‘Governing for Everyone’: the Workers' Party Administration in S60 Paulo, 1989–1992

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‘Governing for Everyone’: the Workers’ Party Administration in S6o Paulo, 1989-l 992”

FIONA MACAULAY St Antony’s College, Oxford

INTRODUCTION This article examines the Workers’ Party administration in SIo Paulo, 1989- 1992, headed by Luiza Erundina. This experience is important for a number of reasons. The Workers’ Party (Part& dos Trabalhadores or PT) is arguably the largest, most dynamic, ‘renovated’, and electorally successful leftwing party in Latin America at the present, bucking the continental trend towards an (apparent) neo-liberal consensus after a decade of structural adjustment, market opening and the collapse of leftwing political projects around the world. The PT won control, to its own surprise, of one of the biggest cities in the world, with a population well in excess of many Latin American nations. Sgo Paulo is the economic powerhouse of Brazil, the historic home of much of its political elite, as well as the cradle of the new union militancy of the late 1970s and 198Os, and of the PT itself. Since the PT’s first, reluctant, forays into electoral politics from 1982 onwards, it had never won such an important political prize.

The experience in SZo Paul0 was traumatic in many ways, leading to internal contlicts within the party, and between party and administration. The rocky first year of government coincided with the 1989 presidential elections, and to a degree Lula’s campaign was fought and lost in Slo Paul0 (Kowarick and Singer, 1993). The municipal arena is also the only sphere in which the PT has administrative experience where the PT’s political principles can be examined in practice. It had not until recently won any governorships, and has narrowly missed the presidency twice now.’ Its adversaries’ accusations-that the PT is inexperienced, overly ideological, a ‘political dinosaur’, fatally internally divided, unable to respect institutional arrangements and democratic practice, isolationist and incapable of forming governing alliances-may also be tested. In many ways the PT was on trial. Their opponents and sections of the media were as harshly critical and unforgiving of real, or perceived, errors as many in the party itself. The lessons, both positive and negative, of that period are only now being assimilated by the party three years after their defeat by that scion of the military regime, Paul0 Maluf.’

* Winner of the Harold Blakemore Essay Prize for 1995, awarded by the Society for Latin American Studies.

212 BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH

Commentators have characterised the PT as the only ‘real’ party in Brazilian politics, in the generally accepted sense of aggregating and representing the interests of wide sectors of society, encouraging membership and activism, maintaining a transparent party structure (within the limits imposed by current legislation), openly debating its program, and maintaining discipline with respect to membership and its political principles (Reck, 1992; Mainwaring, 1992).’ As a minimum, the value of the PT lies in forcing other political parties to follow suit, become less clientelistic and rent-seeking, and adopt the discourse of social concerns. Their Sgo Paulo administration offers a case study of the difficulties facing a political party, particularly a leftwing one, that adheres to certain political and procedural ideals, when it engages with the structures and institutions of contemporary Brazilian politics. How does a party represent interests without succumbing to clientelism? How can it encourage meaningful grassroots and popular input into decision making yet without coopting or dominating its civil society interlocutors, and without substituting or undermining the institutions within which it is obliged to work as the city government? How does it redistribute scarce resources without involving itself in zero-sum conflicts with interest groups in society who may or may not form its electoral base? How does it reform the State from within, tackling corruption and clientelism, even as it governs from a position of precarious authority, for example a PT prefect at odds with an opposition majority in the legislature and politically hostile forces at state and federal level? And what difference does a PT administration make? The PT states its aims in municipal government as ‘popular participation’ and ‘inverting priorities’, i.e. responding first and foremost to the articulated needs of the majority (Bittar, 1992). To what extent did they fulfil their own objectives? In the transition to, and consolidation of, democracy in Brazil, the strengthening of political parties is crucial, and a detailed consideration of the issues raised by the PT’s S??o Paul0 administration provides a valuable example of the difficulties of striking the right balance between principles and pragmatism, between party discipline and the delegation by the party of the responsibility to govern to popularly elected and mandated officials. Finally, what are the opportunities for democratising civil society-State relations, and for intro- ducing much needed accountability into public life?

THE PT AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT The PT has to date participated in four rounds of municipal elections: 1982 (when they won Diadema and a tiny town in MaranhBo); the 1985 elections in the state capitals, when they won Fortaleza (Cearb); 1988 when they won thirty-two towns, including Szio Paulo, Santos, Campinas, two other state capitals (Vitoria and Porto Alegre), and three of the ABCD towns; and 1992 when they lost Sgo Paulo to Paul0 Maluf, but won a total of fifty-three cities, including the state capitals Goibnia, Belo Horizonte, Rio Branco and Porto Alegre. The rise in the PT vote has been impressive. In 1982 they won 3.1 per cent of the vote across the board, of which 88.8 per cent came from the South East and 71.3 per cent from SZo Paul0 alone (Gadotti and Pereira, 1989). However, they won Fortaleza with 35 per cent of the vote in 1985, up

THE WORKERS’ PARTY ADMINISTRATION IN SAO PAUL0 213

from 0.9 per cent in 1982, rising in Goiinia from 1 per cent to 40.2 per cent, in Vitoria from 1.7 per cent to 26.3 per cent and in Porto Alegre from 0.03 per cent to 11.3 per cent, and balancing out the early regional bias, although the bulk of PT administrations are still concentrated in Minas Gerais, SPo Paul0 and Rio Grande do Sul states (30 out of 53).

