Gambling, Resource Distribution, and Racial Economy: An Examination of Poker Machine Expenditure in Three Remote Australian Towns

Gambling, Resource Distribution, and RacialEconomy: An Examination of Poker MachineExpenditure in Three Remote Australian Townsgeor_667 59..71

MARTIN YOUNG1*, DAVID LAMB1 and BRUCE DORAN2

1School for Social and Policy Research, Charles Darwin University, Ellengowan Drive, Casuarina,NT 0909.2Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200.*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

Received 29 July 2009; Revised 5 February 2010; Accepted 10 May 2010

AbstractOur aim in this paper is to examine the ways in which electronic gaming machines(EGMs) redistribute resources to and from three remote towns in the NorthernTerritory (NT), namely Katherine, Tennant Creek and Nhulunbuy. We describeEGM expenditure levels in each town at the level of the individual venue, examinepatterns of socioeconomic status within each town, explore the ways in which EGMmarkets are racialised through venue gate-keeping practices and spatially-basedalcohol regulations, and examine the effects of resource redistribution mechanismsdesigned to return a proportion of EGM profits to host communities. The ability ofvenues to draw resources from extremely disadvantaged groups from the remoteperiphery is of central concern when attempting to assess the societal consequencesof gambling in remote towns, both in terms of individual harm and the adequacy ofresource redistribution. Existing mechanisms for resource redistribution are bothselective and relatively meagre, pointing to a political and racial economy of EGMgambling that transfers resources from remote towns to sites of centralised ‘white’power. We conclude that political economy in the context of remote NT towns maynot be understood outside a consideration of racial economy and the way thatconstructed notions of race operate to legitimate existing processes of economicexploitation and resource redistribution.

KEY WORDS gambling; electronic gaming machines; remote towns; racialeconomy; Northern Territory

IntroductionIn Australia, electronic gaming machine (EGM)or poker machine gambling has increased heavilyover the past decade. Total real EGM expenditurehas increased twofold from $5.9 billion in1995/06 to $10.5 billion in 2006/07 (2006/07AUD). Real per capita EGM rose over the sameperiod from $441 to $658 (2006/07 AUD),amounting to 60% of Australia’s total gamblingexpenditure (Queensland Government, 2008). Ofdirect geographic interest is the spatial diffusion

of this gambling, which has migrated fromcasinos into hotels (or pubs) and sporting, serviceand recreation clubs in every Australian jurisdic-tion with the exception of Western Australia. As aconsequence, the ‘pokie’ has become a ubiqui-tous feature of pubs and clubs in remote andurban Australia alike. While geographic researchon the distribution of EGMs has focused on met-ropolitan areas (e.g. Marshall, 1999; Marshalland Baker, 2000; 2001a; 2001b; 2002; SouthAustralian Centre for Economic Studies, 2005),

59Geographical Research • February 2011 • 49(1):59–71doi: 10.1111/j.1745-5871.2010.00667.x

few studies to date have specifically examinedthe effect of EGM gambling on remote towns(Marshall, 1998). This is an important omissionbecause the relationships between EGM supplystructures, individual communities and gam-bling outcomes identified at the metropolitanlevel are not necessarily applicable to regionaland remote contexts (Young and Tyler, 2008).Our aim in this paper is to examine the financialflows associated with EGM gambling to andfrom three remote towns of the Northern Terri-tory (NT), namely Katherine, Tennant Creekand Nhulunbuy.

Our analysis is exploratory, designed to iden-tify issues that EGMs raise about the collectionand redistribution of gambling revenues withinthese towns as they are incorporated into theglobal economy of EGM gambling. We are par-ticularly interested in the differences betweenclubs and pubs in terms of expenditure and cli-entele, as well as the outcomes of resource redis-tribution mechanisms designed to benefit localcommunities. To contextualise our analysis ofEGM expenditure we present a brief discussionof gambling in remote areas and describe ourcase study sites. We then go on to describe EGMexpenditure levels in each town at the level ofthe individual venue, explore some variations inlocal EGM markets based on our personalknowledge of each town, outline the raft ofracially-based alcohol regulations that createtemporal and spatial market segregation, andexamine the outcomes of resource redistributionmechanisms designed to redistribute a proportionof local EGM profits.

