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Getting to “Yes”
Understanding Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot public perceptions,
concerning a possible Solution to the Cyprus Problem.
Presented by
Alexandros Lordos
and
Muharrem Faiz
• In last April’s referendums, the large gap between official negotiating positions and public perceptions, was made evident.
• Even though the primary Greek Cypriot negotiator over the previous years, Glafkos Clerides, was in favour of the Plan, 76% of Greek Cypriots voted “No”.
• Similarly, even though the main Turkish Cypriot negotiator, Rauf Denktash, was against the Plan, 65% of Turkish Cypriots voted “Yes”.
• One lesson from last April’s referendums, is therefore that public perceptions and preferences should be carefully examined from now on, since after all it is the wider public – and not the negotiators – who will be the final arbitrators of any Solution.
• For the purposes of this presentation, two recent public opinion surveys will be utilised – one of the Greek Cypriots and the other of the Turkish Cypriots.
• The first Survey was conducted in September 2004, with a sample of 1000 Greek Cypriots who were interviewed over the telephone.
• The second survey was conducted in January 2005, with a sample of 700 Turkish Cypriots who were interviewed face-to-face.
• The surveys were not conducted in parallel with identical questionnaires. Rather, the Turkish Cypriot survey was designed in such a way as to build on the findings of the Greek Cypriot survey.
0
100
200
300
400
400
280
170
50100
Greek Cypriot Survey Sample (by district)
0
50
100
150
200
250
242
179
119
84 78
Turkish Cypriot Survey Sample (by district)
Sampling procedure: Multi-stage stratified random sampling
Underlying Attitudes
0
10
20
30
40
50
Perc
ent
12,88,9
4,8
40,433,1
"We have much in common with Turkish Cypriots"
Greek Cypriot dominant narratives currently favour co-existence with the Turkish Cypriots.
0
10
20
30
40
Pe
rce
nt
32,5
12
5,8
16,7
30,9
"Greek Cypriots are our co-citizens"
The Turkish Cypriot community is currently polarized on the issue of co-existence with Greek Cypriots.
0
10
20
30
40
Per
cent
22,418,8
8,8
16,2
33,8
"The Turkish Cypriots are devious and self-serving"
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Perc
ent
28,21
15,38 13,39 13,11
27,35
"Greek Cypriots will attempt to dominate us"
Both communities currently tend to mistrust the intentions of the other.
0
10
20
30
40
50
Perc
ent
18,8 16
6,511,8
46,9
"I could never trust a Turk"
Greek Cypriots have strong reservations about the role of Turkey and of the Mainland Turks in the whole Cyprus affair.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Per
cent
27,64
15,81 16,24 16,6719,23
"Greek Cypriots are murderers"
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Per
cent
3,4 3,110
22,4
56,7
"The Turkish Army is here to protect us"
Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, tend to believe that they need Turkey’s protection in order to be safe from “Greek Cypriot aggression”.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Per
cent
68,9
10,23,9 7 10
"The Cyprus Problem can only be solved through a liberation struggle"
0
10
20
30
40
50
Pe
rce
nt
47
14,4 11,4 9,113,7
"The only way to resolve our national issue is through an
armed struggle"
Majorities of both communities strongly oppose the use of violence.
Motivations
Turkish Cypriot motivations
• To become members of the European Union.• To escape economic isolation.• To become “the masters of their own house”.• To overcome the risk of another war.• To be re-united with the Greek Cypriots.
(secondary motive)• To be able to return to ancestral homes that are
now in the south. (secondary motive)
Greek Cypriot motivations
• To escape the military stranglehold of Turkey.• To re-establish the integrity and sovereignty of the
Republic.• To put an end to the “Turkification” of the northern half of
Cyprus.• To be able to return to ancestral homes that are now in
the north.• To be re-united with the Turkish Cypriots. (secondary
motive)• To attract foreign investment by resolving “the political
irregularity” on the island. (secondary motive)
0
10
20
30
40
Per
cent
12,89,9
21,8
32,4
14,7
Bizonal - Bicommunal Federation
0
10
20
30
40
Per
cent
12,39,8
13
35,7
29,2
Bizonal - Bicommunal Federation
Majorities of both communities are willing to accept a Federal Solution.
