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Page

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RO

DU

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ION

1

AP

PE

LLAN

T’S

RE

PLY

BR

IEF

4

AR

GU

ME

NT

4

GA

MS

ON

ISE

NT

ITLE

DTO

JUD

GM

EN

TB

EC

AU

SE

TH

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SE

RV

ATO

RLE

AS

ED

OE

SN

OT

CO

NFE

RA

PE

RP

ETU

AL

RIG

HT

OF

RE

NE

WA

L.4

A.

TheC

onservatorLeaseC

onfersA

Single

Renew

alThatE

xpiredIn

April2006.

4

1.G

insbergis

notentitledto

atrialon

them

eaningof

theC

onservatorLease’s

ambiguous

renewal

languagebecause,

asa

mailero

flaw,an

ambiguous

renewalclause

confersonly

asingle

renewal.

4

2.C

ontraryto

Ginsberg’s

contention,C

alifornia—like

virtuallyevery

otherjurisdictionthathas

consideredthe

question—disfavors

perpetualleases.5

3.G

insberg’sreliance

onC

aliforniadecisions

thatconsiderthe

ruleagainstperpetuities

ism

isplaced.8

4.Taken

asa

whole,

theC

onservatorLeaseevinces

anintentto

createa

short-termcom

merciallease.

Itslanguage

isinconsistentw

ithan

intenttocreate

aperpetuallease.

10

a.G

insbergcannotshow

thattheC

onservatorLease

isunam

biguouslyperpetual.

10

b.G

insberghas

notrebuttedG

amson’s

analysisshow

ingthatthe

ConservatorLease

takenas

aw

holeis

inconsistentwith

aperpetuallease.

13

5.C

odeofC

ivilProcedure

section1864

doesnot

trump

them

orespecific

rulegoverning

theinterpretation

ofam

biguousrenew

allanguagepurportedly

creatinga

perpetuallease.14

I

TA

BL

EO

FC

ON

TE

NT

S(continued)

Page

B.

No

StatuteO

fLimitations

BarsG

amson’s

Cross-A

ctionSeeking

Declaratory

ReliefO

nThe

Meaning

OfThe

Conservator

Lease’sR

enewalLanguage.

16

1.G

amson.’s

declaratoryreliefclaim

sare

governedby

afour-yearlim

itationsperiod

becausehercross-action

arisesfrom

adispute

aboutthem

eaningofthe

ConservatorLease’s

renewallanguage.

16

2.G

amson’s

declaratoryreliefcauses

ofaction

didnotaccrue

when

shesigned

theC

onservatorLeasein

1996;indeed,G

insberg’sperpetuallease

theorydid

notevensurface

untilaftershe

filedthis

action.18

3.G

amson’s

declaratoryreliefclaim

sare

timely

usingany

feasibleaccrualdate:

Ap

ril2006,N

ovember

2004,orD

ecember2003.

21

a.G

amson’s

declaratoryreliefclaim

saccrued

inA

pril2006,when

Gam

sonfirst

became

entitledto

evictGinsberg.

21

b.A

tmost,events

beforeA

pril2006

amounted

toanticipatory

repudiationsthat

didnottrigger

anystatute

of

limitations—

and,inany

event,theyoccurred

within

thelim

itationsperiod.

22

II.IF

TH

EC

OU

RT

DO

ES

NO

TO

RD

ER

JUD

GM

EN

TIN

GA

MS

ON

’SF

AV

OR

,IT

SH

OU

LDR

EM

AN

DFO

RA

TR

IAL

LIMIT

ED

TOTH

EIN

TE

RP

RE

TA

TIO

NO

FTH

ER

EN

EW

AL

LAN

GU

AG

EA

ND

RE

LAT

ED

MA

TT

ER

S.

24

A.

ThereIs

No

Basis

ForG

insberg’sR

equestForAN

ewT

rialOn

Com

pensatoryD

amages.

24

B.

TheT

rialCourt,N

otThisC

ourt,S

houldC

onsiderG

insberg’sN

ewA

ndD

isputedE

xtrinsicE

videnceA

rguments

InThe

FirstInstance.26

11

TA

BLE

OF

CO

NT

EN

TS

(continued)

Page

III.TH

EP

ER

MA

NE

NT

iNJU

NC

TIO

NF

AILS

AS

AM

AT

TE

RO

FLA

W.

30

A.

TheT

rialCourtA

busedIts

Discretion

By

IssuingA

nInjunction

ThatIsN

otPracticable

BecauseItR

equires80-Plus

YearsO

fCourtS

upervision.31

B.

TheT

rialCourtA

busedIts

Discretion

By

IssuingA

nInjunction

ThatGives

Ginsberg

More

Rights

ThanShe

Has

UnderThe

ConservatorLease.

31

IV.

IFG

AM

SO

NP

RE

VA

ILSO

NT

HE

INT

ER

PR

ET

AT

ION

OF

THE

LEA

SE

’SR

EN

EW

AL

LAN

GU

AG

E,

TH

EN

HE

RS

EC

TION

998O

FFER

MU

ST

BE

RE

CO

NS

IDE

RE

D.

35

A.

Overview

.35

B.

AS

ection998

OfferM

ayP

roperlyInclude

Multiple

Conditions.

36

C.G

amson

Was

NotR

equiredTo

TenderSeparate

Section

998O

ffersTo

Ginsberg

And

Eden.37

1.G

amson’s

join

tofferwas

properbecauseG

insbergand

Eden

areco-tenants.

37

2.G

amson’s

join

toffer

was

properbecauseG

insbergand

Eden

arem

anied.38

CR

OS

S-R

ES

PO

ND

EN

T’SB

RIE

F40

ST

AT

EM

EN

TO

FFA

CTS

40

A.

TheC

onservatorLease’sLim

itationsO

nG

amson’s

Repair

Obligations.

40

B.

Ginsberg

PresentsN

oE

videnceO

fLostBusinessA

ttributableTo

Water

Intrusion.43

C.D

uringT

rial,The

CourtE

xcludesE

videnceO

fWhy

Ganison

Believed

TheC

onservatorLeaseE

xpiredIn

2006.44

111

TA

BL

EO

FC

ON

TE

NT

S(continued)

Page

D.

TheJury

Aw

ards$49,100

InC

ompensatory

Dam

ages,Less

ThanA

TenthO

fWhatG

insbergS

ought—B

utA

lmostE

ightTimes

ThatAm

ountinP

unitiveD

amages.

47

AR

GU

ME

NT

48

GIN

SB

ER

GD

OE

SN

OT

SE

EK

,A

ND

CO

ULD

NE

VE

RB

EE

NT

ITLE

DTO

,PU

NIT

IVE

DA

MA

GE

SB

AS

ED

ON

TH

EJU

RY

’SB

RE

AC

HO

FC

ON

TRA

CT

FIND

1NG

S.48

A.

AB

reachO

fContract,

Even

IfWillfb

lOrM

alicious,C

annotSupportA

Punitive

Dam

agesA

ward.

48

B.

BecauseItIs

An

Implied

ContractualTerm

,AB

reachO

fTheC

ovenantOfQ

uietEnjoym

entCannotS

upportA

Punitive

Dam

agesA

ward.

48

II.G

1NS

BE

RG

’SM

AD

E-U

PC

LAIM

—”1N

TE

NT

ION

AL

INT

ER

FE

RE

NC

EW

ITH

US

EO

FP

RE

MIS

ES

”—IS

NO

TA

CO

GN

IZA

BLE

TOR

TA

ND

PR

OV

IDE

SN

OB

AS

ISFO

RA

PU

NIT

IVE

DA

MA

GE

SA

WA

RD

.50

A.

TheT

rialCourtP

roperlyR

ejectedG

insberg’sA

ttempt

ToR

ecastHer

ContractualC

laimFor

Breach

OfQ

uietE

njoymentA

sA

Tort.50

1.A

simple

breachofcontractalm

ostnevergives

riseto

tortliability.50

2.G

insberg’spurported

tortamounts

toa

garden-variety

contractclaimalleging

breachofquiet

enjoyment.

52

B.

Ginsberg’s

Reliance

On

CasesA

ddressingThe

WrongffilE

victionO

fResidentialTenants

FailsTo

SupportH

erC

ontentionThatThere

Exists

AT

ortFor

TheB

reachO

fQuietE

njoymentIn

TheC

omm

ercialContext.

55

I.The

gravamen

ofG

insberg’scross-appealis

hernew

theorythatshe

was

wrongfully

evicted.55

iv

TA

BL

EO

FC

ON

TE

NT

S(continued)

Page

2.Because

Ginsberg

hasnotshow

nthatshe

reliedon

aw

rongfiilevictiontheory

inthe

trialcourt,thisC

ourtshouldnotconsiderit.

57

C.E

venA

ssuming

ThatThereE

xistsA

Claim

ForTheW

rongfulEviction

OfA

Com

mercialTenant,

Ginsberg

FailedTo

Establish

ItB

yP

roogJury

Instructions,Or

SpecialVerdict.

59

1.G

insbergdid

notallegeor

establishthatshe

was

evicted.59

2.The

juryw

asnotinstructed

onw

rongfuleviction.60

3.The

jury’sspecialverdictm

adeno

findingsthat

would

supportaclaim

forw

rongfuleviction.61

D.

TheT

rialCourtP

roperlyR

eliedO

nE

rlichand

Butler-R

uppTo

Conclude

ThatGinsberg

Could

NotR

ecoverTortD

amages

On

Her

Breach

Of

ContractC

laim.

64

III.A

SA

MA

TT

ER

OF

PU

BLIC

PO

LICY

,P

UN

ITIV

ED

AM

AG

ES

SH

OU

LDN

OT

BE

AV

AIL

AB

LE

FOR

THE

BR

EA

CH

OF

THE

CO

VE

NA

NT

OF

QU

IET

EN

JOY

ME

NT

INA

CO

MM

ER

CIA

LLE

AS

E.

65

A.

Even

IfPunitive

Dam

agesW

ereA

vailableForThe

Breach

OfThe

CovenantO

fQuietE

njoyment,They

Would

BeInappropriate

InThe

Com

mercialC

ontext.65

B.

Ginsberg’s

California

Case

LawD

oesN

otSupport

HerP

osition.68

C.

Ginsberg’s

Out-O

f-State

Authority

Does

NotS

upportH

erP

osition.70

v

TA

BL

EO

FC

ON

TE

NT

S(continued)

Page

IV.

THIS

CO

UR

TS

HO

ULD

AF

FIR

MTH

EO

RD

ER

ST

RIK

ING

TH

EP

UN

ITIV

ED

AM

AG

ES

VE

RD

ICT

EV

EN

AS

SU

MIN

GT

HA

TG

INS

BE

RG

PLE

AD

ED

AN

DP

RO

VE

DTO

RTIO

US

CO

ND

UC

TB

YG

AM

SO

N.

72

A.

TheSpecialV

erdictFailsTo

SupportA

Punitive

Dam

agesA

ward.

72

1.A

sa

mailer

ofconstitutionaldue

process,punitivedam

agesm

ustbeara

reasonablerelationship

tocom

pensatorydam

ages.72

2.Because

thespecialverdictdoes

notdistinguishbetw

eendam

agesaw

ardedforbreach

ofcontract

andtort,

itisim

possibleto

determine

whetherthe

ratioofpunitive

damages

tocom

pensatorytort

damages

satisfiesdue

process.73

a.O

nlytortdam

agesm

aybe

consideredin

assessingw

hetherpunitivedam

agesare

constitutionallyexcessive.

73

b.The

punitivedam

agesaw

ardfails

becausethere

isno

specialverdictfmding

thatG

amson’s

purported“intentional

interference”dam

agedG

insberg.74

c.The

punitivedam

agesaw

ardviolates

dueprocess

becausethe

lump-sum

compensatory

damages

verdictprecludesm

eaningfuljudicialreviewofthe

proportionalityofthe

award.

77

B.

Punitive

Dam

agesC

ouldN

otBeA

warded

InLight

OfG

amson’s

Well-Founded

Beliefs

ThatSheW

asC

omplying

With

HerR

epairO

bligationsA

ndThat

Ginsberg

Was

Holding

Over.

79

1.P

unitivedam

agescannotattach

where

thedefendanthad

aw

ell-foundedbeliefthather

conductwas

proper.79

vi

TA

BL

EO

FC

ON

TE

NT

S(continued)

Page

2.A

sa

matteroflaw

,G

amson

hada

reasonablebasis

forasserting

thatGinsberg’s

leaseexpired

inA

pril2006and

thatshew

asa

holdovertenant.81

a.G

amson’s

interpretationofthe

renewal

languagew

asreasonable.

81

b.G

amson’s

interpretationofthe

renewal

languagecannotsupportpunitive

damages

asamatteroflaw

.83

3.The

trialcourt’serroneous

exclusionofevidence

of

Gam

son’sgood

faithentitles

hertoa

newtrial.

85

C.E

venIfP

unitiveD

amages

Could

Be

Aw

arded,TheyM

ustBe

ReassessedIfThe

CourtA

greesThat

Ginsberg’s

LeaseE

xpiredIn

Ap

ril2006.88

V.

THE

$385,000P

UN

ITIV

ED

AM

AG

ES

AW

AR

DIS

CO

NS

TIT

UT

ION

ALLY

EX

CE

SS

IVE

EV

EN

IFTH

EF

ULL

$49,100C

OM

PE

NS

ATO

RY

DA

MA

GE

SA

WA

RD

ISA

TT

RIB

UT

AB

LETO

GIN

SB

ER

G’S

PU

RP

OR

TED

“INT

EN

TIO

NA

LIN

TE

RF

ER

EN

CE

”C

LAIM

.89

CO

NC

LUS

ION

93

CE

RT

IFIC

AT

EO

FC

OM

PLIA

NC

E95

vii

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BL

EO

FA

UT

HO

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IES

FE

DE

RA

LC

AS

ES

Page

.8MW

ofN

orthA

merica

v.G

ore(1996)

517U

.S.

55972

Ca4fbrnia

v.Altus

FinanceLA

.(9th

Cir.

2008)540

F.3d992

74,75

Inre

Exxon

Valdez(9th

Cir.

2001)270

F.3d1215

78

Honda

Motor

Co.,Ltd.v.

Oberg

(1994)512

U.S

.41577

Morgan

Guaranty

TrustCo.ofN

Y.

v.Am

ericanSavings

&Loan

Association

(9thC

ir.1986)

804F.2d

148784

StateFarm

MutualA

utomobile

InsuranceCo.

v.C

ampbell

(2003)538

U.S

.408

72,78,89,

90

Waits

v.Frito-Lay,

Inc.(9th

Cit

1992)978

F.2d1093

84

ST

AT

EC

AS

ES

Aas

v.Superior

Court

(2000)24

Cal.4th

62751

Am

ericanM

odernH

ome

InsuranceCo.

v.Fahmian

(2011)194

Cal.A

pp.4th162

72

Am

erigraphics,In

cv.M

ercutyC

asualtyCo.

(2010)182

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Andrew

sv.M

obileA

ireEstates

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pp.4th578

48,53,

54,55,

60

Antounian

v.LouisV

uittonM

alletier(2010)

189C

al.App.4th

43884

viii

TA

BLE

OF

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TH

OR

ITIE

S(C

ont’d)

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AT

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AS

ES

Page

Applied

Equipm

entCorp.

v.LittonS

audiArabia

Ltd.(1994)

7C

aI.4th503

48,66,

67

Apra

v.Aureguy

(1961)55

Cal.2d

82733

Arias

v.Katella

Townhouse

Hom

eowners

Association,

Inc.(2005)

127C

al.App.4th

84737

Barkettv.B

rucato(1953)

122C

al.App.2d

26455,

56

Barlow

v.Frink

(1915)171

CaL

16528

Barnettv.F

irstNat.Insurance

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merica

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Beckerv.

Subm

arineO

ilCo.(1921)

55C

al.App.

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5,6,8,10,

16

Beckettv.

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ofP

arisThy

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aI.2d633

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Behr

v.Redm

ond(2011)

193C

aI.App.4th

51772

Bellv.M

ason(2011)

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al.App.4th

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BeneficialF

ireand

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&Co.,Inc.

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51785

Berg

v.Darden

(2004)120

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pp.4th721

37

Blake

v.Arp

(1919)180

Cal.

14461

x

TA

BLE

OF

AU

TH

OR

ITIE

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ont’d)

ST

AT

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AS

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Page

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pp.4th1220

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acaire(1958)

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pp.4th1673

74,75,77

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ofH

opeN

at.M

edicalCenterv.

Genentech,

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City

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untingtonB

eachv.S

uperiorC

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Daniels

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ason(1911)17

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19

x

TA

BL

EO

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AS

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PageE.

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&Co.,

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erced(1987)

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v.Parsons

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xvii

TA

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OF

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ST

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EC

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ES

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ST

AT

ES

TA

TU

TE

S

CivilC

ode

Section

71893

Section

164113

Section

192748

Section

194164

Section3294

48,73

Section

330051,66

Code

ofC

ivilProcedure

Section

4324

Section

31221

Section

33716

xviii

TA

BL

EO

FA

UT

HO

RIT

IES

(Cont’d)

ST

AT

ES

TA

TU

TE

SPage

Section

62462

Section

99835,36,37,38,39

Section

106021

Section

116122

Section

185833

Section

186414,

15,16

Evidence

Code

Section

77682,

87

Fam

ilyC

ode

Section

76039

InsuranceC

ode

Section

38115

Rev.

&Tax.

Code

Section

1191114

OT

HE

R

CA

CIN

o.2021

52,60

xix

INT

RO

DU

CT

ION

It’sa

classicdiversion

strategy:E

venthough

everyissue

inboth

Gam

son’sappealand

Ginsberg’s

cross-appealturnson

purequestions

of

law,

Ginsberg

devotesm

uchofherbriefto

irrelevantpersonalattackson

Gam

son.G

insbergapparently

justifiedincluding

theseattacks

onthe

basis

thattheyare

relevanttoherargum

entsthatparts

ofthe

trialcourt’s

injunction(R

B/X

AO

B70-74)

andthe

jury’spunitive

damages

determination

(RB

/XA

OB

82-87)are

supportedby

substantialevidence.

Butthose

arguments

havenothing

todo

with

thisappeal:

Gam

sonhas

not

challengedeitherdeterm

ination—orany

otherjuryorthaicourt

determination—

forlackofsubstantialevidence.

Thatisbecause,though

sheprofoundly

disagreesw

ithG

insberg’sevidence

andthe

jury’sand

trial

court’sinterpretation

ofit,

Gam

sonrecognizes

thatbasicrules

ofappellate

lawinsulate

themfrom

review.

Ginsberg’s

strategydoes

notwork.

Thelaw

isw

hatitis—and

itis

definitelynotw

hatGinsberg

saysitis.

Correctapplication

oflaw

requires

reversalofthe

judgment,

exceptasto

theorderstriking

punitivedam

ages.

Gam

son’sA

ppeal.G

amson’s

appealisnotcom

plicated.U

nder

California

law,iflease

renewallanguage

isatalluncertain,then

thecourt

mustrejecta

tenant’sclaim

ofa

perpetualleaseand

construethe

leaseto

conferonlya

singlerenew

al.Thus,

contraryto

Ginsberg’s

contention,

Gam

sonneed

notshowthatthe

ConservatorLease’s

renewallanguage

unambiguously

confersa

singlerenew

al.G

amson

prevailsas

am

atter

oflaw

solong

asthe

ConservatorLease’s

renewallanguage

is

ambiguous—

anditis.

That’sexactly

whatthe

thaijudgew

hoinitially

presidedoverthis

casefound

when

hedenied

summ

aryjudgm

ent,saying

1

thattherenew

allanguage“show

[s],atbest,thatthere

isam

biguityas

to

whether

anoption

oroptions

were

grantedto

thetenant.”

(2A

A281.)

Ginsberg’s

torturedconstruction

ofthe

ConservatorLease

isnot

credible:She

would

havethe

Courttransform

them

ostbasicstationery-

storeshort-term

formlease

intoa

perpetuallease.Precedentand

policy

precludethatresult.

IftheC

ourtchoosesto

breakw

ithprecedentrequiring

entryof

judgmentin

Gam

son’sfavor,itshould

reversefor

anew

trial:G

insberg

cannotdemonstrate

thattheC

onservatorLease—view

edas

aw

hole—

unambiguously

confersperpetualrenew

alsas

am

atteroflaw

.A

ccordingly,

thetrialcourterred

byentering

judgmentin

Ginsberg’s

favorwithout

atrial.

On

remand,the

trialcourtmustalso

reassessthe

portionsofthe

judgmentissuing

theperm

anentinjunctionand

awarding

Ginsberg

attorney’sfees

andcosts.

Ginsberg’s

Cross-A

ppeal.The

cross-appealtacitlyrecognizes

that

thetrialcourtproperly

rejectedG

insberg’stheory

forrecoveringpunitive

damages—

thatis,thetrialcourtproperly

ruledthata

breachofthe

implied

covenantofquietenjoym

entcannotsupportpunitivedam

agesand

thatthere

isno

suchtortas

alandlord’s

“intentionalinterferencew

ithuse

of

property.”Instead,

Ginsberg

urgesan

entirelynew

theory:w

rongfhl

eviction.A

ccordingto

Ginsberg,a

handthlofcases

involvingresidential

tenantsw

hovacated

theirleased

premises

showthatthere

existsan

independentclaimfor

“tortious”breach

ofquietenjoym

entinthe

comm

ercialcontextandthatthe

juryfound

Gam

sonliable

forthat“tort.”

Ginsberg

isw

rongon

everylevel:

Sheis

notaresidentialtenant,she

did

notvacatethe

premises,

andshe

was

notevicted,constructively

or

2

otherwise.

Equally

important,

Ginsberg

neveralleged

aclaim

forw

rongful

eviction,and

theju

ryneitherw

asinstructed

onitnorm

adeany

findingsthat

would

supportsucha

claim.

Buteven

ifG

insberghad

pleadedand

provena

viabletort,the

Court

mustnevertheless

affirmthe

orderstrikingpunitive

damages

becauseitfails

topass

constitutionalmuster.

Becausethe

damages

specialverdictformlum

psall

compensatory

damages

together,itisim

possibleto

know

whetherthe

juryaw

ardedany

tortdamages—

aprerequisite

forpunitivedam

ages.

•E

venassum

ingthe

jury

awarded

some

amounto

ftort

damages,the

unitarydam

agesverdictform

precludesthe

Courtfrom

conductingthe

requisiteindependentreview

of

theproportionality

ofthe

punitiveand

tortdamages.

•E

venifthe

entire$49,100

compensatory

damages

award

were

attributableto

acognizable

tort,the

$385,000punitive

damages

award

would

beconstitutionally

excessive:For

multiple

reasons,the8:1

ratiobetw

eenthe

punitiveand

compensatory

awards

isunsupported

andunsupportable.

Accordingly,this

Courtshould

affirmthe

orderstrilcingthe

punitive

damages

award.

3

AP

PE

LLAN

T’S

RE

PLY

BR

IEF

AR

GU

ME

NT

I.

GA

MS

ON

ISE

NT

ITL

ED

TO

JUD

GM

EN

TB

EC

AU

SE

TH

EC

ON

SE

RV

AT

OR

LEA

SE

DO

ES

NO

TC

ON

FE

R

AP

ER

PE

TU

AL

RIG

HT

OF

RE

NE

WA

L.

A.

TheC

onservatorLease

Confers

AS

ingleR

enewalT

hat

Expired

InA

pril2006.

1.G

insbergis

notentitledto

atria

lonthe

meaning

of

theC

onservatorLease’s

ambiguous

renewal

languagebecause,

asa

matter

oflaw,

anam

biguous

renewalclause

confersonly

asingle

renewal.

Ginsberg

groundsherargum

entson

am

isunderstandingofC

alifornia

lawgoverning

purportedlyperpetualleases.

According

toG

insberg,the

Courtm

ustaffirmthe

trialcourt’s

misinterpretation

ofthe

Conservator

Lease’srenew

allanguagebecause

“Gam

sonhas

notprovidedany

analysis(norcould

she)as

tohow

theLease

couldbe

readunam

biguouslyin

herfavor.”(R

B/X

AO

B63,italics

added;

seealso

RB

/XA

OB

66.)B

utGam

sonhas

nosuch

burden.She

needonly

showthatthe

leaseis

ambiguous,and

shehas

donethat.

(AO

B24-40.)

“[L]easesw

hichm

ayhave

beenintended

tobe

renewable

inperpetuity,~fat

alluncertainin

thatregard,w

illbeconstrued

asim

portingbutone

renewal.”

(Beckerv.

Subm

arineO

ilCo.(1921)

55C

al.App.

698,700

(Becker),italics

added;seealso

AO

B18-19.)

4

Forthe

same

reason,G

insbergis

alsow

rongin

claiming

thatshehas

an“absolute

right”to

presentevidenceata

retrial.(R

BIX

AO

B62.)

She

hasno

“right”to

aretrial,because

noam

ountofextrinsic

evidencecan

injectclarityinto

theC

onservatorLease’sfaciallyam

biguousrenew

al

language.(See

pp.10-16,post;A

OB

24-40.)A

sB

eckerrequires,theC

ourt

shouldinstead

“construe[]”the

ConservatorLease

“asim

portingbutone

renewal”

(55C

aLApp.

atp.700)

andenterjudgm

entthatGinsberg’s

lease

expiredin

Ap

ril2006,atthe

endofherone

andonly

renewal,and

shehas

beena

holdovertenanteversince

(see4

AA

815,¶3;4

AA

820,¶20;

4AA

823,~J1).2.

Contrary

toG

insberg’scontention,

California—

likevirtu

ally

everyother

jurisd

iction

thathas

consideredthe

question—disfavors

perpetual

leases.

Ginsberg

concedes,as

shem

ust,thatBecker—

which

isthe

only

California

decisionthathas

interpretedpurportedly

perpetuallease

language—controls

theinterpretation

ofthe

ConservatorLease’s

renewal

language.(R

B/X

AO

B43.)