Gambling and remote townsIt is clear that gambling is a highly regressiveindustry, in that poorer groups spend proportion-ately more than those better off (Doughney,2004; Livingstone, 2001; Livingstone andWoolley, 2007; Nibert, 2006; Productivity Com-mission, 1999). From a geographical point ofview, this system of exploitation is spatiallystructured. In large metropolitan areas, suburbsof low socioeconomic status tend to be moreheavily provisioned with EGMs than theirwealthier counterparts (Marshall, 1999; Marshalland Baker, 2000; 2001a; 2001b; 2002; Produc-tivity Commission, 1999; South AustralianCentre for Economic Studies, 2005). Thisspatially regressive pattern is mirrored overseas(Wheeler et al., 2006; Robitaille and Herjean,2008; Gilliland and Ross, 2005). Unfortunately,our knowledge of the effects of gambling in

regional and remote Australia is limited. Conse-quently, gambling liberalisation has proceededlargely on the basis that its impacts in regionaland remote areas are similar to those witnessedin urban areas. For example, the ProductivityCommission’s (1999) landmark study ofAustralia’s gambling industries regarded thenon-metropolitan not only as similar to the met-ropolitan, but also as a relatively homogenouszone.

We suggest this approach represents a con-ceptual error as it is based on the untestedassumption that the sociospatial processes atwork in the metropolitan context will be thesame as those in the non-metropolitan context.For example, previous research on the relation-ship between socioeconomic status of localareas and EGM supply in the NT found no rela-tionship between the location of EGMs and thesocial disadvantage of their local areas (Younget al., 2006). This did not imply that poorerpeople were less likely to play EGMs, but thatthe relationship between venues and marketswas mediated by a range of sociospatial vari-ables including the historical location of hotels,demographic characteristics of local markets,the catchment areas of venues, the spatialmobility of key markets, and spatial restrictionson supply. In other words, the patterns ofexpenditure in remote areas may be determinedby a different mix of spatial, regulatory, andmarket forces to those found in major Austra-lian cities. As a case in point, Marshall’s (1998)study of EGM gambling in Peterborough, SouthAustralia, concluded that the purported benefitsof EGMs, including an economic multipliereffect and increased taxation revenues, eitherdid not occur or tended to accrue primarily atthe regional level. This study made clear thatEGMs have the potential to direct resourcesboth within towns (i.e. from gamblers to venueowners) and from small towns to central gov-ernments, with little redistribution to the hostcommunity. As a consequence, remote townsmay be more vulnerable to the exploitativeeffects of EGM gambling than larger centres.This is the issue we explored in three remoteNT towns.

Three remote towns

NhulunbuyNhulunbuy is a well-provisioned mining towndesigned to support the bauxite extraction opera-tion conducted by Rio Tinto Alcan on the Gove

60 Geographical Research • February 2011 • 49(1):59–71

© 2010 The AuthorsGeographical Research © 2010 Institute of Australian Geographers

Peninsula. It is located within East ArnhemLand, an Aboriginal-owned area in the north eastof the NT. The population of Nhulunbuy in 2006was 4 112, (place of usual residence) of whomonly 5% identified as Aboriginal and TorresStrait Islander, despite its location in ArnhemLand (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2007a).Nhulunbuy is designated as a ‘very remote’ town,the most remote categorisation of the AustralianStandard Geographical Classification (ASGC)Remoteness Structure (Australian Bureau of Sta-tistics, 2006a). One of the larger Aboriginal com-munities in the area, Yirrkala, is located 17 kmfrom Nhulunbuy. The population of Yirrkala in2006 was 687 (Australian Bureau of Statistics,2007b). Both the Walkabout Tavern and the largeArnhem Club are located adjacent to the centralbusiness district and main shopping centre (seeFigure 1). The smaller Gove Country Club islocated on the edge of town where space is avail-able to accommodate the golf course.

KatherineKatherine is located approximately 3 hours drivesouth of Darwin via the Stuart Highway (themain road that runs north-south through thecentre of the NT). It is designated as a ‘remote’town according to the ASGC Remoteness Struc-ture (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006a). Thepopulation of Katherine in 2006 was 5 849 (placeof usual residence) of which 28% identified asAboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (AustralianBureau of Statistics, 2007c). These figuresexclude the Aboriginal ‘town camps’ that sur-round the urban area of Katherine. Katherinedeveloped as an overland telegraph station in1870–2 and acted as a service centre to pastorallands in the district. By the late 1960s, theeconomy of Katherine had shifted towards amore tourism-based economy, taking advantageof its proximity to Katherine River Gorge (nowin Nitmiluk National Park). As is typical forcountry-town pubs, the two original hotels, theKatherine Hotel and Crossways, are located onthe main road, Katherine Terrace. The three clubs(i.e. Katherine Club, Katherine Country Club,and Katherine Sports and Recreation Club) arelocated in the suburbs on either side of this road.

