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Groups as Epistemic Communities:Social Forces and Affect as Antecedentsto KnowledgeMiika VähämaaPublished online: 02 Apr 2013.

To cite this article: Miika Vähämaa (2013) Groups as Epistemic Communities: Social Forces andAffect as Antecedents to Knowledge, Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture andPolicy, 27:1, 3-20, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2012.760660

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Groups as Epistemic Communities:Social Forces and Affect asAntecedents to KnowledgeMiika Vahamaa

Individuals desire a coherent worldview that both maintains personal affective statesand contains functional knowledge enabling the completion of quotidian tasks. Tocreate such a worldview, individuals seek information from both large-scale and localreference groups. Thus, group membership serves an important epistemic function. Inthis article, the core properties of social knowledge formation are conceptualized as the“epistemic calculus” of groups. Perceptions of low salience risks, such as global warm-ing, are used to illustrate the social dimension of epistemic standards.

Keywords: Group Knowledge; Epistemic Judgment; Social Psychology of Knowledge

1. Introduction

The willingness of individuals to maintain group memberships (Tajfel 1982, 21–2)and to use heuristic methods of thought in understanding both their social(Habermas 2006, 420) and physical worlds (Sjoberg 2007, 228–30) invites us to

consider the social epistemic dimension of group membership.Here I argue that our shared understanding of the nature of things qualifies as

an important type of social knowledge, regardless of the truth value of that knowl-edge. This view challenges those of Fallis, which have previously been presented in

this journal (Fallis 2007, 267–8).According to Fallis (2007, 267–8), the underlying desire of all groups is to

maximize accurate beliefs while rejecting as many false beliefs as possible. Such a

Miika Vahamaa is a researcher at the Media Concepts Research Group at Aalto University School of Arts,

Design and Architecture in Helsinki, Finland.

Correspondence to: Miika Vahamaa Aalto University School of Arts, Design and Architecture, PO

Box 31000, FI-00076 Aalto Helsinki, Finland. Email: miika.vahamaa@aalto.fi

Social Epistemology, 2013Vol. 27, No. 1, 3–20, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2012.760660

� 2013 Taylor & Francis

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view is ideal from the classical truth-oriented——veritistic——viewpoint of knowl-edge (Goldman 1999; Kitcher 2002), but contradicts some of the research available

in social epistemology. Social epistemologists suggest that a veritistic dimensionalone is not sufficiently complex for understanding the epistemic——knowledge-

related——judgments that commonly arise in group contexts (Bergin 2001, 376;Hamill 1990, 8–10). Thus, Fallis conflates the meaning of social and psychological

dimensions of social epistemic judgments to the pursuit of truth. In social reality,I propose, the social psychological group processes may lead to truth and error

alike. Nevertheless, the members of the group do not primarily care about the veri-tistic achievements of their reference groups——group members care more aboutthe stability, social significance, and happiness that the group brings about.

To better understand the formation of collective knowledge, I contend thatresearchers should emphasize eudaimonic and social variables, such as the desire

for happiness, the maintenance of self-efficacy, group cohesion, and in-groupcommunication, as a set of psychological and social standards that also often func-

tion as epistemic standards for groups. In this Aristotelian sense, collective knowl-edge is primarily built upon the innate human desire to minimize suffering and

maximize well-being (Annas 1993, 43–6) and positivity (Fredrickson 2009, 24–7).Such desires are often achieved not just individually but within social groups.

Well-being and positivity are the psychologically subjective sense of positive feel-ings. Barbara Fredrickson describes positivity in her broaden-and-build theory as apalette of 10 core emotions——joy, gratitude, serenity, interest, hope, pride, amuse-

ment, inspiration, awe, and love——that together form psychological well-being forindividuals (Fredrickson 2009, 39) and social groups (Fredrickson 2009, 22–4).

In this paper, well-being and positivity are synonymous and seen as products ofa broad set of actions, affective states, thoughts, and beliefs that have Aristotelian

eudaimonia, or “happiness,” as their ultimate goal, telos. I argue that any constructconcerning socially based knowledge——such as risks——will benefit from assuming

that shared understandings are part of a larger human endeavor influenced by a laytheory——a sort of homemade social ontological model of risk——that has happinessas its goal. This perspective sees groups as a sort of epistemic synthesizer or episte-

mic machinery in which understanding of the world develops in a social context forsocial ends. In other words, groups should not be seen as systems that we form in

the social world to achieve truth. Groups should first be seen as systems in whichwe pursue happiness. This pursuit has epistemic consequences since it shows that

our knowledge is most of the time conducive to happiness, rather than truth per se.In the fifth section of this paper, I conceptualize the core aspects of the synthesizing

epistemic functions of social groups as the “epistemic calculus” of groups.Different strands of social research support these claims. For instance, the clas-

sic and contemporary elaborations of cognitive dissonance (Cooper 2007) andtwo-step flow of communication theories (Nisbet and Kotcher 2009), coupled withthe epistemic bias that group membership introduces in the interpretation of

scientific facts (Morton et al. 2006), help to explain divergence in public knowl-edge. Tajfel (1982) and other researchers have demonstrated the significance of