Security
0
20
40
60
80
Perc
ent
3,7
19,5
76,3
0,5
The withdrawal of Greek and Turkish Troops to take place much faster than currently provided for in the UN Plan.
0
10
20
30
40
50
Pe
rce
nt
44,6
13,8 13,7 14,713,2
The bulk of Greek and Turkish troops to leave the island much sooner than currently
provided for in the UN Plan.
The two communities are sharply opposed on the issue of troop withdrawal.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Perc
ent
10,3
29,5
58,3
1,9
All Greek and Turkish troops to eventually depart from the island.
0
10
20
30
40
50
Pe
rce
nt
49
13,810,3
17,5
9,4
Cyprus to be fully demilitarized (i.e. all Greek and Turkish troops to depart) when Turkey
joins the European Union.
The two communities are also opposed on the issue of demilitarization.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Pe
rce
nt
29,91
17,66
13,11
24,5
14,81
All Greek and Turkish troops to become part of an integrated European Security force, when
Turkey joins the European Union.
The creation of an integrated Security Force may be a mutually acceptable compromise.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Pe
rcent
11,8
22,9
60,7
4,6
Guarantor Powers to not have the right of unilateral intervention.
0
10
20
30
40
Pe
rcen
t
33,8
20,1
10,1
23,5
12,5
Greek and Turkish Intervention rights to be clearly limited, so that Turkey can only intervene in the Turkish Cypriot state.
0
10
20
30
Pe
rce
nt
30,8
23,5
14
21,2
10,5
Greece or Turkey to require authorisation by the UN Security Council before either of them can
intervene in Cyprus.
Greek Cypriots demand the removal of intervention rights.
The Turkish Cypriots would accept a moderation of intervention rights.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Pe
rce
nt
17,81
25,36
13,68
22,5120,66
The Treaty of Guarantee to be replaced by a European Security agreement, in which Turkey
will also play a part, when Turkey joins the European Union.
Replacing the Treaty of Guarantee with a European Security agreement, would be acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots.
Governance
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Perc
ent
67,2
28,9
3,8
On the issue of Federal Decision Making, what do you prefer for the Turkish Cypriots: To have Veto Powers over every decision, and face the risk of deadlocks, or to limit the veto power to
the most essential issues, for the sake of effective governance?
The Turkish Cypriots have shaped the issue of governance in the negotiations, by insisting on privileges to protect them from majority rule.
0
10
20
30
40
Pe
rce
nt
15,2
33 31,5
20,3
The requirement for qualified majorities (that is, votes in favour from both
communities) to be removed from decision making in the Federal Government.
0
10
20
30
40
50
Perc
ent
21,9
29
40,2
8,9
No International J udges to be sitting on the bench of the Supreme Court.
Greek Cypriots are willing to tolerate the constitutional concessions which the Turkish Cypriots demand.
0
10
20
30
40
50
Per
cent
17
36,4
42,9
3,7
No permanent limits to the settlement of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the
opposite constituent state.
0
10
20
30
40
Pe
rce
nt
12,2
38,3
31,4
18,1
The senate to be elected according to permanent residence, not ethnic background.
The Greek Cypriots are also willing to tolerate the derogations which the Turkish Cypriots demand in order to preserve bizonality and political equality.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Perc
ent
25,2121,79
16,81
21,79
14,39
The three International J udges on the Supreme Court to come from EU countries, so that their rulings help to lead Cyprus in
a more European Direction.
The Turkish Cypriots are willing to tolerate “only Europeans as the three non-Cypriot judges on the Supreme Court”.
0
5
10
15
20
25
Perc
ent
20,5117,66 16,95
22,7922,08
Senate Special Majority to apply only in the most essential issues, in order to avoid
deadlocks, while for all other issues normal qualified majority to apply.
The Turkish Cypriots are also willing to tolerate a reduction in the number of issues for which Senate Special Majority is required.