Tennant CreekTennant Creek is also accessible via the StuartHighway and is located 9 to 10 hours’ drive fromDarwin to the north and 5 hours drive from AliceSprings to the south. The next sizable town isElliot with a population of 355, some 254 kilo-

metres away (Australian Bureau of Statistics,2007d). Due to these distances Tennant Creek isclassed by the ASGC as ‘very remote’. The popu-lation in Tennant Creek in 2006 comprised 2 919people, (place of usual residence) half of whomidentified as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2007e). As withKatherine, Tennant Creek started life as a tele-graph repeater station for the overland telegraphline in the 1870s. However, the main develop-ment of the town did not occur until 1933 whengold was discovered. In the 1950s, miningswitched from gold to copper and continued tosupport the town’s growth. The contemporaryTennant Creek acts as a regional centre for theBarkly Region, supporting the pastoral industryas well as providing government services to thearea. The economy still relies heavily on themining industry through the Bootu Creek Man-ganese Mine located 110 km north of town. In asimilar fashion to the spatial layout of Katherine,the two pubs (i.e. Tennant Creek Hotel and Gold-fields) are located along the Stuart Highway(renamed Patterson Street within the townboundary), while the three clubs (i.e. MemorialClub, Sporties Club, and Tennant Creek BowlingClub) are located off to either side of the mainroad (Figure 1).

EGM expenditure patterns in the three townsTable 1 presents the number of EGMs, totalexpenditure, and expenditure per machine(e.p.m.) for individual venues in Katherine,Tennant Creek and Nhulunbuy (2006/07 finan-cial year). Note that the number of machines iscapped at 45 for clubs and 10 for pubs. InTennant Creek, the Memorial Club dominated interms of total e.p.m. The two pubs (TennantCreek Hotel and Goldfields Hotel) earned morethan the two clubs (Sporties Club and TennantCreek Bowling Club) on an e.p.m. basis. InKatherine, the two largest clubs earned the mostrevenue. Expenditure per machine did varygreatly, although the two hotels were positionedfirst and third in terms of e.p.m. ranking. Nearlyall expenditure within Nhulunbuy occurredwithin two venues, the Arnhem Club and theWalkabout Tavern. These two venues had by farthe highest expenditure of any of the remote townvenues, earning over $100 000 per EGM from atotal of 55 machines. Indeed, the Arnhem Clubwas the third highest of all NT clubs, outper-formed only by the major clubs in Darwin(Palmerston Sports Club $129 777 e.p.m. andCasuarina All Sports Club $136 491 e.p.m.

M. Young et al.: Gambling, Resource Distribution, and Racial Economy 61


2006/07 financial year). The Walkabout Tavernwas sixth in terms of all pubs in the NT. Theleading five were only marginally more profit-able, and were all located in Darwin. The resultsfor the two Nhulunbuy venues, located within100 metres of each other, is remarkable given themuch larger markets available to the Darwinvenues.

Venue location, socioeconomic statusand accessFigure 1 presents the Australian Bureau of Sta-tistics Index of Relative Socio-economic Advan-

tage and Disadvantage (IRSAD) mapped at theCollection District (CD) level for each town. TheIRSAD is a general socioeconomic index thatincorporates 21 measures including low or highincome, internet connection, occupation, andeducation. A low IRSAD score indicates rela-tively greater disadvantage and a lack of advan-tage in general while a high score indicates arelative lack of disadvantage and greater advan-tage in general (Australian Bureau of Statistics,2006b). For Tennant Creek and Nhulunbuy, therelatively advantaged areas are the town centres.These contrast markedly with the disadvantaged

Figure 1 Index of Relative Socioeconomic Advantage and Disadvantage by Collector District for Katherine, Nhulunbuy, andTennant Creek (Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006c).



surrounding regions (note that the areas of ‘nodata’ in Figure 1 are pastoral or Aboriginal LandTrust areas). This pattern is clearest in the case ofNhulunbuy which juxtaposes a well-off urbanpopulation, contained within the mining leaseboundaries, with a socioeconomically disadvan-taged regional population in Arnhem Land. Thisgeneral pattern is less evident in Katherine, theleast remote of the three towns, where there areadvantaged areas to the west of the town associ-ated with horticultural properties irrigated fromthe Katherine River. At a more localised level,pockets of extreme socioeconomic disadvantageexist to the north of Katherine town centre andnorth and south of Tennant Creek town centre.This socioeconomic distribution is reflective ofan underlying racial one. Figure 2 presents theproportion of each CD’s total population thatidentified as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islanderat the last Census. This map correlates veryclosely with IRSAD distribution (Figure 1). TheCDs of high disadvantage generally reflectAboriginal town camps while the outlying areasreflect undeveloped remote tracts that have fewresident non-Aboriginal people. It is clear thatsocioeconomic disadvantage in these towns isracially-based and demonstrates a clear spatialpattern. Therefore, the relationship betweensocioeconomic status and EGMs needs to beexplored in racial terms.

