T8 B6 FAA HQ Shirley Miller Fdr- 3-30-04 MFR 862

8/14/2019 T8 B6 FAA HQ Shirley Miller Fdr- 3-30-04 MFR 862

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Shirley MillerType: InterviewDate: March 30, 2004Special Access Issues: Non ePrepared By: Lisa SullivanTeam: 8Participants (non-Commission): David Wiegand, FAA Counsel and Shirley MillerParticipants (Com mission): Lisa Sullivan, Miles Kara, John Farmer, Dan a Hyde, andJohn A zzarelloLocation: F A A H D Q T sBackgroundStarted at the FAA in 1988 in financial organization as a budget analyst. 1998 diddifferent programs on the operations side; the m odernization program s; requested to workfor the Dep uty A dm inistrator 1998-2002 when he retired Mo nte Belger - he was acting atthat time - he wasnominated and it wasnever formalized.Worked on Fin areas with him - as her area of expertise - it was a chronic budgetsituation with challenges - helping him run the operation - he was outofair trafficservices - he wasn't a controller but he was operationally focused. Anything that had todo with running the regulatory and operational side.She has a good working know of the system operationally. Does not have techbackground or technical know -how.Basis of your understanding - tour the facilities - yes - been tomany of them - workedwith them formany years the terminology -She was special assistant to the Deputy. Adm inistrator Hinsen left in 1997; LindaDaschle was acting-Administrator for short time and left; Monte was acting asadministrator or deputy - Donna V ickers was also assisting him and Tony W illete. On 9-11 she was the only assistant.When there was a crash prior to 9-11, what was your role?


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Her role w as very little other than getting the information to him . Norm ally all the dataand documentation to turn over to theNTSB - accident investigation people work w ithNTSB - not air traffic - accident investigation people call on air traffic people forexpertise -She does not remem ber anything about the Lufthansa hijacking.Pre-9-11, what was the protocol for reporting an air incident?Limited to the fact she had never been involved in a hijacking. Or an assumed hijacking.W hat she knew w as what she learned in the crisis man agem ent handbook. Air Piracychapter. W ho here or what position w ould coordinate with the military in response tohijack? It was security that had the lead and that was clear in the handbook. As part ofthat notification in the piracy event they would notify the NM CC . National MilitaryControl Center.FAA h ijack coordinator - to request themilitary to provide anescort for thehijackedplane - that person wascivil aviation security (ACS) - ACSM ike Canavan and LynnOsmus - her understanding it was ACSOperations - theprimary and if not available itwould be intelligence. The director was Lee Longmire (she is not positive of hispresence onthat day) PatMcDonald had retired - Claudio was thedeputy -Lynn thought it was in the position description of ACO-1 ... Shirley M iller is not sure.W as the hijack coordinator ACS-1 or ACO-1? The chapter was not clear an d there is nodate on the document. She is going to look into it for us -W as it you understanding on 9-11 that there was a position to be filled - a designation - tocoordinate the hijack should one occur between the FAA and DO D?Yes. Not jus t with the m il. The FB I and other agencies.What was the role?They would coordinate SS FBI Military; the list was in the handbook depending on theevent. The crisis managem ent handbook.Tab 1 - notifications - The list was allDOT and FAA internal - that is forthe tac net -The outside interests arebrought up on the primary net - that list was also review ed inthe interview.Understanding pre 9-11 w hat agency has the responsibility of establishing the prim ary netand all the appropriate parties were on it: it was security to wo rk with operations centerto put up the primary net.Also the tac net was the responsibility of the security division.


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Lee Longmire A G O 1 at the time. She doesn't recall if he was present when the eventoccurred that morning.W hat was the CC role on 9-11?She is not sure she understood what there role was pre-911. She knew it was a systemswide perspective. They wou ld be one of the first to know should something to happen.But sh e knows the CARFs weren't there (mil specialists) weren't thereCA RF work with the DO D to make accom modations for mil movem ents. They can beclassified or troop movem ent. Coordinated through Command Center. The CARF had norole in response to hijacking

