagainstall othermen,tothe exclusive control, dominion, use,and enjoymentof anyparticularthing.” ‘~

Thus,accordingto Spooner’sdefinitions,the ideaswehave,aswell asour feelingsandouremotions,areourproperty.“Ifthe ideas,which a manhasproduced,were not rightfully hisown,but belongedequally to othermen, theywould havetheright imperatively to requirehim to give his ideasto them,withoutcompensation;andit would bejust andright for themto punishhim asa criminal, if herefused.”4

Thefoundationsof property,accordingto Spooner,aretheactsof possessionandofcreation,Propertyis necessaryto se-curethe“naturalright ofeachmanto providefor his own sub-sistence;and,secondly,.. . his right to providefor his generalhappinessandwell-being, in additionto ameresubsistence.”5

Thus,while Spooner’saccountofthenaturalright to property,and especiallyof intellectualproperty,falls amongthe moral-desertargumentsfor property,it containsaconsequentialistel-ement:propertyis justified becauseit is a necessarymeanstotheattainmentof man’snaturalend.

Having establishedthat ideasarewealthandthat all wealthisthe productof intellect,16 Spoonerarguesanalogically that

ventorsto a PerpetualProperty in Their ideas, in 3 Tria COLLECTED WORKS OF LYSANDERSPOONER (C. Shively ed. 1971).

11. Id. at 13.12. Id. at 15.13. Id. at 15.14. Id. at 19.This assumesthat a common right would necessarilyentaila common

claim to access.15. Id. at 28.16. Seeid.at 27

All thatlabor,whichwe arein thehabitof callingphysicallabor,is in realityperformedwholly by themind,will, or spirit,whichusesthe bonesandmus-

No. 3] Are PatentsandCopyrightsMorallyJvstifi~d7 823

ideasarejustasmuchpropertyastangibleobjects.If ideaspre-existin natureandaremerely discovered(as,for example,sci-entificprinciplesornaturallyoccurringsubstances),’7then“hewhodoesdiscover,or first takespossessionof, anidea,therebybecomesits lawful andrightful proprietor;on thesameprinci-ple that he, who first takespossessionofany materialproduc-tion ofnature,therebymakeshimselfits rightful owner.”18Onthe otherhand, if ideasarenot pre-existingin nature,but aretheproductsof anactive intellect, then“the right of propertyin thembelongsto him, whoselaborcreatedthem.”9

Spoonerspendstherestofthebookdefendinghis argumentagainstobjections.Against the objectionthat ideasare incor-poreal,hearguesthatotherincorporealentitiescanalsobeob-jectsofpropertyrights,suchaslabor,a ride, one’sreputationandcredit;eventheright to propertyis itself, inalienableprop-erty. To the objectionthat property rights in ideasceaseonpublicationor communicationof an ideato another(“becausethat otherpersontherebyacquiresas completepossessionoftheidea,as theoriginal proprietor”20),Spoonerrespondsthatit falselyassumesthat “if a manonceintrust his property inanotherman’skeeping,he therebyloseshis own rightofprop-ertyin it,”2’ Possessionis notequivalentto theright ofuse,for“whereonemanintrustshis propertyin anotherman’sposses-sion, the latterhasno right whateverto useit, otherwisethanasthe ownerconsentsthat hemayuseit.”22

Against the objectionthat some ideasaresocial in nature,Spoonerarguesthat therole of societyin the productionofideasis nil, Ideasarecreatedby individuals,andonly individu-als haverights to them.As Spoonercounters,“Nothing is, byits own essenceandnature,moreperfectlysusceptibleofexclu-sive appropriation,thanathought.It originatesin themindof

desmerelyastools... .Thereis, therefore,nosuchthingasthephysicallaborof men,independentlyof their intellectuallabor.

Id.17. SeeSpooner,supra note2, at 10.18. Sd. at 26. Note that thiswould go farbeyondthetraditionalscopeof thepatent

lawsoftheUnitedStates,whichexplicitly excludediscoveriesofscientificormathemat-ical laws or of naturallyoccurringsubstancesfrom patentprotection.Recently,how-ever, the U.S. PatentOffice has been awarding patents to discovers of usefulmathematicalalgorithms,atrendthat would surelyhavepleasedSpooner.

19. Id. at 27.20. Id. at 42 (emphasisin original).21. Id.22. Id. at 52.


a single individual. It can leavehis mind only in obediencetohis will. It dies with him, if he so elect.”23Even grantingthetruth of theobjection,heasks,dowedenyprivateownershipoftangible objectsbecausetheir creatorsavailed themselvesofpre-existingknowledge, or cooperatedwith others in theirproduction?24

Spooner also refutes the objection that ideas are non-rivairousin consumption;that is, that theuseby onepersonofan ideadoesnotdiminish anyoneelse’suse,and thatideasarethereforeunsuitablecandidatesfor the statusof property,byshowingits consequencesif appliedto tangibleproperty.For,

if it be a true principle, that laborandproductiongive noexclusiveright of property,and that everycommodity, bywhomsoeverproduced,should, without theconsentof theproducer,be madeto serveasmanypersonsasIt can, with-outbringingthemin collisionwith eachother, thatprincipleasclearly requiresthatahammershouldbefreeto differentpersonsat different times, andthata road, or canalshouldbe free to as manypersonsat once, as canuse it withoutcollision, as it doesthat an ideashouldbe free to asmanypersonsatonceaschooseto useit.25

Thekey to Spooner’sapproachis to denythosedefensesofpropertythat reston thejoint operationof scarcity,the law ofthe excludedmiddle, and the desirability of avoiding violentconflict. Hewrites, “The right of property,or dominion, doesnotdepend,astheobjectionsupposes,uponeitherthepoliticalor moral necessityofmen’savoidingcollisionwith eachother,in thepossessionanduseofcommodities.. ~ Rather,“theright of property,or dominion, dependsupon the necessityandright of eachman’sprovidingfor his own subsistenceandhappiness;and upon the consequentnecessityand right ofevery man’s exercisingexclusiveand absolutedominion overthefruits of his labor.”27Similarly, theargumentthattheprop-agationof anideais like the lighting of onecandleby another,illuminating the formerwithout darkeningthe latter, would“apply aswell to a surplusoffood,clothing,orany othercom-modity, asto asurplusof ideas,or—whatis thesamething—to

28. Id. at 58.24. Seeid. at 61-64.25. Id. at 79.26. Id. at 81.27. Id. at 81-82.

No. 3] Are PatentsandCopyrightsMorallyJust�ed? 825

thesurpluscapacityofa singleidea,beyondthepersonaluseoftheproducer—bywhich I meanthecapacityofa singleideatobe usedby otherpersonssimultaneously~with the producer,without collision with him.”28

A similar argument,but one that stops short of propertyrights in perpetuity,is offered by Ayn Rand.Randstates,“pat-entsandcopyrightsarethelegal implementationofthebaseofall propertyrights:aman’sright to theproductofhis mind.”29

Patentsand copyrightsaremoralrights,and not merelylegalrights: “The governmentdoesnot ‘grant’ a patentor copy-right, in the senseof agift, privilege, or favor; the governmentmerelysecuresit—[that is], thegovernmentcertifiestheorigi-nationofanideaandprotectsits owner’sexclusiveright ofuseand disposal.”3°Like many other advocatesof intellectualpropertyrights,Randseespatentsasthehighestform of prop-erty: “theheartand coreofpropertyrights.”TM

In stoppingshort of grantingto scientistsand mathemati-ciansrights to the facts or theoriestheydiscover,Rand relieson the samegeneralmoral principlesas Spoonerin her de-fenseoftheright to intellectualproperty,but addsa twist. Be-causeofher focuson therole of “productivework” in humanhappiness,sheadvocateslimits on thetemporaldurationofin-tellectualproperty:

[Ijntellectual propertycannotbe consumed.If it were heldin perpetuity,it would leadto theoppositeof theveryprinci-ple on which it is based:it would lead,not to the earnedrewardofachievement,but to theunearnedsupportofpara-sitism. It would becomea cumulativelien on theproductionof unborngenerations,which would immediately paralyzethem.. . - Theinheritanceofmaterialproperty representsadynamicclaim on a staticamountofwealth; the inheritanceof intellectual propertyrepresentsa static claim on a dy-namic processof production.32

HerbertSpencer,whotestifiedor behalfof copyrightbeforetheRoyalCommissionof 1878,presentedan argumentfor pat-entsand copyrightsbasedon moraldesert.33“[J]ustice underits positive aspect,”he argued,“consists in the receptionby

28. Id. at 94.29. Rand,Patentsand Copyrights,in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 130 (1967).30. Id. at 126.51. Id. at 128.52. Id. at 127.33. SeeII H. SPENCER,THE PRINCIPL~SOF EThIcs121 (F. Machaned. 1978)(1893).


eachindividualof the benefitsandevils ofhis ownnatureandconsequentconduct”;therefore,“it is manifestthatif any indi-vidual by mentallaborachievessomeresult,heought to havewhateverbenefitnaturallyflows from this result.”34To theob-jection that the useof another’sideadoesnot takepropertyaway from theoriginatorof theideabut only allows its use,herespondedfirst, that “the useby othersmay be the contem-platedsourceof profit,” second,that a “tacit understanding”limits therights transferredto “the printedpaper,therightofreadingand of lending to read,but not theright of reproduc-tion,” andthird, that patentsandcopyrightsarenot monopo-lies becausemonopolyis theuseof forceto constrainothersintheuseof what would “in theabsenceof suchlaw.. . be opento all,” while inventionsand thelike could notbe said to existbeforetheir creation.35

Lord Coke haddefinedmonopolyas “an institution, or al-lowanceby the king by his grant,commission,or otherwisetoany personor persons.. . wherebyany personor persons.are soughtto be restrainedof any freedome,or liberty thattheyhadbefore,orhinderedin theirlawfull trade.”36Thusrea-sonedproponentsofpatentsandcopyrights,an exclusiverightoveraninnovationcouldnot bea monopoly,becauseprior toits invention it wasnot a “liberty that theyhad before.”37

Another labor-basedmoral desertargumenthasbeenad-vancedby IsraelKirzner.38Kirzner beginswith theassumptionthat oneis entitled to “what onehasproduced.”His primaryconcernis to provideajustificationfor entrepreneurialprofits.Heaskswhetherthis entitlementderivesfrom thecontribution

34. Id. Spencerspecificallydisavowsrelianceonutilitarian concerns:“Even wereaninvention of no benefit to society unless thrown open to unbought use, therewouldstill beno just groundfor disregardingtheinventor’sclaim; anymorethan for disre-gardingtheclaimof onewholaborson hisfarmfor his own benefitandnotfor publicbenefit.” Id. at 127-28.

85. Id. at 122.24.36. III E. COKE, THE FIREr PART OF THE INSTITUTEs OP THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 181

(London1797) (ch. 85).37. RobertNozickargueson this basisthatpatentsandcopyrightsdo notrunafoul

of the “LockeanProviso”: “An inventor’s patent doesnot deprive others of an objectwhichwouldnotexist if not for theinventor.” R. Nozicic,ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA182 (1974).

38. SeeKirzner,Producers Entrepreneur,andtheRightto Property in PERCEPTION,OPP0R-TUNFPY, AND PRoFIT 185-99 (1979); Kirzner,Entrepreneurship~Entitlement,and EconomicJustice,in id. at200-24.Kirzner doesnot applythe theoryheadvancesdirectly to intel-lectualproperty,but theimplicationsof hisargumentwouldnaturallyleadoneto sup-port patentsandcopyrights..

No. 3] Are Patentsand CopyrightsMorally Juct~fied? 827

to the productionprocessoffactorsofproductionorfrom en-trepreneurialactivity. Following what he calls the “finders-keepers”rule, hearguesthat “a producerisentitledto whathehasproducednot becausehe hascontributedanything to itsphysicalfabrication,but becausehe perceivedandgraspedtheopportunityfor its fabricationby utilizing the resourcesavail-able in the market.”39 He contrasts“ownership-by-creation”with “ownership-by-just-acquisition-from-nature”and arguesthat the formerbetterjustifies entrepreneurialprofit because“until a resourcehasbeendiscovered,it hasnot, in thesenserelevantto therights of accessandcommonuse,existedat all.By this view it seemsplausibleto considerthediscovererofthehitherto ‘nonexistent’ resourceas, in the relevantsense,thecreatorofwhat hehasfound.”4°Clearly, if onewereto substi-tutesuchan “ownershipby creation”theory(or “finders-keep-ers”) for “ownership-by-just-acquisition-from-nature,”thenthe casefor intellectualpropertyrights would becomemuchmoreplausible.

All of theselines of argumentstronglyemphasizethemoraldesertofthecreator,inventor,orauthor.4’Theyareconsistentwith theargumentofJohnLockein his SecondTreatisethat noone, so long astherewas “as good left for his Improvement,”should “meddlewith what was alreadyimprovedby another’sLabour;If he did, ‘tis plain hedesiredthebenefitof another’sPains,which he had no right to . . ,“~ When one hasim-provedwhat was before unimproved(or createdwhat beforedid not exist),oneis entitledto theresultofone’s labor. Onedeservesit.

Objectionsto Labor-BasedMoral Desert Theories

ArgumentssuchasSpooner’sandRand’sencounterafunda-mentalproblem.While they pay homageto the right of self-ownership,theyrestrictothers’usesoftheirown bodiesin con-junctionwith resourcesto which theyhavefull moralandlegalrights.Enforcementofapropertyright inadance,for example,

39. Id. at 196.40. Id. at212-13.41. Moral desertplaysa powerful role in manytheoriesof property.Accordingto

LawrenceC. Becker,“the conceptof desertis constitutive of the conceptof moralityperse L.C. BECKER, PROPERTYRIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 51 (1977).

42. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OP GOVERNMENT, 309 (P. Laslett ed. 1970) (3d ed.1698). *

‘a

harvardJournal of Law ~sYPubiw Policy [Vol. US

meansthat forcecanbeusedagainstanotherto stophim fromtaking certain stepswith his body; enforcementof a propertyright in an inventionmeansthat forcecanbe usedagainstan-otherto stophim from usinghis handsin certainways,In eachcase,anintellectualpropertyright is aclaimofaright overhowanotherpersonusesherbody.