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group cohesion in the formation of shared knowledge (Morton et al. 2006). Thetheory of attribution error posits that group members often bias their views in

favor of the reference group (Hewstone 1990). Studies in education and personalepistemologies have shown that self-efficacy (House 2006; Pajares and Miller

1994)——a belief in one’s ability to achieve personally important goals——andepistemic beliefs have deep social roots (Kuhn, Cheney, and Weinstock 2000; for a

collection of case studies in personal epistemologies and social development seeHofer and Pintrich 2002). The power of in-group communication has been docu-

mented in a number of experimental studies of deliberative democracy (Fishkinand Luskin 2005; for a review of empirical studies see Habermas 2006, 413–5).

2. Standard Views of the Epistemic Functions of Groups

I use Tajfel’s (1978, 1982, 2) broad social psychological definition of group:

A “group” can be defined as such on the basis of criteria which are either external orinternal. External criteria are the “outside” designations such as bank clerks, hospitalpatients, members of a trades union, etc. Internal criteria are those of “group identifi-cation.” In order to achieve the stage of “identification,” two components are neces-sary, and one is frequently associated with them. The two necessary components are: acognitive one, in the sense of awareness of membership and an evaluative one, in thesense that this awareness is related to some value connotations. The third componentconsists of an emotional investment in the awareness and evaluations.

For the purpose of this paper, the internal criteria of group is the most mean-

ingful, since I focus on casual social groups——an interaction between at least twofriends, say——although the arguments of the paper are applicable to more formal

groups as well. As Tajfel (1982, 2) notes, however, some externally identifiablecriteria that members acknowledge are needed for a group. The emotional and

cognitive involvement of group members also ought to be recognizable by peopleoutside the group.

Social groups are especially important for individuals for the sake of social lifeper se but also in the pursuit of cognitive and affective stability. Groups are impor-tant as individuals attempt to create a more or less coherent representation of the

world, a representation that helps maintain emotional stability and self-efficacy.In attempting to create this mental model of the world, individuals generate

personal beliefs congruent with their referent groups. These referent groups includeclusters of individuals such as political parties, church groups, and families. People

join groups because groups are important for individual well-being and positivefeelings (Fredrickson 2009, 22–4; Tajfel 1982, 21–2). In joining and creating

groups, individuals also help create shared understandings of the world aroundthem.

In this manner, the large-scale political and social considerations of thesegroups, as well as understandings shared in small groups, shape individual knowl-edge perceptions. This occurs since group affiliations at both large and local scales

are central to the construction of public perceptions and to the overall

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maintenance of individual well-being. Hence, group memberships introduce animportant epistemic dimension to the formation and sharing of knowledge.

From this viewpoint, then, the biases in knowledge that different groups holdcannot be said to be the result of a public that is irrational or ignorant. Instead, it

needs to be understood that the ultimate goal of our knowledge is not often inpursuit of the truth, even though it is always functional. Thus, if information

regarding risks is socially functional and helps in the pursuit of desirable, pain-avoidant outcomes, it may gain the status of knowledge in social groups even if

that information is unverifiable or actually falsifiable. In practice, this could meanthat social groups may discredit science in deference to political ideologies orreligious belief systems.

What is different here from Fallis’ (2007) treatment of group knowledge is theassumption that the importance of groups and the general human orientation

toward maintaining an affective status quo function simultaneously. I am arguingthat social groups act as a type of epistemic machinery in the interpretation of

social knowledge——the shared understanding of how things are (Bergin 2001, 376).Fallis’ claim that groups generally pursue the discovery of truth through social

interactions and in-group communication does not apply in everyday social life.Empirical studies suggest the opposite: groups exist for their own sake, and typi-

cally the functionality of the group transcends any epistemic desire for truth. Thecoherence of social groups implies that groups do function as epistemic communi-ties as Fallis argues, but their epistemic goals are not truth. Social goals such as the

functionality of the group itself, maintenance of group coherence and allocation ofshared understanding among the group members are more likely than ascertaining

the truth.Such social epistemic goals can be clearly seen in the case of global warming,

where some groups have selected nonveritistic criteria for knowledge construction.Such socially oriented knowledge criteria results in increased group cohesion for

the group as a whole and for group members as individuals. (Morton and Duck2001; Morton et al. 2006; Nisbet and Kotcher 2009). For instance, a political orsocial group may hold a shared belief that global warming should not be consid-

ered as a fact for the mere pursuit of what is “true” in a veritistic sense. Rather,such a group would approach global warming along social parameters of group

cohesion and group standards. In this scenario, a group would decide through itsinteractions what is considered a “reasonable” belief about global warming when

the benefits and shortcomings of a given belief are related to the standards andfunctionality of the group. For example, a political group may value the individual

freedom to choose beliefs about global warming that contradict beliefs that arecredited in the scientific community. In fact, a political group may be coherent

only as far as group “knows” the same facts and communicates them in a way thatis acceptable for the group members.