Unfortunately, an examination of the locationof venues in relation to CDs with a high propor-

tion of Aboriginal residents is not particularlyinformative. In small remote towns, EGM venuesare located in the town centres (particularly thepubs) or suburbs (particularly the clubs) that tendto be the more advantaged areas (Figure 1).Given the small size of the towns and the asso-ciated concentration of essential infrastructure(e.g. shopping centres, public transportation,social services), EGM venues are spatially(although not necessarily socially) accessibleto the entire population. For example, whileAboriginal people may not permanently live intown centres, they certainly congregate in theirpublic spaces which also provide good access tothe pubs that tend to be located along the mainroad of the central business district. For bothclubs and pubs, a substantial Aboriginal clientelewould imply a spatial attenuation of catchmentsgiven that a large proportion of the Aboriginalpopulation live either on the outskirts (e.g. towncamps) or outside these towns in neighbouringcommunities (e.g. Yirrkala) (Figure 2).

Segregation of EGM marketsIndeed, the question of markets, of who is actu-ally contributing to EGM expenditures, is centralto understanding the social impacts of EGMgambling. We know that remote EGM venues inthe NT are clearly differentiated on the basis ofrace, and this differentiation is both markedlyspatial and temporal. For example, previousresearch has identified the Tennant Creek Hotel

Table 1 Number of EGMs, total expenditure, and expenditure per EGM for individual venues in Katherine, Tennant Creek andNhulunbuy, 2006/07 financial year (Source: Northern Territory Government EGM expenditure database).

Venue Total expenditure2006/07 ($)

Expenditure permachine 2006/07 ($)

NumberEGMs

Tennant CreekTennant Creek Hotel 326 254 32 625 10Goldfields Hotel 330 084 33 008 10Sporties Club 369 980 23 124 16Tennant Creek Bowling Club 13 751 3 434 4Tennant Creek Memorial Club 1 532 326 61 293 25

KatherineKatherine Hotel 608 870 60 887 10Crossways Hotel 531 460 53 146 10Katherine Club 2 136 006 47 467 45Katherine Country Club 1 370 032 54 801 25Katherine Sports & Recreation Club 692 147 36 429 19

NhulunbuyGove Country Golf Club 119 880 9 990 12The Arnhem Club 5 195 266 115 450 45Walkabout Tavern 1 037 314 103 731 10



as a venue used heavily by Aboriginal patrons(Brady, 1988). Indeed, based on our own obser-vations in these towns, the clientele of a numberof pubs (e.g. Katherine Hotel, Crossways Hotel,and the Walkabout Tavern), particularly duringbusy mid-morning sessions, is almost entirelyAboriginal. This market appears highly diurnalwith a marked peak in visitation from mid-morning to early-afternoon. In contrast with thepubs, remote clubs in the NT tend to have a morediverse clientele. The clubs are generally quieter,more controlled venues that cater to a widerrange of social groups.

It is clear that EGM gambling is inevitablypart of a racial economy. In the sense we use theterm here, racial economy is a perspective that‘. . . explains empirical objects and processes(e.g., poverty, unemployment, urban form) byreference to the interconnections among politicalinstitutions, economic markets, and conceptionsof race’ (Wilson, 2009, 140). In this context,‘race’ refers to a discursive category rather thanan empirical or naturalistic one (Bonnett, 1996;Mitchell, 2000). In a racial economy, space isactively ‘racialised’ through social and institu-tional practices and policies that create and main-

Figure 2 Percent of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander by Collector District for Katherine, Nhulunbuy, and Tennant Creek(Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006d).



tain identities, social boundaries, and ideologies,all of which are deployed as central elements(Wilson, 2009, 143). At the level of the EGMvenue, racialisation occurs, in part, throughsocial practices around entry. Specifically,patrons of clubs are more heavily regulated bygate-keeping practices than those of pubs. Theseinclude regulations relating to adequate clothing,footwear, and personal hygiene. Figure 3 pre-sents the signage displayed on the front door ofone club that is generally reflective of all clubs inthe three towns. These restrictions provide theclubs with the opportunity to regulate access for-mally at the level of the individual. While notexplicitly race-based, these requirements offerthe potential to racialise venues through gate-keeping, policing and standard-setting practices.

