Antiheroes Are Not Morally Ambiguous Red

8/16/2019 Antiheroes Are Not Morally Ambiguous Red

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Running head: CHARACTER AMBIGUITY ENJOYMENT 1

Antiheroes are Not Morally Ambiguous:

Redefining Morally Ambiguous Characters and Viewer Enjoyment

Dao Minh Nguyen

University at Buffalo


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Antiheroes are Not Morally Ambiguous:

Redefining Morally Ambiguous Characters and Viewer Enjoyment

Perceptions of media characters are important determinants of the enjoyment of media

content, especially with regard to narrative media forms. Affective disposition theory (ADT)

(Zillmann, 2000; Raney, 2003 & 2004) states that "enjoyment of media content is a function

of a viewer's affective disposition toward characters and the story line outcomes associated

with those characters" (Raney, 2004, p.349). This sentiment is echoed by many imminent

scholars (Cohen, 1999; Vorderer & Knobloch, 2002), who point out that characters are

mentioned as one of the main reasons we enjoy entertainment.

Currently, there is an evolution of characters in narrative media forms whereby

formerly morally clear protagonists are increasingly becoming morally ambiguous characters.

This evolution is particularly evident in television shows. Indeed, more and more morally

ambiguous characters, whom viewers cannot identify as either purely good or purely bad

(Krakowiak & Tsay Vogel, 2013), are becoming the central character in popular television

shows, such as 24, Dexter, Breaking Bad , and American Horror Story. This new type of

fictional characters is captivating the attention of scholars and media researchers (Janicke &

Raney, 2011; Krakowiak & Tsay, 2013; Raney & Janicke, 2013). In addition, the evolution

from morally clear to morally ambiguous may also require adjustments to extant media

theories that have yet to fully integrate morally ambiguous characters into their theoretical

propositions, as compared to the morally clear characters, which usually dominate the

protagonist category and which were the target of early research and theorizing in this area.

There are some notable research studies (Krakowiak, 2008; Krakowiak & Tsay

Vogel, 2013; Shafer & Raney, 2012) that attempt to define the essence of morally ambiguous

characters and try to explain why we, as viewers, enjoy watching these characters. These

studies are based on extant media entertainment theories, including ADT, moral


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disengagement, and schema theory, and these studies identify multiple variables important to

viewer perceptions of characters including characters' motivations and potentially positive

outcomes coming from morally ambiguous character s’ actions (Krakowiak, 2008; Krakowiak

& Tsay-Vogel, 2013; Shafer & Raney, 2012).

According to Krakowiak (2008), "a character that is ambiguous is one that causes

doubt or uncertainty or that can be understood in two or more possible ways" (p.4).

Moreover, "character ambiguity can result from either the presentation of contradictory or

conflicting information about a character or from the absence of meaningful information

about a character" (Krakowiak, 2008, p.4). More recently, Krakowiak and Tsay-Vogel (2013)

proposed a similar definition of moral character complexity and argue that fictional main

characters or protagonists are categorized as "good guys,” who sometimes perform immoral

or evil acts. According to this definition, Shafer and Raney (2012) argue that the antihero is

one type of ambiguous character.

These perspectives attempt to differentiate morally clear and morally ambiguous

characters. They also suggest that previous theories which only focus on clearly defined (i.e.,

not ambiguous) characters may or may not be applicable for explaining enjoyment of the

media experience. However, nearly all of this previous work arrives at a similar conclusion

that ambiguous characters are either “good guys” who behave badly or “bad guys” that

behave well (Krakowiak & Tsay-Vogel, 2013). These definitions thus presume that these

characters are good or bad at their heart, but that they provide mixed signals to the audience.

For that reason, this paper's agenda attempts to provide a new definition of morally

ambiguous characters. In doing so, the paper will point out shortcomings of previous work

that focuses on categorizing morally ambiguous characters in terms of prototypical character

roles (i.e., heroes with bad qualities or villains with good qualities). In addition, this paper

discusses how enjoyment relates to ambiguous characters through an inseparable relation


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with narrative complexity, especially in television shows and feature films. Through those

two goals, this paper attempts to explain why viewers may enjoy morally ambiguous

characters more than clearly defined characters, and why viewers may enjoy narrative

complexity more than narrative simplicity.

Affective Disposition Theory

Before exploring previous studies that have yielded consistent results to ADT, it is

necessary to answer the question “What is Affective Disposition Theory?” To do that, Raney

in Expanding Disposition Theory (2004) concludes that viewers derive enjoyment from

narratives by observing characters and narrative outcomes. Enjoyment is "a function of a

viewer's affective disposition toward characters and the outcomes experienced by those

characters in the unfolding narrative" (Raney, 2004, p. 350). More specifically, ADT suggests

that witnessing positive consequences befalling liked characters (or negative consequences

befalling disliked characters) will result in viewers liking and enjoying the narrative, while

witnessing negative consequences befalling liked characters (or positive consequences

befalling disliked characters) will result in viewers disliking and not enjoying the narrative

(Raney, 2004; Zillmann, 2000; Zillmann & Cantor, 1977).