Shealso

concedes,as

shem

ust,thatunder

Becker,

California

courtsw

illenforcea

purportedlyperpetuallease

onlyif

therenew

allanguageis

clearandunm

istakable.(R

B/X

AO

B43,

citing

Becker,supra,

55C

al.App.

atp.700.)

BecauseB

eckeristhe

onlyC

aliforniaauthority

addressingthe

interpretationoflease

languagethatis

ambiguous

butpurportedlyperpetual,

theopening

briefpresenteda

thoroughsurvey

ofrelevantauthority

from

otherjurisdictions—authority

thatoverwhelm

inglym

inorsB

ecker.

(AQ

B20-29

&lb.

14,19.)

Ginsberg

ticksthrough

much

ofthis

authority

5

withoutseriously

tryingto

distinguishany

ofit.

(Com

pareibid.

with

RB

IXA

OB

53-57.)H

eronly

efforttodiscreditthe

majority

ruleis

todirect

theC

ourttothe

two

outliercases

thatwe

identifiedin

theopening

brief:

Pope

v.Lee(2005)

152N

.H.

296[879

A.2d

735](P

ope),and

Pechenik

v.

Baltim

ore&

Ohio

Railroad

Co.(1974)

157W

.Va.

895[205

S.E

.2d813]

(Pechenik).

(RB

IXA

OB

53-54;seeA

OB

24,fIt12.)

ThatGinsberg

could

fmd

noothercases

reflectingthe

minority

viewconfirm

sourresearch:

Thesearen’tjustm

inoritycases,they

arethe

onlym

inoritycases.

And

not

eventhey

supportGinsberg’s

position.

Ginsberg

suggeststhatin

Pope,supra,

879A

.2d735,the

New

Ham

pshireSuprem

eC

ourtuphelda

perpetualleasew

ithterm

s

analogousto

thosein

theC

onservatorLease.

(RB

/XA

OB

54.)Thatis

incorrect.P

opespecifically

explainedthatit

didnotaddress

aperpetual

lease—instead,P

opeconsidered

therightto

automatic

renewals:

“On

appeal,theparties

donotchallenge

thetrialcourt’s

rulingthatthe

1998lease

agreementdid

notconferuponthe

defendanttherightto

perpetualrenewals.”

(879A

.2datp.740;

seealso

Pope

v.Lee(N

.H.

2005)

885A

.2d427,427-428

[ingranting

reconsiderationin

part,courtclarified

thattheonly

issueaddressed

was

therightto

automatic

renewals

without

theneed

foradditionalw

ritings,nota

perpetuallease].)

Even

ifPope’s

discussionofautom

aticrenew

alrightscould

be

analogizedto

adisputed

perpetuallease,Ginsberg

stillgetsP

opew

rong.

Avery

recentNew

Ham

pshireSuprem

eC

ourtopinionexplains

theflaw

sin

Ginsberg’s

analysisofP

ope.W

inecellarFarm

,Inc.

v.Hibbard

(July21,

2011)_N

.H.

_[2011W

L2976753,

at*1,7

](Winecellar),

considered

alease

statingthatthe

tenantcouldcultivate

andharvesthay

onthe

6

landlord’sproperty

“inperpetuity.”

Winecellarheld

thatdespitethe

“inperpetuity”

language,thelease

didnotestablish

adisfavored

perpetual

leaseholdin

viewofthe

totalityofcircum

stances.(Id.

at*7..8.)For

example,as

istrue

here,theW

inecellartenant’s

considerationforthe

propertyw

asm

eagerand

thetenantm

adeno

showing

thata“bona

fide

purchaser”seeking

tobuy

thefarm

“would

bew

illingto

doso

inlighto

f

theexistence

ofthe

Haying

Agreem

ent.”(Id.

at*~

[tenantrendered

servicesin

exchangeforuse

ofproperty

butpaidno

rentorpropertytaxes].)

And

Winecellar’s

concernsaboutrestraints

onalienation

areequally

valid

here.(Id.

at*78

)

Winecellar

distinguishedPope:

Unlike

Winecellar,the

Pope

lease

“establisheda

leasepaym

entbasedon

theapplicable

consumerprice

index,

andincluded

clausesgoverning

rentalincreases,adjustm

entsand

taxes.”

(Id.at*8,

citingP

ope,supra,atpp.737-741.)

Forexam

ple,theP

opelease

expresslyprovided

foran

automatic

annualrentincreaseof3.5%

.

(Pope,supra,879

A.2d

atp.739.)

Pope

concludedthatthe

dependable

income

streamm

ightbeattractive

toa

prospectivepurchaser.

(Winecellar,

supra,at*8,citing

Pope,supra,atp.

745.)B

utthat’snottrue

inour

case.

Although

theC

onservatorLease

doeshave

arentescalation

clausetied

to

theC

onsumerP

riceIndex,

it’scapped

atanum

bersolow

asto

renderit

almostvalueless

tothe

landlord—and

eventhatm

eagerrentincreasekicks

inonly

onceevery

fiveyears,notannually

asin

Pope.

(4A

A823,¶

1.)

Thatmeans

thatGinsberg

ism

uchm

orelike

theW

inecellartenantthanthe

Pope

tenant:H

ergrossly

under-marketrentdestroys

theproperty’s

comm

ercialvalue.(See

4R

T463-464;butsee

5R

T787-788

[sustaining

objectionsto

evidenceregarding

fairmarketrent].)

7

Ginsberg’s

relianceon

Pechenik

isflaw

ed,too.(R

BIX

AO

B53-54.)

Ginsberg

omits

acornerstone

ofFechenik’s

reasoning:“W

estVirginia

law

disfavorsperpetualleases,butdoubçfulquestions

willusually

beconstrued

infavor

ofthe

lessee.”(205

S.E

.2datp.

815,italicsadded.)

California

law

isexplicitly

contrary:U

nlikeW

estVirginia,

ourcourts“w

ill”construe

ambiguous—

butpurportedlyperpetual—

leaserenew

allanguage“as

importing

butonerenew

al.”(B

ecker,supra,55C

aLApp.

atp.700,italics

added.)

3.G

insberg’sreliance

onC

aliforniadecisions

that

considerthe

ruleagainstperpetuities

ism

isplaced.

Also

off-baseis

Ginsberg’s

discussionofB

eckerand

California

casesthatanalyze

perpetualleasesunderthe

ruleagainstperpetuities.

(RB

IXA

OB

36-38,43-44.)

First,G

amson

never“assert[ed]”

thatBeckerdoes

not“applyto

this

case.”(R

B/X

AO

B43,

citingA

OB

44-45.)To

thecontrary,

Gam

son

providedthe

Courtw

iththe

factualcontextunderlyingthe

disputein

Becker

andexplained

thattherule

announcedin

Beckernotonly

governs

(or“applies”)here,butdictates

thatGam

sonprevailas

am

atteroflaw

.

(AO

B19,20,43-46.)

Where

Beckerdoes

not“apply”is

inits

factual

analysisregarding

theparticularlease

consideredthere.

Butthat’s

because

offactualdifferences

between

Becker’s

oil-and-gaslease

andthe

comm

ercialleasehere—

notdifferencesin

legalprinciples.

Second,Ginsberg

misunderstands

caselaw

interpretingthe

significanceofB

ecker’soil-and-gas

leasecontext.

(RB

/XA

OB

38&

43,

citingFisher

v.Parsons

(1963)213

Cal.A

pp.2d829,

841(Fisher).)

The

8

citedportion

ofFisher

concernsonly

thequestion

ofw

hetherthereis

adifference

between

oil-and-gasleases

andotherleasesforpurposes

of

applyingthe

ruleagainstperpetuities,

anissue

notpresenthere(Fisher

rejectedapplication

ofthe

ruleto

leases).(213

Cal.A

pp.2datp.

841.)

More

tothe

point,Fisherleftno

doubtaboutitsholding

by“em

phasiz[ing]”

that“we

donotdealw

ithan

optionforperpetualrenew

alhere.”(Ibid.)

Finally,

Ginsberg’s

relianceon

two

additionalrule-against

perpetuitiescases

issim

ilarlym

isplaced:S

haverv.C

lanton(1994)

26C

al.App.4th

568(Shaver)

andE

psteinv.Zahloute

(1950)99

Cal.A

pp.2d

738(E

pstein).(R

B/X

AO

B36-38,43-44.)

Throughouttheseproceedings,

Ginsberg

hasclaim

edthatS

haveris

controllingauthority

becausethat

decisionsupposedly

consideredand

rejecteda

challengeto

alease’s

perpetualrenewallanguage.

(See,e.g.,R

B/X

AO

B36-38,43-44;

1A

A196,

239,247-250;2

AA

272-274,333;2

RT

B-4,B

-b—B

-I1,5.)That’s

just

notso.A

sS

haverexplained,

“[altissue

isw

hethera

leaseam

endment

which

providesforperpetualoptions

torenew

isvoid

becauseitviolates

the

rule[againstperpetuities].”

(26C

al.App.4th

atp.571,italics

added.)

Epstein

ruledon

thesam

eissue.

(99C

al.App.2d

atp.739.)

Neither

case

interpretedlease

language:The

perpetualnatureofthe

leasesw

asa

given

ineach.

Nonetheless,G

insbergled

thetrialcourtastray

byclaim

ingthat

Shaverupheld

aperpetualrenew

alclausebased

onan

analysisofthe

lease’slanguage.

(E.g.,2R

T18-19,24,33-34,37,40-42.)

9

4.T

akenas

aw

hole,theC

onservatorLeaseevinces

anintentto

createa

short-termcom

merciallease.

Itslanguage

isinconsistentw

ithan

intenttocreate

aperpetuallease.

a.G

insbergcannotshow

thattheC

onservator

Leaseis

unambiguously

perpetual.

Ginsberg

arguesthatthe

Conservator

Leaseis

unambiguously

perpetual.(R

B/X

AO

B32-43.)

Her

arguments

arenotpersuasive.

Plain

language.The

renewallanguage

doesnotbearthe

hallmarks

ofan

unambiguous

renewalclause.

(SeeR

B/X

AO

B32-33.)

Forexam

ple,

theprovision

inB

ecker—the

onlyon-pointC

aliforniadecision—

is

markedly

different.There,the

leasegave

thetenantthe

“rightofrenew

al

fora

fbrtherterm

often

yearsatthe

endofsuch

term,

oratthe

endofany

subsequenttermfo

rw

hichit

may

berenew

ed.”(55

Cal.A

pp.atp.

699,

italicsadded.)

TheC

onservatorLease

doesnotreferto

a“subsequent”

or

laterrentalterm.

Itsays

onlythatG

insberghas

therightto

renew:

“Tenant

shallhavethe

optionto

extendthe

termofthe

leasefor

additionalfiveyear

periodsupon

thesam

eterm

sand

conditionscontained

inthe

lease.”(4

AA

823,¶1.)

Although

thislanguage

mightsuggestpluralrenew

als,itisnot

nearlyas

explicitasB

ecker’sreference

to“any

subsequentterm”

andalso

lacksotherindicia

ofperpetualleases.

Thatisw

hythe

trialjudgew

ho

initiallypresided

overthiscase

(JudgeFerns)

foundthe

renewallanguage

ambiguous.

(2A

A28

1-283.)

Crossed-outlease

provisions.G

insbergsuggests

thatcrossingout

some

ofthe

preprintedlease

provisionsevinces

anintentto

create

10

aperpetuallease.

(RB

/XA

OB

33-35.)H

ardly.C

rossingoutprovisions

saysnothing

abouttheam

biguityin

therenew

allanguage—itshow

sonly

thattheparties

signeda

leasew

ithterm

sdiffering

fromthe

stationery-store

preprintedlease

terms.

Stationery-store

form~cboilerplate

terms.

Ginsberg

arguesthat

some

ofthe

mostboilerplate

terms

ofa

stationery-storelease

formevince

anintentto

createa

perpetuallease.(R

B/X

AO

B35,41,42.)

Forexam

ple,

shesays

withoutexplanation

thattheuse

ofthe

definedtenm

s“Landlord”

and“T

enant”(4

AA

815)instead

ofthe

parties’propernames

“expresses

theintentthatthe

Partiesagreed

thatGinsberg

andE

denshallhave

aperpetualrenew

alright”(R

B/X

AO

B3

5%

1B

utifthisw

erecorrect,

every

formlease

would

createthe

disfavoredand

rareperpetuallease.

That

cannotbe—and

isnot—

right.

Capitalim

provements.

TheC

onservatorLease

statesthatG

insberg

loanedG

amson

$11,950for

capitalimprovem

ents;G

insbergtestified

that

thetotalw

asaround

$30,000.(4

AA

823,¶3;

3R

T238.)

Regardless

of

theam

ount,theC

onservatorLeaseentitled

Ginsberg

todeductfrom

herrent

notonlythe

specified$11,950

butalsoany

additionalamounts

spenton

“[o]thercriticalrepairs.”

(4A

.A823,¶

3;butsee3

RT

239:22-240:9

Ginsberg’s

otherexamples

ofprovisions

purportedlyevincing

anintent

tocreate

aperpetuallease

aresim

ilarlyflaw

ed,including

herrelianceon

standardlease

provisionsaboutheirs

andassigns

andsubordination.

(RB

/XA

OB

35,42;4A

A819-821,¶~J

14,18,

19.)A

nd,contrary

toher

contention,apurchase

option(like

theone

includedin

theC

onservatorLease,4

AA

824,¶6)

iscom

mon

andit

doesnotreflecta

“long-terminterestin

theLeased

Prem

ises.”(R

BIX

AO

B41;

seeS

pauldingv.

Yovino

Young(1947)

30C

al.2d138,

141[purchase

optionis

“comm

onlyfound

ina

lease”].)

11

[Ginsberg

apparentlyonly

tookthe

benefitofthe

initial$11,950].)In

any

case,the$11,950

loanw

asnothing

more

thana

rentreductionfor

eight

months.

(See4

AA

823,¶3

[$11,950loan

tobe

offsetby$1,500

monthly

rentreductions].)Since

Ginsberg

was

reimbursed

forthe

$11,950loan

throughthe

rentreductions,hercapitalinvestm

entwas

atmost$18,050,not

$30,000.YetG

insbergclaim

sthatthe

veryshort-term

$11,950loan

plus

thealleged

$18,050capitalinvestm

entdemonstrate

thatshew

ouldnothave

agreedto

alease

conferringa

singlerenew

al,especiallygiven

thatthe

Rubinfeld

Leasew

ithG

amson’s

fatherconferred,

atmost,

abase

five-year

termplus

fivefive-year

options.(R

B/X

AO

B39-4

0j2

Theargum

ent

doesn’twork.

Forone

thing,G

insbergconcedes

thatsheundertook

the

$11,950w

orthofrepairs

beforesigning

theC

onservatorLease(3

RT

236:5-13,238:2-15;1

AA

46-47,¶flj7-12[firstam

endedcom

plaint);

RB

IXA

OB

39)—therefore,

hersupposed$11,950

loanw

asnotgiven

in

considerationforthe

ConservatorLease,butratherw

asgiven

while

the

Rubinfeld

Leasew

asstillin

effect.For

another,even

overlookingthis

faultyfactualprem

ise,Ginsberg’s

conclusionis

hardlyobvious

andit

certainlyis

notcompelling

evidenceofaperpetuallease.

Mostim

portantly,

herargumentdoes

nothingto

dispeltheC

onservatorLease’s

ambiguity

precludinga

perpetuallease.

2G

insbergm

isstates—yetagain—

Gam

son’sargum

ent,which

isthat

Ginsberg

isentitled

toonly

onerenew

alasa

matter

oflaw

.G

amson

doesnotargue

thattheC

onservatorLease

unambiguously

confersonly

asingle

renewal.

12

b.G

insberghas

notrebuttedG

amson’s

analysis

showing

thattheC

onservatorLease

takenas

aw

holeis

inconsistentwith

aperpetuallease.

Gam

sondem

onstratedthatthe

ConservatorLease

takenas

aw

holeis

inconsistentwith

aperpetualrenew

alright.(A

OB

24-40.)G

insberg’s

responses(R

BIX

AO

B44-49)

arefacially

unavailing.A

tmostthey

are

arguments—

andnotvery

goodones

(forinstance,the

suggestionthat“etc.”

issom

ehownotam

biguous,RB

/XA

OB

45)—w

hyG

amson’s

readingofthe

Leaseas

aw

holedoes

notnecessarilyestablish

thattheC

onservator

Lease’scannotbe

perpetual.B

utunlikeG

insberg,w

eacknow

ledgethatthe

ConservatorLease’s

renewallanguage

isam

biguousand

thattherenew

al

provisionm

ustbeinterpreted

inconjunction

with

allofthe

leaseterm

s.

(SeeC

iv.C

ode,§1641

[“The

whole

ofa

contractisto

betaken

together,so

asto

giveeffectto

everypart,ifreasonably

practicable,each

clausehelping

tointerpretthe

other”].)W

hileone

mightfm

dsom

eofthe

clausesw

e

discussin

aperpetuallease,

onew

ouldn’texpectto—and

collectivelyit

would

bealm

ostunthinkable.This

means

thatviewed

asa

whole,

the

ConservatorLease

cannotbeconstrued

asperpetual.

One

ofG

insberg’sargum

ents,however,

isw

rongas

am

atteroflaw

:

herargumentregarding

thepaym

entofdocum

entarytransfertaxes.

(RB

/XA

OB

49.)The

openingbriefexplained

thatunliketrue

long-term

leases,theC

onservatorLeasedoes

notallocateliability

fordocum

entary

transfertaxes.(A

OB

40.)G

insbergresponds

that“[d]ocumentary

transfer

taxesare

consideredrealproperty

taxesand

assessments”

andthatG

amson

isresponsible

forrealpropertytaxes

undertheC

onservatorLease.

(RB

/XA

OB

49.)N

otso:A

“[documentary]

transfertax[is]

atax

onthe

13

exerciseofthe

rightorprivilegeoftransferring

propertyand

notatax

on

realproperty.“

(City

ofH

untingtonB

eachv.

Superior

Court(1978)

78C

aLApp.3d

333,340,italicsadded.)

Ginsberg’s

authorityis

nottothe

contrary.Thr(fty

Corp.

v.C

ounty

ofL.A

.(1989)

210C

al.App.3d

881,884-886,held

thattheterm

“realty

sold”as

usedin

thedocum

entarytransfertax

statute(R

ev.&

Tax.C

ode,

§11911)

includeslong-term

leaseholds.Ifanything,

Thrjfty

illustratesw

hy

long-tennleases

allocateliability

fordocum

entarytransfertaxes:

The

creationofsuch

aleasehold

triggerssignificanttax

consequences.(Itis

unclearwhy

Ginsberg

citesE.

Gottschalk

&Co.,Inc.

v.C

ountyofM

erced

(1987)196

Cal.A

pp.3d1378,w

hichsays

nothingaboutdocum

entary

transfertaxes—itdoesn’teven

containthe

phrase.)

5.C

odeofC

ivilProcedure

section1864

doesnot

trump

them

orespecific

rulegoverning

the

interpretationofam

biguousrenew

allanguage

purportedlycreating

aperpetuallease.

Ginsberg

leadsoffherrespondent’s

briefbyresorting

toan

obscure

ruleofcontractconstruction:

Code

ofC

ivilProceduresection

1864

(section1864),w

hichapplies

“when

differentconstructionsofa

provision

areotherw

iseequally

proper”—in

otherwords,

ifotherrulesofcontract

constructiondo

notresolvean

ambiguity,

thenthe

ambiguous

termshould

beinterpreted

infavor

ofthe

partybenefitted

bythe

term.

(RB

/XA

OB

31-

14

32.)~B

yits

verylanguage,section

1864cannotsupplantthe

specificrule

thatambiguous

renewallanguage

isdeem

edto

conferonly

asingle

renewal.

Thatrulem

eansthatthere

areno

ambiguities

tobe

resolved:The

findingof

ambiguity

isitselfdispositive.

And

evenifthe

ambiguity

didhave

tobe

resolved,sectioh

1864w

ouldnotcom

einto

playunless

theestablished

rules

ofinterpretation

failed.(C

f.Troyk

v.Farmers

Group,

Inc.(2009)

171C

al.App.4th

1305,1332,lii.

15[“W

econclude

that(the)generalrule

of

constructionofcontracts

doesnotsupersede

them

orespecific

statutory

requirementfor

disclosurein

insurancepolicies

setforthin

(Insurance

Code)

section381,

subdivision(f)”].)

Buthere,they

donotfail—

they

negateany

perpetualinterpretation.

Thecase

Ginsberg

cites,Mitchellv.E

xhibitionFoods,Inc.

(1986)

184C

al.App.3d

1033,illustratessection

1864’slim

itedapplication.

Mitchelllooked

tosection

1864—w

hichitterm

ed“one

ofthe

lessfam

iliar

canonsofconstruction”—

onlybecause

them

eaningofthe

ambiguous

lease

termcould

notbenailed

down

bythe

provision’s“express

language”orthe

Section

1864states

infill:

“When

theterm

sofan

agreementhave

beenintended

ina

differentsenseby

thedifferentparties

toit,

thatsenseis

toprevailagainsteitherparty

inw

hichhe

supposedthe

otherunderstoodit,

andw

hendifferentconstructions

ofa

provisionare

otherwise

equallyproper,thatis

tobe

takenw

hichis

mostfavorable

tothe

partyin

whose

favortheprovision

was

made.”

15

“generalrules”ofcontractconstruction.

(184C

al.App.3d

atpp.1041-

1043.)~Our

caseis

different:Because

Beckercontrols

theinterpretation

of

theC

onservatorLease’s

ambiguous

renewallanguage,and

becauseother

rulesofconstruction

alsoapply,

section1864

isirrelevant.

B.

No

Statute

OfLim

itationsB

arsG

amson’s

Cross-A

ction

Seeking

Declaratory

ReliefO

nThe

Meaning

OfThe

Conservator

Lease’sR

enewalLanguage.

1.G

amson’s

declaratoryre

liefclaim

sare

governedby

afour-year

limitations

periodbecause

hercross-

actionarises

froma

disputeaboutthe

meaning

of

theC

onservatorLease’s

renewallanguage.

Thegravam

enofa

claimdictates

theoperative

limitations

period.

(SanF

ilippov.

Gr!fflths

(1975)51

Cal.A

pp.3d640,644-645.)

The

declaratoryjudgm

entclaims

atissuein

thisappealadd

upto

an“action

upon”the

meaning

ofthe

ConservatorLease’s

renewallanguage.

(Seegenerally

IA

A131-134,¶~

7-23.)The

four-yearlimitations

period

thereforegoverns.

(SeeC

odeC

iv.Proc.,§

337,subd.(1)

[“action(s)upon

anycontract,obligation

orliabilityfounded

uponan

instrumentin

writing”

mustbe

filedw

ithinfouryears

ofaccrualo

fclaim];M

aguirev.H

ibernia

‘~Ginsberg’s

relianceon

Wu

v.InterstateC

onsolidatedIndustries

(1991)226

Cal.A

pp.3d1511,is

misplaced.

Wu

didnothold

thatalease’s

renewal

languagem

ustalways

beinterpreted

inthe

tenant’sfavor

anditsaid

nothingaboutthe

interpretationofam

biguousrenew

allanguage.In

Wu

therew

asno

doubtthatthelease

conferredrenew

aloptions.W

usim

plyconsidered

thetenant’s

indisputablerightto

renewals

ininterpreting

thelease’s

rent-escalationclause.

(Id.atpp.

1514-1515.)

16

Savings&

LoanSoc.

(1944)23C

al.2d719,

733-734(M

aguire)[sam

e

limitations

periodgoverns

contractactionw

hetherpartyseeks

legalor

declaratoryrelief]

•)S

ButG

insbergclaim

sthata

three-yearlimitations

periodgoverns

becausethe

“nature’ofG

amson’s

claims

are[sic]

thatin1996

when

Gam

sonsigned

theC

onservatorLease,

Gam

son‘did

notintendto

create

optionsin

perpetuity.’(A

A132:22-25.)”

(RB

IXA

OB

64,citing1

AA

132,

¶15(b).)

Shecites

asingle

phrasefrom

thethird

amended

cross-complaint,

which

shetakes

outofcontextand

gramm

aticallyalters,

tocontend

thatthe

“nature”ofG

amson’s

cross-actionis

thatGainson

signedthe

Conservator

Leaseby

mistake

andthatshe

didnotintend

tocreate

aperpetuallease.

But

that’snotw

hatthecross-com

plaintalleges.Itsays,w

iththe

relevant

languageunderlined,

Cross-C

omplainant[G

amson]

contendsthatthe

Conservatorship

Leaseprovides

forone

only[sic]

renewalperiod

(which

was

exercisedin

2001and

expiredin

2006),andthatthe

Conservatorship

Leasedoes

notprovidefor,

andthe

nartiesdid

notintendto

create,

optionsin

perpetuity.

(1A

A132,¶

15(b),underliningadded.)

Incontext,

thephrase

hasnothing

todo

with

“mistake”—

itratheralleges

thattheparties

didnotagree

to

aperpetuallease.

Ginsberg’s

theoryofthe

cross-actionm

ightbeviable

ifthethird

amended

cross-complaintalleged

thattherenew

alclausew

as

~See

1A

A208:16-20

(Ginsberg

pleadeda

statuteoflim

itations

affirmative

defense).

17

unambiguously

perpetualbutthatGam

sonm

istakenlyagreed

tothat

unambiguous

clause.Thatis

notthegravam

enofG

amson’s

operative

pleadingand

Ginsberg’s

characterizationcannotbe

squaredw

ithany

reasonablereading

ofit.

Inany

case,thetussle

overthethree-yearor

four-

yearlimitations

periodis

notdecisive—the

realissuehere

isw

hen

Gam

son’scauses

ofaction

accrued:In

Ap

ril1996

when

theparties

signed

theC

onservatorLease,

orinA

pril2006

when

Ginsberg

breachedthe

ConservatorLease

byholding

over.

