Glouberman. Error Theory- Logic, Rhetoric and Philosophy

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Error Theory: Logic, Rhetoric, and PhilosophyAuthor(s): M. GLOUBERMANSource: The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, New Series, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1990), pp. 37-65Published by: Penn State University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25669939.

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M. GLOUBERMANErrorTheory: Logic, Rhetoric,and Philosophy

1.MODELLINGAn expository technique?modelling?is often used by philosophical theorists indealing with opposed views.Witness Aristotle's portrayal of earlierphilosophers as elevating to a place of unmerited supremacy one or anotherof the fourmetaphysically coeval Aristotelian causes. The Milesians, forexample, are said tohave overplayed the importance of thematerial cause,the Platonists of the formal cause. The Stagirite models the positions of theothers: he presents them inhis own achieved theoretical terms. Similarly,Kant's depiction of the rationalist analysis of experience as focussed exclusivelyon theConceptual' side of cognition, and of the empiricist analysis asfixated on the 'intuitive' side,model the dominant preceding accounts ofmind and world in the domestic termsof the 'critical* theory.Modelling has the effectof thinningown thethickreflectivityf a theorist's

thought. That thought is thickly reflective in that competing conceptualisations of the chosen subject-matter are included among itsdata. Byusing the technique, the philosopher indicates that he is addressing thoseconceptualisations. (By contrast, the thought of philosophers who moveentirely in the beaten track of an established tradition is thinly reflective.Reflective like all philosophical thought, among itsdata are not includedthe competing products of other second-order endeavors. Ifmodellingsappear in thework of such philosophers, they appear forgetfully?without(full) awareness of their origins.)Why should a philosopher model? As per the illustrations, themodeller

THE JOURNALOF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, Vol. IV,No. 1, 1990.Published by The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park and London.

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38 M.GLOUBERMANsubordinates opposed theories to the position endorsed. As modelled,those theories live no life independently of the view that supplies themodelling materials. They are thusneutralised as loci of opposition. Modelling thereforepromotes the reception of thenew position, on the part ofan audience with some awareness of the chosen topic's history, as a baselinefor subsequent activity.

Achieving baseline status rates high in the order of disciplinary success:it isensured thereby that one's practices will serve as normative for subsequent operators. But why secure the end by thinning down reflectivethickness? The answer would seem to be as follows. Reflective thickness,left overexplicit, fosters the impression that the theoretical proposal isessentiallya reaction to other views, rather than an unmediated treatmentof the subject-matter. Kant, early in the firstCritique, makes an astonishingclaim which reverberates in this regard. His isnot, he twice declares, "acritique of books and systems of pure reason; we are concerned only withthe critique of the faculty of pure reason itself."1But theCritique isverymuch an examination of the dominant positions of the formative modernera, and could scarcely have approximated its actual form in a contextwhere the interplayof views was appreciably different. So why isKant thatanxious topresent himself as an unmediated enquirer intohuman cognitiveprocess? The explanation offered amoment ago isappended immediately."Otherwise," Kant states, "the . . .critic [will appear tobe] passing judgements upon the groundless assertions of others bymeans of his own, whichare equally groundless."2 The rightphilosophy issuperior to thewrong. Buta philosophy better by some inter-theoreticmeasure of quality may still be,along with theworse, awrong philosophy.3 The modeller, in sum, exposeshis position in a fashion that removes the impression that its identity is(primarily or essentially) a reactive function of opposed views.

Judging by the foregoing remarks and examples, modelling belongs tothe rhetorical aspect of a theorist's activity.A philosopher's modelling doesnot work to prove or justify the position held, but to assist in bringingonside an audience whose exposure has for the most part been to themodelled view.4Given that rhetorical factors, at least as typifiedbypatentlysuasive elements, bear an external relation to theory, it follows that theunderstanding of a theoryon thepart of a reader or interpreterwho failed torecognise the rhetorical-as-distinct-from-justificatory character ofmodellingwould be flawed. What figures in exposition otherwise than as part ofthe probative case would be (mistakenly) regarded as pertinent to thetheory'scoremeaning. Thus, assuming I am rightabout theKantian case?



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ERROR HEORY 39and the reader is of course at liberty to resist on the level of detail?interpreters go badly astray who, in grappling with the central criticaldoctrine, transcendental idealism, approach it b initio s theoutcome of anattempt by Kant to plug complementary lacunae in preceding empiricistand rationalist views by fitting together elements of the two: these interpreters are, inmy judgement anyway, reading off the theoreticalidentityofthe critical account fromKant's rhetoricalmodelling of the theories ofmindand world he aims to replace.5Are the rhetorical characteristics of a philosophical presentation capableunder some conditions of playing a bona fide role inproving or establishingthe correctness of a theory?The negative answer inspired by the precedingdiscussion ofmodelling seems to lead to a dilemma. Modelling acts to thindown thickness. Assuming a taboo on modelling-type techniques for stricttheoretical purposes, that would appear to force the theorist to ignorecompeting positions, or else to leave reflective thickness visible. But asponsor of an original view certainly believes the view superior to others,and should be able todefend that belief if sked. Unless something akin to

modelling were available, whatever is said would result in the situationKant describes.In this discussion I shall make a case for an affirmative answer to the

question. Let me briefly blueprint the upcoming discussion. I begin byassuming (as is evident enough in the preceding paragraphs) a fairly lowlevel or intuitive understanding of the contrast between rhetorical andjustificatoryelements. On this understanding the contrast is, in the philosophical context and generally, quite sharp. For good or ill, such anunderstanding informs the activity, interpretative and original, of philosophical practitioners of a broadly 'analytic' cast. Since my purpose is toconvince those who endorse the conception that the division is notexclusive, Imove beyond it slowly, by firstoffering a generalisation ofrhetoricality, a generalisation intended todraw out what lies at the heart ofthe usual understanding of the notion. Using the generalised account, Ithen challenge the intuitively certified contrast by closely examining theprocess of theory-establishment in philosophy. So while I set out with asharp distinction between rhetoric and justification, the purpose is to showthat, as far as philosophy is concerned, the contrast breaks down at onecrucial place at least. None of this is to deny, I hasten to add, that somerhetorical elements, i.e. 'patently suasive' ones, are entirely void of justificatorycharacter. It is to say, rather, that there are elements, rhetorical inkind, which also function in a probative capacity.



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40 M. GLOUBERMANTo eliminate the possibility of the leastmisunderstanding here, letmestate plainly that I am offeringno general critique of the contrast betweenrhetorical and non-rhetorical The essay is in the first instance a contribution tometaphilosophy, not tophilosophy of language. Thus, asmentionedamoment ago, it isnot indispute that some elements of a philosophicalcase are purely rhetorical. (The instances ofmodelling displayed earlier fallinto this class.) The concern is to show, as against an entrenched or

widespread metaphilosophical opinion, that features that cannot be distinguished in root character from uncontroversially rhetorical features such asmodelling, play an essential role in philosophical theorising, and determine the very identity of the activity's products. Also, I argue the unavoidability of the rhetorical infusion, and the inevitability of its influence,on a very rarifiedphilosophical level?in metaphysics.6 How the interpenetration of rhetorical maneuvers and theory-identity at that loftystation trickles down tomore workaday philosophical activity and itsproductsIwill make no effortto say on this occasion.

2. RHETORIC: A GENERIC CHARACTERISTICElements of a philosophical case which play a recognisably suasive role areparadigmatically rhetorical in character, rhetoric, in the normal acceptation, being the art of persuasion.7 What, on a more general level, markssuch elements of a philosophical presentation off rom the ones that play aparadigmatic role inestablishing, and hence indetermining the identityof,a theory?the probative ox justificatory lements?