The conceptual roots of ADT were based in examining responses to humor (Zillmann

& Cantor, 1972). This research challenged previous conceptualizations of humor’s enjoyment

and “dealt with humor appreciation deriving from the projection of undesirable, negative

outcomes for protagonists characterized by their role as the communication decoder’s

antagonists” (Zillmann & Cantor, 1972, p.198). Zillmann and Cantor’s model predicted that

“individuals with primarily subordinate experiences would exhibit greater appreciation for

humorous communications that show a subordinate temporarily dominating a superior than

for those in which the superior dominates the subordinate, and that individuals primarily

occupying superior positions would manifest the opposite preference” (p.191). As expected,


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the findings were consistent with the theoretical expectations derived from consideration of

the direction of the transitory dominance expressed in the humorous communications. “It

appears that the assumptions made about the resentments existing between the two

populations involved were valid. The resentments seem to be sufficiently pronounced to

affect the hedonic tone of cognitions elicited in the decoding of humorous communications of

the type employed” (Zillmann & Cantor, 1972, p.197-198).

Following that early research on humor, Zillmann and Cantor (1976) continued

extending the propositions from humor to drama. They argued that in this case, drama was

different from humor for two reasons. First, “dramatic presentations differ from humorous

ones in that enjoyment of the former may involve both the debasement and benefaction of

characters” (Raney, 2004, p.68), while enjoyment of the latter is entirely dependent on

debasement. Secondly, “dramatic presentations involving the misfortune of others lacks joke

work ” (Raney, 2004, p.68). Joke work presents cues to the viewer that it is morally

acceptable to laugh at the misfortune of others, an act that normally is not considered to be

morally acceptable. In this manner, joke work grants moral amnesty to the viewer that allows

them to enjoy the debasement of others (Zillmann & Cantor, 1972). Drama, on the other

hand, lacks joke work. Thus, our enjoyment of drama depicting loss or misfortune is not

readily excusable.

To test these proposition, Zillmann and Bryant (1975) examined how cognitive

development interacted with retaliation in a dramatic narrative. They utilized a fairy tale

about two princes (a good prince and a bad prince). In the story, the good prince is deceived

by his brother, the bad prince, who seeks to overthrow his brother and rule their shared

kingdom alone. At the end, the good prince defeats the usurpation and is given the chance to

retaliate against his brother. The researchers varied the level of retaliation at the end with

under retribution (the good prince forgives the bad prince), equitable retribution (the good


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prince does to the bad prince what the bad prince was planning to do to the good prince), and

over retribution (the good prince’s punishment of the bad prince exceeded the crimes

committed). This story with its various endings was shown to children at different stages of

development. The results showed that all children liked the good prince more than the bad

prince (indicating moral judgment plays a role in disposition formation). In addition, all

children preferred punishment to forgiveness, but moral development moderated the results.

Children with higher levels of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1971; Kohlberg, 1973) enjoyed

equitable retribution the most, while children with lower levels of moral reasoning enjoyed

the harshest punishment the most, followed by equitable retribution, followed by under

retribution. The findings of this study strongly supports the proposition that v iewer’s moral

sanction of retribution in the appreciation of dramatic presentations; and “the appreciation of

dramatic presentations which employ provocation and retaliation as a central theme is

mediated though viewer’s moral convictions” (Zillmann & Bryant, 1975, p.581). In another

word, viewers use their moral judgment to form the liking toward characters based on

characters’ narrative presentation (including their actions, behaviors, outcomes, to name a

few) and enjoy the resolution based in a manner that seems morally justifiable.

In sum, research examining the extension of ADT from humor to drama suggests two

things. First, viewers not only rejoice in seeing disliked characters punished, but they also

rejoice in seeing like characters rewarded. Hence, the enjoyment only occurs when viewers

get satisfied by both or vice versa; alternatively, their enjoyment will decrease if witnessing

liked characters being punished and disliked characters being rewarded. Second, viewers also

bring moral judgment into play when determining the appropriateness of rewards and

punishments. More specifically, for viewers, punishments must be considered appropriate

and equitable for enjoyment to occur. For that reason, over retribution does not result in

enjoyment, but rather disliking of the narrative (Zillmann & Bryant, 1975). Although all


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previous studies are generally consistent with the proposition that viewers enjoy witnessing

liked characters rewarded and disliked characters punished, ADT was less well developed

theoretically regarding how viewers came to like or dislike characters. As such, explicating

how viewers form liking or disliking toward characters was a crucial need for fully

developing ADT.

Where does liking and disliking come from?

