Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts

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Kingston, OntarioMay - June 2001

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FUTURE ARMY EXPERIMENTOperations in the Expanded

Battlespace

Fort FrontenacKingstonJune 2001

1

Preface

The Future Army Development Plan of08 March 1999 highlighted the need for wargamingexperimentation to validate future army concepts.June of 2001 saw the first of these experiments.While much work remains to be done to analyzeall of the findings, and even as a detailed report onthe conduct of the experiment is being completedfor issue in the near future, some early conclusionsof interest to a wider audience merit publicationnow. The aim of this report is to disseminate to theArmy at large the insights gained from the DLSCExperiment 01. It must be understood that it isstill early in the experimentation process and theseinsights remain to be tested under other conditions.

Two experimental forces, EXFORs Aand B, were examined. EXFOR A represented anevolutionary development of the Army whileEXFOR B represented the acquisition ofcapabilities sufficiently advanced to facilitate adifferent concept of operations. In essence, theevolutionary EXFOR A model would continue thecurrent trend of using firepower to supportmanoeuvre. For EXFOR B, enhanced extendedrange capabilities, coupled with a correspondingreduction in manoeuvre elements, demanded thatmanoeuvre support firepower.

With Army Council approval, it wasdetermined that this first experiment should lookat operations in a general war scenario in the open,expanded battlespace, circa 2020, and shouldcompare and contrast two different sets ofcapabilities. The timeframe of 2020 fits within theDLSC mandate of examining issues in the 11 to25 year timeframe. The Future SecurityEnvironment (August 1999) and Future ArmyCapability Requirements (January 2001), coupledwith the recent combat function audit on indirectfire, provided much of the background information.

The experiment was conducted in a seminarformat of action, reaction, counter-reaction anddiscussion. To assist in the wargame deliberations,the work of the Army Experimentation Centre indeveloping appropriate simulation was used.

The results derived from this experimentrepresent but one small piece of a larger future forcestructuring process. Over the next year, DLSC willbe conducting a similar experiment to explore high-end View 2 operations in the urban environment.Taken together, this series of experiments, later toinclude an examination of domestic operations, willprovide the background for developing a modelfor the future Army.

DLSC/LFDTSFort Frontenac,Kingston, OntarioAug 2001

The strategy and operations of any war can be understood onlyin the light of conditions of the ten or twenty years before itsbeginning. Technology, organization, doctrine, training,command and staff appointments—all the essentials of action inwar—are put in place and developed in peacetime. The testingexperience of combat will bring about change, but pre-warelements continue to affect many events throughout the longestof conflicts.

Peter Paret

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DLSC ExperimentObjective

To measure differences in capability between twoexperimental forces operating in the expandedbattlespace circa 2020.

MethodSeminar wargame supported by OR/constructivemodelling as appropriate. Incorporate ArmyCouncil insights, concept development methods,technology demonstrators and novel operationalconcepts.

Background Analyses• Cdn OR Studies & Army Experimentation

– Combat Function Audits 00/01

– Army Experimentation Centre Modelling

• Australian Headline (Bde) Experiments 99/00

• US Army:– Army Transformation Wargame Series

– Div Advanced Warfighting Experiment (DAWE)

– Interim Strike Force (Bde) Experiments 99

Background

In order to increase the cogency of thefindings, every effort was made to use validateddata from previous experiments and analyses.Of particular value was the recent combatfunction audit on indirect fire assets.

A second source of import was the baselinedata on weapons capabilities provided by the ArmyExperimentation Centre. This was especiallyimportant for those capabilities for which research anddevelopment is only just beginning. For example, oneof the EXFOR vehicles was a Multi-Mission EffectsVehicle (MMEV), armed with a high energy missile(HeMi) postulated to reach speeds of mach 7 within400 metres. Modelling was done using the currentair-defence, anti-tank missile (ADATS) which is slowerand bigger than the HeMi; however, the ability of theADATS to kill T80 tanks at 5 km provided a minimalbaseline from which results during the experimentcould be projected.