As thepro-libertyjournalistWilliam Leggett,a leaderof theJacksonianLoco-Foco partyand editorof the New York Eve-ningPost,wrote,

We do not wish to denyto Britishauthorsa right; but wedodesirethat a legal privilege,which we contendhasno foun-dation in na~turalright, and is prejudicial to ‘the greatestgoodof thegreatestnumber,’shouldbewholly annulled,inrelationto all authors,ofeverynameandcountry.Ourposi-tion is, thatauthorshavenonaturalright ofpropertyin theirpublishedworks, and that laws to createandguard sucharight areadverseto the true interestsof society.43

Leggettopposedcopyrightand patentrights for two reasons:First,hearguedthatintellectualpropertyrights stifled thefreespreadof ideasanddamagedthepublic interest.44Second,hearguedthat such rights were in reality statutorymonopoliesthat infringed upon the rights of others to the ownershipoftheir own bodies:

Ourpositionthatan authorhasan exclusivenaturalright ofpropertyin his manuscript,wasmeantto beunderstoodonlyin the samesensethata mechanichasan exclusivenaturalright of property in the results of his labour. The mentalprocessby whichhecontrivedthoseresultsarenot,andcan-not properlyberendered,exclusiveproperty;Sincethe rightof a freeexerciseof our thinkingfacultiesis given by natureto all mankind,andthemerefact thatagiven modeofdoing

43. W. LEOGETF, supra note2, at 397.98. Interestingly,LeggettandSpoonernotonly agreedon the abolition of slavery, but alsoagreedthat, if intellectualpropertyrightsare indeednaturalrights,then theyshouldnot be limited in duration. Accord.ing to Lessett,

An authoreitherhasanaturalandjust right ofpropertyin his production,orhe hasnot. If he has,it is onenot to beboundedby space,or limited induration,but,like thatoftheIndianto thebow andarrowhehasshapedfromthesaplingandreedsof the unappropriatedwilderness,his own exclusivelyandforever.

Id. at 398.44. If theprincipleof copyrightwerewholly doneaway,the businessof author-

ship,we areinclinedto think, wouldreadilyaccommodateitselfto thechangeofcircumstances,andwould bemoreextensivelypursued,andwith moread-vantageto all concernedthan is thecaseat present.

Id. at 394.

INO. ~J Are Patentsand CopyrightsMorally Justified? 829

a thing hasbeenthoughtof by one, doesnot preventthesameideas presentingthemselvesto the mind of anotherandshouldnot preventhim from a perfectliberty of actingupon them.45

Leggett’sargument,while containingstrongconsequentialistelements,rests on the intimate relationshipbetweenlibertyandproperty:

The rights of corporealpropertymaybe asserted,withoutthe possibility of infringing any otherindividual’s rights.Thoseof incorporealproperty may obviously give rise toconflicting claims,all equallywell founded.. . . [I]f you as-sertan exclusiveright to a particular idea, you cannotbesurethat the very sameidea did not at the samemomententersomeothermind.46

Israel Kirzner’s attempt to substitute “ownership-by-crea-tion” for “ownership-by-just-acquisition-from-nature”en-countersdifficulty becauseit leavesuswith a mereassumption,that “a mandeserveswhathehasproduced,”asajustificationfor property.However, entrepreneurialprofits canbejustifiedin other waysconsistentwith the theoryof ownership-by-just-acquisition.47“Profits” arejustified if they ariseby meansofNozickian“justice-preservingtransformations.”48A rearrange-mentof propertytitles thatemergedthrougha seriesof volun-tary transfers,eachof which was just, andwhich beganon afoundationofjust propertytitles, is itselfjust.If in theprocessprofitsor lossesaregenerated,thenthesearejust aswell. TheKirzneriansubstitute,in contrast,suffersfromalackofground-ing. “Becauseweproducedit” is an inadequateanswerto thequestionof why we deservewhat wehaveproduced.

Theseauthors do not effectively deal with the importantproblemof simultaneousinventionor discovery,which is oftenraised as an objection to positions such as those taken bySpoonerandRand.Accordingto Rand:

As anobjectionto the patentlaws,somepeoplecite thefactthat two inventorsmay work independentlyfor years on the

45. Id. at 399.46. Id. at 999-400.47. SeeBarnett,A ConsentTheo~yofContract,86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986). Thear-

rangementsof propertythatresultfrom transferenceofjustlyacquiredpropertytitlesarethemselvesjust, andif somearrangementsmean profits for someandlossesforothers,thejustice of the profits or lossesis ancillary to thejustice of the resultingarrangementof propertytitles.

48. K. NoziCic, Supra note37, at 151.

830 HarvardJournalofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. 13

sameinvention,but onewill beattheotherto the patentof-ficeby anhouror adayandwill acquireanexclusivemonop-oiy, while theloser’s work will be totally wasted. . . . Sincethe issueis oneof commercialrights,the loser in a caseofthat kind hasto acceptthefact that in seekingto tradewithothershe must face the possibilityof a competitorwinningthe race,which is true of all typesof competition.49

Thisidea doesnot comportwell with herearlierclaim that in-tellectualpropertyrights arenaturalrights thataremerelyrec-ognized—not granted—bygovernment;in this casea fullmonopolyis awardedby governmentto oneinventor,while an-otherwith aclaimequallyvalid in everyrespectexceptfor atenminuteleadtime at thepatentoffice is deniedany right to ex-ploit the invention.

Spooneroffers a very different responseto the problem:

[T]he fact that two menproducethe sameinvention, is averygood reasonwhy the inventionshouldbelongto both;but it is no reasonat all why bothshouldbe deprivedof it.

If two menproducethe sameinvention,eachhasanequalright to it; becauseeachhasanequalright to thefruits of hislabor. Neithercan denytheright oftheother,withoutdeny-ing hisown.50

What if, however,oneof theinventorsgives this right to therestof mankind?As Leggettargued,in thecaseof authorship,

Two authors,without concertor intercommunion,mayde-scribe the sameincidents, in languageso nearly identicalthat the two books, for all purposesof sale, shall be thesame.Yetonewriter maymakeafree gift of his productionto the public, may throwit openin common;andthenwhatbecomesof the other’sright of property?5’

The sameargumentcanbe extended,of course,to inventions.Liberty and intellectual property seemto be at odds, for

while property in tangibleobjectslimits actionsonly with re-spectto particulargoods,propertyin idealobjectsrestrictsanentire rangeof actionsunlimited by place or time, involvinglegitimately ownedproperty (VCRs, taperecorders,typewrit-ers, thehumanvoice,andmore) by all but thoseprivilegedtoreceivemonopolygrantsfrom the state.To thosewho might

49. Rand,.supra note 29, at 133.50. Spooner,supra note2, at 68;seealso R. Nozicx.supranote 37, at 182.51. W. LEOGETF,supra note43, at 402.

No. 3] Are Patentsand CopyrightsMorallyJust~fied? 831

arguethatanyform of propertylimits liberty in someway,JanNarvesonresponds:

This is to talk as thoughthe ‘restrictions’ involvedin owner-shipwerenothingbut that.But that’sabsurdiTheessenceofmy havinganApple Macintoshis that I haveone,atmy dis-posalwhenandasI wish,whichlatterof courserequiresthatyounot beablesimply touseit anytimeyoulike; it’s not thatyoucan’t haveone unlessI sayso.52

My ownershipclaim overmy computerrestrictsyour accesstothatcomputer,but it is not ablanketrestrictionon your libertyto acquirea similar computer,or an abacus,or to count onyour fingers or usepencilandpaper. In contrast,to claim apropertyright overaprocessis to claim ablanketright to con-trol the actionsof others.For example,if apropertyright tothe useof the abacuswereto begrantedto someone,it wouldmeanprecisely thatotherscould not makean abacusunlesstheyhadthepermissionof theownerof that right. It would bea restrictionon the libertyof everyonewho wantedto makeanabacuswith their own laborout ofwood that theylegitimatelyowned. This is a restriction on action qualitatively differentfrom the restriction implied in my ownershipof a particularabacus.

The previousparagraphillustratesthat intellectualpropertyrights arenot equivalentto otherpropertyrights in “restrictingliberty.” Propertyrights in tangibleobjectsdo not restrictlib-erty at all—they simply restrainaction. Intellectualpropertyrights,on the otherhand,do restrict liberty.

Arguments from self-ownership,including Spooner’s (butperhapsnot Rand’s),hingeupon the ideaof liberty. As I ar-guedabove,thereis no reasonthat anumberofdifferentargu-mentsmight not be marshalledin favor of property.Locke’sargumentfor labor as the foundationof property has threeprincipalpillars: (1) Having establishedtheright to propertyinoneself,how canwe determinewhen somethinghai become“so his, [that is], apartof him, thatanothercanno longerhaveanyright to it?”53 Theannexationof laboris therelevantpointat which a thing becomesownedand thereforeassimilatedto

52. J.NARVESON, THE LIBERTARtAN IDEA 77 (1988). Fora liberty-basedargumentforpropertyby Narveson,seeid~at 62-93.But seeKelly, L~fe~Liberty andProperty, in HUMANRiosrrs 108.18(1984).

53. J. LOCKE, supra note42, at 305. -


one’s body, the violation of which constitutesan infringementof liberty. (2)

[God] gave[the earth]to the IndustriousandRational,(andLabourwas to be his Title to it;) not to the Fancyor Cov-etousnessof the QuarrelsomandContentious.He that hadas good left for hisImprovement,as was alreadytakenup,needednot complain,oughtnot to meddlewith what wasalreadyimprovedbyanother’sLabour:If hedid, ‘tis plainhedesiredthebenefitof another’sPains,which hehadno rightto....54

(3)” ‘tis Labour indeed that puts the differenceof value oneverything. . . . [T]he improvementof labourmakes the fargreaterpartof the value.”Indeed,“in mostof them99/100arewholly to beput on theaccountof labor.”55

Thesethreeargumentsall lend support,eachin a differentway, to privatepropertyrights in land—Locke’sprimary inter-est in thechapteron property.Theydivergewhenit comestoideal objects,however.Although the secondandthird argu-ments lend support to intellectualpropertyrights claims, thefirst emphaticallydoesnot. For Locke, self-ownershipservesseveralimportant functions.First, it is the foundationof lib-erty; indeed,it is synonymouswith liberty. Second,it allowsLocketo respondeffectivelyto Filmer’scriticism of theconsenttheoriesof propertyset forth by GrotiusandPufendorf.If ap-propriationof commonpropertyrestson unanimousconsent,Filmer knowsof at leastonepersonwho would refusehis con-sent,thusknockingthestrutsout from underthe entireedifice.Lockeseeksto show“how Men might cometo haveapropertyin severalpartsof thatwhichGodgaveto Mankindin common,and that without any expressCompactof all the Common-ers,”56 that is, in a way that will avoid Filmer’s otherwisefatalobjection. By beginning with one tangible thing that is soclearly one’s own that no one else can claim it—one’s ownbody—Locke can show how property rights can legitimatelyemergewithout requiringuniversalconsent,thussidesteppingFilmer’s objection.57

54. Id. at 333.55. Id. at 338.56. Id. at 327.57. Though theEarth andall inferior Creaturesbe commonto all Men, yet

everyMan hasa Propertyin his own Person.This no Body hasanyRight tobuthimself.TheLabourof his Body, andtheWorkof his Hands,wemay say,areproperly his.

No. 3] Are Patentsand CopyrightsMorallyJvs4fied? 883

Locke seesthis right of self-ownershipas necessaryfor lib-erty. He explicitly rulesout “voluntary slavery” (or absolutismalong Hobbesianlines) and takescare to argue thatour self-ownershipis inalienable.58Indeed,theprefaceof Two Treatises,in whichhe statesthathehopesthathiswords“aresufficienttoestablishtheThroneofourGreatRestorer,Our presentKingWilliam; to makegoodhis Title, in the Consentof the People,which being the only one of all lawful Governments,he hasmorefully andclearlythananyPrincein Christendom,”59indi-catesthat theargumentsareintendedto overthrowStuartdes-potismandusherin aneraof liberty. (Remarkably,oneof theprincipalpopularcomplaintsagainsttheStuartswas theirpat-entpolicy.)60

Ownershipin ourselvesis the foundation for ownershipofalienableobjectsbecausetheybecomeassimilatedto ourbod-ies.6’ At ahighly strategicpoint in his argument~Locke raisesthe following problem:

He that is nourishedby the Acorns he pickt up under anOak, or theAppleshegatheredfrom theTreesin theWood,has certainly appropriatedthem to himself. No Body candenybut the nourishmentis his. I ask then,Whendid theybegin to be his? Whenhe digested?Or when he eat? Orwhenhe boiled?Or whenhe broughtthemhome?Or whenhe pickt them up?62

Clearly,to forceamanto disgorgehis mealafterhe haseatenitwould be to infringe his rights to his own body. But at whatpointdoesit becomesointimatelyrelatedto him, “so his, [thatis], apart of him, thatanothercanno longerhaveanyright toit,”63 that to takeit from him would be an injustice?Locke set-ties on the transformationof the objectthrough labor as thedemarcationpoint: “And ‘tis plain, if the first gatheringmadethemnot his, nothingelsecould. Thatlabourput adistinctionbetweenthem andcommon.That addedsomethingto themmorethanNature,the commonMother of all, haddone;andso

Id. at 328.58. Id. at325.59. Id. at 171.60. SeeC. MACLEOD. INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOurrIoN: THE ENGLISH PArENr

SYSTEM, 1660.1800(1988).61. SeeWheeler,Natural PropertyRightsasBodyRights, 14 Nous171 (1980).62. J. LOCKE, supranote42, at 329-30.63. Id. at 328.