Everyday the director of intelligence would send the daily intelligence summary (DIS) tothe Deputy A dministrator, Monte Belger. He re-delegated the responsibility of reviewingthe DIS to her. She looked at it and broug ht relevant information to his attention."Did you bring information to Belger daily?""No, it wasn't that often. Every couple weeks."She does not recall anything during the days or months prior to 9-11 that would indicateanything specific targeting aviation was being planned. She does not remember anythingabout Al Qeada. "There was always a lot of noise," she said. The DIS was usuallyclassified secret. If there was anything at a higher level the document would be broughtdirectly to Belger. Doesn't remember there was mu ch SC I material to speak of.Intelligence was brought to the Administrator's attention at Belger's behest.She can't remember if Claudio was the head and the director would bring it up -Monte also got intelligence information from secure telcons with other agencies that heparticipated in from time to time."Was it your perception there was an increased level of reporting or higher threat levelthat summer?""No, not at the time." Shirley learned after 9-11 that the threat level was purported tohave been higher the summer of '01.Belger's intelligence sources:-DIS-Secure telcons-CI information


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Adm inistrator got daily briefs after 9-11M ineta S60 had their own intell shop briefed him daily.She never got intelligence inform ation about a hijacking.

The summer before 9-11, there were som e actions taken by security based in informationsuch as security directives and information circulars - briefed Monte on what they weredoing - ifa security directive was released, hegot them -Does no t remember a heightened alertContent of the DIS: Something's were bizarre... aviation specific things.. . lawenforcement information was included ...The DIS was a secret docum ent it was not that often shebrought something to his attn -she does not know how much of the S CI material there was that went around her.She doesn't know whoelse got the DIS - Canavan of course he received it -Som ething of interest to air traffic we would share that with them.W ho from FAA participated in threat-based working groups or NM CC/NS C meetings?No. Neither did B elger. Doesn' t remem ber if they took place or who w ould be doing it.On 9-11:She got to work at 7 AM . There was as standing meeting with AT at 7:30 in conferenceroom between the deputy an d administrators office on the 10 th floor. At about 8:20Griffith got a page about an AAL flight that turned the transponder turned off. Shedoesn 't remem ber who else was at the meeting. She is there because a lot of action itemscame out of the meetings. She followed up with air traffic. Belger was also in themeeting. Jeff left theconference room - themeeting wasadjourning - shewent into theoperations center because it was odd and she was concerned about it - the ops center washearing the same thing - that AAL 11 had turned the transponder off. Someone came into the office and said a sm all plane hit the world trade center she wen t to find Monte andsaid a small plane had hit the trade center. He had gone to get coffee an d when he cameback she said come on into the op erations center a small plane crashed into the WT C.She thinks she was the o ne to tell him that a plane had crashed into the WT C. She can'tremember where she was when sh e heard about the second one. Neither of them were inthe W OC . She certainly heard abo ut it as soon as it happened. Someone told her. Shedid not hear the word hijack up to this point. She cant recall if she was the one to informBelger of the second crash. Not equating the Griffith page with the crashes..She went to the ops center and saw the hug e hole and everyone kn ew it was a hugeproblem . She can't remem ber if Belger was there or not. Everyone w as trying to set


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things up. She cant remem ber when she heard hijack. The second one went in, she say thereplay, and then she certainly thought "hijack." "that bad guys had taken over."Monte Belger's guidance - by the time of the second crash the administrator wasbackand they went into her office and she did not see him for a while. The ACC knew what todo they were doing there thing. Setting it up. Know s that operations specialists aresetting up the telcon an d manning the phones.Lee Longm ire was in there; Mike Morse was in there;Jane Garvey came back from the Department sometime after the second crash. When shecame back she and Monte w ere in both of there offices. At some point, they were talkingto the secretary. She was in the ops center observing what was going on. She as alsorunning around looking fo r people for Monte. Peter ChallenceShe didn't take notes. N o recollection of time after the second crash. It was insane aroundhere - so much activity.She is not sure when she heard about (AA L 77) the third plane. Bogus inf orm ation wascirculating. 10:30 time frame misinf orm ation was rampant.Sh e cant recall specifically hearing that another plane was lost - she can rememberhearing about a plane that crashed on the Ohio Kentucky border. Then she heard all waslost on AAL 77 and making the connection between the two. Before the Pentagon crash,heard the bomb went off at the State Department. Someone from HDQTs came to tellher the Pentagon was hit by mou th. She didn't equ ate Pentagon to AAL 77 at all. Shewas right in the middle of what information was available. She remem bers for some timeno t knowing what hit the Pentagon.AAL CEO asked Monte what had crashed into the Pentagon and he didn't know. AALhad a missing plane at this point. It was frustrating not to know for Belger AA L 77 wasreported at this tiem to have crashed into the WTc. Misinformation was coming fromATC - couriers were running back and forth.AT telcon facilities were on - she didn't know for sure what centers were on. She knew itwas definitely ate people.The crisis room - who were they talking to? Talking to the Boston CA SFO the NY andregional security people - airport directors -Doug Davis - she saw him in Monte 's office - standing in the operations center he was inthe phone with the command center relaying information to Mon te talking about shuttingdown the system. The tim e is blurry. 9:30 and 10:00.Doe sn't rem ember reports abot AA L 77 being lost. Or about the one down on the border.When were you aware of UAL 93 or the flight that crashed in PA?She hesitates to say.. . can't recall when. . .She is sure sheheard about it -