Objectives of the Experiment

The objective of the experiment was tocompare and contrast the capabilities of two differentforces operating in an expanded battlespace. The focuswas on answering two major questions: what are thesignificant multipliers and what are the majorvulnerabilities? Utilizing two different force structuresallowed a broader examination of both capabilitiesand vulnerabilities. The following list of subordinatequestions was developed to address selected aspectsof each of the operational functions.

Sense

• How should information for the force bemanaged, co-ordinated, and distributed?

• Will Sense capabilities be able to provide theassurance of targeting needed to exploitextremely long range weapons?

Additional background information wasdrawn from related experiments conducted bythe US and Australian Armies. Data from theseexperiments was consolidated to form a baselinepicture representing the situational awarenessthat might be enjoyed and how it might bedegraded over time. As well, data from theseexperiments was used as a start point to set thekill ratios and to determine the general effectsof extended range capabilities.

Command

• What degree of confidence is required (oracceptable) by a force commander to identifyand automatically attack mobile high payofftargets?

• What is the most appropriate commandstructure within and between headquartersto satisfy the time restrictions posed byattacking mobile high payoff targets?

• What are the potential command supportfunctions that could be satisfied through a

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HypothesisThe concept for operations in the expanded

battlespace is predicated on the statement thatEXFOR will achieve operational shock through

manoeuvre, firepower and offensive IO against theadversary in depth. Hence the emphasis on

conducting high tempo, simultaneous, tacticalmanoeuvre of limited duration with the ability torapidly aggregate effects from dispersed assets.

reachback capability—at Battlegroup (BG)/EXFOR level?

• How will a network centric capability affectmission command?

Act

• How much integral firepower does the forceneed and can the force receive timely andeffective supporting fire through reachback?

• What are the possible implications of automaticsensor-shooter links and the implications fortarget acquisition, target assessment, munitionsselection and morality?

• Do EXFOR A & B have the correct balance offirepower and manoeuvre resources to supporttheir respective concepts of operation(CONOPS)? (i.e. firepower to supportmanoeuvre (EXFOR A) and manoeuvre tosupport firepower (EXFOR B).

Shield

• Does the increased lethality and mobility ofEXFOR compensate for traditional passiveprotection? (i.e. will it be possible to achievethe protection afforded by a 70 ton vehicle in a20 ton package?)

• What redundancy & protection does EXFORrequire for its Information Systems?

• To what degree will EXFOR rely on deceptionfor protection?

Sustain

• Will it be possible to configure a force formission sufficiency, thus negating a regular/linear re-supply system?

• Will mission sufficiency create a mobilityproblem?

• What is the best method for the care andevacuation of casualties?

Exercise Hypotheses

To be effective in the 2020 expandedbattlespace, the Army will require newcapabilities—defined as a combination of doctrine,structure and systems.

The experiment was designed to exploreboth new capabilities and what balance ofcapabilities would best enable the Army to fightand win in open terrain in an expanded battlespace.The central hypothesis was that to be successfulEXFOR would have to achieve operational shockthrough manoeuvre, firepower and offensiveinformation operations against the enemy in depth.This would include conducting high tempo,simultaneous, tactical manoeuvre of limitedduration with the ability to rapidly aggregate effectsfrom dispersed assets. In this regard, the followingadditional hypotheses were explored:

• burst engagements plus dispersion enhanceforce survivability;

• improvements to sense and extended rangeassets facilitate a decrease in close range forces;

• improvements to lethality allow close rangeforces to defeat much larger enemy forces;

• extended range forces gain in exploiting burstengagement tactics, dispersion, precision andlethality overmatch; and

• sense facilitates precision that in turn allowsformations to engage and destroy enemy forceswell above the currently accepted ratios of 3:1.

