FO B6 Public Hearing 6-17-04 2 of 2 Fdr- Tab 6-19- John S White- Bio- MFR- Written Statement- Testimony Request 710

8/14/2019 FO B6 Public Hearing 6-17-04 2 of 2 Fdr- Tab 6-19- John S White- Bio- MFR- Written Statement- Testimony Reques

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John S. WhiteMy career as an air traffic controller began in 1965 when I joined the United States AirForce. My duty assignments included Goodfellow Air Force Base, San Angelo, Texasand Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Republic of Vietnam. In 1970,1 was hired by the FAA andassigned to Los Angeles Center in Palmdale, California. During my 17 1/2 years at LosAngeles Center, I held positions as an Air Traffic Control Specialist, Airspace andProcedures Specialist, an d Area Supervisor. In 1987,1 was transferred to the Air TrafficDivision in the Western-Pacific Region where I served for more than two years as aPlanning Specialist in the Planning, Requirements and Automation Branch. In 1989,1was promoted to the position of Assistant Air Traffic Manager at the Honolulu CenterRadar Approach (CERAP). During my three years in Hawaii, I also served as the AirTraffic Manager of both the Honolulu Air Traffic Control Tower and the HonoluluCERAP.In 1992,1 was promoted to the position of Assistant Program Manager at the AirTraffic Control System Command Center located at FAA Headquarters in WashingtonD.C. During the eleven years I worked at the ATCSCC, there were many organizationrealignments and the ATCSCC was moved from FAAHeadquarters to its presentlocation in Herndon Virginia. In this period of time, I held the positions of AssistantProgram Manager, Assistant Division Manager and Division Manager. On September11, 2001,1 held the position of Manager of the System Efficiency Division.


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UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDEvent: John White, former Assistant. Program Manager for Adm inistration at theATCSCC, "Command Center", Herndon VAType: InterviewDate: May 7, 2004Special Access Issues: NonePrepared By: Lisa SullivanTeam: 8Participants (non-Comm ission): NoneParticipants (Com m ission): Miles Kara an d John AzzarelloLocation: GSA Conference RoomBackgroundFrom 1965-1969, he was in the US A ir Force; in 1970 he joined FAA at Los AngelesCenter; he spent 14 years as a controller; from 1989-1992 he was in Hawaii as an ATmanager; November 1992, he started at the Com m and Center at FAA HDQTS inWashington, and then helped build the Com m and Center out in Herndon, Virginia. Theym oved in March 1994. He retired on Januar y 3, 2004.Command Center leadershipOn 9/11, Jack Kies was the Manger Air Traffic Tactical Operations (ATT-1); LindaSchuessler was the Facility Manager at the Command Center (ATT-100); John W hitewas the Manager of System Efficiency (ATT-200) at the Comm and Center.Jack Kies was not at the Com m and Center on 9/11. He was on travel.Command CenterThe concern of the Comm and Center is supply anddemand - capacity issues and trafficflow management. The job was to ensure that the system didn't overload one airport atany one given time.The Command Center has expanded since then; it is now a communications facility - itcommands a lot of data - a lot of which is not directly related to air traffic management.Prior to 9/11 it was going that way.

