General Growth Properties - 3 (1)

8/10/2019 General Growth Properties - 3 (1)

1/43

GeneralGrowthProperties

January21,2010 HovdeCapitalAdvisorsLLC

Inconsistencies andErrors inPershingSquaresAnalysis

January21,2010


2/43

TableofContents

OurGoals (p.3) InconsistentCalculationofNOI (p.410)

FlawedCap

Rate

Analysis

(p.11

12)

InconsistentCalculationofLeverage (p.1317)

InconsistentComparisonofDebtCosts (p.1821)

Irreconcilable

Valuation

of

Development

Assets

(p.22

25) IrreconcilableValuationofCash (p.2627) IrreconcilableValuationofOtherAssets (p.2829) BankruptcyRisks (p.3032)

RecentRetail

and

Consumer

Data (p.33

34)

Summary (p.3539) Appendix (p.4041) Disclosures (p.4243)

HovdeCapitalAdvisorsLLCJanuary21,2010


3/43

OurGoals WecontinuetoreceivenumerousfollowupinquiriesintotheGeneralGrowth

situation,whichhascausedustoexaminethePershingSquareanalysispublishedonDecember22,2009,inevengreaterdetail. Wehavealsoreceivedinquiriesastosourcedataforfundamentaloperatingandtransactionaldata,whichwehave

providedin

this

presentation

for

reference.

Uponfurtherreview,webelievePershingSquaresanalysisisnotonlydeeplyfundamentallyflawed,butitcontainsnumerousfactualerrorsandmethodologicalinconsistencies,whichwedetailinthispresentation,thatcauseittobemateriallymisleadinginitsconclusions.

Webelievethemarketismadeupofdifferingviewsoftheworldandweappreciatethisdiversityofopinionandanalyticalinterpretation itisthelifebloodofmarkets. Wecanagreetodisagreeonmattersofopinion,butwhenthefactsaremisrepresentedeitherthroughattemptedsleightofhandor

negligence,we

believe

this

needs

to

be

brought

to

investors

attention.

Wecontinuetoencourageinvestorstodotheirownanalysisandduediligenceandcheckthefactsofanythirdpartyanalysis.

January21,2010 HovdeCapitalAdvisorsLLC 3

NOTE:FUNDS

ADVISED

BY

HOVDE

CAPITAL

ADVISORS,

LLC

AND

ONE

OF

ITS

PRINCIPALS

HAVE

SHORT

POSITIONS

IN

GGWPQ

AS

WELL

ASANOTHERCOMPANYMENTIONEDINTHISPRESENTATION. SEEADDITIONALIMPORTANTDISCLOSURESATPAGE43.


4/43

Inconsistent

Calculation

of

NOI



5/43

WhyDoesPershingSquareCalculateNOIDifferently

When

Comparing

GGP

and

SPG? WhencalculatingandcomparingNOI,PershingSquareusesasreported

NOIforbothcompaniesasthestartingpointforitscalculation,whichitadjustsforseveralnoncashitems. However,eachcompanyreportsNOIusing

adifferent

methodology;

so

this

analysis

is

based

on

inconsistency

fromthestart.

SPGincludescorporate(termedhomeandregionalofficecosts),generalandadministrativeexpensesincalculatingitsreportedNOI.

GPPexcludestheseexpensesincalculatingitsreportedNOI. SinceGGPisanationalmallplatformaccordingtoPershingSquare,theexpensesthatgoalongwithmanagingthisplatformshouldbeincludedastheyareinSPGscalculation,ortheseexpensesshouldbedeductedinthecalculation

ofSPGs

NOI.

PershingSquarestatesthattheiranalysisisappletoapplesalthoughwehaveshownwhyitisclearlynot.



6/43

SPGsDefinitionofNOI


SPGsdefinition

of

NOI

starts

with

operating

income

which

includes

corporate

expenses,G&Aexpenses,andpropertymanagementexpenses,whichGeneral

GrowthEXCLUDESasshownonthefollowingpages.

*Source:SPGQ309supplementalfinancialfiling.

6

HovdeCommentary


7/43

SPGsReconciliationofNOI



7


8/43

GGPsDefinitionofNOI


*Source:ExcerptfromGGWPQQ309supplementalfinancialfiling;emphasisadded.

8


9/43

GGPsReconciliationofNOI


*Source:GGWPQQ309supplementalfinancialfiling;emphasisadded.

