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SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN June 1994 107 THE ANALYTICAL ECONOMIST W hen new leaders came into power in eastern Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union, they found themselves saddled with an unwanted inheritance: tens of thousands of businesses, from shops to steel mills that encompassed entire cities. Central planning and government control of these myriad enterprises had led to the economic disaster that swept communist governments out of power. Yet transferring these state-owned com- panies to private hands is proving to be nearly as much of a headache as was trying to run them. Its not just a pu of smoke and a wave of the wand, and the companies belong to the citizens, rues Anthony A. Repa, an economic ad- viser to the Polish government. The problems of privatization are simple to state but tricky to solve. Most citizens have no money with which to purchase corporate shares, and many enterprises are in such perilous nan- cial condition that few people would want to buy them. Even solvent busi- nesses come encumbered with now ir- relevant assetsapartment complexes and sports stadiums among themthat make valuation dicult. Countries have taken various ap- proaches to shedding state property, according to economists at the World Bank. In the territories of the former East Germany, a federal agency manag- es businesses and properties while try- ing to arrange their sale or return to former owners. In Russia and in the Czech and Slovak republics, in contrast, citizens have received coupons with which they can buy shares in state-held concerns. In Poland, privatization has followed several strategies, including focusing on foreign investors and on investment funds that act as proxies for citizens with coupons. Most of the emerging market nations have also tak- en a more informal approach to priva- tizing small businesses by selling them to their managers or by auctioning them. Coupon schemes are popular because they avoid many problems that arise when state property is sold for cash. Nemat Shak of the World Banks Cen- tral Europe Department lists some of these drawbacks in a recent report on the Czech experience: foreigners can easily outbid citizens; the few people who have money can acquire the lions share of formerly public assets; and the low price paid for rms because of general lack of capital distorts future market patterns. But coupons entail a dierent problem. Unlike cash sales, they generate no government revenue and no capital for modernizing a rm. At the same time, unless special pre- cautions are taken, coupon privatiza- tion may diuse corporate ownership so widely that eective governance is impossible. In Russia, some kind of gov- ernance has been preserved by reserv- ing a percentage of shares in each en- terprise for managers and workers. The Czechs and Slovaks took another ap- proach, according to Shak. They en- couraged the development of mutual funds to which citizens signed over coupons. In theory, the funds can keep a closer watch on each company than can individual shareholders. In Poland, this form of privatization, when it is implemented, will be some- what more intricate. Citizens coupons buy shares only in investment funds; the funds, in turn, purchase companies and manage them. The share prices rise and fall depending on the markets assessment of the companies they in- vest in, thus providing incentives for careful oversight. Only about 450 Pol- ish enterprises, out of a total of about 9,000, will be subject to mass privatiza- tion, Repa points out. Other companies are being groomed for foreign sale or have been acquired by their managers in leveraged buyouts. Although such subtle manipulations of market structure may help provide eective oversight of companies and give the public access to the capitalist dream of shared ownership, they do not necessarily address the problems of actual restructuring needed for sur- vival. Almost all these businesses need capital for new investment, and many are burdened by the debts that piled up in the old days of central planning. Firms that cannot survive in their present form may be subjected to what is called asset liberation (on Wall Street it is known as rape, loot, pillage). Dur- ing this process, auditors strip out prop- erty or businesses that might fetch a good price on their own and discard the remainder. This tactic is explained by the rationale that it is far cheaper for the economy to shut a plant down and pay workers for two or three years un- til they can nd other jobs than it is to pay people to lose money indenitely. Asset liberation is, however, a com- plex undertaking. The commingling of government and business produced in- numerable company towns throughout eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In these sites an electric power company might own not only genera- tors and oil reneries but housing for its employees, day care centers and ca- sinos. Some of these adjuncts can be sold for a prot; others must be taken over by a state or municipality if the underlying company is to be sold protably. Ironically, remnants of the political liberalization that marked the early stages of the transition to market econ- omies may be hindering the last stages of privatization. In their nal years, cen- tral authorities ceded ownership of many enterprises to provincial or mu- nicipal governments. Towns and cities are even more strapped for resources than are national governments, so they are unwilling to bear the brunt of clos- ings that would eventually benet the economy as a whole. In one instance, the economic transi- tion seems to be occurring most suc- cessfully independently of state-led ef- forts. The private sector in Poland has been growing rapidly, contributing about 50 percent of the gross national prod- uct last year. Poland is looking poten- tially like the economic tiger of the re- gion, Repa notes. The growth of the private sector has been spontaneous. It has not been the result of privatization, but the result of a couple of million new businesses. In fact, Repa explains, the private sector is encouraged by ongoing ineciencies in the vestigial state-run sector: In a competitive market, it gives them an advantage. Whether jealous, unfrocked apparatchiks will permit that advantage to persist remains to be seen. Paul Wallich and Marguerite Holloway For Sale: One Country, As Is The problems of privatization are simple to state but tricky to solve. Copyright 1994 Scientific American, Inc.