A shared political ideology has an epistemic function. A given ideology that

values financial ends and maintenance of existing industrial infrastructure for thesake of functionality of the society may easily come to view anthropogenic global

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warming as nonfunctional for the group. In a similar vein, members of thescientific community that study global warming create an epistemic community in

which most weight in the formation of knowledge is given to the scientificcredibility as an ultimate pathway to truth and functionality. Thus, within that sort

of community the shared knowledge of global warming and its causes and conse-quences is vastly different from the knowledge that the less scientifically oriented

social group holds.

3. Current Empirical Research on Social Knowledge

In one widely used analytical model of risk communications, the Social Amplifica-

tion of Risk Framework (SARF), the importance of social referent groups is clearlyrecognized (Finucane et al. 2000; Kasperson et al. 2003; Sjoberg 2007), but the

extent and the mechanisms of group influence are not clear (McComas 2006).Studies also have shown (Finucane et al. 2000; Kasperson et al. 2003; Nisbet and

Kotcher 2009; Sjoberg 2007) that affect plays an important role in the formationof risk perceptions highlighting the common human tendency to preserve positiv-ity and functionality. The SARF stresses that groups function as social loci in

which both affect and cognitions of risk perceptions are amplified (Kaspersonet al. 2003). For instance, the choice of viewing global warming as anthropogenic

may be influenced by peer pressure and a shared understanding of “reasonable”behavior in a given group. The actual behavior——to believe or not to believe that

global warming is caused by humans——is a result of group interaction andmanagement of individual cognitive and affective states.

The SARF framework assumes that in everyday lives both risk evaluations andshared understanding of risks are based primarily on social and eudaimonistic

variables, rather than a formal or positivistic review of risk, as is proposed in veri-tistic or normative accounts of social epistemology (Goldman 1999; Kitcher 2002;Tuomela 1995).

3.1. The Role of Affect in Social Knowledge Formation

The traditional understanding of human processing of risk and related decision-

making emphasize the cognitive dimension. Increasingly, however, researchers havehighlighted the role of affect in the processing of information used in decisionmaking about risks. Sjoberg (2007, 234) suggests a three-step process, where initial

cognitive processing gives rise to emotions, which in turn guide further, moreelaborate, cognitive processing. Importantly, Sjoberg (2007, 232–5) argues that this

three-step process applies to both high-salient and low-salient large-scale risks.Although not dismissing the importance of the cognitive side of risk perceptions,

these findings point to the importance of the functionality of risk perceptions, not theverifiability or truthfulness of a given perception. We seem to believe things because

those beliefs benefit us——increase our ability to function in the social world——notbecause those beliefs meet some criterion of credibility. The maintenance of group

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stability, then, comes at a cost. Erroneous beliefs may be considered as truthfulalthough the classically understood truth value of such beliefs may be low.

In her treatise on the morality of happiness, Annas (1993, 43–6) proposed that theimportance of eudaimonism in understanding moral as well as knowledge judgments

is clear if the agent’s final end——happiness or eudaimonia——is assumed as primary.Eudaimonia is best understood in the broad Aristotelian sense rather than in

Jeremy Bentham’s narrow utilitarian sense of “hedonic calculus” in which humansare merely concerned with maximizing immediate pleasure (Skirbekk and Gilje

2001, 263–5). Whereas, utilitarian views of happiness are based on the pursuit ofpleasure by maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain, the Aristotelian eudaimoniaconcerns itself with good or bad moral outcomes. Thus, the pursuit of Aristotelian

eudaimonia requires an epistemic judgment that is socially responsible. A concom-itant methaphor with Bentham’s “hedonic calculus” could then be the “epistemic

calculus” of groups: a reflective thought process embedded in the social world thattakes into account other people’s needs as well as the individual’s need to maintain

emotional and cognitive stability. Eudaimonia, I propose, could be achieved withan “epistemic calculus” of groups that gives weight to desirable social ends as well

as desirable individual ends that may be achieved only within the social world.The result is a view of eudaimonia that acknowledges human utilitarian tendencies,

but adds the need for social stability that stems from socially responsible epistemicand moral judgments.

For Aristotle, eudaimonia as a general and ultimate human goal was trivially

obvious. It seems fair to say that happiness or eudaimonia is a common if notuniversal pursuit in contemporary lives as well, even though no universal agree-

ment on the exact nature of these notions exists in the philosophical or empiricalliterature (Annas 2004, 44).