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She rememb ers hearing it had crashed. She was in her office and she saw the TV reporto f the crash.Command Center - John W hite was relaying information toDoug Davis - she was notJohn Flaherty (he was over here) and Michael Jackson the depu ty secty - trying to assessthe situation - putthem intheconference room - Vince Taylor wasalso there -She was hanging out with the ops center specialists to learn what they knew.She was not in the crisis center. She was on the other side.Flaherty went into the SIVITS. When he came over sh e when into the MOC there was abig screen tv . What do you recall about it?SIVITS - it was activated after 9 AM - thecomputer room - at 9:40She joined something inprogress. Jeff was in there - this wasafter Pentagon crash. Thevoices were distorted it was the President on the SIVTS - she is pretty sure it was himfrom AF1 - surreal - novideo inthere at that point it was all audio at that time - she wasin there for 10-15 minutes at the most. There wasnothing about the Pennsylvania plane -there was a listening only mode at that point.hi themorning - she was not trailing Monte. She wastrying to findpeople - find pohonenumbers for people - Monte had been in the SIVTS when John Flaherty came over earlyon.ACI/Smith - at that point itwould not beunusual forsomeone to fill in - someone fromACI had called the Center and wanted to conference in ROCPULL THE WIEKERT INTERVIEW FO R DANAMo nte was working directly with Air Traffic and Security. Jane Garvey and Mo nte wereon thephone with the Secretary - gathering the information from mostly Jeff GriffithMonte wastelling the secretary from hisoffice - itwasn't anopen line - one or twocalls- no oneelse wasspeaking to the secretaryThe Administrator was w ith Monte Belger for parts of the morning. She was in the opscenter and the ACC too. There were SIVITS going on that sheparticipated in -She went down to the air traffic conference. She doesn't remember why. John Flahertywas around but she doesn' t recall how long he stayed here.What kind of inform ation were youhearing - it wasconsiderably after thePentagon - theconversation was the onewhile he was onboard AF1 that he talked to VP Cheney -


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Substance ofthe conversation - mostly it was - thepresident wastalking abouthowhorrible of this was - Jane Garvey's Assistant TomZoeller told her it was the Presidenton the sivits.Jeff Griffith w as getting situational awareness f rom. . . not sure.Doug D avis was asked to man the CC line. She was not aw are of that. This is before thePentagon was hit.Sh e doesn't recall that he passed information on to her to pass to other sources. Sheremembers being in the ACC - sheknows that Doug wasrelaying information and shew as hearing it - that is reasonable toher - she doesn't recall notes - she remembers itwas all verbal. She doesn't remember being there specifically wh en he heard realinformation -Once the system w as shut down there were a number of planes still in the air that we requestionable.She has no recollection about scrambling military aircraft. She doesn't remember thesesdiscussions takin g place o r any discussion of scram bling.In terms ofthe ADA 30 log - theprocess that morning ofkeeping the log - doesn't knowwhat process they use - sheknows thepractice was a list of those setting up the net -doesn't know w hat they used - May wasdirecting them -The net was being set up the AC C person from securityShe was in and out of her office that morning - there were no telcons - shedoesn'tremember what she was doing. Doesn't remember conversations with the Mil or Monteasking about it.From a sort of a shock to the system it was insane what w as going on. They h ad goodinstincts people w ere doing w hat they trained to do. Maybe on timing wise w e could havedone a little better. A lot of the information - no one knew what was real and not real.The FAA m edia people were also in here - there w asn't shouting coming in. the reportscirculatedThings got written dow n an d information was passed on inputting information in thelaptop.False reports were discredited: she used the Delta flight as an example. That was before93. AT was very sensitive to any anomalies at that point.Any time a new report came in, it was filtered - she doesn't know w hat they were doingto filter. She doesn't have a sense of what they w ere doing to verify. She doesn't recallwhat she thought or who she discussed the Delta flight with.


