Glouberman. Consicousness and Cognition (Article)

8/14/2019 Glouberman. Consicousness and Cognition (Article)

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Consciousness and Cognition: From Descartes to Berkeley

Author(s): M. GLOUBERMANSource: Studia Leibnitiana, Bd. 14, H. 2 (1982), pp. 244-265Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40693948.

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ConsciousnessndCognition FromDescartes oBerkeleyBy

M. GLOUBERMAN (BEER SHEVA)ResumEn soulignanta) la positionressemblante u Dieu dans e systme e Descarteset deBerkeley ommesujetde connaissance ptimale, 'est dire certain', t (b) le rle de lanotioncartsienne e 'certitude*n dfinissanta nature e la vrit cientifique,n peutnettementransformera thorie alistique artsienne n thoriedalistique erkelienne.L'limination ne quivoquedans a conception e certitude e Descartes stcrucial cettetransformation.ans cetteequivoque, la distinction artsienne on-berkeliennentre asensation t la perceptionne peuttre dfendu.Cette interprtationst videmment nconflict vec le point de vue standard ur l'attitudede Descartes,comme rationaliste,concernant es sens,maismalgr ela, e textey apportent n srieux outien.

1. The traditionalnstallation f Berkeley s the Isaac amongempiricistatriarchsas come of lateunder ire.Berkeley's aturalhabitat it s argued isCartesiananhistoricallyensitiveeadingfthe exts eveals is houghtobe nappropriatelyast s the roductfcriticaleform,nthename f more onsistentmpiricism,fLocke'sEssay}Supportersfthis tandardiew,whodo morehan etracehatwell-known ext-bookenealogyfearlymodernhilosophy, hich acesthe three oundingathersf rationalismff gainst heir mpiricistcounterparts,re of courseunlikelyo be unaware f the mannernwhich haracteristicallyrationalist*hemes ropup withdisturbingfrequencynBerkeley's ritings. itness erkeley'sikenessrinciple,that anideacanbe ikenothingut n dea Principles8),2whichsacleardevelopmentf theview, rucial o Cartesianmetaphysics,hatcausemust e ike ts ffect,ndhis nsistence,eminiscentfLeibniz's,that ach substances one simple, ndivided,ctive eing'1.27).Butonekeyfactwould eem ospeak oudlynthe tandardiew's avour.1 Perhapsthemostvigorous, nd historicallyensitive,ecent xponent rthisview sH. Bracken, whose Berkeley London, 1974) closes by tagging he Bishop 'an IrishCartesian'.R. A. Watson's Berkeleyna CartesianContext,n Revue Internationale ePhilosophie, 4 (1963),has also been influential.L References uilt ntothe textgivesectionnumbersn standard ditions. Numbersafter a slash give correspondingpagination in the following.BERKELEYPrinciples,Dialogues, and PhilosophicalCorrespondence,ditedbyC. M. TURBAYNEIndianapolis,

New York,KansasCity,1965).Descartes ThePhilosophicalWorksfDescartes, olumesI and II, translated yE. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (New York 1955).StudiaLeibniciana, and XIV/2 (1982) Franz SteinerVerlagGmbH, D-6200 Wiesbaden

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ConsciousnessndCognition:romDescartesoBerkeley 245Aren'teven tscriticsn agreementhatBerkeley'sbasicprinciple thatesse est percipi- givesvoice to a fundamentallympiricistentimentIf so, isn't it only right o play down his empiricisticallyndigestibleremarks s remnants f an improperly uperseded nheritanceMy specific im in this discussion s to combat the view of esse estpercipi as empiricistn character. erkeley's dvocacyoftheprinciplecan be representeds theoutcomeofan attemptorepair,n a minimallymutilativemanner,a genuineflaw in Cartesian epistemology.Re-presentedn thisway, the principle'sconnectionswithconcernsof atraditionallympiricist indare,for the mostpart, ccidental.Given that I oppose a readingwhich is by rightsdenominated'standard', I am obviously not saying that Berkeley'stexts speakunequivocallyn myfavour.To sustaintheconstrual support, gooddeal ofviolencemustbe done to the manifestontent fa work ikethePrinciples.temerges or nstance hatesse est percipi, interpretedupied de la lettre, is accepted nlysubjectto considerable edgingbyBerkeley, nd that,contrary o the strong mpression reatedby thePrinciples'ntroduction, erkeleygrants heineliminabilityf abstrac-tions fromcognitiverepresentationf the world as we know it. Buttextualcompromisesare equally obligatoryon a proponentof thestandardview, who is also forced,by his commitmento a uniformphenomenalisteadingofBerkeley, o makepainful hoices.Trade-offsare, nshort, fact finterpretativeife, nd I contend hat hestandardresolution ftensions n Berkeley's hought s lesssatisfactoryhantheone whichsees his affiliationss Cartesian.By sayingthat the repairto Descartes' positionwhich issues inBerkeleiandealism s 'minimallymutilative', am not suggestinghatBerkeley's world-pictureresembles the one painted by Cartesianscience.The point s onlythatBerkeley ccepts, ndoperatesreactivelywithinthe framework f the basic Cartesian termsof discussion.Because, as I believe,thesetermsof discussioncourt, f theydo notmarry, ncoherence,Berkeley's position - even if by some intra-doctrinalmeasureofprogress tconstitutes n advanceon Descartes'-has very ittle ndependent ppeal. For all of Locke's annoying ncon-stancies nddownrightonfusions, is lessaccommodatingeaction o abroadly Cartesian conceptionof things is, in my opinion, almostunqualifiedlyreferableoBerkeley's and it sneithernaccidentnor amisfortunehat ts nfluence, othhistoricallynddoctrinally,as beenthe dominantone. But, as I will explain,to take a line like Locke'srequiresbreakingwithbasicCartesian ssumptions bout therelation-shipbetweenmindandworldwhichBerkeley ccepts.And,ifthetruth17



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246 M. Gloubermanbe told, t s notalwaysclearthatLocke,notwithstandinghis pproval,has theconvictions fhis courage.