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SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN June 1994 107

THE ANALYTICAL ECONOMIST

When new leaders came intopower in eastern Europe andthe states of the former Soviet

Union, they found themselves saddledwith an unwanted inheritance: tens ofthousands of businesses, from shopsto steel mills that encompassed entirecities. Central planning and governmentcontrol of these myriad enterprises hadled to the economic disaster that sweptcommunist governments out of power.Yet transferring these state-owned com-panies to private hands is proving to benearly as much of a headache as wastrying to run them. ÒItÕs not just a puÝof smoke and a wave of the wand, andthe companies belong to the citizens,Órues Anthony A. Repa, an economic ad-viser to the Polish government.

The problems of privatization aresimple to state but tricky to solve. Mostcitizens have no money with which topurchase corporate shares, and manyenterprises are in such perilous Þnan-cial condition that few people wouldwant to buy them. Even solvent busi-nesses come encumbered with now ir-relevant assetsÑapartment complexesand sports stadiums among themÑthatmake valuation diÛcult.

Countries have taken various ap-proaches to shedding state property,according to economists at the WorldBank. In the territories of the formerEast Germany, a federal agency manag-es businesses and properties while try-ing to arrange their sale or return toformer owners. In Russia and in theCzech and Slovak republics, in contrast,citizens have received coupons withwhich they can buy shares in state-heldconcerns. In Poland, privatization hasfollowed several strategies, includingfocusing on foreign investors and oninvestment funds that act as proxiesfor citizens with coupons. Most of theemerging market nations have also tak-en a more informal approach to priva-tizing small businesses by selling themto their managers or by auctioning them.

Coupon schemes are popular becausethey avoid many problems that arisewhen state property is sold for cash.Nemat ShaÞk of the World BankÕs Cen-tral Europe Department lists some ofthese drawbacks in a recent report onthe Czech experience: foreigners caneasily outbid citizens; the few people

who have money can acquire the lionÕsshare of formerly public assets; andthe low price paid for Þrms because ofgeneral lack of capital distorts futuremarket patterns. But coupons entail adiÝerent problem. Unlike cash sales,they generate no government revenueand no capital for modernizing a Þrm.

At the same time, unless special pre-cautions are taken, coupon privatiza-tion may diÝuse corporate ownershipso widely that eÝective governance isimpossible. In Russia, some kind of gov-ernance has been preserved by reserv-ing a percentage of shares in each en-terprise for managers and workers. TheCzechs and Slovaks took another ap-proach, according to ShaÞk. They en-couraged the development of mutualfunds to which citizens signed overcoupons. In theory, the funds can keepa closer watch on each company thancan individual shareholders.

In Poland, this form of privatization,when it is implemented, will be some-what more intricate. CitizensÕ couponsbuy shares only in investment funds;the funds, in turn, purchase companiesand manage them. The share pricesrise and fall depending on the marketÕsassessment of the companies they in-vest in, thus providing incentives forcareful oversight. Only about 450 Pol-ish enterprises, out of a total of about9,000, will be subject to mass privatiza-tion, Repa points out. Other companiesare being groomed for foreign sale orhave been acquired by their managersin leveraged buyouts.

Although such subtle manipulationsof market structure may help provideeÝective oversight of companies andgive the public access to the capitalistdream of shared ownership, they donot necessarily address the problemsof actual restructuring needed for sur-vival. Almost all these businesses needcapital for new investment, and manyare burdened by the debts that piled

up in the old days of central planning.Firms that cannot survive in their

present form may be subjected to whatis called asset liberation (on Wall Streetit is known as Òrape, loot, pillageÓ). Dur-ing this process, auditors strip out prop-erty or businesses that might fetch agood price on their own and discardthe remainder. This tactic is explainedby the rationale that it is far cheaper forthe economy to shut a plant down andpay workers for two or three years un-til they can Þnd other jobs than it is topay people to lose money indeÞnitely.

Asset liberation is, however, a com-plex undertaking. The commingling ofgovernment and business produced in-numerable company towns throughouteastern Europe and the former SovietUnion. In these sites an electric powercompany might own not only genera-tors and oil reÞneries but housing forits employees, day care centers and ca-sinos. Some of these adjuncts can besold for a proÞt; others must be takenover by a state or municipality if theunderlying company is to be soldproÞtably.

Ironically, remnants of the politicalliberalization that marked the earlystages of the transition to market econ-omies may be hindering the last stagesof privatization. In their Þnal years, cen-tral authorities ceded ownership ofmany enterprises to provincial or mu-nicipal governments. Towns and citiesare even more strapped for resourcesthan are national governments, so theyare unwilling to bear the brunt of clos-ings that would eventually beneÞt theeconomy as a whole.

In one instance, the economic transi-tion seems to be occurring most suc-cessfully independently of state-led ef-forts. The private sector in Poland hasbeen growing rapidly, contributing about50 percent of the gross national prod-uct last year. ÒPoland is looking poten-tially like the economic tiger of the re-gion,Ó Repa notes. ÒThe growth of theprivate sector has been spontaneous. Ithas not been the result of privatization,but the result of a couple of million newbusinesses.Ó In fact, Repa explains, theprivate sector is encouraged by ongoingineÛciencies in the vestigial state-runsector: ÒIn a competitive market, it givesthem an advantage.Ó Whether jealous,unfrocked apparatchiks will permit thatadvantage to persist remains to be seen.ÑPaul Wallich and Marguerite Holloway

For Sale: One Country, As Is

The problems of privatization are simple to state but tricky to solve.

Copyright 1994 Scientific American, Inc.