This is not to say clubs exclude on the basis ofrace per se. On the contrary, Aboriginal patronsare included to the extent that they meet thedeportment and behaviour requirements set bythe venues. Based on our, admittedly anecdotal,observations and conversations with governmentofficials, a significant proportion of EGM playersare Aboriginal, particularly in the larger clubs. Inthis way, a particular sort of space is produced bythe clubs, one that accepts Aboriginal patrons tothe extent that they conform to existing ‘white’norms. Pubs tend to create a very different kindof space, one that is less reflective of these normsand inclusionary of a socioeconomically dis-advantaged Aboriginal underclass (e.g. Brady,1988). Unfortunately, our knowledge of thesepractices is circumstantial and we require furtherresearch in this area. However, the fact that

EGMs are only permitted in venues licensed toserve alcohol means that EGM usage is inevi-tably tied to alcohol management in the NT.Indeed, a raft of alcohol regulations are appliedto remote towns in an explicit and concertedattempt to govern the Aboriginal consumer. Aswe outline in the next section, these regulationsare instrumental in bounding consumption prac-tices on the basis of race.

Alcohol restrictions, race and venues

Local alcohol restrictionsIn the NT, alcohol may be purchased from avenue in one of two ways, either from a bar forconsumption on the premises or as a ‘takeaway’from a venue’s bar or bottleshop for consump-tion offsite. Alcohol may also be purchasedas a ‘takeaway’ from other licensed alcoholretailers, including some supermarkets such asWoolworths. In Katherine, the purchase of‘takeaways’ from licensed premises is permittedfrom 2pm – 8pm on weekdays, 12pm – 8pm onSaturdays, and 2pm – 8pm (only from hotels) onSundays (Department of Justice, 2008a). In thecase of clubs, ‘takeaways’ are only available tomembers. In addition to these temporal restric-tions, limits also apply to the quantity of alcoholthat may be purchased. In Katherine, takeawaysales are generally limited to one 2-litre cask orone bottle of fortified wine per person per dayand these are limited to the hours of 2pm to 6pm(Department of Justice, 2008a). These restric-tions on takeaway cask and fortified wine pur-chases are specifically targeted at impoverishedAboriginal drinkers who are more likely to seeklow-cost, high alcohol content drinks (Gray andChikritzhs, 2002). In this regard, cask wine pro-vides the greatest ‘bang for buck’.

In Tennant Creek, alcohol may be consumedwithin venues from 12pm to closing on week-days, and 10am to closing on weekends (Depart-ment of Justice, 2008b). The purchase of‘takeaways’ from licensed premises is permittedfrom 2pm – 8pm on weekdays, 12pm – 8pm onSaturdays, and 2pm – 8pm on Sundays (Depart-ment of Justice, 2008b). Takeaway sales arerestricted to containers less than 1 litre with theexception of 2-litre casks of wine from 4pm to6pm, and ‘Darwin stubby’ souvenir packs atroom temperature (Department of Justice,2008b). The latter is a 2-litre bottle of beer origi-nally created in 1958 for the NT market butwhich has, over time, somewhat ironicallyFigure 3 Racialisation of Space 1: Club Membership Rules.



evolved into a tourist souvenir celebrating thereputation of the NT as a place of heavy beerdrinking.

Nhulunbuy is the only location in East ArnhemLand where alcohol is sold with the exception ofGroote Eylandt (Wearne et al., 2006; Departmentof Justice, 2009). The takeaway times are similarto those of the other two towns. In addition, apermit, introduced in March 2008, is required forany local residents or visitors to purchase ordrink takeaway alcohol within the East Arnhemregion, and this may only occur at a permitholder’s residence (Department of Justice,2008e; 2008f). To apply for a permit you must be18 years or older and either (a) a resident ofNhulunbuy or the Aboriginal communities of SkiBeach andYirrkala; or (b) a visitor or tourist withan itinerary, recognised accommodation, andphoto identification (Department of Justice,2008f). Residents of Yirrkala and Ski Beachrequire the additional approval of the localcouncil, local permits committee, and the seniorsergeant of the Nhulunbuy Police (Department ofJustice, 2008f). In short, if you are Aboriginalthen it appears more difficult to obtain a permit,particularly if you have poor literacy skills.However, alcohol may be consumed on licensedpremises by both permit and non-permit holders.Entrance to the clubs is, as pointed out above,enforced through gate-keeping practices. Thesepractices, combined with the potential difficultyof acquiring a permit for Aboriginal communitymembers, leave the Walkabout Tavern as themain public space for the consumption of alcoholwithout a permit.