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CONDUCT OF THE EXPERIMENT

Scenario and Red ConOps

The scenario involved fighting aconventional battle in open terrain, but within agreatly expanded battlespace and withinunfavourable force ratio. The area of operationsallocated to EXFOR A and B was comparableto that which would currently be allocated to adivision or higher formation (150 X 200 kms).The size of the AO and the disadvantageouscorrelation of forces dictated that manoeuvre andfirepower be carefully co-ordinated to achievethe ability to shape and defeat the enemy whileretaining the combat capability for exploitation.

EXFOR A and B respectively and 7:1 in firepower.The initiative for the initial attack lay with RED.

N Red Concept of OpsHamburg

Hildesheim

Harz Mtns

xxx

1

1

2

Parchim

Uelzen

Wolfsburg

Celle

Braunschweis

PL 10 100kmapprox.

Dannenberg

xx

xx

xx

xCAX4

x1 UK

x

Immediate

xx

xx

xx

xx

Both EXFOR A and B faced two divisionsof RED forces, with four motor rifle regiments(MRR) in the first tactical echelon oriented onimmediate objectives and two MRRs and two tankregiments in the second tactical echelon focussedon the subsequent objectives. RED possessed thefull suite of modern conventional capabilities, beingparticularly strong in armoured forces and indirectfire assets. RED’s attack helicopters were of highquality but limited in numbers. The correlation offorces lay significantly in RED’s favour, with anadvantage of 7:1 and 10:1 in manoeuvre against

Although numerically superior, RED wasconstrained by the relative backwardness of itsintelligence, surveillance and target acquisition(ISTAR) system, which resulted in significantvulnerabilities. Most significant werecomparatively deficient situational awarenessand command and control systems. This resultedin vulnerability to BLUE reconnaissance andattack aviation capabilities. RED was alsounable to fix BLUE forces and engage them inclose battle, where RED’s superior numberswould have been advantageous.

Blue (EXFOR) Forces

The two EXFORS were structured toprovide capabilities across the five operationalfunctions. Both EXFORS were relative in sizeto a current brigade group with a strength ofabout 5000 personnel. A summary of eachoperational function follows.

EXFOR A—Act

The Act capabilities assigned to EXFORA comprised tube artillery, mortars, armedaviation, offensive operations capability andthree Future Armoured Vehicle (FAV) battlegroups.For modelling purposes the tube artillery was based

Representative RED Systems

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CV

ECCFAVFAVFAVFAVBATTLEGROUPBATTLEGROUPBATTLEGROUPBATTLEGROUP

Act Sense Shield Sustain

Comd

FAV

BGIFS CEVMMEV SV CSV

MMEV MMEV CEV CEV CEVMMEV

on 155 mm with precision guided munitions (PGM)and a range of 40 km. The mortars were based ona 120 mm calibre mortar with PGM and a range of15 km. Aviation resources were modelled on theGriffon helicopter with an electro-optical,reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition

The rocket system was based on theUS Army high mobility artillery rocket system(HIMARS); however, the range was extendedto 100 km—a realistic expectation for 2020. Thearmed, ERSTA equipped Griffon helicopterswere upgraded to the US Army RAH-66Comanche. The stealth profile of the Comanche(radar cross section 1/30th of an Apache)combined with the ability to acquire, process andhand-off up to 200 targets gave EXFOR B aconsiderable extended range capability.

EXFOR A EXFOR A

Mors FAVOIO

ComdSp

ISTAR

D IO

x - Firepower to support manoeuvre

COMMAND

ACT

SENSE

SHIELD

SUSTAIN

(ERSTA) suite and a weapons load of 8-16 Hellfiremissiles with a range of 8 km and 38 laser guidedCRV 7 rockets with a range of 7 km.

EXFOR B—Act

The primary difference between EXFOR Aand B was the addition to EXFOR B of improvedextended range assets. To supplement tubeartillery and mortars, EXFOR B was givenartillery rocket systems and attack aviation.