Sought isa generic difference between paradigm rhetorical and paradigmprobative features of a philosophical case. I propose the following.A feature of a philosophical case is (generically) rhetorical incharacter the understanding of which essentially requires appealingto those who hold ormake the case, and/or those towhom the caseisdirected, over and above appealing to the case's propositional ortheoretic content.8

Such a feature characteristically will be encoded or expressed verbally. (Abook's dedication isa good illustration of a generically rhetorical elementverbally encoded.) Nevertheless, the feature's contribution cannot becomprehended unless it isseen as emanating from and often also as directedto a particular personage.9 Thus?to give some relatively simple exam



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ERROR HEORY 41pies?a text, in itsrestrictedlypropositional or theoretic content, does notcriticise nother view, nor does itapprove. Criticism, to focus on the former,comes essentially from a theorist or proposition-proposer?a particularpersonage. Ifone reads a text as a criticism, to that extent one must see atleast the shadow of a producer of the textpresent. To be sure, the criticismmade is likely to be anchored inwhat the text contains, propositionally ortheoretically speaking. Nonetheless, the critical moment isnot reducibletomatters of, exclusively, propositional content and purely inter-theoreticrelations. This differs from the trivial point that the activityof criticismrequires a critic. After all, so does the process of theorising require atheorist, and of proposing a proposer, though the theory theorised and theproposition proposed can be grasped on theirown. The point concerns thecriticism qua content or product of that activity or process. That, too, onlymakes sense if n agent is (implicitly) acknowledged. It iseasy tomiss thisby confusing what thecriticismcomes toorwhat thecriticism mounts towiththe criticism itself.A criticism of a theorymay come to the claim that thetheory involves inconsistency. But the inconsistency of the theory?a factabout the theory?is not a criticism: only a ground, a very strong one ofcourse, forcriticism.10 Similarly, though perhaps a bitmore elusively, a textper se can involve a refutation of some theory. In reading the text, one isreading a refutation. The text's critical content may be identified as therefutation itcontains. But refutation and criticism are different. There canbe a refutation without a refuter; there cannot however be a criticismwithout a critic, just as approval isnot possible without an approver. Moreformally: the concept refutationhas only accidental linkswith the conceptof a refutingagent, while the concepts criticism nd approval are inseparablefrom the concepts of critic and approver.What ofmodelling? Modelling qualifies, generically, as rhetorical. Notheorymodels another. A modelling requires, conceptually requires, amodeller.11 When, in reading a text, we findone theorymodelled inanother, we therefore discern, however unspecifically, the theorist. Thepresence ofmodelling in a philosophical text shows us individuals in thedisciplinary correlate of political interaction, not abstract theories inbloodless, formal, relations with one another.12 The contrast with proof, asthe latter isusually regarded, should be plain. A prover proves a theory, justas a critic criticises one. But the proof of the theory (like itsdisproof orrefutation) is independent of the prover in theway that the criticism isnotindependent of the critic.We understand the idea of a proofwithout anyappeal to the prover. Not that proofs spring forth spontaneously. Rather,



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42 M.GLOUBERMANthe proof-relation, like the refutation-relation, is an abstract one. Bycontrast, the criticism-relation, like the approval-relation, essentially involves concrete, historical, personages.13The generic characteristic of rhetoric in hand, we can take up ourquestion without appearing to flout the dictionary. With 'rhetorical' and'probative' given their usual senses, the idea of a rhetorical feature functioning probatively isa round square: "x isa probative feature" entails "x isnon-rhetorical." But we can sensibly ask whether some feature having thespecified generic characteristic might play a probative role. That this isnotthe case for the paradigms does not rule out the affirmative.

3.THE EXPOSITORY FRAMEMy initial subject-matter isnot the bare notion of a philosophical theory,but that of a philosophical exposition. What constraints bind a philosophical theoristwho breaks with current doctrinal holdings? These, in the firstinstance, will be constraints on the theorist not only as a believer in, butalso as an expositor of, a specified position. To secure adherence to thenovel proposal, what must the theorist do?What he must do ispartly amatter of tactics and, in theusual understanding, rhetoric. The obligationsflow fromtheneed tocontendwith an audience?a need fuller than themorenarrowly understood commands of theoretical justification or proof. In thecompany of a recent writer, I shall argue against (what I call) errortheoretic minimalism, a view reflecting the entrenched analytic metaphilosophical view that rhetorical matters are irrelevant to core theoryidentity, i.e. that the contrast between rhetoric and justification is sharp.

Intuitively, the core idea of a theoretical position isexhausted by a pair ofterms: the theory and the data. Intuitively, thinking about a text as anexposition, not merely as a delineation of a theoretical stand, introducestwo additional elements: a theory-presenter and a target audience uponwhich thepresentation is intended to impact. Thus, as permy explanation,taking a text as an exposition leaves open the possibility of a rhetoricalcontribution in themeasure that appeal to the theory-presenter or/andtheory-recipient proves essential forunderstanding the case.

The fact that theorist and audience are introduced after theory and datamakes it appear that the constraints alluded to are, as per the analyticmetaphilosophy, extra-theoretical. On the analytic view, thepresenter of atheory contracts to the status of amere choice-point forone of a number ofabstract theoretical structureswhich do what such structuresdo, e.g. unifydiverse data, or predict future data when actual data are fed in. For the



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ERROR HEORY 43analyst, it isnot qua philosopher, but qua historian, psychologist, etc., thatone interestsoneself in the theorist as an historically-situated, psychologically complex and distinctive, personality. To the extent that the chooser'sactivity seems toplay into the character of the theory, that influence has tobe offset as a condition of proper theoretical delineation. Thus?to take asimple instance of the sort attractive to analysts?given Frege's non-linearnotation for predicate logic in the Begriffschriftnd the linear RussellWhitehead notation in PrincipiaMathematica, the aim of understandingquantification theory requires abstracting from thenotational specifics. Inthat respect, the theory itself isan abstract thing, in theway thatmeaningis independent of some specific linguisticmedium of conveyance. While,in fine, a theorist's presentation may be constrained by the audience, thetheory per se is free of all such governance and influence. The theory'sduties, as itwere, are exclusively to the data.

Schematically, the intuitive position in regard to the relative arrangement of the fourmentioned terms can be given as follows.

Theory-presenterTheoryData

Theory-audienceThe theory-presenter, the exponent, will set the theory forth in thiswayrather than that because, inter lia, of how the audience isperceived. Thespecifics of the mode of exposition, to the degree that their choice isdetermined by the content of that perception, have to be offset as acondition of disclosing the theory's root identity.So what falls essentiallyoutside thenested square?i.e. what does not directly reflector superveneupon the contents of that square?belongs to rhetoric.14Since access to theory isvia theory-expositions, there seems no alternative but to view theory-interpretation?the task of identifyinga theory?as requiring one tograpple with more than the contents of the inner square.Should thisnot be a source of some concern to analysts? For ifthemiddletwo terms can only be accessed by moving inwards from the wider frame,the character of those termsmay come to be seen differently; specifically,talk about them as iftheywere well-defined in isolation of the outer termsmay fall suspect of vicious abstraction. The root character of theorymay,



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44 M. GLOUBERMANthat is, be a function of factors having to do in the first instance withfeatures of theorists, including relations between them.

The issue remains to be decided. But two thingshave been established.First, there could be no objection from the analytic quarter to proceedingby considering the situations of theory-expositors, since there isno nonmagical methodology that would enable the identity of a theory to bedetermined without addressing the exposition. Second, that very factsuggests that the segregation of theory from theoristmay be less easilydefended than our intuitions, feeding on the stock examples of what thenesting square contains, viz. patently rhetorical elements, would incline usto think.

