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Northem States Power Company

414 Nicollet MallMinneapolis, Minnesota 55401-1927Telephone (612) 330-5500

June 30, 1989 10 CFR 50.71(e)

U S Nuclear Regulatory CommissionAttn: Document Control DeskWashington, DC 20555

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR CENERATING PINTTDocket Nos. 50-282 License Nos. DPR-42

50-306 DPR-60

Submittal of Revision No. 7 to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.71(c), we are submitting 14 copies of Revision No. 7 tothe Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) for the Prairie Island GeneratingPlant. This revision updates the information in the USAR for the period fromJanuary 1, 1988 through December 31, 1988.

Exhibit A contains a description and a summary of the safety evaluations forchanges, tests and experiments made under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59during this period.

Exhibit B contains the USAR page changes and instructions for entering thepages. Inc~.uded in Exhibit B is Revision 13 to the Northern States PowerCompan'j Operational Quality Assurance Plan in compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(a).Changes included in Revision 13 to the plan are described in exhibit A (Item10, page A-7) of this letter.

19fh $Thomas M ParkerManager - Nuclear Support Services

'TMP/RJM/rj m

c: Regional Administrator - III, NRCDirector IE, NRC (w/o Exhibit B)NRR Project Manager, NRC (w/o Exhibit B) ik#

Resident Inspector, NRC (w/o Exhibit B)G Charnoff (w/o Exhibit B)

Attachments

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8908150321 890630PDR ADOCK 05000282 )k PLC j

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EXHIBIT A

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANTANNUAL REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS

January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1988

The following sections include a brief description and a summary of the safetyevaluation for those changes, tests and experiments which were carried outwithout prior NRC approval, pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR 50.59(b)..

1. SFP DEMINERALIZED INLET BYPASS LINE (87L967)

Description of Modification

This modification was initiated to reduce silica concentrations in therefueling water storage tanks by processing the water through the-reverse osmosis system. The reverse osmosis system, when in service,normally takes suction directly from the spent fuel pool. Thismodification installed additional piping between the spent fuel poolpurification loop and the Refueling Water Storage Tanks (RUST) whichallows RWST water and spent fuel pool water to mix. This enables thesilica levels in the spent fuel pool and the selected RWST to equalizeand be reduced simultaneously.

Summary of Safety Evaluation

By procedure, RWST and SFP boron concentrations are checked prior tomixing, so as to prevent inadvertent boron dilution below technicalspecifications. No alterations or modifications were performed onsafety related portions of the spent fuel cooling system. Therefore,this modification does not create any flowpath for drain down of the SFPor dilution of the RWST not already analyzed in the USAR.

2. REVERSE OSMOSIS SYSTEM (86L896)

Description of Modification

This modification temporarily installed a reverse osmosis system for thepurpose of reducing silica levels to within Westinghouse limits invarious tanks throughout the plant. During normal operation the reverseosmosis system takes water directly from the spent fuel pool, removesthe silica and returns the clean water back to the spent fuel pool.Upon completion of the silica reduction effort, the reverse osmosissystem is disconnected, disassembled and placed into storage. |

ISummary of Safety Evaluation

All work for this modification was performed under normal QA-IIIrequirements. Installation was such that the spent fuel pool could not

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be drained below to hnical specifications. In addition, a temporarydike was installed around tne reverse osmosis system to direct systemleakage and rejected effluent to the liquid radwaste system. Design

{analysis and review determined that use of the reverse osmosis system j

would have no adverse impact on plant operation or design.

3. Addition of Clean out Flannes on the Laundry and Hot ShowerTanks Overflow Line ;87L012)'

Description of Modification

Modification 87LO12 involves replacing an elbow on the Hot Shower Tanksoverflow line (2-WL-21) with a tee and a clean-out flange. The clean-out flange consists of the flanged connection, a diaphragm valve, and ahose connection for demineralized water. This will allow for theflushing oi hot spots in the Aerated Drains Monitor Tanks overflow lineto the Waste Hold-Up Tank. Figure 9.1-3 of the USAR will be changed toshow the addition of the clean-out flange.

Summary of Safety Evaluation

All work associated with this modification took place in the Aux.Building (695' el.). During installation, a fire watch was establishedduring all cutting and welding. A fire retardant blanke, was laid over j

neighboring cable trays to minimize the fire hazard due to sparks causedfrom cutting and welding. A temporary containment was also installedaround the work area in order to prevent contamination of tihesurrounding area. Additional lead shielding was placed over the nearby" hot" piping in order to minimize worker exposure.