COMANCHE

HIMARS

EXFOR B EXFOR B

Mors FAVOIO

ComdSp

ISTAR

DIO

x - Manoeuvre to support firepower

COMMAND

ACT

SENSE

SHIELD

SUSTAIN

FAV Battlegroups

Close combat assets were organized intoBGs, each of which contained capabilities acrossthe five operational functions. In order to better explorethe trade-off between close and extended range assetsand their relationship to manoeuvre, EXFOR A wasallocated three BGs and EXFOR B two.

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High Energy Missile (High Energy Missile (HEMiHEMi))

Mach 723 kg1.25 m

Multi-mission Effects Vehicle

LAV Based

• Armed with– 105 mm ETC gun (4 km)

– HEMi x 4 (5 km)

– VSHORAD msl x 4 (5 km)

Common Capabilities

In order to keep the number of variables toa manageable level, capabilities within theindividual BGs, and across the other operationalfunctions, were identical for EXFOR A and B.

The BG indirect fire assets were allocatedfrom EXFOR. The main combat power of the BGwas contained within the Multi-Mission EffectsVehicle (MMEV) and Close Effects Vehicle (CEV)sub-units. The MMEV sub-unit consisted of threesub-sub units of MMEV and one sub-sub unitequipped with a ground mounted missile based onHellfire capabilities. The CEV sub-unit consistedof three sub-sub units. The MMEV representedthe evolution of the current direct fire capability ofthe tank and the CEV represented the evolution ofthe LAV III. The CEV represented a conventionalevolution of the LAV III, manned by a crew of threeand carrying a section of six soldiers. Each CEVwas armed with a 25 mm cannon and a generalpurpose machine gun (GPMG). Two vehicles persub-sub unit were equipped with a Mk 19 automaticgrenade launcher and one vehicle per sub-sub unitwas equipped with a very short range air defence(VSHORAD) pod of four missiles.

The Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle

The MMEV was slightly morerevolutionary in capability. In consultation withthe research and development community, the

vehicle was modelled on the capabilities inherentin the FAV project. Armament consisted of a105 mm electro-thermal-chemical gun with abasic load of 40 rounds and a pod mountedmissile system for both anti-tank and VSHORADtasks.

High Energy Missile (HeMi)

The MMEV missile was based on thecurrent ADATS missile, but with improvementsprojected to occur in the next 10 or so years. Itis expected that such a missile will be

approximately one meter in length, weigh 20 kgand reach a speed of mach 7 within 400 m oflaunch. Given the speed of the missile, it isexpected that it will be a laser beam rider.

Command—Effects Coordination Cell (ECC)

Command support was organized on thebasis of a command support battalion, relyingheavily on technology with knowledge as thedriving feature. The routine collection, analysisand synthesis of data was considered to beautomated. The headquarters of both EXFOR Aand B comprised two “effects co-ordination”cells that provided redundancy and the capabilityto split planning and execution between the twocells.

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Effects Coordination Cell

EFFECTS SENSORS HPTs SA

• Focal point for firepower related resources and activities

• Single unified view of battle space

• Near real-time visibility over all sensors

• Access to full spectrum of weapons effects

• Establish sensor-to-shooter links

• Digital link to other services (Air, Naval)

Objectives

An integrated system including both integral andhigher formation systems.

SENSE

In order to make effective use of thecapabilities inherent within each EXFOR, it wasnecessary to make some projections about thesensing systems that will be available circa 2015.In particular, it is expected that the sensing systemwill be an integrated one, enabling commanders atall levels to access information from a wide varietyof sources—strategic to tactical. This capabilitywas given to both EXFOR A and B. Degradationof this capability was not exercised.

The Sense features common to bothEXFOR A and B included sensor links andcomputer systems immune to interruption anddestruction. The sensor mix provided 24/7coverage and through connectivity withresources from higher facilitated long-rangetarget identification and engagement. Thecommon operating picture (COP) was welldeveloped out to a distance of 120 km.