834 HarvardJournal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 13

theybecamehis privateright.”~If thehinge to aLockeanlabor theory of property,then, is

ownershipin ourselves(as I believeit is), the fact thathis twoadditional supplementaryargumentspoint toward a form of“property” thatwould infringe on our ownershipin ourselves(ascopyrightsandpatentsdo) indicatesthattheyshouldbede-tachedfrom theargumentfrom self-ownershipascontradictoryto it. If onewishedto insist on thejusticeof intellectualprop-ertyclaims,ownershiprights in ourselveswouldhaveto bere-jected as a foundation for property and independentargumentsofferedfor rewardingmoral desertbasedon labor.This is a difficult task, andone thathas not beenadequatelyundertaken,for reasonsthat Hume, Kant, and others havepointedout: deserthasno principle, thatis, no readilyavailableand intersubjectivelyascertainablemeasure.65Such an inher-ently subjectivestandardprovidesa poor foundationfor theabstractandgeneralrules thatguide conductin agreatsoci-ety.66In agreatsociety,not all labor is rewarded;67andnot allof the rewardsto laborarein the form of propertyrights.68

Our ownershiprights in ourselvesarebasedon our naturalfreedom,andareindeedsynonymouswith it; theycannotrest

64. Id. at 830.65. As DavidHumenotes,

‘Twerebetter,no doubt,thateveryonewerepossess’dofwhat is mostsuita-ble to him,andproperfor hisuse:But besides,thatthis relationoffitnessmaybecommonto severalatonce,‘tis liabletoso manycontroversiesandmenareso partialandpassionatein judging of thesecontroversies,thatsuchalooseanduncertainrulewou’dbeabsolutelyincompatibLewith thepeaceof humansociety.

D. HUME, A TRa~vnsEOF HUMAN NATURE 502(P. Nidditch ed.1978);seealsoF. HAYEK,THE FATAL CONCEIT:THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 78-75(1989).

66. FrankKnight hascharacterizedthe patentsystemas“an exceedinglycrudewayof rewardinginvention,” for

as the thing works out, it is undoubtedlya very rareandexceptionalcasewherethereally deservinginventorgetsanythinglike afair reward.If anyonegains, it is somepurchaseroftheinventionorat bestaninventorwho addsadetailor finishing touchthatmakesanideapracticablewheretherealwork ofpioneeringandexplorationhasbeendoneby others.

F. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PRoFIT 372 (1921).67. Indeed,oftenthe greatestrewardsgo to thosewho have—inthe usualsenseof

theword—laboredtheleast.Wemayowemoreto thelaziestamongus: to thepersonwho wastoolazy to carry loadsby handandcameupontheideaof usingawheelbar-row, for example.Attemptsto reducesuchdifferentialsin productivityto asubstrataofundifferentiatedlaborareinherendydoomed,asthefailed attemptofMarxist systemsindicates.

68. Therewardto laborfor inventivenessin marketing,for example,is greatersalesor marketshare,not propertyrights in marketingtechniquesor (leastplausibly) inmarketshare.

No. 3] Are Patentsand CopyrightsMorallyJustified? 885

on labor-basedmoraldesert,aswearenot theproductsof ourown labor. But that is the subjectof thenext sectionof thisArticle.

III. PERSONALITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYRIGHTS

Thedevelopmentof personalityhasbeenlinked to propertyrights by a numberof pro-propertywriters, notably the Ger-manclassicalliberal Wilhelm von Humboldt. In his seminalwork, The Limits of StateAction, von Humboldt declaredthat“[t]he true endofMan. . .is thehighestandmostharmoniousdevelopmentof his powers to a completeand consistentwhole.”69Further,he wrote:

[R]easoncannotdesirefor man any other conditionthanthat in which eachindividual not only enjoysthemostabso-lute freedomof developinghimselfby his own energies,inhis perfect individuality, but in which eachexternalnatureitself is left unfashionedby anyhumanagency,but only re-ceivesthe impressgiven to it by eachindividual by himselfandof his own free will, to the measureof his wants andinstincts,andrestrictedonly by the limits of his powersandhisrights.7°

“Every citizen,” writes von Humboldt,“must be in a positionto actwithout hindranceandjust ashe pleases,solong as hedoesnot transgressthelaw.. . - If he is deprivedof this liberty,thenhis right is violated,and the cultivation of his faculties—thedevelopmentofhis individuality—suffers.”7’

Respectfor propertyis intimatelyrelatedto this selfdevelop-ment. “[T]he ideaof propertygrows only in companywith theideaof freedom,andit is to thesenseofpropertythatwe owethemost vigorousactivity.”72 Provisionof securityfrom exter-nal forceis theproperendof government:“I call the citizensofa Statesecure,when, living togetherin thefull enjoymentoftheir due rights of personand prop~erty,they areout of thereachof any externaldisturbancefrom theencroachmentsofothers . . . .

This line of argument—derivingpropertyfrom therequire-

69. W. VON HUMBOLDT, THE LIMITS OF STATE AcrioN 16 (J. Coulthardtrans.,J.W.Burrow ed. 1969).

70. Id. at20.21.71. Id. at 116.72. Id. at89.73. Id.at 83.

Ilarvarajournat of Law C~tuotw rotwy L.voL. io

mentsofpersonaldevelopment—seemsin somewaysarestate-ment of Locke’s basicargument,74but with a different twist.Ratherthanemphasizethe satisfactionof man’smaterialwantsand,throughthat, fulfillment of God’sinjunctionto manin theGardenof Eden to prosperand multiply, von Humboldtem-phasizesthe developmentof humanpotential.75The key toboth theLockeanandtheHumbolteanargumentsis ownershipin ourselves,with statepowerseverelyconstrainedandlimitedto the protectionof liberty. As J.W. Burrow notes,“[Hum-boldt’s] view of the State’sfunctionsmaynot differ in practicefrom a naturalrights theoryofthetraditionalLockeankind.”76

In practice,theLockeanandvonHumboldteanliberty-basedargumentsfor propertyarefundamentallythesame,althoughtheemphasisdiffers. At base,eachis intimatelyconcernedwithfreedom.Indeed,von Humboldt’sargumentagainstthevalid-ity of testamentarydispositionsthat go beyondmeretransfer-enceof property titles to one’s heirs shows the primacy offreedomin his theory:

[A]s long as he lives, manis free to disposeof histhings ashepleases,to alienatethemin partor altogether—theirsub-stance,use,or possession;. . . But heis in no wayentitledtodefine, in anyway bindingon others,whatshallbedonewithhispropertyafterhis decease,or to determinehowits futurepossessoris to act. . . . [This] restrictsthat freedomwhich isessentialto humandevelopment,andso runs counter toeveryprinciple we haveput forward.77

This argumentfrom personalityoffers little supportfor pat-entsandcopyrights,and,like otherargumentsfrom ownershiprights in ourselves,would be morelikely to undercutclaimsforintellectualpropertyrights.

74. Seesupranotes53-67andaccompanyingtext.75. As theEnglishLevellerleaderRichardOvertonsimilarly argued,

ToeveryIndividual] in nature,is givenanindividuall propertyby nature,notto beinvadedorusurpedby any: for everyoneasheis himselfe,so hehathaselfepropriety,elsecouldhenot behimselfe,andon thisno secondmaypre-sumeto depriveanyof, without manifestviolation andaffrontto theveryprin-ciplesofnature,andoftheRulesofequityandjusticebetweenmanandman;mine andthine cannotbe,exceptthis be:No manhathpowerovermy rightsandliberties, andI overno mans;I maybebut anIndividuall,enjoymyselfeandmy selfepropriety,andmay write my selfe no more then my selfe, orpresumeanyfurther. .

Overtop,AnArrowAgainstAll 1)ranb, ~flTHE LEVELLERS IN THE ENGLISH REvourrIoN68 (G.E. Aylmered. 1975).

76. Burrow, Editor’s Introduction to W. VON HUMBOLDT, su,branote 69. at xxxix.77. W. VON HUMBOLDT, supra note69, at 96.97.

No. 3] Are Patentsand CopyrightsMorally Justified? 887

A superficiallysimilar,but in reality very differentargumentbasedon personality, is offered by Hegel in his PhilosophyofRight.78Unlike von Humboldt’s appealto thedevelopmentofpersonality,theHegelianargumentseespropertynot only asanecessaryconditionfor thisdevelopment,but as themanifesta-tion of this developmentitself. In the Phenomenologyof Spirit,Hegelemphasizedthat it is throughwork that thespirit comesto know itself.79 In the Philosophyof Right, a treatiseon law,propertyfills theroleof work. Notably,thediscussionofprop-erty culminatesin patentsandcopyrights.For Hegel,personal-ity forms the foundationof any systemof rights: “Personalityessentiallyinvolves the capacity for rights andconstitutestheconceptandthebasis(itselfabstract)of thesystemofabstractand thereforeformal right. Hencethe imperativeof right is:‘Be a personandrespectothersaspersons.’“80

Personalitymust be translatedfrom merepotentiality intoactuality,or, in Hegelianterms, from Concept(Begrij) to Idea(Idee).

A personmust translatehis freedominto an externalspherein order to exist as Idea.Personalityis the first, stillwholly abstract,determinationof the absoluteandinfinitewill, andthereforethis spheredistinctfrom theperson,thespherecapableof embodyinghis freedom,is likewisedeter-mined as what is immediatelydifferent andseparablefromhim.8’

Hegelspecifically eschewsutilitarianjustifications for prop-erty, for “[i}f emphasisis placedon my needs,then theposses-sion of property appearsas a meansto their satisfaction,butthetruepositionis that, from thestandpointoffreedom,prop-erty is thefirst embodimentof freedomandso is in itselfasub-stantiveend,”82

Themetaphysicalgroundingof this theoryof private prop-erty is straightforward:“Since my will, as thewill of a person,

78. SeeG. HECEL, Pnu.osopHvOF RIGHT (F. Knox trans. 1952).79. SeeG. HEGEL,, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (A.V. Miller trans.1977).80. 0. HEGEL, supranote78, at87. Knox points to asimilarity in the treatmentof

Bildung (loosely translatableas “education”or “spiritual development”)in both vonHumboldtandHegel.Seeid. at815 n.58.Thedifferenëeis thatwhereasvonHumboldtsawthe role of the statein the processof Bildung as“negative,” that is, protectingcitizensfromviolencebut otherwisekeepingoutof theway, Hegelseesapositiverolefor thestatein this process.Seeid.

81. Id. at 40.82. Id. at42.

838 HarvardJournal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. iS

and so asa singlewill, becomesobjectiveto me in property,propertyacquiresthecharacterofprivateproperty. ~ Per-sonalitydoesnot simply requireexternalobjectsfor its devel-opment. Its development is its objectification throughexternalizationof its will.

Occupancy,not labor, is the actby whichexternalthingsbe-comeproperty:“The principlethata thingbelongsto theper-son who happensto be the first in time to take it into hispossessionis immediatelyself-explanatoryandsuperfluous,be-causeasecondpersoncannottakeinto his possessionwhat isalreadythepropertyof another.”84This occupancy,or takingpossession,can take threeforms: (1) by directly graspingitphysically, (2) by forming it, and(3) by merely marking it asours.85It is thesecondof theseformsofpossessionthatis mostinterestingfor ourpurposes. As Hegelremarks,“WhenI im-poseaform on something,thething’sdeterminatecharacterasmine acquiresan independentexternalityandceasesto bere-strictedto my presencehereandnow and to the directpres-enceof my awarenessand will.”86

Unlike Locke,Hegeldoesnotseemanas naturallyfree, andthereforeashavingnatural,orpre-historicownershiprights inhimself. It is only throughthehistoricalprocessofobjectifica-tion andhenceself-confrontationthatonecomesto befree:“Itis only through the developmentof his own body andmind,essentiallythroughhis self-consciousness’sapprehensionofit-selfasfree,thathe takespossessionofhimselfandbecomeshisown propertyandno one else’s.”87

85. Sd.84. Sd. at 45. Further,“[s]ince propertyis theembodimentof personality,my inward

ideaandwill that somethingis to bemine is not enoughto make it my property;tosecurethis endoccupancyis requisite.” Id. (emphasisin original).

85. Id. at 46.86. Id. at 47. This is the “modeof taking possessionmost in conformity with the

Ideato thisextent, thatit impliesaunionof subjectandobject.. . .“ Sd.87. Id. This process,asHegel remarksin his notes,is the sameasthe diaLecticof

lordandbondsmandescribedin thePhenomenokgyofSp&nt. Remarkably,self-ownershipemergesonly attheendofahistoricalprocessofself-confrontationthroughpossessionofandtransformationoftheexternalworld.Theanti-liberal characterof Hegel’sap-proachis mademostclearin his identificationof the“Idea” of freedom(its concretionandsynthesiswith thecontentof its concept)with thestate:

But thatobjectivemind, thecontentof theright, shouldno longerbeappre-hendedin itssubjectiveconceptalone,andconsequentlythatman’sabsoluteunfitnessfor slaveryshould no longerbeapprehendedasa mere‘ought tobe’, is somethingwhich doesnot comehometo ourmindsuntil we recognizethat the Ideaoffreedomis genuinelyactualonly asthestate.

Id. at 48.

No. 3] Are Patentsand CopyrightsMorally Justified? 839

Whenit comesto intellectualproperty,Hegel doesnot gonearlyas far as his epigoni, suchasGierke and Kohler. LikeKant, heoffers greatprotectionto literaryworks,butvery littleto the plastic arts. Kant arguedfor theprotectionof literaryworks in his essay, “On the Injustice of the Pirating ofBooks.”88A brief digressionon Kant’s theoryof copyright isappropriatehere,after which we shallreturn to Hegel’s treat-ment,andto its reformulationandextraordinaryextensioninmorerecentyears.

In anotherofKant’s essays,What is a book?,he identifiedtheequivocaluseoftheterm“book” asthesourceofthecopyrightdispute.

The basiccauseof an appearanceoflegality in somethingthat is nevertheless,at the first inspection,such an injus-lice—asbook piracy is—lies in this: thatthe book is, on theonehand,a corporealproductofart (opusnzechanicum),whichcanbe copied(by him, whofinds himselfin legalpossessionof an exemplarof this product)—consequentlyhas a realright therein;on the otherhand,however, a book is alsomerelyan addressof the publisherto thepublic, which thispublisher,without having the authorizationthereto of theauthor,maynot publicly repeat(praestatiooperae)—apersonalright; andnow the error consistsin this, that the two areconfusedwith eachother.89

Thus,a “book” is both thecorporealthing I hold whenI read(“my book”), andalso the addressby onepersonto another(the“author’sbook”). Kantarguedthatabookorotherliteraryproductis not simply “a kind ofmerchandise,”but an “exerciseofhis [theauthor’s]powers(opera),which he cangrantto others(concedere),but canneveralienate.”90A copier,or infringer, of-fersto the public thethoughtsofanother,theauthor.Thatis,he speaksin theauthor’sname,whichhe canproperlydo onlywith permission.The author has given permission,however,only to his authorizedpublisher,who is wrongedwhena bookedition is pirated.