Even with definitional limitations in mind, it seems plausible that to makesense of social knowledge one has to acknowledge that social groups exist mainly

for the sake of human sociability, not for “true” or veritistic ends. Groups, fromthe viewpoint of sociability, aim at the maintenance of happiness, as broadlydefined, and function as “epistemic synthesizers” creating shared meaning and

knowledge for their members.On the other hand, the importance of social group cohesion may make it diffi-

cult for the group to move toward beliefs that are beneficial for group members aswell as the group as a whole. This concern has been raised mainly in the domain

of normative philosophical study of social epistemology. Such concerns are brieflyreviewed in the following section.

4. Contrasting views on the Social Epistemic Dimension of Groups

Goldman has argued that the study of social epistemology should not be taken as aproject that shows how various social factors cripple the prospect of anybody everascertaining truth (Goldman 1999, 7–9). In his view, the study of social epistemology

should concern itself with the ways in which social factors contribute to moving

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closer to the truth in a veritistic sense. Goldman (1999, 24) claims that truth-orientedcollective epistemic goals are dominant and thus of chief analytical interest. In an

elaboration of Goldman’s standpoint, Mathiesen (2007, 210) calls for more alterna-tive considerations on the possibility of groups as epistemic agents. Mathiesen

implies that the study of collective epistemic agency proceeds best in the context ofclassic or standard epistemic variables such as truth, rationality, and justification.

It should be noted that the study of scientific standards of knowledge in a socialworld as well as empirical examinations on the function of personal epistemic beliefs

framing knowledge acquisition (Muis, Bendixen, and Haerle 2006) are important,and in certain domains, practically useful. For instance, scientific discoveries oftenbenefit from formal truth-oriented epistemic discourses. However, the quest for

observing and improving the veritistic (Kitcher 2002) and quotidian standards ofcollective knowledge as outlined by Fallis (2007, 267–8) overlooks the important

ways in which collective knowledge is employed in everyday social interaction.The emphasis on social interaction as an epistemic enabler is also supported by

Habermas’ (2006) account of deliberative political communication. Habermas claimsthat the formation of political group knowledge can be empirically tested, as is shown

in experiments conducted by Fishkin and Luskin (2005). Habermas (2006) presentsstudies that show how the epistemic dimension of group discourses, both in the micro

and macro dimensions, construct knowledge and generate the ability to deliberate.The epistemic dimension discussed by Habermas, in contrast to the conceptual-

izations of Goldman and Fallis, highlights the real-life practices of knowing in

which the knowledge a group holds is what that group understands itself to know(Bergin 2001, 376). That knowledge thus is rooted in communicative praxis of

everyday talk, as Habermas (1984, 11) states in his theory of communicativeaction. Habermas sees social interaction chiefly as a communicative practice that

requires “performative attitude”——a competence to understand what is being saidand competence to say what can be understood by others——on the part of the

participants in a group (Habermas 1984, 11).Habermas´ “performative attitude” provides a framework in which the role of

collective knowledge in groups can be viewed both as socially and rationally func-

tional, although this view can be criticized for its lack of a veritistic orientation(Goldman 1999, 7–9). A strict veritistic orientation, on the other hand, would be

more suitable in contexts that are parasocial and professional rather than onlysocial in nature. In parasocial settings, the people in the group typically hold asym-

metrical amounts of knowledge. In most professional settings, laypeople do notknow as much as the experts and possess limited opportunities to communicate at

the same level with the expert. An example of such a situation could be a visit to ahospital, where the layperson, the patient, is dependent on the knowledge shared

by the health care professionals.For a social setting that requires “truth” as a collective epistemic goal Fallis

(2007, 267) gives the example of a courtroom where the set of epistemic standards

is clearly outlined by the rule of law——is preconditioned by a spoken agree-ment——and is imposed on all concerned by experts. The parasocial nature of such

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a specific interaction may enable the function of the court system, but does notresemble most real-life interactive episodes. If Fallis´ example is thought through it

becomes obvious that the audience, the lay members of the court, do not typicallyhold symmetrical understanding of the facts regarding a given case with the

experts, the judges, and the lawyers. Thus, the example of a courtroom as a modelof group knowledge is clearly not applicable to the reality of everyday social life, in

which often greater levels of symmetrical understanding exist.Everyday social life can be epistemically asymmetrical, if not parasocial, as well,

but hardly rigorously analytical as is the case in more formalized and professionaldiscourses. The interaction between parents and children could be considered asan example of epistemically asymmetrical interaction. Parents typically know more

than the children, and have more of a say in how things are. In a similar vein,teachers and learners, coaches and players, and other common group situations

posit epistemic gaps of authority and position. However, even in these epistemi-cally disproportionate interactions, the epistemic goals remain primarily those

conducive to social functionality and happiness. On the most quotidian level,pupils and children listen to and adopt views from their teachers and parents

because both of these authorities are socially meaningful for children, they aretrustworthy, respectable, and someone they can depend on. Such reasons are

conducive to social well-being——rather than reasons for “truth”——and providethe “group calculus” shaping the direction of shared knowledge.