Shield

There were no structural differences in theShield capabilities assigned to EXFOR A and B.Field engineer, air defence and NBCD capabilitieswere available at both the EXFOR and BG level.Engineers were able to provide both mobility andcounter mobility support; however, this aspect wasnot fully explored in this particular experiment.Regarding air defence, EXFOR established anumbrella to counter low to medium threats and theBGs handled very low level threats with theVSHORAD missile on the MMEV.

Sustain

Sustain capabilities for both EXFOR Aand B were based on a modular approachwherein sub and sub-sub unit capabilities wereadded or deleted depending on the missionanalysis. Replenishment was provided througha distribution based system emphasizingprecision. Sufficient integral support was

One of the more important projectedcapabilities was centralized control of weapon effectsembodied in the concept of an ECC, linking sensorsand effects providers. In order to do this effectivelythe ECC requires visibility over all potential sensorsand attack resources, including joint assets, in order tomaximize responsiveness.

The ECC was capable of establishing,altering and terminating direct sensor-to-effectslinks. Connectivity permitted a reduction in thelayers of fire support and fire direction nodes.These functions and organizations wereconsolidated into fewer and more capable ECCswhich were located at those levels that could plan,coordinate, prioritize, de-conflict and execute thefire support plan.

Sense

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Concept of Operations—EXFOR A

Find - Fix - Strike

Based on

provided to enable the completion of a range ofpotential missions with resupply on an emergencybasis only. The medical support systemconcentrated on stabilization and evacuation. Thesize of the area of operation, in most cases, dictatedthe need for a dedicated air evacuation capability.

Blue Concepts of Operations

only after significantly reducing the enemy’scombat power. Where possible, EXFOR Ashaped the battle wherein the enemy was forcedto break out, allowing EXFOR A to use theadvantage of defensive power. EXFOR A soughtsecurity through dispersion. The manoeuvreelements were dispersed throughout thebattlespace down to sub-sub unit level, with ahigh level of situational awareness. Each sub-unit contained the integral capabilities, bothdirect fire and VSHORAD, to facilitate thecreation of a protective envelope within whichany threats could be destroyed by integralfirepower. Indirect assets were as welldispersed with the ability to mass effectsprovided through the ECC.

EXFOR B ConOps

The extended range assets of EXFOR Ballowed it to employ a concept of operations bestdescribed as “Find-Kill-Finish”. As withEXFOR A, the find function was accomplishedthrough the integration of both higher andintegral sense assets. A high degree of situationalawareness was achieved with a commonoperating picture at all levels. The advantage ofEXFOR B lay in its ability to use extended rangeassets, specifically the Commanche helicopterand rocket systems, to kill at distance.

C o m m a n d

S e n s e

A c t

S h i e l d

S u s ta in

S H A P E

DE

F EA

T

EX

PL

OI

T

How EXFOR Will Fight

Sets conditions fordecisive manoeuvre

Causes enemyto culminate

Completes disintegrationFacilitates success

The operating concepts for both EXFORA and B were based on a cyclical process ofshaping, defeating and then exploiting. The wayin which this was achieved differed based on theavailability of extended range assets. Inaddition, the entire cycle was examined using aconstruct based on the operational functions ofcommand, sense, act, shield and sustain.

EXFOR A ConOps

The concept of operations for EXFORA was based on the tactics of “Find-Fix-Strike”.Find was based on the integration of higher andintegral sense assets. Of note was the ability ofthe sense systems to identify enemy actions wellbeyond the ability of EXFOR A to take actionwith integral Act resources. Using this highdegree of situational awareness, the enemy wasfixed using medium range assets, and wherepossible, the extended range assets fromcoalition. The enemy was then defeated usingtraditional close combat tactics, but executed

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Judgements and Insights

• Extremely good SA coupled with extended rangecapabilities allowed EXFOR B greater scope incomposition of reserve.

• Situation awareness facilitated dispersion which enhancedsurvivability e.g. RED counterfire was generallyineffective.