Alcohol restrictions and thefederal interventionAdding to these local regulations is the raft ofmeasures introduced in October 2007 by thefederal government’s Northern Territory Emer-gency Response Act 2007 (NTERA) which was areaction to reports of widespread child abuse inAboriginal communities in the NT (FaHCSIA,2009a). This plan is explicitly race-based in that itapplied legislation to all Aboriginal communitiesin the NT, termed ‘prescribed areas’. These areaswere subjected to a range of measures, includingthe compulsory acquisition of the land on 5-yearleases by the federal government, income quaran-tining (which means 50% of social security pay-ments are in food and clothing vouchers ratherthan cash), mandatory child health checks, socialsecurity quarantining, pornography bans, and

bans on alcohol (FaHCSIA, 2009b). Under theplan, all prescribed areas are ‘dry areas’ with acomplete alcohol ban. There are hefty fines fordrinking, possessing, supplying or transport-ing alcohol into prescribed areas with potentialimprisonment for the possession for over1 350 ml of pure alcohol (FaHCSIA, 2009c).

We suggest that the federal and local policies ofalcohol regulation amount to a spatial system thatmay operate to move Aboriginal drinkers out ofpublic spaces (e.g. parks), out of commercialzones where local shopkeepers wage an ongoingcampaign against what is discursively positionedas ‘anti-social behaviour’, and into specificvenues (i.e. pubs) before 2pm. In this way, theusage of EGMs is intimately tied to alcoholpolicy. After 2pm, when the takeaway restrictionsare relaxed, there is an exodus out of the pubs. Atthis time, a second layer of spatial managementcomes into effect. Under the alcohol restrictions,consumption of alcohol in all public areas withinthe towns is an offense, except for special eventsthat have been granted a permit by the NTLicensing Commission by written application(Department of Justice, 2008c; 2008d). There-fore, takeaway alcohol drinkers are forced todrink outside the town limits or in private dwell-ings. If you live in a ‘prescribed area’ (whichmeans you are most likely Aboriginal), then theNTERA mandates that any drinking is illegal.Therefore, drinkers are forced into the societaland spatial margins. Such margins take on newand extreme meanings in remote Australiantowns. Figure 4 shows a dry drainage channel thatruns through Tennant Creek. Under existingalcohol restrictions this area is classed a ‘publicarea’ and subject to an alcohol ban. The sign inFigure 4 reads as follows:

ALCOHOL FREE AREADrinking in this public area without a permitis a serious offence.

Penalties include:• Alcohol tipped out or confiscated• $100 on the spot fines up to $500 if the

matter goes to court• Court might order the person not to drink

Obviously, this is not a process of protectingexisting public space as such, but reflects theappropriation of the public space idea and itsselective spatial application to specifically targetAboriginal drinkers and move them further awayfrom other residents of the township. It is thedirect racialisation of space.



However, we wish to make clear that whilesuch spatial logics of regulation inevitably affectconsumption patterns, we only have anecdotalevidence of correlation between EGM use, alco-hol restrictions and venue usage. We urgentlyrequire further research on the relationshipsbetween alcohol consumption, regulation andEGM use, particularly in terms of local spatialand temporal variation between towns andvenues. If Aboriginal drinkers are effectivelyherded into pubs before 2pm, then the question inthe context of EGMs is the extent to whichexpenditure is drawn from this extremely disad-vantaged group. In this case, the proportion ofpub expenditure that is derived from socially andeconomically marginalised groups may be dis-proportionately high. Indeed, given the possibil-ity of high EGM expenditure by disadvantagedgroups, the question of equitable redistribution ofresources becomes a pressing one. As pubs andclubs have differing redistributive obligations,we set about tracing the proportionate flow ofresources back to the individual towns that gen-erate the profit in the first place.

EGMs and resource redistributionThe policy of EGM expansion in the NT, as withelsewhere, rests on a community benefit argu-ment (McMillen and Togni, 2000, 119). Clubs,in accordance with their not-for-profit formalcharter, are expected to redistribute profits totheir members through facility improvementsand services. In the NT, clubs are not formallyrequired to contribute a set amount towards this‘community benefit’, but they are required toadhere to a set of Ministerial guidelines. Theseguidelines state that eligible contributions should‘have the effect of developing or supporting thesocial fabric of the Territory community, orassisting sport or other recreational activities . . .’(Community Benefit Fund, 2009a, 3). There is nomechanism for enforcement should the clubs failto meet these generalised requirements. More-over, the individual venue may choose therecipients of the contribution, which is usuallythe club’s membership. Hotels, in contrast, aretreated as private, profit-seeking businesses bythe NTG. Under the Gaming Machine Act 1995,hotels are required to contribute 10% of grossEGM revenue to the Community Benefit Fund(CBF). The CBF was created to ameliorate the‘significant negative social consequences’ ofgambling in the NT through gambling researchand support of programs intended to reduceproblem gambling (Community Benefit Fund,2009b, 2).