All materials conform to Fluor Pioneer Inc. Specification 106A-Section I

IV, SS-M 380 (NSP), and were fabricated and ins".alled as per \NSI-B31.1.Since the line in cuestion is a4 overflow line (i.e. cannot beisolated), a hydrostatic test was not performed on the new welds as iscalled for in ANSI-B31.1. A visual inspection combined with a dye-penetrant test and a leak check during flushing of the line withdemineralize > <ater were used as acceptance criteria for the new welds.

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The only portions of the Waste Liquid Treatment Systems on the Q-listare those associated with containment penetration .

The elbow is classified as QA-III, and the r.sw parts will also be

classified as QA-III. The affected overflow lines (3-WL-21 and 2-WL-21)do not perform a safety related function, do not support any safetyrelated components, nor are they required to bring the plant to safeshutdown. No safety power supply components will be affected.

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4. Removal of Hot Chem Lab Fume Hood and Addition of New Laundry

and CVCS_ Monitor Tanks Exhaust (86L960)

Description of Modification

In order to' increase the efficient operation of the Hot Chem Lab,Modification 86L960 involved removing the #121 Hot Chem Lab Fume Hood tomake room for more bench space. The #121 Hot Chem Lab Exhaust equipment(fan, PAC filter, etc.) was then used for the new laundry dryers thatwere insc 41ed in the Demineralized Lift Roon (735' el. Aux. Building)as a part of Modification 86L943. To ninimize the possibility of anairborne hazard in the area, the 4" vents on the CVCS Monitor Tanks werealso tied into this exhaust line. A particulate filter was installed f nthe line near the dryers, in order ' temove th- excess lint due to thelaundry, before reaching the PAC filter unit.

The equipment labels were changed as follows: The #121 Hot ChtaLab Exhaust equipment became the #121 Laundry / Monitor TanksExhaust equipment, and the #122 Hot Chem Lab Exhaust equipmentbecame the #121 Hot Chem Lab Exhaust equipment. Figure 10.3-5 of -

the USAR will be changed to reflect the changes mentioned above.The status of the Category 1 Vent Zone Boundaries on the Hot Laband Sample Room Vent system were also corrected to as foundconditions.

Summary of Safety Evaluation

All equipment installed or affected by this modification are classifiedas QA-III. This equipment does not perform a safety furstion, nor is itdirectly associated with safety related equipment. No safety relatedpower supply components were affected.

5. Addition oi Laundry Washer to Demineralized Water System (86L943)

Description of Modificati2D

In order to increase the efficient operation of the radioactive laundryprocess, Modification 86L943 involved combining the wet wash anddry leaning operations by installing a new wet washer and two new dryersin the Demineralized Lift Room (735' el. Aux. Bldg.).

To keep the fire hazard in the area (lint from laundry) to a minimum,*the dryers utilize steam ccils to heat the air for drying, as opposed to

electric coils which could supply an ignition source. The steam forthese heating coils comes from the heating system. Since there is no

| potable water source available in the area, demineralized water is usedfor the washer. This water is heated by injecting steam directly intothe water inside the washer cylinder.

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Li Summary of Safety Evaluation

j Presently, the waste water from the original laundry washers iscollectea in the aerated sump and is treated as aerated waste. Thevaste liquid from the new washer is dumped down a local floor drain,c ore it then goes to the aerated sump. Therefore, no significantchange was made to the waste liquid system. However, USAR 9.2-2 statesthat the laundry waste is collected in the laundry and hot shower tanks.USAR 9.2-2 will be updated to show the new changes, and Figure 10.2-9 ofthe USAR will be updated to show the addition of the new washer on thedemineralized water system.

The equipment installed in this modification is not safety related, noris it directly connected to any safety related systems. All componentsinstalled or affected by this modification are classified as QA-III. Nosafety related power supply components were installed or affected.

