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STRAINED ALLIANCE: AMERCAN IDEAL AND SAUDI EXPERTISE IN FOSTERING ISLAMIC EXTREMISM
by
Samantha Hawe
A Senior Honors Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of The University of Utah
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Honors Degree in Bachelor of Arts
In
International Studies
Approved: ______________________________ Mehran Mazinani Thesis Faculty Supervisor
_____________________________ Johanna Watzinger-Tharpe Chair, Department of International Studies
_______________________________ Johanna Watzinger-Tharpe Honors Faculty Advisor
_____________________________ Sylvia D. Torti, PhD Dean, Honors College
May 2016
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Abstract
During the Cold War, the United States and Saudi Arabia worked together to
bolster the efforts of Islamic fundamentalist groups who were battling the Soviet
Union. The training, funding, and connections given to some groups in that era led to
many of the conflicts in the Middle East today, such as militant extremism in the Levant
and Afghanistan. What factors led the United States to channel its efforts through Saudi
Arabia? Why did it choose Saudi Arabia, rather than other potential allies like Egypt or
Iran? To answer this question, first, a brief account of the political history between the
United States and Saudi Arabia will be given. Then, there will be an examination of the
domestic, regional, and international issues involved in this effort to maintain the balance
of power between communism and the West. I argue that Saudi Arabia was chosen by
the United States because of its religious and tribal ties to conflicted areas, as well as
economic opportunity in oil.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ii
INTRODUCTION 1
LITERATURE REVIEW 3
HISTORY OF U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS 5
TRIBAL TIES AND RELIGION 12
U.S. OIL INTERESTS 18
CONCLUSION 21
REFERENCES 23
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Introduction
Al-Qaeda. The Taliban. The Islamic State.
These are names that carry significance in the contemporary lexicon; each has
played a key role in determining United States foreign policy in the 21st century.
Reciprocally, these groups were also determined due to U.S. foreign policy.
During the Cold War, American foreign policy revolved around preventing the
spread of communism. Often called Containment Doctrine, the policy boiled down to
one simple objective: prevent the spread of communism to any new arenas (Paterson, 27).
Over the years of the Cold War, the U.S. government acted in accordance with this policy
all over the world, from Vietnam and Korea, to Colombia and Nicaragua, to Eastern
Europe, Angola, and Afghanistan (Gaddis, 371). It was implemented with varying
methods and degrees of involvement throughout its history. In Eastern Europe, for
example, the U.S. (led by President Truman) supplied monetary aide to fight communist
subversion totaling 400 million dollars, most of which went to the governments of Greece
and Turkey (Gaddis, 40). On the other extreme, the American military launched full-
scale invasions into Vietnam and Korea, losing an estimated 100 thousand soldiers in the
process (Lawrence, 123).
The strategy in the Middle East was unique: the U.S. elected to foster a stronger
religious identity in the region (Napoleoni, 49). Historically, much of the societal
identity of Middle Eastern peoples had been based on the common Islamic faith (Rogan,
3), while Soviet communism was predicated on an anti-theist notion, and religion was—
at least nominally—not present in Soviet society (Paterson, 125). The U.S. contrasted
this aspect of the Soviet Union against the Islamic Arab identity to alienate communism
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from the Middle East, and sought to emphasize Islam to underpin this animosity
(Napoleoni, 16). Under President Reagan, America used a combination of strategies it
had already tested in other regions, including sending money and military resources to the
insurgents in places such as Turkey, Afghanistan, and Iran (El Mansour). The U.S.
provided military resources and training to the Afghanis, who fought against Soviet
incursion, the mujahedeen. (Mamdani, 87 and 133). To effectively reach these secretive
groups, America funneled its funds, resources, and training through Saudi Arabia
(Mamdani, 128).
Working together in containment did much to further the relationship between the
United States and Saudi Arabia; indeed, in later years of the Cold War their combined
efforts expanded beyond the Middle East, into arenas such as Latin America and
Southeast Asia (Bronson, 171). And directly aiding extremist Muslim insurgents in their
fight against the Soviets, whatever the strategy’s future ramifications, was among the
more successful containment efforts. In efforts like those in Korea, the U.S. emerged
having paid heavy costs and casualties, and still did not eradicate the country’s
communists (Paterson, 155). When the U.S. simply provided money to anti-communists,
such as in Poland, efforts were often equally unsuccessful, though with minimal
casualties (Paterson, 55). But in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the U.S. was able to halt the
spread of communism into the region with minimal cost and casualties, especially
because of the Saudi buffer between the U.S. and Afghanistan (Mamdani, 137).