2.G

amson’s

declaratoryre

liefcauses

ofactiondid

not

accruew

henshe

signedthe

ConservatorLease

in1996;

indeed,G

insberg’sperpetuallease

theory

didnoteven

surfaceuntilafter

shefiled

thisaction.

Ginsberg

evidentlycontends

thatGam

sonknew

orshouldhave

known

when

executingthe

Conservator

Leasein

1996thatG

insbergw

ould

disputethe

meaning

ofits

renewallanguage

tenyears

later.(See

RB

IXA

OB

67[arguing

thatGam

son’sdeclaratory

judgmentclaim

sconcern

the“actualw

ordsofthe

Renew

alClause,”

ratherthanG

insberg’sbreach

of

theC

onservatorLease].)A

ccordingto

Ginsberg,the

limitations

period

thereforebegan

torun

in1996—

not2006,when

shebreached

the

ConservatorLease

byholding

over.(R

B/X

AO

B64-67.)

Buta

contractclaimaccrues

uponthe

breach—notexecution—

ofthe

contract.A

nyotherrule

would

beunw

orkable:

[It]w

ouldrequire

thefilin

gofa

declaratoryreliefaction

whenever term

sofa

contractrevealedthe

slightesthintof

disagreement.

After

signingany

contract,partiesw

ouldhave

18

toconjure

upevery

imaginable

hypotheticalgroundfor

fliture

disagreementand

thendecide

whetherto

sueim

mediately

or

torisk

losingtheftrights

ifan

actualdisagreementerupts

more

thanfouryears

later.There

isno

reasonto

encourage,

much

lessrequire,

thatsortofprem

aturelitigation.

(Garver

v.Brace

(1996)47

Cai.A

pp.4th995,

1000-1001(G

an’er)

[declaratoryreliefclaim

regardingprom

issorynote’s

pre-paymentpenalty

accruedw

henpenalty

imposed,notupon

executionofnote];N

ilesv.Louis

H.

Rapoport&

Sons,Inc.(1942)

53C

al.App.2d

644,651

[“The

statuteof

limitations

doesnotbegin

torun

fromthe

time

ofm

akinga

contract,but

comm

encesfrom

thetim

ethe

causeofaction

accrues.(C

itations.)

Thestatute

comm

encesas

ofthe

dateofbreach

ofthe

obligation”].)Thatis

why

aclaim

forbreach

ofan

optionagreem

entaccruesonly

when

the

optionis

ultimately

exercised—notw

henthe

optionis

agreedto.

(See

New

bergerv.R~7kind

(1972)28

Cal.A

pp.3d1070,

1077[stock

option];

Dinkeispielv.N

ason(1911)17

Cal.A

pp.591,

600[claim

forbroker’s

comm

issionaccrued

when

purchaseoption

exercised].)

Garver’s

concernsare

particularlyapthere.

Ginsberg

didnoturge

thetheory

thattheC

onservatorLeaseconfers

unlimited

renewals

untilafter

filing

thislaw

suit.B

eforethen,her

conductshowed

thatshebelieved

that

theC

onservatorLease

conferredno

more

thanfive

renewals.

(SeeC

ityof

Hope

Nat.M

edicalCenterv.

Genentech,

Inc.(2008)

43C

al.4th375,393

[“Aparty’s

conductoccurringbetw

eenexecution

ofthe

contractand

adispute

aboutthem

eaningofthe

contract’sterm

sm

ayrevealw

hatthe

partiesunderstood

andintended

thoseterm

sto

mean”).)

19

•In

Ap

ril1997,

almosta

yearafterexecuting

theC

onservatorLease

andlong

beforea

disputeoverits

renewallanguage

arose,Ginsberg

proposedrevised

terms

toadd

atenantand

to“lim

it{]ourlease

tofour

five

yearoptions.”

(1S

AA

955,¶10

[Ginsberg

declarationin

oppositionto

Gam

son’ssum

mary

judgmentm

otion,cited

atRB

/XA

OB

62;see

1R

A

140,¶10];

1S

AA

957;1

SA

A966,¶

1[exhibits

todeclaration].)

Thereis

noreasonable

scenariounderw

hichG

insbergw

ouldhave

preemptively

askedG

amson

tosw

apa

leasew

ithperpetualrenew

alsfor

onew

ithonly

20years’

worth

ofrenew

als—herrequestw

ouldonly

make

senseif

she

believedthatthe

Conservator

Leasealready

conferredsom

ethingless

than

perpetualrenewaloptions.

After

all,Ginsberg

herselfarguesthatshe

wouldn’thave

tradeda

leasew

ithfive

renewaloptions

forone

with

asingle

option.(R

BIX

AO

B40.)

•In

Novem

ber2004,G

insbergagain

comm

unicatedherbeliefthat

theC

onservatorLeasew

asnotperpetual,this

time

writing

toG

amson:

“Iam

officiallygiving

younotice

thatIam

exercisingm

ynextoption

(2ndof5)

toextend

my

leasefor

thenext5

years,when

thecurrentoption

expires.”(4

AA

854-855.)

•N

eitherG

insberg’scom

plaintnorherfirstamended

complaint

allegedthatthe

ConservatorLease

conferredperpetualoptions.

(1A

A

4-17,¶~J12,

18,49;1

AA

46-58,¶~J12,

16,19,41.)

Ginsberg

neverexplainshow

Gam

soncould

haveanticipated

acontractdispute

in1996

ona

theorythatG

insbergherselfdidn’tthink

up

untiltenyears

later.(See

Garver,supra,47

Cal.A

pp.4thatpp.

1000-1001.)

20

3.G

amson’s

declaratoryre

liefclaim

sare

timely

using

anyfeasible

accrualdate:A

pril2006,

Novem

ber2004,or

Decem

ber2003.

February1,2006—

thedate

thatGinsberg

comm

encedher

action—is

theoperative

filing

dateofG

ainson’scross-com

plaint.(See

RB

/XA

OB

65;

LibertyM

utualInsuranceCo.

v.Fales(1973)8

Cal.3d

712,715,

fit4.)

Accordingly,G

amson’s

cross-actionw

astim

elyundereither

anypossible

statuteoflim

itations—three

yearsor

fouryears—ifhercauses

ofaction

accruedafterFebruary

1,2003.A

sw

enow

demonstrate,they

did.

a.G

amson’s

declaratoryre

liefclaim

saccrued

inA

pril2006,w

henG

amson

firstbecame

entitledto

evictGinsberg.

Likeany

breachofcontractclaim

,thefour-yearlim

itationsperiod

on

Gam

son’sdeclaratory

judgmentclaim

sbegan

torun

when

thoseclaim

s

accrued.(See

Code

Civ.

Proc.,§

312[“C

ivilactions,withoutexception,

canonly

becom

menced

within

theperiods

prescribedin

thistitle,

afterthe

causeofaction

shallhaveaccrued”];M

aguire,supra,23C

al.2datp.

733-

734.)A

declaratoryre

liefclaim

foundedon

acontractdispute

accruesfor

limitations

purposesw

henthe

contractisbreached.

(United

Faq/Ic-

Reliance

InsuranceCo.

v.DiD

omenico

(1985)173

Cal.A

pp.3d673,

677;

Gat-ver,supra,47

Cal.A

pp.4thatpp.

1000-1001.)A

dditionally,

adeclaratory

judgmentaction

seekinga

“determination

ofany

questionof

constructionorvalidity

arisingunderthe

instrumentor

contract”is

viable

evenbefore

abreach.

(Code

Civ.

Proc.,§1060;M

aguire,supra,23C

al.2d

atp.734.)

21

Under

Gam

son’sinterpretation

ofthe

ConservatorLease,

Ginsberg

breachedthe

leasein

Ap

ril2006,w

henG

insberg’ssingle

five-yearrenewal

periodexpired

andG

insbergrefused

tovacate.

Atthatpoint,

Gam

sonw

as

entitledto

evictherasa

holdovertenant.(See

Code

Civ.

Proc.,§1161,

subd.I

[unlawfuldetainer];R

ylandv.A

ppelbaum(1924)

70C

aLApp.

268,

270.)Thus,

Ginsberg’s

April2006

breachofthe

ConservatorLease

started

theclock

onthe

four-yearlimitations

period,and

Gam

son’scross-action

was

timely.

b.A

tm

ost,events

beforeA

pril2006

amounted

toanticipatory

repudiationsthatdid

not

triggerany

statuteoflim

itations—and,

inany

event,theyoccurred

with

inthe

limitations

period.

Ginsberg

arguablyrepudiated

theC

onservatorLease’srenew

al

provisionon

Novem

ber11,2004—

when

shepurportedly

exercisedthe

“2ndof5”

five-yearrenewaloptions

andsaid

thatshew

ouldnotvacate

the

premises

when

theC

onservatorLease

expiredin

April2006.

(4A

A

854-855.)N

ovember

2004w

astherefore

theearliestthatG

amson

could

havestated

aviable

anticipatorybreach

claim—

meaning

that

Novem

ber2004is

thevery

earliestthatthoseclaim

scould

haveaccrued

for

limitations

purposes.(See

Cavalliv.M

acaire(1958)

159C

al.App.2d

714,

718;Fitzgerald

v.Frovines(1951)

102C

al.App.2d

529,539.)

Butjustbecause

Gam

soncould

havesued

Ginsberg

foranticipatory

breachin

Novem

ber2004does

notmean

thatshehad

tosue

then.G

amson

hadthe

optionofeithersuing

imm

ediatelyor

waiting

untilGinsberg

refused

22

tovacate

when

theC

onservatorLease

expiredin

April2006.

(SeeR

otnano

v.Rockw

ellIntern.,Inc.

(1996)14

Cal.4th

479,488-489.)

Inany

event,even

ifG

insberg’sN

ovember2004

conducttriggered

thelim

itationsperiod,

Gam

son’scross-action

was

timely

filed15

months

lateron

February1,2006.

Ginsberg

suggestsa

thirdalternative

accrualdate:D

ecember2003,

when

Gam

sonfirsthad

noticethatthere

mighthave

beensom

ething

“wrong”

with

theC

onservatorLease.

(RB

/XA

OB

65&

67,citing

4R

T458-459.)

Even

assuming

thatGam

sonw

asvaguely

aware

of

aproblem

with

theC

onservatorLeaseas

ofDecem

ber2003,hercontract

claims

nonethelessdid

notaccrueatthattim

e.

First,a

contractclaimaccrues

forstatute

oflim

itationspurposes

uponbreach—

beforethen,p

lain

tiffhassustained

noinjury

andtherefore

hasno

causeofaction.

(McC

askeyv.

CaL

StateA

utomobile

Assn.(2010)

189C

al.App.4th

947,957-962;

Cleveland

v.InternetSpecialties

West,Inc.

(2009)171

Cal.A

pp.4th24,

31-32(C

leveland).)G

amson’s

declaratory

judgmentclaim

stherefore

didnotaccrue

untilApril2006.

(Seepp.

18-20,

ante.)

Second,thisC

ourthasexpressly

rejectedan

interpretationofthe

discoveryrule

thatwould

acceleratethe

runningofthe

limitations

period:

The“discovery

rulem

ayextend

thestatute

oflim

itations,butitcannot

decreaseit,

anda

statuteoflim

itationsdoes

notaccrueuntila

causeof

actionis

‘complete

with

allofits

elements,’including

injury.[C

itation.]”

(Cleveland,supra,

171C

al.App.4th

atp.32.)

23

Finally,even

ifthelim

itationsperiod

didbegin

torun

in

Decem

ber2003,G

amson’s

cross-actionw

asstilltim

elyfiled

just26m

onths

later,on

February1,2006.

Ginsberg’s

theoriesthatG

amson’s

contractclaims

aregoverned

by

athree-yearlim

itationsperiod

andthatthose

claims

accruedin

1996are

untenable.G

amson’s

cross-actionis

notbanedby

anystatute

of

limitations.

H.

IFT

HE

CO

UR

TD

OE

SN

OT

OR

DE

RJU

DG

ME

NT

IN

GA

MS

ON

’SF

AV

OR

,ITS

HO

ULD

RE

MA

ND

FO

RA

TR

IAL

LIM

ITE

DT

OT

HE

INT

ER

PR

ET

AT

ION

OF

TH

ER

EN

EW

AL

LAN

GU

AG

EA

ND

RE

LAT

ED

MA

TT

ER

S.

A.

There

IsN

oB

asisF

orG

insberg’sR

equestFor

AN

ew

Tria

lOn

Com

pensatoryD

amages.

IftheC

ourtremands

forreconsiderationofthe

renewallanguage,

thenthe

trialshouldbe

limited

tothatsingle

issue.G

insbergis

notentitled

toa

newtrialon

compensatory

damages.

(SeeR

B/X

AO

B68;

Code

Civ.

Proc.,§43

[reviewing

court“may

affirm,reverse,

ormodif~’anyjudgm

ent

ororderappealed

from,

andm

aydirectthe

properjudgmentor

ordertobe

entered,ordirecta

newtrialor

furtherproceedingsto

behad”].)

Ginsberg

doesnotclaim

anyenor

inthe

trialofhercom

pensatory

damages

claims,nor

couldshe

crediblydo

so.She

gotthebestpossible

trialonthatsubject,w

ithno

restrictionson

evidenceaboutthe

sourceor

amounto

fherclaimed

damages.

And

becauseofthe

trialcourt’s

misinterpretation

ofthe

ConservatorLease,she

couldeven

seekreliefon

24

thebasis

ofG

amson’s

effortsto

gethertosign

anew

lease.(See,e.g.,

3R

T246-269,

340-342[G

insbergtestified

thatlucrativesublease

was

delayedbecause

Gam

soninsisted

thatGinsberg

firstagreeto

anew

lease

with

lessadvantageous

terms,including

norenew

aloptions];3

RT

319-321

[Ginsberg

testifiedthatG

amson

refusedto

remove

a“for

lease”sign

from

thebuilding

unlessG

insbergsigned

anew

lease];3R

T345-346

[Ginsberg

testifiedthatG

amson

refusedto

allowG

insbergto

repairherinteriorfloor

unlessshe

signeda

newlease];4

RT

454-464[G

amson

cross-examined

abouthereffortsto

enterintonew

leasew

ithG

insberg).)B

estofallfor

Ginsberg,

onthis

issueG

amson

was

defenseless,becausethe

trialcourt

barredherfrom

explainingw

hyshe

wanted

Ginsberg

tosign

anew

lease—thatis,G

amson

couldnotadduce

evidenceofhergood-faith

belief

thattheC

onservatorLeasew

ouldexpire

inA

pril2006.(See,e.g.,5

RT

743-745[sustaining

objectionsto

Gainson

testimony];

5R

T787-788

[sustainingobjections

totestim

onyofG

amson’s

realestatelaw

yerSaul

Jaffe];see

also5

RT

737[G

amson’s

triallawyer

explainingthe

relevanceof

suchtestim

ony];4R

T454-457

[strikingG

amson’s

cross-examination

testimony

aboutConservatorLease

terms].)

Ineffect,

Ginsberg

seeksa

reversaldespitethe

absenceoferror—

anim

permissible

result.(See

Mancuso

v.Southern

CaL

Edison

Co.(1991)

232C

al.App.3d

88,106

[remanding

forlim

itedretrialon

defendant’s

liability,butnottheam

ountofdam

agesaw

ardedin

firsttrial];accord,

Soils

v.O

ij,fIeldsTrucking

Co.(1979)

90C

al.App.3d

349,355;

Gilm

orev.

Casw

ell(1924)65

Cal.A

pp.299,305-306.)

Ginsberg’s

improper

requestfora

retrialoncom

pensatorydam

ages,

however,

doesnotaffecthow

theC

ourtshouldrule

onG

amson’s

appeal.

25

Thatis,ifthe

Courtconcludes

thattheC

onservatorLease’s

renewal

languageis

ambiguous,

butchoosesnotto

enterjudgmentin

Gam

son’s

favor,thenthe

Courtm

ustremand

fora

newtrialon

them

eaningofthe

ambiguous

renewalcause.

Anew

trial—entailing

thethaicourt’s

considerationofextrinsic

evidenceregarding

theparties’intent—

would

be

necessarybecause

theC

onservatorLeaseis

faciallyam

biguousforthe

reasonsdetailed

inthe

openingbrief.

B.

TheT

rialC

ourt,NotT

hisC

ourt,S

houldC

onsider

Ginsberg’s

New

And

Disputed

Extrinsic

Evidence

Argum

entsIn

TheF

irstInstance.

TheC

ourtshouldalso

rejectGinsberg’s

requestthattheC

ourtrely

onhernew

,unsupportedfactualargum

entsto

upholdthe

trialcourt’s

misinterpretation

oftheC

onservatorLease.

(SeeR

B/X

AO

B52-53,

59-

60.)6

Ginsberg’s

unsupportedfactu

alrepresentations

andspeculative

theories.G

insbergasserts

thatGam

sonhas

30years

ofexperiencein

negotiatingleases

andthat,during

those30

years,(1)

sheonce

proposed

alease

thatdidnotm

odif5rthepreprinted

form’s

renewalterm

s

(aD

ecember2003

proposedlease

thatwas

notsignedby

theparties),

and

(2)she

oncesigned

alease

thatmodified

preprintedterm

s(the

1996

Conservator

Lease).(R

B/X

AO

B52-53;

seealso

RB

/XA

OB

9.)G

insberg

alsorepresents

that“she[m

eaningG

amson]

crossedoutthe

preprintedform

6Because

theC

ourtdeniedG

insberg’sm

otionto

takeevidence

onappeal,

we

donotaddress,and

theC

ourtshoulddisregard,

Ginsberg’s

arguments

thatarebased

onlease

documents

purportedlybetw

eenG

amson

andthird

parties.(R

B/X

AO

B46,48,50-52.)

26

Option

toE

xtendclause

andagreed

tothe

Renew

alClause

inthe

[Conservator]

Lease’sA

ddendum.”

(RB

/XA

OB

52,italicsadded.)

Relying

onthese

“facts,”G

insbergconcludes

(1)thatG

amson

was

aware

thatpartiescan

electwhetherto

modifS’preprinted

leaserenew

al

clauses,and(2)

thatGam

son“understands

thesignificance

ofusing

differentrenewallanguage

indifferentleases.”

(Thid.)The

recorddoes

not

bearoutany

ofG

insberg’sfactualrepresentations

orspeculative

conclusions,and

becausethese

issuesw

erenevertried,

sheis

entitledto

no

favorableappellate

presumptions.

Moreover,

evenifher“facts”

were

true

(they’renot),they

stillwouldn’t

addup

tothe

requisite“intent”

tocreate

aperpetuallease.

Gam

sonadm

ittedlyfilled

inthe

blanksin

theproposed

Decem

ber2003preprinted

leasew

ithher

own

hand.(4

RT

459;2R

A320-

329[exhibit60].)

Butshe

testifiedthatshe

couldnotrecallits

terms

and

that“[w]hateverM

r.S

knolick[herlaw

yerin

2003]putinthere

isw

hathe

putinthere.”

(4R

T460.)

Ginsberg

doesnotcite

thistestim

ony—even

thoughitrebuts

hertheorythatG

amson

understandsthe

“significanceof

usingdifferentrenew

allanguagein

differentleases.”(R

B/X

AO

B52.)

Ginsberg

tellsthe

CourtthatG

amson

“crossedout”

the

ConservatorLease’s

preprintedrenew

allanguage.(Thid.)

Butthere

isno

evidencethatG

anison“crossed

out”anything

onthe

Conservator

Lease—and

Ginsberg

citesnone.

Instead,G

insbergdirects

theC

ourttothe

ConservatorLease

itsegw

hichdoes

notindicatehow

orwhy

orw

henthe

renewallanguage

was

modified.

(Thid.,citing

2B

A294,301.)

Ginsberg’s

representationthatG

amson

“crossedout”

thepreprinted

renewalclause

is

furtherundercutbyherow

nrespondent’s

btief,which

relieson

the

27

allegationin

Gam

son’sfirstam

endedcross-com

plaintthatGam

sondid

not

evenread

theC

onservatorLeasebefore

signingit.

(P.BIXAOB

65,citing

1R

A5:27-6:1,

6:14-6:15.)M

oreover,theonly

relevantrecordevidence

is

Gam

son’stestim

onythatG

insbergasked

hertosign

theC

onservatorLease

tosupersede

theR

ubinfeldLease.

(5R

T735:4-9,

735:27-736:2.)

Ginsberg

raisesthese

theoriesfor

thefirsttim

eon

appeal.

Ginsberg

doesnotdem

onstiatethatshe

raisedthese

arguments

inthe

trial

court.(See

RB

/XA

OB

52-53,59-60.)

Therefore,even

ifG

insberghad

admissible

evidenceto

backup

herspeculative

assertions(she

doesn’t),itis

thetrialcourt—

notthisC

ourt—thatm

ustconsiderherevidentiary

arguments

inthe

firstinstance.(See

Walsh

v.W

alsh(1941)

18C

al.2d439,

443,quotingB

arlowv.

Frink(1915)

171C

al.165,

173.)

Ginsberg

misstates

thesign~cance

ofherN

ovember

11,2004

letter.Ifextrinsic

evidenceis

relevanttothese

proceedings,then,contrary

toG

insberg’srepresentations,

herNovem

ber11,2004

lettertoG

amson

is

dispositivein

Gam

son’sfavor.

(SeeR

B/X

AO

B59-60;4

AA

854-855.)

Inthatletter,G

insbergw

rote:“I

amofficially

givingyou

noticethat

Iam

exercisingm

ynextoption

(2ndof5)

toextend

my

leaseforthe

next

5years,w

henthe

currentoptionexpires.”

(4A

A854-855.)

Thisletterw

as

consistentwith

Ginsberg’s

April

1997proposalthatG

amson

signa

new

leaseto

replacethe

Conservator

Lease—she

proposeda

limited

number

of

renewaloptions,

something

sheneverw

ouldhave

offeredifshe

alreadyhad

aperpetuallease.

(1S

AA

955,¶10;

1S

AA

957;1

SA

A966,¶

1.)

Accordingly,if

Ginsberg’s

Novem

ber2004letteris

toplay

anyrole

inthis

appeal,itm

ustbeto

negateherperpetuallease

claim.

Thatis

28

becauseitis

a“cardinalrule

ofconstruction

thatwhen

acontractis

ambiguous

oruncertainthe

practicalconstructionplaced

uponitby

the

partiesbefore

anycontroversy

arisesas

toits

meaning

affordsone

ofthe

mostreliable

means

ofdeterm

iningthe

intentofthe

parties.”(S

terlingv.

Taylor(2007)

40C

al.4th757,772-773,internalquotation

marks

omitted.)

Ginsberg

arguesthatthis

interpretationofthe

Conservator

Lease—herow

ninterpretation—

isirrelevantbecause

byN

ovember

11,

2004,the“controversy”

between

theparties

hadalready

arisen.

(RB

/XA

OB

60-61.)B

utaccordingto

herbrie

tatthattim

e,the

parties’

comm

unicationsprim

arily(ifnotexclusively)

concernedG

insberg’srent

andrequestto

sublet—notrenew

aloptions.(ibid.)

And

evenifthe

parties

haddiscussed

theC

onservatorLease’srenew

allanguagebefore

Novem

ber11,2004,

Ginsberg

hadn’tyetcontendedthatshe

was

entitledto

aperpetuallease—

shedidn’tadoptthatargum

entuntilsometim

eafter

filingher

amended

complaintin

August2006.

(Seep.

20,ante.)Perhaps

mostim

portantly,ifG

insbergw

ereright,

andshe

assertedthis

interpretation

aftertheparties

were

alreadylocked

ina

disputeaboutthe

meaning

ofthe

renewallanguage,then

herinterpretationw

ouldbe

entitledto

more—

not

less—w

eight.In

them

idstofthatdispute,

Ginsberg

would

havebeen

highlym

otivatedto

interpretthecontested

languagein

thelightm

ost

favorableto

herposition,butthem

ostfavorableinterpretation

shecam

eup

with

was

thattheC

onservatorLease

conferreda

baseterm

plusfive

five-

yearoptions.

Finally,

Ginsberg’s

after-the-factspinon

herNovem

ber11,2004

repudiationofthe

Conservator

Leaselacks

evidentiarysupportand

defies

comm

onsense.

Shetells

theC

ourtthatthe“letter,

atbest,statesonly

29

Ginsberg’s

intentasofN

ovember

11,2004to

exerciseher

‘2nd’option

and

thatsheintends

asofN

ovember

11,2004to

exercise‘5’

options.”

(RB

/XA

OB

59-60,citing

theletterat2

RA

360-361.)In

otherwords,

in

Novem

ber2004,G

insberggratuitously

choseto

signalthatshew

ouldforgo

heralleged

righttoa

perpetualleasein

favorofone

with

onlythree

five-

yearrenewals

remaining

(bythen,

Ginsberg

hadalready

exercisedtw

oof

herpurportedfive

options).N

oreasonable

jury

would

acceptsuch

anotion—

”’[t]hetrier

ofthe

factsm

aynotbelieve

impossibilities.”

(Gaffney

v.Dow

neySavings

&Loan

Assn.(1988)

200C

al.App.3d

1154,

1168.)

III.

TH

EP

ER

MA

NE

NT

INJU

NC

TIO

NF

AILS

AS

AM

AT

TE

RO

FLA

W.

Insteadofresponding

toG

amson’s

challengesto

theinjunction,

Ginsberg

mounts

adefense

toa

substantialevidenceargum

entthatGam

son

hasn’tmade.

(Com

pareA

OB

50-53w

ithR

B/X

AO

B69-74.)

Mostnotably,

Ginsberg

doesnotdefend

theim

practicablityofjudicialsupervision

over

day-to-daym

aintenancerequests

forthenext80-plus

years,nordoesshe

addressthe

trialcourt’serrorin

imposing

obligationson

Gam

sonbeyond

thosein

theC

onservatorLeaseand

evenbeyond

thoseG

insbergrequested.