UNCLASSIFIED 1COMMISSION SENSITIVE


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UNCLASSFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVEW e have a lot of automation activity that supports A TC function but it also givesinformation all over the world . For instance, CNN and the Weather Channel u seCommand Center information. They read Command Center advisories."Command Center," as a term, is misleading.Wh at was the Command Center's role in a hijacking?There were no "legitimate" hijackings in the United States for a considerable period oft ime. On 9/10/01, a hijacking was a method of extortion. "No one thought a hijack wo uldever result in an airplane being turned into a missile."The Command Center did not have a large role in response to a hijacking, other thanbeing aware of the situation. The primary concern of the Comm and C enter was toprevent the hijacked plane from disrupting the paths of other planes in the system.The authority of the AT C System was given to Com mand Center by Jane Garvey in1999. The change is reflected in the handb ook. 7210.3, the controllers ' hijack protocol,was not changed to reflect authority of the Comm and Center over the national air space.Lufthansa HijackingHe wasn't involve d in that. He remembers the incident.Hijack CoordinatorACS 1 and 2 were Mike Canavan and Lynn Osmus. Under FAA Security division,operations and intelligence divisions existed. White would assume wh en info rmation on ahijacking came in, the WO C wo uld brief the ACS, the Ad ministrator, and the Depu tyAdministrator.Would you, at the Comm and Center, know w ho the hijack coordinator was on any givenday?No, he does not know who the hijack coordinator was on 9/11.Regional Operations Center and the Command CenterThe plan to elim inate the Regional Operations C enters has been floated within the FA A.The A TC D ivision Manager of all the different regions has their own little "kingdoms".They are all resistant to change. The FAA and ATC have not changed that m uch since1970. They talk about modernization, but it is still very much the same. A profession asyou ng as AT C sh ould not stagnate as it is. Change h as to be driven by struc ture.Misinformation on 9/11



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UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVE"O n 9/11, i t was ob vious to me when I was on the phone that 60-percent of theinformation w as wrong."For instance, the US Secret Service reported that UAL 93 had crashed into Camp David."They confirm ed that, I heard it; it was in my ear." "W e thought it was still inPennsylvania." hi addition, Indianapolis Center passed information to Command Centerthat a plane had crashed on the border of Ohio and Kentucky. "We passed thatinformation raw up the line."H e attributes that misinformation in part to a lot of stove-pipes in the government. TheCommand Center floor is an attempt to bring people together to eliminate stove-piping."If, in the event of a crisis, th e best thing to do is have the USAF, NORAD, th e FAA, an dthe FBI in the same room so they are all on the same page, than tha t 's w hat we shouldhave and we don' t have it."For instance, the DH S has a W ashington Area Op s Center across the street from th eComm and Center in Herndon. They were at one time located in the Command Centerfacility. Since they built their own facility, "we don 't talk to them"; "there's no way we'dhave rapid comm unication with them in the event of another crisis."When th e first plane hit the W T C ; my mind did not allow me to think, "Somebody flewthat airplane into the W TC." Wh en the second pla ne hit the WT C, then he knew it was aterrorist attack. The question, "what do we do?" loomed large. White said, "There was nodirection. If you can find a shred of direction anywhere, in any of this, let me know."On that day, the Com mand Center was in shock; it was surreal; the response was anger."How do we defend the United States?"W hite and the other controllers went back to their US Air Force training- the Cold W artraining. They stopped transatlantic flights first; then they landed everybody. Y ou wouldhave been amazed in watching all the work in that room in trying to figure out how torespond withou t prior know ledge or training.Awareness of HijackingsO n 9/11, he started out the day in a staff meeting reviewing the events of the day before.Ben Sliney came in off the floor and interrupted the meeting to say there was a report of ahijacking and a flight attendant had been stabbed.W ithin a matter of minutes, Tom Paccione came in and said he heard report of atransmission, "w e have other planes." A t that point, th e meeting broke up."Then things started m oving way, way, way too fast."



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EmployeeUNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVE

W e all got around the NOM desk - me, Ellen King, Linda Schuessler, BenSliney.H e thinks that the first p lane had crashed at thi s point . CNN was not on the big screen forthe first crash, but soon after, they had i t up.