9


10/43

BasedonPershingSquaresMethodologyandComparableNOI,

SPGsCalculatedNOIIs$3.4Billion,Not$3.2Billion


Startwith:

SPGLTMNOI(Pershingcalc.) $3,227

Plus:

LTM

Home

and

Regional

Office

Costs 149

Plus: LTMG&ACosts 20

ComparableLTMNOI $3,396

PershingSquareAnalysis* HovdeAnalysis(1)

*PershingSquareCapitalManagement,L.P.LLCADetailedResponseto

HovdesShortThesisonGeneralGrowthPropertiesDecember22,2009,page

23.(1)Source:SPGQ309andQ408supplementalfinancialfilings.

10


11/43

Flawed

Cap

Rate

Analysis



12/43

BasedonPershingSquaresMethodologyandComparably

CalculatedNOI,SPGsImpliedCapRateWas7.1%,NOT6.7%


PershingSquareAnalysis*

Basedonaconsistentmethodologywith

thewayGGPcalculatesitsNOI,SPGs

NOIwouldbe$3.396billionandwould

implyacap

rate

of

7.1%,

not

6.7%.

HovdeCommentary

*PershingSquareCapitalManagement,L.P.LLCADetailedResponseto

Hovdes

Short

Thesis

on

General

Growth

Properties

December

22,

2009,

page

23.

(1)Source:SPGQ309andQ408supplementalfinancialfilings.

HovdeAnalysis(1)

SPGLTMNOI(millions) $ 3,227

Plus:LTMHomeandRegionalOfficeCosts 149

Plus:

LTM

General

and

Administrative

Costs 20

ComparableLTMNOI $ 3,396

ImpliedCapRate 7.1%

12


13/43

Inconsistent CalculationofLeverage



14/43

WhyDoesPershingSquareCalculateLeverage

Differently

When

Comparing

GGP

and

SPG?

Whencomparingleverage,PershingSquare

deductscash

in

calculating

debt

for

GGP,

but

doesnotforSPG,whichhasover$4billion*

ofcashonhand.

WhydoesPershingSquarenotprovideanydetailontheircalculationsinthissectionof

theiranalysis?



14


15/43


Differently

When

Comparing

GGP

and

SPG?



*PershingSquareCapitalManagement,L.P.LLCADetailedResponsetoHovdesShortThesisonGeneralGrowthPropertiesDecember22,2009,page25.

Thecalculationoftheseratiosis

notconsistent. ForGGP,net

debtisbeingused,whilefor

SPG,grossdebtisbeingused.

Asnotedpreviously,Pershing

Squareassumestheconversion

of

unsecured

debt

for

comparing

leveragebutdoesnotassume

theconversionforvaluation

purposes.

HovdeCommentary

15


16/43


Differently

When

Comparing

GGP

and

SPG?


HovdeAnalysis

(Pershing Square Using

assumption of Pershing Pershing Using

unsecured Square Square Comparable

Current conversion) Presentation NOI Method NOI Method

GGP GGP (1) SPG (1) SPG SPG

Total Debt (w/JV @ Share) 27,868 27,868 25,041 25,041 25,041

Less: Unsecured Debt - (6,382) - - -

Less: Preferred Stock - (121) - (46) (46)

Less: Cash - (692) - (4,066) (4,066)

NOI (1) 2,478 2,478 3,227 3,227 3,396

Leverage 11.2x 8.3x 7.8x 6.5x 6.2x

Clearlythesepresentquitedifferent

pictures,andtheinconsistencyinthe

methodologyof

calculation

is

obvious.

(1)PershingSquareCapitalManagement,L.P.LLCADetailedResponsetoHovdesShortThesisonGeneralGrowthPropertiesDecember22,2009,page25.

(figuresinmillions)

16


17/43

SummaryofNOI,Leverage,andCapRateCalculation

PershingSquarecalculatesNOIandleveragedifferentlyforGGPandSPGandthencomparesthemasapplestoappleswhichtheyarenot.

Asaresult

of

this

inconsistency,

we

believe

most

of

Pershing

Squares

assertionsasitrelatestovaluationandleverageareinaccurateandmisleading.

Youcanthaveitbothways:

EitherGGPsNOIislowerthanPershingSquarepresentsbecauseitexcludescorporateandG&AexpensesorSPGsNOIishigherbecauseitincludestheseexpenseitems.

EitherGGPsleverageishigherifitisgrossedupforitscashbalanceandlowerNOI

or

SPGs

leverage

is

lower

ifits

cash

is

netted

out

of

its

debt

and

its

NOI

is

higher.