6. Reclacengnt V/_LCOR Solenoid Control Valves on the RHRDmp.la Lines (87L006)

Descrintf oq of ifodification

Modification 87 LOO 6 consisted of replacing the Valcor solenoid controlvalves on the RHR sample lines (SV-33640 for Unit 1 and SV-33668 forUnit 2) with a rection of austenitic stainless steel tubing. The aasonfor tLeir removs1 was because of the risk that'th y might fail clo;edduring a post accident condition. These risks were just.ified when SV-?3668 failed to open when tested prior to the Unit 2 refueling outage inJanuary of 1988, and when SV-33640 failed to open during the forced Unit1 outage in March of 1988. The RHR Sample is now controlled by a manualvalve on the Sample Panel in the Sample Room.

Summayv cf Safety Evaluation

These solenoid valves (SV-33640 and SV-33668) and the sample lines theyare on are classified as QA-III according to Appendix B of 10CFR50.

All sample lines consist of sustenitic stainless steel tubing and are '

designed for high pressure service (the PHR system pressure is 450 psig, )j]

whereas the design pressure for sample piping is 2500 psig.). Thesample lines are routed in uni-strut and are locsted so as to protectthem frem at.cidental dana,e during routine operation and maintenance.

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The electrically operated Valcor solenoid valves were DC powered and,therefore, their removal does not affect any safety related power

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sources. These valves were controlled from the Sample Room by an "Open- i

Close" switch. They did not close upon a containment isolation signal.

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7. Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Throttle Valve ' Stem Leak Off (86L332)

Description of Modification

Previously the throttle valve'atem leak off lines were routed to floordrains near the auxiliary feedwater turbine exhaust vent stack. Thismodification rerouted the. stem leak.off lines to the auxiliary feedwaterpump turbine exhaust. stack. Stem leak off can now blow unrestricted tothe' atmosphere via the turbine exhaust stack during operation of theauxiliary feedwater turbine driven pumps.

Summarv of Safety Evaluation

!Previously,.the outlets for the auxiliary feedwater turbine throttlevalve stem leak off were ruuted to floor drains near the auxiliaryfeedwater pump turbines. The purpose for the stem leak off lines is toprevent' pressure from building up within the stems of thu valves as aresult of leaks through the stem bushings. However, since these linesvera'disigned to discharge into the atmosphere of the auxiliary

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feedwater pump rooms, flow throagh these lines was restricted by '

partially closing the isolation valves in an attempt to minicize thepotential for the development of a steam environment.

Modification 86L932 rerouted the stem' leak off lines to direct theirdischarge to the,suxiliary feedwater turbine exhaust header. This-modification removed the potential for creating a steam environment inthe auxiliary.feedwater pump room during auxiliary feedwater turbinedriven pump operation.

all piping installed under this modification was seismically designedand mounted. Piping modification were analyzed and found acceptable inaccordance with the requirements of the Prairie Island USAR.

8. Unit 1 Cvele 13 Reload (88LO411

Description of Chance

Prairie Island Unit 1 Cycle 13 began operation in September 1988 and isexpected to shutdown in January 1990. Cycle 13 is projected to reach anend of hot full power exposure of 15,830 MWD /MTU and to shutdown with anexposure of 16,600 MWD /MIV. This will result in a coastdown of 23 daysto 81% of full power at shutdown.

Prairie Island Unit 1 Cycle 13 contains 48 fresh Westinghouse ImprovedOptimized Fuel Assemblics (OFA), 44 once burned Westinghouse OFAassemblies. 28 twice burned westinghouse (OFA) assemblies and one twiceburned Exxon TOPROD assembly. The core uses gadolinium as a burnablepoison to control the temperature coefficient and power peaking. Thefresh fuel also has approximately 6 inches of natural uranium at the topand bottom of the gadolinium pins only. The natural uranium blanketswere not incorporated in the enriched fuel pins. This reduces axialpeaking and increases cycle Ivngth.

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Summary of Safety Evaluation

The. analyses performed in the design and licensing of Unit 1 Cycle 13operation were done by USP's Nuclear Analysis Depsrtment (NAD) and aresummarized in the " Prairie Island Unit 1 Cycle 13 Final Reload DesignReport (Reload Safety L'raluation)", NSPNAD-8810P, May 1, 1988. Theanalyses indicate that he core can be operated within TechnicalSpecification and USAR .3mits.

9. Unit ? Cvele '1_neload (89L080)

Description of Chance

Prairie Island Unit. 2 Cycle 13 began operation in April 1989 and isexpected to shutdown in August 1990. Cycle 13 is projected to reach anend of hot full power exposure of 16,530 MWD /MTU and to shutdown with anexposure of 17,570 MUD /MTU. This will result in a coastdown of 32 daysto 69% of full power at shutdown.