There..was some di f ference of op inion that i t was a commercial je t or a sm all aircraft .The New York facilities reported that an aircraft had hi t the World Trade Center.John Azzarello talks about the ATC centers l i nk ing up to share information a bou t the fi rsthi jacking : New York, Boston, and Cleveland (among others). New York and Bostonlost radar on the plane almost simultaneously. This was all recorded at posi tion 15 at theCommand Center -| |s line.Do you personal ly equate the reported hijack with th e crash at the WTC?White is not sure that your brain allows yo u to equ ate those tw o things. It wa s a" q u a n t u m leap." We had a susp icion, but we weren ' t ready to th ink abou t that a t thetime.He learned of the second one because they had CNN o n and they saw i t . He t h i n k s thathe saw one of the playbac ks on CNN m om ents af ter the imp act . Wh i te th ink s he knewthere were other prob lems in the sys tem; he knew there was anoth er p lane w i t h ap r o b l e m . . .He th ink s they received a cal l from Newark Tower t h a t said, "Watch this," in reference toHight U AL 175.White asked the Commission if Langley fighters were ever scrambled in response lo th ehijackings. He asked that ques t ion on 9/11 , and i t was never co nf i rm ed to him .Commiss ion s taf f and White spent some time lis tening to tapes... 9:02 a.m. is the t i m e ofth e second impact . Af ter th e second crash, White ends up on the phone w i th Jef fGriffi ths. The call began at the NOM position - line 34. He crossed the room to getsom e i n fo rm at i on . Gr i f f i th called back and "threatened" Whi te to stay on the line. He wasat th e NTMO East posi tion for the rema inder of the call . There wa s a fifteen m i n u t einterval of time between the calls .White got emotional at this point of the interview.T he cal l w as resumed on an a d m i n p h o n e . After th e second crash, a w hi te board wen t upwith a who le s lew of f light num bers .White confirmed the Commission's suspicion there was some hos t i l i ty between thecontrol lers a t the New York p os i t ion 14 (located in close pro xim ity to the East NT MOposition).



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UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVECommission staff showed W hite a sketch of the Aviation Crisis Center on the 10 th f looror the FAA Headquarters . When th e call first started, he thinks Griffi th was in the ATSuite. He thinks Griffi th moved the call to the ACC at some point. He did not know wha tperson he was ta lking to at Headquarters most of the t ime.Even though I technical ly "out-ranked" Ben Sliney, it wa s his room tha t day. He was incharge of the room.What were other supervisors doing?Linda Schuessler was ha ndling internal security issues, such as get t ing armed guards andsending non-essential peop le home. She was also ta lking to people at Headquarters . Shewas w orking with El len King at t imes.Si tuat iona l AwarenessGriffith wanted information that we weren't able to garner right away . There was al l ofthis "noise" in the system. Continental , Delta, Uni ted . . . Probably 60-percent of theinformation he got was false. W hile they wanted information and they wanted it fast, hewanted to give Headquarters good information. But he does not think they were everreal ly successful in that there was no wa y to fi l ter the reports th ey received.Azzarello pointed out that th e Comma nd Center was on top of UAL 93 in terms ofpinpoint ing where i t was a nd pass ing on that information quickly.Whi te agreed; he said that was the only plane they were on top of that morning. "TheAmerican flight tha t hit the Pentagon - No." There w a s n o advance informat ion on thatto re lay to Hea dquarters.Azzarello points out that a t 9:25 a.m., White tel l Jeff Griffi th about AAL 77Dul les to LAX with f l ight level 3-5-0; th e target was lost. H e said Command Center hadreceived that information 10 minutes prior. H e also reported that th e Delta flight hadlanded safely in Cleveland."There was a lways confusion for a good period of time what aircraf ts went in to wha tbuildings." They thought at one point th e plane that went into th e Pentagon was muchsmal ler; "a n American Eagle or something."Commission staff and White discuss Eastern Region's misinformation recorded on theEast NTM O l ine; as we l l as the misinform ation documented in their logs from 9/11."There were c learly folks that were confused that day" about which planes hit where.W hite remem bers that i t was very difficult to "wade through" all the informa tion thatday.



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EmployeeUNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVE

, is ' - . . Ifrom ATCSCC corrects and verif ies the informat ion about the fou r f l igh ts and\et hey hit,

At"9:34, Command Center reported to Headquar t e r s th e report of "a b o m b o n board"\. '!;;s;; """,,..