4.TWO KINDS OF CASEWhat must a theory-presenterdo as a condition of securing acceptance foranovel theoretical proposal? Before responding, twokinds of case have tobeset apart. Inone, the novel proposal isput forward ina theoretical vacuum;in the other, it is injected into a forum of live theoretical contestation. Thedifference corresponds to that between a teacher of beginners, and alecturer toprofessionals. Of the two, the latter alone confronts an audiencewhose members hold views theoretically comparable to the views beingadvanced.15

As a condition of accurate understanding, determining towhich kind asample under investigation belongs isamatter of some importance. Let meillustrate by citing a pair of historical cases. In both, the proposal isnotbeing advanced in a theoretical vacuum. But interpreters, especially analytic interpreterswith theirprincipled bias against history, have oftenmistaken them thatway.Consider first heCartesian case. Itmay initially be thought thatDescartes isattempting in theMeditations to establish dualism in a theoreticalvacuum. The audience does not support some opposed conception ofman;rather, concerted theoretical attention has yet tobe paid to the concepts ofconsciousness, extension, substance, etc. informingourmundane thoughtand talk. But closer attention reveals thatDescartes' theoryofmind isbeingpresented against thosewho, passively or actively, endorse anAristotelianpicture of man as "a reasonable animal."16 A reader who approachedDescartes' discussion without knowledge of the factwould have a great dealof trouble interpreting the text aright.The second example isSpinoza's Ethics. Here, the position, as exposed,strikes the prospective interpreterverymuch like a case where the author



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ERROR HEORY 45does not have any live opposition inhis sights, hence a case where nomoves will bemade which are dictated by thepresence of a hostile audiencerather than by the strictdemands of theory.Descartes' Meditations commences with the resounding thud of thewrecker's ball, "the . . .upheavalof all my formeropinions."17 No room for doubt is left in the mind of thereader that something is being rejected, and thus that there may be aconsiderable rhetorical infusion. By contrast, the Ethics starts with astaccato overture of definitions and axioms. Faced with the difference,many interpreters see Spinoza as proceeding without concern foropposingtheories and theorists. But this isquite untrue. Nor isSpinoza deliberatelymisleading the reader. That today's readers are easily led astray saysnothingabout Spinoza's readership. Spinoza proceeds as he does because the destructive taskhas been accomplished elsewhere, by other theoristsworkingalong the same general lines. He soft-pedals or suppresses the negativestrain because the audience has already been made receptive byDescartesand the Cartesian climate to the constructive one. But his constructiveendeavor isasmuch keyed asDescartes' to a specific theoretical opposition.Both examples make clear that to pin down the probative content of atext it is sometimes essential to have some (concrete) knowledge of theidentityof the text's audience. Otherwise, in interpreting theposition, onemay ignore or omit what went without saying at the time of composition;and/or, conversely, one may treat everything thatwas said at that time,even what was said solely because of thenature of the audience, as if thasto be said. The deleterious potentialities forunderstanding need no elaboration.18

My question about the theoretical significance of generically rhetoricalelements isdirected to expository circumstances of the sort exemplified bythe illustrations. This focus has an obvious effecton the question. Wherethe audience consists of theoretical innocents, the expositor isunder nopressure to counteract other views. That ishowever of eminent concernwhere the intended recipients are theoretically sophisticated. And, Ishould stress, the examples offered suggest that in the philosophical context cases of the first ort, ifthey exist at all, are farrarer than one might atfirst e inclined tobelieve, so that the restriction ofmy purview isnot selfservingly selective.

5. EFFECTIVE EXPOSITIONA theorist espouses a novel view T2. The audience is committed to thecompeting TI. What must the T2-theorist do as a condition of securing



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46 M. GLOUBERMANadherence? The answer thrustup by our intuitions isbipartite. (1) Tl hastobe overcome. (2) T2 has tobe established. fwe take (1) and (2) asisolating separate tasks,we will see the initial, question itself s (implicitly)compounded of (1)What must be done to overcome Tl?, and (2)Whatmust be done to establish T2?

There certainly appear at firstsight to be a pair of tasks. The view thattheunitarily presented question masks thepresence of two tasks, and hencehas the potential tomislead, I take as one identification of error-theoreticminimalism. Error-theoretic minimalism istheview that the refutation of arejected or erroneous theoryTl isa job separate from the establishment ofan espoused theoryT2: the treatment of what ismistaken isaufond quiteseparate from the establishment ofwhat is correct.19 Pace error-theoretic

minimalism, I shall argue that the two questions must be blended: thefactoring of the initial question into twodoes not plumb the question's truecharacter, but reacts to amisconception of philosophical process.What expository pressures are placed on a T2-theorist by the need tocope with an audience committed to a different theoryTl ? o see that thefactored answer isrough sailing, letus take up the idea of effective xposition.Those who factor the question are likely thinking thus. The mosteffectiveway for theT2-theorist todeal with Tl consists in showing that itsuffers rom a debilitating flaw, e.g. inconsistency. A theoretical proposalexposed as inconsistent not being a bona fide contender for the prize, theestablishment or disclosure of inconsistency decisively rules itout.20

Undeniably, inconsistency writes finis toTl. However, the question wasnot merely how most effectively to dispatch Tl. This can be taken as aquestion having nothing whatever to do with exposition, as ismade plainby the fact that thedisclosure ofTl's inconsistency isapt tobe an ineffectiveway of advancing the stock ofT2.21 How can an effective criticism ofTl beineffective?We encounter here an ambiguity in the idea of effectiveness, nambiguity aligned with the normal distinction between rhetorical and nonrhetorical. The disclosure of inconsistency concerns the latter alone. Afatal flaw is shown in the theory. hat isapt tobe an ineffective treatment ifonly for the reason thatone accused ofholding an inconsistent position, orthose partial to the view under attack, are unlikely to take it lyingdown.The harder the critic pushes, themore the targetof his criticism will resist.Note thatwe are speaking now not of the (pure) theory, but of theoryadvocates. We have exited thenested square. Itoften has greater effect, inthe rhetorical sense, to advance a criticism which, in the logical sense, isless effective.Moreover, given that the desire is to secure adherence toT2,



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ERROR HEORY 47TVs ouster accomplishes nothing in that line, save in the limiting sense ofridding the field of one putative competitor.These remarkshighlight the complexity of the idea of effective presentation. Once the inner square isdistinguished from the outer, two senses of'effective' emerge. And the question concerns the relations between presentations effective in the one and effective in the other sense.

I can now identifyerror-theoretic minimalism with greater precision asthe view that the outer task of effective presentation?i.e. the task ofmaking a case that impacts in thedesired way on an audience committed toa different theory?is exhausted within the embedded square. Effectivetheory-criticism, in short, has only inessential rhetorical aspects.

Obviously, minimalism could not be correct just as it stands. In aperfectly acceptable sense of 'effective', the outer taskmay be carried outeffectively inways having nothing to do with the effective prosecution ofthe inner, logical, task. This may forexample be done through threat orflattery.But the needed emendation is readily supplied. Error-theoreticminimalists hold, of course, that the distinctive sortof effectiveness associated with the outer task lacks all theoretical relevance.

6. ERRORBy the rhetorical technique ofmodelling, antagonistic theories are represented as iftheycaptured part of the truth the espoused theory reveals. It isobvious that such treatment can serve the theoristwho models by pacifyingthe opposition?one's pride being battered less ifone is said to havecontributed to a difficult task thanmade a total botch of it.A recentwriteron historical topicswho often speaks in the soothing way, unaware that thetalk ismore likely rhetorical than theoretical, isJonathan Bennett. Here isa sample claim: "it takes time, and generations of stumbling, to get thesedeep and difficultmatters right."22We come here, from the rhetorical angle, to the key element of thepiece, the issue of error.Modelling treatments embed the (putatively)erroneous view in the (putatively) correct, one: they situate the formerrelative to, and give itmeaning in terms of, the latter. This amountsprecisely to representing the proponents of the formeras getting some wayto the truth, seeing the truth, albeit indistinctly. Thus theMilesians,according toAristotle, while recognising the importance of thematerialcomponent, failed to appreciate the equal importance of the formal ingredient, and the Platonists stressed the latter at the expense of the former.



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48 M. GLOUBERMANEach was perspicacious enough to get part of the story;neither was penetrating enough to get itall.Proponents of a theoryT2, in dealing with a theoryTl bymodelling,thus execute their taskof securing adherence toT2 in a unitaryway. Theydo not first emonstrate the flaw inTl, only afterwardsproceeding tomakethe case forT2. In-and-by making the case forT2 they (try to) reveal theproblem(s)in l.This, it is apt to seem, is a matter of effective practice in the whollyrhetorical sense. But the greater rhetorical effectiveness of unitary treatment does not mean that the core project of theoretical evaluation rendersitmandatory. Or so the error-theoretic minimalist maintains. To see thathe ismistaken, we must delve a littlemore deeply into the specifics ofshowing a position to be flawed.