2. Withthepreliminariesoncluded, etme turn oDescartes.There sa root flaw in Cartesianepistemology, rift r lack of uniformitynDescartes' handlingof the notions of certaintynd knowledge. Itsdetaileddisclosure to which I will therefore evote a good deal ofdiscussion- will put us in a position quicklyto appreciate he realmotivation ehindBerkeley'sesse est percipl.The intellectuallyelf-renovativeroject executedby the solitarythinker f theMeditationsould be varied nmanyrespects,whether yomission, ddition, r rearrangement.ut whichever oute s travelled,two way-stationsvisitedby the originalmeditatormust be passed:withoutthe cogito of Meditation2, the doubt would disqualify llbeliefs, eavingan epistemicvacuum in which the verypossibility fknowledge would be forfeited; nd without the divine guaranteesuppliedthe meditator s a result f the exertions f Meditation , therealm f scientific nowledgewould be evacuated f content.But whilethe terminus ad quern of the Meditations ould not be reachedbutfor heresults urnishedteachstation, hekindofcertaintyandhence,we shallsee,thekindofknowledge) ssociatedwiththecogito is quitedifferentrom hatwhich, nceinpossession fGod's guarantee, e canclaimfor thepropositions f Cartesianscience.This failure f unifor-mityhas seriousconsequencesforDescartes consequenceswhich orso I amarguing) erkeley ries oblock. I am notatall concerned ere,shouldadd, withthe well-knowndifficulty hichappearsto arise forDescartes fromthe factthatthe meditator'sknowledgeof his ownexistence nd natureprecedes hisknowledge f God's existence, ndhence precedesthose regionsof knowledgewhichdepend on God'sassistance. he present roblemwould arise ven f t weregranted hattheordering f thetwo is merely ompositional,nd that n logic theyaresimultaneous.)What s itaboutthe ogito that, ccording oDescartes,putsa halt othe nroads f doubt?The basisfor n answer s found n theseCartesianclaims.Thought is a word thatcoverseverythinghatexists n us in sucha way thatwe are

immediatelyonsciousof it {ArgumentsrawnupingeometricalashionDefinition/II52). [Tjherecan exist nus no thought fwhich, ttheverymoment hat t s presentnus, we are not conscious {Reply to Objections4/II 115). By the word thoughtunderstand ll thatofwhichwe are consciousas operatingn us {Principles .9/1 22).



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ConsciousnessndCognition:romDescartesoBerkeley 247Ifthemeditatorhinks,f he doubts, e ipso factoknows hathethinks,hat edoubts.AsEudoxus, escartes'pokesmannThe earchafterTruth,aystoPolyander,fterhe atter asadmitted,s we allwould,to having pecific oubts: Since, hen, oucannot eny hatyoudoubt,.. it s certain . . thatyoudoubt /I316).Thinkingnddoubtingre elf-evident states r conditionsf he ubject.Itwouldbemore orrecto saythat hepropositionttributingthoughtr adoubtto thesubjects self-evident,. e. thatwhen hepropositionstrue, he ubject nows t.Butthe tate r conditionfthe ubject analso,by implessociation,e described ithoutxcessivennaturalnessas self-evident.)ecausecogito' or dubito', premisesfDescartes'cogito-argument,reself-evident,hethinkerrdoubter as certainknowledgeftheirrutheven hewiles f nevil eniusannot ucceedinshaking isconviction.3Typically,what shall all)wholly sychologicaltatesrconditionslikethinking thoughtr entertainingdoubt reself-evident.utDescartes'words eaveopenthepossibilityhat onditions f a non-psychologicalort, rpsychologicaltates hich ave non-psychologi-cal component,. g. theperceptualtateof seeing hesun,are self-evident. o say that thoughts thatof whichwe areimmediatelyconscious s notto saythat thoughts that lone ofwhichwe areimmediatelyonscious. o itcan at leastbe suggestedhat houghhecogito turns on self-contained entalstates- i. e. on whollypsychologicaltates rconditionsthekind f ertaintyttachingo themeditator'sonclusions not boundup internallyiththeir pecialfeatures.Butwhile his anbesuggestednthe bstract,losercrutinyevealsthatDescartes oes have hiseyeon wholly sychologicalonditions.Consider,ornstance,escartes' ontentionhatI seethe un'or I amwalking' s an inappropriateremise ortheargument,nappropriatebecause, s heexplains,tmay nly eem omethat amseeinghe unorwalking.But ,hecontinues,if mean nly o talk fmy ensation,rmy onsciouslyeemingosee or towalk,tbecomesuite rue ecausemy ssertionowrefersnly omymind'*(Principles. /1 22).Itis, notherwords, ecause hecogito's premiserefersnly omymind'that tscertaintys assured. hatDescartes ites herestricted3 Whateverhe mbiguitiesnthediscussion fthecogito intheMeditations,hetreatmentn TheSearch fterTruthndelsewhereecisivelyiscredits.HlNTlKKA's'performative'nterpretation.ee A. KENNY, escartes: Study fhisPhilosophyNewYork1968), p.47ff.17*



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248 M. Gloubermanmentality r contentof the cogito's premiseas the reason for itsdoubt-resistancehows thathe links tscertainty ith tsmentality.The pointhere s easilysmudged s a result fa commonmisinterpre-tation f the overall rgumentf Meditation .On thebasisof a text iketheonewhichfollows,Descartes s often hargedwith rguingnvalidlyfromthe knowledge that the senses sometimesdeceive him to theconclusion that every sense-based beliefmay be deceptive: 'it issometimes rovedto me that hese enses aredeceptive, nd it is wisernotto trust ntirelyo anything ywhichwe haveonce beendeceived'(Meditation /I 145),wiser,on thisreading, ecausethe sensesmaybedeceivingme, for all I know, at all times. f Descarteswere indeedarguingn thisgrosslynvalidway,he would notreally ucceed nrulingoutthepossibility fcertaintynthecaseof a standard erceptual laim,which is not wholly psychological. I see the sun', utteredby themeditator nder pecific onditions,might lso express belief fwhichhe could be certain, nd so, undertheseconditions, is seeing hesunwould be self-evident.Accordingly, he restrictedmentality f theco gito' s premisewould not reallycount as an explanationof thecertainty ttachingo it.Even if t is agreedthatDescartes s arguingnvalidlyhere, t wouldstill f course be a bithastyfor n interpreteroconcludethatCartesiancertaintys not intendedby Descartesto be connected nternally ithwhollypsychological onditions. he onlywarrantedonclusionwouldbe theconditional ne, that fhe intends heconnection, e has falleninto error.But, admittedly,f it were shown that Descartes arguesfallaciouslyn thedescribedfashion, hiswouldprovide omeevidence,albeitofa veryweakkind, hat heconnectionsnotreally upported yhim.