Early research on ADT took a somewhat simplistic view of determining how liking

was formed. In Zillmann and Cantor’s (1972) early work examining enjoyment from jokes,

liking was assumed to be related to similarity to one’s on place in society. According to this

research, people appreciate the jokes involving the disparagement of a person from a group

that they do not belong to and they do not appreciate jokes involving the disparagement of

their own group. Later research by Zillmann and Cantor (1976) pointed out that liking was

assumed to be related to the moral judgment of viewers based on the good or bad behavior of

characters. Although the basic logic of dispositions toward characters being related to moral

evaluations was present in these early incantations of the theory, it was not until later in the

development of this research that the theory began to delineate processes related to moral

judgment in a specific manner. Zillmann (2000) formally integrated moral judgment

processes related to ADT in his moral sanction theory of delight and repugnance. This theory

argued that liking and disliking of characters is formed through the approval or disapproval of

actions and their apparent purpose. Literally, the actions of characters define the judgments of

the audience in terms of defining those characters as liked protagonists or disliked

antagonists. Moreover, character development is considered to be a function of moral

evaluation. As Zillmann pointed out, viewers are interpreted to be “untiring moral monitors”

witnessing socially relevant events (fictional or nonfictional) “whose continually rendered


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verdicts are bound to yield the approval and adoration of some, and the disapproval and

detestation of others” (Zillmann, 2000, p.54).

When liking or disliking is formed, emotional dispositions are set up and encourage

anticipatory emotions that are in turn either positive or negative. Positive dispositions

encourage hope for positive, rewarding outcomes and encourages fear for negative, punitive

ones; while negative dispositions encourages the opposite. “Hoped for and morally

sanctioned outcomes (rewarding events for protagonists and punitive events for antagonists)

will foster euphoric, joyous reactions, whereas feared and morally unwarranted outcomes

(rewarding events for antagonists and punitive events for protagonists) will prompt reactions

of dysphoria, discontent, disappointment, and contempt” (Zillmann, 2000, p.54, 55). After

Zillmann proposed that viewers of media were untiring moral monitors who constantly

evaluated the acceptability of character actions, researchers began to challenge this claim.

One such researcher was Raney.

Raney adheres to Zillmann’s assumptions in numerous ways. In fact, Raney does not

challenge the basic assumptions of ADT at all. He firmly holds similar to Zillmann that in

drama presentation liking of characters and outcomes that befall them combine to determine

viewers’ enjoyment: viewers find more satisf action when their liked characters are rewarded

and their disliked characters are punished, and vice versa. Viewers’ enjoyment is suffered

when disliked characters are rewarded and liked characters are punished (Raney 2003).

However, Raney does challenge the notion that liking is entirely dependent upon moral

judgments. Raney thus offers possible alternative or additional ways viewers form affiliations

with characters. Raney suggests that rather than constantly judging the morals of the

characters and liking resulting from those judgments, liking can instead come prior to

observation of actions and influence moral judgments of the characters. This reversal is based

on Raney’s application of schema theory.


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According to Raney (2004), viewers may form the liking toward characters quickly

without much moral monitoring at all. Schema theory argues that through repeated exposure

to stimuli in our environments, humans form expectations based on simple cues (Shafer &

Raney, 2012). As such, viewers form story schema due to consuming various type of

narrative forms including books, films, shows, etc. Schemas then lead viewers to create

expectations about how a narrative will unfold and which characters are the “protagonists”

and which are the “antagonists” independent from any moral judgment of their behavior or

perhaps prior to witnessing any actions conducted by these characters.

Schema Theory

According to Mandler (1984), a story schema is “a mental representation containing

expectation about how a narrative is internally structured and how it will unfold. Story

schemas rely upon an understanding of story grammar (or the common rule system that

describes regularities within similar texts), which we start developing from early childhood;

story schema direct attention, guide anticipations, and aid comprehension and recall ” (Shafer

& Raney, 2012, p.1030). “According to schema theory, knowledge about a concept, event,

sequence of events or actions, situation story type, or other stimuli is packaged together in

memory in a template of sorts” (Raney, 2004, p.353). Raney (2004) also argues that

“schemas are knowledge structures consisting of a network of interrelations between aspects

of a stimulus that are thought to constitute our understanding of that stimulus. This

knowledge structure subsequently serves as our “building block of cognition” about the

stimulus (Rumelhart, 1980)” (p.353).

Raney stated that “schemas help direct our perceptions about the guide our

interpretations of a stimulus” (2004, p.353). With regard to narratives, through repeated

exposure, we learn how stories are constructed, how typical actions relate to one another,

how scenes and settings are constructed, and how themes are repeated. Over time, viewers


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develop various schema structures that are activated when a subsequent media text is

encountered. These structures then guide expectations and interpretations of narratives and

characters.

Raney has argued that viewers likely develop story schemas that provide them "the

cognitive pegs upon which to hang their initial interpretations and expectations of characters"

(Raney, 2004, p. 354). In a more recent study, Shafer & Raney (2012) argued that “repeated

exposure to stories from the same genre teaches viewers how narratives, scenes, and settings

are constructed, how fictional causes are related to fictional effects, how themes and

archetypes are recycled, among other things” (p.1031). In other words, being exposed to

similar stories and narratives allows viewers to quickly jump to the conclusion of characters'

identity and form expectation without carefully judging characters' acts or motivations. That

means viewers actually are able to identify intended character roles within narratives without

considering the moral acceptability of a character ’s actions. Janicke and Raney (2014) shared

the same argument when they described the liking of antiheroes based on story schemas.