Qn the East .NTMO Ime, John Whi t e reports to Jeff Gri f f i th at Headquar t e r s t ha t UAL 93i s 2 9 min u tes o.ut of the Washing ton area, it turned around over A kro n, Oh io, and ist racking t owa rd 'Washing ton; ! I t a k e s t h e l ine . W hi te asks h im i f t hey wan t to, sc ramb le ai rc raf ts . r Isays h ie does not know. White, says th at is a decisio n t ha t needs

. to be m a d e in the next - en minutes.T Iresoonds t ha t everyone just le f t th e r o o m .1 [tries to re lay that i n f o r m a t i o n to someone e lse , most likel'yl |W h i t ethen tellsl jo f another reported hijack - Delta 1989. Discussion on th is f l i gh t ensuesand the conversat ion moves away from UAL 93 .M i l i t a r y Scrambles and UAL 93

At 9:54a . m . , W h i t e re lays on the tape to'j t h a t h e received a repor t t h a tf ighters were sc r amb led for the W a s h i n g t o n and New Yo rk a r ea. H e te l l s th eC o m m i s s i o n staff t h a t he has no r e c o l l e c t io n w h e r e h e received t ha t i n f o rm a t i on .Miles Kara interjects know n t imes o f f igh t e r sc r am b les on 9 / 1 1 :Otis f ighters - 8:52 a.m.Lang ley f ighters - 9:24a . m . (Thef ighters were sc r amb led because of a repor t t ha t AAL1 1 had not crashed into the WTC and was h e a d i n g s ou th t o w a r d W a s h i n g t o n . So t heyheaded nor th to in tercept it and actual ly headed o ut over th e ocean unt i l they were to lddi f fe rent ly to turn and head t o Wash ing to n . They capped DC a t 9:52 a.m.)On UAL 93, what prompted Langley to scramble was Boston Center t e l l ing N E A D s thatA A L 11 was st i l l ai rborne and head ing sou th . Th e Langley f ighters were turned becauseo f a repor t o f a f ast mo v ing "VFR" heading toward th e White House .Headquar ters and the people in the Cr isis Center were to ld abou t UAL 93 by John Wh i t eand given a m p l e t i m e (29 m i n u t e s ) to in fo rm th e m i l i t a ry . However , NEADS did nothea r abou t it unt i l th e p lane was a l r eady in the g r o u n d . The f igh te r p i lo t s have to ld usthey were no t aware o f UAL 93 . T h a t message was l o s t somewhere at Headquar ters .J o h n W h i t e was not aware that Headquar ters did n o t h i n g with th e in fo rmat ion h e reportedo n U A L 93 . He said " that i s a shame. "John A zzare l l o Recap:On AAL 11 , Boston Center gave the m i l i t a r y 8 m inutes not ice bef ore i t crashed . The cal lwas placed at 8:38a .m. . This i s after the loss of radio, loss of t ransponder, and the stranget ransmissions heard on the f requency.



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UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVEOn UAL 175, the military got a call on that a minu te or two b efore impact. T hetransponder code was changed at the tim e of impact of AAL 11. The controller washandling both planes at the time, and he did not notice the change in code for 5 or 6minutes. There was only 17 minutes between the first tw o crashes.On AAL 77, no one gained awareness on where the plane was located. At 9:08 a.m.Indianapolis Center reported it missing. Dulles TRACON finally picked it up again jus tmoments before it hit the Pentagon. No one knew at the time the plane was AAL 77. Itwas referred to as the fast moving VFR. The state police at one point did report a crashin the area of the Kentucky/Ohio border. That m isinformation stems from th e Indy C enterpersonnel asking the police to check for a crash.On UAL 93, Comm and Center, as White says, was on top of it, yet the report of thefourth hijacking never got to m ilitary assets.Azzarello showed Wh ite the factual inaccuracies in the press release from FAA issued ayear after 9/11; an d also referred him to erroneous timeline information presented byDOD w itnesses at the Comm ission's May 2003 hearing (they testified that the DOD wasnotified about UAL 93 at 9:16 a.m. C omm ission staff has learned that the cockpit wasnot breached by the terrorists until 9:28 a.m., as heard on the air traffic controlfrequency).H e then told White that the first NEADS learned of a problem with UAL 93 was when itreached out to Cleveland Center to follow up on Delta 1989 at 10:07 a.m. ClevelandCenter told NEA DS about the "bomb on board" transmission heard from UAL 93 'scockpit. The plane had crashed four minutes prior to the call.The remainder of this interview was conducted o f f th e record at the request of JohnWhite.