EitherGGPtradesatamuchlowerimpliedcapratethanPershingSquarepresentsorSPGtradesatamuchhigherimpliedcapratethanpresented.



18/43

InconsistentComparisonofDebtCosts



19/43

WhyDoesPershingSquareCompareRateson

Mortgage

Debt

to

Rates

on

Unsecured

Debt?




Thiscomparison

is

not

applestoapples. When

comparingmortgagedebtto

mortgagedebt,SPGhas

moreattractivelypriced

mortgagedebt,

with

a

weightedaveragerateof

5.17% perpage46ofSPGs

Q309supplementalfinancial

report.

Seenext

page.

HovdeCommentary

19


20/43

SPGsSecuredDebtIsLowerCost

ThanGGPs




Source:SPGQ309supplementalfinancialfiling,p.46.

SPGActualBalanceSheetData


21/43

SPGsUnsecuredDebtTradesatMoreAttractiveYields

Than

Even

GGPs

Secured

Debt


*Source:Bloomberg,asof1/14/2010.

SPGsunsecureddebtof

comparablematurity

to

GGPssecureddebttrades

ataLOWERyieldto

maturity(4.59%),

suggesting

SPG

could

refinancethisdebtata

morefavorablecostthan

GGPsfinancing. In

addition,GGPssecured

debtrequires

amortization.

HovdeCommentary

21


22/43

Irreconcilable ValuationofDevelopment

Assets



23/43

WeCannotReconcilePershingSquaresCalculationof

Development

Pipeline

Assets



PershingSquarestatesthatitappliesa

35%discounttotheseassets;however,

perpages3335thecompanysQ309supplementalreport,theseassetstotal

$1.05billion,whichwouldimplya

valueof$653millionusinga35%

discountas

opposed

to

the

$779

millionPershingSquareusesinits

analysis. Wasthisacalculator

malfunction?

HovdeCommentary


23


24/43

PershingSquareAppliesa35%DiscounttoGGPs

DevelopmentPipeline TheCompanyItself Thinks

53%of

These

Assets

May

Need

To

Be

Written

Off


PershingSquareAnalysis

Ofthe$1.05billionofdevelopmentprojects,$536.6million(53%)

aresignificantdeferreddevelopmentprojects,whichthecompany

discussesin

footnote

(d)

on

page

35

of

its

Q3

09

supplemental.

The

footnotereads:Inlate2008,wesuspendedourElkGrove

Promenade,TheShopsatSummerlinCentre(SM)andother

developments.AsofSeptember30,2009,wehadincurred

$459.7Mofdevelopmentcostsassociatedwiththese

developments,withthemajorityofthecostsbeingincurred

prior

to

suspension.

We

are

currently

obligated

under

existing

contractualobligationstolocaljurisdictionsandprospective

tenantstospendanadditional$23.8M.Adecisionabout

whethertoproceedandcompletethesedevelopmentswill

dependontheCompany'sliquidityposition,marketconditions

andsuchcontractualobligations.Adecisiontoabandon

completionofthesedevelopmentswouldlikelyresultinthe

marketingfor

sale

of

such

project,

potentially

resulting

in

a

writeoffofasubstantialportionofthecostsincurredtodate.

(emphasisadded)

HovdeCommentary


24


25/43


PershingSquareAnalysis

Of the $1.05 billion of development

projects, $536.6 million (53%) aresignificant deferred development

projects, which the company discusses in

footnote (d) on page 35 of its Q309

supplemental. If the company itself

believes 53% of these assets may need tobe written off completely, does 35%

seem like an appropriate way to discount

this possibility? Assuming these

deferred assets are written off, another

$266 million would need to be

subtracted.

HovdeCommentary


25

PershingSquareAppliesa35%DiscounttoGGPs

DevelopmentPipeline TheCompanyItself Thinks

53%of

These

Assets

May

Need

To

Be

Written

Off


26/43

Irreconcilable ValuationofCash



27/43

WeJustDontKnowWhatElseToSayAboutThis



Everyonemakesmistakessometimes?Hovde

Commentary

Source:GGWPQQ309supplementalfinancialfiling.


27


28/43

Irreconcilable ValuationofOtherAssets



29/43

WeCannotReconcilePershingSquaresCalculationof

OtherAssets




(1)Source:GGWPQform10Q93009,p.3.

GGPsActualBalanceSheet(1)

29


30/43

BankruptcyRisks



31/43

BankruptcyRisks

Astockpriceisnotnecessarilyanindicationofsolvency.