The extensionof sucha personalright beyonda realright isshownin thecaseof thedeathofanauthorprior to publicationofhis work:

88. SeeKant,VondeeUnrechtsmdssigkeitdesBãehernachdnicks,in 2 COPYRIGHTS AND PAT-ENTS FOR INVENTIONs 580 (R. MacFieed. 1888).

89. Kant, Wasitt an Bash?,in DIE MF.rAPnvsIx DIE SITFEN 405 (F. Palmertrans.,W.Weischedeled. 1977).

90. Kant,supra note88, at 582.

840 HaruardJournal ofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. iS

Thatthepublisherdoesnotconducthis businessin his ownname,but in thatofanother,is confirmedby certainobliga-tions which areuniversallyacknowledged.Weretheauthorto dieafterhehadconfidedhis [manuscript]to thepublisherfor printing andthepublisherhadagreedto theconditions,still thepublisheris not free.In defaultof heirs, the publichasa right to compelhim to publish it, or to give over the[manuscript]to anotherwho may offer himselfas publisher.For it hadbeena businesswhich theauthor,throughhim,wishedto carry on with thepublic, and for which heofferedhimselfas agent.[H]e [the publisher]possessesthe [manu-script] only on conditionthat heshall useit with the publicin theinterestof theauthor.If thepublishershouldmutilateor falsify the work after the deathof the author,or if heshouldfail in producinganumberofcopiesequalto thede-mand,thenthepublic wouldhavetheright to requirehim toenlargethe edition andto exactgreateraccuracy,and,if herefusedto meetthesedemands,to go elsewhereto getthemcompliedwith.9’

Importantly,Kant limits theserightsagainstcopiersor muti-lators to literary productsanddenies themto the plasticandrepresentationalarts.92Kant wrote:

Works of art, as things,can, on the contrary,from acopy ofthem which has beenlawfully procured,be imitated, mod-elled,and thecdpiesopenlysold, without the consentof thecreatorof their original,or of thosewhom hehasemployedto carry out his ideas. A drawing which some one hasdesigned,or throughanothercausedto becopiedin copperorstone,metalorplasterofParis,canby thosewho buy theproductionbeprintedor cast,andsoopenlymadetraffic of.So with all which anyoneexecuteswith his ownthingsandin hisown name,theconsentofanotheris not necessary.Forit is a work—anopus, not an operaalterius—whicheachwhopossesses,without evenknowing thenameof the artist,candisposeof, consequentlycan imitate, andin his own nameexposefor saleashis own.But thewriting of anotheris thespeechof aperson—opera—andhewhopublishesit canonlyspeakto thepublic in thenameoftheauthor.Hehimselfhasnothing further to say than that the author, throughhim,makesthe following speechto the public.93

Thus,thekeyto Kantiancopyrightis speech;whenno speechispresent,no copyrightaccruesto the creator.Accordingly,Kantclaimedconsistentlythat translationsor derivativeworks can-

91. Id. at 584.92. This may reflect thefact thatKant wasawriterandnot a sculptor.93. Id. at 585.


not be restrictedby copyright: “He [an editor] representshim-self, not as thatauthoras if he werespeakingthroughhim,butas another.Translationinto anotherlanguageis alsonot in-fringement,for it is not thevery speechoftheauthoralthoughthethoughtsmaybe thesame.”94

Like Kant, Hegel arguesthat artistic reproductionsare “sopeculiarly thepropertyof the individual artist that acopy of awork of art is essentiallyaproductof thecopyist’s ownmentaland technicalability,” while thereproductionofliterary worksor of inventions“is of a mechanicalkind.”95 Hegel declaredfurther that “this powerto reproducehasaspecialcharacter,viz, it is thatin virtue ofwhich thethingis notmerelyaposses-sion but acapitalasset.”96The right of reproductionof inven-tions or literary works derives from their nature as capitalassets,andnot merepossessions.Theyyieldan incomestream,the diminution of whichsubstantiallydiminishes the value ofthe capital.

The theoriesof personalrights andof personalityset forthby Kant and Hegel havebeenextendedin the last hundredyearsorso to embracea rangeofrights to artisticproductionsfar wider thantheyenvisioned.Indeed,theseallegedrightsarenot, like Anglo-Americancopyrights,fully alienable,but are,asthe French 1957 Law on Artistic andLiterary Property97de-clares, “perpetual, inalienable, and imprescriptible.”98 Sub-stantial efforts have been made to import this notion intoAmericanlaw, muchof themoccasionedby theintroductionofthe techniqueof “colorizing” films originally producedinblack-and-white.99

As developedunder Frenchlaw, four suchpersonalrightsareretainedby artists: theright of disclosure,theright of attri-bution, the right of integrity, and the right of retraction.’0°

94. Id.95. G. HEGEL,supranote78, at 54.96. Id. at 55.97. C. civ. art. 548,Codepenal(C.pCn.Iarts.425.429(“Law of March 11, 1957 on

literaryandartisticproperty”);seealso Loi du 11 mars 1957cur Iapropriétélittéraireetartistique,1957JournalOfficiel de Ia RepubliqueFrançaiseU.O.1 2728,1957 RecuetlDailoz Legislation [D.L.] 102 (for amendmentsand casesinterpretingthestatute).

98. Sd.99. Foranoverviewof theproposedlegislation,aswell asa discussionof thepros

andconsof theseproposals,seeDonnelly,Artist’s Rightsandcopyrights, i CoNG.QUAR-TERLY’s RES.REP. 245 (1988);seealso Wash.Post,May 22, 1988,at Fl, col. I.

100. See Damich, TheRightof Personality:A Common-LawBasisfor the Protection of theMoral RightsofAuthors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, ~6-25(1988).

1-laroarajournal oj Law C5 ruoucrotwy iv us. su

Ratherthanofferinga surveyofsomeof themoreoutréresultsof this law, I will presentinsteadabriefstatementof its theo-reticalgrounding.

Such rights enteredthe law (in France,at least, the placewhere they have receivedthe greatestlegal recognition) incourtdecisionsgoverningthe divisionof artisticproperty. In a1902 casebeforethehighestFrenchcourt, theCourt of Cassa-don, thecourthadto considerwhethertheex-wife ofanartisthadthe right to sharein the commercialexploitsof her hus-band’swork.’°’Thecourt ruledthat shehadaright to a shareoftheeconomicproceeds,but thatthisdecisionwouldnot “de-tract from therightoftheauthor,inherentin his personality,oflatermodifying his creation,or evensuppressingit”102

JosefKohler, authorofan influential treatiseon law, argued:“Personalitymustbepermittedto be active, that is to say, tobringits will to bearandrevealits significanceto the world; forculture can thrive only if personsare able to expressthem-selves,andarein apositionto placeall theirinherentcapacitiesat the commandof theirwill.”03 So far, this soundsfamiliar.But, Kohierarguedfurther:

[T]he writer cannot only demandthat no strangework bepresentedashis, butthathisownwork not bepresentedin achangedform. Theauthorcanmakethis demandevenwhenhe hasgiven up his copyright.This demandis not so muchanexerciseofdominionovermy ownwork, asit is of domin-ion overmy being,overmy personalitywhich thus gives metheright to demandthatno oneshallsharein m~5personalityandhavemesaythingswhichI havenot said.’

Damageto a work of art, evenafter ownershiprights to ithavebeentransferredto anotherparty,constitutesdamagetothepersonalityof thecreator;theworkof artis anextensionofthepersonalityofthecreator.Thus, accordingto Kohier, issu-ing anunauthorized,orbowdlerized,editionof anauthor’swork,hangingredribbonson asculpture,ortearingdownapieceofsculptureevenso offensively ugly asRichard Serra’s“Tilted

101. Cinquin v. Lecocq,Req.Sirey, 1900.2.121,note Saleilles(1902) (cited in S.STROMHOLM, I La Daon~MORAL DE L’AUTEUR 285 (1966)).

102. S. STROMHOLM, supranote 101. at 285.108.J. KOHLER, PHILOSOPHY OF Law 80 (G. Albrechttrans. 1914).104.J. KOHLER, URHEBERRECET AN SCHRWFWERKEN UND VERLAGSRECHT 15 (1907)

(quotedin Damich,.supranote 100, at 29);seealso Katz, The Doctrine ofMoral Right andAmericanCopyrightLaw—AProposal,24 S. C~u..L. REV. 402(1951).


Arc” (aswasrecentlydonein NewYork), all constitutedamageto the personalityof the creator.

In fact, the relationshipbetweencreatorandcreationis sointimate that whenthe personalityof theformerchanges,sotoo can the treatmentof the latter. Underarticle 32 of theFrench 1957Law, for example:“Notwithstandingthe transferof his right of exploitation,the author,evenafter thepublica-tion of his work, enjoysa right of modification or withdrawalvis-a-vishis transferee.”°5

Theconceptofpersonalrightshasalsobeenextendedto en-compassthe so-calleddroit tie suite,or inalienableresaleroyaltyrights.Accordingto this idea,a partofFrenchlaw’°6andrela-tively recentlyadoptedinto law by severalAmerican states,apercentageof theresaleprofits beyondacertainlevel mustbegiven to the original creator.

Objectionsto Personality-BasedIntellectualProperty Theories

At theirfoundation,personality-basedtheoriesofintellectualpropertysufferfrom aconfusionabouttheontologicalstatusofideal objectsand their relationship to their creators.If, asHegel insists, “[a] personmust translatehis freedominto anexternalspherein order to exist as Idea,”107 this doesnotmeanthatthis “translation” is constitutiveof theperson‘him-self, nor that the artifacts resulting from this translationbe-comeinextricablyboundup with theperson.This is especiallyobviousin thecaseofsuchartifactsasapuffofsmoke,a tracingin the sand,or a knot in apieceof rope.Thesmokemaydissi-pate;thetracingmaybewashedawayby thetide; theknotmaycomeundone;but in noneof thesecasesis thepersonalityofthecreatordiminished,

Most claims on behalfof personality-basedrights arecon-fined to “artistic” creations. Thus, CongressmanEdwardJ.Markey (D-MA) arguesthat: “A work of art is not a utilitarianobject, like a toaster;it is acreativework, like asong,apoem,

108. C. civ. art. 548,Codepenal (C.pCn.] arts.425.429,art. 84. Damich, however,arguesthat,dueto difficultiespresentedby practicalapplicationandconflictwith otherrights, the right of retractionis “a ‘dead letter’ evenin Frenchlaw.” Damich,supranote 100, at 25.

106. C. civ. art.548,Codepenal[C.pCn.] arts.425-429(“Theauthorsof graphicorplasticworksof arthave,notwithstandinganytransferoftheoriginalwork, aninaliena-ble right to participatein the productof all salesof this work madeat auctionorthroughtheintermediationof dealers

107. G. HEGEL, .supranote78, at 40.•t*4

~44 HarvardJournalofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. 13

ora novel.We shouldnotpretendthatall connectionbetweentheartist andthe creationis severedthe first time thework issold.”°8

RepresentativeMarkey, like thephilosopherswho haveinflu-encedhim,hasmisunderstoodtheontologyof thework ofart.The connectionbetween“theartist andthecreation”is indeedsevered,not thefirst time thework is sold,but themomentthatit is finished.’09

Referentsofdiscoursecanenjoyvariouskinds ofdependentbeing. They may, for example, be dependentupon anotherthing, as in the brightnessof asurfacebeing“dependent”onthesurface,or theymaybedependentin anotherway, as in theway thatahandis dependentfor its beingon thebody to whichit is attached,althoughthehandandthebody maybecomesep-arated,unlike the surfaceandthebrightness.t’0

Twosensesof dependenceareconfusedby advocatesofper-sonality-basedintellectualpropertytheories:the dependenceof theart work on ahumanagentor agentsfor its creation,andthe dependenceof thatsameworkof art on ahumanagentoragentsfor its continuedexistence.While a work of art obvi-ously dependson its creator(s)for its creation,andis thereforea “translationofhis freedominto anexternalsphere,”onceitis createdit enjoysits ownobjectivity.Thesignthatanartworkexistsas an objectivity is thatwecanalwaysreturnto it andfindthe samework. We do not experiencea differentwork everytime we seeor readShakespeare’sOthello.”

Oncecreated,works of artareindependentoftheircreators,as shouldbeevidentby the fact thatworksof art do not “die”whentheir creatorsdo. While no longerdependenton theircreators,theyneverthelessremaindependenton somehuman

108. Markey, LetArtuis Havea Fair Shareof TheirProfits, N.Y. Times,Dec. 20, 1987,§ 5, at 2, col. 2.

109. This of courseraisesthe questionof when thework is finished. Who wouldknowwhenit wasfinished? Would anyoneelseundertaketo finish Schubert’s“Unfin-ishedSymphony”?Theartistmayindeedbein theprivilegedpositionofdeterminingwhena work is finished, but thatdoesnot privilege the subjectiveexperienceof theartist in the constitutionof theart work assuch.

110. Thestrategicdifferentiationbetweenvariouskindsofdependenceis elaboratedin Husserl,InvestigationIII: On the Theorj of Wholesand Parts, in 2 LOGICAL INVESTIGA-TIONS 436 0. Findlay trans.1970);seealso PARTS AND MOMENTS: STUDIES IN LoGic AND

FORMAL ONTOLOGY (B. Smithad. 1982).111. I usedthe possessive—”Shakespeare’s”—indescribingthis play to highlight

therelationshipofdependencethat thework doeshaveonits author.Shakespearehasbeendeadfor centuries,while Othello lives on. Onemight say, however,thatShake-speare’smind remainsactiveor still “lives” in Othello.


agencyfor their continuedexistence.The agentstheydependon, however,arenot artists,but audiences,”2

Romanticnotionsof creativity, which stresssubjectiveexpe-rienceandits expression,emphasizethe sublimeexperienceofthe artist. The reproductionof this experienceis what consti-tutesthe artisticattitude.The artist recreatesher own experi-ence in the audience by means of artistic works orperformances.But theconcreteexperienceoftheartist cannotbe identicalwith theconcreteexperienceof theaudience—thereaders,listeners,orviewers.In oppositionto theromanticno-tionsofart takenup in personalitytheoriesofintellectualprop-erty, with their emphasison the subjective,RomanIngardenarguesthattheidentificationof thework ofartwith its creator’ssubjectiveexperienceswould meanthat “it would be impossi-bleeitherto haveadirectintercoursewith thework orto knowit.”118

The reasonis that everythingthatwould be directlyaccessi-ble to us—exceptfor the perceivedcharacters—wouldbeonly our ideas,thoughts,or, possibly,emotionalstates.Noonewouldwant to identify theconcretepsychiccontentsex-periencedby us during the readingwith the alreadylong-goneexperiencesof theauthor.Thus,thework is eithernotdirectly comprehensible,or else it is identicalwith our ex-periences.Whateverthe case,theattemptto identify the lit-erary work with a manifold of the author’s psychicexperiencesis quiteabsurd.Theauthor’sexperiencesceaseto exist themoment the work createdby him comesintoexistence.”4

In addition,as Ingardenpoints out,wewould haveto askhowwecouldexcludefrom anauthor’sexperiences“a toothachehemight havehad in the courseof writing,” while simultaneouslyincludingin his work “the desiresof acharacter.. . which theauthorhimselfcertainlydid not,andcouldnot, ~

The fact that two of uscanappreciatethe “same”work, (say,for example,a sonata),althoughwe eachundergo differentperceptualexperiences(youarein thefront ofthehall, I amat

112. Ofcourse,anartist mayalsobeherown audience,butwe areherespeakingofidealroles;oneandthesamepersonmay fulfill variousroles.Whentheterm“artist” isused,it will be understoodthatartist qua artist is meant,andsimilarly of otherroles,suchas“audience.”