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Written Statement of John S. Whiteto the National Commission on Terrorist AttacksUpon the United StatesOn January 3 of this year, I retired from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) withalmost 38 years of government service. All of this service was spent in the field of airtraffic control. In preparing this statement, I did not seek or gain access to FAA filesconcerning the events of September 11, 2001 and I do not have personal files concerningthe events of that day. On May 15,1 was interviewed by two m embers of theCommission's staff. During the interview, I listened to recordings of coordination thattook place, on September 11, at the Air Traffic Control System Command Center(ATCSCC), in Herndon, Virgin ia. In a letter dated May 27 , 2004, the NationalCommission on Terrorist A ttacks Upon the United States requested that I provide oraland written testimony on three topics related to the events of September 11, 2001. Theresponses to the three topics have been developed from my memories of the events. Asthese topics are addressed, any opinions provided are my own and should not be taken asofficial FAA positions.My career as an air traffic controller began in 1965 when I joined the United States AirForce. My duty assignments included Goodfellow Air Force Base, San Angelo, Texasan d Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Republic of Vietnam . In 1970,1 was hired by the FAA andassigned to Los Angeles Center in Palmd ale, California. During my 17 1/2 years at LosAngeles Center, I held positions as an Air Traffic Control Specialist, Airspace an dProcedures Specialist, an d Area Supervisor. In 1987,1 was transferred to the Air TrafficDivision in the W estern-Pacific Region w here I served for more than tw o years as aPlanning Specialist in the Planning, Requirements and Automation Branch. In 1989,1was promoted to the position of Assistant Air Traffic Manager at the Honolulu CenterRadar Approach (CERAP). During my three years in Hawaii, I also served as the AirTraffic Manager of both the Honolulu Air Traffic Control Tower and the HonoluluCERAP.In 1992,1was promoted to the position of Assistant Program Manager at the AirTraffic Control System Com man d Center located at FAA Headquarters in WashingtonD.C. During the eleven years I worked at the AT CSC C, there were many organizationrealignments and the ATCSCC was moved from FAA Headquarters to its presentlocation in Hern don V irginia. In this period of time, I held the positions of AssistantProgram Manager, Assistant Division Manager and Division Manager. On September11, 200 1,1 held the position of Manager of the System Efficiency Division.T he specific role played by the Air Traffic Control System C omm and Center (AT CSCC )on 9/11 in the im mediate response to the hijackings, placed in the g eneral context of theATCSCC's function within FAA organizational structure.On September 11,2001, the ATCSCC was the major organization in the Air TrafficTactical Operations (AT T) Program. Air Traffic Tactical Operations reported to the