The PT has devoted considerable reflection to its performance in the municipal arena. Rejecting the clientelistic model, their municipal govem- ments are seen as showcases for the new-style politics they advocate-anti- corruption, accountability, popular participation and concrete results in favouring marginalised social sectors. The PT does not flinch from examin- ing its failures (Marcondes, 1991) and and openly debates the major contentious areas, e.g. the proper role and organisation of the Conselhos Populures (Popular Councils). In the late 1980s it was a prime mover in the Frenfe Nucional de Prefeitos (National Prefects’ Front), established as a progressive lobby and support group to fight the municipal comer against attacks by state-level and national government. Within the party, national and state-wide Secretariats for Institutional Affairs sponsor collaboration between the widely flung PT municipalities, and their administrations have been widely studied and written about, by contrast to the administrations of any other party, despite the fact that the PT has governed a tiny minority of Brazilian cities (0.7 per cent in 1989-1992, and 1.1 per cent in 1992-1996), albeit some of the most important in the country. In 1989-1992 PT administrations comprised 15 million inhabitants, i.e. 10 per cent of the population.

THE SAO PAUL0 ADMINISTRATION 1989-1992

The Election Sgo Paulo’s new mayor, Luiza Erundina, a small stocky woman from the Northeast of Brazil, a social worker, founder of the PT, grassroots activist and on the left of the party, constituted a novelty both in the city and in the party.4 She was determined to leave her own stamp on the city and to fulfil her commitments to good administration, to the popular movements that supported her, and to the PT’s political principles. In the event, these commitments became ever more incompatible, and she became noticeably more of a maverick and pragmatist, increasingly at odds with more established interest groups and with her own party. Only in the second half of her administration was a modus vivendi negotiated with the local party, and a redistributive bargaining approach adopted with the opposition forces in the legislature and the social sectors to which the latter were allied (Couto, 1995: 33).

Her victory was unexpected, in part because the PT still had not come to terms with governing, viewing elections rather ritualistically, as a means to building profile and membership, not as a path to state power. Their previous experiences in municipal government had been troubled, and they had been unable to theorise their practice, even as their practice itself was in evolution.5 The electoral victories in 1988 took them by surprise, with key topics such as the relationship between party, administration and


Popular Councils still to be hammered out. It was thus left to PT administrations, often to individuals, to steer a course left unplotted by the party (Venceslau, 1992).

Erundina was elected with 30 per cent of the vote for a left coalition headed by the PT on 15 November 1988, taking office on 1 January 1989.‘j The PT had done badly in previous contests. In 1982 they were unprepared to govern, viewing themselves as still principally a political movement rather than a party, and the State as an irredeemably authoritarian antagonist. The PMDB was also enjoying the height of its dominance as the leading opposition party. However, by 1985 the PT was more at ease with electoral competition and ran Eduardo Suplicy for mayor, and again in 1986 for governor of the state, in both instances as a compromise candidate between radical left and social-democratic tendencies. In the 1988 selection process, Plinio de Arruda de Sampaio, the more ‘moderate’ candidate, had the backing of both the ArticulapTo faction (the centrist grouping around Lula, and the dominant faction in the local party directorate), and of Lula and the party leadership. Erundina’s surprise victory in the primaries was swung by the more radical left factions and the grassroots of the party, who were swayed by her conviction that the Popular Councils should be deliberative and not consultative as Plinio argued. The latter was also content to reinforce the Councils’ level of representivity and democratic aspects within the existing institutional apparatus. Erundina however, with a strong background in grassroots activism, particularly in housing struggles in the shanty towns, wanted to build up the popular movements as a parallel and alternative power base from which to challenge institutional arrangements (Sader, 1992: 17). The resistance of the Articulapio faction to her candidacy and their lacklustre support of her campaign sowed the seeds for later tensions between the prefect and her team, and the local party.

In 1982 the PT had come third in Go Paul0 with 14.9 per cent of the votes in the mayoral elections, in 1985 they came third again with 20.7 per cent and in 1986 slumped to a depressing fourth place with 11 per cent, losing to Quadros. Erundina was elected effectively by the tenacity of the party militants, and her sudden transformation into a viable candidate, i.e. able to win and govern. Three major factors played a part: the image of both the PT and Erundina; a protest vote against the PMDB and the government; and the campaign itself, along with certain conjunctural elements (Lamou- nier, 1989: 96). Maluf led the polls until the day of the election, pushed into second place by the PT’s last minute surge, whilst the PSDB and PMDB lost ground to their own lack of a coherent strategy and unappealing candi- dates.’ Despite the fact that PT had refused to support Cardoso against Quadros in the 1986 elections, some PSDB leaders finally declared their support for Erundina, whilst church groups and the CEBs assisted the growth in her vote in the poor areas. The PMDB candidate Leiva became the object of an anti-incumbency vote and several violent clashes between police and strikers or demonstrators enabled the PT to attack the PMDB government at all levels on the question of repression which, combined with economic recession and unfulfilled expectations, produced a ‘protest vote’ against the PMDB state government and the failure of the Cruzado Plan.


The last people to decide how to vote were Northeasterners, especially women, and she essentially won on this last minute decision (SPo Paulo has the largest, most concentrated population outside the Northeast). The PMDB vote shifted from the poorest sectors, who had missed out on the ‘economic miracle’, to the middle classes and in 1988 the PT won in all classes but scored highest among those in work (75 per cent of electors against 59 per cent for Malt.@, unions, and youth. On an index of democratic attitudes Erundina’s electors came out with the lowest rate of agreement with such statements as ‘political parties are useless’ and ‘people like me cannot influence the government’, blamed social problems on government and business, rather than on the political opposition or the trade unions, and favoured more direct forms of political action such as land invasions or marches (Muszynski, 1989). Being a woman, a Northeasterner, a radical and inexperienced were seen to count against her, whilst her selling points included honesty, union backing, affiliation to the PT and a perceived empathy with the day-to-day problems of the electorate.’ Overall the bi- party system had been suffering steady erosion (40 per cent of voters cited the political party in 1982, 20 per cent in 1986 and 18 per cent in 1988) although in Erundina’s case, the party was cited more often than the candidate in pre-election surveys. However, the election of PT mayors has not yet managed to counter the strongly executive oriented patterns of Brazilian elections, in which the majoritarian candidate overshadows the party and the legislators, elected on an open list PR system. Her slim victory with 30 per cent of the valid votes was accompanied by minority representation in the legislature. The PT elected 16 out of a total of 53 city councillors (up from 5 in 1982). Eduardo Suplicy won the most votes and was elected President of the Chamber giving, initially, a greater sense of influence in the Chamber than was warranted. This was of course laying the groundwork for a difficult minority government, a situation frequently faced by the PT within the existing electoral regime and political culture.