Publiclytradedcomparablesarenottheonlyfactorsconsideredinabankruptcyvaluationanalysis;therefore,privatemarkettransactionswherecapratesaremuchhigherarelikelyto

beconsidered

in

the

analysis.

WebelievetherelativeeaseofconsensusontheplanofemergencerelatedtosecuredcreditorsthusfarhasbeendrivenbythefactthatmuchofthedebtincludedinthisplanwasCMBSloans,wheretheserviceristypicallycontractuallyobligatedtoliquidateassetswithinaspecifiedperiodoftimeuponforeclosure,whichwouldlikelyleadtovaluedestruction.In

addition,

servicers

have

economic

incentives

not

to

foreclose

on

assets

and

risk

losing

fee

income. Thisisincontrasttoothersecuredlendersandunsecuredlenders,whichcan(andoftenwantto)ownandoperateassetstomaximizerecoveryvaluesand,therefore,havemorenegotiatingleverage.

AccordingtoCRTCapitalGroupLLC,postpetitioninterestonthebondsandtheunsecuredtermloancouldamounttonearly$500millionassumingemergencebyMay1,2010,which

wouldfurther

jeopardize

any

equity

recovery

(1).

Webelieveunsecuredcreditorswouldbeoutoftheirmindstoallowthemselvestobeequitizedataninflatedvalueandhavetheirclaimdiluted. Webelievethecreditorsarelikelytorejectanyproposedplanvaluethatallowscurrentequityholderstoretainasignificantstakeinthecompany.


(1)Source:DottingtheI'sandCrossingtheT'sKevinStarke,CFA, CRTCapitalGroupLLC,12/28/09.


32/43

BankruptcyRisks

Inouropiniontimeisnotonequityholdersside: Thelongerthecompanyremainsinbankruptcy,themore

difficultit

becomes

for

the

company

to

renew

leases,

attractnewtenants,anddemandbetterpricinginleasenegotiations.

Thelongerthisdynamiccontinues,themoreextendedthedecline

in

the

cash

flow

stream

that

will

become

embeddedinthecompanyovertime.

GGPishighlyleveraged;therefore,smallchangesinNOIcanleadtosubstantialchangesinvalueandweakenschances

for

an

equity

recovery.

Legalfees,otherbankruptcycosts,andunpaidinterestcontinuetoaccrue,erodinganypotentialequityrecovery.



33/43

RecentRetailandConsumerData



34/43

RecentRetailandConsumerDataConfirm

Ongoing

Weakness

in

Mall

Fundamentals OveragerentsinGGPsNovemberoperatingstatementshowedan

insignificantincreasefromOctober,confirmingourviewthatmanyretailersarelikelygeneratingsalesbelowthresholdlevelsnecessaryto

generate

significant

levels

of

overage

rents.

(1)

Consumercreditshoweditslargestcontractiononrecord,declining$17.5billioninthemonthofNovember.(2)

Decemberretailsalesdeclined0.3%,missingexpectationsforanincrease.

Traditionally

mall

based

categories

such

as

consumer

electronicsandappliancesandmiscellaneousretailersshowedexceptionalweakness,falling2.6%and1.0%,respectively.(3)

Footlocker(NYSE:FL)announcedplanstoclose117storesinJanuary

2010.

(4)

WilliamsSonoma(NYSE:WSM)announceditplanstoreduceitssquarefootageby12%in2010andisactivelyrenegotiatingmorefavorableleasetermsfromlandlords.(5)


(1) GGWPQNovembermonthlyoperatingstatement. (2)FederalReserveBoardofGovernors,ConsumerCredit,1/8/2010. (3)USCENSUSBUREAUADVANCEMONTHLYSALESFORRETAILANDFOOD

SERVICES,1/14/2010. (4)Companypressrelease,1/8/2010. (5)Companypressrelease,1/14/2010.


35/43

Summary



36/43

Summary

Basedontheforegoingpointsinthispresentationandothermaterialflawswehavehighlightedpreviously,webelievePershingSquaresanalysisisfactuallyinaccurateandmisleading,regardlessofones

opinionof

the

company

or

potential

outcome

of

the

bankruptcy

process.

GiventhatPershingSquarehasarepresentativeonGGPsBoardofDirectors,howcanGGPsBoardofDirectorsallowPershingSquaretodisseminatesuchinaccurateandmisleadingdata?

HowcaninvestorsblindlyfollowtherecommendationsofPershingSquarewithoutscrutinizingthefactualaccuracyofthesupportinganalysis,whichwehaveshowntobefaulty?