7. POWERS'S DEVIATION FROMMINIMALISMLawrence H. Powers writes about the problems confronting an historian ofphilosophy?one called upon daily to deal with bygone positions.23 Butthe concern is not merely to explain or describe the negative historicalreception of some theory?to identify those who took exception to thetheory, to reportwhat the detractors said, describe how the criticism wasreceived, etc. Powers takes the view that the unfriendly assessment iscorrect. Accordingly, Powers' historian of philosophy isdoing philosophywith a special subject-matter, and Powers is thereforedealing with theoretical conflict inphilosophy's past ina philosophical mode. So we can look tohis discussion for a suitably general view of the process of philosophicaltheorising in a context of live opposition.As a proponent of the criticising theory,how does Powers deal with thetheory criticised? Does he proceed as per the factored, or as per theunitarily-taken, question of effective exposition?On error-theoretic minimalism, overcoming a view Tl is a job to beexecuted quite apart from establishing a different view T2. Powers' maintool of criticism is the idea of logical fallacy.A fallacious piece of reasoningis located inTl. In amoment I shall examine how fallacy is imputed. Butsince Powers' critical mechanism comes from logic, his position would seemipsofacto tobe a version of error-theoreticminimalism.24 After all, if l isshown to be indefensible because the associated reasoning includes alogically invalid transition, isn't that an end of it?And isn't the negativejudgement delivered without any consideration ofT2 ? owever, it merges



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ERROR HEORY 49as we go forward that the separation of the two questions isnot sustainedeven relative to this quite narrow understanding of philosophical error.Amove ismade from the inner square of the schema to the outer square; fromlogical to rhetorical considerations. And if here isa spillover here, seepageis almost sure to occur everywhere.According to Powers, the philosophical criticism of a philosophical

position takes the following canonical form.The proponent of the viewunder scrutiny asserts Z, contending that it follows fromY which followsfromX. The critic charges thatZ does not follow fromX. Y, hemaintains, ismultiply interpretable, as Yl and Y2. While Yl follows fromX, Z followsfromY2. So the reasoning fromX to Z is invalid.The flaw imputed isrooted in the theorist's (unintentional) exploitationof an ambiguity. For Powers, criticism of a philosophical position involvesdisplaying the reasoning as invalid due to equivocation. But the meredisclosure of a logical flawof the sortwhich fits nto the canonical format isnot, as Powers appreciates, necessarily an effective mode of criticism.Powers introduces a furtherconstraint on critical effectiveness, the constraint of allowability.

An argument is 'allowable' just in case . . . every invalid step isdecently disguised by an appropriate fallacy of ambiguity. In picturing an argument I reject as nonetheless allowable, I offeran explanation ofwhy that argument, which I regard as noncogent, nonetheless appears cogent to others.25

Criticial success requires that the imputed error be one the proponent ofthe theory can reasonably, i.e. non-pathologically, be regarded as committing.That is to say, the representation of a theorist as committing the flawmust not, from the vantage point of the representer,make the theorist looklike one who is incapable of reasoning at all.With these notions?allowability, apparent cogency, committability?we depart the narrowly logical arena. A logical blunder, to paraphraseGertrude Stein, isa logical blunder is a logical blunder. But consider nowthat introductory logicmanuals devoting space to the topic of deductivefallacy deal with logical blunders of a very select class. Only some logicalflawsare produced as fallacies.While, forexample, deducing p frompDqand q isa logical flaw,also reaching q frompDq, the first lone qualifies asfallacious?the fallacy being that of affirmingtheconsequent. As a rule ofthumb: the fallacies among the flaws are those baptised with (conven



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50 M. GLOUBERMANtional) names.26 There isno mystery as towhat singles out some flaws forbaptism. Flaws having a history are selected; i.e. flaws actually exemplifiedwith some regularity in the activities of generally competent human reasoners; flawswhich generally able human reasoners, with some degree ofregularity, fail in default of effortor application to detect; hence flawsanchored in some relatively general and stable feature of human make-up.Other flaws remain anonymous. While committing the fallacious movesshows a reasoner who operates illogically, the repeated but isolated perpetrator of non-fallacious flawedmoves might be described as a-logical?the difference aligning roughly with that between an ungrammaticalspeaker and a babbler.27

Logic manuals are not required to penetrate to theminutiae of equivocity or ambiguity. Powers's notion of allowability stands to the general ideaof a logical blunder (an invalidmove of reasoning) much as logical fallacystands to logical flaw. Over and above the purely formal evaluation ofinvalidity, allowability imports thenotion of thenormal subject?and withthat the notions of non-pathological error, apparent cogency, etc. SoPowers' account of theory-criticism does fall within the ambit of thequestion construed unitarily. The account perhaps still invites the denomination 'minimal'?for the reason that the core criticism, invalidity, ispurely logical. But that,we can now appreciate, differsfrom (what mightbe called) ultra-minimality. It differsbecause the invaliditymust be, in thedistinctive sense given, a fallacy, not only a flaw.28The two features?unitary construal of the question and non-minimality?go together. Even on Powers' account, with its logical slant, the criticism ofTl (the theory identified as erroneous) makes essential referenceto T2 (the theory espoused). The ambiguity alleged to vitiate the Tlreasoning isdisplayed inT2, whose argumentation therefore unfolds unaffected by it.As forminimality, the contrast justnow drawn with ultraminimality situates us already outside the logical arena. Pace minimalism,that the problem charged toTl is, in the strictest sense, logical, does notmatter. The fact remains that the effectiveness of disclosure of thatprobleminTl requires showing more about T2 than merely its innocence. T2'savoidance of the invalid move has to come across as the avoidance of amove which can tempt a normal T2-subscriber. Otherwise, representingTl as involving the blunder would imply itssponsors tobe ina state of suchbefuddlement that the distinction between the forgiveable and the pathological is lost, and consequently all reason to hold that Tl is, in anyreasonable sense, a competing theory, rather than gibberish. And this



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ERROR HEORY 51means thatT2's dealings with TI implicitly introduce theory-holders overand above the theories. For the idea of normalcy concerns the doings oftheorists. The acceptability of the criticism turns on the plausibility ofattributing the criticised view to the opponent. This, inpart a situationalor circumstantial matter, could not be decided by analysis of the content ofthe view attributed. So even here we have at least a variant ofmodelling,and with that the presence of material qualifying, inour generic sense, asrhetorical.

8. ERROR: JUSTA FACT?For the preceding brief to defeat error-theoreticminimalism, Powers' presentation must be representative. But that Powers violates minimalism byhandling the question of effectiveness unitarily may be due to his specialinterest inovercoming TI. The question isa perfectly good one how aT2theorist who undertakes that sets to the task. But what prevents us fromfocussing only on the case for 2? Why not see theT2-theorist as developinghis thesis and letting the audience decide about TI on the basis of thedifferences?29The issueultimately concerns the status of error.The contest of theoriesand theorists is a contest between candidates some of which must beuntrue. Is the treatment of error, i.e. ofwhat, though false, isespoused or

accepted as true, internally related to the establishment of truth,or do thepair stand externally related?The latterview isminimalistic. The only waythe theoristmust deal with error?so it isheld?is by presenting what istrue.There isno obligation independently

to address deviation from truth.In short, suppression of the first f the two questions is required. Not thatthe topic of the question, viz. the treatment of error, should be ignored.Rather, the response to the second question itselfsupplies all that the topicneeds, theoretically speaking anyway.I shall now argue against this strong formofminimalism. Doing sowillrequire taking up some philosophical specifics.