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Director of Air Traffic (AAT ); which, in turn, reported to the A ssociate Adm inistrator forAir Traffic Services (AT S). AT S reported to the Deputy Adm inistrator (ADA ).The primary operational purpose of the A T CSCC is to collaboratively manage the AirTraffic Control System. Simply stated, the AT CSC C ensures that air traffic demand doesnot exceed system capacity. Norm ally, this is accomplished through man y avenues ofclose coordination with system users and air traffic field facilities. The FAAAdm inistrator provides the AT CSCC the authority to manage the Air Traffic ControlSystem and to implement traffic management initiatives such as ground delay program sand ground stops. This a uthority is described inFAA Order 7210.3.T he ATCSCC is most effective when it collaboratively plans responses to systemconstraints w ith all system stakeholders. On September 11, 2001, the surprise terroristattacks required the men and w omen of the AT CSCC to take a completely differentapproach in responding to the attacks. T he following actions were initiated:In retrospect, armed with our current knowledge, the threat of September 11th is obvious.How ever, as the a ttacks occurred on that day there was nothing o bvious about themagnitude of the threat or even who the perpetrators were. In an effort to ascertain thescope of the attacks, personnel at the AT CSC C began to gather as muc h data as possible.Soon a dry erase board was pressed into service and was used to track system anom alies.As I recall, the list of flights of interest reached eleven. As data w as collected it waspassed to FAA Headq uarters. The initiative and professiona lism displayed by the menand wom en of the ATCSC C in this and all their efforts on that day were truly impressive.After the first attack on the World Trade Center, ground stops were implemented for NewYork Center and Boston Center airports. These ground stops were expa nded in relativelyquick fashion and, ultima tely, a national ground stop was implem ented.AT CSC C personnel took action to refuse entry into United States' airspace to all aircraftthat had departed international airports. T he Cana dian air traffic control system did amarvelous job of supporting this action. Eventually, the AT CSCC gave the order to landall airborne aircraft at the nearest airport. This was the first time in the history of airtraffic control in the United States that this order was given. The air traffic controlsystem responded flaw lessly.The above actions were taken in an attempt to disrupt the terrorists' plan of attack. W eknew a hijacker ha d inadvertently transmitted, "... .we have other planes." We did notknow how many.Each business day, the A T CSC C operations and a dministrative mana gers conduct areview of the previous day's operation. On September 11, 2001 this m eeting wasconvened at 0830 EOT. At the time the m eeting began, the A T CSC C had alreadyreceived reports of a hijack ed aircraft. Subsequent, reports resulted in the termina tion ofthe meeting and the mana gement team moving to the operations room.


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The M anager of the System Efficiency Division has no routine operational role in theATC SCC operational quarters. On the morning of September 11th managementpersonnel assumed roles designed to assist operations personnel respond to the nationalemergency. Sometime after the managers had conducted a brief meeting in theoperations room, at which items such as internal security and the status of contract andnon-essential personnel were discussed, I received a telephone call from th e DeputyDirector of Air Traffic. I took this call on the administrative phone at the first levelsupervisor position in the East area of specialization. Du ring this call, I was ordered toremain on the line to facilitate instant comm unication. I remained at this ad hoccommunication position fo r approximately five hours. I received no information as towhere the "hotline" I was monitoring terminated. Initially, I believed it was connected toa conference room in the Air Traffic suite in FAA Headquarters.When I began to exchange information on this line with ATS personnel, I believed the"hotline" ha d been moved to a conference room close to the FAA HeadquartersOperations Center.During the time I worked this ad hoc comm unications position, I tried to provideheadquarters w ith inform ation that was as com plete and as accurate as possible.Since much of the inform ation the AT CSCC received that day was inaccurate, this was adifficult task. As I recall, at least twice during the time of the four hijackings, theATC SCC received direction to take actions that had already been initiated by theATCSCC. A myriad of issues were handled on this line.Initially, the information concerning the aircraft of interest were predom inant.As time passed, hum anitarian and VIP flights into New York an d Washington werecoordinated on this line as well as special waivers fo r certain air carrier internationalflights.Until my May 15th interview with tw o members of the Commission's staff, I believedthat, on Septem ber 11, 2001, the appropriate coordination between theFAA and the Department of Defense concerning the hijacked aircraft had beenaccomplished.The only manner in which I can address this topic is to write how I believe coordinationshould have taken place on September 11. The hijackings should have been reported bythe controllers up their managem ent chain to the regional operations centers. Theregional operations centers should have passed the information to the WashingtonOperations Center. The Operations Center should have advised the FAA officialassigned the responsibility of coordinating military assistance. I cannot say that duringthe attacks of 9/11 my personal understanding of the process was crystal clear, but I didknow that the request fo r military assistance had to come from headquarters. During myMay 15th interview, I listened to coordination concerning United 93, in which I asked ifheadquarters had m ade a decision to request the launch of fighter aircraft.There was a clear expectation that the responsibility for this action belonged in FAAHeadquarters.