Total resource redistributionTo determine how much money is returned toeach town through club contributions and theCBF we examined EGM profits on a per venuebasis for the 2006/07 financial year (Figure 5).This ‘grid of flows’ has five columns: a) totalEGM revenue, b) total EGM taxation, c) totalcontributions to the CBF (for pubs), d)total ‘community’ contributions (for clubs), ande) remaining venue profit. The rows aggregatevenues based on type (i.e. pub or club) for eachtown. The shaded squares are proportional to thedollar amount for each column. As discussedabove, the clubs in Katherine and Nhulunbuywere the big earners. In terms of taxation, thesevenues also paid the most tax (i.e. $1.2 millionfor clubs in Katherine and $2.0 million for theNhulunbuy clubs) which is levied on a progres-sive basis. In terms of CBF contributions, the10% of total EGM revenue appears as the threevery small squares in the middle column (thisamounted to $489 000 for Katherine pubs,

Figure 4 Racialisation of Space 2: Regulation of ‘Public’Space in Tennant Creek.



$104 000 for the Nhulunbuy pubs, and $519 000for the Tennant Creek pubs). The contributions ofthe clubs back to the community are larger thanthat for pubs, reflecting their higher aggregateEGM expenditure, although the definition of‘community’ differs by venue type – for pubsit is the CBF while for clubs it is largely theirmembership base. The remainder squares (finalcolumn) represent gross venue EGM profit.Figure 5 demonstrates that the money spent by

EGM players overwhelmingly accrues to thevenues and to the NTG. The return to the townseither through the CBF or through club ‘commu-nity’ contributions is paltry when examined in aproportionate sense.

Redistribution by clubsTable 2 sets out the total cash and in-kind com-munity redistributions by individual clubs. Thevariation between clubs reflects the discretion

Figure 5 Proportional Symbols of Revenue Data: July 2006–June 2007 (Source: Northern Territory Government EGMexpenditure databases).

Table 2 Total club contributions for Katherine, Tennant Creek and Nhulunbuy (Source: Community Benefit Fund Committee,2008, 31).

Venue CashContributions ($)

In kindcontribution ($)

Totalcontributions ($)

Net EGMrevenue ($)

Contrib. as %EGM revenue

Katherine Club 69 933 62 548 132 481 1 250 906 10.59Katherine Sports & Rec Club 83 296 33 931 117 227 459 987 25.48Katherine Country Club 132 396 5 400 137 796 848 151 16.25Sporties Club 6 732 26 882 33 614 254 220 13.22Tennant Creek Bowling Club 720 3 310 4 030 10 601 38.02Tennant Creek Memorial Club 33 244 7 400 40 644 939 685 4.33The Arnhem Club 47 807 87 635 135 442 2 692 451 5.03Gove Country Golf Club 912 1 876 2 788 86 427 3.23

Total for all NT Clubs 1 676 424 699 027 2 375 451 24 668 829 9.63



individual venues have in redistributing profits.The largest clubs redistributed the lowest propor-tionate amount. These clubs operate on a moreexplicitly commercial basis than the smallerclubs and are likely to have a higher cost base foroperations and marketing. While the specificbeneficiaries of the club contributions in the NTare not available in the public realm, at the aggre-gate level, around three-quarters of total contri-butions for 2006/07 were directed towards sportsand recreational facilities and organisations.Examples of contributions included donations tosports clubs, maintenance of sporting facilities,the use of facilities such as sports fields and pooltables, use of rooms for meetings, dinner anddrink vouchers, and sponsorship of individualsor teams. We would speculate that Aboriginalmembers are underrepresented in the overallmembership base of clubs, certainly in the pro-portion of gamblers that actually directly benefitfrom club contributions. To investigate this ideawe need to know more about the membershipbase, the proportion of Aboriginal members, aswell as which members actually use and benefitfrom the various facilities provided by the differ-ent clubs.

Redistribution by hotelsThe redistribution by hotels through the CBF is amore transparent process. In the 2006/07 finan-cial year, the CBF Committee distributed a totalof $1.75 million in amelioration funds, researchgrants and small community grants (CommunityBenefit Fund Committee, 2008, 9). Gamblingamelioration grants ‘support interventions thatreduce problem gambling and minimise theharms that result from gambling’ and totalled$491 843. They included community awareness/education programs and the provision of coun-selling, rehabilitation or support services forproblem gamblers. The research expenditureincluded a $10 000 grant to Charles DarwinUniversity (CDU) and $7 736 to the nationalgambling research program (Gambling ResearchAustralia). This figure does not include a three-year research program by CDU of $1.46 millionthat was accounted for in the previous year’sgrants. Finally, in 2006/07, 318 communitygrants totalling $972 711 were awarded. Ofthese grants, organisations in Katherine received$65 168, Tennant Creek received $43 071 whileNhulunbuy received $108 825. This compares toa total EGM spend in pubs for the same period of$1 140 330, $656 338 and $1 037 314 for eachtown respectively.