~18. R. INGARDEN, THE LITERARY WORK OF ART 13-14(1973).114. Id.115. Id. at 14.


theback,etc.),indicatesthat thework enjoysat leastaninter-subjectiveavailability.Wedo not saythatwe went to two differ-ent performances,nor that we heard two different sonatas,simply becauseourperceptions(or impressions)werenot en-tirely thesame.TheobjectivityofShakespeare’sOthello consistsin preciselythis: that thereis one Othello for all of us, ratherthanone Othello for eachof us, or evenone for eachof ourseparatereadingsor viewingsof theplay.”6

Eachseparateperformanceof Othello is a real event,andassuchis governedby propertyrights (therights of self-owner-ship of the actors,the propertyrights of the theaterowners,etc.),while Othello itself is neithera realeventnorarealobject.While thework ofart doesindeedoriginatein a definite time,as Ingardenriotes:

not everythingwhich originates in a definite time mustthereforebesomethingreal. . . , Every realobjectandeveryrealeventis, aboveall, somethingwhichexistsor takesplacehic et nunc.But. . . the categoriesofhere and now cannotbeappliedto the musicalwork andits content. . . . What is itsupposedto mean, for example, that Beethoven’ssonata,Qpuc13, is ‘here’?Whereis ‘here’?”7

The sameness,intersubjectivity, and objectivity of the workareintimatelyrelated.Withoutamanifoldof appearances—likepresentationsandinterpretations—thework cannotappeartousas “the same”;without appearingto us as thesame,it can-not be intersubjective;andwithout intersubjectivity, it cannotbe objective.In thedialecticofsameandother,wecannothavetheformerwithoutthe latter;we cannothave“same”without“other.” Thus, wecannothavethesamenessofa work ofart

116.This is whataccountsfor thenon-rivalrousnatureof theconsumptionofworksof art andotherideal objects;theirenjoymentby onepersonneednot diminish theirenjoymentby another.This also showsthe differencebetweenthe concretionof awork, like a performance,andthe work itself. My enjoymentof aperformancemaydiminish your ability to enjoy the sameperformance,perhapsbecauseI block yourview, butit doesnot exhaustor in anyway diminish thework itself. It is for this reasonthatThomasJeffersondeniedanynaturalpropertyright in idealobjects:“If naturehasmadeanyonethinglesssusceptiblethanallothersofexclusiveproperty,it is theactionof the thinking powercalledan idea, whichanindividual may exclusivelypossessaslongashekeepsit to himself; but the momentit is divulged, it forcesitselfinto thepossessionof everyone,andthe receivercannotdispossesshimselfof it. Its peculiarcharacter,too, is that no one possessesthe less,becauseeveryother possessesthewhole of it. He who receivesanideafrom me, receivesinstruction himselfwithoutlesseningmine;as hewho lights his taperat mine, receiveslight without darkeningme.” Jefferson,Letter to IsaacMcPherson,Monticello, August13, 1813, in XIII THE WRIT-INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 826-88 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904).

117. R. INGARDEN, ONTOLOGY OF THE WORK OF ART 85.86(1989).

No. 3] Are Patentsand CopyrightsMorallyJust!fied? 847

without a manifold of othernessin which its samenesscanap-pearas an immanentpoleofunity.”8

Thus,aworkof artenjoysits peculiarkind of objectivity onlythrougha multitude of presentationsandinterpretationsthatprovide the manifold within which it canappearas the same,n~tonly to oneinterpreter,but to many.”°Thespecialkind ofobjectivityenjoyedby art is called“heteronomy”by RomanIn-garden.’2°Theart work is objective,but “other ruled.”

This situationofbeing“other ruled” arisesfrom the depen-denceof the art work not only on thecreativeactivity of theartistbut—evenmore—ontheactivity of its audience.In orderto exist asan artwork, an objectmusthaveanaudiencethatcanappreciateit, that is, anaudiencewith theappropriateca-pacities.’2’An audienceofthetonedeafwould beincapableof

118. SeeR. SoxoLowsxi,HUSSERLIAN MEDITATIONS 99 (1974) (“Every ‘cultural ob-ject’ which requiresa performanceto be actualized—amusicalcomposition,aplay,dance,or poem—appearsthroughamanifoldof interpretations.All of thempresenttheobjectitself, andtheobjectis the identity within theinterpretations.”);seealso R.INGARDEN, supranote 117,at 36 (“[H]ow doesaliteraryworkappearduringreading,andwhatis theimmediatecorrelateof this reading?... (A] distinctionshouldbedrawnbetweenthework andits concretions,whichdiffer from it in variousrespects.Theseconcretionsarepreciselywhatis constitutedduringthereadingandwhat,in amannerof speaking,forms themodeof appearanceof awork, theconcreteform in whichtheworkitself is apprehended.”);cf.H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METhOD 274 (1982)(“Inter-pretationis not anoccasionaladditional actsubsequentto understanding,but ratherunderstandingis alwaysaninterpretation,andhenceinterpretationis theexplicit formof understanding.”).Ratherthansimply reproducingtheexperienceof theartist,eachmemberof theaudiencecontributesadifferentinterpretation—theway in which thework “speaksto us” andallows us to learnfromit, ratherthansimply reproducing“inus”someoneelse’sexperience.This manifoldofinterpretationsis whatmakespossiblethespecialkind of intersubjectivityandobjectivity thatworksof art enjoy.The mam-fold of interpretationsprovidethe “other” thatis thenecessarycondition~fortheap-pearanceof the“same.”

119. Forthegeneralapproachto objectivityoutlinedhere,seeE.HUSSERL, FoRMAL.AND TRANSCENDENTAL Looic 282 (1978).

120. R. INGARDEN, supra note 113, at 340, 349; seealso Simons, TheFormalizationofHusserl’sTheo, of WholesandParts,in PMLT5 AND MoMENTs, supranote110,at 185-42(foradiscussionofthekindsofdependenceandindependencesetforthby Ingarden).Notethat,whileI haveearlierusedtheterm“idealobject” to coverall of thesubjectmatterof copyrightsand patents,Ingardenwould limit that term to scientific discoveries,mathematicaltheorems,andthelike (that is, typically to thesubjectmatterofpatents),andwould considerworks of art in a differentcategory,since they comeinto beingduring a definite period of time andare not, unlike what he terms ideal objects,atemporal.

121. SeeR.INGARDEN, supranote113,at340,349;seealsoBarry Smith,PracticesofArt,in Piucric~ KNOWLEDGE: OUTLINES OF A THEORY OF TRADITIONS AND SKILLS 174 Ci.Nyu & Barry Smith ed. 1988) (“Art works aredependent,now, not only upon theactivities of their creators,but alsouponcertaincorrelatedactivitiesof an appropri-atelyreceptiveaudience.A shell, a leaf,orarelicof somelost civilization, existingin aworldlackingeverytendencytowardappreciativeevaluation,would besimplyashell,aleaf,oralump ofstone.”);cfN. GooDMAN, LANGUAGES OFAwi’ 20 (1976)(“The distantorcolossalsculpturehasalsoto beshapedverydifferentlyfrom whatit depictsin order

tiarvardJournal Of Law C~t”UOIZC t’OtZcy Ivol. U)

appreciatingcertainkinds of music; a groupof Kalaharibush-menwould be unlikely to appreciatea playby Moliere; andanaudienceof modernAmericanswould probablynot graspthesubtletiesof Japanese“No” theater.A specialcompetenceispresupposedon thepart ofanaudiencefor awork ofart to bedistinguishedfrom a merething or event.

Thus,if specialpersonalrights governingworksofartaretoberecognizedanywhere,theyshouldbe in theaudience,andnot in theartist, for it is on theaudiencethatthe artwork de-pendsfor its continuedexistence,and not on the artist. Theconceptof thedroit moral for artistsis completelymisguided.Itrevealsafaulty appreciationofthe relationshipbetweenartist,art work, andaudience.’22

If rights do existto enjoyworks unalteredfrom theiroriginalstate,they inhere,asKant noted,not in theartist (or author),but in the audience.A publisherwho passedoff as Shake-speare’sHamleta work thatwasmissingthesoliloquy would bedefraudingthe audience;he would not be doing any harm tothe personalityof the late Mr. Shakespeare.If, however,thework werepublishedas “Shakespeare’sHamlet,MinusVariousIndecisiveParts,” thenthepurchasersofthe work would haveno groundsfor legal complaint.

Personality-basedintellectual property rights attaching tomanufacturingprocessesor algorithmslack any of the specialontological claims of personalrights for artists; the scientistmayrealizehis freedomin his discoveries,the inventorin hisinventions,but thepersonalityofneitheris harmedwhentheirresultsareput to newuses.’23Theseclaimsto propertyrights

to be realistic,in orderto ‘look right.’ And the waysof making it ‘look right’ arenotreducibleto fixed anduniversalrules; for how anobjectlooksdependsnot only uponits orientation,distance,andlighting, butuponall we knowofit anduponourtraining,habits,andconcerns.”).

122. As a practicalmatter,onealso facestheproblemof identifyingjust who theartist is in anycollaborative work. Testifying on behalfof moralrights legislation,filmdirectorandproducerGeorgeLucasreferredto film colorizersandotherswhoalter artworks as “barbarians.”His colleagueStephenSpielberginsistedthat “without theagreementandpermissionofthetwo artisticauthors(theprincipaldirectorandprinci-pal screenwriter), no materialalterations[should]bemadein afilm following its first,paid, publicexhibition.”SeePalmer,ArtistsDon’t DeserveSpecialRights,Wall St.J.,Mar.8,1988,at34, col.5(quotingtestimonythatSpielbergandLucasgaveto SenateSubcom-mittee). But, by his own theory, is not Mr. Spielberg(not to mentionMr. Lucas)abarbarian?Whatof theart of theactors?Whyshouldtheysubmitto havingtheir workdistortedor left on thecuttingroomfloor? Andwhatofthelighting crew,etc.?Arenottheseothercollaboratorsartists?Why shouldonly directorsandscreenwriters enjoysuchmoralrights?

123. Whethertheyareharmedin theeconomicsense,in losingrevenue,is another

No. ~S] Are Patentsand CopyrightsMorallyJvst!fied? S49

asnecessaryto the realizationof freedomreduce,then, to theargumentof Wilhelm vonHumboldt,which,as notedabove,’24

is anotherversionof the principal argumentof John Locke.And this liberty-basedargument,in its primary implications,ishostileratherthanfriendly to intellectualproperty claims, forsuchclaimsrepresentliberty-restrictionson othersin waysthattangiblepropertyrights do not.

As to thedroite desuite,or inalienableresaleroyalty right, theeconomicconsequencesof this notionhavebeenexploredelse-where.’25It should sufficeto point out that this resaleroyaltyright benefits some establishedartists by awarding themunearnedwindfall profits, while others sufferby having theirfreedomto negotiateover theschedule.ofpaymentscoercivelyabridged.The prospectof having to part with ashareof theappreciationof awork is capitalizedinto thesaleprice, mean-ing thatthe moneyreceivedatthepointof saleby the artistwillbe less.’26In addition,like inalienablepersonalrights overartworks, such“rights” reducethe moralagencyof artistsby re-strictingtheir rights to makecontractswith others.The termsof thecontractarefixed by others,andthecontractingpartiesare constrainedfrom freely transferring their property bycontract.

IV. THE BASIC STRUCTUREOF UTILITARIAN ARGUMENTS ANDINTELLECTUAL PROPERTYRIGHTS

As notedearlier,utilitarian argumentsof a certainclasscancut for or againstintellectualpropertyrights claims. As dealtwith in muchof the economicsliterature,for example,‘the util-ity gains from increasedincentivesfor innovation must beweighedagainstthe utility lossesincurredfrom monopoliza-tion of innovationsandtheir diminisheddiffusion, Somehavearguedthatthefirst partof the comparisonmaybeeithernega-

matter;asI havenotedelsewhere,however,purelyutilitarian claimson behalfof intel-lectualpropertyrightsareshaky, at best.SeePalmer,supranote7.

124.Seesupra notes69-77andaccompanyingtext.125.See,e.g.,Rottenberg,TheRemunerationofArtists,in FRONTIERS OF ECONOMICS 47-

51 (K. Arrow & S. Honkapohjaeds. 1985); Bolch, Damon, & Hinshaw,An EconomicAnalysisof theCalifornia Art RoyaltyStatute, 10 C0NN. L. REV. 689 (1978).

126. Thosewho preferpaymentnow to paymentlater,suchasthemanyartistswhosell their work “on thestreet,”areharmedby sucha requirement.As Ben W. Bolchremarks:“Many artists,‘starving’ornot, want theirmoneynow, not tomorrow.Other-wise, theywould‘invest’ in theart by keepingit for themselves.”Bolch, ThereIsNoJustPrice For Art, N.Y. Times,Nov. 28, 1987,at 23, col. 4.