9.METAPHYSICS: REALITY AND ITSDEFECTNourishing support forminimalism isthe feeling that error,epidemic as it isand ineradicable as it seems in theoretical affairs, is accidental. Humanfallibilitydoes not entail actually erring.Can't a circumstance consistentlybe envisaged inwhich the truth, like the cheese of thenursery song, stands



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52 M. GLOUBERMANalone? If so, won't the view's exposition, in themeasure that itdeviatesfrom the supplying the probative basis, involve (rhetorical) superfluities?For the logician, invalid argumentation ismere happenstance. Is error,for the philosophical theorist, also amere factual matter? Arguably, in themetaphysical arena the philosopher isdebarred from so treating it. If so,minimalism isphilosophically incorrect because itcould not apply at thediscipline's very center.We can improve our feel for the situation inmetaphysics by developing acontrast with the condition of the logician. Recur to the flaw/fallacydistinction. While flaw is a purely logical concept, comprehensible inlogical terms,fallacy is substantively extra-logical. To say that a presentation involves a fallacy istherefore togo beyond the 'internal' characteristicsof the position presented. For this reason, the logician qua logician has noobligations towards the specific notion of fallacy. True, the logic shelvescontain many texts tackling the topic. But, qua logician, the logician candown tools once validity has been treated. Logic is the science of the valid.The logician has no obligations to invalidity beyond those that can bedischarged by appealing to the analysis of validity: the logician's dutiestowards invalidity are exhausted by his positive topic, validity, and thelogical idea of negation. Ifwe ask the logician to comment ex cathedra onthe invalid, he need only respond that it iswhatever is exclusive of thevalid. This, I claim, does not reflect the case ofmetaphysics. The metaphysician, having detailed how reality is constituted, cannot say that he hastherebymet his obligations as the scientist of the real.Talk of validity and invalidity suggests a helpful valetudinarian example.Logic is the science of valid reasoning; medicine, of health. But thephysician has an obligation to the invalid that the logician, on the preceding explanation, does not incur to the invalid. As I said, the logician,having quarantined the offending patterns, or supplied a means, candecline furtherdealings with invalidity. Ifwe ask the logician to tell uswhathas gone awry in a particular patch of reasoning, he has only to identifysome move as running afoul of the conditions forvalidity. But what mannerof doctor would wash his hands of patients having diagnosed an ailment?Medicine, inother words, is the science of ill-health asmuch as of health.It isnot the science of sickness only by being the science of health?if anysense at all attaches to the formulation.

The metaphysical compartment of philosophical enquiry is in this respectmedical. Metaphysics, qua science of the real, has an inbuilt duty todeal not only with the real, but also with the defect of the real, i.e. thevarious erroneous conceptions distortive of the real.30 And thatduty isone



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ERROR HEORY 53not only to the actuality of error, but to itspossibility too.Which meansthat error isno accidental factfrom themetaphysical vantage point. Iferrorispossible, then a theory of the realmust account for that.31It isuseful to put explicitly towork here the verbal distinction betweenfalsity,on the one hand, error ormistake, on the other. The distinctionruns closely parallel to the flaw/fallacydistinction. The logical flaws are theinvalid cases; the fallacies, a sub-class of those. Similarly, falsity,what truthexcludes, is definable by means of truth and negation. But error isnotcorrelatively definable. Error ismore circumscribed than falsity. he specification of fallacies requires exiting the borders of logic. So too does therange of errors resist identification by combining truth and negation. Errorsare not simply falsehoods. An error is a falsehood mistaken, a verisimilarfalsehood, just as a fallacy is an invalidity with the physiognomy of avalidity. The issue, then, iswhether a philosopher, as a proponent of someposition concerning a specific topic, isever obliged to treat errorabout thetopic, or whether the treatment can be exhausted merely by reference tothe difference of themistaken view from the view endorsed? If the latter,then the treatment of error is not incumbent on the metaphysician.

Otherwise, the narrow theory-data link isonly part of the story. If, that is,the philosophical theorist ofX must supply an account of error concerningX, then that theoretical activity isnot sealed off from rhetorical matters.The antecedent of this last conditional can bemade out in themetaphysical case by attending to a demand peculiar on themetaphysician, amongphilosophical investigators. As Iwill now explain, themetaphysician issubject to the special theoretical requirement of comprehensiveness.32The logician has no professional concern forfallacy.The topic of fallacy,from his vantage point in part a topic for (e.g.) psychology, can be leftunexplained relative to the basic elements of logical theory. But themetaphysician, qua scientist of the real, cannot relegate to the competenceof some extra-philosophical compartment of enquiry the metaphysicalcorrelate of fallacy,viz. error.Qua possible relative to the real, errorcannotbe leftwithout a philosophical explanation. Error, qua possible, must beaccounted for.Omission in this regardwould be a serious blemish on themetaphysical view held.33 Nor can the responsibility forerrorbe delegatedto its own proprietary philosophical compartment?'error-ology'. Thatcompartment would stand artificially outside metaphysics.So faras characteristically metaphysical theorising goes, the treatmentof opposed, putatively erroneous, views actually formspart of the internalactivity. The theorist cannot leave the latter to sort themselves out. Bycontrast with the logical case, where (sheer) differencefrom validity takes



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54 M. GLOUBERMANcare of invalidity, it is insufficient here to allow the erroneous views'difference from the espoused conception to do the work. This means thatthe figure f twoboxes, if aken as factoring the rhetoricalmaterial from theprobative, will not do ingeneral as a depiction of the theoretical conditionof philosophy.34 Error cannot be equated with falsehood. Just as thelocation of a criticism in a document essentially involves recognising acritic, so the imputation of erroressentially introduces an error-maker.Themetaphysician, indealing (as he must) with error, is inprinciple dealingwith other theorists. Consequently, the theoretical activity is genericallyrhetorical. The metaphysician cannot handle opposing conceptualisationsby detailing the conceptualisation he favours and letting the differencepick up the slack. The truth-deviating conceptualisations must receivesome explanation from the standpoint of the accepted one, just asmustfallacy in termsof validity.Moreover, themetaphysician has to deal witherror in termsofwhat isheld to be correct. So the generically rhetoricalactivity will to some degree duplicate the features ofmodelling. All thisgives us a perspective on the schema of the nested boxes rather differentfrom the early, intuitive or naive, one.The introduction of rhetoricalmaterial, in the generic sense, isenforcedby the demand on the metaphysician to deal with error qua possible.Usually, the original metaphysician has samples to hand of actual error.Under the circumstances, it isnatural forerror tobe dealt with by attackingits oncrete personification, hence in theouter box of the schema. It iseasyto slide from this fact to the conclusion that the treatment of error is asaccidental as the existence of the miscreants is contingent; that thetreatment reacts to local, historically-variable, theoretically uncompelling, expository pressures. The treatment of actual error ishowever justonemanner inwhich theprincipledduty to treaterror isdischarged. Even wherethere isno actual erringopponent, the need todeal with theverypossibilityof deviation from the truth remains, and that dealing will be rhetorical inthe generic sense?the deviation being error, not mere falsity.At allevents, theouter treatmentwill be a particular exemplification of themoreabstract way inwhich error is treated (orwould be treated) in the innercase.

10.THEORY OF ERRORMetaphysics isunder an obligation todeal with error.This is stronger thanthe obligation todeal with falsity.Sheer difference from truth, in the sense



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ERROR HEORY 55of the statement 'an error isan untruth* isonly one aspect of the identityofan error. In addition, an error is a falsehood mistaken for a truth. Thissurplus, captured incompletely bynoting that error is the product of a process of erring, iswhat themetaphysician must address and explain. Thus,(putatively) rejected conceptualisations, (putatively) erroneous views,must be explained in termsof the accepted one.The modern metaphysical concern with erroremerges in thepreoccupationwith the distinction between appearance and reality. Ifmetaphysics isthe science of the real, it isnot so in the sense that logic is the science of thevalid. The practice ofmetaphysicians?specifically, the attempt to accountforthedefect of reality,appearance?already confirms the fact. This defectis, in the classical understanding, an aspect of reality.35 I stress thatappearance, not theunreal, ispart of reality.Appearance iswhat isnot fullyreal.Appearance thus parallels fallacy,which (to couch it similarly) isnotfullyvalid. In logic, the non-fallacious flaws are invalid simpliciter.Theylack all validity-similitude. But the fallacies do possess that characteristic.Which isone important reason why they are fallacies.36Mutatis mutandis,what counts as appearance, though differing from the real, isnot lackingin, ifyou will,


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56 M. GLOUBERMANlevel of abstraction. Itmay initiallyhave seemed, from theway the case wasset up, that the presence of rhetorical matters is the presence of actual,concrete, historical, relations, and that these completely elude theory,since theories, though applicable to particulars, apply to them only quainstances of general types, not qua the specific entities that they are. Butisn'ta theoryof, say,normal personality possible, or a theoryof criticism, ora theoryof ambiguity? Surely, those who think about thesematters are notrestricted to compiling and cataloguing particular cases. My claim isnothowever that theoretical treatment isruled out here, only that the resultingtheories are in a significant sense less abstract?less theoretical, ifyouwill?than logic and mathematics. When one explains what ambiguity is,one is essentially saying that it is like . . . ,where the blank is filledby aparticular, exemplary, case. The purely structural or formal definition ofambiguity?as, say, 'expression capable ofmore than one meaning'?doesnot suffice; any termwhatever has the specified capacity. So I have noobjection to saying that the theoretical level that treats error is less bstractthan the level that treats falsehood. I do not deny, in other words, thatsomethingmeriting the title 'theoryof error' ispossible. What Ideny is thatany theory answering to the name could treat the cases itcovers merely asinstances of general kinds. This amounts to saying that error theorymust,in the generalised sense, includematters of a rhetorical sort.38And becauseof this styleof relation to particulars itfollows that such theories, to applyacross times and cultures, will have to operate on higher and higher levelsof generality, i.e. at progressively greater removes of abstraction from theconcrete facts, and in this respect will perforce suffer, as their use isextended, a progressive diminution of explanatory power.