Social policy SZo Paulo is truly a megalopolis, with enormous problems of resource distribution and social inequality. The city’s budget is the third largest in the country, after that of the federal government and of SZo Paul0 state. It covers an area of 1100 square kilometers, with 9.5 million inhabitants, of whom 2 million live in slum tenements, 1 million in shanty towns and 2.5 million on illegal plots of land. Erundina came into office faced with two major problems: establishing an administrative and financial basis for governability (the political basis took longer both to perceive and construct), and the task of forging a viable plan of action out of the party’s guiding principles.

The legacy of Jlnio Quadros ranged from a public debt of US$ 1.5 billion, run down or closed creches, schools and hospitals, and a corrupt public administration. The CMTC (transport company) owed US% 6 million alone just to tyre suppliers, the hospitals had no medicine supplies and 800 beds had been taken out of action. Twenty-two million cruzeiros were owed to the rubbish collecting companies and city employee salaries lagged way behind

BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH

TABLE 1 City Council of SZo Paul0 (PMSP). Development of Total, Actual Average Expenditure, by Area and Administration

AREA 197551978 1979-1982 1983-1985 19861988 19891992

Olavo Reynaldo Mario Settibal de Barros Covas

Jlnio Luiza Quadros Erundina

Social services 100 140 164 242 457 Operations/infras. 100 95 95 210 195 Environment 100 104 116 153 220 Other 100 119 176 266 284 TOTAL 100 116 139 231 303

Source: Bakuyos PiUSP e relatdrios mensais de execupfo or@mentriria, Pos&rio em 27/12/91. 1992: Orpzmento-Programa. Index used: IPC-FIPE. Cited in Brasil Agora 31/g/92.

market averages (Freire and Azevedo, 1990). Erundina had to start by balancing the public books and redressing the urgent financial and administrative problems inherited before implementing the kinds of social programs anticipated by its electors and the PT. The first stage was to renegotiate the debts, and remodel some costly mega-projects left unfinished by Quadros. The lack of immediate results in the fist year provoked much disappointment, giving Erundina an unprecedented 79.2 per cent disap- proval rate, partly also the result of sustained media criticism of the administration in the run-up to the presidential elections. However, the impact of the next two years of work reversed public opinion, producing visible improvements for large sectors of the population. The PT administration spent much more in real terms on social welfare than the three preceding administrations (see Table 1). Erundina allocated 48 per cent of her budget to this area, particularly housing and transport, compared to 33.8 per cent under Quadros and 37.4 per cent under Covas (Kowarick and Singer, 1993: 207).

The public health service was run down and underfunded, therefore priority was placed on renovating existing installations, building new ones and improving service to users. Five new hospitals and twelve health units were built, 137 enlarged and renovated and 110 ambulances and radio- communication units purchased, reducing waiting time from 40 to 12 minutes. Spending on medical equipment and maintenance increased by 132 per cent and 254 per cent over 1988, and the number of hospital beds doubled, even though SZo Paul0 still does not satisfy the WHO recom- mended number of beds per population.

The number of pupils in municipal schools rose by 20 per cent, and truancy and failure rates dropped. Teaching itself improved and teachers enjoyed better employment conditions with new job descriptions, salaries, career structures and a fulltime working day in a single school. Outlay on running costs, maintenance and purchase of materials rose by 389 per cent over 1988. Erundina emphasised professionalisation and higher status for public service workers in order to spur a qualitative improvement in services,


which could not be achieved by simply employing more, badly paid, workers.

When the PT took office the city had an estimated shortfall of 1 million houses. Their administration managed to build or start 40,000 houses, a tiny number compared to the demand, yet still a huge program equivalent to erecting a city of 200,000 inhabitants (the two previous city governments had housed a mere 3000 families), 10,000 of which using a self-build scheme run by contracts between the municipal government and community housing groups. PT executive officers are still facing a court case initiated by the city auditors and local police alleging illegal granting of building plots, although ironically it was the PT that confronted clandestine activities in the city (squatting, street trading) and regularised them, giving tenants and street sellers legal status and protection. The PT brought urban services to 25,000 families in the favelas, again in collaboration with local community groups, and gave squatters on municipal owned land the right of occupancy, in effect integrating the poorest and most marginal inhabitants into the city as a whole.

Other areas of social policy encompassed sport, leisure, culture and women’s issues. Erundina raised SHo Paulo’s international profile by refurb- ishing Interlagos as a world quality Farmula I racing circuit. New parks were built and a rubbish separation and recycling scheme introduced involving some 64,000 homes. The city’s cultural activities were to be accessible to the entire population, rather than a small privileged elite. The appointment of Marilena Chaui, highly respected philosophy professor at the University of Sao Paulo, as city Secretary for Culture was a bold move. The latter set up 13 local cultural centres, and extended services into other neighbourhoods through outreach workers who coordinated with community committees. The Municipal Theatre was refurbished along with other theatres, library buses and children’s play schemes set up and a summer sports program established servicing 320,000 people a day. They also introduced matinee performances in municipal theatres, so that people could go after work, thus easing congestion in the buses. 44 new creches were set up, the old ones refurbished and the pre-school diet improved. 301 Youth Centres and 14 new Community Centres set up, with six designed especially for the homeless and street population. Street sellers, who has previously suffered harassment from the police, shopkeepers and protection rackets were licensed by the municipality, with preference to the disabled and those with several years trading in the area. Erundina appointed five women in a total of eighteen Secretaries, and set up the Coordenadoria Especial da Mulher (Women’s Coordinating Committee), a non-executive, appointed body to work with the other Secretariats to integrate gender-related issues into their agendas. The city supported a shelter for battered women, made contraception freely and widely available in health posts, ensured that the public hospitals offered abortion services to women under the current legislation,g increased the number of creche places and provided legal backup for women workers claiming sexual harassment or discrimination.