What factors led America to choose Saudi Arabia for these efforts? In the
remainder of this paper, the evolution of the American-Saudi relationship will be
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detailed, and factors that led to the partnership—namely Saudi Arabia’s tribal ties,
religion, and oil reserves—will be explained.
Literature Review
Saudi-American Relations
Much has been written on American foreign policy during the Cold War in and
outside of Afghanistan, and more on the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.
The primary source used in this paper regarding U.S. involvement in Afghanistan was
Mahmood Mamdani’s Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots
of Terror (2004), which discusses political and extreme Islam and its origins in American
and Saudi involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It explains both how the U.S. and
Saudi Arabia cooperated in the region, as well as why Saudi Wahhabism was so
successful in those efforts.
Meanwhile, works such as John Lewis Gaddis’s Strategies of Containment: A
Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (1982) and David
Ottaway’s online article “The King and Us” (2009) provide a contextual history of
American-Saudi relations and their cooperation in the Cold War. “Awkward Relations,”
(2014) an editorial from The Economist, details the ebb and flow of these relations since
World War II and examines the factors that have affected how closely the two countries
were tied throughout the twentieth century, as well as the post-Afghanistan outlook.
These three works provide a well-rounded look at relations between the U.S. and Saudi
Arabia through different time periods in the relationship.
Tribalism and Religion in the Middle East
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Much of the Western interest in Middle Eastern tribalism was sparked after the
9/11 attacks. Articles such as Ilene Prusher’s “Tribal Ties Band Afghan Army” (2002)
and Rick Bragg’s “Afghan and Pakistani Tribe Lives by its Own Set of Rules” (2001)
examine tribalism in the Pashtun region through the lens of America’s War on Terror.
Both examine one facet of tribalism—its effects on a national army, or the life it dictates
for one particular tribe—in order to explain to Western readers that longstanding tribal
ties dictate much of modern Middle Eastern life. The nonprofit TeachMidEast’s country
profiles on Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and other countries are an excellent overview of
the politics, history, and culture of each nation, and their ties to one another.
A more scholarly look at Saudi and other tribes is “Tribalism in the Arabian
Peninsula: It Is a Family Affair” by Sultan Al-Qassemi (2012). This article is a detailed
look at the Al-Saud family’s tribal ties to other ruling families in the Arabian Gulf and
beyond, and how those ties affected the spread of Wahhabism. Al-Qassemi concludes
that, today, religion is a more powerful uniting factor in the Middle East, particularly
amongst groups that practice stricter interpretations of Islam.
Another valuable resource used in this paper was Vincent Tuminello’s paper,
“Snake Oil: U.S. Foreign Policy, Afghanistan, and the Cold War” (2015), a helpful
examination of the use of Wahhabism in Afghanistan and the instilment of
fundamentalism into the mujahedeen. It studies American foreign policy, Saudi actions
(both independent of and in conjunction with America), and Pakistani preventative
measures, which makes it a unique, measure-by-measure account. Together, this body of
literature established a cohesive narrative of the tribal ties and religious power utilized by
Saudi Arabia, bolstered by the U.S., during the Cold War.
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American Oil Interests
The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power by Daniel Yergin (2008) is
the definitive book on American oil policy in history. It clearly traces shifting oil
interests and their importance in domestic and foreign policy since before the twentieth
century. Yergin examines the American-Saudi relationship from the petroleum
perspective, demonstrating that relations have closely followed oil interests through their
history. The book also includes detailed histories on oil companies such as Standard Oil
and Aramco, discoveries of major oil fields, and drilling technology.
Delving into the specifics of the American-Saudi oil dynamic, Rachel Bronson,
author of Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (2006)
offers a comprehensive history of Saudi-American relations based on petroleum. She
contends that, while the relationship has followed oil interests, other factors such as
containment, terrorism, and religion have been more important in determining its status
than has oil alone. Similar in scope, Andrew Scott Cooper’s The Oil Kings: How The
U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East (2012)
examines the role of oil in Saudi Arabia’s rise as a regional power, not simply a conduit
for American influence in the region, and how it factored into radicalism in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. These three analyses form a picture of oil’s determinative role in world
politics, particularly the U.S.-Saudi dynamic and their relations with other nations.