Conflicting Models

Overall, Zillmann and Raney propose alternative models regarding how liking and

disliking of characters is formed. Zillmann states that liking is the result of viewer’s moral

judgments of the character, whereas according to Raney, liking can also occur based on

previous experiences with various character archetypes (i.e., previous characters similar to

characters being viewed) and this liking could be independent of moral judgment. For

example, with Zillmann’s approach, Anakin Skywalker in Star Wars series starts as an

innocent child, who is neutral at the beginning of the narrative. Following the unfolding of

narration, viewer’s moral monitor ing is applied to judge Anakin’s behaviors to determine

whether he is a protagonist or an antagonist. Obviously, when he follows the Jedi part, he is a


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liked character, and when he turns to the “Darkside of the Force”, he becomes an antagonist,

and disliked character.

This process can be compared to Raney’s proposition regarding schema using another

Star Wars character, Luke Skywalker. According to Raney, viewers can form dispositions

toward Luke Skywalker very quickly based on viewers’ previous schema about the hero

character type. For that reason, viewers can form liking toward Luke from the beginning

without monitoring and judging his behavior, and possibly without observing any of his

actions.

These two frameworks make very different predictions regarding how liking will

develop over time and over the viewer’s experience of the narrative. On one hand, Zillmann

predicts that at the beginning of a narrative, viewer’s liking will be relatively neutral

regarding all characters and that the behaviors of characters will shift liking from neutral to

positive or negative based on how the viewer evaluates each individual character’s behaviors.

Raney, on the other hand, predicts that liking may not begin at a neutral standpoint. Instead,

decisions made by writers can activate schemas in the viewer, which leads to predetermined

levels of liking (and some levels of moral approbation/disapprobation) before any behaviors

are observed. For example, hero characters may be universally liked and the viewer may

expect that they will do good things for good reasons. As such, the viewer expects these types

of behaviors and would not need to judge each or any of the characters’ actions. For

characters like Superman, Wonder Woman, Spider-man, The Flash, to name a few, viewers

do not need to apply moral judgment since they active the hero schema. Moreover, an

unknown character who is similar to Superman may be evaluated similarly, purely because of

the expectations of the audience. As such, schema about character types may influence

perceptions of characters from the beginning of the narrative or perhaps even prior to

narrative exposure.


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Character Archetypes

Previous research on the evaluation of different types of characters (e.g., heroes,

villains, anti-heroes, etc.) has focused on describing these characters in simple terms and

using “schemas” of different character types (Zillmann, 1975). We are able to propose a short

definition of morally clear characters (traditional protagonist/hero/good characters or

traditional antagonist/villain/bad characters) based on this research. These clear characters are

the types of character who purely do either good, moral things (protagonists/heroes) or bad,

immoral things (for antagonists/villains). Moreover, they would not be expected to perform

any act which could be used to judge them as the opposite side of the character's moral

identity. Indeed, morally clear characters are purely good or bad from the beginning to the

end of narrative presentation. In addition, traditional heroes do not have moral flaws (Shafer

& Raney 2012).

We can name more than one traditional protagonist characters, such as Superman,

Spider-man, Wonder Woman, and so on. Superman upholds nearly every form of morality:

he is caring, just, obedient to legitimate authorities, loyal, and pure (Tamborini, Grizzard,

Eden, & Lewis 2011). These characters mostly present only purely good, traditional

protagonistic actions (or purely bad antagonistic actions for villains) in narrative. As such,

they are expected to behave in entirely moral way (or entirely immoral way for antagonists).

Other traditionally clear characters could be Luke Skywalker as a positive moral character

and as negative moral characters, Lex Luthor (Superman’s nemesis) and The Emperor (Luke

Skywalker’s nemesis).

Recent theoretical advances have begun to attempt to define morally “ambiguous”

characters (Krakowiak, 2008; Krakowiak & Tsay-Vogel, 2013; Shafer & Raney, 2012).

However, these theoretical advances still draw heavily on using character archetypes to

define morally ambiguous characters. These studies define the term "ambiguous characters"


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as morally complicated (Krakowiak, 2008), but also in a variety of other ways. For example,

studies by Krakowiak and Tsay-Vogel (2013) and Shafer and Raney (2012) suggested a more

clearly explicated definition of ambiguous characters. According to those researchers,

morally ambiguous characters are fictional main characters or protagonists that are

considered as "good guys" who sometimes perform immoral or evil acts. Krakowiak (2008)

also argued that morally ambiguous characters are good characters who do both good and bad

things. According to her research, based on morally judgment of characters' action, they can

be identified as either heroes/protagonists/good or villains/antagonists/bad.

In previous literature reviews, morally ambiguous characters are also known as

antiheroes (Janicke & Raney 2014). In their study, Janicke and Raney stated that antiheroes

are type of characters that include characteristics of both a hero and a villain and display

qualities of both heroes and villains (Lott, 1997). West (2001) argued that “they may have

noble goals, but the way they pursue them is rather ignoble or morally questionable” (Janicke

& Raney, 2014, p.5). Shares the same argument, Naremore (1998) pointed out that in a way,

“they show characteristics of a classic hero with good intentions; however, the means by

which they try to reach these well-intended goals are morally questionable” (Janicke &

Raney 2014, p.5-6)). “Despite clearly doing improper things for (at times) corrupt reasons,

antiheroes still function as “forces of good” in many narratives” (Shafer & Raney, 2012,

p.1030). For example, the character Jack Bauer in 24 who is a CTU agent usually use torture

on suspects to gather information to prevent terrorist attacks and save innocent people's lives;

or Sergeant Henry "Hank" Voight in Chicago P.D. show, who is a shady yet loyal head of the

Chicago Police Department’s Intelligence Unit that uses torture and corrupt ties with gang

members to further his investigations. Furthermore, Batman, Cat-woman, Green Arrow, or

any vigilante can be put into this category.