0
10
20
30
40
50
Pe
rcen
t
11
19,212,8
43,9
13,1
The Presidential Council to be elected directly by the people.
The Turkish Cypriots would strongly support “direct election of the Presidential Council”
0
10
20
30
40
50
Perc
ent
10,315,7 17,9
42,3
13,8
Provisions to be put in place, such that will encourage the development of bi-communal
Political Parties.
The Turkish Cypriots would also strongly support “provisions to encourage the development of bi-communal Political Parties”
Property
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Pe
rce
nt
7,8
37,9
50,2
4,1
More territory to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration, than currently
provided for in the UN Plan.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Pe
rce
nt
7,9
27,5
63
1,6
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to be entitled to a greater percent of their property in
the other constituent state, than currently provided for in the UN Plan.
Greek Cypriots consider individual Property Rights to be more important than further territorial concessions.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Pe
rce
nt
22,36 22,93
11,97
27,78
14,96
Refugees, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, to be entitled to a greater
proportion of their property in the other constituent state, so long as current
occupants are protected as per the UN Plan.
0
10
20
30
40
50
Perc
ent
11,517,8 15,7
46,9
8,1
Each refugee that will not receive his original home, to be entitled to have a new home built
for him in the same town or village.
The Turkish Cypriots are willing to accept a greater respect for Property Rights, and they would enthusiastically support “non-
entitled refugees to have the right to a new home in the same village”
0
10
20
30
40
Pe
rce
nt
10,5
16,712,4
38,5
21,9
The right to become a resident of the other constituent state to be granted much sooner than currently provided for in the UN Plan.
The Turkish Cypriots are also eager to put aside timetable restrictions to the application of residence rights.
Citizens from Turkey
We have been here
since before 1974
We came here
between 1974 and
1979
We came here
between 1980 and
1989
We came here
between 1990 and
1999
We came here after the year
2000
My family has mixed through marriage
No Response
How long has your family been resident in Cyprus?
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70P
erce
nt
16,5
6 3,7 1,3
66,8
3,81,9
Turkish Citizens who came in the 1970s
32,500
Turkish Citizens who came in the 1980s
13,500
Turkish Citizens who came in the 1990s
9,000
Turkish Citizens who came since yr 2000
4,000
More than half of the Turkish Citizens arrived in the 1970s
0
20
40
60
80
Pe
rce
nt
4,2
20,3
74,7
0,8
More immigrants from Turkey to leave the island, than currently provided for in the UN Plan.
The Greek Cypriots strongly insist that more Turkish Citizens should depart from the island.
Greek Cypriot concerns about the Settlers.
• That many more would stay under the UN Plan, not just 45,000.
• That the Settlers would be entitled to stay in Greek Cypriot properties.
• That by allowing Settlers to stay, it will be like rewarding Turkey for her violation of International Law.
• That the Settlers would be an alien body to the culture of Cyprus, and would refuse to integrate.
• That through the vote of the Settlers, the influence of Turkey would remain strong in Cypriot politics.
0
10
20
30
40
Pe
rce
nt
24
39,3
19,816,9
Attitude of Turkish Cypriots towards the Greek Cypriots
0
10
20
30
40
Pe
rce
nt
18,39
29,8934,48
17,24
Attitudes of Settlers from Turkey towards the Greek Cypriots
Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Citizens do not vary much in their attitudes towards the Greek Cypriots.
0
10
20
30
40
50
Per
cent
23,1
42,1
9,5 10,5
What did you vote in the parliamentary elections of 2003? (Votes of Turkish Cypriots)
0
10
20
30
40
Per
cent
32,8
27,6
19,5
4
What did you vote in the parliamentary elections of 2003? (Votes of Settlers from Turkey)
However, the voting patterns of Turkish Citizens are sharply different to the voting patterns of the Turkish Cypriots.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Perc
ent
52,9
19,2
3,3
18
6,6
The list of immigrants that may remain on the island, currently numbering 45.000, to be shortened.
(views of Turkish Cypriots)
Turkish Cypriots would strongly oppose a reduction in ”the list of 45.000 who may remain”
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Pe
rce
nt
12,1 13,48,8
57,5
8,1
Strong implementation mechanisms, so that the illegal workers who are not entitled to
remain will indeed leave the island.