In the social world, individual and collective epistemic goals of social happiness,

or eudaimonia, typically have primacy over veritistic or analytical epistemic goals.In the social world, individual epistemic standards go hand in hand with the collec-

tive standards and become merged due to the overall social goal of eudaimonia.Emotionally motivated assessments of knowledge that are conducive to social

happiness are typically found in group settings because they offer importantadvantages; such judgments are rapid and subsume substantial amounts of infor-

mation without significant mental effort (Sjoberg 2007, 228–30). Methods ofthought that emphasize affective states, affective information and heuristics fit wellin situations that need immediate recognition of the other people in the communi-

cation setting. Such methods of thought are thus conducive to social happiness.1

The following section continues with the argument that the various groups in

which we interact and cooperate create the platforms for divergent, group-basedunderstandings. The diversity of these understandings is prone to create disputes and

debates that are often seen both in small- and large-scale interaction. The case of riskperceptions in public debates makes this very clear. Social and political group affilia-

tions have been shown to significantly influence shared understanding of the scaleand nature of global warming (Nisbet and Kotcher 2009; Oppenheimer et al. 2007).

5. Cognitive and Affective Elements of Group Knowledge

Scientists as well as the general public consider their standing in social groupswhen assessing and adopting scientific facts. According to empirical studies,

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individuals are inclined to support scientific findings that increase their status andconform to shared beliefs about what science should “look like” (Morton et al.

2006). Thus, more often than not, the revolutionary aspects of scientific pursuitare likely to be overlooked (Morton et al. 2006, 836)——not because a given set of

revolutionary “facts” are less likely to be true but because they are less likely towin favor in the social realm.

Group memberships then both amplify the opinions present within the groupand disseminate understandings to individuals who interact in the group. In

groups of friends, opinions regarding subject matters are quickly expressed andexchanged, sometimes thoroughly discussed, rarely scientifically examined. Thefocus of group communication is on the maintenance of the group’s stability.

Thus, understandings shared in a group may be erroneous on scientific criteriaand in the long haul some shared beliefs may prove to be harmful for the group

itself. For example, a group of friends may exchange their understanding of climatechange and argue whether now one needs to act on the matter. It is likely that

most of the arguments are taken as credible for the sake of group cohesion andmutual trust, although some disagreements may occur. The group conversation

would allow the knowledge of the individual members to surface and becomemerged with the shared understandings, collective knowledge of the group. The

group of friends thus has an epistemic dimension: due to their sense of belongingto the group, the friends within the group would likely influence each other, vali-date some information and discard some information depending on the social

norms of the group.Some recent research has focused on the epistemic function of groups in

changing group knowledge. Sunstein (2002, 176) has proposed a type of grouppolarization, an epistemic function of group deliberation that moves individual

group members toward extreme views proposed by the reference group. Sunstein’s(2002, 175) model focuses on more formal settings where the group assembles to

deliberate on some specific matter, however. Such organized gatherings around agiven subject matter do not capture the more casual and quotidian epistemic func-tion of most social groups. The social epistemic dimension of informal group

communication may be surprisingly subtle and may create shared understandingsas a side product of interaction rather than as a result of purposeful deliberation.

In some circumstances, e.g. in a jury, at political conferences, at organizationalmeetings of clubs, and the like——more formal group deliberation may occur.

5.1. Affective Elements are not Irrational

Habermasian speech acts are at work even in the most casual of interactions. AsHabermas (1998, 232) posits, “we understand a speech act when we know the

kinds of reasons that a speaker could provide in order to convince a hearer thathe is entitled in the given circumstances to claim validity for his utterance——in

short, when we know what makes it acceptable.” In this way, the group situationin which conversations take place not only enables understandable communication,

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but simultaneously connects individuals to the group and its rules of what isunderstandable and acceptable.

Arguably the example of the group of friends discussing global warming can beextrapolated to the concerns of larger groups——informal political gatherings, class-

rooms, churches, clubs, associations, and the like. As Morton and colleagues(2006, 836) conclude, in everyday social interaction, any lay or scientific theory of

risk——a social ontology of risk——is likely to be evaluated with the epistemic stan-dards that suit the group: “[W]hat comes to be accepted as scientific fact is the

outcome of a process in which different identities and associated worldviews arecontested. Among other things, science is politics. Accordingly, we see that socialpsychological and political forces shape individuals’ perceptions of the

facts——both among those involved in the creation of scientific knowledge andamong those who consume it.”