The past three years of Maluf’s administration have seen a return to the more traditional pharaonic civil engineering projects of old, with most of


Erundina’s most innovative initiatives axed. Public perception of her performance has improved as a result, but such a reversal also underlines the failure of the early PT administrations to guarantee institutionally the survival of their most successful, visible and popular policies.

The transport conflict Transport in Slo Paulo is chaotic, badly regulated and inefficient. The metro lines are woefully inadequate, whilst the buses are overcrowded, often dangerous and polluting. Six and a half million of the city’s workforce has to travel significant distances by bus to work resulting in total congestion at rushhour. In the rest of Latin America price hikes in bus fares regularly spark off rioting and social unrest, so it is therefore unsurprising that public transport became the litmus test of the Erundina administration, and here that she met her greatest political challenges. Promises of lower fares and improvements in services proved difficult to implement in practice, as she came into conflict with labour unions over wages and staffing, the business sector over financing of a subsidy and the local populace over fares and standards. The system was near breaking point. The bus fleet had not grown in 14 years from 8500, and 800 of the CMTC’s 3300 buses were stuck in the garages waiting for repair. The CMTC had inherited a bankrupt company from Quadros, with a drop in the real value of fare income and delays in receiving subsidies. For the first time ever the CMTC, founded by Adhemar Barros in 1947, was less popular than the private companies and the transport secretariat itself went through three incumbents in as many years. The major areas of contention became: the introduction of the ‘Zero Fare’ on public transport (and how this should be subsidised), municipalisation of the city bus services, and a showdown between the administration and striking bus drivers and conductors.

The ‘Zero Fare’ was the most ambitious project and was to be subsidised by massive increases in business and corporate property rates (IPTU) of around 600 per cent overall.” The right to transport was viewed as ranking with the right to health and education, and it was thought to be a clearly comprehensible, popular measure, demonstrating the PT’s commitment to redistribution of resources and marking Erundina’s shift from her initially defensive posture to a more active stance. Unsurprisingly it was thrown out by a legislature nervous of the high political and financial cost. Her gamble in mobilising the population in support of the measure, to put pressure on the councillors, proved a miscalculation, faced by powerful opposition from business and media. The social movements had demanded improvements in public transport, but not free transport, and the over-ambitious gamble backfired (Sader, 1992: 112).

Transference of transport services to state-level public control formed at the time a key plank in the party platform, particularly for the left, but was discarded as unworkable by the administration. Municipalisation of the bus companies was intended to improve services, and solve queues, overcrowding and unreliable timetables, and to score a much-needed victory in a key policy area. By the time the bill had been approved in the Chamber in 1991, however, it was almost unrecognisable, with major concessions won by the


big bus companies. They pushed up the price per kilometer travelled paid by the prefecture (designed to reduce overcrowding and encourage servicing of less popular routes). The resulting revenue allowed them to enlarge their fleet and reap even bigger profits. However, bus drivers working for private companies earned 30-40 per cent less on average than their colleagues working for the CMTC. There was no wages and employment policy for the employees and thus the CUT affiliated Slo Paulo Bus Drivers Union viewed a mtmicipalised service, so distorted by the PDS and cronies, as being tantamount to privatisation. Once again, the administration did not, or could not, bank on mass mobilisation and so negotiation was conducted behind closed doors. The Secretary for Transport at the time, Lticio Gregory, felt that, given the balance of power in the city government, they could push the reforms no further. When the Chamber voted on the Law of Budgetary Guidelines, they passed an amendment limiting any subsidy to public transport to no more than 10 per cent, a move which Erundina immediately vetoed, then overturned by the councillors. In 1992 this amendment was removed, freeing Malufs hands, who reorganised the CMTC with a view to eventual privatisation.” On the positive side, the number of buses was increased by 2000, with more traffic wardens and police. The CMTC was transformed into a modern streamlined company, its debts rescheduled, its deficit eliminated and the staff reduced (3000 job losses over three years, down to 26,500). The PT’s agenda was so obstructed or distorted that it is hard to determine the outcome had the Zero Fare been introduced or municipalisation fully implemented. The service continued to be substandard and the conilicts within party and administration as to the strategy to pursue were never fully resolved.

THE POLITICS OF GOVERNMENT Erundina’s administration was beset with political difficulties from the outset. Despite her reputation as a radical, pragmatism took over and she set course for a prolonged confrontation with the ArticuZu@ dominated PT Municipal Directorate, as well as with certain trotskyite factions. Expecta- tions were high in all quarters after the election of a ‘workers’ administration. Business feared fiscal irresponsibility, political marginalisation and a massive transfer of private services into the hands of the city government. Meanwhile the trade unions expected benefits and special treatment, whilst the more marginal sectors who had provided crucial votes for Erundina’s victory, especially those explicitly allied to the PT via the social movements, anticipated rapid improvements in their standard of living, particularly with respect to key issues such as land rights. How then did the PT deal with the structures, mechanisms and institutions of local government, and the opportunities and limits offered, given its aims of redistributing resources and of democratising State-civil society relations?