11.PHILOSOPHICAL ERROR-THEORY: DESCARTESMetaphysics, even at its theoretically most relaxed, isa hard master. Theconditions for success must often strike the practitioner as near impossibleof fulfillment.39The requirement on themetaphysician also to deal witherror, should that necessitate importing generically rhetorical material,may seem to imply thatmetaphysics is simply

not a 'philosophical' enterprise in the traditional acceptation. If its theoreticity is demonstrablyimpure,wouldn't the greatmetaphysical practitioners despair of the subject?And given the status ofmetaphysics as 'firstphilosophy', wouldn'tthat amount to an abandonment of philosophy? I believe that themajorexponents were implicitly aware of the dangers. Many of the greatest



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ERROR HEORY 57exhibits come across as attempts todeal with theerror-theoretic kmands bygiving them purelyy i.e. genericaUynon-rhetoricalf theoretical tatus.They tryto accomplish, by using a technique resembling modelling, what theparadigmatically rhetorical use ofmodelling accomplishes, viz.making thevery idea or semblance of opposition disappear within their own theories.Many of the best-known metaphysical treatments show the characteristicshighlighted by our discussion. Opposed conceptualisations gethandledin the domestic termsof what is endorsed. Also, thatwhich is rejected isportrayed as partially correct rather than partially incorrect. The pressureso to portray error iseasily explained. Since one isnot usually called uponto account forwhy someone gets something right, that lleviates theneed toexplain commission. But the gain made by casting the rejected as partiallycorrect is often illusory: a verbal gain unsustained by compelling argu

ments.Descartes' position furnishes good examples of these features. Take theCartesian (conjunctive) idea of unclarity and indistinctness. The idea

figures n the analysis of the concept of uncertainty, uncertainty being whatDescartes isout to isolate and overcome.40 The true, for escartes, may beidentifiedwith the certain and the clear and distinct. By calling the untrue'uncertain' and 'unclear and indistinct', Descartes is already doing something akin tomodelling. The claim that the sense-acquired conception ofthe world is unclear and indistinct is like the claim, discussed in thecompany of Powers, that some argumentational move exploits an ambiguity. (Failure to discern a difference ofmeaning is, in a sense, evidence ofconfusion. But, of course, the meanings are not confused. Only themeaning-user or grasper.) In effect, rather than treating 'unclear' as 'different from clear', which would relate the two by the sign '#', Descartestreats itas 'partially clear', or 'not fullyclear'. 'Unclear', that is, ishandledsynonymouslywith 'like the clear'. As a result, 'unclear' stands to 'clear' as'fallacious', not as 'flawed', stands to 'valid', 'fallacious' having the sense of'like the valid'.

Descartes' treatment thus exemplifies the chiefmetaphysical characteristicunderscored. Error ishandled in the termsof theposition endorsed. Wecan better appreciate the theoretical pressure to do this by looking at thealternative. Suppose Descartes related 'unclear' to 'clear' as 'logicallyflawed' is related to 'valid'. That would mean that the unreal ismerelydifferent from the real. Bearing no resemblance to, itwould thus lack allstatus from the vantage point of, the real. As such, itcould easily congealinto an autonomous conceptual galaxy. We can envisage an aggressive



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58 M. GLOUBERMANreaction. "You call the conception I subscribe to unclear. That merelycomes to saying 'It isa conception differingfrommine*. But difference (inthe sense of ) is symmetrical. My difference from you isyour differencefrom me. So 'unreal* and 'appearance', as you employ them, are simplytermsof abuse." And inaddition to seeingwhy Descartes proceeds thisway,we also see him making error into an element of pure theory (as I put itabove). Describing something as 'unclear and indistinct'would ordinarilybe thought rhetorical, in the generic sense, requiring some subject who iserring.Descartes' treatment, in termsof'partial clarity and limited distinctness', turns it into an element of the truth.

A bitmore concretely, it ispossible tomake sense ofDescartes' practiceby seeing him as tryingto explain theAristotelian ontological categorisation ('the uncertain') he rejects in termsof the (rather Platonic) categorisation he accepts ('the certain'). Obviously, ifhe is leftat the end with themere assertion ofdifference, thenhe can scarcely claim tohave establishedthe superiority, let alone the truth, of his own conception. Making nopretense of deep penetration, letme say this much. One way Descartesdeals with the position he rejects isby appealing toman's carelessness, orhaste, or practical needs. These give part of themeaning of 'unclear andindistinct'. Thus Descartes will say that the entrenchment of the (mistaken) Aristotelian view is a function ofman's tailoring his theoreticalconception of the world to his practical requirements. The Aristotelianview is 'superficial'; it fails to reach reality-bedrock. The superficiality isman's deciding before having taken all relevant factors into account, not"having leisure to examine matters carefully."41 So, error ispartial truth.42Of course, Descartes isnot home free yet.Why should man be subject topractical needs? The relevant metaphysical explainer seems tobe finitude.Reality is infinite.Man isfinite.Man's being subject to such requirements islinked ohis finitude.

In thenature of the case, an infiniteworld will contain finite elements.So man's status qua finitecan so far be accounted for in termsof the real.And we can dimly discern how the linkage of finitude with practicalitymight go?through the claim that what is finite isdetermined inpart, andhence dependent inpart, on other finite elements.

Now there are a couple of points intertwined here. Ihave indicated thatDescartes deals with error; and Ihave said a word about how he does so.Obviously, as Descartes' practice confirms, he recognizes that he isnot atliberty to neglect the topic. The fact that his actual manner of dealing isobjectionable is,here, tangential, though itbacks up a lot ofwhat has gonebefore, showing that philosophers are not immune to using techniques



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ERROR HEORY 59which are rhetorical, in the disreputable sense, against their opponents,and passing the techniques offas probative.

The general point should be clear enough?whatever the ultimateevaluation of the situation. In treating reality-deviating conceptions, themetaphysician has to explain, theoretically explain, the presence of thoseconceptions, and the explanation has to be in terms of the conceptionadvanced as correct, that being the ultimate explainer. The unreal-takenfor-realmust be explained by the real. The deviating conceptions have,that is, to be taken as possessing some reality. But the unreal, identifiedsolely as that which is not real, does not possess reality.What needsexplanation stands to the real as logical fallacy,not as logical flaw,stands tovalidity.43 Fallacy has reality in the reasoning ofmen. Non-fallacious flawdoes not. Could an extension of logical theory which took that in beenvisaged, itwould be the logical counterpart ofmetaphysics. But since theextension involves psychology?i.e. appeal towhat actually isdone, or ispossible in reasoning?we are in the generically rhetorical area.It ispossible to supply a kind of blueprint of how metaphysicians whowish to avoid the rhetorical infusionwill actually handle error.On analogywith the various 'natural-ising' moves essayed in recent years, e.g. naturalised epistemology and sociobiology, theywill 'real-ise' error.They willcast around forsome unproblematic characteristic of the realwhich appearsto duplicate the notion of 'partiality'. A prime candidate, the idea ofpart/whole-structure, seems tomake full sense from the standpoint of thereal qua whole. The idea of errorwill thusbe construed via the idea of part.I shall leave Descartes here. The main point has, I think, been made.The defect of reality ishandled as partial reality.This is amodelling. It ismoreover a modelling that disguises the generically rhetorical factors?perhaps an essential mask if the integrityof metaphysics, traditionallyunderstood, isnot to go by the boards.