Fortunately,we need not lucubrate vertheseexegetical ubtleties.The fact is that Descartes does not argue invalidly along the linessketched.Rather thanapplying he doubt to each and everybeliefheholds, Descartes explains in Meditation1 that he will attack thoseprinciples pon whichall myformer pinionsrested ibid./ibid.), heprinciples eing, neffect,hefaculties f sense and reason: if amableto find n eachone some reasonto doubt, hiswillsuffice o justifymyrejectinghe whole (ibid./ibid.). o themovemade s not from hefactthat omeperceptual eliefs he meditatorcquiredhave notpannedoutto theconclusion hat ll suchbeliefsmaybemistaken.t is,rather,romthediscovery fa flaw n a perceptualmodeofgaining eliefs bouttheworldthatDescartesconcludes hat he enses re ncapable fdeliveringthe certainties isprojectrequires.



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ConsciousnessndCognition:romDescartes oBerkeley 249In form, hearguments roughly quivalent, hen, o thefollowingbecauseanybachelor s unmarried,verybachelor s unmarried.tsrootstructures thereforepecifiable hus any F-thing s a G-thingbecauseof what being an F-thing nvolves; so everyF-thing s a G-thing.Though, ursorily onsidered, hemove heremay ook to thereader ikeone of those any-every ransitionswhose invalidity s disclosed inelementaryogic texts e. g. from hepremise hat nyonecanwin thelottery o the conclusionthateveryonecan win - thisappearance s

misleading. bjection cannotberaisedon logicalgrounds o themove.3.What s it about sense-based eliefs hat eadsDescartes odeny hatanysuchbelief an be certain?Weknowthismuch nadvance whateverit is will explain why Cartesian certaintyconnects with whollypsychologicalconditions; that featureof sense-basedbeliefswhich,according o Descartes,disqualifies hem,will be a featuren principleunexemplifiedybeliefs boutrestrictedly ental tates nd conditions.The hint of an answer s found n Descartes' observation hat thesenses sometimes deceive us concerningthingswhich are hardlyperceptible, r very far away (ibid./ibid.). Descartes immediatelyproceedsto remark, uite correctly,hattheobjectperceivedmay, inother ases,be near to hand,and theconditionsofperception ptimal.While this could be taken to implythata perceptualbeliefmightbecertainust n case conditions re optimal, his s notthecase. The onlyimplications that,underoptimal onditions, urperceptual eliefs remore ikelyto be truethanwhenconditions reunfavourable. ut thepresentssue concernscertainty,ot truth.Once this s recognised, hequoted passagecan be madetoyieldup itsmessage.Let me firstketchthemessage, nd thencall uponsome textsforsupport.As Descarteswrites, n objectperceivedmaybe 'veryfaraway*. tmay lso,ofcourse,be close at hand.A perceptual elief,n otherwords,bears on an object or state of affairs o which the subjectmay, quaperceiver,tand nanyone ofmanydistinctspatial)relations. his is noincidental eature f perception,ikethefactthattheperceivermaybemyopic r astigmatic,r the fact hat heobjectperceivedmaybe red orblue: it is rooted in the very structure of the perceptualnexus . Quite simply, heobjector state f affairsbout which belief sperceptually cquired is external to theperceiverwho acquires t. Toknow whatperceiving n objectconsists n is ipso facto to know thatanysuchobjectmaybe 'hardlyperceptible, r veryfaraway'.Considernow that, ven n optimal ases,more thana single ubjectmay acquire one and the same belief: a groupof perceivers, tanding



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250 M. Gloubermanaround a table,might cquirethe belief hat here s a bowlof fruit n it.As this shows, it is a simplecorollaryof the structural eature f theperceptualnexus noted above thatthe positionof any one amonganumber fsubjectswhoacquire belief yperceptualmeansneednot besuperior o that fanyother:allmaybe placedequallyadvantageously.So even in optimalcases,wherethe object is clearlyperceptible,ndcloseby, t s a principled act hatno one perceiver as evidenceforhisbeliefwhich is complete,whereby 'completeevidence for a subject'sbelief is meant evidencefora subject'sbelief o which no additionalevidence f the samesort, elevanto thebelief's ruth valuation ythatsubject,maybe added'.No one perceiver is inpossessionofcompleteevidencebecause, as per the illustration,here re always in principleothervantagepoints,displacedfrom hatofP, e. g. thevantage ointofsomeperceiverQ, fromwhich dditional vidence f thesame sort s Prelies on can be acquired,which evidence s as relevant o the truthevaluation f P's belief s theevidenceP in factrelieson4.Descartes' assessmentfperceptually roundedbeliefs s uncertainsbased, then,on the factthatperceptual vidence s, for a principled,structural, eason, evidence-of-an-augmentable-kind : no sub-ject's perceptual vidential asis forthe beliefhe acquires s complete.This reading can be usefullyconfirmed, lbeit in an explanatorilyunhelpfulway, by meansof thefollowing laimfrom heearlyRules.Contrasting roperlycientificognition,whichovercomes he merelyprobable knowledge Rule 2/13) connectedwith an inferior indofcognitionoperative n what are called 'arts', Descartes tells us: theformerentirely onsists] in thecognitive xercise fthe mind RuleI/I 1),while the atterdepend[s]upon an exercise nddisposition f thebody (ibid./ibid.). t is less thanclear,from hesefewwords,what amode of cognition onsistingntirelyn mental ctivityould be. But tis clear enough thatsense-basedcognition,which of course dependsupon an exercise nd disposition f thebody, is of thedisadvantagedsort.These results ufficeo establish hepointtowardswhich have beenworking.The feature f sense-basedbeliefswhich, n Descartes'view,renders hemuncertains a feature nexemplifiednprinciple ybeliefsaboutrestrictedly ental tates nd conditions.BecauseDescartes s sooftenmisrepresentedn thispoint, trust willbe pardonedfor eizing

4 The readerwho is moved ocontest his xplication f evidential ompleteness,r theuse I put it to, e. g. by arguing hat, n thecase described, ach ofP andQ hascompleteevidence, s to be remindedhatmyconcern s to explainDescartes'thinking.



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Consciousness and Cognition FromDescartesto Berkeley 25 1the ccasion o stressgain hat,s this hows, isrejectionf he enseshas ittle o do with hefact hat hey re notexceptionlesslyeliable.)Structurally,erceptualognitionnvolves he ubject's tandingnanexternal elation o an objector state f affairsoncerninghichheacquires belief.This is not the case wherewhollypsychologicalconditions reconcerned.While nynumberfus,evenunder dealconditions f perception,an be equivalentlylacedvis--vis theobject r state faffairsboutwhich beliefsacquiredwith he esultthat he videntialasis f ach fus s ncompletethiss not rue nthecase ofwholly sychologicalonditions.f,fornstance,ne ofusis npain, heres no cognitiveosition, isplaced rom isown,atwhichadditionalvidence,f he ort vailable ohim,ndwhich s relevantohis truthvaluation fhis belief hathe is inpain, an be gained.Hisevidencelone, n otherwords,s complete.Recurringo Descartes'laim hat hebeliefs express illbe certainjust ncase I ... only . . talk fmy ensation Principles9/1 22),letmethereforeall he tylef ognition hich escartes onnects erewith ertainty-cognition (V beingmnemonicorsensation'). hestyle f cognition erejectss inadequate as incapable fachievingcertaintymay ccordinglye called - cognition (withp' mnemonicof perception').t s ndeed he ase, ofar s our ensationso, hat hestructuraleature fp-cognitionhich enderseliefscquirednthiswayuncertains absent: ensationsre nternal,notexternal,o thesubjectswho have hem.