Such social orientations raise questions regarding the value and disseminationof “truth” among the public. Especially around important societal issues, the worry

has been that social norms and affective orientation outweigh the importance ofrationally based cognitions. Indeed, according to some accounts, the public can be

conceptualized as highly ignorant or even irrational when they form perceptions ofthe state of the world, particularly when those perceptions are based largely upon

media representations (Caplan 2007; Friedman 2003; Weinshall 2003). Such igno-rant social epistemologies highlight the need to change everyday epistemic stan-dards to match better with the “truth.”2

Fears regarding the harmful outcomes of group knowledge and public ignorancemay be lessened upon the consideration of recent empirical findings, however (Hab-

ermas 2006, 420). Research shows (Carpini 2004; Dalton 2006) that in the formationof perceptions about societal issues, the public can make use of their forgotten affec-

tive reactions to casually received pieces of information from the media and fromthe discourses that occur in daily lives. For instance, a forgotten news broadcast or

blog that presented an emotionally meaningful viewpoint may be remembered andused in a casual conversation that functions as a memory cue. Such casual momentsmay then serve a surprisingly important epistemic function, as our group interac-

tions——often without substantial mental effort or notice——bring up, reinforce, andshape our understandings of what is reasonable and credible——what we come to

know. Dalton (2006) and Carpini (2004) argue that the public’s perceptions areinfluenced by social groups as well as affective and casual evaluations and such per-

ceptions are functional and meaningful for the individual.Recent empirical studies show that people commonly merge affect in their

rational judgments about divergent risk perceptions (Loewenstein et al. 2001;Sjoberg 2007, 228–30; Slovic et al. 2007). Groups come to hold different under-

standings of the causes and implications of societal issues, such as global warming.But neither groups nor individuals are irrational in relying on combinations ofaffective and cognitive reasoning, and for turning to members of their chosen

social groups for knowledge. Rather, reason and communicative rationality(Habermas 1984, 11, 1998, 232) is what steers individuals to form such collective

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understandings. In the formation of understandings of global warming (Kellstedt,Zahran, and Vedlitz 2008, 115), it has been shown that people tend to draw upon

their overall experience of self-efficacy and social functionality——both variablesthat serve the maintenance of individual happiness and group coherence.

Thus, reliance upon in-group communication, trust in other group members,and consideration of group norms may be the best available method of knowledge

creation available for the individual. Unfortunately, reliance upon such social heu-ristics may lead to knowledge that appears well reasoned and socially functional,

but is not veritistic. What we get, thus, is the diversity of public opinions that arisewithin group settings and shape the world in which we live.

In the next section, I suggest that the diversity in group knowledge may not only

be unavoidable but necessary for the dissemination of understandings. It is onlythrough discourse that groups can achieve understanding. As Fallis (2007, 275–6)

points out, even the achievement of a “true” belief requires the acknowledgment oferroneous beliefs: “… for society to arrive at the truth on a particular topic, it may

be necessary for many members of society to have false beliefs on that topic.” Thus,it would be an error to impose a normative veritistic epistemology on groups as this

would not only violate the openness and freedom of group discourse but wouldrequire a step away from informal and casual interaction toward controlled

discourses. Such a step would easily lead to the neglect of the positive and necessaryfunction of errors in our interactions, as Wide (2009, 574) argues in his compellingthesis on the dialectic of errors. Thus, in this final section, I conceptualize the bene-

fits that nonveritistic knowledge formation and dissemination may have for groupsand their members.

6. Combined Cognitive and Affective Components of Group-Based Knowledge

If, indeed, group discourse enables intelligible and rational discourse, then the socialknowledge acquisition common to everyday group communication should be

recognized as having beneficial epistemic consequences (Ingram 1993). This processof group discourse could then be conceptualized as a sort of epistemic machin-

ery——the “epistemic calculus” of groups——that both serves the functionality ofgroups and disseminates and forms social knowledge.

It is difficult to disconnect individual epistemic judgment from judgments formedas part of group interaction. I conceptualize an “epistemic calculus” or groups which

posits that often it is our interactions within groups that bring about many individu-ally experienced positive epistemic consequences, such as a sense of self-efficacy andsocial functionality. It is my view that most of the time collective epistemic standards,

such as group cohesion and group normativity, are not fully separable from theindividual epistemic standards of self-efficacy and social functionality.

6.1. Features of Epistemic Calculus

The primary goals that groups as well as individuals pursue can be conceptualizedas core properties of the “epistemic calculus” of groups. The goals matter the most

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because they define the focus of our attention as well as guide our actions. Ipropose that while individuals talk and evaluate shared understandings in group

communication, the following three fundamental goals of self-efficacy andemotional stability are being pursued implicitly and explicitly:

(1) The sense that one possesses an ability to discuss and pursue truth, and toreview and select different perceptions (following Habermas 1984, 11, 1998,

232).(2) The sense of being a functional, accepted, and credible member of the

group (following Tajfel 1982, 21–2).(3) The sense of an ability to maintain personal affective stability and to achieve

happiness (following Annas 1993, 43–6, 2004).

The justification of these “senses” can be open to critique and elaboration via

discourse in group contexts where social knowledge perceptions are circulated.This type of discourse would further enhance the epistemic value of a particular

shared perception. Such casual and open discourse could be achieved withoutviolating the generally virtuous principle of free speech. The agency in this process

of attaining social knowledge is then less the individual “I” as the knower andmore the “we,” the group itself, as the agent who “knows.”