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On the opposite side of antiheroes are antivillains. According to Urban Dictionary,

antivillain are antagonists who are not purely evil nor entirely unsympathetic - a character

who does not seem to deserving of being cast as the villain, but is perhaps cast arbitrarily as

the villain because they are not the focus of the story and merely present a foil to the central

figure, who may be an antihero protagonist. (For example, Magneto (Eric) in X-Men; Gru in

Despicable Me; Megamind in Megamind ; Loki in Thor and Avengers serve as noticeably

interesting antivillains.

The current definitions of morally ambiguous characters, thus are steeped in the

character archetypes of antiheroes and antivillains (Krakowiak, 2008; Krakowiak & Tsay-

Vogel, 2013; Shafer & Raney, 2012). In these studies, “ambiguous” in morally ambiguous is

really defined based on known archetypes rather than the character being truly unknown (as

ambiguous would imply). In fact, these ambiguous characters generally serve as protagonists

with viewers seeing them as “forces of good” within the narrative. They are really not

ambiguous because viewers can judge their motivation as good, in a similar manner as other

character archetypes. For example, while Superman (pure hero) does good things and Batman

(antihero) performs questionable/immoral acts, both of them still serve “ justice” and both are

often considered to be heroes.

Combining Schema Theory and Moral Monitoring

Based on the fluctuation of characters’ narrative, the unfolding of narrative, the

following section describes how these models might play out over time and describes a

typology of characters in media, including the relationship between character types and these

different models of disposition formation.

According to Zillmann’s model, moral monitoring is applied from the beginning of

the narrative. Viewers form liking or disliking toward to characters, after judging characters’

actions as good or bad (see Figure 1). As we can see in the chart, good and bad characters are


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expected to begin their narrative at the same “neutral” point. During their presentation of

narrative, their actions are judged by viewers. At some point during their presentation, the

consistency of their actions allow viewers to describe them as “good” and liked or “bad” and

disliked. In this model, it is even possible that these characters can switch from being liked to

being disliked based on their actions.

Figure 1. Visual depiction of the Zillmann’s moral monitoring model unfolding over a

narrative.

Meanwhile, Raney’s model (see Figure 2) suggests that because of schema, viewers

are able to apply their prior experience with different characters to identify current

characters’ morality and form liking or disliking toward characters even before the moral

judgment. Good and bad characters do not start at the same “neutral” point because of viewer

schema. Viewers are assumed to use their narrative schema to judge characters’ morality

prior to viewing actions and, then form liking and disliking toward characters they “think”

are good or bad from the beginning of narrative. Because liking and disliking are formed

close to the beginning of the narrative or even prior to viewing the narrative, those attitudes

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are expected to be maintained until the end of a narrative presentation. As such, crossing the

neutral line is not expected. In fact, Raney (2004) argues that actions may be reinterpreted

based on the applied schema (i.e., the “immoral” actions of the liked character are over looked

and judged less harshly)

Figure 2. Visual depiction of the Raney’s schema model unfolding over a narrative.

Raney’s model seem to focus on characters who remain stable throughout a narrative

and Zillmann’s model allows for changes over time. However, Zillmann’s model assumes

that moral judgment is the basis of liking and Raney’s model assumes that liking can be

based on schema, apart from moral judgment. As such, both Zillmann and Raney’s model

have issues regarding disposition formation processes (see Table 1). Zillmann’s model has

difficulty dealing with a situation where audience members approach the narrative with

dispositions already formed towards characters. Meanwhile, Raney’s model has difficulty

dealing with situations where a character would completely change his/her alliance or

reverses his/her morality/schema in the middle of a narrative.

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R unni n gh e a d

: C HARA C T E RAMBI G UI T Y

E N J OYME NT

1 7

T a b l e 1 .

D e p i c t i o n o f Z i l l m a n n a n d R a n e y’ s M o d e l s f or d i f f er e n t c h ar a c t er t y p e s .