However, the Turkish Cypriots do in fact insist that those who are not entitled to stay should indeed leave the island.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Pe
rce
nt
8,1
24,3
63,5
4,1
Absolute limits to the future influx of Turkish Citizens in Cyprus, in such a way as to secure the
long term demographic balance on the island.
0
10
20
30
40
Perc
ent
23,6
14,2 15,8
35,8
10,5
Firm limits to the number of immigrants from Turkey who may come to settle in
Cyprus after the solution.
Both communities tend to agree on the necessity to limit future immigration from Turkey.
The Economy
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Pe
rce
nt
5,3
34,9
51,6
8,2
The central Federal state to be given more powers in economics, public
finance and commerce.
Totally unacceptable
Tolerable if necessary
No Response
A hepful improvement
Absolutely essential
0
10
20
30
40
Per
cent
7,3
16,219,1
35,6
21,8
The Federal Government to have the authority to place limits in the public
borrowing of constituent states.
Both communities tend to agree that Federal oversight of the Economy is important.
0
10
20
30
40
50
Pe
rce
nt
14,5
36,7
44,7
4,1
The right to freely purchase property anywhere in Cyprus, to be granted much sooner than
currently provided for in the UN Plan.
Greek Cypriots would like to see a more rapid application of free market economics.
Totally unacceptable
Tolerable if necessary
No Response
A hepful improvement
Absolutely essential
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Per
cent
14,67
22,65
13,11
27,64
21,94
The right to buy property in the other constituent state to be given within 6 to 9 years, but with
safeguards to ensure that the majority of property will remain in Turkish Cypriots hands.
Totally unacceptable
Tolerable if necessary
No Response
A hepful improvement
Absolutely essential
0
10
20
30
40
50
Per
cent
11,715,4 14,8
42,9
15,2
Greater incentives for the creation of bi-communal joint business ventures in the north, in order to
increase the standard of living of Turkish Cypriots through Greek Cypriot investments.
The Turkish Cypriots would be willing to tolerate such a reduction of economic restrictions, especially if Greek Cypriot
investments are made through bi-communal business ventures.
0
20
40
60
80
Per
cent
4,8
20,9
72,7
1,6
The cost of operation of the Federal State, to be divided more equitably so that Greek Cypriots
do not end up shouldering 90% of the cost.
Totally unacceptable
Tolerable if necessary
No Response
A hepful improvement
Absolutely essential
0
10
20
30
40
50
Per
cent
10,8
18,114,2
40,7
16,1
The cost of the Federal Government to be split more equitably between the Greek
Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots.
Equitable distribution of costs is a demand of both communities.
0
20
40
60
80
Pe
rce
nt
3,7
19,6
75,3
1,4
Turkey to also contribute for the compensation of refugees who will not
be getting their property back.
Totally unacceptable
Tolerable if necessary
No Response
A hepful improvement
Absolutely essential
0
10
20
30
40
50
Per
cent
15,721,4
14,5
43,3
5,1
Turkey to continue its current annual contribution to the Turkish Cypriot state
for ten more years after the solution.
Both communities would like to see Turkey more involved in the financing of the new state of affairs.
Education
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Pe
rce
nt
6,8
38,4
51,3
3,5
The central Federal state to be given more powers in matters of
education and social policy.
The Greek Cypriots insist that the Federal State should be given more authority over educational matters.
Totally unacceptable
Tolerable if necessary
No Response
A hepful improvement
Absolutely essential
0
10
20
30
40
Per
cent
17,8 19,7 17,7
38,2
6,7
The education of Greek Cypriots living in the north and Turkish Cypriots living in the south to
be responsibility of the Federal Government.
Totally unacceptable
Tolerable if necessary
No Response
A hepful improvement
Absolutely essential
0
10
20
30
40
Per
cent
21,223,6
16,8
32,1
6,3
The Federal Government to operate bi-communal schools, for parents who might wish
to send their children there.