(AO

B52-53.)~

‘~Gam

sondoes

notchallengethe

injunction’sterm

sforproviding

Ginsberg

with

keysand

accessto

telephoneconnections.

(Com

pareA

OB

50w

ithR

BIX

AO

B72-74.)

30

A.

TheT

rialC

ourtAbused

ItsD

iscretionB

yIssuing

An

Inju

nctio

nT

hatIsN

otPracticable

Because

ItR

equires

80-Plus

Years

OfC

ourtS

upervision.

Thefinaljudgm

entdecreesthatforthe

next80-plusyears,“G

amson

isordered

tom

akerepairs

tothe

Building

within

48hours

ofnoticeofthe

needfor

repairsfrom

Ginsberg;

andifrepairs

arenotm

adeby

Gam

son

within

48hours,then

Gam

sonis

toim

mediately

provideaccess

tothe

Building

toG

insbergfor

Ginsberg

toundertake

andcom

pletesuch

repairs”

(2A

A495).

Thisjudgm

entthreatensto

condemn

generationsofjudicialofficers

tobeing

calledon

tospring

intoaction

wheneverG

insberg(orher

successor)com

plainsthatG

amson

(orhersuccessor)hasn’tm

aintainedthe

buildingup

toG

insberg’sexacting

standards.Thatis

nottheproperrole

of

thecourts.

Ginsberg

apparentlyagrees:

Inthe

respondent’sb

riet

sherelies

onrhetoricalflourishes

ratherthanany

attemptto

arguethatthe

injunction

ispracticable.

(RB

/XA

OB

70.)

B.

The

Tria

lCourtA

busedIts

Discretion

By

Issuing

An

Inju

nctio

nT

hatGives

Ginsberg

More

Rights

Than

SheH

asU

nderThe

Conservator

Lease.

Even

ifthe

injunctionhadn’trequired

80-plusyears

ofjudicial

supervision,thetrialcourtnonetheless

abusedits

discretionby

awarding

Ginsberg

more

rightsthan

theC

onservatorLease

givesher

andeven

more

rightsthan

Ginsberg

herselfproposed.8

8G

amson

raisedthese

arguments

inthe

trialcourt.(See

2S

AA

1181-

1184,1190-1191;

seealso

7R

T1055:10-12.)

31

The48-hour

repair-or-accessinjunction.

Ginsberg

requested

anorder

compelling

Gam

son—in

perpetuity—to

provideG

insberg“access”

toareas

inthe

buildingthatG

insbergunilaterally

believesrequire

repairsso

thatGinsberg

canm

akethe

repairsherself.

(2A

A401,¶

1;2A

A402;

2A

A406,¶~j4-5;

7R

T1046:19-24.)

During

theinjunction

hearing,

Ginsberg

seemed

tonarrow

herrequesttoan

injunctionthatw

ouldcover

onlyaccess

requiredto

repairtheholes

inherceiling

anda

pipeabove

her

store.(7

RT

1046-1049.)G

insberg’sbriefing

didnotspecify

aw

indowof

time

forG

amson

toprovide

such“access.”

(Seegenerally

2A

A400-410.)

Butduring

thehearing,

sheproposed

aseven-day

window

,telling

thecourt:

“And

Iam

happyto

conditioniton,you

know,

sevendays’notice

or

something

likethat.”

(7R

T1049:22-23.)

Gam

soncountered,am

ongother

things,that“[w]hatthis

pla

intiffis

askingyou

todo,Y

ourH

onor,isto

rewrite

theLease.”

(7R

T1055:10-12.)

Atthe

endofthe

hearing,thetrialcourtgranted

therepair-or-access

injunction:“I

willgive

thema

chance,aslong

as,youknow

,they

saythat

youtellthem

whatis

under,whatthe

repairsare,ifthe

waterstarts

toleak

andthey

don’tcom

ein

thereand

fixthe

waterw

iththatpipe

upthere

that’s

exposedthatI

knoww

hatwe

aretalking

about,ifthey

don’tfixthatand

it

startsto

leak,thenyou

can,youknow

,go

inthere

andfix

it.”(7

RT

1059-

1060.)The

orderdid

notaccountfortheC

onservatorLease’slim

itationson

Gam

son’srepair

obligations.(See

pp.40-41,post.)

Inaddition,

although

thetrialcourtin

itially

consideredgiving

Gam

sona

15-dayw

indowto

repair

anyleaks,and

althoughG

insberghad

askedfor

aseven-day

window

,it

suasponte

chosea

48-hourwindow

andrefused

tohear

argumentfrom

Gam

son.(7

RT

1049,1059-1061.)

32

Thetria

lcourtimproperly

rewrote

theC

onservatorLease.

Acontract-based

injunctioncannotconferrights

thatexceedthose

granted

bythe

contract.(See,e.g.,

Gordon

v.Landau(1958)

49C

al.2d690,

695

[reversingperm

anentinjunctionbecause

nobasis

toenforce

non-

solicitationclause

beyondthe

oneyearprovided

bycontract];E

llisv.

Radem

acher(1899)

125C

al.556,

559[reversing

permanentinjunction

in

partbecausetrialcourtordered

appellanttoperform

contractualterms

regardilessofw

hetherrespondentalsoperform

ed:The

permanent

injunctiondecree

“makes

ittheduty

ofthe

appellantabsolutelyto

perform

thecontractw

ithoutanyreference

tothe

paymentofthe

considerationby

therespondentE

llisby

performing

thecovenants

ofsaid

contractonhis

part

tobe

performed”].)

Butthe

48-hourrepair-or-accessorderdoes

justthat.The

trialcourt

effectively—and

improperly—

rewrote

theC

onservatorLease.U

nderCode

ofC

ivilProceduresection

1858,atrialcourt’s

jobis

“simply

toascertain

anddeclare

whatis

interm

sorin

substancecontained

therein,nottoinsert

whathas

beenom

itted,ortoom

itwhathas

beeninserted.”

Inthe

landlord-

tenantcontext,thistranslates

tothe

“long-establishednile

thatnocourthas

authorityto

make

acontractforthe

parties,ortow

riteinto

alease

material

terms

which,

asin

thepresentcase,w

ouldgreatly

broadena

lessee’s

rights.”(Textile

v.C

oleman

(1954)122

Cal.A

pp.2d756,760.)

As

ourSuprem

eC

ourthasexplained,

“[c]learly,neitherthetrial

courtnorthis

courtisem

powered

tom

akeforthe

partiesa

contractual

arrangementw

hichthey

didnotsee

fitto

make

themselves.”

(Apra

v.

Aureguy

(1961)55

Cal.2d

827,830.)

Therefore,a

trialcourtcannotorder

specificperform

anceofterm

snotcontained

inthe

agreement.

(Moss

v.

33

MinorP

roperties,Inc.

(1968)262

Cal.A

pp.2d847,

854.)S

imilarly,

atrial

courtcannotissuedeclaratory

reliefthatincludesterm

snotcontained

inthe

contract.(E

llisonv.

City

ofSan

Buenaventura

(1975)48

Cal.A

pp.3d952,

960-962.)

Thesam

eis

truehere:

Thetrialcourtim

properlyrew

rotethe

ConservatorLease’s

repairobligations

byordering

Gam

sonto

maintain

her

own

buildingto

satisfS’Ginsberg’s

unilateralspecifications.(See

Textilev.

Colem

an,supra,122

Cal.A

pp.2datp.

760;compare

2A

A492-496

[judgment]

with

4A

A816-817,¶~J9(a),9(b),

11(e)[C

onservatorLease].)

Thetrialcourt’s

erroroflaw

constitutesan

abuseofdiscretion.

(City

of

Sacram

entov.D

rew(1989)

207C

al.App.3d

1287,1297

[“Action

that

transgressesthe

confmes

ofthe

applicableprinciples

oflaw

isoutside

the

scopeofdiscretion

andw

ecallsuch

actionan

‘abuse’ofdiscretion”].)

Theinjunction

isoverbroad

inanotherrespect:

Itexceeds

theterm

s

thatGinsberg

requestedatthe

hearing,when

shelim

itedher

accessrequest

tothe

ceilingholes

andleaks

andalso

expresslyasked

fora

seven-day

window

forsuch

access.(See

p.32,ante.)

Accordingly,

thisC

ourtshouldreverse

the48-hourrepair-or-access

injunctionas

anabuse

ofdiscretion.

34

Iv.

IFG

AM

SO

NP

RE

VA

ILSO

NT

HE

INT

ER

PR

ET

AT

ION

OF

TH

ELE

AS

E’S

RE

NE

WA

LLA

NG

UA

GE

,TH

EN

HE

R

SE

CT

ION

998O

FF

ER

MU

ST

BE

RE

CO

NS

IDE

RE

D.

A.

Overview

.

Gam

sonoffered

toseffle

beforetrialunderC

odeofC

ivilProcedure

section998

(section998).

(2A

A507-510.)

Gam

son’ssection

998offer

providedthat(1)

Gam

sonw

ouldpay

Ginsberg

$135,000and

dismiss

the

cross-actionif

(2)G

insbergdism

issedherlaw

suitandG

insbergand

Eden

agreed—as

co-tenants—thatthe

ConservatorLease

would

expireon

April

14,2011.(2

AA

508-509.)~G

insbergand

Edenrejected

theofferby

failingto

respond.(2

AA

505,¶2.)

IftheC

ourtagreesthatthe

ConservatorLease

isnotperpetual,then

Gam

sonw

illhaveachieved

the

exact resultsheproposed

inher

section998

offerregardingthe

interpretationofthe

renewallanguage.

Accordingly,ifthe

section998

offerwas

valid,then

thetrialcourtw

illhaveto

reassessw

hethershe

can

recovercosts.

Gam

sondid

notaddressthe

validityofhersection

998offer

inthe

openingbriefbecause

theonly

issueon

appealisw

hetherthetrialcourt

shouldreconsiderthe

award

ofcosts

inthe

eventofreversal.

(AO

B49-50.)

Ginsberg

doesnotaddress

thisissue

inherrespondent’s

brief.She

instead

arguesthatG

amson’s

offerwas

invalidbecause

itwas

conditionedon

acceptanceby

bothG

insbergand

herhusbandand

co-tenantEden.

~G

insbergis

theonly

pla

intiffsuing

Gam

son(E

denis

adefendantin

Gam

son’scross-action).

Therefore,thefinancialcom

ponentofG

amson’s

offerwas

necessarilydirected

toG

insbergalone.

(See2

AA

508-509.)

35

(P.BIXAOB

67-68.)G

amson

properlyresponds

toG

insberg’snew

argument here.

(SeeH

tayH

tayC

hinv.A

dvancedFresh

Concepts

FranchiseC

orp.(2011)194

Cal.A

pp.4th704,711,

flu.2;Fratessav.Roffi~’

(1919)40

Cal.A

pp.179,

188.)

TheC

ourtindependentlyreview

sthe

validityofG

amson’s

offer.

(Fo-JenC

henv.Interinsurance

Exchange

ofthe

Autom

obileC

lub(2008)

164C

al.App.4th

117,122.)

B.

AS

ection998

Offer

May

Properly

IncludeM

ultip

le

Conditions.

Ginsberg

arguesthatthe

trialcourt“properlydeterm

inedthatthe

offeris

invalid”and

intimates

thatthecourtstruck

Gam

son’sofferbecause,

asG

insbergargues

onappeal,

itwas

anim

permissible

join

toffer.

(RB

/XA

OB

67-68.)B

utthatwas

notthebasis

ofthe

trialcourt’sruling.

Instead,thetrialcourtstruck

Ganson’s

section998

offeron

adifferent—

butequallyerroneous—

ground:The

trialcourtincorrectlyconcluded

that

theoffer

was

invalidbecause

“itw

asalso

conditionalona

number

ofthings

andthatthe

conditionis

thatanew

lease,etcetera,andthatdoesn’tm

akeit,

a998

offer,when

youputin

abunch

ofconditions.

[~j]So

thereforethe

998is

notvalidatall.

[~j]So

itdoesn’teven

applyin

thiscase.”

(7R

T

1074:10-16;accord,

7R

T1078:20-22

[“That’s

notavalid

998unless

you

acceptalloffers.Y

oucan’tbreak

the$135,000

outbyitse

lf’].)

Thetrialcourtw

asw

rong:W

ehave

foundno

authorityholding

that

asection

998offer

may

includeonly

afinancialpayoutin

exchangefor

dismissal.

Tothe

contrary,asection

998offer

isvalid

solong

asits

terms

aresufficiently

“clearand

specific”to

allowplaintiffs

to“clearly

evaluate

36

thew

orthofthe

extendedoffer.”

(Berg

v.Darden

(2004)120

Cal.A

pp.4th

721,727.)

Moreover,

asection

998offerm

ayinclude

nonmonetary

terms.

(See,e.g.,A

riasv.K

atellaTow

nhouseH

omeow

nersAssn.,

Inc.(2005)

127C

al.App.4th

847,855.)

Ginsberg

neverargued—eitherin

thetrialcourt

oron

appeal—thatG

amson’s

offerwas

fatallyuncertain.

(See4

AA

766-

773;7

RT

1074-1081;RB

IXA

OB

67-68.)

Accordingly,the

trialcourterredby

concludingthatG

amson’s

section998

offerwas

invalidon

thisground.

C.

Gam

sonW

asN

otRequired

To

Tender

Separate

Section

998O

ffersTo

Ginsberg

And

Eden.

1.G

amson’s

join

toffer

was

properbecause

Ginsberg

andE

denare

co-tenants.

Contrary

toG

insberg’sargum

ent(RB

/XA

OB

67-68),there

isno

blanketprohibitionon

offerscontingenton

multiple

parties’acceptance.

Jointoffersare

improperonly

where

theyw

ouldfrustrate

theodds

of

settlement.

Thatcanoccurw

hen“an

offerw

hichprovides

itmustbe

acceptedby

allplaintiffsis

fundamentally

unfairtothe

pla

intiffw

ho

believesthe

offerisreasonable

asto

herandw

antsto

acceptit.Such

aconditionaloffer

frustratesthe

chancesofsettlem

ent,which

isthe

whole

purposebehind

section998.”

(Vick

v.DaC

orsi(2003)110

Cal.A

pp.4th

206,211(V

ick).)B

utcourtsrecognize

that“where

thereis

more

thanone

plaintiff,a

defendantmay

stillextenda

single-jointoffer,conditioned

on

acceptanceby

allofthem

,iftheseparate

plaintiffshave

a‘unity

ofinterest

suchthatthere

isa

single,indivisibleinjury.’

[Citation.]”

(Peterson

v.

JohnC

rane,Inc.

(2007)154

CaLA

pp.4th498,

505.)Thatis

thecase

here.

37

Separateoffers

toG

insbergand

Eden

would

notfostersection

998’s

purposeofencouraging

pretrialsettlements.

Tothe

contrary,the

natureof

Gam

son’sdeclaratoryjudgm

entclaims

precludedsettlem

entwith

justone

ofthem

.A

sco-lessees,G

insbergand

Eden

aretenants

incom

mon

(Schm

itt

v.Felix

(1958)157C

al.App.2d

642,646),

anda

“cotenanthasno

authority

tobind

anothercotenantw

ithrespectto

thelatter’s

interestincom

mon

property”(Lindsay-Field

v.Friendly

(1995)36

Cal.A

pp.4th1728,

1734).

So,bothG

insbergand

Eden

would

havehad

toagree

tothe

offer’s

proposedconstruction

ofthe

ConservatorLease’s

renewallanguage

forthe

settlementto

beenforceable—

otherwise

onecould

accepttheoffer

while

theothercould

continuedisputing

theC

onservatorLease’sm

eaning.(2

AA

508-509,¶~3,4.)

Thatresultwould

eviscerateany

settlementvalue.

Theauthority

Ginsberg

relieson,

Wickw

arev.

Tanner(1997)

53C

aLApp.4th

570(W

ickware),

doesnotcom

peladifferentresult.

The

Wiclcw

aredefendantoffered

alum

p-sumsettlem

entpaymentto

multiple

plaintiffsprosecuting

apersonalinjury

action.(Id.

atp.573.)

Wickw

are

heldthata

fmancialsettlem

entoffercannotbe

contingentonthe

acceptance

byallplaintiffs.

(Id.atpp.

575-578.)W

ickware’s

prohibitionon

conditional,lump-sum

offersm

akessom

esense

when

onlym

oneyis

changinghands,butnotw

henintenelated,nonm

onetaryrights

areatstake.

2.G

amson’s

join

toffer

was

properbecause

Ginsberg

andE

denare

married.

Ginsberg

andE

dennotonly

areco-tenants,butalso

arem

arried.

Thishas

bothpracticaland

legalconsequencesfor

Gam

son’ssection

998

offer.

38

As

apracticalm

atter,itis

impossible

toim

aginea

scenariounder

which

Eden

couldacceptG

anison’soffer

ingood

faithif

Ginsberg

rejected

it.(C

f.Vick,supra,

110C

al.App.4th

atpp.212-213[“requiring

(that)

married

couplesw

itha

comm

oninterestin

thechose

inaction

beallow

edto

accept orrejectjointoffersindividually

couldresultin

theplaintiffs

gaming

thesystem

byhaving

onespouse

accepttheoffer

andthe

otherrejectit”).)

As

alegalm

atter,ajo

intsection

998offerto

am

arriedcouple

is

valid.(B

arnettv.FirstN

at.InsuranceCo.

ofA

merica

(2010)

184C

al.App.4th

1454,1458-1461;

VicJc,supra,110

CaLA

pp.4thatpp.

211-

213.)A

sa

man-ied

couple,G

insbergand

Eden

havean

“equal,undivided

half-interest”in

therights

conferredby

theC

onservatorLeaseor

anaw

ard

ofattorney’s

feesorcosts;therefore,undercom

munity

propertyprinciples,

eitherone

“couldhave

accepted[G

amson’s)

offeron

behalfofthe

comm

unity.”(V

ick,supra,atp.212;see

Fam.

Code,§

760[“allproperty,

realorpersonal,whereversituated,

acquiredby

am

arriedperson

duringthe

marriage

while

domiciled

inthis

stateis

comm

unityproperty”].)

Therefore,

Gam

son’sjo

intofferw

asvalid.

39

CR

OS

S-R

ES

PO

ND

EN

T’S

BR

IEF

ST

AT

EM

EN

TO

FF

AC

TS

Gam

son’scross-respondent’s

briefdemonstrates

thatthereis

nolegalbasis

fora

punitivedam

agesaw

ard.A

ccordingly,thisstatem

entof

factsdoes

notrespondto

Ginsberg’s

drumbeatofad

hominem

accusations

againstGam

son.R

ather,we

focuson

theevidence

concerningw

hether,as

alegalm

atter,punitivedam

agesw

ereavailable.

Parto

fthatanalysisdoes

requirethe

Courtto

considerGinsberg’s

evidenceaboutG

amson’s

underlyingconduct.

Theissue

there,however,is

notwhatG

insberg’sevidence

shows,butratherw

hatitom

its,and

thatwill

beourprim

aryfocus.

Finally,

we

addressthe

trialcourt’serroneous

exclusionofrelevant

evidenceoffered

byG

amson

onpunitive

damages—

asubjectthatcom

es

intoplay

onlyifthis

Courtaccedes

toG

insberg’srequestthatit

expandthe

availabilityofpunitive

damages

beyondw

ell-establishedboundaries.

A.

TheC

onservatorLease’s

Limitations

On

Gam

son’s

Repair

Obligations.

Ginsberg’s

entirecase

was

aboutphysicaldamage

toherprem

ises

andherm

erchandisearising

fromleaks

andotherproblem

sforw

hichshe

allegedG

amson

was

responsible.

Likem

ostleases,theC

onservatorLease

allocatesresponsibility

for

thesem

attersbetw

eenthe

landlordand

tenant,and

itstrictly

limits

Gam

son’sresponsibility:

40

•G

amson

isnotobligated

torepair

“damage

causedby

any

negligentorintentionalactorom

issionofTenant,Tenant’s

agents,em

ployees,orinvitees.”

(4A

A816,¶

9(a).)

•G

amson

isnot“liable

toTenantfor

anydam

agesarising

from

anyactorneglectofany

othertenant.”(4

AA

817,¶11(e).)

•G

amson’s

repairobligations

arelim

itedto

the“foundations,

exteriorwalls,

andexteriorro

of’;

the“unexposed

electrical,

plumbing

andsew

agesystem

s”;the

“window

frames,gutters

and

down

spoutson

thebuilding”

(butnotshoww

indows);

andthe

“heating,ventilatingand

air-conditioningsystem

s.”(4

AA

816,

¶9(a).)

•A

bsenta“hazard

orem

ergencysituation,”

Gam

sonhas

“thirty

(30)days

afternoticefrom

Tenanttocom

mence

toperform

[her

repair]obligations.”

(4A

A816,¶

9(a).)

•“TenantatTenant’s

solecostand

expenseshallkeep

ingood

order,conditionand

repairthePrem

isesand

everypartthereof

including,withoutlim

itation,allTenant’s

personalproperty,

fixtures,signs,storefronts,plate

glass,showw

indows,

doors,

interiorwalls,

interiorceiling,and

lightingfacilities.”

(4A

A816,¶

9(b).)

•“E

xceptforLandlord’s

willffil

orgrossly

negligentconduct

Tenantherebyagrees

thatLandlordshallnotbe

liablefor

any

injuryto

Tenant’sbusiness

orlossofincom

etherefrom

orfor

damage

tothe

goods,wares,m

erchandise,orotherproperty.”

(4A

A817,¶

11(e).)

41

Theselim

itationsaffectsom

eofG

insberg’sclaim

s.For

example,

Ginsberg

complained

aboutaD

ecember2003

episodeofw

aterintnision

causedby

anupstairs

tenantwho

lefthisfaucetturned

on—w

hattheparties

called“Jack’s

flood.”(3

RT

269:5-24,330:13-19,

332:1-18,343:5-15.)

Gam

sonrepaired

theinterior

ofGinsberg’s

store,so

Ginsberg

suedonly

for

breachofa

claimed

oralpromise

byG

ainson’sem

ployeeto

payfor

damaged

merchandise.

(3R

T233:14-21,269:11-272:13;

6R

T933:1-6;

5R

T750:12-18

[duringcross-exam

ination,Gam

sonagreed

with

Ginsberg’s

counselthat“(t)herew

asno

disputein

thiscase

aboutwhether

ornotyoupaid

therepairs

ofthepatching;

correct?”and

thatthe“dispute

is

whetherornotyou

paidher(sic)

merchandise;

correct?”];see

also1

AA

60-61,¶~f56-59[firstam

endedcom

plaint’sclaim

forbreachoforal

contract].)U

ndertheC

onservatorLease,how

ever,G

amson

isnot“liable

to

Tenantforany

damages

arisingfrom

anyactorneglecto

fanyothertenant”

(4A

A817,¶

11(e))or,

exceptwhere

Gam

sonw

asguilty

ofw

illfhlor

grosslynegligentconduct,

“for

damage

tothe

goods,wares,m

erchandise,

orother

property”(ibid.).

Ginsberg

alsocom

plainedthatG

amson

didnotrepaintpeeling

paint

onherinterior

floorand

reffisedto

repairan

indentationin

thefloor.

(2R

T

190:15-24,191:17-20;

3R

T228:15-231:17,329:1-330:12,

345:18-347:12,

414:7-416:15,417:14-17;6

RT

926:28-927:23;seealso

3R

T433:13-24

[Ginsberg’s

experttestifiedthatthe

indentationdid

notthreatenthe

building’sfoundation

orstructuralsoundness];

4R

T532:2-9,

562:16-565:3,

569:9-15[G

amson’s

expertwitness

describedthe

indentationas

a“divot”].)

Underthe

Conservator

Lease,however,

Gam

sonis

notresponsiblefor

repairingthe

interiorofthe

leasedproperty.

(4A

A816,¶

9(a),(b).)

42

B.

Ginsberg

Presents

No

Evidence

OfLostB

usiness

Attributable

ToW

aterIntrusion.

Ginsberg

testifiedthather

storehad

beenplagued

byepisodes

of

recurrent,destructive

water

intrusionw

hileshe

was

atenantin

Gam

son’s

building—and

specificallyduring

thefive

anda

halfyearsbefore

trial(from

Decem

ber2003

throughthe

eveoftrialin

Septem

ber2009).(See

generally

3R

T269:11-297:14

[Ginsberg’s

testimony

regardingleaks];

seealso

RB

IXA

OB

10-24.)G

insbergestim

atedthatw

aterhadleaked

intoher

store

atdifferentlocations“atleasta

dozentim

es”during

thatperiod.(3

RT

272:14-273:8,italics

added;accord,

3R

T350:24-28

[Ginsberg

employee’s

testimony].)

Ginsberg

alsotestified

thatduringthis

periodher

show

window

leaked“every

time

there’sa

heavyrain”

(3R

T273:15-274:27,

italicsadded)

andthatanother

areaofherstore

(undertheA

partment3

patio)leaked

“everytim

eitrained”

(3R

T275:18-276:4,

italicsadded).

Ginsberg

testifiedthatone

ofherem

ployeesspent30

minutes

everysingle

dayduring

thoseflveand

ahajfyears

dealingw

iththese

leaksand

Ginsberg’s

othercom

plaints.(3

RT

311:17-26;

2A

A335.)

Despite

theseallegations,G

insbergdid

notseeklostprofits

and

presentedno

evidencethatshe

was

unableto

conductbusinessfor

any

appreciableperiod:

Continuous

operationo

fbusiness.G

insbergtestified

thatherstore

was

closedfor

a“few

days”in

Decem

ber2003due

to“Jack’s

flood.”

(3R

T270:28-271:4.)