History of U.S.-Saudi Relations
Pre-World War II Relations
After Saudi Arabia became a unified nation in 1902, King Abdul-Aziz sought to
garner international recognition of his fledgling state, which was quickly recognized by
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Great Britain and other European nations; the United States, on the other hand, seemed
disinterested in establishing relations, until it finally recognized the state in 1931 (“All
About Saudi Arabia;” Grayson, 97). Relations between the two countries began in
earnest in 1933, when King Abdul-Aziz and President Roosevelt met to discuss the future
of the Middle East. (Yergin, 383). In 1936, the first and longest-running conflict of
interest in the relationship began, when the United States favored the establishment of a
Jewish state, but Saudi Arabia vehemently opposed it (Citino).
Prior to the discovery of oil, Saudi Arabia was known for its barrenness (“Country
Information”). The only major source of income for the government came from its rule
over Mecca, site of the yearly pilgrimage Muslims complete at least once in their
lifetime; otherwise the kingdom was in a precarious financial position. Though Saudi
Arabia has never released data on the revenue generated by the pilgrimage, it is estimated
to have made up the majority of the Saudi GPD before oil was discovered; today it
comprises only three percent (Long). The first discoveries of oil in 1938 provided
breathing room for King Abdul-Aziz, as the country could drill for oil, and retain its
identity as a looser, tribal-based society. Oil reserves also sparked U.S. interest, which
encouraged the development of a close relationship as World War II drew to a close
(Yergin, 293).
Cold War Relations
After World War II, the United States was abruptly the outstanding power,
entrusted with recharging Europe and containing Soviet Russia. Meanwhile, the Saudi
economy remained precarious, forcing Riyadh to pursue Washington. It wasn’t until
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1943 that the American administration made it a priority: Roosevelt declared, “the
defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States” (Ottaway).
During the Cold War period, Washington’s policy was to stop the spread of
communism. Commonly referred to as Containment Doctrine, this policy used
economic, political, and armament incentives to foster anti-communist movements
(Gaddis, 21). Riyadh, meanwhile, feared the Hashemite regimes in Jordan and Iraq, who
resented being driven out of the holy cities by the Al-Saud family during the 1920s
(Ottaway). It proposed a formal military alliance between the United States and Saudi
Arabia and, though the former was unwilling to proceed to that extent, it did build an
airbase in Dhahran in 1946 (Bronson, 33). The two countries became increasingly
dependent on one another for support within their individual political agendas. With
Washington backing it, Saudi Arabia was more than equal to any threat the Hashemites
might pose (Ottaway). The United States needed manpower: in order to avoid all-out war
between nuclear powers, containment meant going head-to-head with the Soviets in a
number of proxy wars in Central America, the Middle East, and East Asia (Bronson, 10).
Saudi Arabia was particularly integral to American efforts in the Middle East,
serving as both a conduit and a companion in American intervention. The two
governments worked together during this time period to foster Islamic fundamentalism in
areas of the Middle East the United States saw as vulnerable to Soviet incursion: Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan. American soldiers trained extremist freedom fighters in
Afghanistan, while Saudis, both officially and privately, sent funding to Muslim
fundamentalist groups (Bronson, 9). Moreover, these joint efforts were not confined to
the Middle East. On request from the United States, Saudi Arabia intervened frequently
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in Central American and African affairs, supplying money and armament to anti-
communist fighters in Nicaragua, Angola, and Ethiopia (Bronson, 102). By cooperating
in containment, Saudi Arabia earned American protection, while the U.S. gained a
willing and connected partner.
U.S.-Saudi Intervention in Afghanistan
Cold War-era Afghanistan saw the development of an ideological pendulum.
Daoud Khan, who had been the prime minister, staged a coup in 1973. His
administration chose a side in 1977, when he met Soviet head Brezhnev but subsequently
began to pursue relations with the West rather than Russia, an initiative that was brought
to a halt in 1978, when Daoud himself was deposed and killed. The communistic
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) took over in response, “Various
groups of mujahedeen, Muslim guerilla forces, rose to combat the newly formed pro-
Soviet government, due to its secular nature and reforms that were against traditional
practices” (Mamdani, 120). Soviet forces streamed into the country to protect the pro-
Russian regime. The United States, in partnership with Saudi Arabia, immediately began
funding the mujahedeen: over the course of the ten-year war, the two countries gave over
$40 billion to these groups (“Country Profile: Afghanistan”). They found Islamic zealots
to be “reliable” because they were “one-dimensionally anti-Soviet” (Moran). Riyadh and
Washington also sent American troops into the mujahedeen camps to train fighters in
guerrilla war, which radicalized the country, creating support for the traditional Muslim
society fought for by the mujahedeen but scorned by the communist-backed regime (Seth
Jones, 28).