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I do not recall any AT CSC C coordination that took place with the m ilitary during thehijackings. This does not mean that none took place. The Central AltitudeReservation Function (CARF) and the Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC ) are both housedat the ATCSC C and both have comm unication links with the military. In fact, the ATSCis staffed by military reserve personnel. It would be foolish to think that nocomm unications took place w ith their military counterparts during the hijackings.Additionally, traffic man agemen t specialists m ay have contacted m ilitary organizationswith whom he or she routinely worked. With the exception of being advised by a trafficmanagem ent specialist of the location of an aircraft carrier, I have no personalrecollection of ever having knowledge any of these com munications. After the lasthijacking ha d been terminated, I recall nume rous calls from NORAD, various air defensesectors and other military entities con cerning the access to and control of airspace.On the evening of September 11, 2001, like most Am ericans, I experienced a full gamutof emotions. I felt a deep sadness fo r those lost in the four aircraft and for those who losttheir lives at the Pentagon and the World Trade Center.I was angry that terrorists had been able to use the air traffic control system to carry outtheir attacks. I was anxious about the safety of my family and for the security of theUnited States. Contrarily, I felt a tremendous pride, in particular, for the performance ofthe people at the Air Traffic Control System Com mand Center and, in general, for theentire air traffic control system.During a time of crisis, the controllers m ade the difficult look easy and served A mericawell. Nothin g in the intervening months and ye ars of investigation has changed thatfeeling of pride.


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/9/11 Personal Privacy

H. Kean

Hamil tonC H A I RBen-V eniste

F. FieldingGorelick

Gortonob Kerrey

F. Lehmanj. RoemerThompson

D. ZelikowD I R E C T O R

May 27,2004

Mr. John White

Dear Mr. White:The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States willhold a public hearing on June 17,2004, in Washington, DC on the topic ofNational Crisis Management. You are invited to testify at these proceedingsat 9:15 - 11:00 a.m. onThursday, June 17.This session will be the seventh and last hearing in the Commission's 2004investigative hearing schedule, which will collectively advance theCommission's efforts to produce an authoritative account of the facts ofcircumstances surrounding the September 11,2001, terrorist attacks. At thishearing, the Commission's objective is to present the definitive account of ournation's response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Aspects of the hearing willspecifically address the response of the military, the Federal AviationAdministration (FAA), and senior levels of the Executive branch.We look forward to your testimony on the following topics: The specific role played by the Air Traffic Control Systems Command

Center (ATCSCC) on 9/11 in the immediate response to the hijackings,placed in the general context of the ATCSCC's function within FAAorganizational structure;

A description of your responsibilities and actions taken at the ATCSCC onthe morning of 9/11; and

Your understanding of coordination and communications that took placebetween the ATCSCC, other FAA entities, and military entities inresponse to the hijackings.

Given time constraints, you will not be asked to give introductory oraltestimony, as others on your panel have been asked to give a brief openingstatement. However, we ask that yousubmit a comprehensive writtentestimony and provide your statement via e-mail to Lisa Sullivan atlsullivan@9-l lcommission.gov by 9:00 a.m.on June 9,2004. Your ful l

1 7 th Street SW, Room 5125202.331.4060 F 202.296.5545

commission.gov

26 Federal PlazaS u i t e 13-100New York, NY 10278T 212.264.1505 F 212.264.1595


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Mr. John WhiteMay 27,2004Page 2

statement will be made part of the record and carefully studied by theCommission. All witnesses at this Commission hearing will be asked totestify under oath.Please contact John Azzarello at (212) 264-1588 with any questions you mayhave. We look forward to your participation in this important public forum.

With best regards,

Thomas H. Kean Lee H. HamiltonChair Vice Chair

cc: Dan Levin, U.S. Department of Justice

Documents

FO B6 Public Hearing 6-17-04 2 of 2 Fdr- Tab 6-19- John S White- Bio- MFR- Written Statement- Testimony Request 710