• The ability to mass effects from dispersed locations wascritical to success.

Judgements and Insights

• The formation is a ‘system of systems’ which together achievetactical synergies:

– aviation and extended range firepower;

– manoeuvre and firepower.

• EXFOR B was able to exploit extended range capabilitiessetting conditions for the close fight on Blue’s terms:

– extended range neutralized Red reserves during ‘break-in’;

– extended range facilitated rapid penetration of Reddefences;

– extended range denied Red the ability to close with anddecisively engage Blue.

Concept of Operations—EXFOR B

Find - Kill - Finish

Based on

In the initial stages of the battle, themanoeuvre elements were used to provide securityfor the extended range assets. Security was furtherenhanced through the physical dispersion of assetsand the use of the ECC to mass effects. EXFOR Bused its long range assets to set favourableconditions for the close battle, which could best bedescribed as “mopping up”. In fact, the 1st tacticalechelon motor rifle regiment was so decimatedthrough extended range fire that it was defeatedwithout engaging in a close battle at all.

Judgements & Insights

As many analytical and assessment toolsas possible were used in order to determine thegreatest possible breadth of insights andjudgements. The tools ranged from themathematically based operational research analysis

to collective, subjective insights based onprofessional opinion. The insights andjudgements from this experiment must becombined with other scenarios in order to drawvalid conclusions about desired forcedevelopment. The computer modelling wasbased on using existing, or about to be fieldedcapabilities, with a margin of capability addedfor what might occur in the next few years.

EXFOR B was particularly successful indegrading RED’s capability during the break inbattle. Extended range capabilities were usedto attack RED reserves in their assembly areaonce the border was breached. Most importantly,extended range assets allowed EXFOR B toshape the conditions under which the close battlewas eventually fought. This ability to shapeessentially deprived RED of the ability to closewith and decisively engage EXFOR B, with aconcomitant reduction in Blue casualties.

The Experiment modelled a high levelof situational awareness which, when coupledwith extended range assets, gave EXFOR Bconsiderable latitude in both the composition andtiming of establishing a reserve. This same SAfacilitated dispersion down to the sub-sub unitlevel for manoeuvre forces and down toindividual systems for indirect assets. Thisdispersion enhanced security and survivabilitythrough negating counter-fire while still allowing

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Judgements and InsightsAct– Balance of capabilities existed in both EXFORs, but

EXFOR B suffered from a lack of soldiers who coulddismount.

– Both EXFORs achieved success in shaping but onlyEXFOR B was able to exploit.

Shield– Active protection, high mobility and dispersion are

essential to success. Best defence = Good offence (AECand DREV modelling).

– Information is Centre of Gravity. Informationprotection is key to enabling EXFOR concept.Redundancy of systems ensured continuity of COP.

Judgements and Insights

Command

– Dispersion will impact on cohesion, morale andtrust.

– “Human in Command” Issues (overload, fatigue).

– Network Centricity allows both Mission andDirective command.

– Battlespace management in a multi-dimensionalbattlespace will be a highly complex joint/combinedactivity.

Judgements and InsightsSense

– Shared, scalable COP needed to accomplishcommand decision making (PIRs), precisiontargeting and BDA.

– High resolution sense assets are needed toaccomplish extremely difficult extended rangeeffects. Must have plug’n play capability.

– Highly vulnerable to deception.

the massing of effects through the ECC. Althoughthe HiMARS were initially dispersed individually,it was determined through exercise play thatresupply would be more effective if sited in pairs.Siting in pairs allowed the reload vehicles toestablish a fairly good rate of turnaround.