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When the regime fell in 1992, Afghanistan deteriorated to in-fighting for power
by various factions; by 1996, the Taliban had taken power, imposing harsh religious law,
monopolizing the country’s trade, and harboring and training Al-Qaeda militants (Saikal,
210). Many of the prominent, U.S.-backed mujahedeen, such as Osama Bin Laden and
many other founding Al-Qaeda members, later planned and led terrorist attacks in the
United States and around the world. (“Country Profile: Afghanistan”). Nevertheless, the
American-Saudi-backed mujahedeen had driven out Soviet influence.
Post-Soviet Relations
For the latter half of the twentieth century, global politics had been driven by the
American-Soviet race for influence, but with the fall of the Soviet Union, the United
States rose as the only viable world power, free to pursue a unilateral agenda (Gaddis,
48). At first, Washington continued to weed out communism, particularly in Latin
America. But it lacked the justifiable capital to invest in counter-communism
movements (Bronson, 264). So it turned to Saudi Arabia, who reluctantly agreed to help
fund revolutions in Central and South America. Riyadh supplied money to the C.I.A.,
which in turn instigated revolutions in countries such as Nicaragua, hoping that it would
preserve the commitment to Saudi protection (Bronson, 187 and 188). Saudi Arabia
faced uncertainty about future American investment: propagating Islam was no longer a
priority; if anything, Washington now saw Muslim fundamentalism as a liability and, as
the 1990s progressed, extremists became an imminent threat (“Awkward Relations”).
But Saudi Arabia, again in both a public and private capacity, continued its holy mission
to spread Islam, specifically the radical Wahhabism (Rogan, 402).
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Public opinion in each nation began to turn against the other. Americans saw
Saudi Arabia as a backwards kingdom of fanatics, while Saudis were up in arms about
their resources being used in a region so irrelevant to their political needs, seeing
American influence as contrary to Wahhabism; many Islamic leaders and clergy began to
speak publicly against the encroachment of the West (Bronson, 220). As Saudi and
American interests were no longer congruent, they began to drift apart.
This trend had continued since the attacks of September 11, 2001. America has
focused heavily on security, including invading Afghanistan and Iraq, in the interest of
rooting out extremists. It spent seven years hunting for a Saudi-educated man it trained
during the Cold War—Osama Bin Laden (“Who is Bin Laden?”). Were it not for the
joint efforts of Saudi Arabia and the U.S. to encourage extreme Islamic interpretations,
the reach of Bin Laden and others like him may have been very different. During these
years, the American public perceived Islam as a terroristic religion bent on waging jihad
on the West. It did not help that many of the attackers on 9/11 were of Saudi origin, or
that Al-Qaeda affiliates had been funded for years by Saudi citizens (Rogan, 442).
The Obama administration has further widened the gap between America and
Saudi Arabia. Oil production within the United States has surged recently, hitting 7,500
barrels per day in 2013, beginning to slowly push the Saudis out of the American
economy (“Awkward Relations”). Futher, the ongoing extraction of troops from
Afghanistan and Iraq shows America’s declining involvement in the area (“Awkward
Relations”). Indeed, the U.S. continues to edge its way out of the Middle East, remaining
reluctant to throw its weight into the Syrian conflict and allowing the regional powers of
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Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as interested parties like Russia, to fill the gaps
(Trofimov).
Moreover, the Arab Spring served to exacerbate tensions between the countries.
To Saudi Arabia, the Arab Spring was cause for alarm, an upset to regional order; the
U.S. hailed it as a new era of democratization. During the height of the movement, Saudi
Arabia asserted itself aggressively in regional interests, showing a lack of trust in
America’s security guarantees (“Saudi King Announces New Benefits”). Saudi troops
intervened without White House support in order to keep Bahrain’s king on his throne
(Bronner and Slackman). It also pulled its ambassador from Qatar, which had financed
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (“Saudi King Announces New Benefits”). In 2012,
Saudi Arabia spent $25 billion subsidizing allied conservative regimes in the region
(“Awkward Relations”). These moves put the Saudis in opposition to America, which
overall supported the pro-democracy tide. Even in countries where the Americans and
Saudis act together, such as Syria, the aims and limits of the nations have been far from
aligned (“Awkward Relations”).