In the long term, the “epistemic calculus” of groups is influenced by true andfalse beliefs alike. The functionality of the group’s knowledge will be testedthrough successful or unsuccessful interpretation of the world. In the case of

beliefs regarding global warming any interpretation of reality will be confronted byevolving events. It is likely, however, that even in the face of drastic changes in

global climate, groups will have different interpretations. Some may blame ineffec-tive policy implementation, some may blame human ignorance, greed or other

vices, and some groups may regard global warming as a natural phenomenondevoid of human influence. In any case, groups are likely to synthesize——via their

“epistemic calculus”——differing beliefs and create group knowledge that appearsto its members as reasonable. From the viewpoint of being “right” or “wrong,” asocially shared criteria of truth remains difficult to achieve. Many societally impor-

tant matters are beyond the grasp of lay people and do not have high salience forgroup members. For these reasons, epistemic diversity is likely to be found around

matters that are low-salient, abstract, and beyond first-hand knowledge on the partof group members.

In an open society where the members of social groups are free to interact andcommunicate, the influence of “true” as well as “false” information and beliefs is

impossible to avoid. In the long-term, arguably, knowledge that proves to holdpractical and epistemic value for groups should move groups toward more accu-

rate——more “truthful”——understandings. This view comes close to pragmatism(Skirbekk and Gilje 2001, 362), although pragmatism conflates all standards ofknowledge to their mere practical value.

As discussed above, a potentially unfortunate side to the function of groups asepistemic communities exists. The influence of group norms and the importance

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of social functionality of the group enable a sense of rationality toward a falsebelief that can be harmful for the society at large. For instance, a shared under-

standing that global warming is not anthropogenic at all would lead to policiesthat would most likely undermine efforts to reduce the amounts of carbon

exhausts released in the atmosphere. In the long term such policies would haveenvironmental consequences that would probably speak to the fact that industrial

waste, as the majority of the scientific community now posits, is a major contribu-tor to the evolving global warming. The evolving environmental changes would

create need for revising the shared beliefs. Thus, time as an aspect of social reality,would guarantee that absolute disconnection from “truth” is as impossible as thepursuit of absolute “truth.” Collective pathways to truth over time, thus, will be

dependent on the “truth” of errors that play an important and meaningful role insocial interaction (Wide 2009, 574).

The possibility, then, to counter potentially harmful beliefs requires the classicvirtues of openness and availability of information coupled with public discourse.

Given that these epistemic virtues are present in most real-life group situationswhen ideas are being exchanged and discussed, the proposed epistemic process

could be used as a tool in analyzing divergent public risk perceptions. To view riskperception as a type of social knowledge that builds upon mainly social epistemic

standards would be to acknowledge that divergent risk perceptions are not just asimple case of public ignorance or lack of valid education and information, butare instead an aspect of the social forces at work in the process of knowledge

formation.Quite surprising empirical evidence exists that in the case of global warming

the amount of information or lack thereof a person has does not shape their over-all understanding of the matter. As Kellstedt, Zahran, and Vedlitz (2008, 122)

conclude in their study of the knowledge-deficit hypothesis regarding the issue ofglobal warming “the more information a person has about global warming, the less

responsible he or she feel for it; and indirectly, the more information a person hasabout global warming, the less concerned he or she is for it.” Thus, the researchfound that shared concern was significantly correlated with shared values, not with

the amount of information.Thus, it seems that the cognitive and affective components of group discourse

are the individual’s pathway to the epistemic function of groups and knowledgeformation. Without better understanding the epistemic function of group

discourse, however, it will be difficult to change the public’s understanding of riskor other types of social knowledge.

Epistemic tolerance, a tolerance that gives special weight to social parameters,is needed. As described by Fuller in his account of social epistemology (Fuller

2002, x, 2007; see also Shapin 1994) social knowledge is always linked to thecontext in which knowledge is used and the actions that involve that knowledge.According to Fuller (2002, xv) epistemic understandings develop in our everyday

language and communication in which we casually use the terms “truth” and“justification” and organize our actions based on these underlying notions:

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Thus, I have been less interested in identifying what people “really believe” (whateverthat means) than in how knowledge operates as a principle of social organiza-tion——for example, by motivating people to act in certain ways with regard to eachother and their environments.

As Fuller argues, knowledge has fundamental value as a guiding principle thatorganizes action. It has even been noted in some refinements of the “groupthink”

model that claims that group decisions typically lead to negative, false, and harm-ful outcomes, that group-based collective epistemic judgments can be useful or

correct (Aldag and Fuller 1993). It seems, then, reasonable to treat the pragmaticand social goals of the epistemic calculus of groups as goals that truly matter for

individuals. The reliance upon in-group communication, trust in other groupmembers, and consideration of group norms should be considered a type of episte-mic judgment by individuals with reference to external social groups and internal

affective states.Upon reflection on the example of global warming, it seems difficult to under-

stand the diversity of risk perceptions in the face of significant efforts to provide cor-rect, scientifically based information to the populace. Yet, when the epistemic

importance of the groups in which people interact in their everyday lives is consid-ered, it is likely that individuals form their perceptions of the risks of global warming

with consideration of their self-efficacy and standing in their social reference groups.