The battlespace in which EXFOR A and Boperated was far different from the current norm,in particular in terms of physical size andconcentration of enemy forces. It was subjectivelyassessed that this dispersion could create feelingsof isolation that could impact on cohesion, moraland trust. As the battlespace increases in size,training and education must prepare all ranks touse this dispersion to advantage. It was furtheropined that the size of the AO combined with thelack of friendly forces on the flanks, would place

additional stress on the command support systemas well as on the commander. Situationalawareness and a common operating picture wouldhelp to alleviate this situation; however, it was theopinion of the exercise participants that somedegradation in SA was to be expected. Whilefunctional, this high level of awareness presentedthe opportunity for directive command, the impactof which requires further examination. The size ofthe AO and of the enemy forces created the needfor synergy of effort both within the formation andwith external sources. Battlespace managementwas problematic and relied very much on themaintenance of a common operating picture andunderstanding of the commander’s intent at eachlevel of command.

Sense assets were essential to realize thepotential of the extended range capabilities.High resolution was required and it wasconsidered that given the complexity of thebattlespace and targeting issues, it was essentialthat formation level resources have the capabilityto integrate with higher level.

It was further considered that the relianceon Sense creates a critical vulnerability. Thesystem must be protected and must have built inredundancies. The vulnerability to deceptionmust be carefully assessed and guarded against.The ability of EXFOR to “act” like a currentdivision is based on the effective use of all itscapabilities and any significant degradation ofthe sensing capability would cause areassessment of the task.

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Questions Not Answered

– Moral vs physical effect

– Command through reachback

– Command and Control warfare

– Impact of deception

– Mobility support and counter-mobility

Judgements and Insights

Sustain

– Precision munitions, increased reliability andreduced demand make mission sufficiency anachievable concept.

– EXFOR could not operate fully without LOCs forspecific weapon systems.

– Focus of casualty care on stabilization andevacuation. More capability required forwardespecially in the expanded battlespace.

EXFOR A and B contained different ratiosof manoeuvre to firepower capabilities, withEXFOR A having one additional manoeuvre BGand EXFOR B have significantly more lethalextended range assets. This difference becamepronounced when the mission changed and EXFORwas given an exploitation task. EXFOR A hadsuffered far more casualties than B and requiredsome reconstitution; whereas the combat powerof EXFOR B was essentially intact. At the sametime, during discussion about engaging in tasks witha high manpower requirement, it was clear thatEXFOR B would lack flexibility. The balancebetween firepower and manoeuvre must becarefully considered in force structure and musttake into account the requirements of more thanany one mission setting.

The experiment provided ample evidence ofthe need to integrate the capabilities inherent ineach of the five operational functions. Thevulnerabilities of EXFOR, in particularinformation, demand that the Shield function begiven a high priority. The proliferation of sensingsystems throughout the world gave rise todiscussion about whether or not deception is stillpossible. It is clear that given the proliferation ofinformation, the advantage will lie with the forcethat can process and act on this information in atimely fashion. Direct shooter to sensor links andautonomous burst engagements are twopossibilities in this regard.

Sustainment issues were considered duringthe exercise and controls were placed on missileavailability. A “mission sufficiency” approachmeant a larger “tail” than normal; however, thetrade off was a reduction in the requirement forsecure lines of communication. During theexperiment, it was determined that this would workfor the majority of supplies; however the provisionof artillery ammunition became problematic dueto the quantities involved. Resupply based on“battle rhythm” was more achievable than was“mission sufficiency”. This dictated theestablishment of temporary resupply corridors on

an as required basis. The experiment did showthat the use of precision munitions can reduce thequantity of munitions expended and thus reducethe resupply problem. For example, EXFOR Bonly expended 1000 missiles.

Medical support to a fast movingformation in an expanded battlespace wasdiscussed. Although casualties were relatively low(approx 100 per day for a total of 400/450 total), itwas clear that the effort in the future must be onstabilization and evacuation. The distances andpossible lack of secure lines of communication willlikely dictate dedicated air evacuation resources.

Questions Not Answered

Although the experiment provided theopportunity to examine issues related tooperations in an open, expanded battlespace,there were a number of issues that could not beexamined due to experimental limitations.

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Recommendations• Aviation:

– ERSTA,

– Armed ERSTA,

– Future ARH.