However, there are still unifying factors in the relationship. Though communism
is no longer a threat, both Saudi Arabia and the United States consider the ever-more-
powerful Shia Iran an enemy which needs to be controlled, despite new developments in
Iran’s relationship with the West (Trofimov). To the U.S., the problem is one of nuclear
proliferation, and a potential threat to its Israeli ally; Saudi Arabia views Iran as a
regional rival, upsetting its interests in the unstable countries of the Levant and posing an
ideological threat to Wahhabism (Ottaway). The United States continues to lean on
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Saudi policing in the region to minimize extremism, and Saudi Arabia relies on America
as the guarantor of its security (“Awkward Relations”).
American-Saudi relations were established before the Cold War, primarily reliant
on oil and Saudi security concerns. During the Cold War the nations grew closer as they
cooperated in containment efforts, and increasingly relied on one another for security and
containment in Afghanistan, Africa, and Latin America. After the Cold War, American-
Saudi relations cooled: public opinion in both states turned against the other, America
increased demands for anti-communist campaigns in Central America, and Saudi Arabia
remained uncertain about future investment due to religious differences. However, there
is evidence that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia continue to be close: they share a mutual
distrust of Iran, desire to stabilize countries like Syria, and mutual security reliance.
Their relationship has been an important factor in international politics since its
inception.
Tribal Ties and Religion
Because most of the Middle East, particularly the Arabian Peninsula, is dry and
barren, establishing settled communities like villages and cities was largely impossible
for most of history. Instead, a network of pastoral nomadic tribes, called Bedouins,
became standard. Until as recently as the twentieth century, these tribes were the primary
building block of society, with alliances and territory working at a local, rather than
national or international, level, and ancient tribal lineages were the determiners of
monetary and political capital. Additionally, the Saudi leadership has for centuries been
closely tied to Wahhabism, a fundamentalist, “for the people” sect of Islam ingrained in
the philosophy of many extremist groups. Saudi Arabia is a nation built on connection,
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the Bedouin lifestyle, and Wahhabism, and these ties extend beyond its borders, making
it the most viable nation to foster extremism in the Muslim world. Its tribal ties provided
a network to establish training, and Wahhabism spread like wildfire to provide
motivation.
Middle Eastern Tribal Networks
Today, there are more than 1.5 million Bedouins in Saudi Arabia, out of the total
population of nearly 29 million. This number includes only those who practice a
traditional nomadic lifestyle; the vast majority of native Saudis are of Bedouin descent,
though they have settled. (“Country Profile: Saudi Arabia”). The traditional tribal
structure, in terms of connections and community, is still standard in Saudi Arabia (Al-
Qassemi). This means that in order to do business, make agreements, or be respected in
society, it is necessary to be backed by a rich tribal ancestry, which is an established
network of people willing to express their trust and loyalty. While this system may be
criticized for being inaccessible and nepotistic, it is extremely favorable to those working
inside it (Al-Qassemi). Its reach extends far beyond the Saudi borders. For example, the
ruling families of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain are all members of the Anaza tribe
of Central Arabia (Al-Qassemi). This close connection keeps these states working
together, supporting each other, and using joint policy to protect the interests of each:
Saudi Arabia putting down Arab Spring uprisings in Bahrain, or the three countries
setting oil policy together, for instance (Bronner and Slackman). Saudi tribal ties extend
beyond the Arabian Peninsula, becoming increasing loose as the geographical distance
from the Arabian Peninsula grows.
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Middle Eastern societies as far away as Afghanistan and Pakistan have long been
based on tribes as well, and these tribes identify with one another more strongly than they
do with non-tribal entities, however far apart they may be. Reports by American troops
suggest that some communities in Afghanistan do not even know of the unified
country—they are isolated enough that news of the Soviets, 9/11, or the War on Terror
has not reached them (Lister). The Afghan national army has had a number of problems
with inter-tribal disputes taking precedence over national concerns, or causing rifts within
troops (Prusher). The United States has relied on tribal networks for its goals throughout
its involvement in Afghanistan: first creating coalitions of anti-Soviet tribes during the
Cold War, then anti-Taliban tribes during the War on Terror (Foust). “Afghani” is at
most a secondary identifier for most people in the region; the primary identification there,
as in Saudi Arabia, is by one’s extended family, or tribe. (Bragg).
Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan
The Al-Saud family has traditionally aligned with the Pashtun tribe, which makes
up nearly 50% of the Afghan population and controls northwest Pakistan. It is one of the
oldest, strongest, and proudest tribes on earth, dating back thousands of years, and has
driven off great forces of history such as Alexander the Great and the British empire. It
also boasts a long-established quasi-legal system (Bragg). Pashtuns make up the majority
of the Taliban, as well as the mujahedeen of the anti-Soviet insurgency (Ollivant). In
adherence to their hospitality laws, they harbored Bin Laden; they often justify action
against American forces with revenge customs (Bragg).
American-Saudi cooperation in bolstering the mujahedeen falls into three main
categories. First, the two countries entered into a fund-matching agreement: for every
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dollar Washington spent in the region, Riyadh gave the same. This agreement cemented
reciprocal trust because the United States was assured that Saudi Arabia was willing to
back their efforts completely, while Saudi Arabia knew that the United States was going
to stand by its heavy investment in Middle Eastern security (Tuminello). Second, Saudi
Arabia agreed to serve as the transit hub for American money, arms, supplies, and troops
on their way to Pashtun territory, easing complications in transport. In 1987, for
example, the United States sent $700 million in military assistance and 65 thousand tons
of arms to Afghanistan alone, nearly all of which passed through Saudi Arabia (Harvey).
Third, the Saudi government joined Washington in supporting Pakistan, which faced the
imminent threat of Soviet incursion due to its proximity. Because Pakistan’s leader,
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, was not Pashtun but Punjabi, the Saudis would not traditionally
have had relations with him. Zia sought to fortify Pakistan’s Pashtun region as a buffer
against the Soviets, which allowed the Saudis to assist him while maintaining their
relationship with the Pashtuns (Tuminello). This support ultimately prevented Pakistan
from experiencing a communist takeover like the one in Afghanistan.
Less officially, the Al-Saud family used its tribal connections to encourage other
governments, as well as private citizens, to support the mujahedeen. Thousands of Saudi
men travelled to Afghanistan to become mujahedeen themselves—including Bin
Laden—and private citizens of Saudi Arabia donated millions of dollars to the
mujahedeen fighters (Napoleoni, 54). The Saudi Red Crescent, at first a medical aid
organization, took on a key role in arms transportation as its funds grew. The Muslim
World Organization, based in Saudi Arabia, funded religious schools in the Pashtun
region, creating future mujahedeen.
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Together, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia worked with and encouraged Islamist leaders
to establish charity networks funding the mujahedeen. Muslims from all over provided
funds to “assist displaced Afghans, to cover the travel expenses of young Muslims
interested in joining the jihad, to train and arm the mujahedeen, and to support the
families of those killed in battle” (Koker and Yordán, 3). One such charity, Muktab al-
Khidamat (the Afghan Services Bureau), was founded by the “father of global jihad,”
Abdullah Yusuf Azzam and Bin Laden in 1984. The men met in Saudi Arabia while Bin
Laden was a student at King Abdul Aziz University, and Azzam a professor. Muktab al-
Khidamat was a smaller charity effort during the Soviet era, distributing about $1 million
and training 100 mujahedeen; however, the group subsequently grew and became Al-
Qaeda in the 1990s (Koker and Yordán, 4-5).
Spreading Wahhabism
Wahhabism is an ultraconservative movement of Sunni Islam that advocates
puritan interpretation of the Quran and does not deviate from Sharia law. Its founder,
Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, preached that the reason Islamic society had been
overtaken by Europe was that it had moved away from fundamentalist Islam. He
advocated a return to the Islam practiced in the medieval era, when a unified Muslim
society was the center of philosophy, science, and art (Al-Fahad, 488). The sect began in
the eighteenth century, and from its founding, has been closely tied to the Al-Saud
family. When Abdul-Aziz established Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism became its state
religion and the basis for its legal and societal structure. Courts are based on sharia law,
and for many years Western objects such as television were not permitted (Vassiliev, 48).
Wahhabism has been hailed by its proponents as “revolutionary,” appealing to a broad
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audience of Muslims, rather than other, more “elitist” sects which speak mainly to the
upper echelons of Islamic society (Mamdani, 122). Thus, Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabism
was the ideal vehicle for creating Islamic extremists: it was easily spread, readily
understood, and attractive to a variety of Muslims.