7. Conclusions

The notion that the public forms perceptions of risk——or any other type of social

knowledge——largely through socially transmitted information, and that that infor-mation comes to them through agents that have their own agendas, goals, and

desired outcomes, is not entirely new. Neither is the idea that human thought isoften affected by social and eudaimonistic factors. Aristotle´s conclusions about thearrangement of human thought, the medieval practices of hierarchical arrange-

ments of knowledge, and modern investigations of the significance of group factorsin forming public perceptions all imply that social groups affect knowledge and

beliefs as well as risk perceptions.In their attempt to create a coherent worldview that maintains personal affective

and cognitive states, individuals generate personal knowledge which is congruentwith both knowledge perceptions in general and larger ideologies of both macro-

scale and local referent groups. Thus, the groups to which individuals adhere intro-duce an important epistemic dimension to the formation of knowledge.

The shared understandings of things——as in the case of low-salience risks suchas perceptions concerning anthropogenic climate change——are a type of collectiveknowledge that attain epistemic and therefore socially powerful and meaningful

status via social variables, such as the maintenance of self-efficacy, group cohesion,and in-group communication.

The divergent knowledge perceptions that arise within different groups areprimarily built upon the innate human desire to minimize suffering and maximize

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well-being and positivity——desires that are seen by most humans as best achievedwithin social groups. Perceptions of risks that are remote to personal experience

are then largely shaped by our social reference groups. From the viewpoint ofeveryday life, however, the reason for joining social groups and spending time

within them is not primarily the pursuit of knowledge; it is of course what AdamSmith called “sociability,” the pursuit of the benefits which inhere to the social life

(Dwyer 1990).What is crucial here is the suggestion that human thought, both affective and

cognitive, has a substantial if not dominant social component, and that groupsplay an important epistemic function. According to this view, when individualsgenerate social knowledge, they use cognitive and affective structures that are influ-

enced by and constructed within their chosen referent groups. People exist ingroups with substantial cohesion and similarity of thought. Future research should

pay more attention to the epistemic benefits and consequences of group discourseabout social issues.

Acknowledgments

The writing of this article at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill was

made possible by a Fulbright ASLA graduate student grant, commissioned by theFulbright Center in Helsinki, Finland. I would like to thank my advisors, Mark D.West at the University of North Carolina at Asheville and Anna-Maija Pirttila-

Backman at the University of Helsinki, for guidance and stimulating conversations.The anonymous referees provided helpful, insightful comments.

Notes

[1] The focus on the importance of “us” in the pursuit of knowledge has enjoyed moresubstantial normative and veritistic accounts than the one sketched here, (Gilbert 1987;Tuomela 1995) and there are recent attempts to refine normative accounts to bridge thegap between the actual and the normative (Bergin 2001; Hakli 2007). These advances onthe preconditions of group or collective knowledge recognize that what we know is alwaysinfluenced by material, moral, social, and political factors.What is common to both normative and more descriptive accounts of collective knowledgeis that they acknowledge that any significant or useful amount of knowledge lies beyondthe powers of a single individual (Webb 1995). Thus, humans need and cannot avoid coop-erative interaction in cognitive activities. It is hence unavoidable that such cooperationtakes place in groups.

[2] Epistemologies of ignorance, I argue, put too little emphasis on the positive affect and well-being that comes in the form of increased group coherence and increased functionality ofthe group as a social entity. For Caplan (2007), the “ignorance” of the average citizen is ahindrance to the development of well-functioning society. What he fails to note, however,is the functionality that shared beliefs provide for social ends. Increasing political supportfor protectionist policies, say, may count as an ill-informed standpoint from Caplan’sperspective, but may strike a large subgroup of society as a functional idea that helps tomaintain in-group coherence and appears as conducive to the well-being of the subgroupmembers.

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Some other recent accounts of public ignorance posit the epistemic function on the level ofgroup, but see the social forces as harmful, as creators of oppression and inequality. Sulli-van and Tuana (2007, 1), in their account of the epistemology of ignorance that “a lack ofknowledge or an unlearning of something previously known often is actively produced forpurposes of domination and exploitation.” Such a viewpoint is compelling in setting an epi-stemic function of the level of social interaction, but dismisses the potentially epistemicallypositive and successful social ends as forces of mere oppression toward the outgroup.Similarly, in his essay on “White Ignorance,” Mills (2007, 20–23) posits that social episte-mology should not be only an effort to bridge a knowledge gap but to understand thegroup-based reasons for such gaps. Yet, for Mills, as for Sullivan and Tuana, the group-based reasons for epistemic biases are ethically undesirable variables such as racism andwhite privilege.

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