• S&T focus areas:

– Future US Army FCS-focussed R&D.

– Align ISTAR TD to explore issues of sensors, sensormanagement and data fusion in the context ofoperations.

– Continue exploration into lethality andcommunications areas.

Recommendations

– Extended range engagement capability

– ISTAR system

– Integrated digitized command system

– Armed Recce Hel

– Deception

– Ability to engage in close combat (kill/finish)

As the experimentation process matures,it is intended to examine these issues in bothopen and restricted terrain. The mobility supportissue is of particular importance given theprojection of being a wheeled force.

Recommendations

Although further analysis is required, thisexperiment clearly showed the value of extendedrange assets in an open, expanded battlespace.The HiMARS was very effective and incombination with mortars and tube artillerygreatly increased the lethality of indirect fire. Itis a system well worth further investigation.

The integration of Sense systems wasconsidered essential for EXFOR success and theISTAR project should be pursued as part of thisrequirement. In view of the obvious need forsynergy and a systems approach, an integrateddigitized command system is essential to facilitatethe required connectivity.

Armed helicopters provided both EXFORswith a considerable capability. The Comanche wasparticularly effective; however, the Griffonhelicopter equipped with ERSTA, CRV 7 rocketsand Hellfire missiles provided a formidablecapability.

The experiment results serve to endorse thecurrent alignment of 1 Wing and S&T forcedevelopment. An evolutionary process isrecommended, moving from ERSTA througharmed ERSTA Griffon to a dedicated armedreconnaissance helicopter.

Notwithstanding the proliferation of Sensesystems, deception is still considered to be animportant factor and work needs to be done in thisarea to determine what is possible, in particular inthe electronic cloaking of forces.

Although EXFOR B was a formidable forceat extended range, the close battle was stillnecessary. As well, there are tasks for whichdismounted soldiers are required. A balance ofmanoeuvre and firepower assets is essential.

Future areas for S&T involvement are manyand varied, but must include continued work withthe US Army on their FCS; the alignment of ISTARto meet operational requirements and continuedresearch into lethality and communications,including information security.

Conclusion

The experiment provided valuable insightsinto the use of extended range indirect fire assetsin open terrain. The expanded battlespace presentscomplex problems that can only be dealt with bybalancing capabilities, in particular, manoeuvre andfirepower. The results derived from this experimentrepresent but one small piece of a larger future forcestructuring process. In the near future, DLSC willbe conducting a similar experiment to exploreoperations in the urban environment. This will befollowed by an examination of domestic operations.Taken together, this series of experiments willprovide the background for developing a modelfor future Army force development.

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WHITE CELL

Col M Ward DLSC

LCol M Cessford DLSC

Mr. RL Roy OR Team

Mr. FW Cameron OR Team

Ms Z Bouayed OR Team

Dr S Robertson Strat Analyst

Capt BJ Chapman LFDTS AEC

Cpl L Steele DLSC Clerk

RED CELL

LCol RA ap Probert DLSC

LCol W Schultz CFLO(W)

Maj JAYR Boissonault DGOR

EXFOR A

LCol GD Burt DLSC

LtCol D Fraser Australian LO

Maj RS McLeish DAD

Maj S Davidson 427 Tac Hel Sqn

Maj MP Gagne DLR

Capt RW Dupuis DLR

Maj KS McKay DAD

EXFOR B

LCol AG Morrow DLSC

LTC SE Murray US TRADOC LO

LCol A Welsh UKSTANREP/DLFR

Maj P Duff DAD

Maj PJ Fleury DLSP

Maj K Whale 1 Wing

Maj MB Johnstone DAD

ADVISORS

Dr K Ackles DLSC/Science Advisor

Maj LM Espenant DAVPM

Dr J Beaulieu Contractor

Mr. DH Saint ADM (S&T)

Mr. DL Smith ADM (S&T)

Mr. P Fournier DREV

Ms A De Montigny DREV

Ms C McCann DCIEM

Participants