The Turkish Cypriots would be willing to accept the creation of a “Federal Ministry of Education”, to oversee
integrated schooling and cross-state schooling.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Perc
ent
20,2
9,5 12,3
52,7
5,3
Free instruction of English and Greek to be made available for all citizens of the
Turkish Cypriot state, in order to improve their employment prospects.
The Turkish Cypriots would strongly appreciate a European Development program for the instruction of other languages.
Legal Status
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Perc
ent
5,6
23,7
65,7
5
Assurances that the new state of affairs will be the legal continuity of the Republic of Cyprus.
Greek Cypriots strongly insist on the legal continuity of the Republic of Cyprus.
0
10
20
30
40
Perc
ent
15,710,7 10,3
37,2
26,2
The new state of affairs to be the legal continuity of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus, but
without the requirement to recognize the post-1963 Greek Cypriot administration.
The Turkish Cypriots would be willing to consider legal continuity, so long as a formula could be found so that they wouldn’t be forced
to also recognize the “unilateral Greek Cypriot administration”
Implementation Guarantees
Unnecessary
Helpful
Essential
No Response
0
20
40
60
80
Per
cent
3,8
20,8
72
3,4
International guarantees for the implementation of the solution, with serious consequences for the
side that breaks from what has been agreed.
Totally unacceptable
Tolerable if necessary
No Response
A hepful improvement
Absolutely essential
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Per
cent
5
15,5 14,2
52,6
12,7
Enforceable international guarantees to be given for the implementation of the solution, with serious consequences for the side that
breaks away from what has been agreed.
Both communities insist that strong and enforceable guarantees be offered for the implementation of the solution.
Greek Cypriot Implementation concerns
• That territorial adjustment will indeed happen as agreed.
• That Turkish troops will indeed withdraw as agreed.
• That current occupants will indeed vacate properties when the Property Board orders them to do so.
• That the Turkish Cypriots will not be able to secede from the Republic.
Turkish Cypriot Implementation concerns
• That the terms of the agreement (more particularly Bizonality and Political Equality) will not later be overruled through the application of European Law.
• That National Guard weapons kept in Greek Cypriot homes will indeed be relinquished as agreed.
• That alternative accommodation will indeed be found for those who would have to relocate.
• That the Greek Cypriots will not be able to dominate the Republic.
Shared Implementation concerns
• That Settlers will indeed depart the island as planned.
• That properties will indeed be compensated for as agreed.
• That international donors will indeed support the settlement as promised.
Getting to “Yes”:
An overview of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot requirements.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Pe
rce
nt
5,1
14,1
19,120,7
15,7
25,3
Attitude towards the UN Plan (views of Greek Cypriots)
0
10
20
30
40
50
Pe
rcent
22,6
43,7
33,6
Attitude towards the UN Plan (views of Turkish Cypriots)
Conclusions (I)
• Getting to a “double Yes” in a future referendum involves satisfying those segments of each community whose demands do not clash with the fundamental requirements of the other side.
• From the Greek Cypriot point of view, getting to “Yes” involves satisfying those Greek Cypriots whose main concern is Security, as well as those Greek Cypriots whose main concern is Return of Refugees.
• Those Greek Cypriots who would like to “bury the UN Plan”, “because it is not based on simple majority rule”, cannot be satisfied without alienating the majority of the Turkish Cypriots.
Conclusions (II)
• From the Turkish Cypriot point of view, renewing the “Yes” will involve satisfying those who would like to see a closer integration of the two communities, as well as those whose main concern is the raising of their standard of living through European Integration.
• Those Turkish Cypriots who would like to see a “Pure Turkish State”, cannot be satisfied without alienating the majority of the Greek Cypriots.
• The issue on which it will be most difficult to reach a mutually satisfactory compromise is Security – and here, it will be imperative for all concerned to be willing to consider creative solutions.
Conclusions (III)
If Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot demands as described above are satisfied, then we can reasonably expect a “double Yes” at a future referendum, with approximate majorities of 65-70% on each side. Given the underlying public perceptions of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, this is the maximum level of support that any proposal for a Federal Solution could currently achieve.