Institutional arrangements Throughout its genesis and development, the PT had regarded the Brazilian State with a great deal of suspicion, adopting both an anti-Statist and extra- Statist stance. The enormous expansion of the State under authoritarian rule


(Vargas, then the military) had made the State bureaucratic, corrupt, clientelistic and a key player in the advance of industrial capitalism in Brazil. It therefore could not be regarded as ‘neutral’ in any sense, and governing via the institutions of the State presented the PT with thorny ideological questions. Luiza Erundina herself favoured initially the promotion of the grassroots movements as a counterbalance and parallel force to the elected legislature, in part to remove their clientelistic base of support and in part to counteract the PT’s lack of a working majority in the Municipal Chamber. However, it was also clear to her in the first year that in order to introduce significant changes she had to put her own house in order first, rescheduling debts and streamlining the administrative apparatus. Perversely this led to accusations by her own party that her administration was ‘technocratic’, suffering from ‘paralysis’ and ‘adminis- trativismo’ and had accommodated itself to the machinery of bourgeois government.”

There were however also a number of opportunities available for democratising social relations in the city. The 1988 Constitution accorded greater autonomy to Brazilian cities, permitting them to formulate their own Organic Law (subject to federal and state constitutions), and every city over 20,000 had to produce a Piano Diretor (Master Plan) in order to circumvent piecemeal clientelistic responses to local needs, and to provide a tool for coordinating urban development.

The Master Plan, however, was marginalised within the administration and viewed by many in the party as a technocratic fetish, of little relevance to the immediate needs of the population, even though regarded by its authors as a crucial blueprint for S5o Paulo’s future, and a means by which to rationalise and regulate the overall development of the city both economic- ally and socially (Singer, 1993; Rolnick et al., 1990). It focused on moder- nising the outmoded zoning regulations that were strangling economic growth throughout the city, and underutilising public infrastructure, for example workers having to commute at certain peak hours. The document was also intended to be the fruit of wide, popular consultation. However in the event the party evinced little interest and as a result grassroots input (by slum dwellers, etc.) was minimal. Ironically, after months of closed door negotiations with business interests (architects, big real estate owners), once the plan went to public discussion, more radical urbanists in the PT started raising objections, along with other groups on the right. As Paul Singer notes on the failure to approve the Plan:

Political struggles focus either on immediate grievances or on rules. Social movements tend to engage themselves in struggles for or against immediate measures. They involve themselves far less in contests over rules (Singer, 1993: 28).

The administration’s anxiety to deliver immediate concrete results in SBo Paul0 tended to reinforce this contradiction.

Democratising social relations in general, that is between civil society and the State at municipal level, was attempted in a number of ways: decentralisation and administrative reform; the promotion of the Popular Coun-


cils; public discussion of the city budget and Master Plan; the removal of the clientelistic nexus between city councillors and their political constituencies, and its replacement with organised grassroots groups who could negotiate with the administration as a whole, and with other interest groups over resource distribution. Erundina also opened up government contracts to competitive tender, changing the rules on tendering so small businesses could compete on equal terms, in effect applying market forces to counteract clientelism. The legislature remained hostile throughout the administration, not least because having lost their clientelistic base and raison d’e^tre, they were unaccustomed to legislating and indeed the municipal sphere is still marked by the presidentialist style of government, despite the changes of the 1988 Constitution. One criticism of the first year of her government is precisely that it established vertical linkages between the executive and social movements, rather than fostering horizontal linkages with the city councillors and possible allies in the Chamber.

Administrative decentralisation was seen as crucial in order to demo- cratise access to services and increase efficiency. The bill on administrative reform sent to the Chamber in May 1991 therefore had the potential to link social welfare priorities to greater popular participation, making the PT’s dream of popular consultation more of a reality. A centralised consultation process via sectoral Popular Councils and regional Plenaries in a city of 9.5 million was ultimately unsatisfactory in terms of representivity, and efficiency, and absorbed much time and energy in the first year of the administration. The bill proposed 13 subprefectures with autonomy over their own resources. The 17 municipal secretariats would be replaced with 5 new ones. The 13 subprefectures would then work with 5 corre- sponding subsecretariats. All the subprefects would be designated by the prefect, thus guaranteeing policy coherence. Coordination would be achieved via a Government Action Council, composed of the prefect, her cabinet chief, secretaries and subprefects to set priorities, targets and budgets. However this proposal never got through the conservative dominated Chamber.

An ongoing debate within the PT has been the nature of the Popular Councils through which popular participation is to be channelled (Daniel, 1991; Azevedo, 1988). The PT is marked by its origins in the social movements of the late 197Os, and maintained a strongly ‘movimentista identity until the mid 1980s when it was increasingly faced with the challenges of institutional power. Its confusion over the Popular Councils is symptomatic of the inherent contradictions of attempting to combine the conflicting functions of movement and party. The former articulates specific interests, the latter should aggregate and balance potentially competing interests. Social movements act as pressure groups, making demands, the party in power however is obliged to govern and to produce public policy in response to a diversity of demands. The party was also slow to understand that whilst it had occupied an oppositional role in Brazilian politics since its inception, and could use its occupancy of municipal power both as a focus of opposition to the federal government, and a showcase for a radical alternative, it could no longer cling to such a negative posture once in


government. Erundina’s own preference for a more deliberative role for the popular councils was modified by pressing pragmatic considerations. The first months of her administration were occupied with endless assemblies and meetings but the limitations of allowing the views expressed by the grassroots to determine rather than inform the administration became apparent. Firstly the PT could not promise to meet all demands due to lack of resources. Some demands were very parochial and economistic and the executive alone could not guarantee results. For example, the budget sent to the legislature was entirely altered, causing popular movements to claim the PT had broken its promises. The grassroots movements themselves are of variable strength and some have a symbiotic relationship with the PT that verges on clientelism. Erundina noted, ‘The Popular Councils are not a technical question, but an essentially political one. I do not think it is the role of the State, of the Prefecture, to take the initiative in setting them up. Popular Councils cannot be institutional organs for representation and participation’.” The shift from the ideological elevation of the Popular Councils as the ultimate and authentic expression of direct democracy, to a style based more on negotiation, compromise and an overall strategy for the city and for maintaining governability was telling.