P e r c e p t i on s of C h a r a c t e r s A c r o s s

N a r r a t i v e

T y p e of C h a r a c t e r

Z i l l m a nn’ s M o d e l

R a n e y’ s M o d e l

A c t i on s

B e gi nni n g

E n d

B e gi nni n g

E n d

M or a l l y C l e a r C h a r a c t e r s

H e r o

P o s i t i v e

N e u t r a l

G

o o d

H e r o

( G o o d )

H e r o

( B e t t e r )

Vi l l a i n

N e g a t i v e

N e u t r a l

E vi l

Vi l l a i n

( E vi l )

Vi l l a i n

( M or e E vi l )

M or a l l yAm b

i g u o u s

C h a r a c t e r s

An t i h e r o

N e g a t i v e

N e u t r a l

E vi l

An t i h e r o ( G o o d )

An t i h e r o

( B e t t e r )

An t i vi l l a i n

P o s i t i v e

N e u t r a l

G

o o d

An t i vi l l a i n ( E vi l )

An t i vi l l a i n

( M or e E vi l )


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Notably, schemas may even apply to complex character types, such as antiheroes. For

instance, a character who begins a narrative as an antihero should activate the antihero

schema for audiences. This can happen even prior to watching the narrative if the audience

understands a narrative to fit a certain schema (e.g., the American outlaw narrative).

However, once that schema has been firmly activated in the audience and the audience is

using that schema to judge the character’s actions, it becomes difficult to explain how that

schema could become deactivated and another schema become activated. Schemas rely on

broad understandings and the application of rules in advance. Once the rules of a particular

schema are broken, the schema loses its utility as future experiences are no longer easy to

categorize. As such, the audience would not be able to use schemas when characters’ actions

do not fit a particular schema. In this instance, Zillmann’s model of constantly judging the

character’s actions seems a better fit. As such, a combination model would seem to be the

best fit for narratives featuring morally ambiguous characters. As an example, consider

Breaking Bad and its main character Walter White. Walter White is mentioned in previous

studies and identified as an ambiguous character (and antihero). However, based on his own

narrative through five seasons, viewers actually witness and experience the process of his

changing: Walter White’s actions and behaviors swing from a traditional protagonist at the

beginning of the drama, to an antihero in the middle when he adopts the Heisenberg persona,

to an antagonist towards the end when he aligns himself with neo-Nazis, and then finally a

return to an antihero for the grand finale. This remarkable process makes Walter

White/Heisenberg different from other type of characters (including Dexter or Tony Soprano)

because his character’s alignment changes drastically between good and evil throughout the

show. Vince Gilligan, in an interview with The Guardian magazine, said "I have kind of lost

sympathy for Walt along the way… I find it interesting, this sociological phenomenon that

people still root for Walt. Perhaps it says something about the nature of fiction, that viewers


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have to identify on some level with the protagonist of the show, or maybe he's just interesting

because he is good at what he does” (Plunkett, 2013). Even though Walter is one of a kind

(according to many critics and reviews, he is the most ambiguous character in television

history; John, 2013), and there are not many characters like that in television today (yet), we

have to question that why this type of ambiguous characters attract viewers so much.

This type of character who activates a schema, but then does actually change

characteristics during the narrative, seems to fall outside of previous theories’ explanatory

power. On one hand, traditional character archetypes still dominate media forms, especially

in television series and feature films. On the other hand, we have witnessed the appearance of

"truly" moral ambiguous characters recently, and the fact that viewers actually enjoy

watching narratives featuring these characters ( Dexter, The Sopranos and Breaking Bad are

extremely successful shows) leads to the need to re-define the definition of morally

ambiguous character. At this point, I would like to suggest a "new" definition of moral

ambiguous characters, which expands how the word "ambiguous" is understood: Character

ambiguity is the type of character who cannot be clearly defined or categorized as good or

bad. Moreover, they can also change themselves between good and bad, and turn to opposite

side of their identity during a narrative presentation.

How Morally Ambiguous Characters Relate to Complex Narrative and Schema Theory

Now, that we have redefined morally ambiguous characters, we turn to narrative

theories to explain how narrative structure and complex characters relate to each other. The

following section first explains what narrative complexity is. Then, we integrate narrative

complexity with ambiguous characters. Finally, we present reasons why ambiguous

characters may be enjoyed more than morally clear characters and by which specific

audiences.


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Bordwell and Thompson (2008) give a general definition of narrative in cinema as a

chain of events in cause-effect relationship occurring in time and space with characters being

one of many factors of narrative structure. Moreover, Bordwell (1985) defined that “ a

narrational mode is a historically distinct set of norms of narrational construction and

comprehension” (p.150), “one that crosses genres, specific creators, and artistic movements

to forge a coherent category of practices” (Mittell, 2006, p.29). Consistency in narrative

structure across various creators and genres allows for viewers to form schemas related to

different genres (e.g., tragedies, feel good comedies, etc.) and character types (e.g., heroes,

villains, the every-person, etc.).

Narrative structure influences how characters are presented. Thus, we expect simple

narrative presentation to generally define characters as morally clear. For example, children’s

stories feature very few plot elements or subplots and the characters generally fit into “pure

heroes” and “clear villains.” As such, simple familiar narratives allow viewers to form

quickly and immediately the liking of characters, because viewers have been exposed to these

types of narratives multiple times before. Narrative complexity, on the other hand, does not

allow for these quick judgments as there are more plots and subplots for the viewer to keep in

mind and the character’s actions often times do not fit neatly into clearly defined archetypes.