Wecontinue

to

encourage

institutional

and

retail

investors

in

these

typesofinvestmentstobewaryofselfinterestedthirdpartiespromotingstocksbasedoninaccurateandmisleadinganalysis. Weencourageinvestorstodotheirownanalysisandduediligenceandcheckthefactsofanypotentialinvestment.



37/43

WeBelieveOurAnalysisIsGenerousTowardstheCompany

andThatItIsQuestionableWhetherThereWillBeValuefor

CurrentShareholders

Using

Cap

Rates

We

Think

Are

Too

Low

HovdeCapitalAdvisorsLLC 37

(1)SeecalculationofNOIonpage30ofGeneralGrowthProperties,FoolsGold,HovdeCapitalAdvisors,LLC,December15,2009.

(2)AnalysistakenfromTheBucksReboundBeginsHeredatedMay27,2009 PershingSquareCapitalManagement,L.P.(p.56),updatedforQ309financialstatements.(3)HovdeCapitalAdvisorsanalysisassumescashNOIof$2.0billionand,unlikePershingSquare,assumescashispaidoutin feestosecuredandunsecuredcreditors.

January21,2010

Assumes 10% Decline in NOI (1)

Pershing Square Analysis Framework (2)

($ in millions, except per share data) Low High

Cash NOI $ 2,000 $ 2,000

Cap Rate 8.5% 7.5%

Implied Value of GGP's REIT 23,529 26,667

Pro Rata for JVs:Less: Total Debt (28,174) (28,174)

Less: Preferred Debt (121) (121)

Less: Other Liabilities (1,766) (1,766)

Plus: Cash (3) - -

Plus: Other Assets 1,448 1,448

Plus: Development Pipeline 653 653

Implied Equity Value $ (4,431) $ (1,294)

Per Share $ (13.86) $ (4.05)


38/43

WeBelieveOurAnalysisIsGenerousTowardstheCompany

andThatItIsQuestionableWhetherThereWillBeValuefor

CurrentShareholders

Using

Cap

Rates

We

Think

Are

Too

Low

January21,2010 38HovdeCapitalAdvisorsLLC

Assumedconversionprice: $ 5.00 $ 6.00 $ 7.00 $ 8.00 $ 3.00 $ 4.00 $ 5.00 $ 6.00

(1) Seecalculation

on

page

24

of

General

Growth

Properties,

Fools

Gold,

Hovde

Capital

Advisors,

LLC,

December

15,

2009.Assumes

unsecured

debt

would

require

amoderate

discount

to

convert,

although

it

isquestionableinourviewwhethertherewillbeanyvalueforexistingshareholdersgiventhatwebelievethevalueofthedebtexceedsthatoftheassets.

(2) Assumes cash is paid out to creditors in forbearance fees and reimbursement of legal expenses.

Best Case Assumes Conversion and No

Decline in NOI (1)Realistic Case - Assumes Conversion and No

Decline in NOI (1)

($ in millions, except per share data) Conversion Price Range $5-$8 Conversion Price Range $3-$6

LTM Cash NOI $ 2,200 $ 2,200 $ 2,200 $ 2,200 $ 2,200 $ 2,200 $ 2,200 $ 2,200

Cap Rate 7.5% 7.5% 7.5% 7.5% 8.5% 8.5% 8.5% 8.5%

Implied Value of GGP's REIT 29,333 29,333 29,333 29,333 25,882 25,882 25,882 25,882

Pro Rata for JVs:

Less: Total Debt (21,174) (21,174) (21,174) (21,174) (21,174) (21,174) (21,174) (21,174)

Less: Preferred Debt (121) (121) (121) (121) (121) (121) (121) (121)

Less: Other Liabilities (1,766) (1,766) (1,766) (1,766) (1,766) (1,766) (1,766) (1,766)

Plus: Cash (2) - - - - - - - -

Plus: Other Assets 1,448 1,448 1,448 1,448 1,448 1,448 1,448 1,448

Plus: Development Pipeline 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653

Implied Equity Value $ 8,373 $ 8,373 $ 8,373 $ 8,373 $ 4,922 $ 4,922 $ 4,922 $ 4,922

Per Share $ 4.87 $ 5.63 $ 6.34 $ 7.01 $ 1.86 $ 2.38 $ 2.86 $ 3.31


39/43

CommercialRealEstateValuesHave

Dropped43%

Since

the

Peak

in

2007


Source:Moodys/REALCommercialPropertyIndex,RealCapital

Analytics.