Funding redistribution The bankrupt state of the city caused major frustration. Paying for social programs required making those in higher income brackets contribute more without necessarily seeing a return, as,well as improving tax collection, and coordinating the demands made on the city by popular movements and interest groups. The Brazilian municipality has three main sources of income: transfers from the state government (56 per cent), transfers from the federal government (11 per cent) and self-generated income (29 per cent). Despite a greater measure of freedom to raise funds under the 1988 Constitution, municipalities are still highly dependent on these transfers. The city’s receipts increased under Erundina, allowing both for restoring equilibrium in the city’s accounts and for greater social expenditure, essentially by improving tax collection and making the IPTU (rates) more progressive. Apart from being morally just, a more progressive IPTU was protected by law and nearly all the major Brazilian cities use this collection method. The IPTU was to be used to subsidise the Zero Fare scheme, and not unsurprisingly met resistance. The request for a 380 per cent rise was denied, but Erundina was then able to negotiate a later 125 per cent rise. By 1992 she had restored the contribution of the IPTU to the city’s receipts to its 1978 level. As a percentage of city income it rose from 9.7 per cent in 1989 to 20.8 per cent in 1992.

The campaign launched against changes in the IPTU was clearly designed to deprive the PT administration of funds in its final year of office, whilst popular mobilisation in support was non-existent (Sader, 1992: 109). The IPTU had not been much used by previous administrations who had relied for capital flows on bank loans, and the federal and state government. The population was unaware of the hidden costs of this apparently easy finance whilst over half of the IPTU income came from residential property,


effectively subsidising land holdings and businesses. In essence 50,000 land- owners, or 4 per cent of the contributors, paid 60 per cent of the total collected, whilst 550,000 properties, 33 per cent of the total, remained virtually exempt from the tax.

Challenging corporatism Corporatism is entrenched in many levels of Brazilian political life, in the relationship of organised groups, particularly labour, with politicians and in a narrowly economistic and short term vision among many interest groups. In attempting to govern on behalf of workers, the poor, the homeless, in short the whole population, the PT was bound to meet zero-sum conflicts over resources, most acute when public workers went on strike. The prefecture employed some 100,000 in the administration, with 25,000 employees alone in the CMTC, making it the largest PT-run public enterprise with a payroll almost double that of the city of Campinas.

The PT enjoys a close, symbiotic relationship with the new trade union movement in Brazil embodied in the CUT, springing from its origins in the metalworkers strikes of the ABCD region in the late 197Os, and its opposition to old-style pelego unions controlled by the Ministry of Labour. In reaction to decades of corporatist control, the PT has struggled from the outset to maintain the autonomy of the trade unions and popular movements from the party, recognising that they have distinct, if overlapping, memberships, goals and tactics. In Sgo Paulo, these issues of representation, autonomy and the distribution of limited resources all came, painfully, to the fore.

Once in office the PT faced high expectations from all sides. However, it could not support strikes indiscriminately particularly if industrial action brought the administration into conflict with other groups of workers and citizens. In SZo Paul0 Erundina had to confront a number of strikes, the most serious being that by bus drivers and conductors. She had to balance her own perspective as a long time union militant, with that of the ‘public interest’, the demands of the strikers, and the position of the local party. She had supported the general strike of 14-11 March 1989, calling via paid newspaper adverts on the population to join in, which resulted in several court challenges. However, relations between Erundina and the local party reached a nadir with the strike of bus drivers and conductors in 1992, paralysing transport for nine days. The administration wanted to replace bus collectors with automatic gates, an idea which, despite being more efficient, was opposed by the CMTC who wanted it both ways, i.e. to introduce the gates, and redeploy the ticket collectors.‘4 On 23 May 1992, the Municipal Directorate of the PT met to approve a motion of censure of Erundina on her handling of the strike. She was defended by Suplicy and threatened to leave the party. She had in effect prevented vandalism and sacked those in the union who had overstepped the line. Eight hundred buses suffered damage estimated at US%14 million caused by pickets and the frustrated public, with a loss of US%17 million in bus fares and parking fees.” The legally required minimum of a 40 per cent service had been flouted, threatening the union with legal action. Her position on wage rises over


inflation was unequivocal: ‘The City does not have the money and the population supports my position’.i6 The CMTC Transport Director notes the intransigence and economism of the CMTC unionists who enjoyed a very high level of union recognition and material benefits-for example, a total of 638 employees released on a part or full time basis to perform union duties, and 17 garage commissions (Venceslau, 1992). He claims that offers to involve the union more closely in the running of the company were rejected out of hand, whilst worker-management talks revolved around day- to-day grievances. He comments: ‘Democratic and participatory management, or co-management as some prefer, involving government, management, workers and consumers is a challenge which those involved have not yet met’. Overall Erundina had a hard time with the unions. She met resistance to getting public service workers to work more flexible hours in order to suit the users, for example, underscoring the apparent schism between consumers and producers, and workers’ divergent interests as wage labourers and as citizens in need of certain services. In one early strike of public service workers, she invited them to hold open meetings with representatives from community and consumer groups to explain why finite city resources should go into public sector wages and not into health centres, schools and so forth (Sader, 1992: 52). The dialogue produced a compromise not forthcoming in the bus strike however.