Mittell (2006) argued that narrative complexity began to dominate contemporary

American television in the 1990s. Through various examples of American network and cable

shows, Mittell examined the interaction between viewers and narrative complexity and how

viewers unfold innovative narrative structures by a comparison with conventional types of

narratives. It is logical to assume that viewers' story schemas of characters cannot be used to

accurately predict story arcs or draw any assumption when they are exposed with narrational

modes of truly morally ambiguous characters and complex narratives, because (1) viewers

may not have experienced complex narrative presentation before or (2) the complex narrative


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purposefully thwarts accepted narrative schemas. The confusion, ambiguity, and complexity

of narrative presentation in these cases increases the need for viewers to exercise careful

judgments of characters that cannot be defined in terms of schemas. For that reason, simple,

rational, or conventional story schemas would not be able to explain the enjoyment of

viewers in morally ambiguous characters narrative, as these types of narratives purposefully

buck narrative traditions.

As I pointed out above, unless combined, the two previous disposition models of

Zillmann and Raney cannot explain viewers’ enjoyment of characters who activate

competing narrative schemas. Nevertheless, because morally ambiguous characters have an

integrated relationship with complex narrative, it is also logical to look at the relationship

between complex narrative and schema theory. We can assume that complex narratives could

be considered as narratives that do not activate any kind of schema. There are a lot of feature

films, or television shows where viewers find enjoyment not necessarily through the

evaluation of characters, but rather through the specific narrational style adapted by the

writer. Pulp Fiction (1994), for example, is praised and recognized for an outstanding and

irrational script structure, in which narrative presentation is not only out of order temporally,

but also presents villainous characters as the main characters (Vince and Jules) and the lone

heroic character (Butch) as an ancillary minor character. However, the appeal of the

unconventional narrative of Pulp Fiction is not based on character archetypes, but rather it is

based on how the narrative unfolds. It is the narrative rather than the characters that elicits

viewers’ enjoyment of the movie.

However, we also can possibly argue that complex narrative has to sometimes

activate schema because viewers generally have an extensive history of exposure to

narratives. This history may cause viewers to engage schemas, even if writers are not

purposefully activating them through their narrative choices. However, complex narratives


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could also be understood as narratives that activate many different schemas, contradictory

schemas, or none at all. With the case of many different schemas or contradictory schemas,

the narrative presentation may purposefully thwart expected resolutions. A such, the activated

schemas might turn out to be the wrong schemas for interpreting actions, or the viewer comes

to realize that the characters and narrative fits no schema at all. Schemas provide comfort to

viewers because they know they can form certain expectations about how the narrative will

unfold (the antihero character will do some immoral acts but for good reason, the villain will

perform extremely immoral behaviors for bad reasons, and so on). However, with complex

narratives, all these expectations begin to be thwarted and the schemas might start to

breakdown.

Future Research Directions

As I argued above, the combination of Zillmann and Raney’s model can explain the

viewers’ enjoyment to truly morally ambiguous characters and their narratives. Nevertheless,

it is necessary to navigate future research direction to try to untangle the relationship between

narrative complexity, ambiguous characters, and viewer enjoyment. It is also important to

state that besides the enjoyment of morally ambiguous characters and complex narrative,

there are viewers who still root for and stick to the traditional characters’ schema and simple

narratives. In fact, the success of feature films (e.g., summer blockbusters) and television

shows where traditional characters still dominate proves that viewers have not turned their

back on simple narratives. These simple, schema-based narratives are quite popular as

evidenced by the great numbers of traditional TV shows fitting a simple schema. For

example, CBS still produces many spin-off series from NCIS , include NCIS Los Angeles,

NCIS New Orleans, where the focus is on typical heroes, antiheroes, villains, and so on. In

fact, this type of myster/crime schema is popular across many networks. However, research

should perhaps turn its focus to the more difficult question of how complexity in narratives


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and characters influences viewers’ enjoyment. Some theories that might explain this process

include Expectation violation theory (EVT) and Excitation transfer theory (ETT).

EVT, according to Defining Communication Theories, examines how messages are

structured, and the theory argues that when communicative norms are violated, the violation

may be perceived either favorably or unfavorably, depending on the perception that the

receiver has of the violator, or the consequences of the violation. There are only a few studies

that apply the tenets of EVT to explain media enjoyment (see for exception Krakowiak, 2008

and Weber et al., 2008). For example, Weber et al. (2008) stated that screenwriters of soap

opera will often violate audience expectations from time to time so that viewers do not

become bored with predictable outcomes.

As mentioned above, story schemas are formed when viewers are exposed continually

to the same or similar narrative structures. Because of repeated exposure and similarity

between different narratives, viewers also are able to make quick, unconscious decisions

about how plot and story will be unfold. For that reason, we can expect that irrational,

innovative, complex narrative presentation and truly ambiguous characters will violate

viewers' expectations more than simple, predictable one. This leads to discomfort for the

viewer because they can no longer anticipate what is coming next. This discomfort can be

resolved in several ways. If we assume viewers' expectation are violated in positive way,

enjoyment will be increased. For example, when viewers are exposed to Walter White in the

first episodes of the first season of the show, schemas might be activated where viewers

perceived Walter White to be the protagonist or at most an antihero. This causes viewers to

root for him as a likeable character. During Walter's story line, however, viewers may come

to realize that their previous schema and assumptions about his character does not fit the

narrative that is unfolding. As such, viewers may come to view Walter no longer as a

protagonist but rather as an antagonist (first, he used family as a moral excuse for his