Prairie Island Unit 2 Cycle 13 contains 48 fresh Westinghouse ImprovedOptimized Fuel Assemblies (OFA), 44 once burned Westinghouse OFAassemblies, 28 twice burned westinghouse (OFA) assembi.ies and one twiceburned Exxon TOPROD assembly. The core uses gadolinium as a burnablep)ison to control the temperature coefficient and power peaking. Thef21sh fuel also has approximately 6 inches of natural uranium at the topand bottom of the gadolinium pins only. The natural uranium blanketswere not incorporated in the enriched fuel pins. This reduces axialpeaking and increases cycle length.

Summary of Safety Evaluation

The anslyses performed in the design and licensing of Unit 2 Cycle 13operation were done by NSP's Nuclear Analysis Department (NAD) and aresummarized in the " Prairie Island Unit 2 Cycle 13 Final Reload DesignReport (Reload Safety Evaluation)", NSPNAD-8829P, December 1988. Theanalyses indicate that the core can be operated within TechnicalSpecification and USAR limits.

10. CHANGE TO OPERATIONAL OUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN APPENDIX C

Revision 13 to the NSP Operational Quality Assurance Plan was internallyreviewed and approved on May 24, 1989. We have concluded that thisrevision does not reduce the commitments of NSP's Operational QualityAssurance Program and does not adversely impact the safe operation ofthe nuclear plants. Specific changes with the reason for the change andthe basis for concluding no reduction in commitments [per 10 CFR50.54(a)(3)] are presented in Appendix D to the plan. Tho OperationalQuality Assurance Plan, Revision 13, is Appendix C of the USAR.

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L PAGE CHANGES TO THE: PRAIRIE ISLAND USAR1

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

DESCRIPTION:Page Revisions for USAR Revision No. 2 (Exhibit B of NSP Letter dated June 30, 1989)

Manifest Date: August 10, 1989

USNRC.

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Fluor Power Services [#30) 1

DCD ..

'[#27, #31-thru 43] * 14- Attn: A V SetlurRegional Admin-III [#44] * 1 + Plant Nuc Tech Services [#14) 1

+ Resident Inspector [#10] 1 Attn: J E GoldsmithProd Training Quadrex 2

+ T E Amundson [#11 & #12, #55-60) 8 Attn: Librarian [#29)+ EOF (Lee Finholm) [#54) 1 Attn: R Tomkiewicz [#46]

+ Prairie Island Plant Mgr [#2-6,#53) 6 Westinghouse+ Pwr Supply QA Attn: L Kish [#50] 1

Attn: T W Bacon [#64) 1 Attn: R Tomkiewicz (Chpt III Only)Attn: Library Copy [#16) 1 + T N Vogel [#48] 1

+ M B Sellman [#67 6 #68) 2 Wisconsin Public Service 2+ D M Vincent [#8) 1 Attn: D J Ropson [#19)+ F W Hartley [#9] 1 Attn: Library Copy

[#16) ' 1+ E'F Eckholt [#22) 1 MDC [#61]+ R 0 Anderson [#17) 1 Attn: F E Gregor+ D E Gilberts [#52] 1 EPM (on loan) [#20] 1

+ H S Isbin [#24) 1 Attn: E Margalejo+ D M Musolf [#26] 1 Gasser Assoicates [#23] 1

+ J A Leveille [#66) 1 LIS [#62) 1

+ J A Thie [#47] 1 Attn:-Lyle Graber+ Plt Engr & Constr Library [#15) 1 L J McDonnell [#51] 1

+ NSS Master Copy [#1] ** 1 MPCA [#25] 1

NSS USAR History File [#45] 1 Attn: J W FermanNSS Document Control File (Manifest Only) American Nuclear Insurers [#21] 1

Attn: LibrarianTLG EngineeringAttn: Tom LaGuardia [#65] 1

* Distributed under P-47 manifest** Removed pages should be filed in the NSS USAR History File

REMARY.S:

+ Indicates Controlled Copy [ ] Indicates USAR Book No,

Insert the attached pages per the attached instructions within 5 working days.

ACkNOWLEDG EMr. * r all controlled USAR copies, copy hold ign, date and.

return this page t hern States Power Com uclear Support Services,

Dept., 414 Nicollet Mall, a olis 55401.

Signature: Date: USAR Book No.

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