Butotherthan

those“few

days,”G

insbergneither

allegednorpresented

anyevidence

thattheconditions

shecom

plained

aboutcausedherto

closeherstore

orotherw

isevacate

theprem

ises.N

or

didshe

allegeorpresentevidence

thatGam

sonactually

orconstructively

43

evictedher.

(Seegenerally

2R

T187-192

[Ginsberg

openingstatem

ent];

3R

T201-321

[Ginsberg

directexamination];

6R

T923-940

[Ginsberg

closingargum

ent];1

AA

44-62[firstam

endedcom

plaint];2

AA

329-330

[Ginsberg

trialbrief];2

AA

335[G

insbergdam

ageschart];

seepp.

90-91,

post.)

No

lostprofits.G

insbergdid

notseek—and

presentedno

evidence

about—dam

agesfor

lostcustomers,lostprofits,

orlostgoodw

ill.(E

.g.,

6R

T932-938

[Ginsberg

closingargum

ent];2

AA

335[G

insbergdam

ages

chart].)C.

During

Tria

l,T

heC

ourtExcludes

Evidence

OfW

hy

Gam

sonB

elievedThe

Conservator

LeaseE

xpiredIn

2006.

During

heropening

statement,G

insbergtold

thejury

thatGam

son

knowingly

triedto

breakthe

ConservatorLease

becauseithad

become

disadvantageous:“Y

ouw

illhearthatMs.

Gam

sonno

longerliked”the

Conservator

Lease’sterm

sand

“wanted

more

rent.So

startingin

2003,she

undertooka

campaign

togetrid

ofm

yclientorto

haveherpay

more

rent.”

(2R

T188:24-27;

seegenerally

2R

T187-192

[entireG

insbergopening

statement].)

Ginsberg

framed

thistheory

nearthebeginning

ofher

direct

examination,w

henshe

testified:“M

ycontention

isthatshe’s

doingthis

damage

toforce

me

togive

upm

ylease,to

move

outortosign

anew

lease

andpay

triplem

yrentatleast.

Soeither

Im

oveoutorI

signa

newlease

thatgivesup

my

optionsto

renewthatshe

promised

me

andchanges

allthe

conditionsthatIoriginally

hadw

hen—on

my

firstlease.”(3

RT

234:5-10.)

Gam

soncould

rebutthistheory

onlyby

presentingevidence

ofher

good-faithand

well-founded

understandingthatthe

ConservatorLease

was

44

settoexpire

in2006.

Her

triallawyer

(David

Felsenthal)explained

thisto

thecourt:

“He

[Ginsberg’s

lawyer,M

r.W

eiss]made

anum

berofpoints

about[G

amson]

wanted

increasedrentbut[G

amson]

didn’twantto

payfor

anyrepairs.

Im

ean,hew

entallupand

down

thisissue

about[G

amson]

wanted

more

rentbutwouldn’tdo

repairs.Iw

anttogive

contexttothat.”

(5R

T737:16-19.)

Thecourtresponded

“.

..w

ealready

knowaboutthe

leaseand

soforth.Ifyou

wantto

askspecific

questions,ask

questions.B

ut

don’tgoaround

andbring

allthisstuffup

thatwe’ve

heardalready.”

(5R

T

737:24-27,italicsadded.)

Sim

ilarly,attheoutseto

fGam

son’scase

inch

iet

thetrialcourt

made

clearthatitwould

excludeevidence

regardingthe

terms

ofthe

ConservatorLease

becauseithad

alreadyheld

thatthelease

conferred

unlimited

renewals

with

minim

alrentincreasesonce

everyfive

years.Soon

intoG

amson’s

directexamination,the

trialcourtsustainedobjections

to

questionsaboutthe

circumstances

surroundingthe

executionofthe

Conservator

Leaseand

thedifferences

between

theR

ubinfeldLease

andthe

ConservatorLease.

(5R

T743-745.)

Thecourtconcluded

thatthe

testimony

implicated

“legal”issues

onw

hichithad

“alreadyruled.”

(5R

T

744-745.)

Thetrialcourtalso

sustainedobjections

totestim

onyfrom

Gam

son’s

realestatelaw

yerSaulJaffe

aboutGinsberg’s

under-marketrent.

Thecourt

heldthatthis

topicalso

implicated

a“question

oflaw

”thatithad

“already

ruledon”:

45

Q:A

tthatpointintim

e[around

early2005,

see5

RT

783-784],was

Ms.

Ginsberg

payingless

thanm

arketrent?

A:

Yes.

Q:Based

onyourpersonalexperience

andknow

ledge,howm

uch

undermarketrentw

asshe

payingatthattim

e?

A:

It’sgrossly

undermarket.

Q:C

anyou

explainw

hatyoum

eanand

give—

Mr.

Weiss:

Objection.

Relevance.

TheC

ourt:Sustained.

Mr.

Felsenthal:Y

ourH

onor,his

theoryofthe

caseis

thatdefendant

was

tryingto

increaseherrentand

refusedto

doany

repairs.

TheC

ourt:C

ounsel,theyhave

alease

forthe

amounto

ftherent.

Theyhave

optionsto

renew.

Shepays

accordingto

herlease.It’s

aquestion

oflaw

,and

I’vealready

ruledon

allthose.

(5R

T787-788.)

So,throughoutthetrial,the

jury

primarily

(ifnotexclusively)heard

Ginsberg’s

seemingly

undisputedside

ofthestory:

Gam

sonknew

that

Ginsberg

hada

perpetual,binding,under-marketlease

andtherefore

intentionallycam

paignedeitherto

“extort”additionalrentfrom

Ginsberg

(6R

T930,938,984,

986)or,failing

that,tooustG

insbergso

asto

charge

more

renttoa

newtenant(e.g.,3

RT

233-235,256[G

insbergexam

ination];

4R

T453-455,

460-464[G

amson

examination];

6R

T923,925,

927,928,

930,931,937-939

[Ginsberg

closingargum

ent]).

46

B.

The

Jury

Aw

ards$49,100

InC

ompensatory

Dam

ages,

LessT

hanA

Tenth

OfW

hatG

insbergS

ought—B

ut

Alm

ostEightTim

esT

hatAm

ountinP

unitiveD

amages.

Ginsberg

askedfor

about$545,000in

economic

damages

(2A

A335;2

RT

189-192;6

RT

932-938,990-991),including

over$41,000

onhertrespass-to-chattels

countthatthejury

rejected(2

AA

335,391;6

RT

932-934).O

nthe

countsforbreach

ofcontractand

“intentional

interferencew

ithuse

ofprem

ises,”the

juryaw

ardeda

lump

sumof

$49,100,orabout9%

ofw

hatGinsberg

hadasked

for.(2

AA

389-390,

392-393.)The

jury

awarded

$385,000in

punitivedam

ages,oralm

osteight

times

thecom

pensatorydam

agesaw

ard.(2

AA

393;see

6R

T938-939

[Ginsberg

askedfor

$1.2m

illionin

punitivedam

ages].)

On

Gam

son’sm

otionforpartialjudgm

entnotwithstanding

the

verdict,the

trialcourtstruckthe

punitivedam

agesverdict.

(3A

A527-531;

4A

A791;

7R

T1067-1074.)

Thetrialcourtconcluded

thatthebasis

for

thepunitive

damages

verdictwas

thejury’s

findingon

thecountalleging

“intentionalinterferencew

ithuse

ofprem

ises,”butthatthispurported

tort

amounted

toa

contractclaimfor

thebreach

ofthe

implied

covenantofquiet

enjoymentthatcould

notsupportpunitivedam

ages.(7

RT

1067-1074.)

47

AR

GU

ME

NT

I.

GIN

SB

ER

GD

OE

SN

OT

SE

EK

,AN

DC

OU

LDN

EV

ER

BE

EN

TIT

LE

DT

O,P

UN

ITIV

ED

AM

AG

ES

BA

SE

DO

NT

HE

JUR

Y’S

BR

EA

CH

OF

CO

NT

RA

CT

FIN

DIN

GS

.

A.

AB

reachO

fContract,

Even

IfWififu

lOr

Malicious,

CannotS

upportAP

unitiveD

amages

Aw

ard.

CivilC

odesection

3294allow

spunitive

damages

onlyin

an“action

forthe

breachofan

obligationnotarisingfrom

contract.”(~

3294,

subd.(a),italics

added.)“The

statutoryschem

efor

allowance

ofpunitive

damages

requiresboth

atortaction

anda

findingof‘oppression,

fraud,or

malice.’

(Civ.

Code,§

3294.)”(M

yersB

uildingIndustries,

Ltd.v.

InterfaceTechnology,

Inc

(1993)13

Cal.A

pp.4th949,961

(Myers),

originalitalics.)P

unitivedam

agesare

unavailableforbreach

ofcontract,

evenifthe

breachw

as“w

ilffil,fraudulent,

ormalicious”;

accordingly,the

defendant’sm

otivationfor

thebreach

isirrelevant.

(Applied

Equipm

ent

Corp.

v.LittonS

audiArabia

Ltd.(1994)

7C

al.4th503,

514-516(A

pplied

Equipm

ent).)

B.

BecauseIt

IsA

nIm

pliedC

ontractualTerm

,AB

reachO

f

TheC

ovenantOfQ

uietEnjoym

entCannotS

upport

AP

unitiveD

amages

Aw

ard.

Every

leasecontains

anim

pliedcovenanto

fquietenjoyment.

(Andrew

sv.M

obileA

ireEstates

(2005)125

Cal.A

pp.4th578,

588-591

(Andrew

s);C

iv.C

ode,§1927

[“An

agreementto

letuponhire

bindsthe

lettertosecure

tothe

hirerthequietpossession

ofthething

hiredduring

the

48

termofthe

hiring,againstallpersons

lawfully

claiming

thesam

e”).)

Breach

ofthis

implied

covenantgivesrise

toa

contract—nota

tort—claim

.

(Nathan

v.Locke(1930)

108C

al.App.

158,162

(Nathan);

seealso,

e.g.,

Butler-R

uppv.Lourdeaux

(2005)134

Cal.A

pp.4th1220,

1229-1230

(Butler-.R

upp)[only

contract—nottort—

damages

areavailable

forbreach

ofquietenjoym

ent];pp.52-55,post.)

Ginsberg

knows

this:O

verthelife

ofthis

case,shefiled

severalsetsofproposed

jury

instructionsthatw

ould

haveinstructed

theju

ryto

award

contractdamages

onher

quietenjoyment

claim.

(1S

AA

1057,1058;

2S

AA

1145,1146,

1175,1176.)

Becausea

breachofquietenjoym

entisnota

tort,punitivedam

ages

arenotavailable.

(Cyrus

v.Haveson

(1976)65

CaLA

pp.3d306,309-310,

316.)The

trialcourtthereforeproperly

refusedG

insberg’sproposed

instructionsaying

thattheju

rycould

award

punitivedam

agesifit

found

Gam

sonliable

fora

contractualbreachofquietenjoym

ent.(2

SA

A1176;

6R

T910:6-26;see

also2

AA

330[G

insbergtrialbrief].)

Thecourtinstead

instructedthe

jury

toconsiderpunitive

damages

onlyif

Ginsberg

prevailed

onherpurported

tortalleging“intentionalinterference

with

useof

premises.”

(2A

A381;

6R

T910;

seealso

6R

T932

[Ginsberg

closing

argument];

cf.Myers,supra,

13C

al.App.4th

atpp.960-96

1[reversing

punitivedam

agesspecialverdictbecause

jury“w

asneitherrequested

tonor

diditm

akethe

necessaryfactualfm

dingsfor

afraud

orothertortcause

of

action”].)

On

appeal,G

insbergessentially

dropsherearlier

argumentthat

acontractualbreach

ofquietenjoym

entcansupportpunitive

damages.

(Com

pare,e.g.,2

SA

A1176

with

RB

/XA

OB

78-98.)Instead,

shecontends

thatshealleged

andprevailed

ona

completely

differentclaimsupporting

49

herrequestforpunitivedam

ages:“tortious”

breachofquietenjoym

ent.

(RB

/XA

OB

76-77.)A

sw

enow

show,this

contentionis

meritless.

II.

GIN

SB

ER

G’S

MA

DE

-UP

CL

AIM

—”IN

TE

NT

ION

AL

INT

ER

FE

RE

NC

EW

ITH

US

EO

FP

RE

MIS

ES

”—IS

NO

T

AC

OG

NIZ

AB

LET

OR

TA

ND

PR

OV

IDE

SN

OB

AS

ISF

OR

AP

UN

ITW

ED

AM

AG

ES

AW

AR

D.

Thecrux

ofGinsberg’s

cross-appealishercontention

that

“Gam

son’sconductin

deliberatelytrying

todestroy

Ginsberg’s

abilityto

operateherstore

througha

seriesofintentionally

annoyingacts

designedto

compelthe

tenanttovacate,w

asa

tortiousbreach

ofthe

covenantofquiet

enjoymentindependento

fanycontractualobligation.”

(RB

/XA

OB

76-77,

italicsadded.)

Ginsberg

arguesthatcase

lawaboutthe

wrongfuleviction

of

residentialtenantsdem

onstratesthata

comm

ercialtenantcanrecover

for

a“tortious”

breachofquietenjoym

ent.(R

B/X

AO

B78-8

1,87-98.)She

jugglesthese

threetorttheories

interchangeably:“intentionalinterference

with

premises,”

“tortiousbreach

ofquietenjoym

ent,”and

wrongful

eviction.H

ertorttheoryfails

regardlessoftenninology.

A.

TheT

rialC

ourtProperly

Rejected

Ginsberg’s

Attem

pt

To

RecastH

erC

ontractualClaim

For

Breach

OfQ

uiet

Enjoym

entAs

AT

ort.

1.A

simple

breachofcontractalm

ostnevergives

rise

toto

rtlia

bility.

Ginsberg’s

torttheoryim

properlyconflates

contractandtortliability:

“Aperson

may

notordinarilyrecoverin

tortforthebreach

ofduties

that

50

merely

restatecontractualobligations.”

(Aasv.

Superior

Court(2000)

24C

al.4th627,643,superseded

inpartby

statuteon

othergroundsas

stated

inG

reystoneH

omes,Inc.

v.Midtec,

Inc.(2008)

168C

al.App.4th

1194,

1202.)“Ifthe

breachis

bothcontractualand

tortious,we

mustascertain

which

dutyis

thequintessence

oftheaction.

Ifitisunclear,

courts

generallyw

illconsidertheaction

tobe

incontractratherthan

intort.”

(Voth

v.W

ascoP

ublicU

tilityD

ist.(1976)

56C

al.App.3d

353,356-357.)

Disputes

allegingbreach

ofim

plied-by-lawcontractualterm

s(w

hich

would

includethe

implied

covenantofquietenjoym

ent)sound

incontract,

nottort.(See

Fairchild

v.Park

(2001)90

Cal.A

pp.4th919,927

[actions

allegingbreach

ofcovenanto

fhabitability(a

termstatutorily

implied

in

residentialleases)sound

incontract,nottort].)

And

California

courtshave

expresslyheld

thatquietenjoymentclaim

ssound

incontract:

“As

between

landlordand

tenant,where

thelease

containsa

covenantforquiet

enjoyment,

theusualrem

edyforthe

tenantisan

actionfor

abreach

ofthe

covenant.”(N

athan,supra,108

Cal.A

pp.atp.

162;seealso,

e.g.,Standard

LiveS

tockCo.

v.Pentz

(1928)204

Cal.

618,642

[tenantprevailingon

aclaim

forbreachofquietenjoym

entmay

recoveronlycontractdam

ages

underCiv.

Code,§

3300];pp.52-55,post.)

Furthermore,G

insbergand

Gam

sonare

“partiesto

acom

merciallease;

assuch,they

[are]in

nospecial

relationshipthatw

ouldgive

riseto

aduty

intort.”

(llkhchooyiv.Best

(1995)37

Cal.A

pp.4th395,412.)

51

2.G

insberg’spurported

tort

amounts

toa

garden-

varietycontractclaim

allegingbreach

ofquiet

enjoyment.

Even

thoughG

insbergargued

thatGam

sonw

asliable

foran

“intentionalinterferencew

ithuse

ofproperty,”

shedid

notproposean

instructionon

thatpurportedtort.

(6R

T873-875;

seegenerally

6R

T873-

890.)She

insteadproposed

aprivate

nuisanceinstruction

(CA

CIN

o.2021)

becauseitw

as“frankly,the

closestone[she]

couldfm

d.”(6

RT

873:20-

87

4:5

.)10

Thetrialcourtrefused

theinstruction.

(6R

T988-990.)

ICG

insberg’sproposed

nuisanceinstruction

said:

EstherG

insbergclaim

sthatH

annaG

amson

interferedw

ithE

stherG

insberg’suse

andenjoym

entofherland.

Toestablish

thisclaim

,E

stherGinsberg

mustprove

allofthe

following.

One,thatEstherG

insbergleased

theproperty;

Two,

thatHanna

Gam

sonby

actingor—

excusem

e—by

actingor

failingto

actcreateda

conditionthatw

asan

obstructionto

thefree

useofthe

propertyso

asto

interferew

iththe

comfortable

enjoyment

oflife

orproperty;

Three,thatthis

conditioninterfered

with

EstherGinsberg’s

useof

enjoymentofherland;

Four,thatE

stherGinsberg

didnotconsentto

Hanna

Gam

son’sconduct;

Five,thatan

ordinaryperson

would

bereasonably

annoyedor

disturbedby

Hanna

Gam

son’sconduct;

Six,thatEstherG

insbergw

asharm

ed;

Seven,thatHanna

Gam

son’sconductw

asa

substantialfactorin

causingEstherG

insberg’sharm

;

And,

eight,thattheseriousness

ofthe

harmoutw

eighsthe

publicbenefito

fHanna

Gam

son’sconduct.

(6RT

874-875;see

also1

SA

A1017-1019;2S

AA

1108-1110.)

52

Gam

sonobjected

throughoutthetrialcourtproceedings

thatthere

was

nocognizable

tortfora

landlord’s“intentionalinterference

with

useof

[thetenant’sjproperty.”

(4R

T497-498;

6R

T893-897.)

Nonetheless,

becausethe

thaicourtoverruledher

objections(4

RT

497-498;6

RT

896,

898),G

amson

proposedan

instructioncovering

bothG

insberg’scontract

claimforbreach

ofquietenjoym

entandherpurported

tortfor“intentional

interferencew

ithuse

ofproperty”

(6R

T880-888).”

Butneitherside

ever

locatedany

relevantauthoritythateven

addressedthe

existenceof

Ginsberg’s

claimfor

“intentionalinterferencew

ithuse

ofproperty.”

Instead,the

instructionon

Ginsberg’s

purported“to

rt”w

aspatterned

onauthority

construinga

contractualbreachofquietenjoym

entina

residentiallease,notanytort:

Andrew

s,supra,125

Cal.A

pp.4thatpp.

585,

590.(6

RT

880-888.)A

ndrews

doesnoteven

suggesttortliabilityor

punitivedam

ages.Itju

stdefmes

theim

pliedcovenanto

fquietenjoyment,

statingthat“[m

]inorinconveniences

andannoyances

arenotactionable

breachesofthe

implied

covenantofquietenjoym

ent.To

beactionable,the

landlord’sactor

omission

mustsubstantially

interferew

itha

tenant’sright

touse

andenjoy

theprem

isesfor

thepurposes

contemplated

bythe

tenancy.”(125

Cal.A

pp.4thatp.

589;see

also2

SA

A1173-1174.)

Andrew

sfurtherrecognizes

thatatenantw

horeffises

tovacate

theleased

premises

“may

elect‘tostand

uponthe

lease,remain

inpossession

andsue

for

contractdamages.”

(125C

aLApp.4th

atp.590,italics

added,quoting

“Gam

sonproposed

thisinstruction

onlybecause

thetrialcourtoverruled

herobjections,

soshe

isnotestopped

fromarguing

onappealthatthe

purportedtortfor

“intentionalinterferencew

ithuse

ofproperty”

doesnot

exist.(See

Mary

Mv.

City

ofLos

Angeles

(1991)54

Cal.3d

202,212-213.)

53

Guntertv.

City

ofStockton

(1976)55

Cal.A

pp.3d131,

141(G

untert);see

pp.59-60,post.)

Ginsberg

apparentlyagreed

thattheinstruction

onherintentional

interferenceclaim

shouldbe

patternedafterA

ndrews.

(6R

T880-888.)

Sheeven

arguedthatthe

trialcourtshouldadoptherproposed

special

instructionbecause

it—unlike

Gam

son’s—”niniic[ked]”

Andrew

s’breach

ofquietenjoym

entlanguage.(6

RT

883.)G

insbergultim

atelypersuaded

thetrialcourtto

modify

Gam

son’sproposed

tortinstructionin

aw

aythat

shebelieved

more

closelyfollow

edthe

Andrew

sstandard

fora

breachof

quietenjoyment.

(6R

T883-888;

2A

A372.)

Theas-given

specialinstructionsays:

Implied

inevery

rentalagreementis

acovenanto

fquite[sic]

enjoymentby

which

thelandlord

impliedly

promises

toallow

the

tenantpossessionand

“quietenjoyment”

ofthe

premises

duringthe

leaseterm

andnotto,through

actorom

ission,disturbthe

tenant’s

possessionand

beneficialenjoymento

ftheprem

isesfor

thepurposes

contemplated

inthe

lease.

Inorderto

prevailonherclaim

forIntentionalInterference

with

Use

ofP

roperty,pla

intiffm

ustprovethatacts

orom

issionsofdefendant

substantiallyinterfered

with

plaintiff’srightto

useand

enjoythe

leasedprem

ises.A

ctsorom

issionsam

ountingonly

toinconvenience

andannoyance

arenotsufficientto

meetthis

standardofproof.

(2A

A372;

seealso

6R

T887-888,

1004.)

Thisinstruction

doesnotdefine

anytort—

itonlysets

outtheprim

a

facieelem

entsofa

contractclaimarising

froma

landlord’sbreach

ofthe

54

covenantofquietenjoym

ent.Itis

indistinguishablefrom

thisblack-letter

formulation

ofa

contractualquietenjoymentclaim

;A

“landlord’sfailure

to

fulfillan

obligationto

repairorto

replacean

essentialstructureorto

providea

necessaryservice

[cjanresultin

abreach

ofthe

covenantifthe

failuresubstantially

affectsthe

tenant’sbeneficialenjoym

entofthe

premises.”

(Petroleum

Collections,

Inc.v.

Swords

(1975)48

Cal.A

pp.3d

841,846;see

p.53,ante

[quotingA

ndrews’s

breachofquietenjoym

ent

definition].)So,justas

Ginsberg

wanted,the

finalinstruction

“mim

ic[ked]”A

ndrew?

definitionofa

contractclaim,nota

tort.

B.

Ginsberg’s

Reliance

On

Cases

Addressing

TheW

rongful

Eviction

OfR

esidentialTenantsFails

To

SupportH

er

Contention

ThatT

hereE

xistsA

To

rtF

orThe

Breach

OfQ

uietEnjoym

entInT

heC

omm

ercialContext.

Ginsberg

arguesfor

thefirsttim

eon

appealthatcasesrecognizing

atortforthe

wrongfuleviction

ofa

residentialtenantsupporther

contentionthatthere

existsa

tortforthebreach

ofa

comm

ercialtenant’s

quietenjoyment.

(SeeR

B/X

AO

B80-81,quoting

Barkettv.B

rucato(1953)

122C

al.App.2d

264,274-275(B

arkett).)H

erargum

entfails.

1.T

hegravam

enofG

insberg’scross-appealis

her

newtheory

thatshe

was

wrongfully

evicted.

Theelem

entsofa

prima

facieclaim

forwrongfully

evicting

aresidentialtenant,

asexplained

byB

arkettandlatercases,are:

(1)the

residentialtenantwas

actuallyor

constructivelyevicted

fromthe

premises

by(2)

thelandlord’s

“seriesofintentionally

annoyingacts”

that

(3)w

ere“designed

tocom

pelthetenantto

vacate.”(B

arkett,supra,

55

122C

al.App.2d

atp.274;G

reenv.S

uperiorC

ourt(1974)10

Cal.3d

616,

625, flu.10.)

Accordingly,this

claimlies

only~fthe

tenantvacatesthe

residence.(G

reenv.S

uperiorC

ourt,supra,10

Cal.3d

atp.625,flu.

10.)

Ginsberg’s

newly-conceived

wrongfuleviction

theoryis

grounded

ona

misunderstanding

ofthetortsetoutin

Barkett.

(RB

/XA

OB

80-81,87-

88.)A

ccordingto

Ginsberg,B

arkettheldthatto

prevailona

wrongful

evictionclaim

,thetenantneed

showonly

theelem

entsfornuisance

as

defmed

bythe

Restatem

ent(First)ofTorts

section822.

(RB

JXA

OB

80-81,

quotingB

arkett,supra,122

CatA

pp.2datpp.274-275.)

Notso.

Barkett

considereda

“willfu

lwrongfuleviction”

ofa

residentialtenantwho

had

vacatedthe

premises—

notasim

pleclaim

fornuisance

orbreachofquiet

enjoyment.

(122C

al.App.2d

atpp.272,274-275[distinguishing

thistort

froma

contractualbreachofquietenjoym

ent].)

Ginsberg

similarly

misconstrues

thetw

oother

casesthatshe

says

showthata

comm

ercialtenantcanstate

aclaim

fora

“tortious”breach

of

quietenjoyment:

Spin/csv.E

quityR

esidentialBriarw

oodA

partments

(2009)171

CaLA

pp.4th1004

(Spin/cs)and

Too/cev.A

llen(1948)

85C

al.App.2d

230(Too/ce).

(RB

/XA

OB

88-89.)O

nceagain,both

cases

involvedresidentialtenants.

(Spin/cs,supra,171

Cal.A

pp.4thatpp.