4. To modulate Qthesecond account f certainty,nd henceofknowledge, hich iguresnDescartes' pistemology,et me setdownseveralharacteristicartesian emarksbout he ptimalognitivetatewhichs themeditator'soal.InDiscourse ,Descartesays hatudgementsre ertainf 'acceptinthemnothingmore hanwhatwaspresentedomymind o clearlyanddistinctlyhat couldhaveno occasion o doubt t' /I 92).At thestart fMeditation,hedescribess certain hose eliefs hich may[not] ebrought ithinhe pheref hedoubtful /1 44).Similarly,nReplyto Objections, a cognisers said to haveno right o claimcertaintyo long s [a doubt]may omeup (/II39).And, tseveralplaces, . g. Reply oObjections/111andReplyoObjections/1145,Descartes inkscertainty'o immutability'.Thecommon oint s that belief s certainf t sevidentiallyasedonsuch way hat hereouldbenosubsequentvidentialevelopmentwhichwould eadthe ogniser'snitialpinionowaver. natural ord



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252 M. Gloubermanto describea belief of this kind is 'irrevisable'.Here is an analyticformulationf irrevisability5a propositionh is irrevisable or a subjectS at time t ifand only if i) S is justifiednbelieving att on thebasisof some set of evidential ropositions,, and ii) there s no t'and possiblee' such that t' is later hant, e is a subsetof e', and e* failsto justify inbelieving at t'It is extremelynlighteningo notethat, f we speakofplacesratherthan times,the very formof this analysis negatively uplicatesthestructural act boutperceptionaidbare above. Perceptual videncefora belief, explained, s in principlencomplete r augmentablethere salways some further erceptualvantagepointvis--vis an object orstate f affairsn which hebelief ears,displacedfrom hat fany evenoptimally laced) subject, he evidence vailable atwhich s relevant othe truth valuation f his belief.So no such beliefcan be certain.Bycontrast, ecause the belief cquiredby s-cognition oncerns he nternalstate of the subjectwho acquires t,his evidence s complete.So it isappropriateo say thathis doxastic tate s immutable r irrevisable.Withthe linkbetween rrevisabilitynd s-cognitionbeforeus, theproblem facingDescartes afterMeditation2 is plain. Given thattheworldwhose charactert s the Cartesian cientist'sob todisclose snots-cognised the world of scientificnvestigation eingan externalworld,notan internal, sychological,ne - how can certain nowledgebe achievedat all? P-cognition, n the one hand, thoughof a typeappropriate orputting hesubject ncontactwith n externalworld, sconstitutionallyncommensurate ith certainty:beliefsp-cognitivelybased are in principlervisable.On the other hand, s-cognition sconstitutionallynappropriate orthe purposesof science.Whatpro-spectsarethere, hen,for Cartesian cience

The metaphysicalines of Descartes' answer are well-known.Theeffortsf Meditation secure divineguarantee f theveracityf clearand distinct' ognitions. hisguarantee, eingdivine, enders hetruthsuncovered by the scientist mmutable. So these truthsqualify ascertainties,nd henceas knowledge.But this,whiledescribinghemetaphysical strategyfDescartes'argument,eaves the key epistemological questionwhollyuntou-ched: whatkindofcognition oes scientific nowledge nvolve?To saythatGod is theguarantor fsuchknowledge s to remainmumon thisvital matter.5 I am (over-)simplifying. Tlumak's formulation,n: Certainty nd CartesianMethod Descartes:Critical nd Interpretativessays, ditedbyM. HOOKER Baltimoreand London, 1978),p. 46).



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Consciousness nd Cognition: From Descartes toBerkeley 253Insensitised y themassivedose ofdisreputableheology nd schooldogma njectedbyDescartes nto Meditation ,many ommentatorsailto recognisethat an informative nswer is offered.The followingpassage,one ofmanywith a similarmessage, s relevant

He [sc. God] on whom dependpossesses n Himself ll thegreat hings owardswhichaspire andthe deasofwhich findwithinmyself],nd thatnot ndefinitelyrpotentiallyalone,but really, ctually, nd infinitely Meditation3/1170).The relevantmplication, hich s quite ndependentftheclaim hatGod serves o guaranteeheveracity f theclear nddistinct,s thatGodhimself ossessesthe kindof (certain)knowledge fthe worldtowardswhich,as a good Cartesian cientist, aspire.The kind ofcognition equisite or scientificknowledge s, then, hekind which divine intellectual ctivity exemplifies o the full. Butwithoutdenying hatGod's commercewiththeworld s inmanyways(bound to be) unique, the phrase 'divine cognition', ike the phrase'Jack'scognition',does nottellus whatcognition f thiskindamountsto. If divinecognition' lassified nutterly istinctive indofcognition,

i.e. if God's intellectual ctivitywere entirelysui generis, themeditator ould no more intelligibly e said to 'aspire' to it thananumber could aspireto be a table. In sayingthatthe humansubject'potentially' possesses the scientificknowledge of the world Godpossesses r-eally,ctually, nd infinitely',escartes s telling s that hekindofcognition equisite orsuchknowledge s exemplifiedn part,or imperfectly, in human ntellectual ctivity.And this mplies hatthis kind of cognition s amenable to clarification rom the humanstandpoint; nhuman erms.I willhenceforthummarisehisbysayingthat,for Descartes, human cognitionand divine cognitionmust begenerically niform).So whatkindofcognitions it that shumanly xemplifiedutwhich,in itshumanexemplification,chievesonly imperfectlyr partially rindefinitely hatGod achievesby itsmeans to thefull?The (perhapssurprising) nswer s p-cognition.By bringinghepassage lastquotedintocontactwiththeanalysisof irrevisabilityet down above, one canquicklyconfirm hatthis s so and at thesametimeexplainwhyGoddoes better hanman.In the quotation,God is referred o by themeditator n a primafacie curiousand inexplicableway, i. e. as 'He on whom I depend'.Itwould be insensitive o takethis s a mere iteraryouch,or as designedto curryfavourwiththe Sorbonne.A clearconnection s impliedbyDescartesbetween hemeditator's ependence n God and thefact hat