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There was ATC and then there was security - is it to correct to think of these as twoseparate channels?It is better to have everyone collocated. There was a lot of security info rmation comingin . Reporting from the field facilities on security issues. W e weren't hearing aboutbombs at airports or things -Gatherer role: showed her the chronology of events presented to Canoles - Millerreferred to it as the correct timelineAT information - theATC facilities - were they repo rting - she doesn't knowDetailed notification list no one know s whose hand writing it is.In the ACC she went to the person at the desk to find out what was new. She reached outto Lynn Osmus fo r documents from that day. The doc request was transferred to TSA.An y request for inform ation from the day of wo uld be at TSA. W as there acomprehensive meld of the chronologiesSSI backgrounder in front of it separated by fl ight; incorporating chronologiesProduced for the chief of staff. Thiswas b efore or the after the commi? This was anotherattempt to have a summarized timeline of each aircraft. For John Flaherty. Once thecom mission started he wan ted to see something all inclusive. Ultimately it came to theComm ission. It says SSI on it;There were notother comprehensive efforts -Summary of Hijack Events produced by Dave Canoles Office briefed the secretary -September 17th there may be dates an d times that changed because things were stillcoming in - it was also to help ms garvey in her testimo ny before Congress it was mostlyabout Security rather than air traffic - the briefing the week after 9-11 as told to them byNORAD source. Jeff went to that briefing. W e will ask him tomorrow . She was presentfor the briefing of the Secretary on the Summary of Hijack EventsWhen did the faa notify the military?She doesn't rem ember from the briefing that it was discussed but she knows that and theSept 17 th publication was too soon to know when officially the notification wastransmitted.9:24 NEADS and FAA logs show notification to NEA DS on AA L 77 (9-20, theyannounced it)FA A point person for reviewing mil logs? Not sure who that was it was someone in airtraffic. DO you remem ber discussions with Mo nte about notifications of the mil was aconcern? No, shedoesn't remember there was concern about it -


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FAA did not investigate notifications, what times we learned, a matrix of each flight, itssomething else, who did know the colums say something like first time of distress,probably time ofcrash - conveyed to themilitary - this topic was discussed theevaluation of the system after the fact - notification Flight 77 we though the flight hadcrashed becusae al l contact was lost. The controller is trained to believe it was crashed.Through other reporting and hearing about the border crash. 20 minutes or so went bysome center notified the military - Indy orCLE - that 77 was missing -Early on they thought it crashed, look at the summ ary chronology that was given toFlaherty FIND THS!Notifications 77and 93 -Subsequenlt we were able to ficure it outNMCC was o n the net so it is her understanding that when the y heard the new s thenNMC C heard thenews. That is why anofficial notification wasn't relayed The net -they were supposed to be on it. Were they?Did what was supposed to happen, happen?She doesn't know about thatThere probably were conversations about it she is unaware o f Doesn't remember conversations about UAL 93, specifically. She remembers adiscussion abo ut the matrix that shows each flight.Doesn't remember discussions about what the mil logs said about UAL 93. She doesremember about AAL 77; and there was discrepancy about 175. what the two logs said;what the mil and the faa were saying. It was resolved. The august 12, 2002 PA releasethe time was wrong on UAL 175 - at 8:43 what happened was that the mil liaison saidwe need mil assistance for AAL 11. It is a public affairs guy an oversight - facts arewrong -Last line on the log "Notifications to Military"- both planes into the WTC were AAL (?)"FAA ne t logs" Primary net or tactical net? Unclear on this notifications listThe DEN is in response to problem of real time communicationsShe doesn't know if the military missed o ut on specific crucial information because ofpoor comms with the milNo knowledge of shoot down stuff


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Bogus reports -AA L called to ask if it was there planes that hit the trade centerShe does not know about 11 being airborne after first hitDoes remem ber hearing it was AA L 77 that hit the trade centerMineta had to testify soon after - 2 wks laterAT and Security briefed Garvey for the hearings

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T8 B6 FAA HQ Shirley Miller Fdr- 3-30-04 MFR 862