850 HarvardJournal ofLaw & Public Policy [Vol, 18

tive or positive;patentsorcopyrightsmayactuallydecreasein-novation,ratherthanincreaseit. 127

Thus,the specificsituationmattersa greatdealin suchargu-ments.But this kind of utilitarian argumentdoesnot exhausttherangeof possibleutilitarian approaches.Here, I will simplycontrastargumentsof this sort, which I will call “X-maximiza-tion arguments”(with “X” standingin for utility, wealth, orsomeotherwelfare-relatedmaximand),with anothersort ofbroadutilitarian concern:justice-as-order.’28The formerseeksto arrangepropertyrights in suchaway that somequantity ismaximized; the latter seeksto createan overarchingorderwithin which humanbeingscanrealizetheirvariousendswith-out sufferingfrom uncertaintyarising from scarceresources,socialconflict, andviolent predation.’29

X-maximizationargumentsover intellectualpropertyrightshinge on contingentmattersof fact. The relevant facts maychange;technology,socialpractices,andother factorscannotbeheldconstantin therealworld.’3°Scarcityplaysavital rolewithin suchapproaches.Innovationsandresearcharescarceinthesensethat they “useup” resources,and theallocationoftheseresourcesinvolves opportunitycosts,alternativeusesoftheresourceswhich areforegone.Theproblem,then,is to al-locatepropertyrights—includingintellectualpropertyrights—in sucha way that the greatestnet“X” (utility, wealth,andsoon) is producedat the lowestcost.

127. By diminishing pre-patentcooperationamongresearchers,for example,orthroughdiminishing opportunitiesfor playwrights to emulateWilliam Shakespeare,who rewroteThomasKyd’s now-forgottenplay “The SpanishTragedy”andgaveus“Hamlet.” Seealso Bittlingmayer,PropertyRights, Progress,andthe~4ircraftPatentAgreement,30J.L.Sc Ecom. 227 (1988).

128. SeeH.SIDOWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 440(1981)(“What Hume. . , meansbyJusticeis rather what I shouldcall Order ).

129. Aristotle seemsto have usedboth argumentsin his disputewith Platooverthecommunity ofpossessions.In his Politics heargued:“What belongsin commonto themostpeopleis accordedtheleastcare:theytakethoughtfor their ownthingsaboveall,andlessaboutthings common,or only so muchas falls to eachindividually.” A&rs-TOThE, THE Pou’rics57 (C. Lord trans.1984).This corresponds,moreor less,tojus-tice-as-”X-maximization.”He addressesjustice-as.orderlater: “In general, to livetogetherandbepartnersin anyhumanmatteris difficult, andparticularlythingsof thissort (owningcommonproperty].This is clearin partnershipsoffellow travellers,mostof whomarealwaysquarrelingasaresultof friction with oneanother over everydayandsmallmatters.Again, friction particularlyariseswith theservantswe usemostfre-quently for regulartasks.”Id. at60.

130. See,e.g.,E.EI5ENSrEIN,THE PRINTING PREssAS AN AGENT OF CHANGE: COMMU-NICATIONS AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATIONSIN EARLY-MODERN Euaopa(1979) (dis-cussingthe impact of theprinting presson a variety of areas,including intellectualproperty).

No. 8} Are PatentsandCopyrightsMorally Jus1~fied? 851

The role of scarcity within thejustice-as-orderapproachisequallyimportant,but leadsus in an entirely differentdirec-tion. Rights to property are allocatedpreciselybecausethescarcityof resourcesmeansthat,without legaldemarcationandprotectionof rights, humanbeings would comeinto violentconflict over theseresources.

This relationship betweenjustice-as-orderand propertyrights is what Humeis gettingat when he arguesthatwithoutpropertythereis nojustice:

tT]ho’ I assert,that in the state ofnature, or that imaginarystate,which precededsociety,therebe neitherjusticenorinjustice, yet I assertnot, that it was allowable, in such astate,to violate thepropertyof others.I only maintain, thattherewasno suchthingasproperty;andconsequentlycou’dbe no suchthing asjusticeor injustice.’5’

Scarcity in X-maximizationargumentsis therelevantfactorin decidingwhetherintellectualpropertyrights shouldberec-ognized,andif so,whatform theyshouldtake.Scarcityin jus-tice-as-orderargumentsis the relevantfactor in determiningwhenrights canor shouldbegrantedto resourcesoverwhichhumansmay comeinto violent conflict. Intellectualproperty,however,doesnot havethe“static” scarcitythattangibleprop-erty has,andthereforedoesnot qualify as a locus of propertyrightswithin justice-as-orderarguments.’32Two of uscanthinkthesamethought,singthesamesong,orusethesamemethodof making fishhookswithout coming into violent conflict overthethought,song,or method.Justice-as-order,then,is incom-patiblewith intellectualpropertyrights.’33

V. PIGGY-BACKING ON THE RIGHTS TO TANGIBLE PROPERTY

One final argumentfor intellectualproperty rights, or atleastfor copyright,deservesconsiderationbefore turning tothefoundationof a property-rightssystemconsistentwith lib-erty.That is the argumentthatintellectualproperty rights canbe justified as “piggy-back” rights, logical extensionsof the

131. D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 501 (P. Nidditchrev. ed. 1978) (em-phasis in original).

132. Suchobjects,however,mustbeproduced.In thissensethey do sharethekindof scarcityrelevantto theX-maximizationarguments.

133. As I shall argueat the conclusionof this Article, justice-as-orderis consistentwith—indeedit is thegenusfor—theself-ownership,liberty-basedargumentfor prop-erty that, asI havearguedabove,is incansutentwith patentandcopyright.

852 HarvardJournalof Law & Public Policy [Vol. 13

right to own andcontrol tangibleobjects.Thus,Murray Roth-bardjustifies what he incorrectly’34calls “common-lawcopy-right” as amounting to “the author or publisherselling allrights to his propertyexceptthe right to resell it.”t35

Rothbard’s argument implicitly rests on the distinctiondrawnby Kantbetweena“book” (orotherobject)asamaterialthing, anda “book” as thework that is instantiatedin amate-rial object but is capableof being instantiatedin othersuchsubstrataad infinitum.’36Heextendshis argumentbeyondtherealmof literature to includeany artifact that incorporatesorinstantiatesan ideal object,whetheramousetrap(its designortheprocessby which it was made),a map,or a dancestep—which is alwaysmateriallyinstantiatedin someway, whetherina performanceon some pieceof property,or through a de-scription in abook, film, or otherdevice.

This would extendacopyright-typeof protectionto thesub-ject matterof patentsas well. Thus,arguesRothbard:

supposethat Brown builds a bettermousetrapand sells itwidely, but stampseach mousetrap‘copyright Mr. Brown.’Whatheis thendoing is sellingnot theentirepropertyrightin eachmousetrap,but the right to do anythingwith themousetrapexceptto sell it or an identicalcopy to someoneelse.The right to sell the Brown mousetrapis retainedinperpetuityby Brown.‘~

134. See Abrams,TheHi.stoncFoundationofAmericanCopyrightLaw: ExplodingtheMythof CommonLaw Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119 (1983).

155. M. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 144 (1982)(Rothbardseemsto havemadeaslip here;hedoesnot meantheright to “resell” theproperty,buttheright tocopy it).

136. SeeKant,supranote 88andaccompanyingtext.137. M. ROTHBARD, supranote135,at 123.Rothbardseemsto haveconfusedwhatis

beingmadethesubjectofapropertyright. Clearlyhecannotmeantheright to sell theobject,for thennothingthat wascopyrightedcouldberesold,andthe marketsystemwould eithergrind to ahaltor copyrightwould becomeadeadletter.He mustmeantheright to reproduce,ratherthanto resell.Note thatthe argumentRothbardpresentsin TheEthiss of Liberty representsa shift from theargumentpresentedin his earliertreatiseon economics,M. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE: A TREATISE ON Eco-NOMIC PRINCIPLES 654-55(1970),in whichheattackspatentsasmonopolies,butjusti-lies copyrightsasaform of implicit contractualagreementnot to copy.Suchanimplicitagreementdiffers from a right reservedby thecreator.“(T]he inventorcouldmark hismachinecopyright,andthenanyonewhobuys themachinebuys it on thecondition thathewill not reproduceandsell such a machinefor profit. Any violation of this contractwould constituteimplicit theft Id. (emphasisoriginal). Rothbard’smorerecentproposalatleastavoidsthemostobviousproblemwith his earlierposition: whatrightwouldtheoriginatorhaveagainstacopierwho did notbuy theitem, but simplysawit,heardof it, or foundit. Therecouldbeno agreement,implicit orexplicit, on thepartofsuchacopier,andhenceno obligationto refrainfrom copying.Thelater“reservedright” positionallows theright to bereservedregardlessofwhocomesinto possession

i’io. 3j Are PatentsandCopyrightsMorallyJus4fied? 858

Thefact thatapropertyright canbeconceivedasabundleofrights to a thingindicatesthatoneright amongthemany maybe retainedby theoriginal producer,in this case,the right toreproducethe item.Justasa piece of landmay be sold, andcertainrights retained(easements,building restrictions,etc.),soall the rights to amousetrapcould be sold exceptone, theright to copy it. This argumentis not novel, andwas in factcriticizedby Kant andHegel.’38The separationandretentionof theright to copyfrom thebundleofrights thatwecall prop-erty is problematic.Couldonereservethe right, for example,to remembersomething?Supposethat I wrote abook andof-feredit to you to read,but I hadretainedoneright: the right torememberit. Would I be justified in taking you to court if Icould prove that you hadrememberedthe nameof the leadcharacterin thebook?Could theretentionoftheright to copyincludethe right to remember?

Supposethat I hadmemorizedthebook andthenspokethewordsaloud to another.Would I beviolatinga retainedrightto the tangibleobject?’3°Whatif I hadheardanotherpersonrecite the work and then wrote it down and published it?WouldI be guilty of aviolationof the creator’spropertyrights

oftheobject,althoughit might facedifficultiesin enforcingtheclaimagainstsomeonewho, say,recordedanillegally broadcastsongor movie.

138. Kant’s remarksdeserverepeating:“Thosewho regardthe publication of abook astheexerciseof the rightsof propertyin respectofasinglecopy—it mayhavecometo thepossessoras a[manuscript]of theauthor,or asawork printed by somepriorpublisher—andwho yetwould,by thereservationof certainrights (whetherashavingtheirorigin in the authoror in thepublisherin whosefavour hehasdenudedhimselfof them),go on to restricttheexerciseof propertyrights,maintainingtheille-galityofreproduction—willneverattaintheir end. For therightsofan author’regard-inghis own thoughtsremainto him notwithstandingthereprint; andastherecannotbeadistinctpermissiongivento thepurchaserofabookfor,andalimitation of, its useasproperty,howmuchlessis amerepresumptionsufficientfor suchaweightofobliga-tion?” Kant,Lu/ira note88, at 581.Hegelargues:“The substanceof anauthor’sor aninventor’sright cannotin thefirst instancebefoundin thesuppositionthatwhen hedisposesofasinglecopyofhis work, hearbitrarilymakesit acondition thatthepowerto producefacsimilesasthings,apowerwhich thereuponpassesinto another’sposses-sion,shouldnotbecomethepropertyof theotherbutshouldremainhisown.Thefirstquestionis whethersuchaseparationbetweenownershipofthethingandthepowertoproducefacsimileswhichis givenwith thethingis compatiblewith theconceptofprop-erty, or whetherit doesnot cancelthe completeandfreeownershipon which thereoriginally dependstheoption of thesingleproducerof intellectualwork to reservetohimself thepowerto reproduce,or to partwith this powerasa thingof value,or toattachno value to it at all andsurrenderit togetherwith thesingle exemplarof hiswork.” C.. HEGEL, supranote78, at 55.

139. It is importantto rememberthattheretainedright involved is aright to controla tangibleobject.No claim is madeto adirect right to own theidealobjectembeddedin thetangibleobject.Thecontroloverthis idealobjectis anindirectconsequenceofapropertyright overatangibleobject.

S54 HarvardJournal ofLaw & Public Policy [Vol, 13

by publishingawork thatI hadheardanotherrecite?Whatif Irecordeda broadcaston my VCR? Does thebroadcasterownmy televisionsetandreservethe right to determineits useinrecordingsignalsthat comeover theairwaves?140If theansweris yes, thenadvocatesof a “piggy-back” copyrightcannotbasetheirargumentsimply on aretainedright to tangibleproperty,for this amountsto assertinga direct claim to theidealobjectitself.141

Rothbardwouldhavebeenfar betteroff looking to thelaw oftradesecretsratherthanto thelaw of copyrightasafoundationfor retained-right,or quasi-contractuallegal exclusivity in theresultsof a creator’sefforts. Under the law of tradesecrecy,“trade secretsarenot given protectionagainstall the world,but only againstonewho haslearnedthesecretby impropermeansor by virtue of aconfidentialrelation.”42Thus, if ase-cret, suchasamanufacturingprocess,adesign,or the internaloperationof a device,is revealedto otherswho arenotbound

140. If anadvocateof”piggy-backrights”wereto respondthat the airwavescanandshouldbetheobjectsofownership,assomehaveargued,hewouldrevealamisunder-standingof thestatusof “the airwaves.” Onecannotown thebroadcastspectrum,althoughonecanhavetheright to useone’sbroadcastingor receivingequipmentwith-out interferencefrom others.Thus, thefirst broadcasterover a frequencyin agivenareacanhavealegally recognizedright tobroadcastoverapartoftheelectro-magneticspectrumwithoutinterferingwith anotherbroadcaster.But if anotherbroadcastercansendout a narrowbeamsignalwithin thatspectrumthatdoesnot interferewith thefirst broadcaster’ssignal(andhencewith his useofhis tangibleproperty),thenthefirstshould haveno right to stop the second.As Ronald Coaseargues,assigningdirectpropertyrightsoverthebroadcastspectrumis assensibleasassigningdirectpropertyrightsover“the notesof themusicalscaleor thecolorsof the rainbow.”Coase,TheFederalCommunicationsCommission,2J.L. & EC0N. 1, 35(1959).In aprivatepropertysys-teIn, “if therewereamarket,whatwould besold, is theright to useapieceofequip.ment to transmit signalsin aparticular way.” Id. Theright in questionwouldbearightover a tangible object, not over theimmaterial broadcast spectrum Seealso Mueller,ReformingTelecommunicationsRegulation,in TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN Caisis:THE FIRSTAMENDMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND DEREGULATION 95-100(1988).