Government and party Her unexpected selection and election was guaranteed to create friction with a large faction in the party who were nervous about what she and her team might do in government. Her appointment of Secretaries did not reflect the relative weight of various groupings in the party as a whole, and she also failed to give posts to the PT’s main coalition partners, the PCB and PCdoB. She brought in some big names (Marilena Chaui from the USP in Culture, Paulo Freire in Education and Paul Singer, economics professor from the USP in Planning), one or two were not party figures, and a couple (Eduardo Jorge in Health and Greenhalgh as Viceprefect) seemed to underline the dominance of the left in the team. Conflicts led to the departure from government of the Transport and Regional Administration secretaries, and the sacking of Greenhalgh. She fought particularly with the Articulagio group who dominated the Sio Paulo municipal party leadership, but who had not received as many posts in the administration as they felt was their due, no doubt in response to their lack of support to her election campaign. They claimed, in an internal party assessment of the first year, that her leadership was marked by a series of errors, the only high point being her public support of the general strike of March 1989. The conflicts between Prefecture and party revolved around three key issues: public policies and their implementation, forms of representation, and electoral issues, in short all the major, ill-resolved fundaments of PT theory and practice. Two of her initial decisions, the compulsory purchase and conservation of a mansion on the Avenida Paulista, and the upgrading of the Interlagos racing circuit (in a deal with Shell), seemed to favour the middle classes at the expense of the poor. Similarly her attempts to reassure business were seen as appeasement


and abandonment of principles. After eighteen months of government she noted:

‘You’ve got to be quite clear about your role as administrator of the public interest. . . the principle of authority must be maintained, other- wise you end up discredited in the eyes of the workers themselves.. . I think you have to govern the city with the majority in mind’.i7

This remark points to several areas of conflict: the need to minimise the hostility of the middle classes and business towards the PT’s program, particularly changes in property rights, tax increases and redistribution of resources; the recognition of citizens’ needs other than those determined by the party; and the acknowledgement of the rights and needs of workers (e.g. in the informal sector) which are not articulated as forcefully as those of salaried public sector workers accustomed to a ‘special’ clientelistic relationship with the city government.

The prime forum for communication between party and administration after the first difficult year became the Political Council. In SZo Paulo this was composed of prefect, vice-prefect, representatives of City Hall, the leader of the Municipal Chamber, the leader of the PT group in the Chamber, three representatives of the PT Municipal Executive, and the state and national level secretaries for institutional affairs in the PT. Set up in 1990, it marked the first step in mediating and reducing political conflict and demarcating discrete spheres of power and competence for both sides. In 1991 a plenary meeting defined the strategic nature of the administration and a negotiating forum was established with greater input from state-level and federal branches of the party. The conflict highlighted the differing logic and demands that drove the party-as-movement, on the one had, and the party-as-government, on the other, as between the ‘ethics of conviction’ (principles and ideology) and the ‘ethics of responsibility’ (pragmatism, governability) (Couto, 1995).

The opposition Opposition to Erundina’s administration came from a number of quarters, from the local party, the Municipal Chamber, business sectors, the Tribunal de Corms A4unicipal (TCM, the Municipal Auditors), from state and federal governments, and local media. ‘* Endemic clientelism, where funds are transferred from one level of government to another as a political favour and not as a right, and the weakness of the judicial system, meant that Sgo Paul0 could easily be starved of funds at politically convenient junctures. The political opposition, wrongfooted in many cases by the PT’s radical policies, particularly in tackling clientelism (sacking ‘ghost’ employees, open tendering for municipal contracts), has reacted with litigation intended to gag or immobilise the PT and to discredit its administrations as illegimate and unconstitutional. Ironically, in many instances they have invoked the rhetoric of the ‘impeachment now’ mobilisations. There are currently hundreds of legal actions in the courts against PT mayors and ex-mayors, including no less than 100 against Erundina. They have also been launched against the leaders of grassroots movements, especially those involved in


self-build housing associations, under the patronage of the municipal Housing and Urban Development Secretariat. One of Erundina’s senior staff received an eighteen month prison sentence for providing municipal vehicles to take members of the Frente National de Prefeitos to Brasilia to lobby with the homeless for housing subsidies.

One of her major mistakes in office was in omitting to build a strong governing alliance from the outset. The PSDB moved into intractable opposition from the outset, joined at times by the PMDB, in response to old interparty rivalries, and it was only in the middle years of the administration that she was able to engage opposition parties in one-off, issue- based agreements (such as the municipalisation of the buses, the IPTU, and the Organic Municipal Law), and enter into a certain degree of bargaining with city councillors (accepting their amendments and agreeing to fund their local projects in exchange for key votes).

The most severe legal attack on her administration came, however, from the Municipal Auditors, an anomalous body established to check the city accounts (in all other cities, auditing is conducted by a state-level agency). Unelected, unaccountable, with huge salaries and ensconced in a pharaonic pile, the five auditors (all with affiliations to rightwing parties) rejected the city accounts for 1991 and 1992, on mere technicalities, despite the Muni- cipal Chamber voting 41 to 9 to overrule their decision. Such a clear act of victimisation spurred one of the largest mobilisations seen in support of Erundina’s government. She received backing from other mayors, several parties and celebrities, and eventually independent auditors cleared her accounts.

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ADMINISTRATION In the Presidential elections of 1989 Collor won 48.9 per cent of the vote in Sgo Paulo, and Lula 37.4 per cent, a significant margin of advantage given the sheer size of the S5o Paulo electorate.” It was notable that the PT consolidated its position more in cities where the PT mayor and local party worked in harmony. Enmdina herself remains a maverick and outsider, even at the top of the party, but enjoys immense popularity with the rank-and-file. Her brief and ill-starred participation in Itamar France’s government resulted in a one-year suspension from the party, she ran for senator in 1994 having failed to be selected to run for governor, and was not elected after an under-resourced campaign. Erundina and her team left office traumatised and exhausted, as much by internecine conflicts as by the institutional inertia they confronted in trying to implement substantial change in the distribution of resources in the city. Her putative successor, Suplicy, an upper-class intellectual with a reputation for honesty and hard work, having fought corruption in the Municipal Chamber, ran an unin- spiring campaign. It was felt by some in the party to be revisionist, and to violate PT principles in failing to educate the electorate politically, focusing too much on his person, not promoting the party ticket as a whole, and barely mentioning the Erundina administration in which he himself had been a key player (Bolaff, 1993). Surveys in 1992 revealed that Sgo Paulo electors evaluated the services of the prefeiture positively, but Erundina and


the party negatively, due to an anti-PT press campaign. This underscores a recurrent complaint inside the party, viz. the failure of the party to publicise its achievements in office and thus to reap electoral rewards. In 1992 only one third of municipalities that elected a PT mayor in 1988 reelected the party. Over two years on, the assessment of Luiza Erundina’s achievements both by the PT and the population as a whole is improving steadily, especially those of accountability, a purging of corrupt practices and a shifting of available resources into the social area, away from pharaonic projects.