Summary of resource redistributionWe wish to make three general points. First,redistributions are not proportionately linked toEGM expenditure in each town. The recipientsare at the discretion of the CBF Committee andclubs respectively. What this amounts to is a dualsystem where clubs enjoy substantial discretionin terms of how much money they redirect to‘community benefit’, as well as who the recipi-ents may be, while the contributions by hotels aremandated, and redirected to community purposesthrough the CBF. However, the CBF schemeawards money to those organisations with thecapacity to apply, and this may not be an equi-table mechanism. For example, Yirrkala receivedno CBF contributions in 2006/07 even though itmay well be responsible for a significant shareof Nhulunbuy’s EGM revenue. In addition, thetaxation of EGM revenues over and above theformal redistribution mechanisms accrues tocentral government in Darwin. Second, CBFcontributions are more concerned with gamblingamelioration and broader community concernsthan the club contributions. The hotels are privatebusinesses and have no community charter – theyspecifically provide gambling and drinking forprofit. Here the CBF is an important and neces-sary re-distributor. In contrast to hotels, the clubshave a charter based on improving access tofacilities, particularly sporting and recreationalfacilities, to their members and broader commu-nity. However, these contributions accrue to theirmembership base. Thus the suburban clubs arelikely to develop social capital and amenity for aselect group of beneficiaries, while their mostdisadvantaged patrons, particularly if they areAboriginal and live outside town, may receivevery little. Third, if EGM consumption by theAboriginal population is significant, then a nettransfer of resources will occur from the mostdisadvantaged group in society, ironically thosetargeted by the NTER through measures such asincome quarantining. Again, rather than answerthis question, we wish to place it firmly on theresearch and policy agenda.

ConclusionOur analysis of EGM expenditure patterns for thethree towns made clear that EGMs are used asintensively in remote towns, particularly in pubs,as they are in the larger centres in the NT,although there is considerable variation betweentowns and the individual venues within them.The fact that socioeconomic status is racially-based in these towns means that any spatial rela-



tionship between socioeconomic status of localareas and EGM supply needs to be attenuated toaccount for the mobility patterns of different sub-groups defined along racial lines. While we arenot in a position to describe clientele, EGMvenues have the ability to spatially and tempo-rally segregate markets on the basis of racethrough gate-keeping regulations and practices.Pubs in particular tend to cater for the most dis-advantaged Aboriginal drinkers and gamblers,while the clubs are more likely to cater for non-Aboriginal and better-off Aboriginal markets.Moreover, this spatial pattern is temporallydefined through a complex set of alcoholrestrictions imposed by local, state, and federalauthorities.

In terms of the profits of EGMs, venues giveback very little in a proportionate sense and themechanisms for the redistribution are inequi-table. In terms of the latter, clubs tend to supportsocial capital building for their members whilehotels are more explicitly mercantile. While theCBF attempts to redirect significant funds backto the community at large, this system is selectiveand fails to take into account finer-scale spatialand social patterns. In effect, EGM gamblingoperates as a mechanism to transfer resourcesfrom remote towns to venue owners and theNTG. It is thus possible that EGM venues rein-force inequality and accelerate or intensify ineq-uitable resource distribution particularly alongracial lines. Therefore, we argue that the politicaleconomy of remote NT towns may not beadequately understood outside a racial economyperspective. Here we refer to the way that con-structed notions of race operate to legitimiseexisting processes of economic exploitation andresource redistribution. In the remote NT, pat-terns of socioeconomic disadvantage are patternsof racial disadvantage, alcohol management isracial management, and economic exploitationof remote towns is inevitably racially patterned.Specific economic and spatial practices of localauthorities, the state, and gambling venues inter-act to control racial groups and produce particu-lar outcomes along racial lines. This, in turn, ispart of how capitalism harnesses the economicand social resources of remote towns through theinstitutionalised deployment of ‘race’. In thecontext of EGMs, racial economies are based noton the exploitation of production (i.e. throughlabour markets), but through the production oftightly governed spaces of consumption. Theseracialised spaces of consumption act to incorpo-rate into gambling’s regressive political economy

the most marginalised sections of Australiansociety.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThis research was supported by a Charles Darwin UniversityVisiting Fellow’s Grant and conducted as preparatoryresearch for Australian Research Council Linkages GrantLP0990584. The authors thank the Department of Justice,Northern Territory Government, for providing the EGMexpenditure data.

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