141. The generalthrust of Rothbard’soverall argumentfor propertyseemsto beconsistentwith the ‘~justice-as-order”notion,althoughhesometimesdoesnot makethedistinctionsnecessaryin orderto addressintellectualpropertyissues.Thus,Roth-barddefendsthepropertyright of asculptor’screationwithoutdistinguishingbetweenthedifferentwaysin which thesculptormight own his “product,”like ownershipofthematerialartifact,or ownershipof theform embeddedin it: “[T]he sculptorhasin fact‘created’ thiswork of art—notof coursein thesensethathe has created matter—butthat hehas producedit by transformingnature-givenmatter(the clay) into anotherformin accordancewith his own ideasandhis own laborandenergy.Surely,if everymanhasthe right to own his own body, andif he mustuseand transformmaterialnaturalobjectsin orderto survive,thenhehastheright to owntheproductthathehasmade,by his energyandeffort, into averitableextensionof his own personality.”M.ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 48 (1983).

142. W. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLAW PRIMER 168 (1982)(quotingCarverv. Harr, 132 N.J. Eq. 207,209, 27 A.2d 895, 897 (1942)).

NO. ~J Are PatentsandCopyrightsMorally Ju,ct~fi�d? 855

by contractor byafiduciaryrelationshipto keepthesecretcon-fidential, then the original proprietor of the secrethas nogroundsforlegalactionagainstotherswhowould duplicatehisproductorotherwiseusewhatwaspreviouslysecret.If a chem-ist for theCoca-ColaCompanywereto reproducetheformulafor Coca-Cola(a tradesecret,unprotectedby patent)on leaf-letsand dropthemover New York City, theCoca-ColaCom-pany would have uncontestablegroundsfor (drastic) legalactionagainsttheviolatoroftheirsecretandanyofhis conspir-ators,but not againstall thoseon whom theleaflets fell whoproceededto duplicatethefirm’s productionefforts. Similarly,independentinventorswould be immunefrom legal action.Iftheproprietorofthe tradesecretwereunableto showthat an-otheruserhadimproperaccessto his product,his productionprocess,or someotherrelevantaspectof his business,thenhehasno legal claim againsttheindependentinventor.Thus,anideal object canbe constrainedwithin a contractualnexusbypropertyrights, but once that ideal object has somehowes-capedthenexus,it canno longerberestrainedby forceof law.Such anapproachis fully consistentwith thepropertyrightsregimesetforth in theremainderof this Article.

VI. JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY

Havingoffered criticismsof variouspropertyrightsclaims, itis incumbentuponmeto offeranalternativeargumentthatwillestablishproperty rights to tangible objects while denyingthemfor ideal objects.

As notedabove,liberty-basedargumentsfor property’rightsare fundamentallyhostile to intellectualpropertyclaims, forpatentandcopyrightmonopoliesinterferewith thefreedomofothers to usetheir own bodiesor their,ownjustly acquiredpropertyin certainways. Establishinga liberty-basedright toself-ownershipwouldcreatethefoundationfor propertyin tan-gible objectswhile excludingpropertyin ideal objects,for thelatteramountssimply to controlsplacedon theuseof ourownbodiesandon theuseofourlegitimatelyacquiredproperty.’43

148. ButseeGordon, AnInquiry Into theMerits ofCopyright: TheChallengeof Consisteney,Consent,and EncouragementTheoty,41 SI-AN. L. REV. 1843 (1989). Arguingagainstmyearlieressaywhich was critical of patentsandcopyrights (seePalmer,supra note 7),Gordonagreesthat intellectualpropertyclaimsarerestraintson otherpropertyrightsbut responds,in Hohfeldianandpositivist fashion,that “All entitlements limit eachother” Gordon, supraat 1428.

~3bb I-IarvardJournal of Law C~PublIc Polwy [Vol. l~

Theargumentsof Locke andvon Humboldton the impor-tanceof ownershiprights in ourselvesandin tangibleobjectshavealreadybeendiscussed,sothereis noneedto reviewthemfurther.WhatI do propose,however,is 1) thatsuchrightshavetheir foundationin natureandcanwithout confusionbecallednaturalrights, eventhoughthey emergethrough a historicalprocessandnecessarilycontainan elementof theconventionalandcontingent(naturerevealingitself throughhistory);and2)that self-ownershiprights are consistentwith justice-as-order(asdiscussedin thesectionon thestructureofutilitarian argu-mentsabove).

Therole playedby scarcityin self-ownershiptheoriesis cen-tral, for the mostobviously scarceof all physical resourcesisone’sown body. Ifjustice hasany meaningat all, it refersatleastto the allocationofvarious rights to controlphysicalre-sources.Such a systemofjustice canemergefrom a flow ofhistoricaleventsby an “invisible hand”process,withoutdimin-ishing its “naturalness.”As Humeremarks,“Tho’ therulesofjusticebeartificial, theyarenotarbitrary.Nor is theexpressionimproperto call themLawsof Nature;if by naturalweunder-standwhat is commonto anyspecies,orevenif we confineit tomeanwhat is inseparablefrom the species.”144To say that alawis naturalis not, however,to affirm thatit is self-evident,oreventhatasufficiently powerful deductivemindcould arriveatit. As Humeremarks,“Nor is the ruleconcerningthestabilityof possessionsthelessderiv’d from humanconventions,thatitarisesgradually,andacquiresforceby a slowprogression,andby our repeatedexperienceof the inconveniencesof trans-gressingit.”45 Practice,in social experienceaswell as per-sonal, plays a significant factor in the formation of ethics.(“Ethics” is, afterall, but a transliterationof the Greekwordperhapsbest translatedas “habit,” that is, what is formedthroughpractice.)

The fundamentalquestionof who should havethe right tocontrolone’sbody and,by implication, theproductsof one’slabor, is, in many respects,a problemofcoordination.It is aproblem of arriving at a stable equilibrium solution in a“game” thathasnouniquestablesolution.Our bodiescouldbeconsideredthepropertyoftheking; someclassof peoplecould

144. D. HUME. supranote 131, at484.145. Id. at490.

No. 3] Are Patentsand CopyrightsMorally Justi/led? 857

beownedby another;eachof uscouldbecommonproperty,inthe sensethat a socialdecisionwould bemadeto determineeveryuseof ourbodies(participatorycollectivism); orwe couldeachbe the ownersof ourselves,Eachof. thesepossiblesolu-tions hasbeentriedatonetimeor another.Modernsocietyhastendedto convergeon thelast, on self-ownership.’46

Whatis it thatmight lead“players” in coordination“games”to convergeon self-ownership?In coordinationproblemsthereis a naturaltendencyfor playersto convergeon “obvious” so-lutions.The pioneeringwork of ThomasSchellinghasshownthat playersin gameswith monetarypayoffsfor successfulco-ordinationtendto convergeon certain ~ As Schel-ling remarks,“A primecharacteristicof these‘solutions’ to theproblems,thatis, ofthecluesor coordinatorsorfocal points,issomekind of prominenceor conspicuousness.”48Thesecon-spicuous“clues” havecometo beknownas “Schellingpoints.”

Wecanfind Schellingpointsin “propertygames”aswell. Inthe caseof ownershipof our bodies,whatcan bemore natu-ral—moreprominent—thantheallocationof personalowner-ship rights to eachperson?’49As deTracyaffirms,

[I]f it be certainthat theideaofpropertycanariseonly in abeingendowedwith will, it is equallycertainthat in suchabeingit arisesnecessarilyandinevitably in all its plenitude;for, as soonas this individual knowsaccuratelyitself, or its

146. Fora contrastin this respectbetweenthe ancientworld andmodernity,seeB.CONSTANT, TheLibertyoftheAncientsContrastedwith thatoft/is Moderns,in POLITICAL. WRIT-INGs 308-28 (1988).

147. SeeT. SCHEI.LING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 53-58 (1960).148. Id. at 57.149. SeeT. HODGSKIN, THE NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL RIGHT OF PRoPERTYCON.

TRASTED 28-29(Kelley ed. 1973) (1sted 1832).Mr. Lockesays,that everymanhasaproperty in his own person;in fact,

individuality—which is signified by theword own—cannotbedisjoined fromtheperson.Each individual learnshis own shapeand form, and eventhe exist-enceofhis limbs and body, from seeingand feeling them.Theseconstitute hisnotion ofpersonalidentity,bothfor himselfandothers;andit is impossibletoconceive—itis in fact acontradictionto say—thataman’slimbs andbody donotbelongto himself: for thewordshim, self,andhis body, signify thesamematerialthing. Aswe learntheexistenceofourownbodiesfrom seeingandfeeling them,andaswe seeandfeel thebodiesof others,we havepreciselysimilar groundsfor believingin theindividualityor identityof otherpersons,asfor believingin ourownidentity. The ideasexpressedby thewordsmineandthine, asapplied to the produceof labour,aresimply thenanextendedform of the ideasof personalidentity andindividuality.

On theappreciationof the individuality andspecialstatusof other humans,seeE.HUSSERL, CARTEsIAN MEDITATIONS 129 (1960) (arguingthat thereasonwe do notsim-ply considerothersasthingsorasmeatis thatweapprehendthatwe existin acommu-nity, with an “[oJbjectivating equalizationof my existencewith that of all others ).


moralperson,andits capacityto enjoyandto suffer, andtoactnecessarily,it seesclearly alsothat this selfis the exclu-siveproprietorof thebodywhich it animates,of the organswhich it moves,of all their passionsandtheir actions;for allthisfinishesandcommenceswith thisself, existsbut by it, isnot movedbut by its acts,and no othermoralpersoncanemploy the sameinstrumentsnor be affected in the samemannerby their effects.’5°

Suchan allocationmaynotmakethebestsensefrom a “so-cial” perspective,thatis, from the perspectiveof increasingthetotal utility of a group.But humanbeingstypically areunableto make(and donot haveto make)suchGod-likechoices;ourreal choicesare inevitably constrainedby our own horizons.“Society” is not asinglechoosingentity,nor canit be consid-eredas such.’5’Thenaturalprominenceof individuality andofourcontrolof our ownbodiesnaturallylendsitself to aprocesswherebyagreementis secured(it neednot be explicit agree-ment)to respectrightsto self-ownershipandto theproductsofour labor.As Humenotes,“it mustimmediatelyoccur, as themostnaturalexpedient,thateveryonecontinueto enjoywhathe is at presentmasterof, andthatpropertyor constantpos-sessionbe conjoin’d to the immediatepossession.”52

Let us makea distinction betweengoods that are simplygiven (if thereare suchgoods)and goodsthat mustbe pro-duced;one rule for allocatinggoods(suchas equal division)might havea greaterdegreeof“obviousness”whenthe goodsaresimply given than whenthey areproduced;in the latter

150. D. uaTRAcY, A TREATISE OF Pot.mc~ECoNOMY 47 (A. Kelley ed. 1970) (T.Jeffersontrans.ed. 1817).

151. But cf. Mirrlees, TheEconomicUses of Utilitarianism, in UTILrrAIUANISM AND BE-YoND 71(1982).“Roughly speaking,[in asocietyofidenticalindividuals~thetotalityofall individualscanbe regardedasasingleindividual.Thereforetotal socialutility, thesumofthetotal utilities oftheseparateindividuals,is theright wayto evaluatealterna-tivepatternsof outcomesfor thewholesociety.Thatshouldbetheviewofanyindivid-ual in thesociety,andthereforeofanyoutsideobserver.” This approachis subjectedtowitheringcriticismin Sugden,Labour,PropertyandtheMorality ofMarkets,in TuaMAR-xa-r IN HISTORY 9-28(1986).SeealsoR. SUODEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, Co-OPERA-TION, AND WELFARE 6-8 (1986) (criticism of the “U.S. Cavalry Model” of moralphilosophyandpresentationofanalternativebasedon theviewpoint oftheindividualdecisionmaker).Sugdenpresentsan extendedargumentabouthow propertyrightsandotherconventionscan emergespontaneously,withoutanycentralizedagencyorguidinghand,andhow theycangain in the processthemoralapprobationof thepar-ticipants in theprocess.even thoughthey maybe “suboptimal” from someexternalperspective.I am deeplyindebtedto ProfessorSugden’swork for my own viewsonmorality andproperty.

152. D. HuMR, supra note 131,at 503.

No. 3] Are Patentsand CopyrightsMorally justified? 859

case the associationof self to labor to product is moreprominent.

Humeproposesa thoughtexperiment:“Supposea German,aFrenchman,andaSpaniardto comeintoaroom,wherethereareplac’dupon thetablethreebottlesof wine, Rhenish,Bur-gundy and Port; and supposethey shou’d fall a quarrellingaboutthe division of them; aperson,who was chosenfor um-pire,wou’d naturally, to shewhis impartiality, give every onethe productof his own country. . . . [T]here is first a naturalunion betwixt theideaofthepersonandthatof theobject,andafterwardsa new andmoral union produc’d by that right orproperty,which weascribeto theperson.”55This seemsto bea sensiblesolutionthat the threedrinkersmight also arriveatthemselves.

Now supposethat thethingsto bedivided mustbeproducedby thethreepersonsandarenot merelyfoundathand.Is it notmorereasonableto supposethattheywill insiston adivisionoftheproductthatrecognizestheseparatecontributionsofeach,ratherthan,say,equaldivision or, as in thecaseof thewine,division by nationalorigin? Further, let us supposethat theproblemis faced,not by threelaborerswho know eachotherimmediatelyand are engagedin a joint enterprise,but is aproblemfacedby membersof an extendedorderwho, whilenecessarilydependentuponeachotherfor sustenance,havenoknowledgewhatsoeverof eachother.’~Is it not evenmorereasonableto supposethat they will converge,not on someprincipleof evendistribution,orofdistributionto themostde-serving(deserthaving,asnotedearlier,no principle),but thateachbeawardedhis “own” product,thatis, whatheproduces?(In amarketsystem,this neednot bearany closerelationshipto the “amountof labor” that might havebeenexpended,butto what can be claimed on the basisof self-ownershiprightsand mutually satisfactory agreementsamong contractingparties.)