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254 M.GloubermanGod possessesto thefull what the meditator ossesses only partially.What could thisconnection e?The language of dependence is used in Cartesianphilosophytodescribetherelationship etweena substance n thefullest ense andthose items- human minds in particular which are also, thoughderivatively,ccorded substantial tatus. trictlypeaking,God alone isa substance: nlyhe sindependent of all else.Finite ubstancesaswecallthem) redoublydependent: irst,hey recausallydependent ponGod forexisting t all; second,because of the atomistic haracter ftime, heydependfortheir ninterruptedxistence n a continuous ctof divinecreation.As the latterfact ndicates,God's substantialitysspecial in thissense,thathis continued xistence s guaranteed y hisessence 'granted hat here sonesuchGod whonowexists, seeclearlythat t s necessaryhatHe shouldhaveexisted rom lleternity,ndthatHe mustexisteternally'Meditation /1182-183).How, then,does thisspecial and pre-eminentubstantialityf Godconnectwith the fact that his intellectual ctivity s adequate forscientificertainty? ecurringo the nalysis f rrevisability,he nswerbecomesplain. Note how the analysis mportsthe notionsof a timedifferentrom he timeat which a subjectgainsthe evidence n whichhis belief s based,andof evidence dditional o the evidencehe gains tthe time he belief s initially ngendered.As I explained, -cognitivelybased beliefsare in principlervisable, ecause there s always someadditional, quipollent, vidential ource.But suppose,sweptalongbythecurrentfdiscussion,we ask: whatwould a p-cognisingubjecthaveto do in order to ensurethat his sense-basedbeliefs re certain?Thisanswer s automatic as a necessary ondition fachieving ertainty,ewould have to check out all evidential tandpoints ifferentromhisown, and base his beliefonly on the combined data. The specialsubstantiality of God guarantees precisely that he satisfiesthis condition. Because, forexample,God is eternal, here s notemporal tandpointheevidence vailable t whichremains,o far shisbeliefs o,unchecked. y the sametoken,given hatGod isnotspatiallycircumscribed,.e. 'not marked out and limitedto our view . . ashumanagents re by their ize, complexion, imbs,andmotions',6heevidenceavailable to him, unlike that gained even by a maximallyconscientious inite erceiver, oes not leave open thepossibility f adisplaced vantage point fromwhich additional evidence could inprinciple e gathered.6 Thiscompletelyppropriate laim s notDescartes* it sBerkeley's, from rinciples1.57.Similar houghtsreexpressedbyDESCARTES,. g. in Meditation .



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256 M. Gloubermaninadequate r imperfect,nd hence n need ofrepair rreplacement.utwhilethisnegative hrustnclines n a certain ositive irection,t s farfrom upplying momentumufficientorreaching ny very rticulategoal.

5. Castingour glanceback over thepreceding iscussion,we see thatCartesian epistemologycomprisestwo entirelydistinct ccounts ofknowledge.At the stageof the cogito, knowledge s understood nterms f an s-cognitive aradigm.Where cienceproper sconcerned,i-cognition, enerically niform hough pecificallyuperior o p-cogni-tion, s operative.How couldDescarteshavepermitted imselfo retail isaccount s auniform isionofknowledge It will be noted that was able to applyone and the same analysis of the notions of revisability ndirrevisabilityn amplifying escartes' reasons formakinghis claimsaboutcertaintyt each stageof the Meditations. ut whilethis nswersthequestion, tdoes so only diagnostically, ot n a justificatory ay. fwe examinemorecloselythereasonsoffered or heapplicabilityftheanalysis t each stage, t emerges hatonlyby overlooking subtlebutneverthelessealequivocationon themeaning f completegraspofanobject' could the two have been rangedby Descartes under a singlebanner.Having established his,we will then see that the Cartesianconception fknowledge n science s rooted n a metaphor,nd hencethat, n the name of coherence,revision s required.One avenue ofrevision s Berkeley's, houghwhether t leads to coherence s anotherquestionentirely.Why s certaintyssuredfor beliefs -cognitivelyased It is assuredbecause the object about which a belief s acquired is an internalcontent r mode of consciousness.Where uchcontentsre nquestion,there re no vantagepoints,displacedfrom hatof thes-cogniserwhoacquires the belief e. g. that he is in pain), fromwhich additionalevidence of the sorthe relies on could be gained.This is so forthestrongest easonpossible,viz. that it makes no sense to speak ofsuch alternative vantage points. (The third ersoncan of coursegainbehavioural videnceforthebelief hat certain ubject s inpain.But this s not evidence of the same sort'.)Butthis mplies hat ensecannoteven be attached o talkof a vantagepointfor thes-cognisingsubjecthimself. nd, ndeed, tcannot, aveasafacondeparler. Thisis confirmed y notingthatthe satisfactionf a counterfactualntece-dent boutan s-cognised bjectentails change nthe atter'sdentity.fI say Had I been locallyanaesthetisedwhilethedentist rilled, . .', I



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ConsciousnessndCognition: romDescartesoBerkeley 257could not add '. . ., thepain I feltwould havebeendulled*. he propercomplements '. . ., I would not have felt hepain I felt, . e. I wouldhave felt dullpaininstead f the harpone whichwas so unpleasant*.fevery uchchangebringswith ta changeof dentity,here s no sensetosaying fthesubjecthimself hathe has a unique,orfavoured, antagepointvis--vis thatconcerningwhich he comesto have a belief.

By contrast, hecertaintychievable r-cognitivelys internally,. e.structurally,ound up with theidea of a vantage oint.The Ji-cognisergains certaintyn the case ofbeliefswhich remainmerelyprobableforhis imperfect -cognising ounterparts ecause he leavesno possibleorpotentialvantagepointsout of account.For theJi-cogniser, belief scertain,. e. irrevisable, ecause there re no outstanding antagepointswhich he has not visited. Or, to expressthe same thought in ametaphysicallymoreresonantway, theJt-cogniserraspshis cognisedobjectscompletely, ather han n the mperfect,artial, uperficial, aywhichfeatures -cognitive ontactwiththeworld.This equivocation n 'irrevisable' nd certain' s a seriousmatter. or