1017-

1018,1055

[“wrongfuleviction”

ofaresidentialtenantbased

onlandlord’s

changingtenant’s

locksm

id-lease];Too/ce,supra,

85C

al.App.2d

atp.232

[residentialtenantvacatedapartm

entafterfiling

suit].)

Ginsberg

citesno

authorityforthe

propositionthata

comm

ercial

tenantcanprevailon

aw

rongfhlevictiontheory.

(SeeR

B/X

AO

B80-8

1,

87-89.)B

utevenassum

ingthatsuch

aclaim

were

cognizable,itw

ouldlie

onlyafterthe

tenantvacatedthe

leasedprem

ises:“In

orderthattherebe

56

aconstructive

evictionitis

essentialthatthetenantshould

vacatethe

property.There

isno

constructiveeviction

ifthetenantcontinues

in

possessionofthe

premises

however

much

hem

aybe

disturbedin

the

beneficialenjoyment.”

(Lor4Lim

itedv.

Wojfe

(1948)85

Cal.A

pp.2d54,

65, italicsadded;

Id.atp.

66[constructive

evictionclaim

failedbecause

thetenants

“notonlycontinued

inpossession

butwere

litigating,seeldng

to

remain

inpossession”];

accord,Munoz

v.MacM

illan(2011)

195C

al.App.4th

648,655

[wrongfuleviction

liesonly

ifthe“tenantis

forciblyrem

ovedfrom

premises

withoutjudicialprocess,”

italicsadded].)

2.B

ecauseG

insberghas

notshown

thatshe

reliedon

aw

rongfulevictiontheory

inthe

trialcourt,

this

Courtshould

notconsiderit.

Whateverthe

elements

ofherw

rongfulevictionclaim

are,Ginsberg

hasnotshow

nthatshe

raisedthe

claimin

thetrialcourt.

(Seegenerally

R.B

/XA

OB

78-98.)

Tothe

contrary,Ginsberg’s

primary

theoryon

punitivedam

ages

throughoutthetrialcourtproceedings

was

simple:

Punitive

damages

are

availableto

acom

mercialtenantw

hoprevails

ona

contractclaimfor

breachofquietenjoym

ent.(2

AA

330[G

insbergtrialbrief];

2S

AA

1175,

1176;6R

T895-897;

accord,1

SA

A1057,

1058;2S

AA

1145,1146.)

The

trialcourtrejectedthis

argument(6

RT

910)and

Ginsberg

hasessentially

abandonediton

appeal.

Inthe

trialcourt,G

insbergalso

arguedthatshe

couldrecovertort

damages

forG

amson’s

alleged“intentionalinterference

with

useof

premises.”

(See,e.g.,

6R

T893:22-897:8,

932:8-16.)B

utshenever

57

proposedany

instructionson

thatpurportedtortor

citedany

authority

holdingthatsuch

atort—

--assuniingone

evenexisted—

was

applicableto

thefacts

ofthis

case.(See

generally6

RT

854-903[jury

instruction

conference];2

SA

A1172-1178.)

And

shecertainly

didnotground

her

“intentionalinterference”theory

oncase

lawregarding

thew

rongful

evictionofresidentialtenants.

(See,e.g.,6

RT

873:20-874:5

[relyingon

CA

CIprivate

nuisanceinstruction];

6R

T879:19-888:14

[“tort”instruction

basedon

authorityregarding

contractualbreachofquietenjoym

ent];3

AA

527-529,596-598,

615-617[G

insbergopposition

tom

otionforpartial

JNO

V];

7R

I1067-1073

[hearingon

motion

forpartialJNO

V];

seealso

4A

A779-781

[Gam

sonreply

insupporto

fmotion

forpartialJNO

VJ;

pp.52-55,ante.)

BecauseG

insberghas

notdemonstrated

thatsheraised

herwrongful

evictiontheory

inthe

trialcourt,this

Courtshould

notconsiderit.

(See,e.g.,C

ableC

onnection,Inc.

v.DIR

EC

TV

(2008)44

Cal.4th

1334,

1350,ft

12;Franklin

Mint

Co.v.M

anatt,Phelps

&Phillz~s,

LLP(2010)

184C

al.App.4th

313,349(F

ranklinM

int).)In

anycase,G

insberg’stheory

failson

them

erits.

58

C.

Even

Assum

ingT

hatThereE

xistsA

Claim

For

The

WrongfulE

victionO

fAC

omm

ercialTenant,

Ginsberg

Failed

To

Establish

ItB

yP

roof;Jury

Instructions,O

r

SpecialV

erdict.

1.G

insbergdid

notallegeor

establishthatshe

was

evicted.

Essentialto

aclaim

ofw

rongfulevictionis

thatthereactually

bean

eviction—the

tenantmusthave

vacatedthe

premises.

Atenantw

ho

remains

hasonly

acontractclaim

fordam

agesforbreach

ofthe

covenantof

quietenjoyment.

Thatisw

hathappenedin

Guntertv.

City

ofStockton,

supra,55

Cal.A

pp.3d131,w

herethe

tenant—like

Ginsberg—

was

“not

suingfor

aw

rongful,constructive

evictionbutforthe

lessor’sunjust(fled

andunauthorized

interferencew

ithhis

profitableuse

ofthe

leasedproperty.

Therule

requiringouster

orsunenderpriortosuitforw

rongfuleviction

doesnotpreclude

thetenantfrom

hiselection

tostand

uponthe

lease,

remain

inpossession

andsue

forbreach

ofcontractdam

ages.”(Id.

at

p.141,italics

added.)Later

authoritiesrelying

onG

untertconfirmthat

atenantrem

ainingin

theleased

premises

may

recoveronlycontract

damages:

Guntertm

erelyclarified

thatalandlord’s

interferencew

itha

tenant’s

quietenjoymentm

aysupportan

actionfor

damages

evenifthe

tenantdoesnotm

oveouto

ftheprem

ises.[C

itation.]W

hilea

claim

forbreach

ofthe

covenantofquietenjoym

entissim

ilarto

aconstructive

evictionclaim

,the

criticaldifferenceis

thatthelatter

claimm

aynotbe

broughtuntilthetenanthas

vacatedthe

property.

[Citation.]

59

(Cunningham

v.U

niversalU

nderwriters

(2002)98C

al.App.4th

1141,1152-1153,italics

added;accord,A

ndrews,supra,

125C

al.App.4th

at

p.590;M

archesev.S

tandardR

ealtyand

Developm

entCo.(1977)

74C

al.App.3d

142,148.)

Ginsberg

didnotvacate

theprem

isesand

shepresented

noevidence

ofactualor

constructiveeviction.

(Seegenerally

3R

T201-321

[entire

Ginsberg

directexamination];2

AA

335[G

insbergdam

ageschart].)

Accordingly,her

onlypotentialrem

edyis

contractdamages.

2.T

heju

ryw

asnotinstructed

onw

rongfuleviction.

Thejury’s

verdictmustbe

judgedsolely

bythe

lawgiven

inthe

instructions:“[S

)ince[G

insberg)assert[s]no

claimofenorin

thejury

instructions,the

rulesare

properlylocated

inthe

instructionsgiven

the

jury.”

(Nullv.

City

ofLosAngeles

(1988)206

Cal.A

pp.3d1528,

1534;

seealso

People

v.W

illiams

(2001)25

Cal.4th

441,463[“W

ereaffinn,

therefore,thebasic

rulethatjurors

arerequired

todeterm

inethe

factsand

rendera

verdictinaccordance

with

thecourt’s

instructionson

thelaw

”].)

Ginsberg

neverproposedan

instructionon

thew

rongfuleviction

theorythatshe

urgeson

appeal,and

thejury

receivedno

suchinstruction.

(2A

A372;2

SA

A1172-1178;6

RT

854-903[jury

instructionconference].)

Sheinstead

proposedan

instructionon

privatenuisance

(CA

CIN

o.2021),

which

was

supposedto

coverherpurported“intentionalinterference

with

property”tort.

(6R

T873-875;

seepp.

52-53&

fri.10,ante.)

Thetrial

courtrefusedthatinstruction

(6R

T988-990),w

hichdid

notsetoutthe

prima

facieelem

entsfor

thew

rongfulevictiontheory

thatshenow

pursues

inany

case(seep.

52,fit

10,ante).

60

Theas-given

“intentionalinterferencew

ithuse

ofprem

ises”

instructiontracks

arun-of-the-m

illcontractualquietenjoymentclaim

—not

aclaim

forw

rongfuleviction.(2

AA

372;see

pp.53-57,

ante.)

Specifically,the

jury

was

notinstructedthatit

couldhold

Gam

sonliable

for

“tortiousbreach

ofquietenjoym

ent”(or“intentionalinterference

with

property”or

“wrongfuleviction”)

onlyifitfound

that:(1)

Ginsberg

was

actuallyor

constructivelyevicted

by(2)

Gam

son’s“series

ofintentionally

annoyingacts”

that(3)w

ere“designed

tocom

pel[her]to

vacate.”(See

pp.55-56,ante.)

Ginsberg’s

cross-appealthereforefails:

Shecannotprevailby

assertinga

theoryaboutw

hichthe

juryw

asnotinstructed.

(SeeB

lakev.

Arp

(1919)180

Cal.

144,148

[refusingto

considernew

defensetheory

because“(t)his

pointwas

notpresentedby

instructionsto

thejury,

andit

is

notinvolvedin

anyrequested

instruction,and

thepointw

astherefore

waived”];M

amm

othLakes

LandA

cquisition,LLC

v.Tow

nofM

amm

oth

Lakes(2010)

191C

al.App.4th

435,464,fit

5[rejecting

theorybecause

it

“was

notpresentedto

theju

ryby

instructionsattrial”].)

3.T

heju

ry’sspecialverdictm

adeno

findingsthat

would

supportaclaim

forw

rongfuleviction.

Perhapsthe

Courtcould

overlookG

insberg’sfailure

toallege

and

putonevidence

regardinga

wrongfuleviction

theoryand

theabsence

of

instructionson

theclaim

ifthejury’s

factualfmdings

nevertheless

supportedsuch

aclaim

.B

uttheydon’t.

Aspecialverdictdoes

notbenefitfroma

generalverdict’s

presumption

ofcorrectness.

Areview

ingcourtdoes

notimply

findingsin

favorofthe

prevailingparty;rather,the

verdict’scorrectness

isdeterm

ined

61

asa

matter

oflaw

.(T

rujillov.N

orthC

ountyTransitD

ist.(1998)

63C

al.App.4th

280,285.)In

addition,“[u]nlike

ageneralverdict(w

hich

merely

implies

findingson

allissuesin

favorofthe

pla

intiffor

defendant),

aspecialverdictpresents

tothe

juryeach

ultimate

factinthe

case.The

jury

mustresolve

allofthe

ultimate

factspresented

toitin

thespecialverdict,

so

that‘nothing

shallremain

tothe

courtbuttodraw

fromthem

conclusionsof

law.’

(Code

Civ.

Proc.,§

624.)”(M

yers,supra,13

Cal.A

pp.4thatpp.

959-

960,originalitalics;internalquotation

marks

andcitations

omitted.)

Judgedby

thesestandards,the

specialverdictformhere

doesnot

supportanykind

oftortclaim

,wrongfuleviction

orotherw

ise.

Therelevantspecialverdictform

isentitled

“IntentionalInterference

with

Use

ofP

remises.”

Itreads:

We

answerthe

questionssubm

ittedto

usas

follows:

1.D

idE

stherGinsberg

provethatacts

orom

issionsofH

anna

Gam

sonsubstantially

interferedw

ithE

stherG

insberg’srights

touse

andenjoy

theleased

premises

forthepurposes

contemplated

inthe

lease?

fles

No

Ifyouransw

ertoquestion

1is

yes,thenansw

erquestion

2.

Ifyouansw

eredno,

stophere,answ

ernofurther

questions,and

have

thepresiding

jurorsign

anddate

thisfonn.

2.D

oyou

findby

clearandconvincing

evidencethatH

anna

Gam

sonengaged

inconductw

ithm

alice,oppression

orfraud?

~Y

es_N

o

(2A

A392.)

62

Likethe

juryinstruction,the

specialverdictfindingthatG

ainson

“substantiallyinterfered

with

EstherG

insberg’srights

touse

andenjoy

the

leasedprem

isesforthe

purposescontem

platedin

thelease”

addressesonly

theelem

entsfor

acontractualbreach

ofquietenjoym

ent,and

notthose

forwrongfuleviction.

(Seepp.

53-57,60-61,

ante.)A

bsentthosew

rongful

evictionfindings,how

ever,G

amson

cannotbeliable

undera

wrongful

evictiontheory

asa

matter

oflaw

:A

“specialverdictis‘fatally

defective’if

itdoes

notallowthe

jury

toresolve

everycontroverted

issue.[C

itations.]”

(Saxenav.

Goffizey

(2008)159

Cal.A

pp.4th316,

325,326

[specialverdict

on“inform

edconsent”w

asdefective

becauseit“did

notrequirethe

jury

to

make

afinding

onbattery”j;F

uller-Austin

InsulationCo.

v.Highlands

InsuranceCo.

(2006)135

Cal.A

pp.4th958,

1005-1006[specialverdicton

“inequitablem

isconduct”w

asdefective

becauseitdid

notrequirejury

to

make

afm

dingon

“reasonableness”];Myers,supra,

13C

al.App.4th

at

pp.960-96

1[punitive

damages

award

was

defectivebecause

specialverdict

formdid

notrequireju

ryto

make

findingson

anunderlying

tort].)

Accordingly,

Ginsberg’s

purportedtortclaim

groundedon

a“w

rongfuleviction”theory

(or“tortious”

breachofquietenjoym

entor

“intentionalinterferencew

ithuse

ofprem

ises”or

anyotherlabelG

insberg

mightsuggest)

failsbecause

theju

ryw

asnotinstructed,

andm

adeno

fmdings,

onthatclaim

.

63

P.

TheT

rialC

ourtProperly

Relied

On

Erich

andB

aile

r

Rapp

ToC

oncludeT

hatG

insbergC

ouldN

otRecover

TortD

amages

On

Her

Breach

OfC

ontractClaim

.

Instriking

thepunitive

damages

verdict,thethaicourtrelied

on

Erlich

v.Menezes

(1999)21C

al.4th543

(Erlich)

andB

utler-Rupp,supra,

134C

al.App.4th

1220.(6

RT

1067-1073.)These

casesacknow

ledgethe

unremarkable

propositionthattortdam

agesgenerally

cannotbetacked

onto

acontractclaim

.(E

rlich,supra,21C

al.4thatpp.

551-554;Butler-R

upp,

supra,134

CaLA

pp.4thatpp.

1227-1228.)G

insbergcontends

thatErlich

andB

utler-Rupp

donotpreclude

tortliabilitybecause

thoserulings

hinged

onthe

“negligent”nature

ofthe

tortiousconduct,w

hereasthe

juryhere

supposedlyfound

Gam

sonliable

foran

intentionaltortbearingthe

hallmarks

ofw

rongfuleviction.(R

B/X

AO

B97-98.)

Ginsberg

misstates

boththe

holdingsofE

rlichand

Butler-B

uppand

thejury’s

verdict.

Erlich

concludedthata

homeow

nercouldnotrecovertortdam

ages

againstacontractorfor

whatw

asessentially

acontractualconstruction

defectclaim.

(21C

al.4thatp.

552.)The

obligationsbetw

eenthe

homeow

nerand

contractorwere

defmed

exclusivelyby

contract;therefore,

tortdamages

were

unavailable.(Id.

atp.554.)

Butler-B

uppheld

that

acom

mercialtenantcannotrecover

ona

tortclaimarising

fromthe

landlord’salleged

breachofthe

covenantofquietenjoym

ent.

(134C

al.App.4th

atpp.1229-1230.)

Butler-R

uppalso

rejectedthe

notion—im

plicitinG

insberg’scross-appellant’s

openingbrief—

thatcase

lawallow

ingresidentialtenants

torecoverpunitive

damages

operatesin

the

comm

ercialcontext.(Id.

atp.1230

[residentialtenantmay

recovertort

damages

underC

iv.C

ode,§1941

(warranty

ofhabitability

inresidential

64

leases),butthatstatute“has

noapplication

tocom

mercialleases”].)

Moreover,

contraryto

Ginsberg’s

contention(R

BIX

AO

B98),

although

Erlich

andB

utler-Rupp

bothconsidered

thetortofnegligentinfliction

of

emotionalharm

,neitherlimited

itsanalysis

tonegligence

claims.

Ginsberg

alsom

isstates,once

again,theclaim

aboutwhich

theju

ry

was

instructedand

rendereda

verdict.C

ontraryto

Ginsberg’s

assertion,

theju

rydid

notconsiderorm

akeany

fmdings

onthe

“independenttort”of

“intentionalinterferencew

ithuse

andquietenjoym

entofleased

premises,

accomplished

bya

seriesofintentionally

annoyingacts

designedto

compel

thetenantto

vacate.”(R

B/X

AO

B98;see

2A

A372,

392[jury

instruction

andspecialverdict];pp.

60-63,ante.)

Theju

ryrendered

averdicton

acontractclaim

,period.There

was

nobasis

forpunitivedam

agesand

thereforeno

basisforreversal.

III.

AS

AM

AT

TE

RO

FP

UB

LICP

OLIC

Y,

PU

NIT

IVE

DA

MA

GE

S

SH

OU

LDN

OT

BE

AV

AIL

AB

LE

FO

RTEEE

BR

EA

CH

OF

TH

E

CO

VE

NA

NT

OF

QU

IET

EN

JOY

ME

NT

INA

CO

MM

ER

CIA

L

LEA

SE

.

A.

Even

IfPunitive

Dam

agesW

ereA

vailableF

orThe

Breach

OfThe

CovenantO

fQuietE

njoyment,

TheyW

ouldB

e

InappropriateIn

The

ConunercialC

ontext.

Tortand

contractlawprom

otedistinctpolicies,w

hichexplains

why

thedam

agesavailable

aresim

ilarlydistinct:

“Contractactions

arecreated

toprotectthe

interestinhaving

promises

performed,”

while

“[t]ort

actions

arecreated

toprotectthe

interestinfreedom

fromvarious

kindsofharm

.”

65

(Applied

Equipm

ent,supra,7C

aL4thatp.

515,internalcitationand

quotationm

arksom

itted.)G

iventhatdistinction,

contractdamages

are

limited

tothose

within

thecontem

plationofthe

contractingparties.

(ibid.;

Civ.

Code,§

3300.)Tort-type

damages,w

hichcan

includepunitive

damages,are

almostnever

availablein

contractactions.(E

rlich,supra,

21C

al.4thatp.

553.)“C

onductamounting

toa

breachofcontractbecom

es

tortiousonly

when

italsoviolates

anindependentduty

arisingfrom

principlesoftortlaw

.”(A

ppliedE

quipment,supra,7

Cal.4th

atp.515.)

Courts

arecareflulnotto

“blurthedistinction

between

contractand

tort.”(B

utler-.Rupp,supra,

134C

al.App.4th

atp.1229.)

Thisis

especially

truein

thecom

mercialcontext.

Our

Supreme

Courthas

recognizedthatthe

limitation

oncontractdam

ages“serves

toencourage

contractualrelations

andcom

mercialactivity

byenabling

partiesto

estimate

inadvance

the

financialrisksoftheir

enterprise.”(A

ppliedE

quipment,supra,7

Cal.4th

atp.515.)

TheC

ourtarticulateda

similar

concernw

henrefusing

toexpand

tortremedies

inthe

wrongfulterm

inationcontext:

“Theexpansion

oftort

remedies

inthe

employm

entcontexthaspotentially

enormous

consequences

forthestability

ofthe

businesscom

munity.”

(Foleyv.Interactive

Data

Corp.

(1988)47

Cal.3d

654,699

(Foley).)

Thesam

eholds

truein

thecom

merciallandlord-tenantcontext.

Tort

remedies

areunavailable

becausethe

landlordand

tenantare“parties

to

acom

merciallease;

assuch,they

[are]in

nospecialrelationship

thatwould

giverise

toa

dutyin

tort.”(Illchchooyiv.Best,supra,37

Cal.A

pp.4that

p.412.)M

oth

er

courtexplainedthata

comm

erciallandlordand

tenant

shareno

“specialorfiduciary

relationship”because

“eachcontracted

strictly

outofa

profitmotive,

andordinary

damages

forbreachofa

leasew

ere

66

availableequally

toboth.”

(Girard

v.Delta

Towers

JointVenture

(1993)

20C

al.App.4th

1741,1749.)

Accordingly,w

here—as

here—a

landlord’s

“dutiesw

erecircum

scribedby

[her]obligations

underthelease

andw

ere

confinedto

fUlfilling

[thecom

mercialtenant’s]

contractualexpectationsof

economic

gain,”only

contractdamages

areavailable.

(Butler-R

upp,supra,

134C

al.App.4th

atp.1229

[rejectingem

otionaldistressclaim

].)A

ny

additionalrecoveryw

ouldbe

“superfluous”because

thecom

mercialtenant

“ism

adew

holeby

therecovery

ofcontractdam

ages.”(Ilkhchooyiv.Best,

supra,37

CaLA

pp.4thatp.412.)

Ginsberg

nonethelessasks

theC

ourttojum

patw

hatshecalls

the

“opportunity”to

carveoutan

exceptionto

theseprinciples

(RB

/XA

OB

94)

toallow

punitivedam

agesagainsta

comm

erciallandlordforthe

breachof

quietenjoymentifthat“breach

is(1)

accomplished

bya

seriesof

intentionallyannoying

actsdesigned

tocom

pelthetenantto

vacateand

(2)com

mitted

with

‘oppression,fraud,orm

alice

”(R

B/X

AO

B91).

But

shedoes

notaddressthe

settledrules

that(a)a

breachofcontractnever

supportstortrem

edies,includingpunitive

damages,absentthe

breachof

some

extra-contractualduty,and(b)

motive

isneverrelevantto

aclaim

for

breachofcontract.

(See,e.g.,Freeman

&M

ills,Inc.

v.Belcher

OilCo.

(1995)11

Cal.4th

85,102;A

ppliedEquz~m

ent,supra,7

CaI.4th

atpp.515-

516;Foley,supra,47C

al.3datpp.

692-694.)

Whatlim

itedauthority

thereis

inthe

comm

erciallandlord-tenant

contextdemonstrates

thatGinsberg’s

allegationsvery

likelydo

notmake

outanyintentionaltort.

InM

cDonellv.A

merican

TrustCo.

(1955)

130C

al.App.2d

296,299,comm

ercialtenantssued

theirlandlordalleging

that“defendantaw

areofthe

defectivecondition

ofthe

roofanddrains

and

67

knowing

theycould

causedam

age,refusedto

repairthem.”

MeD

onellheld

that“[tjhosefacts

donotspellan

intentionaltort”and

thereforecould

not

supportpunitivedam

ages.(Id.

atpp.299-300[dem

urrerproperlysustained

topunitive

damages

count].)

Finally,

evenifthe

Courtbelieved

thatGinsberg’s

suggested

formulation

were

agood

idea,Ginsberg

stillwould

notbeentitled

to

punitivedam

ages:The

juryw

asn’teveninstructed,m

uchless

made

fmdings,

aboutwhether

Gam

sonbreached

thecovenant“by

aseries

of

intentionallyannoying

actsdesigned

tocom

pel[Ginsberg]

tovacate”

the

premises.

(Com

pareR

B/X

AO

B91

with

2A

A372,

392[jury

instruction

andspecialverdict];

seepp.

60-63,ante.)

B.

Ginsberg’s

California

Case

LawD

oesN

otSupportH

er

Position.

Although

sheacknow

ledgesthat“[n]o

California

casehas

directly

addressedthe

recoverabilityofpunitive

damages

againstalandlord

under

acom

merciallease

forbreach

ofthe

covenantofquietenjoym

ent,”

Ginsberg

claims

that“severalCalifornia

caseshave

touchedon

theissue.”

(RB

/XA

OB

90.)B

utherauthority

consistsofthree

casesthathave

nothing

todo

with

the“issue.”

(R.B

/XA

OB

90-91;see

Sonic-C

alabasasA,

Inc.v.

Moreno

(2011)51

Cal.4th

659,694,lb.14

(Sonic-C

alabasas)[“(I)t

is

axiomatic

thatcasesare

notauthorityforpropositions

notconsidered,”

alterationin

original;internalquotation

marks

andcitation

omitted].)

Beckettv.

City

ofP

arisThy

Goods

Cc.

(1939)14

Cal.2d

633

(Beckett).

Ginsberg

suggeststhatB

eckett“implicitly

acknowledged

that

[acom

mercialtenant]m

ightbeentitled

topunitive

damages”

forbreachof

68

quietenjoyment.

(RB

IXA

OB

90,alteration

added.)N

ottrue.The

underlyingclaim

inB

eckettwasw

rongfuleviction—notbreach

ofquiet

enjoyment.

(14C

al.2datpp.

638-639j’2

Too/cev.A

llen,supra,85

Cal.A

pp.2d230.

Ginsberg

arguesthat

althoughToo/ce

concerneda

residentialtenant,thecourt“touched

on”

comm

ercialleasesby

affirming

apunitive

damages

award

“for,in

part,

‘lossofbusiness

earnings.”(R

B/X

AO

B90.)

Nottrue.

Too/ceconsidered

onlyw

hethertheresidentialtenant’s

“[1]ossofearnings”

shouldhave

been

“pleadedby

way

ofspeciaidam

ages.”(85

Cal.A

pp.2datp.238.)

Fanoutsopoulosv.

Cham

bliss(2007)

157C

al.App.4th

297

(Panoutsopoulos).

Although

sherelied

onP

anoutsopoulosin

thetrial

court,G

insbergnow

concedesthat“punitive

damages

arenotatissue”

in

thatcase.(R

BIX

AO

B90-91;see

3A

A597;

6R

T895;

7R

T1070.)