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immoral acts but then he enjoys cooking meth and performs bad things for himself. This in

turn evokes and violates viewers' expectations (in an extremely good way in this show as this

surprise turn keeps viewers on the edge of their seats). On the other hand, when viewers’

expectations are suffered in negative way, enjoyment will be decreased. Game of Thrones, for

example, keeps killing many of the main characters of the story (a clear violation of

expectations and a thwarting of the time viewers invest in watching the show). This fact

actually causes a huge controversy around this famous series from HBO. Besides Game of

Thrones, The Walking Dead – the series about apocalypse world with the domination of

zombies and survivors’ stories - continues to provoke and thwart viewers’ expectations. In

the latest season, the show has turned the Terminus group into cannibals. The idea of people

eat people in The Walking Dead ’s new season has caused big controversy due to its focus on

pushing the boundaries of taste (Carter, 2014). Thwarting expectations, as discussed using the

aforementioned Game of Thrones and The Walking Dead examples, can cause viewers to

become angry and frustrated with the narrative. However, some viewers still enjoy them.

Questions remain as to how these different shows may function similarly or differently based

on violation of schemas.

Being confused when schemas begin to be thwarted, viewers quickly find themselves

in situations with higher and higher levels of suspense. For that reason, we can look at

Excitation-transfer theory (ETT) and the way it explains the contribution of suspense to

narrative enjoyment. According to Zillmann (1983), ETT is the application of the three-factor

theory of emotion to such sequences. It predicts that residual excitation intensifies subsequent

emotional responses as a function of residual sympathetic excitation. Indeed, arousal should

increase whatever experience viewers experience based on the narrative’s resolution. As

such, if viewers enjoy what they see, higher levels of arousal should lead to higher levels of

enjoyment; if, on the other hand, viewers hate what they see, higher levels of arousal should


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lead to higher levels of hate. Schemas might be thwarted in various ways leading to both

distaste, but also anticipation. To the extent that viewers continue to expose themselves to the

narratives they view, the anticipation and suspense elicited by violated schemas should lead

to stronger positive responses.

It is possible to explain that viewers' enjoyment is stimulated more when they are

exposed to complex narrative presentation in compare to predictable, usual and convenient of

simple narrative. Suspense may predict why this is the case, especially with regard to morally

ambiguous characters (Krakowiak, 2008). According to Krakowiak’s (2008) argument,

suspense is evoked and violated more by ambiguous characters than traditional characters.

Hence, truly morally ambiguous characters (with the process of changing and the

impossibility to pre-judge or pre-define morality) and the equivalent narrative complexity

featured in programs featuring these characters should evoke viewers' suspense more than

archetypal characters (even antiheroes) and simple narrative presentation. Furthermore,

evoking and violating suspense and story schemas can be interpreted as one of many ways to

create and add arousals to narrative presentation. On one hand, if all such evocations and

violations are negative, enjoyment might suffer. On the other hand, if even a few are positive,

we might expect that viewers' enjoyment will increase.

Conclusion

In conclusion, most conceptualizations of morally ambiguous characters (see

Krakowiak, 2008; Shafer & Raney, 2012; Krakowiak & Tsay Vogel, 2013) define these

characters as characters who show ambiguity in behavior and motive. However, these

conceptualizations focus on these characters as being “good” characters who perform

immoral acts (antiheroes). In feature films and television shows, these type of characters are

quite popular and well-known (e.g., 24, The Sopranos, Chicago P.D.). However, they are not

well understood in terms of how they function within narratives.


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Both Zillmann and Raney’s models reveal certain limitations as they leave out the

relationship between complex characters and complex narrative. For that reason, it is

necessary to look at morally ambiguous characters with the true meaning of “ambiguou s;”

and its relationship with narrative unfolding. These ambiguous characters cannot be classified

as good or bad. Indeed, truly ambiguous characters in their complex narratives challenge

viewers more because of this fact. Complex narratives not only break through predictable

character schemas, but they also contribute to viewers’ enjoyment of irrational narrative and

truly complex characters. In addition, truly ambiguous characters and complex narratives

require viewers to carefully use their moral judgments to watch and understand the narrative

and the characters.

The combination of Zillmann and Raney’s model (moral monitor and schema theory)

is a good start to explain why viewers find enjoyment to truly moral ambiguous characters.

However, future research should continue to attempt to provide more rigorous understandings

of these characters. Indeed, we should look at how characters in general, and complex

characters specifically, function in narratives, and why they draw viewers in. Among

prominent theories, EVT and ETT seem to be able to provide more precise perspectives.

There are only a few studies that look at how these two theories contribute to viewers’

enjoyment, especially the way complex characters and complex narratives function together.

Future research should continue to address these questions, and pay close attention to how

EVT and ETT might explain viewers’ enjoyment of complex characters and. Ultimately these

characters may be so ambiguous that no theory is capable of explaining their function.

However, this is unlikely to deter future scholars from trying.


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