it is only by (tacitly) ppropriatinghemeaning hathas been giventothe claimthat, n s-cognition,hesubjectgrasps n objectas a whole orcompletely,hatwe can think urselves o beattaching definite ensetothe claim thatJt-cognitionchievesa completegrasp, nd hence securesscientific nowledge.But once we come to see that complete grasp' nthecase of s-cognition oes notmean graspfrom ll possiblepointsofview', but means graspof an object in respect f which there re nopointsof view', all we are leftwith, n attemptingo cash Descartes'scientificpistemology,s an inadequately nterpretedorm f words.The problem emerged already above, but was allowed to passunremarked orexpository easons. explainednthepreceding ectionthat t is a necessary condition for a p-cogniser o attain ertaintythat he check out all possible perceptualvantagepoints. Descartes istreating od's (ji-cognitive) atisfactionf this ondition s sufficientfor ertainty.ut even fwe allow that hecondition ouldbe satisfied,twould stillbepossibletodenythat his uffices or ertainty,s thegraspof theworldfrom llpossiblevantagepointswould still ountas inferiorto a graspfrom within, as in the case ofs-cognised ontents.n fact,willshow thatDescarteshimselfmustgrant he nferiorityf theformerbythe basic terms fhismetaphysics. o theequivocation n 'completegrasp' is essential for Descartes' belief that the mechanismsof jc-cognition uffice or chievingn Meditation thecertaintychievedbys-cognitivemeans nMeditation .



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258 M. GloubermanThe severity f thedifficultyesultingrom his fissuren Cartesianepistemologycan be underscoredby consideringthe unattractiveoptionsopen to Descartes fordealingwith it. Suppose he graspsthenettle and admits that divine cognition s sui generis, i.e. is notgenericallyuniformwith p-cognition.He could now say, withoutincurring charge of equivocation,that the uniqueness of divinecognitionconsists n this,that t can achievethe certaintyn sciencewhich is achieveds-cognitivelyn thecogito. But this would render

scientificnowledge ranscendentor ubjects uch as ourselves,ndtheMeditations fterMeditation wouldnot be those of a human ubject.So thisbold course would bring he Cartesianprogrammeo a deadhaltatthecogito. Whatavenueoftreatingheproblem emains None. Forthe world nvestigated y the scientists an extended, orporeal,world,and so is, by theveryterms fCartesianmetaphysics,xternal to thesubjectqua res cogitans. This is no less trueofGod thanofman; infact,God beinga pure spirit, otunited o a body, it s in a senseevenmoretrueofGod. So theonly cognitivemechanism escartes can callon for service n the scientific rena is p-cognition, . e. the type ofcognition suited to (intellectual)contact with an externalobject.Consequently, escartescannot voidreliance n theequivocationf hepost-Meditation discussion s to be saved.For,again, completegrasp'meanssomething ifferents applied n the case ofp-cognition nd itsvariants nd as appliedin the case ofs-cognition.

6. With therupturen Cartesian pistemologyaid out in detail, t istheeasiest hingn the worldtodescribe erkeley's marche. Where,so far as knowledgeof the world is concerned,Descartes accepts ageneric dentity etweenoptimalcognition, . e. Jt-cognition,nd p-cognition,Berkeley'sgeneric ink s betweenoptimalcognition nd s-cognition.Withthisone change,Berkeleianmetaphysicsrystallisesutof theCartesian nsemble.Questions crowd in. But priorto all elaboration nd defense, hesetwo crucialfactsmaybe noted.First, he hangedescribed liminatesheCartesian rift: the mode of cognitionoperative in science is, forBerkeley, enericallyniformwith -cognition,o Descartes'disastrousand unacknowledgedwitchofcognitivemechanismn themovefromMeditation2 to Meditation3 is avoided. Second, because s-cognisedobjectsareobjectswhose esse est percipi, theontologicalhegemonyof the chiefprinciple f Berkeleianmetaphysicss secured.All this,repeat, s theconsequenceofextendinghes-cognitive aradigm o takeinscientificnowledge.And,as I suggested,his sthe inethatwouldbe



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ConsciousnessndCognitionFromDescartesoBerkeley 259followed naturallyby a theoristwho, acceptingDescartes' termsofdiscussion accepting,nparticular,heCartesiandemandforcertainty- attempts o extricatehimselffromDescartes' predicamentwithoutabandoning hegoal ofknowledge n science.7It is quite true that one forwhoman s-cognitivemechanism s theonlykindcan be representeds gravitatingn a phenomenalistirection.But there s onlyfragmentaryvidence hatBerkeley's hought as thisslant. n fact, s we delve ntotherecesses f theBerkeleian orpus,whatwe find s a reduplicationf thestructureftheCartesianposition.Justas optimal cognition s a superiorvariant fp-cognition orDescartes,so, forBerkeley,t s a superior ariant fs-cognition.t is,we shall ee,s-cognition s exemplified yGod, i. e. by a SuperiorMind' {Principles1 93), and it s exemplified yGod rather hanbyman because he aloneamongcognising ubjects s,preciselynDescartes'sense, independent'.(Henceforth,I shall call God's superiormode of s-cognitiono-cognition.) n sum,whereastheworld,for committed henomenalist,is a construction ut of (internal) bjectsof (human)s-cognition, orBerkeley t is the internal) bjectof divine)o-cognition.

Pending extual onfirmation,t can now bebetter nderstoodwhat tmeans to say that Berkeley's repair to Cartesianism s 'minimallymutilative'. avefor hechangefrom -cognitionos-cognition,nd theattendant piritualisationf thereal,all else remains ntact. Esse estpercipi notwithstanding, he world of the Berkeleian scientistreemerges nreduced s an external bjectof (human)s-cognition.It may be doubted thatany such positioncould conceivablybearscrutiny a doubt fully hare.However,thosewho harbour hedoubtmighteasilybe persuadednot thatBerkeleianism s unacceptable, utthat phenomenalisteading f thetextsmustbe theright ne. So, tokilltwo birds with one stone, let me defendmy construalagainsttheobjectionthat s likelyto be most nfluentialmongthose who inclinetowardstaking his ine.7. Even ifthepreceding ccountshows a route fromDescartestoBerkeley, t is not- myobjector nsists Berkeley's route. For noplace is given n thisaccount to Berkeley's nti-sceptical motives.Two pointscan be made in response.First,while t s quitetrue hatBerkeley dvertises hePrincipless an anti-scepticalract,t s exegeti-callynaive fortheobjectorto think hat his ntitles imto appropriate7 Anotherextrication'ould nvolve iving pthe oal f cientificnowledgen theCartesianense. his s, believe, ocke's ine. will eturnoconsidert tthe erynd.