But

shecites

itanyway

becauseit“noted”

thatanarbitrator

ina

prior

proceedinghad

awarded

“$100,000in

punitivedam

agesagainstthe

comm

erciallandlordon

claims

ofbreach

ofthe

covenantofquiet

enjoymentand

intentionalinflictionofem

otionaldistress.”

(RB

IXA

OB

91.)A

gain,nottrue.

Forone

thing,Fanoutsopoulosidentified

nothingof“note”

inthe

arbitrator’saw

ard—itdescribed

theaw

ardonly

asa

mattero

fproceduralbackground.(157

Cal.A

pp.4thatp.

303.)For

another,

thearbitrator

awarded

$100,000in

punitivedam

ageson

aclaim

for

12Beclcettdidnotconsider

orruleon

theviability

ofa

wrongfU

leviction

tortinthe

comm

ercialcontext—itm

erelyassum

edthatthe

tortexisted.Thus,B

eckettisnotauthority

fortheviability

ofthatpurported

tort.(See

Sonic-C

alabasas,supra,51

Cal.4th

atp.694,

fit14.)

69

intentionalinflictionofem

otionaldistress—notbreach

ofquietenjoym

ent.

(Ibid.)

C.

Ginsberg’s

Out-O

f-State

Au

tho

rityD

oesN

otSupportH

er

Position.

Ginsberg

citestw

oout-of-state

opinionsthatshe

says“expressly

affirmed

punitivedam

agesaw

ardsagainstlandlords

undercomm

ercial

leasesfortortious

breachofthe

covenantofquietenjoym

ent”:D

anielsv.

Dean

(1992)253

Mont.

465[833

P.2d1078]

(Daniels),

andh

IP.

Corp.

v.

210C

entralPar/c

SouthC

orp.(N

.Y.

App.

Div.

1962)16

A.D

.2d461

[228N

.Y.S

.2d883],

affd.(N

.Y.

1963)12

N.Y

.2d329

[189N

.E.2d

812]

(LHP

.C

orp.).(R

B/X

AO

B94-97.)

Yetagain,nottrue.

Ginsberg

relieson

theegregious

factsin

Daniels

while

misstating

its

holding.(R

B!X

AO

B94-96.)

Shecontends

thatunderDaniels,the

Court

shoulduphold

thepunitive

damages

award

because,shesays,the

evidence

provesthat—

ashappened

inD

aniels—”G

amson’s

deliberatefailure

to

make

repairscreated

asubstantialrisk

toG

insberg’sbusiness

byturning

away

customers.”

(RB

/XA

OB

96.)She

intimates

thatDaniels’reference

to

tortiousinterference

with

thetenant’s

leaseis

thesam

ecause

ofaction

that

shealleged

here.(R

B/X

AO

B94-96.)

Itisn’t.In

Daniels,the

tenant

complained

aboutthelandlord’s

tortiousinterference

with

contractualor

businessrelationships

with

customers.

(833P.2d

atp.1084.)

TheD

aniels

punitivedam

agesaw

ardw

aspredicated

onfactualfindings

underlyingthat

tort,plusa

defamation

count.(Id.

atpp.1083-1084.)

Incontrast,

Ginsberg

neveralleged

aclaim

fortortiousinterference

with

contractualorbusiness

relationshipsw

ithcustom

ers,andthe

juryw

asnever

instructedon

that

70

theoryand

made

nofindings

thatcouldsupportit.’3

Accordingly,

Ginsberg’s

argumentw

orksonly

byignoring

bothD

aniels’holdingand

the

proceduralpostureofherow

ncase.

Ginsberg

getsLI-fR

.C

orp.wrong,too.

(RB

/XA

OB

96-97.)The

legalissuein

LI-IF.

Corp.

was

whether

equitablereliefcould

support

apunitive

damages

award.

(228N

.Y.S

.2datpp.

885-888,affd.189

N.E

.2d

atpp.812-814.)

Theinterm

ediateappellate

courtheldthatthe

two

forms

of

reliefcouldbe

combined,

andN

ewY

ork’sC

ourtofA

ppealsaffirm

ed.

(Ibid.)B

utneithercourtconsideredw

hether,as

am

atterofpublic

policy,

punitivedam

agesshould

beavailable

toa

comm

ercialtenantprevailingon

apurported

claimfor

“tortious”breach

ofquietenjoym

ent—and

itisnot

evenclearw

hethertheunderlying

causeofaction

inLI-fR

.C

orp.sounded

incontractortort.

(222N

.Y.S

.2datpp.

885,888-889,

affd.189

N.E

.2dat

pp.812,

814.)11fF

.C

orp.is

notauthorityfor

Ginsberg’s

position.

(SeeS

onic-Calabasas,supra,

51C

al.4thatp.

694,th.

14.)

‘~G

insbergim

pliesthatshe

soughtdamages

forcustom

erloss,statingthat

theevidence

showed

and“Judge

Torresfound”

thatthealleged

lackof

repairscreated

“asubstantialrisk

toG

insberg’sbusiness

byturning

away

customers.”

(RB

/XA

OB

96.)B

utJudgeTorres

made

nosuch

finding,eitheratthe

placeG

insbergcites

oranyw

hereelse,and

theclaim

was

neverpartofG

insberg’scase.

(Seegenerally

1A

A44-62

[firstamended

complaint];

2A

A335

[Ginsberg

damages

chart];2R

T189-192

[Ginsberg

openingstatem

ent];3

RT

200-349[G

insbergtrialtestim

ony];6

RT

854-912[conference

oninstructions

andspecialverdictform

s];6

RT

932-938[G

insbergclosing

argument];

6R

T990-991

[referringto

damages

chartused

duringclosing

argument);

7R

T1072:1-7

[trialcourtrecognizedthat

Ginsberg

didnotallege

“lossofprofits,”

only“loss

ofquietenjoym

ent”].)

71

IV.

TH

ISC

OU

RT

SH

OU

LDA

FF

IRM

TH

EO

RD

ER

ST

RIK

ING

THE

P1JINITW

ED

AM

AG

ES

VE

RD

ICT

EV

EN

AS

SU

MIN

G

TH

AT

GIN

SB

ER

GP

LEA

DE

DA

ND

PR

OV

ED

TO

RT

IOU

S

CO

ND

UC

TB

YG

AM

SO

N.

A.

TheS

pecialVerdictFails

ToS

upportAP

unitiveD

amages

Aw

ard.

1.A

sa

matter

ofconstitutionaldue

process,punitive

damages

mustbear

areasonable

relationshipto

compensatory

damages.

TheC

ourtindependentlyreview

sw

hetherthepunitive

damages

verdictisconstitutionally

excessive.(Sim

onv.

SanF

aoloU

S.

Holding

Co.,

Inc.(2005)

35C

al.4th1159,

1172&

fit2

(Simon).)14

Apunitive

damages

award

mustbeara

“reasonablerelationship”

tocom

pensatorydam

ages.

(Id.atp.

1181,citing

BM

WofN

orthA

merica

v.G

ore(1996)

517U

.S.559

andState

Farm

MutualA

utomobile

InsuranceCo.

v.C

ampbell(2003)

538U

.S.408(State

Farm

).)In

assessingthe

constitutionalityofpunitive

damages

awards,

courtsm

ustconsidertheratio

between

thecom

pensatory

14G

amson’s

challengesto

thespecialverdictas

describedin

thissection

areproperly

beforethe

Court.

Shepreserved

thesechallenges

byraising

themin

herpost-trialmotions.

(3A

A532-536,548-558;4

AA

779-788;see

Am

ericanM

odernH

ome

InsuranceCo.

v.Fahmian

(2011)194

Cal.App.4th

162,170.)

Moreover,

“[Ginsberg],

asthe

plaintiff;hadresponsibility

forsubm

ittinga

verdictformsufficientto

supporthercausesofaction.

[Citation.)

Ifshechose

nottoinclude

aproposed

factualfmding

essentialtoone

ofher

claims,itis

notincumbenton

[Gam

son],as

thedefendant,to

make

surethe

omission

iscured.”

(Behrv.R

edmond

(2011)193

Cal.A

pp.4th517,531-532;

accord,e.g.,M

yers,supra,13

Cal.A

pp.4thatpp.

961-962.)

72

andpunitive

damages

awards.

(See,e.g.,Simon,supra,35

CaI.4th

at

pp.1181-1183;JetS

ourceC

harter,Inc.

v.Doherty

(2007)148

CaI.A

pp.4th

1,9-10(JetS

ource).)

2.B

ecausethe

specialverdictdoesnotdistinguish

between

damages

awarded

for

breachofcontract

andto

rt,it

isim

possibleto

determine

whether

the

ratioofpunitive

damages

tocom

pensatoryto

rt

damages

satisfiesdue

process.

Atthe

trialcourt’sinsistence,the

specialverdicthasonly

asingle

determination

ofdam

ages.(2

AA

378,393;

6R

T866:6-21,

868:25-28,

1016:17-1017:25.)Itm

akesno

distinctionbetw

eenG

insberg’scontractand

purported“to

rt”claim

s.(2

AA

393.)E

venassum

ingthatG

insbergalleged

andprevailed

onany

tortclaim,this

failureto

distinguishtortfrom

contract

damages

necessarilydoom

sa

punitivedam

agesaw

ard.

a.O

nlyto

rtdam

agesm

aybe

consideredin

assessingw

hetherpunitive

damages

are

constitutionallyexcessive.

Punitive

damages

areonly

availablefortorts—

notbreachesof

contract.(C

iv.C

ode,§3294;

seep.48,

ante.)Therefore,assum

ingthat

Ginsberg’s

purported“intentionalinterference”

claimw

asa

cognizabletort,

onlythe

damages

awarded

onthatclaim

may

beconsidered

inassessing

whetherthe

punitivedam

agesaw

ardis

constitutionallyexcessive

or

otherwise

defective.(See

TextronF

inancialCorp.

v.Nat.

Union

Fire

Ins.

Co.ofP

ittsburgh(2004)

118C

al.App.4th

1061,1084

(Textron)[“our

considerationofthe

disparitybetw

eenplaintiff’s

actualharmand

the

73

punitivedam

ageaw

ardm

ustbelim

itedto

itstortrelief’];

Diam

ond

Woodw

orks,Inc.v.A

rgonautIns.Co.

(2003)109

Cal.A

pp.4th1020,

1056

&fn.

35,disapprovedofin

partonothergrounds

bySim

on,supra,

35C

al.4thatpp.1182-1183.)

b.T

hepunitive

damages

award

failsbecause

thereis

nospecialverdictfinding

that

Gam

son’spurported

“intentional

interference”dam

agedG

insberg.

Overview

.There

isno

explicitspecialverdictfmding

ofdam

ages

attributableto

Ginsberg’s

purportedtortclaim

for“intentional

interference,”as

distinguishedfrom

hercontractclaim

s.(2

AA

389-390

[breachoforaland

written

contractverdicts);2A

A392

[“intentional

interferencew

ithuse

ofprem

ises”verdict];

2A

A393

[damages

verdict).)

Aju

ryfm

dingofactualtortdam

ages,however,is

anabsolute

“predicate”

forpunitivedam

ages.(M

otherC

obb‘s

Chicken

Turnovers,Inc.v.F

ox

(1937)10

Cal.2d

203,205(M

otherC

obb~i).)

As

theC

aliforniaSuprem

e

Courtexplained

longago:

“Evilthoughts

oracts,barren

ofresult,

arenot

thesubjecto

fexemplary

damages.”

(Id.atp.206.)

Thus,aju

ryverdictthat

expresslyaw

ardszero

tortdamages

cannotsupportapunitive

damages

award.

(SeeC

heungv.D

aley(1995)

35C

al.App.4th

1673,1677

(Cheung)

[reversingpunitive

damages

award

where

jury“m

adean

express

determination

nottoaw

ardcom

pensatorydam

ages”];C

alzforniav.A

ltus

FinanceS.A.

(9thC

ir.2008)

540F.3d

992,1001

(AtticsFinance)

[“California

lawis

well-established

andquite

clear.W

herethe

jury

here

explicitlyfound

‘$0’ofcom

pensatorydam

ages,thegeneralrule

precludes

punitivedam

ages”].)

74

Thisrequirem

entisrigorously

enforced.For

example,a

punitive

damages

award

willbe

reversedon

thisground

evenif

substantialevidence

supportsthe

jury’sfinding

of“fraud,

oppressionorm

alice.”(C

heung,

sup-a,35

Cal.A

pp.4thatp.

1677.)The

same

istrue

evenif

anotherspecial

verdictshows

thatthejury

believedp

lain

tiffhadbeen

“harmed.”

(Altus

Finance,supra,540

F.3datp.

1002[“jury’s

award

of‘$0’in

compensatory

damages

establishedthat,notw

ithstandingthe

‘harm’

foundin

Form5,the

Com

missionerdid

notsufferthe‘actualdam

ages’necessaryto

sustainthe

jury’spunitive

damages

award,”

citingC

heungand

Mother

Cobb

‘s]~)15

Thedam

agesspecialverdict.

Thedam

agesverdictform

required

thejury

toaw

arda

singlecom

pensatorydam

ageam

ountifGinsberg

prevailedon

anyone

ofherfour

counts.(2

AA

393;seep.

73,ante.)

Becausethe

juryfound

Gam

sonliable

forbreachesofcontract(2

AA

389-

390),thereis

now

ayto

knowfrom

theverdictifthe

jury

intendedto

award

anycom

pensatorydam

ages—m

uchless

theam

ountofthose

damages—

on

the“intentionalinterference

with

useofprem

ises”count(2

AA

392).The

damages

specialverdictdirectedthatifthe

juryfound

liabilityand

harmon

anyofG

insberg’stheories—

which

itdidon

breachofw

rittencontract,

breachoforalcontract,and

“intentionalinterferencew

ithuse

ofprem

ises”

(2A.A

389-392)-—itw

asto

answerthe

question“W

hatamounto

f

15There

isa

narrowexception:

Punitive

damages

areavailable

where

the

juryfinds

actualharmbutplaintiffis

statutorilybarred

fromrecovering

tortdam

ages.(A

ltusFinance,supra,

540F.3d

atpp.1001-1002,

citingG

agnonv.

ContinentalC

asualtyCo.

(1989)211

Cal.A

pp.3d1598,

1603-1605.)The

exceptionis

irrelevant—ifG

insberghad

atortclaim

,therew

asno

statutoryim

pedimentto

herrecoveryoftortdam

ages.

75

compensatory

damages,if

any,do

youaw

ardEstherG

insberg?”(2

AA

393).It

found$49,100.

(Ibid.)

Thespecialverdictthen

instructedthatifthe

jury“answ

ered‘yes’to

question2

inV

erdictFormN

o.4”—

i.e.,the

questionin

the“intentional

interference”verdictasking

“Do

youfind

byclearand

convincingevidence

thatHanna

Gam

sonengaged

inconductw

ithm

alice,oppression

orfraud?”

(2A

A392)—

thenitshould

answerquestion

2in

thedam

agesspecial

verdict:

“2.W

hatamounto

fpunitivedam

ages,ifany,do

youaw

ard

Esther

Ginsberg?

“$385.000”

(2A

A393.)

Thisis

theentirety

ofthe

jury’sdam

agesfm

ding.There

isno

findingthatconnects

the$49,100

compensatory

award

toany

particular

causeofaction,

andthere

isno

way

totie

thenum

bertoany

particular

componento

fGinsberg’s

damages

claims.

Thepunitive

damages

award

fails

asa

matter

oflaw

.The

absence

ofa

specialverdictfmding

ofactualtortdam

agesis

fatalbecausea

punitive

damages

award

mustbe

groundedon

afinding

ofactualtortdam

ages.

(Seepp.

73-75,ante.)

Forexam

ple,a

punitivedam

agesverdictfails

asa

matter

oflaw

ifthejury’s

specialverdictomits

fmdings

onthe

requisite

elements

ofthe

underlyingtortcause

ofaction.

(Myers,supra,

13C

al.App.4th

atp.960-961

[punitivedam

agesverdictfailed

becausejury

was

“neitherrequestedto

nordid

itmake

thenecessary

factualfmdings

for

afraud

orothertortcause

ofaction”].)76

Thisdefectprovides

anindependentbasis

onw

hichthis

Court

shouldaffirm

thetrialcourt’s

orderstriking

thepunitive

damages

verdict:

“[Tin

thosecases

inw

hicha

separatetortaction

isalleged,

ifthereis

‘but

oneverdictbased

uponcontract’

apunitive

damage

award

isim

proper.

[Citation.]

Where

suchan

award

ism

ade,thereview

ingcourtm

aym

odifSr

thejudgm

enttostrike

thepunitive

damages

andaffirm

thejudgm

entasso

modified.

[Citation].”

(Id.atp.

960.)M

oreover,thepunitive

damages

verdictfailsas

am

atteroflaw

evenassum

ing—as

Ginsberg

argues—that

thejm

y’s“m

alice,oppression

orfraud”

fmding

issupported

bysubstantial

evidence.(See

RB

IXA

OB

82-87;C

heung,supra,35C

al.App.4th

at

p.1677;M

yers,supra,13

Cal.A

pp.4thatp.

961.)

c.The

punitivedam

agesaw

ardviolates

due

processbecause

thelum

p-sumcom

pensatory

damages

verdictprecludesm

eaningful

jud

icialreview

oftheproportionality

ofthe

award.

Even

assuming

thatthe$49,100

compensatory

award

includessom

e

amounto

ftortdamages,

sothatpunitive

damages

mightbe

theoretically

permissible,the

punitivedam

agesaw

ardstillfails

becausethe

verdict’s

lackofspecificity

violatesdue

process.

Due

processm

andatesm

eaningfulappellatereview

ofpunitive

damages

awards.

(Honda

Motor

Co.,Ltd.v.

Oberg

(1994)512

U.S

.415,

432[holding

unconstitutionalOregon

lawprecluding

suchreview

].)

“[U]nder

Oberg,

[courts]m

ustconsiderwhether

apunitive

damages

award

passes‘m

usterunderfederaldue

processanalysis’in

additionto

reviewing

77

whetherthe

evidenceis

sufficientasa

matter

oflaw

tosupportthe

award.”

(Inre

Exxon

Valdez

(9thC

ir.2001)

270F.3d

1215,1240,footnote

omitted.)

ThisC

ourtcannotmeaningfully

retiewthe

damages

specialverdict

becauseit

doesnotapportion

thelum

p-sum$49,100

compensatory

damages

award

between

Ginsberg’s

contractand“to

rt”claim

s.(See

2A

A393;see

pp.73,75-76,

ante.)The

jurym

ighthaveintended

toaw

ard$0

onthe

purported“intentionalinterference

with

useofprem

ises”tortor$10

or

$100or

$1,000,with

therem

aindercompensating

Ginsberg

onthe

contract

counts.W

ithoutaspecialverdictapportioning

the“tort”

andcontract

compensatory

damages,this

Courtcannotdetennine

whetherthe

$385,000

punitivedam

agesaw

ardbears

areasonable

relationshipto

theactualtort

damages.

(SeeTextron,

supra,118

Cal.A

pp.4thatp.

1084[punitive

damages

award

mustbe

basedonly

onjury’s

fmding

oftort—

not

contract—dam

ages].)

Our

Supreme

Court,how

ever,requires

denovo

appellatereview

of

punitivedam

agesaw

ards,which

mustinclude

“making

anindependent

assessmento

fthereprehensibility

ofthe

defendant’sconduct,

[and)the

relationshipbetw

eenthe

award

andthe

harmdone

tothe

plaintiff.”(S

imon,

supra,35

Cal.4th

atp.1172.)

Thepunitive

damages

verdictfacially

foreclosesthis

mandatory

“[e]xactingappellate

review”

onproportionality.

(Ibid.,originalalteration,quoting

State

Farm,

supra,538

U.s.atp.

418.)

78

TheC

ourtmusttherefore

affinnthe

strikingofthe

punitivedam

ages

verdict.’6B.

Punitive

Dam

agesC

ouldN

otBeA

warded

InL

ightO

f

Gam

son’sW

ell-Founded

Beliefs

That

SheW

asC

omplying

With

Her

Repair

Obligations

And

That

Ginsberg

Was

Holding

Over.

1.P

unitivedam

agescannotattach

where

the

defendanthada

well-founded

beliefthather

conductwas

proper.

Thetrialcourtprejudicially

erredby

submitting

thepunitive

damages

issueto

theju

rybecause

theevidence—

andthere

would

havebeen

more

hadthe

trialcourtnotexcludedit—

demonstrated

thatGam

sonhad

areasonable

basisfor

assertingthatG

insberg’stenancy

expiredin

16Lastyear,Division

Two

ofthis

Districtupheld

apunitive

damages

award

eventhough

thejury’s

lump-sum

compensatory

damages

award

didnotinclude

specialverdictfactualfmdings

onthe

amounto

fcompensatory

damages

awarded

forbadfaith

andbreach

ofcontract.

(Ainerigraphics,

Inc.v.M

ercuryC

asualtyCo.

(2010)182

Cal.A

pp.4th1538,

1557-1558(A

merigraphics).)

Butw

hilethe

Am

erigraphicsverdictfonn

issim

ilartothe

onechallenged

here,Am

erigraphicsis

irrelevantbecausethe

courtdidnotconsider

anyargum

entsimilarto

Gam

son’sconstitutional

proportionalitychallenge.

(SeeS

onic-Calabasas,supra,

51C

al.4that

p.694,fit

14.)ifiany

event,Ainerigraphics’rationale

isunsound.

Am

erigraphicsrecognized

theverdict’s

anomaly,butaffirm

edanyw

aybecause

the“special

verdict formhere

didnotpreclude

afm

dingofpunitive

damages.”

(182C

al.App.4th

p.1557,originalitalics.)

Am

erigraphicsw

asm

istaken:The

constitutionallym

andatedde

novoreview

ofpunitive

awards

means

thatthedispositive

questionm

ustbew

hethertheverdictaffirm

ativelysupports

thepunitive

award,notm

erelyw

hetheritdoesn’tpreclude

theaw

ard.A

merigraphics

askedthe

wrong

question,andso

came

upw

iththe

wrong

answer.

79

Ap

ril2006and

thatshehad

complied

with

herrepairresponsibilitiesunder

theC

onservatorLease.(See

Wojfsen

v.Hathaw

ay(1948)

32C

al.2d632,

648-651

[defendant’sactions

inplow

ingfield

leasedto

plaintiffsand

to

which

defendanthadno

leaseholdrights

couldnotsupporta

punitiveaw

ard

where

defendant hadno

knowledge

ofplaintiffs’interestand

believed,

thougherroneously,thathe

hada

validorallease],

overruledin

parton

othergroundsby

Flaresv.A

rroyo(1961)

56C

al.2d492,

49

7•)1

7

“Exem

plarydam

agesare

notrecoverableagainsta

defendantwho

actsin

goodfaith

andunderthe

adviceofcounseL”

(Foxv.A

ced(1957)

49C

al.2d381,

385.)This

isso

becausepunitive

damages

areim

posedonly

ifthedefendantacted

with

therequisite

stateofm

ind:A

“tortcomm

itted

bym

istake,inthe

assertionofa

supposedright,

orwithoutany

wrong

intention,and

withoutsuch

recklessnessas

evincesm

aliceora

conscious

disregardofthe

rightsofothers,does

notwarrantpunitive

damages”

becausethe

“wrongfhlpersonalintention

toinjure

isthe

factorthatcalls

forththe

penaltyofexem

plarydam

ages.”(R

othv.

ShellO

ilCo.(1960)

185C

al.App.2d

676,682,disapprovedofin

partonothergrounds

by

17G

amson

preservedthese

challengesby

raisingthem

inthe

trialcourt.

(See,e.g.,2

SA

A1153-1162

[nonsuitmotion];

4R

T502-517

[hearingon

nonsuitmotion];

3A

A554-556

[newtrialm

otion];4A

A783-784

[replyin

supportofpost-trialm

otions].)In

addition,G

amson

arguedthroughout

theseproceedings

thattheC

onservatorLeaseexpired

inA

pril2006,and

that,as

aholdover

tenant,G

insbergeitherhad

tovacate

orenteranew

lease.(E

.g.,2R

T4,

12[hearing

onG

amson’s

bifurcationm

otion];2

RT

48[hearing

onG

amson’s

requesteddeclaratory

relief];1

AA

132-134,¶~J15,

20,21[third

amended

cross-complaint];

1S

AA

891,¶IJ5-9

[Gam

sondeclaration

insupporto

fsumm

aryjudgm

entmotion];

1S

AA

896-897,¶~J4-5,

7-8[separate

statementin

supportofG

amson

summ

aryjudgment

motion];

seealso

1A

A164,

172-174[m

emo

insupportofG

amson

summ

aryjudgm

entmotion].)

80

Templeton

Feed&

Grain

v.Ralston

Purina

Co.(1968)

69C

al.2d461,470-

471.)A

tthevery

least,adefendant’s

good-faithreliance

oncounselis

afactor

forthe

jury

toconsiderin

assessingpunitive

damages.

(Rosenerv.

Sears,R

oebuck&

Co.(1980)

110C

al.App.3d

740,754.)

Our

Supreme

Courthas

rejectedpunitive

damages

inthis

very

context.In

Wo(fsen

v.Hathaw

ay,supra,32C

al.2datpp.

650-651,

theC

ourtheldthatthe

trialcourterredby

puttingthe

punitivedam

ages

questionto

theju

rygiven

theevidentiary

record:“S

incethe

record

indisputablyshow

sthat[defendant’s)

tortiousacts

uponthe

premises

in

questionstenned

notfromany

‘malice

infact,’butw

hollyfrom

am

istaken

claimofrightunderthe

beliefthathis‘orallease’w

asvalid

and

enforceable,the‘w

rongifilpersonalintentionto

injure’thatcallsforth

the

penaltyofpunitive

damages

was

notestablishedand

thecourterred

in

submitting

them

atterofsuch

award

tothe

jury.”