12.KANTTo close, it isworth considering, again with perhaps indecent brevity,another colossus from themetaphysical pantheon. Kant is inmany respectsthe direct beneficiary of theproblems Ihave located inDescartes. Kant isofcourse asmuch a critic ofmetaphysics as ametaphysician inhis own right.How does that affecthis own position?a position he preferredus as a resultdifferentially to call 'transcendental philosophy'?Kant isa critic of traditional metaphysics. The traditional demands are,in his view, too extreme to be met. We can only know things 'as they



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60 M. GLOUBERMANappear'.44 The fact places restrictions on what we can intelligibly say andcomprehend, thereby restricting our explanatory reach. Kant, in short,conditionalises the idea of necessity, and with that sets a limit on thedemands of explanation binding themetaphysician. Metaphysics can onlysaywhat isnecessary conditionally; and this comes, in the end, to agreeingthatmetaphysical necessity per se is fugitive.The softening of necessity isno smallmatter. From our perspective, it ishowever an outward sign of something more basic, which emerges on thepositive side of theKantian system, in the pre-Dialectic parts of the firstCritique. Kant's 'psychologistic' formulations have often been lamented?most harshly by analytic readers, who 'logicise' what they can of theformulations and trash the rest. But the whole idea of the genericallyrhetorical clasps hands with this element of psychologism. Normal subjectivity is a key notion for rhetoric, generically understood. (Plainly, thegood rhetorician will have a firmgrounding in psychology.) And Kant'saccount isan account anchored in thenotion ofnormal subjectivity.Nowdoesn't Kant himself offer a fairly elaborate account of error? But here,there isno tendency to disguise error's roots in a fundamentally humanpenchant forseeking the unconditioned, rather than in some extra-humanfact like the abstract connection of part towhole. Justas the necessity ofappearances, the only necessity we can know, isaccording toKant rootedinus, error, forKant, is rooted there too. That is something thatno Cartesianmetaphysician could have admitted without thereby invalidating hiscredentials. For since we, according to theCartesian, are rooted in reality,lodging error inus would, by transitivityof containment, give to error anunderived status in reality.45So there is some justification for saying, pacerecent analytic reconstructions, that Kant's transcendental philosophyintroduces irreducibly pragmatic and anthropological elements. I do nothowever think that themain lessons of this epochal change have fullybeenunderstood. So faras analytic readers ofKant are concerned, this is inpartdue to the fact that,metaphilosophically, they cannot afford so to see hisposition; not, anyway, iftheywish to locate themselves within themainstream western philosophical tradition of which the Prussian isone of themost illustrious figures.As for thewider audience that Kant influenced,including his own contemporaries, the explanation may lie in theway Kantrepresented himself relative to the earlier tradition;may lie, that is, in therhetorics of the critical presentation.46,47

TheUniversityfBritisholumbia



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ERROR HEORY 61NOTES

1.A13/B27. Norman Kemp Smith translation, London, Macmillan, 1933. The quotedlines are from theCritique's Introduction. The same claim ismade in Preface A, at Axii.2. A13/B27. Obviously, Kant presents this as a reason for going directly to the subjectmatter, not fordealing with opposed views bymodelling. But the explanation seems to applyto his own case in the way I state.3. Compare Lewis White Beck, Essays onKant and Hume (New Haven and London: YaleUniversity Press, 1978), p. 24: "what is a good answer toHume may be a very inadequatesystem of philosophy."4. As mentioned earlier, it can also serve to keep disciples in line by suppressingcompetition without seeming to do so. The varieties of thinning motives and techniques arediscussed in a companion piece, "Thinning Thick Reflectivity: A Feature of PhilosophicalRhetoric," he JournalfSpeculativehilosophy,, 1989.5. That the theoretical character of themodelled views will be misunderstood by thosewho see them via modellings is evident. In a Letter to Father Dinet, Descartes reports thefollowing unfriendly judgement about Aristotle: "when he had no good arguments to refutethe opinions of the philosophers who preceded him, he attributed to them others which werequite absurd, that is to say those given inhis writings" [The Philosophical Writings ofDescartes,Volume II, trans. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1931)p. 365].6.1 do not say, formy own part, that if could not effectively establish the unavoidabilityof a rhetorical influence in themetaphysical arena, Iwould endorse a sharp contrast betweenthe rhetorical and the justificatory inphilosophy. But if I could not, I assuredly would not bemaking the present case. The reader who is inclined to hold that only a fool or knave woulddeny that philosophical products are influenced as to rootmeaning or identity by rhetoricalmatters should bear this firmly inmind.7. For the classic statement see Aristotle, Rhetoric I 1354a10-15.8. As will be noted, this proposal assumes a sharp rhetorical/non-rhetorical divide. It isthus to be taken as a firstapproximation, not as a strict analysis. My purpose isof course toshow that 'propositional or theoretic content' in philosophy is, at one crucial place,unavoidably a function of rhetorical factors.9. 'Particular' does not mean 'specific'. To see some feature as emanating from a particularpersonage does not require seeing itas emanating fromTom as opposed

toDick orHarry. I saythis in order tomake plain that comprehension of a rhetorical feature, so understood, doesnot require specific historical knowledge.10. Some might prefer to take inconsistency as a limit case, where the division betweencriticism and what criticism comes to collapses. Providing this is seen as an intersection pointof the two, I have no objection. Obviously, the reader may quarrel with the examples Iuse toillustrate the distinction. The basic concern is to generate conviction that there is adistinction to be made.11.1 stated at the start thatmodelling is a technique of exposition. Since exposition requiresan expositor, that would seem already to show that modelling is rhetorical. However, the

present point goes deeper. From the fact that modelling requires a modeller it follows thatmodelling is a technique of exposition.12. It is helpful to think here of Aristotle's notion of "forensic oratory" (Rhetoric I1354b30?35), the purpose ofwhich is to "conciliate the listener." The point is thatwhen oneencounters a modelling, one ipsofacto has come across (something like) a theorist pleadingfor his position, not merely detailing, dispassionately, its formal content.13. In a recent New Yorker cartoon a character declares: "I will not be swayed by mereproof " Conceptually, this is right. Proof convinces; it does not persuade. (One who is



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62 M. GLOUBERMANconvinced does not of course have to be swayed.) Interestingly, and consonantly with myaccount of rhetoric, "I am persuaded by the case"

cannot involve the rhetorical notion ofpersuasion. The claim must mean: "I am (to some degree) convinced by the case."14. 'Lies essentially outside the inner square': the idea can be sharpened by recurring to thediscussion of criticism. As Inoted, the criticism of a theorymay come or amount to the claimthat the theory is inconsistent. While the criticism involves a critic, so that a minimalunderstanding of an exposition as a criticism cannot be achieved without exiting the innersquare, understanding what the criticism comes or amounts to, viz. the disclosure of aninconsistency, does not require such exit.15. To say that beginners do not hold views of the same theoretical level or depth does notmean that theyhold no theoretical views whatever. So the didactic context may give only anapproximative illustration of the idea of a theoretical vacuum.