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260 M. Gloubermanthe phrase in the name of an empiricist henomenalist eadingofBerkeley.Aren'tthere ceptical ssuesunlinked o traditionalmpiricistconcerns? t would be grossly uestion-beggingo denythat this s acase in point on the groundsthatthe Cartesianreading ervesup apositionwhich is hard to swallow. Second, and specifically, s weexamine he textswe do indeedfindBerkeley's nti-scepticaloncerns obe farremovedfrom hose we naturally xpectfrom heoristswho seethedeliverances f sense^experiences somehowprivileged. trikingly,Berkeley eemswilling o allow that heworldmight eunknowablebyhumancognisers,his overridingoncernbeingrather o establish hat,knowableby us or not,such a worldmustbe spiritualncharacters acondition f beingknowable t all.ConsiderthispassageColour, igure, otion,xtension,nd he ike, onsiderednly s somanyensationsin themind,reperfectlynown,hereeing othingnthem hichs not erceived.utiftheyre ookedon as notes r images,eferredo thingsor archetypes existingwithouthemind,henweare nvolvedll nscepticism Principles.87).Prima facie, this could be interpretedn theobjector'sfavour.But as

we read on, we discover that Berkeleyis quite willing to accept'archetypes' ndependent f humanmindsso long s[objects]renot ctuallyerceivedyme rdonot xistnmymind rthat fany ther reatedpirit,heymustitheraveno existencet llor lse ubsistn hemindofsome ternalpirit 1.6).And again:if the eader]an but onceivetpossible or neextended oveableubstance,r, ngeneral,or nyone idea,oranythingikean idea,to exist therwisehan n a mindperceivingt, shall eadily ive he ause 1.22).

This lastpassage ndicates hatBerkeleyhas no objection o a division fideas - even an exclusivedivision intohumanand divine. n fact,helater talesthis n so manywordsI have oobjectiongainstallinghedeasnthemind fGod, rchetypesfours.Butobjectgainsthose rchetypesyphilosophersupposedo bereal hings,nd ohave nabsolute ationalxistenceistinctromheir eing erceivedy nymindwhatsoever,tbeinghe pinionf llmaterialistshat n deal xistencenthe ivinemind sonething,and thereal xistencefmaterialhingsnother LetteroJohnsonf24March 730/239).His animus s reserved or hosewho attributextra-mental ontologi-cal status o (thecontents f)non-humandeas. Butwhat rethese deas,and how do theyrelate o human deas? I willhavemoreto say aboutthis n the next ection, ut notehow,on one occasion,Berkeley dmits



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ConsciousnessndCognitionFromDescartes oBerkeley 26 1that heymightwellbe of I know notwhat ort Prinrples 71). Ifso,what upportremains or he claimthatesse est percipiis thecopingstone of an anti-sceptical ositionof a standard mpiricist indIn lightof such texts,how arewe construeBerkeley's ssertion hatscepticismwould result were extra-mental eingsto be admitted?Toanswer,we mustbriefly econsider he role of certaintyn Cartesianphilosophy.For Descartes,to be able to talk ntelligiblybout a specific rea ofreality, cognitivemechanismmust be available, n principle t least,which nablescertaintyo be attainednthat reabya cognisingubject.The discussion fcertaintyhould make clearboththat, ndwhy, his sso: the evidential basis sufficient or certaintywith respect to apropositioncoincides with the truthconditionsof the proposition.Accordingly,n inability o be able to explainwhatcertaintybout asubject-matteronsists n - i. e. to providean account ofwhat certaincognitionn itsregard mounts o - is forDescartesan inability learlyto specify he truth onditions, nd hence themeaning, fpropositionsabout that ubjectmatter.

It is often complained that Descartes' method of doubt in theMeditations as a veneerofrationalitynlybecause Descartesdoes notadequately istinguishertaintyrom ruth if theuncertaintyfa beliefis compatiblewith tstruth,hen t s irrational oproceed longthe inesdictatedby themethod, . e. to rejectbeliefswhich are uncertain. utthisobjection oses itsforce f the conditionof certaintyellsus whattruth n a certain rea comes to.Now p-cognisers, ccordingto Descartes, are capable of achievingcertainknowledgeof the (external)worldonly potentially' r 'indefi-nitely'.Descartesneverthelessegards imself s justifiednspeaking fscientific nowledge,because he can call upon jc-cognition,which iscomprehensiblerom p-cognitivetandpoint,nd whichmakesgoodthe hortcomingsftheformer. owever,whatever escartesmayhavethought, e have seenhisposition o be undermined yanequivocation.Unlesshe changeshisontology, ydenying hat heworldofscience sexternal o mind,he cannot in the end avoid conceding hat even jt~cognitions notequal to theachievementfcertaintyn tsregard. o, itwouldfollow, ndefault f theontological hange, hatDescartescannotmakesenseof what the scientific nowledgehe aims to securemeans,inasmuch as he cannot specifya cognitivemechanismcapable ofachieving cientificertainty.t is this, submit, hatBerkeleys statingwhenheasserts hat f heexternal orldwerematerial,.e. ontologicallydistinct rommind,thepossibility fknowledge nitsregardwould be18



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262 M.Gloubermanundermined.Moreover,Berkeley s stating hisfor theprecisereasonsimplicit n Cartesianepistemology, iz. thatno (spiritual)subjectorcogniser no res cogitans- can' chievea complete, n irrevisable,certain, raspofa non-spiritualeality. nd theproof fthis ommunityofreasonings thatBerkeleysquitewilling ogranthat heworldmighttranscend he rangeof s-cognition. t suffices or his anti-scepticalpurposes hat mode ofcognition, enericallyniform ith -cognition,andhencecapableofbeingclarified,t east nprinciple,n itsterms, anbe enlisted o pickup whatever lack is leftby theformer.8. I promisedto elaborate n thecharacter f non-human deas andtheir elations o thecontents fhumanexperience. et me do so verybriefly.The distinctionbetweenarchetypal nd human ideas correspondsexactly, s I said, to the Cartesiandistinction etweenthe content f(divine)Jt-cognitionnd (human)p-cognition. o establish hiswe needonly cite a few texts where Berkeley compares human cognisersunfavourably ith God.A key claim is thisone, fromDialogue 3, that God . . . perceivesnothing y sense as we do' (/1 6). What s impliedbythe fact hatGodis, in thisway,exempted rom modeof contactwiththeworld that snormal for human subjects? I already cited the passage in whichBerkeleyexplains that God is 'not markedout and limited to ourview .. as human agentsare by theirsize, complexion, imbs,andmotions' Principles .57).Here is a companion laim, ndicatinghat hepassagedoes notexpress fleetingrlocal sentiment it seemsvery asyto conceive the soul to exist na separate tate i.e., divested rom hoselimits nd laws of motion ndperceptionwithwhich he isembarrassedhere),and to exerciseherself n new ideas,without he nterventionfthese angible hingswe call bodies' (Letter oJohnson f 25 November1729/227).This is exactly hepointDescartesmakes nclaiming hat nadequate view of the world does not depend upon an exercise nddisposition of the body (Rule I/I 1). And the reasoning isidentical. The embodiedcogniser an achieveno morethan a limitedview of the world, and hence falls shortof the kind of complete,synoptic, raspwhichalone suffices orknowledge.In the course of discussingCartesianepistemology, showed it tofollow fromthedependenceof finite ubjectsthattheycan be saidtopossessknowledge fthe external)world potentially*t best. n effect,it sbya kindof vicarious eliance n thediviner-cognitivetate hat he(disadvantaged) p-cogniser can claim knowledge. If the paralleldescribed s morethan coincidence,we may expectBerkeley o sayof