2.A

sa

matter

oflaw,

Gam

sonhad

areasonable

basis

for

assertingthat

Ginsberg’s

leaseexpired

in

April2006

andthatshe

was

aholdover

ten

an

t

a.G

amson’s

interpretationofthe

renewal

languagew

asreasonable.

We

havedem

onstratedthat,as

am

atteroflaw

,G

insberg’slease

is

notperpetualandtherefore

conferredonly

onerenew

altennthatexpired

in

2006.E

venifthe

Courtdisagrees

thatthelaw

requiresthis

conclusion,

Gam

son’sclaim

iscertainly

tenablegiven

thatitisconsistentw

ithsettled

California

law(A

OB

18-21;pp.4-5,

ante)and

thelaw

inthe

overwhelm

ing

81

majority

ofjurisdictionsthroughoutthe

United

States(A

OB

21-24&

fri.12).

Moreover,G

amson

testifiedw

ithoutcontradictionorim

peachment

thattwo

differentlawyers

toldherthatthe

Conservator

Leasehad

tobe

revised.(See,

e.g.,4R

T454:7-9

[Gam

sontestified

(underEvid.

Code,

§776)

regardingraising

Ginsberg’s

rent:“A

sfar

asw

hateverthelease

said,I’ma

law-abiding

citizen.I’m

goingby

thelease.

And

atthetim

e

therew

assom

econifision

aboutthatlease”];2

RA

318[exhibit57];see

generally4

RT

453:15-464:17[G

amson

testimony

(underEvid.

Code,

§776)

regardingG

insberg’srentand

renewaloptions].)

After

Gam

son

retainedhernow

-currentrealestatelaw

yerSaulJaffe

inlate

2004or

early

2005(5

RT

749,753-754),M

r.Jaffe

comm

unicatedw

ithG

insberg’s

previouslaw

yer“to

claritS’thenum

berofoptions

[Ginsberg]

hadand

to

bringherto

am

arketrentatsome

point”(5

RT

787;seealso

5R

T782-785,

788-789).

And

that’snotall.

JudgeFerns,w

hopresided

overthiscase

before

JudgeTones,

agreedthatG

insberg’srightto

remain

inthe

propertyw

as

uncertain.(2

AA

281-283

[denyingparties’

cross-motions

forsum

mary

judgmentj;

seealso

2R

TB-1—

B-17[hearing].)

Ina

detailedruling,he

foundthatthe

“[renewal]

provision,andthe

provisionsin

theE

stoppel

Certificates

show,atbest,thatthere

isam

biguityas

tow

hetheranoption

or

optionsw

eregranted

tothe

tenant.”(2

AA

281.)

82

b.G

amson’s

interpretationofthe

renewal

languagecannotsupportpunitive

damages

as

am

atteroflaw

.

Given

Gam

son’sconstruction

ofthe

renewallanguage,

shehad

two

choices:eithercom

mence

unlawfhldetainerproceedings

againstGinsberg

aftertheC

onservatorLeaseexpired

inA

pril2006

orpreemptively

negotiate

anew

leasew

ithher.

Sinceneither

coursecould

amountto

anythingm

ore

thanthe

assertionofcontractualrights,neithercould

eversupportpunitive

damages.

(SeeG

affneyv.D

owney

Savings&

LoanAssn.

(1988)

200C

al.App.3d

1154,1170

[“Defendant’s

solerem

edyw

asforeclosure

and

nothingin

itsattem

pttopursue

thatremedy

canbe

construedas

evidence

ofoppression,

fraudorm

alice”].)

Thisconclusion

would

standeven

iftheC

ourtultimately

disagrees

with

Gam

son’slegalposition:

Shedid

nothingm

orethan

assertarightthat

shehad

probablecause

toassertin

lightofthe

lawthatw

ehave

presented

andas

confirmed

byJudge

Ferns’sum

mary

judgmentruling.

Certainly,her

“positioncannotbe

deemed

sounreasonable

asto

evidencem

alice,fraud,

orgross

negligence.”(Food

Pro

InternationaL,Inc.

v.Farmers

Insurance

Exchange

(2008)169

Cal.A

pp.4th976,994-995

(FoodP

ro)[punitive

damages

unavailablein

partbecausetrialcourthad

agreedw

ithdefendant

insurer’sduty-to-defend

position].)G

amson’s

situationis

analogousto

that

ofa

malicious

prosecutiondefendantw

hoprevailed

againstasum

mary

judgmentm

otionin

theunderlying

action:U

nderthe“interim

adverse

judgmentrule,”

thatfactaloneconclusively

establishesthe

defendant’s

83

probablecause

toassertthe

underlyingclaim

becausethe

ruling

“necessarilyim

pl[ies]thatthe

judge[found]

atleastsome

merit”

inthe

claim.

(Antounian

v.LouisV

uittonM

alletier(2010)

189C

al.App.4th

438,

450-451.)So,too,here:

ThatJudgeFerns

rejectedG

insberg’ssum

mary

judgmentchallenge

toG

amson’s

interpretationofthe

ConservatorLease

conclusivelyshow

sthatG

amson

hadprobable

causeto

urgethat

interpretation.Thatbeing

thecase,

Gam

sonshould

notbesubjectto

punitivedam

ages,regardlessofw

hetherherpositionultim

atelyturns

outto

beconect.

Toputitanotherw

ay,theC

onservatorLease’s

veryam

biguitybars

recoveryofpunitive

damages:

“Where

anissue

isone

offirstim

pressionor

where

arighthas

notbeenclearly

established,punitivedam

agesare

generallyunavailable.”

(Waits

v.Frito-Lay,

Inc.(9th

Cir.

1992)978

F.2d

1093,1104

[construingC

alifornialaw

];accord,F

oodP

ro,supra,

169C

al.App.4th

atp.995

[althoughappellate

courtrejectedinsurer’s

positionon

itsduty

todefend,punitive

damages

were

nonetheless

unavailablein

partbecauseinsurerhad

reliedon

advicefrom

two

law

firms];M

organG

uarantyT

rustCo.o

fNY

v.Am

ericanSavings

&Loan

Assn.(9th

Cir.

1986)804

F.2d1487,

1500[“A

lthoughw

ereverse,w

e

acknowledge

thatthisis

aclose

caseand

thatthekey

issueis

oneoffirst

impression.

Punitive

damages

areinappropriate

inthis

case”].)

Likeprobable

causein

am

aliciousprosecution

action,the

determination

ofw

hethera

partyhas

areasonable

basisfor

asserting

acontractualrightis

necessarilya

questionoflaw

.(See

Franklin

Mint,

84

supra,184

Cal.A

pp.4thatp.

333[in

them

aliciousprosecution

context,the

“existenceor

absenceofprobable

causeis

aquestion

oflaw

tobe

determined

bythe

courtfromthe

factsestablished

inthe

case”j.)A

tleast

thism

ustbetrue

where

theonly

issueis—

asitw

ashere—

theinterpretation

ofa

contractonits

face.Since

aface-of-the-agreem

entinterpretationis

for

thecourt,only

thecourtcan

properlydeterm

inew

hethera

party’s

interpretationis

reasonable—or,

inthe

words

ofprobable

cause

jurisprudence,“w

hetherany

reasonableattorney

would

havethoughtthe

claimtenable.”

(Ibid.,citation

omitted.)

“This

isan

objectivestandard,

anddoes

nottakeinto

accountthesubjective

mentalstate

ofthe

defendant;

iftheunderlying

claims

were

objectivelytenable,the

malicious

prosecution

claimfails,

regardlessofany

evidenceofm

aliceon

theparto

fthe

defendant.”(Ibid.)

BecauseG

amson’s

leaseinterpretation

was

reasonable,asa

mattero

f

lawherassertion

ofitcannotsupportpunitive

damages.

3.T

hetria

lcourt’serroneous

exclusionofevidence

of

Gam

son’sgood

faithentitles

herto

anew

trial.

IftheC

ourtdecidesto

chartnewterritory

byholding

thatpunitive

damages

canbe

availableunderfacts

likeours,then

atthevery

least

Gam

sonw

illbeentitled

toa

newthaibecause

ofthe

trialcourt’sexclusion

ofevidence

aboutGam

son’sgood-faith

beliefsand

advicefrom

counsel

thatshehad

notbreachedthe

ConservatorLease.

(E.g.,

5R

T737,

743-745,

787-788,796;

6R

T809-810;

pp.44-46,ante;

seeB

eneficialFire

and

Casualty

InsuranceCo.

v.KurtH

it/ce&

Co.,Inc.(1956)46

Cal.2d

517,522

85

[offerofproofnotrequired

“(w)here

anentire

classofevidence

hasbeen

declaredinadm

issibleorthe

trialcourthasclearly

intimated

itwillreceive

noevidence

ofa

particularclass

orupona

particularissue”].)

Thetrial

court’sevidentiary

rulingsw

ereprejudicially

erroneousbecause

Gam

son’s

stateofm

indw

asdirectly

relevanttothe

availabilityofpunitive

damages

anditis

therefore“reasonably

probable”thatthe

jury

would

nothave

imposed

punitivedam

ages—atleastnot$3

85,000’sw

orth—had

itknown

aboutGam

son’sgood-faith

relianceon

counsel.(See

Bellv.M

ason(2011)

194C

al.App.4th

1102,1107

[standardforprejudicialerror].)

Gam

sonpresented

ample

evidence—or

atleasttriedto—

ofher

good-faithand

well-founded

beliefthatshehad

complied

with

oreven

exceededherrepair

obligationsunderthe

ConservatorLease.

(See,e.g.,

5R

T796;

6R

T809-810

[sustainingobjections

toquestioning

ofM

r.Jaffe

aboutGam

son’scontractualobligation

torepair

Ginsberg’s

floorand

awning].)

Forexam

ple,G

amson

testifiedin

detailaboutwhatshe

believed

tobe

timely

responsesto

Ginsberg’s

complaints

andthe

expensesthatshe

incurredin

inspectingand

repairingG

insberg’sstore.

(E.g.,4

RT

473-474,

482-483,486-487;

5R

T744-750;2

SA

A1247-1249

[exhibit627].)

Inaddition,

afterherlawyers

reviewed

theC

onservatorLease

andinspected

theprem

ises,theytold

Gam

sonthatshe

was

complying

with

hercontractual

repairobligations.

(E.g.,2

SA

A1241-1242

[exhibit614];3

RT

347-348;

6R

T814

[Mr.

Jaffetestified

thatGam

sonw

asnotobligated

torepair

Ginsberg’s

floorundertheC

onservatorLease].)

Moreover,

Gam

sontrusted

Mr.

Jaffe,herrealestate

lawyer,

tohandle

Ginsberg’s

repairdem

ands

86

properly:“S

aulJaffew

ouldhave

donethe

besthecan

[sic]to

resolvethe

problem.”

(4R

T478.)

And

Mr.

Jaffetestified

thatGam

sonhas

“exceeded

herobligationsunderthe

lease.”(5

RT

789;see

also,e.g.,6

RT

814-817,

834-835[M

r.Jaffe

testimony

regardingG

amson’s

repairs];2S

AA

1243-

1246[exhibits

623,624].)H

ere,too,G

amson

was

neithercontradicted

nor

impeached.

(Seegenerally

4R

T464:18-490:1

[Gam

sontestim

ony(under

Evid.

Code,§

776)regarding

repairsj.)

Thelease

provisionsquoted

abovebearoutG

amson’s

views.

(See

p. 41,ante.)G

amson

was

entitledto

readthe

Conservator

Leaseas

casting

uponG

insbergthe

responsibilityfor

atleastsome

oftheproblem

sG

insberg

complained

about.To

besure,there

were

disagreements—

forexample,

was

thehole

inG

insberg’sfloorparto

fherpremises

andtherefore

her

responsibility,orparto

fthebuilding’s

foundationand

thereforeG

amson’s?

Theftviews

differedand

thetrialcourtultim

atelyagreed

with

Ginsberg

that

theju

ryw

ouldhave

todecide.

(6R

T862:4-16;2

AA

363;see

also4

P1

516-517[denying

Gam

son’snonsuitm

otion].)B

utiftherew

asenough

of

adispute

togo

toajury,there

was

enoughofa

disputeto

make

Gam

son’s

interpretationreasonable—

andim

mune

frompunishm

entbypunitive

damages.

Her

error,ifany,should

onlyresultin

payingcontract

damages—

nothingm

ore.(See

KendallYachtC

orp.v.

United

Cal.

Bank

(1975)50

Cal.A

pp.3d949,

959[punitive

damages

were

inappropriatein

acase

allegingbreach

ofbank’s

claimed

agreementto

honoroverdrafts

because“(e)vidence

ofan

evilmotive

isrequired,

ashow

ingthatthe

Bank

deliberatelybreached

arecognized

dutyto

theplaintiffs

with

lcnowledge

thatthebreach

was

likelyto

resultinserious

inju

ry....(I)trem

ainspurely

87

speculativeas

tow

hethertheB

ankacted

with

suchm

aliceratherthan

outof

abona

fidedisagreem

entoverhowfar

theB

ankw

asrequired

togo

in

helpingthe

(plaintiffs)w

iththeftfinancialproblem

s,”italics

added].)

C.

Even

IfP

unitiveD

amages

Could

Be

Aw

arded,T

heyM

ust

Be

Reassessed

IfThe

CourtA

greesT

hatG

insberg’sLease

Expired

InA

pril2006.

IfG

amson

prevailsin

herappealandthe

Courtconcludes

thatthe

ConservatorLease’s

renewallanguage

isam

biguoussuch

thatGinsberg’s

leaseexpired

inA

pril2006,

thenthe

predicateofG

insberg’sclaim

sfor

“tort”

damages

andancillary

punitivedam

agesw

ouldeitherdissipate

or

disappear.In

thatcase,Gam

sonw

ouldhave

beenjustified

inasking

Ginsberg

tosign

anew

leaseand

electingnotto

make

repairsbeyond

those

requiredby

theC

onservatorLease.Thus,if

Gam

sonprevails,then

the

Courteither

shouldhold

thatpunitivedam

agesare

unavailableas

am

ailer

oflaw

or,atthevery

least,shouldrem

andfor

anew

trialonG

insberg’s

purportedtortclaim

(assuming

thattheC

ourtholdsthatG

insbergalleged

acognizable

tort)and

theavailability

andam

ountofpunitive

damages.

88

V.

TH

E$385,000

PU

MT

WE

DA

MA

GE

SA

WA

RD

IS

CO

NS

TIT

UT

ION

AL

LY

EX

CE

SS

IVE

EV

EN

IFT

HE

FU

LL

$49,100C

OM

PE

NS

AT

OR

YD

AM

AG

ES

AW

AR

DIS

AT

TR

IBU

TA

BL

ET

OG

INS

BE

RG

’SP

UR

PO

RT

ED

“INT

EN

TIO

NA

LIN

TE

RF

ER

EN

CE

”C

LA

IM.

The$385,000

punitivedam

agesverdictcannotw

ithstandthe

Court’s

independentrevieweven

assuming

thattheju

ryaw

ardedthe

entire$49,100

onthe

purported“intentionalinterference”

count.

Constitutionalprinciples.

Indeterm

iningw

hetherthepunitive

damages

award

isconstitutionally

excessive,theC

ourtconsidersthree

“guideposts”:“U

)the

degreeofreprehensibility

ofthe

defendant’s

misconduct;

(2)the

disparitybetw

eenthe

actualorpotentialharmsuffered

bythe

pla

intiffand

thepunitive

damages

award;

and(3)

thedifference

between

thepunitive

damages

awarded

bythe

juryand

thecivilpenalties

authorizedor

imposed

incom

parablecases.”

(Walker

v.Farmers

Insurance

Exchange

(2007)153

CaLA

pp.4th965,973

(Walker),

quotingSim

on,

supra,35C

al.4thatpp.

1171-1172.)18

As

theC

ourthasrecognized,reprehensibility

isthe

paramount

criterionw

henconsidering

thereasonableness

ofapunitive

damages

verdict.(W

alker,supra,153

Cal.A

pp.4thatp.

973,th.

9,quotingState

Farm,supra,

538U.S.

atp.419;

accord,e.g.,Roby

v.McK

essonC

orp.

18W

eare

notaware

ofany

analogouscivilpenalties

forthebreach

of

acom

mercialtenant’s

implied

covenantofquietenjoym

ent.

89

(2009)47

Cal.4th

686,713;G

rassilliv.Barr

(2006)142

Cal.A

pp.4th1260,

1288(G

rassilli).)R

elevantfactorsinclude

whetherthe

“harmcaused

was

physicalasopposed

toeconom

ic;thetortious

conductevincedan

indifferenceto

ora

recklessdisregard

ofthehealth

orsafety

ofothers;the

targetofthe

conducthadfinancialvulnerability;the

conductinvolved

repeatedactions

orwas

anisolated

incident;andthe

harmw

asthe

resultof

intentionalmalice,trickery,

ordeceit,orm

ereaccident.”

(JetSource,

supra,148

Cal.A

pp.4thatp.

8,quotingState

Farm,supra,

538U.S.

at

p.419.)Ginsberg’s

minim

alevidenceof“reprehensibility.”

Ginsberg’s

evidencedoes

notdemonstrate

thatGam

sonacted

with

theextrem

e

reprehensibilityrequired

tosupportthe

jury’s$385,000

punitivedam

ages

verdict—alm

osteighttim

esthe

compensatory

damages

verdict.

(2A

A393.)

Thejury

didn’tacceptG

insberg’sstory

ofintolerable

physical

conditionsand

crushingeconom

icdam

ages—itfound

thatGinsberg’s

economic

damages

amounted

nottothe

$545,000she

askedfor,butrather

tobarely

9%ofthat

figure,$49,100.

(2A

A335,393;2

RT

189-192

[openingstatem

entj;6

RT

932-938[closing

argument].)

Thejury

hadgood

reasonnotto

creditGinsberg’s

histrionics,and

thisC

ourtmustalso

be

guidedby

Ginsberg’s

failureto

presentevidencebacking

uphercharges.

Apunitive

damages

award

with

an8:1

ratio—like

thisone—

is“close

tothe

upperconstitutionallimits.”

(Grassilli,supra,

142C

al.App.4th

atp.1289.)

Thus,thejury’s

punitivedam

agesaw

ardcannotstand

unlessG

insberg

90

demonstrated

therequisite

“extraordinaryfactors”

to‘ju

sti~’{]”

thatratio.

(Ibid.)She

didnot.

Forexam

ple:

Ginsberg

testifiedaboutdisastrous

andrecurrentw

aterintrusion.

(Seep.

43,ante.)She

describedveritable

flashfloods

runningthrough

her

store—conditions

thatwould

haveundoubtedly

destroyedany

ongoing

business.Y

etGinsberg

presentedno

evidencethatshe

lostasingle

dollar

ora

singlecustom

erbecauseofw

aterintrusionduring

thefive

anda

half

yearsfrom

Decem

ber2003through

thebeginning

oftrialin

September

2009.She

didn’tevenbotherasking

foran

award

oflostprofits.

(Seegenerally

2R

T187-192

[Ginsberg

openingstatem

ent];3

RT

201-321

[Ginsberg

directexamination];

6R

T923-940

[Ginsberg

closingargum

ent];

1A

A44-62

[firstamended

complaint];

2A

A329-330

[Ginsberg

trial

brief];2

AA

335[G

insbergdam

ageschart).)’9

Nor

didG

insbergpresentany

evidencethatshe

closedherstore

for

anythingotherthan

a‘fe

wdays”

afteranothertenantcaused

aleak

in

Decem

ber2003.

(3R

T270:28-271:4,

italicsadded;

seealso

3R

T332,343

[regardingcause

ofleak].)

Instead,she

identifiedjustsix

dayson

which

waterintrusion

hadallegedly

damaged

hermerchandise

duringthefive

and

aha(fyears

beforetrial:

Decem

ber8,2003;

October

17,2005;O

ctober18,

2005;O

ctober23,2005;

October24,2005;

andM

ay1,2008.

(2A

A329-

330,335;

6R

T932-938.)

Forpurposesofthis

appealonly,we

assume—

eventhough

Ginsberg

didnotallege

orprove—thatherstore

was

closedfor

thosesix

days.Ifso,then

Ginsberg

would

haveclosed

herstore

for0.002%

ofthosefive

anda

hajfyears.

~She

claimed

thatsome

merchandise

was

damaged,butthe

jury

rejected

herclaimfor

“trespassto

chattels.”(2

AA

391.)

91

•G

insbergalleged

thatherstorew

asin

poorrepair,butshedid

not

proveresulting

physicalharm.

ThisC

ourthasheld

thata“conclusory

claim”

ofphysicalharm

lackingevidentiary

supportcannotsupportahigh

multiplier.

(Walker,supra,

153C

al.App.4th

atpp.973-975;

seealso

Jet

Source,supra,148

Cal.A

pp.4thatp.

11[“solely

economic”

harmm

ilitates

againsthighm

ultiplier].)

•S

imilarly,although

Ginsberg

accusedG

amson

offailing

to

maintain

theproperty,she

didnotprove

thatGam

sonw

asindifferentto

or

recklesslydisregarded

anybody’shealth

orsafety.(See

Walker,supra,

153C

al.App.4th

atp.975.)

•G

amson

actedin

goodfaith

andG

insberg’sharm

—ifany—

”was

theresulto

foversight”in

interpretingthe

ConservatorLease.

(Seeid.

at

p.973;pp.

81-85,ante.)

•G

insbergherselfdem

onstratedthatshe

isnotfinancially

vulnerable.Q

uitethe

contrary,she

isan

established,successthl

entrepreneurwho

builtupa

well-know

nvintage

clothingbusiness.

(3R

T

201-224[G

insbergexam

ination];3R

T370-371

[examination

ofG

insberg’s

vintageclothing

expertwitness];

seealso

2R

T187-188

[Ginsberg

opening

statement].)

TheC

ourtshouldtherefore

holdthatthe

jury’spunitive

damages

award

isconstitutionally

excessive.

92

CO

NC

LUS

ION

Gam

sonshould

prevailonher

appeal.The

Courtshould

reversethe

judgmentgranting

Ginsberg

theunfettered

optionto

renewthe

Conservator

Leasefor

thenext99

years—thatis,through

theyear2095—

underC

ivil

Code

section718

(seeA

OB

8,fit

6);ordering

Ganason

tocom

plyw

iththe

48-hourrepair-or-accessorderuntilthe

ConservatorLease

statutorily

expiresin

2095;and

awarding

attorney’sfees

andcosts

toG

insberg.

Inthe

alternative,this

Courtshould

reverseand

remand

fora

new

trialonthe

meaning

ofthe

renewallanguage

becauseG

insberghas

not

shown—

andcannotshow

—thatthe

ConservatorLease

unambiguously

confersperpetualrenew

als.O

nrem

and,thetrialcourtm

ustalsoreconsider

thejudgm

ent’sperm

anentinjunctionand

award

ofattorney’s

feesand

costs.

On

thecross-appeal,there

hasneverbeen

abasis

forpunitive

damages,and

evenifthere

were,the

punitiveaw

ardis

defectivefor

multiple

reasons.A

ccordingly,regardlessofthe

resultonthe

lease

interpretation,the

Courtm

ustaffirmthe

trialcourt’sdecision

tostrike

thepunitive

award.

And

evenifpunitive

damages

mightbe

available,

areversalon

leaseinterpretation

necessarilycom

promises

thebasis

forthe

punitiveaw

ard,andthe

claimm

ustberetried.

93

Dated:

October

18,2011

CLA

RE

MO

NT

LAW

GR

OU

P,

INC

.Luisa

G.Jaffe

SaulJaffe

GR

EIN

ES

,M

AR

TIN

,S

TEIN

&R

ICH

LAN

DLLP

Robin

Meadow

LaraM

.eger

LaraM

.K

rieger

Attorneys

forDefendant,A

ppellantandC

ross-RespondentH

annaG

amson

94

CE

RT

IFIC

AT

EO

FC

OM

PLIA

NC

E

Pursuantto

California

Rules

ofC

ourt,rule8.204

(c)(1),the

attachedH

AN

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ctober18,2011

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OF

LOS

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employed

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alifornia.I

amoverthe

ageof18

andnota

partyto

thew

ithinaction;m

ybusiness

addressis

5900W

ilshireB

oulevard,12th

Floor,LosAngeles,C

alifornia90036.O

nO

ctober18,2011,I

servedthe

foregoingdocum

entdescribedas:

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onthe

partiesin

thisaction

bysew

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MichaelR

.W

eissThe

Honorable

Ricardo

TonesE

pstein,Turner

&Song

LosA

ngelesS

uperiorC

ourt633

W.

5thStreet,

Suite3300

CentralC

ivilWest

-Dept.

316Los

Angeles,

California

90071600

S.Com

monw

ealthA

venueA

ttorneysfo

rP

laintiffs,Los

Angeles,

California

90005R

espondentsand

Cross-A

ppellantsE

stherG

insbergand

Harry

Eden

Supreme

Courto

fCalifornia

350M

cAllister

StreetSan

Francisco,C

alifornia94102-3600

(4copies)

Q()B

yE

nvelope-by

placing0

theoriginalQ()

atrue

copythereof

enclosedin

sealedenvelopes

addressedas

aboveand

deliveringsuch

envelopes:

(A)B

yM

ail:As

follows:

Iam“readily

familiar”

with

thisfirm

’spractice

ofcollectionand

processingcorrespondence

formailing.

Underthat

practice,itwould

bedeposited

with

United

StatesPostalService

onthat

same

dayw

ithpostage

thereonfU

llyprepaid

atLosAngeles,

California

inthe

ordinarycourse

ofbusiness.I

amaw

arethaton

motion

ofpartyserved,

serviceis

presumed

invalidifpostalcancellation

dateorpostage

meterdate

ism

orethan

1day

afterdate

ofdepositformailing

inaffidavit.

Executedon

October

18,2011,atLosAngeles,C

alifornia.

(A)(State)

Ideclare

underpenaltyofperjury

undeftThla

oftheState

California

thattheforegoing

istrue

and