The United States took advantage of this by working with Saudi Arabia to
“organize jihad” in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Mamdani, 128). Zia, knowing that tribal
fragmentation in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s own Pashtun region would allow Soviet
incursion, sought to unify the tribesman with religion. Saudi Wahhabi leaders were sent
to Islamabad in 1980 for a national Islamic conference, where they promoted pan-
Islamism and advocated fundamentalism—Wahhabism—as the religion of choice for the
mujahedeen (Tuminello). To further the spread of Wahhabism, the Saudis established
religious seminary schools in the Pashtun territory (Simpson). These madrasas are
believed to have birthed the Taliban, preaching hardline Sunni rhetoric derived from
Wahhabism (Simpson). Moreover, “Saudi intelligence actively supported the ‘politically
marginal,’ ethnically Pashtun Abdul Rasul Sayyaf [since affiliated with Al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, and Bin Laden], due to his close ties with the Wahhabi religious establishment”
(Tuminello). Riyadh also convinced the United States to recognize Sayyaf’s followers as
one of the resistance groups and they were thus afforded the same training and funding as
other mujahedeen (Tuminello). Arab jihadi fighters, spreading their “Wahhabi brand of
Islam,” were able to unify themselves by religious identity and fight against the Soviets,
because of American-Saudi cooperation (Notte).
Saudi Arabia was easily able to support the mujahedeen because of their tribal ties
and religion. The Saudi ruling family has longstanding tribal ties throughout the Middle
18
East, all of which helped them to foster support for the mujahedeen, establish charitable
funding for them, and attract volunteer fighters. Moreover, it had direct historical ties to
the Pashtun tribe, which controlled the region where mujahedeen were needed, and
whose members made up much of the mujahedeen itself. Saudi Arabia and the U.S.
worked together to fund over $40 billion, provide thousands of tons of arms to the
Pashtun region, and train thousands of mujahedeen; support and supply Pakistan; and
seek help from other actors, particularly private citizens. They also organized a jihad in
the Pashtun region, spreading Wahhabi ideas to and radicalizing the mujahedeen.
U.S. Oil Interests
Saudi Oil Reserves
As the oil boom of the 1920s began, British and French interests partitioned the
Middle Eastern areas already known to have oil, mainly Iran and Iraq. Most American
companies were excluded from the region in the agreement, so they were forced to
prospect the Arabian Peninsula, where no oil had been found. In 1932, Standard Oil of
California (SOCAL) oversaw the first discovery of oil in the region in Bahrain (Yergin,
285). Then, in 1933, it was granted a concession by Saudi Arabia to explore more than
900 thousand square kilometers for oil, and struck oil in 1938 at the Dammam site,
located on the coast near Bahrain. It was the first of many discoveries in what is now
called the Ghawar oil field, which remains the world’s largest known oil reserve (Yergin,
293). As demand for oil rose and it became apparent that it would need unprecedented
amounts of fuel in the upcoming war, the United States began to prioritize Saudi Arabia
as a trading partner. In 1944, the Secretary of the Navy told Congress that the U.S.’s new
oil policy involved acquisition from outside nations, particularly Saudi Arabia (Ottaway).
19
American oil companies formed a consortium known as the Arabian-American
Oil Company (Aramco) to further the discoveries of oil in Saudi Arabia, and the U.S.
government supported their investment by granting tax breaks and assuring security
(Painter, 166). But in response to events such as the Yom Kippur War in Israel, the Saudi
government began pressuring Aramco with nationalization and bought shares of the
company; by 1980, Aramco was owned entirely by the Saudi government. Nevertheless,
the U.S. continued to invest heavily in Saudi oil production and imported more oil from
that country than any other: in 1990, the U.S. imported about 2 million barrels of oil per
day—1.4 million of which came from Saudi Arabia (U.S. Energy Information
Administration). The U.S. continued to place high priority on Saudi oil, and thus on
maintaining excellent relations with Riyadh.