16. Meditation 2, The Philosophical Writings ofDescartes, Volume I, trans. E. S. HaldaneandG. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: ambridgeUniversity ress, 1931) p. 150.A propos hepreceding footnote: Descartes speaks of a "philosophy of... thevulgar" This is identified inthe rench ersion s "that fAristotle nd others" The rinciplesf hibsophy,.202, ibid.,p. 298).Compare the ettertoFather inet (ThePhibsophicalritings f escartes, olumeII,p. 359)where"theprinciplesfthe rdinaryhilosophy"resaidtohave been "inventedbyAristotle."17.Meditation 1,The Philosophicalritings f escartes, olume I,p. 144.18. The situational knowledge spoken of here will help us locate, i.e. 'pin down', thetheory in the text. Itwon't (necessarily) be relevant to the theory'smeaning. So the presentremarks about the interpretative importance of attention to context lend no special supportto the thesis of a rhetorical influence on theory.19. In the abstract, there are three pertinent possibilities with respect to the two tasks: (i)Perform the two tasks separately and (ii) Perform the first task in-and-by performing thesecond. (Modelling isa clear way inwhich a theorist carries out (i) as part of (ii). But because

modelling ispatently an advertising technique, (ii) isbeing carried out here improperly.) (iii)Perform the second task alone, letting the results of one's activities have the effect thatwouldbe achieved by performing the first. In the present phase of discussion, it isassumed that thefirsttask, whether or not it isultimately separable from the second, isat any rate a task thatmustbe undertaken.hat is, I amheredealingonlywith (i) and (ii). I takeup (iii) later.20. Since we are dealing with philosophical theories, it is to be assumed that a position isnot impugned by adducing more (first-order) evidence.21. I should make plain that the establishment of Tl, purely logically understood, hassome positive bearing on T2, to the extent that T2 is free of the inconsistency uncovered.Apart from that, however, the effect ofmaking out" Tl has no additional force.22. "Berkeley and God," inLocke and Berkeley: A Collection ofCritical Essays, C. B. Martinand D. M. Armstrong, eds. (Garden City, New York: Anchor Doubleday, 1968), p. 383.Note how Bennett, in a fairly characteristic glut of confidence, brandishes the olive branchas a switch, to administer a hiding. The quoted words combine the soothing "See how wellthey did, all things considered" with the abrasive "Poor wretches, theywere inno conditionto get it right." Compare Jonathan Ree, "Philosophy and the History of Philosophy," inPhibsophy and Its Past, Ree el al., eds. (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978), p. 28:"Such tokens of respect to philosophers of long ago are two-sided, however: they arenormally offered on the understanding that past philosophers were not really very good at thesubject, so that those who show glimmerings of promise deserve lavish encouragement."(Presumably, since we are talking about the dead, the word 'encouragement' is ill-chosen.)23. "On Philosophy nd Its istory," hibsophicaltudies, 0, 1986.24. Is the idea of a logical fallacy itself a bgical idea? That isone of the key questions.25. P. 7.



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ERROR HEORY 6326. Had the second invalidity been a fallacy, itmight have answered to the name modusvolens.27. The illogical/a-logical distinction here is a shifting one. See note 28.28. The fallacy imputed does not, itmight be worth adding, have to come from the stocklist. That list isopen-ended. Not that some flaws currently not accounted fallacies, since nonormal subject is fooled by them, can later come to qualify. Itmeans that some flawed

patterns of reasoning, not currently figuring inhuman thinking, may later be found tohave acapacity to fool normal subjects.29.We returnere topossibilityiii) listed nnote 19.30. Our initial illustrations again supply good examples. Thus, the treatment of thematerial cause as paramount by theMilesians is, from the vantage point of theAristoteliantheory of reality, a treatment that distorts the real.31. The parallels with the problem evil poses for the anti-gnostic theist will be apparent.

32. Itmight be helpful to indicate in advance thatmetaphysical comprehensiveness isnotmerely amatter of scope, since this is a natural interpretation. In the following passage [SomeMain Problemsf hibsophyLondon:Allen andUnwin, 1958),p. 1] . E.Moore says f (ineffect)metaphysics that its task is "to give a general description of the whole of theUniverse,mentioning all the most important kinds of things which we know to be in it, consideringhow far it is likely that there are in it important kinds of things which we do not knowabsolutely to be in it, and also considering themost important ways inwhich these variouskinds of things are related to one another." What Moore has inmind is, in themetaphysicalframe, only part of the story. The demand of comprehensiveness I intend?to adjust thepoint to the quoted formulation?requires of themetaphysician that in addition to addressingwhat is, and what may be, he also address what isnot.33. Cf. Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Harmondsworth,Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1978) which speaks (p. 301) of a "view of reality . . .whichcan explain the existence of rival views, and of itself." In this connection, Williams uses thephrase "theory of error." Iwill later look briefly at the Cartesian case, which Williams isdiscussing. Note thatWilliams' word View' is ambiguous as between the content of one'sthought, and the process.34. To the extent that the figure continues to seem appropriate in other areas of philosophy, even to those who agree that it is inappropriate inmetaphysics, that results fromacceptance of disciplinary compartmentalisation and division of labour.35. What is the non-classical understanding? A recent move consists in identifyingappearance with rejected modes of speech. It isnot that there isan appearance that deviatesfrom reality. Rather, we have been taught to react to the world inways that subsequentlycome to be revised or scrapped. Those who take this line usually hold quite subversive viewsinmetaphilosophy. The present discussion is aimed at, or at all events takes off from, a moretraditional, conservative, understanding, though I will gesture in the final section towardssome latent anti-traditional implications.36. The underlying point here?lest itbe lost?is that likeness is a function of likenesstakers. There isno relevant gap, in the case of likeness, between appearing to be alike (insome respect), and being alike (in that respect). This isnot because the (internal) likeness ofthings is self-revealing, but because likeness isprojected onto things by subjects who makejudgements of resemblance.37. Reductive analyses of the concepts of one theory in the terms of the concepts ofanother are prime cases of non-rhetorical inter-theoretic relations. To contrast with modellings, such analyses might be called 'mappings'.38. In "On Reference,"Manuscrito, I, 1977, a piece dealing with much different concerns,I spoke of the kind of generality here as 'model generality', and contrasted itwith 'typegenerality'. Compare the differing ideas of generality as between philosophy and rhetoric,



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64 M. GLOUBERMANhistorically viewed, inWesley Trimpi, Muses ofOne Mind (Princeton, New Jersey: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1983), p. 7. "In rhetorical discourse generality usually referred to the extentof applicability to particular instances, not to the degree of abstraction. ... In philosophicaldiscourse ... the 'general' question tended to lose its reference to particular instances anddepart to abstraction."39. The simplest way to sum this up, in traditional terminology, is by saying thatmetaphysical explainers are bound by the principle of sufficient reason. And the binding isreflexive. Itmust be shown that there isa sufficient reason for sufficient reason: the principlemust subsume itself. See here Robert Nozick's dizzying discussion in Chapter Two ofPhilosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981).40. While uncertainty sounds like an evidentiary concept, unclarity and indistinctness hasa predominantly ontological or categorial slant. My own belief is that uncertainty isnot anevidentiary notion. Thus I link itwith untruth. Those who are unwilling to buy thismaysimply take my discussion of Descartes as beginning with the notion of unclarity andindistinctness, as defined at The Principles ofPhibsophy 1.45. My conception of uncertainty isdefended inDescartes: The Probable and theCertain (Wiirzburg and Amsterdam: Konigshausen + Neumann and Rodopi, 1986). A shorter treatment is given in "Cartesian Certainty: Towards the Categorial Core," Idealistic Studies, XV, 1985.41. The quoted words come from the very last sentence of theMeditations, The Phibsophical

Writings ofDescartes, Volume I, p. 199.42. A main problem with the Aristotelian categorisation of reality, inDescartes' view, isthat the items identified as basic and substantial are not so. It is typical of theCartesians toidentifyAristotelian substances with Cartesian modes of a certain class. And modes, whichare quality-like in relation to substances, are genuine elements of reality on the Cartesiancategorisation. So the Aristotelian view is represented as focussing on a part of theCartesianone and treating it independently of the whole.43. It is this difference thatWilliams's discussion ofDescartes, footnoted earlier, entirelymisses.

44. It would be amusing to try towork out a 'Master Antinomy', viz. The Antinomy ofExplanation, whose thesis holds that everything must have a sufficient reason, and antithesisthat there are some things forwhich isno sufficient reason can be given.45. During the discussion of error inMeditation 4, Descartes uses the formulation "[Manis] something intermediate between God and nought" (The Phibsophical Writings ofDescartes,Volume I, p. 172). The problem with giving error an underived status isnot that itmakeserror real. The problem is that itnecessitates the introduction of error-makers on themostbasic level. Any metaphysics must be such as to take account ofman as part of the real. Butno metaphysics can be, essentially, a theory of the real forman. Just so, Kant isdoing morethan guarding his own claim to originality by distinguishing his activity frommetaphysic

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Glouberman. Error Theory- Logic, Rhetoric and Philosophy