CONCLUSIONS The PT learnt that it was neither possible, nor desirable, to attempt to implant socialism overnight in SHo Paulo. A certain element of vohmtarism among those most impatient with Erundina proved counterproductive, ignoring any number of blockages to rapid redistribution of resources: resistance by a number of entrenched interest groups, lack of funds, a clientelistic political culture, and the complex nature of the popular movements.*’ It also ignored the need to work with and within institutional arrangements. The importance of varied alliances is salient, with political allies, with influential groups in the party, with the grassroots. The lack of interest in the Master Plan demonstrates a certain resistance to medium and longterm planning.

Their room for manoeuvre to enact major changes was highly circum- scribed. The mandate was short, they inherited massive administrative, financial and bureaucratic obstacles, and they had to work with a legislative minority in the Municipal Chamber. The IPTU and Zero Fare proposals floundered and died. Erundina had the personal grit and determination to confront the city’s problems, to move away from funding huge construction projects, and feeding a voracious, top-heavy bureaucracy. However, her boldest moves were scuppered at the critical moment due to a lack of links between city council and population. The administration failed to mobilise popular support for the reform of the IPTU, subsidy of public transport or the municipalisation of the bus companies. It only did so belatedly in the crisis with the TCM.

Her strategy also changed rapidly, her radicalism swiftly replaced by a dose of realism and a recognition of the need to negotiate, compromise and ‘govern for everyone’, for the poor, for the workers, for the middle classes. Initial declarations that she would municipalise public transport and that she regarded the right to occupy land as superior to the right to property, quickly gave way to a realisation that governability required working with, if not necessarily condoning, institutional and legal arrangements and the concerns of groups who were not necessarily those whom the PT regarded as their ‘natural’ constituency. She also had to take responsibility for selecting strategies from among the demands of the various groups pressurising her: the technocrats in the administrations, the various factions of the party, the grassroots movements and unions, the political opposition. The party’s lack of overall policy in many areas, due mainly to inexperience in government and the umbrella nature of the PT, embracing such diverse political


tendencies, obliged her to plough her own furrow. The most important difference, however, has been to increase the basis for democracy, popular participation, political education and involvement, and for an expanded understanding of citizenship in the city. Mistakes were made, lessons learnt and not inconsiderable tactical and material advances achieved. Without the SZo Paulo experience the PT would have remained, until now, the party of opposition. As the party of government here and elsewhere, it will continue to change the content and practice of politics in Brazil.

Acknowledgements1 would like to thank the following for their comments on drafts of this article: Alan Angell, Andrew Nickson, Renato Colistete, Igor Fuser, Claudio Goncalves Couto. I am grateful to the ESRC for financial assistance in conducting fieldwork.

NOTES 1.

2.

3.

4. 5. 6.

7.

8.

9.

10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 11. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20.

In the October 1994 elections the PT won the governorship of the Federal District, and the state of Espirito Santo. In the latter, the winner, Vitor Buaiz, had been mayor of the state capital, Vitoria 1989-1992. The party also doubled in representation in Congress. He served as the indirectly elected mayor and subsequently state governor of Slo Paulo under military rule. In 1992 he was elected mayor in the second round with 2.8 million votes against the PT’s 2 million. The PSDB, whilst nominally social democratic, has no organised or organic base, and is better seen as a catch-all party. She had previously been elected city councillor, then state deputy in Sgo Paula. On Fortalexa see Pinto (1992) and on Diadema see Keck (1992, Ch. 8). Electoral rules were changed after much wrangling in Congress for this election, eliminating the provision for a second round runoff in cities of over 200,000 (Lamounier, 1989). Paulo Maluf(PDS) won 24.5 per cent of the vote, Jogo Leiva (PMDB) 14 per cent and Jose Serra (PSDB) 5.5 per cent. Mario Covas, who would have been a strong candidate, refused to run for the PSDB, having his sights set on the presidential elections in 1989. Ex-governor Franc0 Montoro was selected to run, but pulled out due to pneumonia, handing over to his running mate, Jose Serra who won 5.6 per cent of the vote. Her public speeches would begin with a litany of identities, ‘I am a woman, a northeasterner, a petCta . .‘. Abortion is currently permitted in Brazil in the case of rape or if the mother’s life is endangered. Prefeitura Municipal February 1992, p. 33. Brasil Agora, 517193. PT SBo Paul0 Municipal Directorate Avalihio do lo Ano da Aahinbtraclio Petista em Srio Puulo 17/l/90 cited in Kowarick and Singer (1993: 202). Interview in Teoriu e Debate No. 11, August 1990, p. 11. Thirty-three private companies employed 74 per cent of the 65,000 strikers. Gazeta Mercantil, 2515192. Gazeta Mercantil, 1815192. Teoria e Debate, No. 11, 1990, p. 12. She felt the object of prejudice more as a Northeasterner than as a woman (Penna, 1992). The 30 PT controlled municipalities were evenly split between those giving an advantage to Collor, and to Lula. Collor won in Santos, SBo Paul0 and Campinas, with Lula ahead in Porto Alegre (with 66.5 per cent to Collor’s 20 per cent), Santo Andre, Diadema, Angra dos Reis and SBo Bernardo, with generally larger margins than Collor managed in P’f municipalities. Istoe’ Senhor, 10/l/90, p. 35. Literature on urban social movements points to their contradictory character. They can be fragmented, short lived, and prone to clientalism, yet engaged in progressive and con- testatory activities (Banck, 1990).


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Documents

‘Governing for Everyone’: the Workers' Party Administration in S60 Paulo, 1989–1992