American Investment in Saudi Arabia
To maintain the security of its resource interests in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. sought
to strengthen and protect it. It did so largely through strong military support, which
started early in the relationship, peaked during the Cold War, and continues today. In
1946, in conjunction with the construction of the Dhahran air base, King Adbul-Aziz
granted permission for the U.S. air force to fly over Saudi territory and build other bases
(Mansour). In 1951, as the U.S. put Saudi security at the top of the containment
objectives, the two countries signed a mutual defense agreement that provided for the
American military to train Saudi armed forces and build military installations throughout
the next three decades (Cooper, 55). When Egypt attacked Saudi Arabia due to its
production of anti-communist propaganda in Yemen in 1962, the U.S. sent warplanes to
defend Saudi Arabia. In 1979, fighter jets were again sent to protect Saudi Arabia as it
20
increased oil production (Patrizia, 51). As in the First Gulf War, the U.S. protected Saudi
Arabia and its close allies from hostile incursion with its own forces, while encouraging
and aiding the growth of a Saudi military. In 1975, Washington and Riyadh agreed to
military contracts amounting to two billion dollars in planes, training, and other
armaments; in return, the Saudis advocated lower oil prices in OPEC forums (Patrizia,
54). Many similar agreements have taken place over the years: from 1986 to 1993, Saudi
Arabia purchased $55 billion in arms, and in 2010 the countries consummated the largest
arms transaction in American history, with over $60 billion worth of arms purchased
(Cooper, 61).
The U.S. also used diplomatic maneuvering to protect its oil interests in Saudi
Arabia. During the OPEC oil embargo in 1974, Washington placed increasing pressure
on Israel to negotiate with Syria over territory, until Israel yielded the captured Golan
Heights. Saudi Arabia subsequently argued at OPEC for an easing of sanctions, the
embargo was lifted, and relations were renewed (Mansour). In the early 1970s,
Washington also persuaded Iran to drop its territorial claims to Bahrain, a close tribal ally
of the Saudis (Cooper, 65). In all arenas, the U.S. threw its diplomatic weight behind
Saudi Arabia, making clear that it would defend Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies no
matter what. It held true to this posturing even as the Cold War was winding down, when
Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, threatening the Saudis. The U.S., working from Saudi
Arabia, drove Hussein’s forces back, ensuring the safety of Gulf oil and earning favor
from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and their associated neighbors (Halliday).
Additionally, Washington economically supported Saudi Arabia. To build up
Saudi armed forces for Cold War efforts, the U.S. increased military aid from $16 million
21
in 1970 to nearly $312 million just two years later (Bronson, 198). It also helped Saudi
Arabia stabilize as its oil industry grew, by backing Saudi expenditures into foreign
markets (Bronson, 180). After the oil embargo, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. signed a broad
agreement to increase economic and military cooperation, bringing their financial
interests closer (Cooper, 57).
By supporting Saudi Arabia’s military expansion, diplomatic security, and
economy, the U.S. invested itself further in the country, assured that its oil interests
would remain viable, and recruited Saudi Arabia to assist in containment. It hoped to
preserve its interests in Saudi Arabia’s vast supplies by deepening the connection
between the two countries, as well as strengthening and supplying the Saudis. Thus, it
carried out the largest arms deals in its history with Riyadh, totaling more than $60
billion, and approved hundreds of thousands in military aid. It placed diplomatic and
military priority on keeping Saudi Arabia secure when it faced threats from Iraq and Iran.
Finally, it helped stabilize the Saudi economy as the oil industry grew.
Conclusion
U.S. containment policy during the Cold War determined how the world looks
today, particularly the Middle East. Fostering Islamic extremism in Afghanistan and
Pakistan was an effective way to prevent the spread of Soviet influence, though the
mujahedeen that America created have morphed into enemy groups such as the Taliban,
the Islamic State, and Al-Qaeda. Because Middle Eastern culture depends heavily on
ancient tribal connections, the U.S. required an ally to help fund, train, and indoctrinate
mujahedeen fighters. Saudi Arabia, because of its Wahhabi religion, extensive tribal ties,
and massive oil opportunity, proved to be the ideal ally in containment.
22
The U.S. could not have been successful with the mujahedeen in Afghanistan and
Pakistan without Saudi Arabia. Though relations have had their ups and downs, Saudi
Arabia and the U.S. remain tied by security interests, oil investment, and historical
alliance. New threats have emerged in the Islamic State, recent Iran nuclear deal, and
perceived U.S. disengagement in the Middle East—but with those come new
opportunities for cooperation and collaboration. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have a rich
history, forged in containment, and will continue to work together as new challenges
arise.
23
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Name of Candidate: Samantha Hawe
Birth date: August 3, 1994
Birth place: Salt Lake City, Utah
Address: 3491 S. 3610 E. SLC, UT, 84109