Such a systemof self-ownershipandderivedownershipoftangibleobjectsprovidesthefoundationfor asocietyandecon-

153. Id. at 509-10.154. By “extendedorder” I meanwhatAdamSmith referredto as a“Great Soci-

ety.” This is asortoforderthatextendsbeyondthesmallgroupto includeindividualswho, while partof thesameeconomicor legalorder, will neverhaveanyface-to-facerelationships.


omy basedon contract,’55as well asforjustice-as-order.Prop-erty rightsin ourselvesandin alienable,material objectsallowus to cooperatepeacefully.Theycreatean orderwithin whichpeoplecanpursuetheirseparateor commonends.

By allocatingresourcesthroughapropertysystemwe allowagentsto negotiate(for example,throughthe price system)without resort to force in order to decideamongpotentiallyconflictingresources.’56If a river canbeusedforboating,fish-ing, or swimming, but not for any combinationof thesethree,thenpropertyrightsandthemarketsystemthat emergesfromsuchrights allow partiesthat arepotentially in conflict to usereason,ratherthanbruteforce, to decidehow theriver will beused.157As AdamSmithnotedof themarketexchangesystem,

If we shouldenquireinto the principle in the humanmindon which this dispositionof trucking[exchange]is founded,it is clearly thenaturalinclinationeveryonehasto persuade.The offering of a shilling, which to us appearsto havesoplain and simpleameaning,is in reality offering an argu-mentto persuadeoneto do soandsoasit is for hisinterest.Men always endeavourto persuadeothersto be of theiropinion even when the matter is of no consequencetothem.158

Thefunctionofpropertyrights in sucha liberal order,then,is not to maximizesomemaximand,but to allow humanbeings

155. SeeBarnett,supranote47; Barnett,Contract RemediesandInalienableRights,4 SOC.PHIL. & P0L’v 179 (1986). As Barnettargues,a natural-rightsself-ownershipmodelleads,not to absolutismandslavery(asRichardTuck hasargued,R. TUCK, NATVRALRIGHTS THEoRIEs: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT (1979)),but to inalienableliberty.Although Tuck has argued that self-ownership must imply that one could alienate allrights over oneselfto a sovereign,Barneaarguesthatthis presupposesanontologicalimpossibility, the alienation of one’s selffrom oneself.On the consenttheory of con-tractandinalienablerights,seealsoW. VON HUMBOLDT, supranote69, at94-95.

156. SeeDemsetz,Thvarda l’hsorj ofPropertyRights,inTHE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTYRIcIrrs (1974) (originallypublishedin 57 AM. ECON. REv. (1967)).Note that in Dem-setz’s model,scarcity—in the staticsense—iscentralto the origin of propertyrights.

157. Spoonerobjectsthat theargumentfrom avoiding“collision” would asclearlyrequire“thatahammershouldbefreeto differentpersonsatdifferenttimes,andthataroad,orcanalshouldbefreeto asmanypersonsat once,ascanuseit withoutcollision,asit doesthatanideashouldbefreeto asmanypersonsatonceaschooseto useit.”Spooner,supranote2, at79. This ignoresthefactthatuseoftangibleobjectscancomeinto collision, evenif atanyparticularmomenttheyarenot in collision. (In addition,itignoresthefact that “nonuse,”suchasspeculativewithholdingfrom the market,is aslegitimatea useof one’spropertyasis itsactive exploitation.Further,this “externali-ties-based”approachexplainshowpropertyrightscan emergeandchangeovertime,asexpandingpopulations,changingmarket conditions, andnew technologiesmakepossibleforms of “collision” that werepreviouslyunknown.Cf. Mueller,supra note140; Demsetz,supra note 156).

158. A. SMITH. LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 352 (Glasgowed. 1978).

No. 3] Are Palentsand CopyrightsMorally justified? 861

to cooperatein the allocationof scarceresources.Intellectualpropertyrights,however,do not arisefrom scarcity,but areitscause.As Arnold Plantobserves,

It is apeculiarityof propertyrights in patents(andcopy-rights) thattheydo notariseout of thescarcityoftheobjectswhich becomeappropriated.Theyarenotaconsequenceofscarcity.Theyarethedeliberatecreationof statutelaw; and,whereasin generalthe institutionof privatepropertymakesfor the preservationof scarcegoods,tending (aswe mightsomewhatlooselysay) to Leadus ‘to makethe mostofthem,’propertyrights in patentsandcopyrightmakepossiblethecreation of a scarcity of the productsappropriatedwhichcould nototherwisebe maintained.’59

Scarcityof this sort beingcentralto the legitimation of prop-erty rights, intellectual property rights have no legitimatemoralgrounding.

VII. CONCLUSION

Four possible theoriesof intellectualpropertyrights havebeenexamined:labor-desert,personality,utility, and “piggy-backing” on rights to tangible property. In eachcaseI havearguedeitherthat theparticularargumentscannotbe appliedto ideal objects or that the argumentsthemselvesare weak.This is not to denythateachcontainssomegrainof truth,nordoesthismeanthattheycontributenothingto ourunderstand-ing of themoralfoundationsofproperty.

Theideaof deserthasan importantplaceamongourmoralintuitions, although such moral intuitions may have theirproperrole in the moralorderof thesmall group suchas thefamily, and not in the extendedorder, where abstractrulesprevail.’60

159. A. PLAter, TheEconomicTheoryConcerningPatentsfor Inventions,~ti SELECTED ECO-NOMIC EssAYS AND ADDRESSES 36 (1974);seealso F. HAYEK, Tna FATAL CONCEIT: THEERRORS OF SOCIALISM 6 (1988):

Thedifferencebetweenthese[copyrightsandpatentslandother kindsofpropertyrights is this: while ownershipof materialgoodsguidestheuseofscarcemeansto their most important uses,in the caseof immaterialgoodssuchasliteraryproductionsandtechnologicalinventionsthe ability to pro-ducethemis alsolimited, yetoncetheyhavecomeinto existence,they canbeindefinitely multiplied andcan bemadescarceonly by law in orderto createaninducementto producesuch ideas.Yet it is not obviousthatsuch forcedscarcityis themosteffectiveway to stimulate the humancreativeprocess.

Id.160. SeeF. HAYEK, supra note65, at 11-21. We learnourmorality, Hayekargues,

within the small group, notably the family, in which face.to.faceinteractionprevails.

862 HarvardJournalofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. 13

If thefoundationof thenaturalright to ownershipis owner-ship in one’sself, however,then claims to own ideasor otheridealobjectsconflict with this right to self-ownership,for sucha claimis no less thana claim of theright to controlhow an-otheruseshis body.Whenoneclaimsto own adancestep,forexample,oneclaims that no one elsecansomovehis body asto perform this dance,andthereforethat onehasa right ofdominion over thebodiesof everyoneelse.Similarly, a copy-right overamusicalcompositionmeansthatotherscannotusetheir mouthsto blow air in certainsequencesand in certainways into musicalinstrumentstheyown without obtainingthepermissionof the copyrightholder,Thus the real objectsthecopyrightholdercontrolsarethebodyandinstrumentsof theothermusicians,Thesameholds trueofapatentgoverningthecombinationofa groupof chemicalsor thearrangementofthepartsof afishhook.

Thetheoryofpropertythat emphasizespersonalityalsohassomethingto addto ourunderstandingofproperty.Thedevel-opmentof personalityand moral agencyis certainlya goodthing, and for full developmentit requiresat leasta minimalsphereof property.Aristotle recognized,for examplethat lib-erality is impossiblewithoutpropertyandliberty, thenecessaryconditions for the expressionof this ~ But the moreelaborateattemptsto use this as a foundationfor property,suchasthoseofHegelandhis epigoni,sufferfrom seriousphil-osophicaldifficulties. This is mostnotablewhena theoryofaninalienabledroit moral for artistsis built upon it. The relation-ship betweenartist, art work, andaudienceis a complexone,but it doesnot lendsupportto the ideathat thework of theartist is anextensionof theartist’spersonality,capableofbeingdamagedin a way analogousto thebodily damagethat couldbe inflicted on theartist. Personalityandpropertyareindeedrelated, as expressedby Richard Overton’s statement:“To

But we mustalsolive in aworldof strangers,in which “concrete,commonlyperceivedaims”cannotbeassumed,norcanknowledgeoftheneedsor abilitiesof others.“Partof ourpresentdifficulty is that we must constantlyadjustour lives, ourthoughtsandouremotions,in orderto live simultaneouslywithin differentkindsofordersaccordingto differentrules.If we were to applytheunmodified,uncurbed,rules of the micro-cosmos([that is], of the small bandor troop, or of, say, our families) to the macro-cosmos(our wider civilization), asour instincts and sentimental yearnings oftenmakeus do, we would destroy it. Yet if we were always to apply the rules of the extendedorder to our more intimate groupings, we would crush them. Sowemust learn to livein two sorts ofworlds at once.” Id. at 18.

161. SeeARIsTomE, supranote 129, at 61.

No. ~SJ Are PatentsandCopyrightsMorally Just!fled? 863

everyIndividuall in nature,is givenan individual! property bynature,not to be invadedor usurpedby any: for every one ashe is himselfe,sohehathaselfepropriety,elsecouldhenotbehimselfe. , ~ But this necessityofpropertyfor oneto “beoneself”meanspreeminentlyself-ownership,which is aprinci-ple in conflict with intellectualpropertyrights.

Utilitarian argumentsalsohavea role to play in understand-ing themoral groundsof propertyrights.Thatpeoplewill bemoreproductiveandwill generatewealth thatcanbeenjoyedby all only when theycan reapthe rewardsof their efforts iscertainlytrueandhasbeenrecognizedatleastfrom thetimeofAristotle’s criticism of communism.163This is certainlyan im-portantconsiderationin judging whetherprivate property issuperioror inferior to stateownership.But to tailor legisla-tively the abstractrulesof the extendedorderin an effort toreachpredeterminedresultsrevealsa seriousmisunderstand-ing oftheruleof(abstract)law, which aimsatno definiteresultbutwhich providestheframeworkwithin whichjustresultscanemerge.In contrast,the kind of utilitarian’~accountof lawthathasbeencharacterizedas “justice-as-order”doesnot seekto maximizesomeparticularmaximand,but to createanover-archingorderwithin whichhumanbeingscanrealizetheirvari-ous endswithout coming into violent conflict over resources.As an empirical matter,we have goodreasonto believethatwhenindividualsknow whattheirpropertyrights are,theywillbemore productiveandprosperousthanif suchrightsareun-certain,Thekey, therefore,in sucha legal systemis to avoidconflicts betweenrights.’65 Intellectual property rights, how-ever,do createconflicts betweenrights to selfandto tangiblegoods.Moreover, it is far from clearthat intellectual propertyrights increaseincentivesfor innovation, rather thanhamperthem. (This lastconsiderationis amatter for empirical investi-gationandcannotbe decidedon a priori grounds.)

Thecasefor “piggy-back” rights is alsobuilt arounda hardkernelof truth. Variousrights that resemblein somerespectsintellectualpropertyrights,suchastradesecrets,canindeedbe

162. Overion,sn/wanote75, at 68.163. SeeARIsTomE,sn/wanote 129,at 55-6L164. I usetheterm herein abroadenoughsenseto include DavidHume.165. Of course,peopleof good faith often do come into conflict, which is why we

have courtsof law to adjudicatedisputes.To admit the possibility of suchconflicts,however,is afar cry fromseeingconflict a~abuilt-in featureof asocialorder.

4..

864 HarvardJournal ofLaw & Public Policy IVol. 1~$

built on thefoundationofrightsto tangibleobjects.But atradesecretis notaright againstthewholeworld, asa patentis, butaright againstthosewhointerferewith rights to tangiblegoodsor who violate legallybindingcontracts.A monopolyright re-stricting others, for example, from independentlyinventingandbuilding anewcontraptioncannotreston afoundationofcontract,for contractpresupposesconsentandthepoint ofin-tellectual property rights is that they bind non-consentingparties.

Finally, propertyhasbeenexaminedasa meansofrealizingfreedomandachievingsocialcoordination,“justice-as-order.”Thefoundationofsucha systemof’ socialcoordinationis self-ownership,the“node” aroundwhich the conventionsofprop-erty areconstructed.Self-ownershipis an “obvious” solutionto coordinationgamesandplaysanimportantrole in thehis-torical developmentof natural law. Such “games” in real lifeareplayedbecauseof the scarcityof resources.If goodsweretruly superabundant,therewould beno needfor property,forconflicts couldnotarise.Theverynatureofaneconomicgoodinvolves choice,however, and choice implies scarcity.This ismost obviously true of our own bodies,which can be usedasfoodfor others,asobjectsto gratify thesexuallustsof others,or in anumberof otherways.Theproblemforwhich self-own-ershipprovidestheansweris how to allocaterights over themostscarceof scarceresources,one’sownbody. This principleofself-ownershipthen,by analogyprovidesthebasisfor own-ershipof objectsthat arenot partsofour body.’66

The key to all of this is scarcity.Without scarcity,an argu-mentbasedeitheron the realizationof freedomor on findingasolution to coordinationgamescannotgeneratea propertyright. Tangiblegoodsareclearly scarcein that therearecon-flicting uses.It is this scarcitythat givesriseto propertyrights.Intellectualpropertyrights,however,do not reston a naturalscarcityof goods,but on an “artificial, self createdscarcity.”Thatis to say, legislation or legal fiat limits the useof idealobjectsin sucha way as to createan artificial scarcity that, it ishoped,will generategreaterrevenuesfor innovators.Propertyrights in tangiblegoodschanneledtheminto their mosthighly

166. RecallthediscussionbyJohnLocke regarding thequestionofwhenacorns thatapersonhaseatenbecomehisown: “sohis, [thatis], apartofhim, thatanothercannolongerhaveanyright to it.” J. LOCKE,supra note42, at 328.

INO. ZiJ Are PatentsandCopyrightsMorally Just!fied? 865

valueduses.Thepossibility for exchangingtransferableprop-erty titles meansthat holdersof propertywill constantlyrear-range the titles in searchof profits Without scarcity thisprocesswould be unnecessary.But the attemptto generateprofit opportunitiesby legislatively limiting accessto certainidealgoods,andthereforeto mimic themarketprocessesgov-erningthe allocationof tangiblegoods,containsafatal contra-diction: It violatestherights to tangiblegoods,thevery rightsthat providethelegal foundationswith which marketsbegin.

Documents

HARVARD JOURNAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICYtomgpalmer.com/wp-content/uploads/papers/palmer-morally...• 818 HarvardJournal ofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. 13 differingconclusions. This occurs