Applying the Moodys/Real Commercial Property Index Data to General

Growths balance sheet implies a substantial equity value shortfall based

on todays asset values. While we appreciate there are certain assets that

have been held for a long period of time, we would note that roughly half

the companys total assets were acquired in the Rouse acquisition near

peak cycle prices.

General Growth Implied Market Value Analysis

($millions)

As of 12/31/2007 CalculationTotal Assets 28,814,319 ( A )

Accumulated Depreciation 3,605,199 ( B )

Total Liabilities 26,884,779 ( C )

Stockholders Equity 1,456,696 ( D )

Adjusted Total Assets 32,419,518 ( E ) = ( A ) + (B )

Adjusted Stockholders Equity 5,061,895 ( F ) = ( B ) + ( D )

Mark-to-Market Adjusted Total Assets 18,479,125 ( G ) = ( E ) * (1 - 43%)

Total Liabilities 26,884,779 ( C )

Implied Market Value of Equity (8,405,654) = ( G ) - ( C )

HovdeAnalysis

Hovde

Commentary

Balancesheetdataasof12/31/07perGGPSECfilingsform10K.


40/43

Appendix



41/43

ReferenceMaterialsandResources

CommercialRealEstateFundamentalResearchandData(actualprivatemarketdata

depictingthedeterioratingtrendsinretailrentalratesandoccupancyaswellas

decliningcommercialrealestateassetprices)

www.cbre.comCBRichardEllis(nationalandregionaloccupancy,leasing,anddemographictrends)

www.colliers.comColliersInternational(nationalandregionaloccupancy,leasing,anddemographictrends)

www.reis.comReis(marketdataonoccupancy,supply,absorption,etc.)

www.costar.comCoStarGroup

(property

level

data

on

occupancy,

rental

rates,

etc.)

www.rcanalytics.comRealCapitalAnalytics(comprehensiveCREtransactionaldatabase)

http://www.pwc.com/us/en/assetmanagement/realestate/index.jhtml PricewaterhouseCoopers(comprehensiveCREmarketdata,surveys,andforecasts)

PublicREIT

Company

Data(financial

statements

and

operational

data)

http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html publiccompanyfilings

www.ggp.com GeneralGrowthswebsitewithlinkstosupplementalfinancialreports

www.simon.com SimonPropertyGroupswebsitewithlinkstosupplementalfinancialreports

http://www.cbre.com/http://www.colliers.com/http://www.reis.com/http://www.costargroup.com/http://www.rcanalytics.com/http://www.pwc.com/us/en/asset-management/real-estate/index.jhtmlhttp://www.pwc.com/us/en/asset-management/real-estate/index.jhtmlhttp://www.pwc.com/us/en/asset-management/real-estate/index.jhtmlhttp://www.pwc.com/us/en/asset-management/real-estate/index.jhtmlhttp://www.pwc.com/us/en/asset-management/real-estate/index.jhtmlhttp://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.htmlhttp://www.ggp.com/http://www.simon.com/http://www.simon.com/http://www.ggp.com/http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.htmlhttp://www.pwc.com/us/en/asset-management/real-estate/index.jhtmlhttp://www.rcanalytics.com/http://www.costargroup.com/http://www.reis.com/http://www.colliers.com/http://www.cbre.com/


42/43

Disclosures



43/43

Disclosures

FundsadvisedbyHovdeCapitalAdvisors,LLCand/oroneofitsprincipalshaveestablishedshortpositionsinthecommonstockofGeneralGrowthProperties(OTC:GGWPQ)and

WilliamsSonoma(NYSE:WSM).Theirpositionsinthesestocksandothersmaychange

withoutfurther

notice.

NeitherthefundsadvisedbyoranyaffiliatesofHovdeCapitalAdvisors,LLCholdpositionsinanycompaniesmentionedinthisdocumentotherGeneralGrowthPropertiesandWilliams

Sonoma.

The

opinions

and

views

expressed

in

this

document

and

the

analysis

set

forth

herein

may

changeandHovdeCapitalAdvisors,LLCisnotundertakingtoupdateitsopinions,viewsor

analysis.

Althoughthefactualinformationcontainedinthisdocumentisbelievedtobeaccurate,HovdeCapitalAdvisors,LLCdoesnotwarrantitsaccuracyorcompleteness.

Thisdocument

is

not

intended

to

be,

and

should

not

be

construed

as,

investment

advice

or

a

recommendationtobuyortosellanysecurity.

Documents

General Growth Properties - 3 (1)