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Consciousness nd Cognition:From Descartesto Berkeley 263archetypaldeas, nd of theo-cognition hosecontentshey re, hattheymakegoodsomeconstitutionalotentialityr indefinitenessrincompletenesshichmars umandeas.Andthis ndeed esays. t s aconstant erkeleianefrainhat he ragmentarinessfhumanxperiencecontrasts ith he ompletenessfGod's.ThiscorrespondsullyotheCartesianiew f n rretrievableotentialitynhumanognitionf heworld.And, fwe ookclosely, e find rchetypaldeasbeing escribedby Berkeleyn ust hewaywe are ed toexpect. or nstance,umanexperiences featuredy patialnd emporalragmentation.explainedabove how this onnectstructurallyith heclaim hat he evidenceavailable o finiteubjectssnever omplete and hence heir oxasticstates evermmutablendbeliefs everertainr rrevisable.ow is twithGod?Concerningemporality,erkeleynformssthat eacceptsJohnson'sescriptionall things ast,presentndto come arealwaysatevery ointofduration quallyperfectlyknown or present o God's mind. . [I]t is in effect lwaysnow withHim (LettertoBerkeley f 5 February 730/234).Thesame s true fspace[God is] one whose understandings infinite, omprehendingn one clear view theremotest vents, nd consequencesofthings.*'89. I willconclude ypicking p the ooseends.I stated t the tarthat, nthe onstrualfBerkeley'sositiono beoffered,either ouldesseestpercipibe accepted nreservedly,orwould bstractionse ineliminableromognitiveepresentationftheworld s weknow t.Twoobservationsxplainhe ormerlaim. irst,'percipi' is not he ight ord.The structurefperceptualognitionssuchthat tcannot e a basicmodeofcognition ithin positionikeBerkeley's.hus,we found hat hep-cognitive odel nDescartesssupplanted bythe -cognitiveodelnBerkeley.ut his sperhapsverbal oint. hesecond,more ignificant,bservations that sse estpercip ,with heprecedinghange ffected,s true rimarilyromhestandpointf divine ognition,. e. o-cognition. nd this, n turn,explains hy bstractionsre dmittedy Berkeleynthehuman ealm.We ust aw that neoftheways hat -cognitionalls hort fthe dealis infailingoovercomencompleteness,artiality,ragmentation.uteach of thesenotionss synonymousith bstractness.pinozamakesthepointmoreclearly hanBerkeley:God does notknowthings

8 Sermonpreached n WhitSunday,1751. In Collectedworks8.135.18*



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264 M. Gloubermanthroughabstraction,or form general definitions.'9And Leibniz:'abstractionsrenecessary orthescientificxplanation fthings/10uton the reconstruction am recommending,he same is true of theBerkeleian osition abstractions rebanished t theo-cognitive, otthes-cognitive,evel.ThoughI have allowed the word 'p ercip i to pass, a more seriousdifficulty,hichseems to me to redound to the creditof Descartes'position, risesfrom hepreceding emarks. he problem nCartesianphilosophyanatomisedabove arises because of the root differencebetween s-cognitionand p-cognition.But having extendedthe s-cognitivemodelcomprehensively,anBerkeleymakeanysenseat all ofperceptual cognition?Let me expresshis difficulty ialectically. nDescartes'final osition, he relation etween hecontent fp-cognitivestates nd (God's) Ji-cognitivetates s the relationbetween fragmentor partand the completewhole of which it is a part.Given thatp-cognitionand Jt-cognitionoth place the subject in relationto anexternalbject, think hat ensecanbe madeof thisrelation.t sufficesthatwe can understand owthecontent fonep-cognitivetate an be afragmentf thecontent f another -cognitivetate, nthewaythat hecontent fyourp-cognitive tate s a fragmentf thecontent f minewhen have a morecomprehensiveiew of a state f affairshanyoudo.But havingdone away with thep-cognitivemodel at thebasic level,Berkeley s obligedto make senseof thispart/whole onnectionn s-cognitiveerms,nd I can see nowayto do this. t would havetobe as ifI scanyour ensationna step-by-step ay,taking n no more hanpartof it at any one time.But it simplymakes no sense to say thatonesubject'ss-cognitive ontent s partial.A sensation s, by its essence,complete otherwise,t would makesense tosaythat nowfeelpart f apain anotherpart of which I will feel at a later time. Berkeley anovercome hisdifficulty,o faras I can see, only by smugglingn themechanismsof p-cognitionby the back door. But this is quiteincompatiblewith the thrust f Berkeleianism,s p-cognitivemecha-nisms are those which can put the subjectinto contactwitha non-spiritual eality.These remarks ringmenaturally o myfinalpoint.What justsaidamounts o this no adequate accountof experience s we knowit (asopposed,say,to mystical ommercewithreality) an dispensewithp-

9 Letter o Blyenberghf5 January 665. n WorksfSpinoza,Volume I, transi, yR.H. M. ELWESNew York, 1955), p. 333.10Letter o De Voiderof 20 September1703. In LEIBNIZ,Philosophical apersandLetters,d. and transi, y. L. E. LOEMKERDordrecht-Holland1969),p. 531.



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ConsciousnessndCognition:rom escartes oBerkeley 265cognitivemechanisms. o thisextent, regardDescartes' position asbeing more adequate than Berkeley's.But the real victorhere, as Isuggested arlyon, is Locke. For ifwe reject heBerkeleian olution othe problem in Cartesian epistemology, hen, havingseen that theCartesian tandards or solution re settoohigh, heresults that newcategory- that of probability, of probable knowledge - iselevatedto basic status.Book 4 ofLocke's Essay, nwhichprobabilitycomes nto tsown,marks revolutionarytageon the road to a properunderstandingfwhat science s all about.

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