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PREFACE

Commanders must understand the spectrum of capabilities of the fire support system.Skillful integration of fire support into all facets of the AirLand Battle must take placesimultaneously and continuously as close, deep, and rear operations are synchronized.

This publication prescribes fire support doctrine for corps and division operations. It isdesigned to assist fire support coordinators and their staffs in the conduct of combatoperations. It also serves as a guide for echelons above corps regarding theorganization, capabilities, and employment of fire support.

Fire support for brigades is addressed in FM 6-20-40 and FM 6-20-50, the companionmanuals for this document. FM 6-20 serves as the capstone for the entire series. Otherservice commanders and staffs will find this publication useful in planning fire supportfor joint operations.

This publication is fully compatible with the Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine ascontained in FM 100-5 and is consistent with current joint and combined doctrine. Itassumes that the user has a fundamental understanding of the fire support principlesset forth in FM 6-20. It does not repeat concepts in FM 100-5, FM 100-6, FM 100-2-1,FM 101-5, and other readily available references except as necessary to explain uniquecorps- and division-level fire support matters.

This publication has undergone several draft revisions during its development. Almostevery field artillery unit has provided some input during the development cycle.Numerous individual Redlegs helped make it the authoritative fire support referencedocument that it is. Those units listed below actually provided representatives from thefield to a unique exercise encompassing major input and comprehensive rewrite of thepreliminary draft. The efforts of these senior fire support element (FSE)representatives resulted in the publication now before you. It reflects the consensus ofthe field on fire support doctrine for corps and division. The FSE representatives werefrom –

III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma

V Corps Artillery, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)

VII Corps Artillery, FRG

XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

7th Infantry (Light) Division Artillery, Fort Oral, California

The US Army Field Artillery School owes them, and many more, a great debt ofgratitude for the professionalism displayed in true Redleg fashion.

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The provisions of this publication are the subject of international agreements(standardization agreements [STANAGs] and quadripartite standardization agreements[QSTAGs]):

2014/506

2082

2099/531

2103/187

2104/189

2147/221

Operation Orders, Annexes to Operation Orders, andAdministrative and Logistics Orders

Relief of Combat Troops

Fire Coordination in Support of Lund Forces

Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, andPredicting and Warning of Associated Hazard Areas (ATP-45)

Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning to Armed ForcesOperating on Lund

Target Numbering System (Nonnuclear)

The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Submit changes for improving thispublication on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and BlankForms) and forward directly to:

CommandantUS Army Field Artillery SchoolATTN: ATSF-DDFort Sill, OK 73503-5600

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and womenare included.

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CHAPTER 1

THE FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM

The fire support system is made up of three distinct components thatfunction together to give the commander the fire support he needs toaccomplish his mission. These three components are as follows:

Command, control, and communications (C3) systems, facilities, andpersonnel required to manage fire support and to direct those tacticaland technical actions needed to attack targets quickly and effectively.

Target acquisition systems needed to acquire targets byreconnaissance, surveillance, and devices. These systems includemany individuals, units, and resources on the battlefield that helpdetect the enemy.

Weapons and ammunition to deliver the firepower on the targetaccording to the commander’s battle plan.

The key to effective fire support is the force commander’s ability tobring these assets to bear on the enemy in an integrated andcoordinated manner that is synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.These components are the tools that enable the commander to makefire support work. How he uses these tools depends on how well hisfire support commanders and staff officers understand and operate thefire support coordination process. This process must occur at allechelons of command, but it is more complex at the corps and divisionlevels. AirLand Battle doctrine has a major impact on fire support atthese levels, where fire support must simultaneously be planned andexecuted for the deep, close, and rear operations.

This chapter provides the foundation for understanding the use of all ofthe fire support tools and the duties and responsibilities of the manyfire support operators. This chapter serves as a transition from FM 6-20in that it is a recapitulation of the principles of the fire support system.This is a necessary redundancy because the components of the firesupport system must form a base from which the reader can proceedto the later chapters covering the planning and execution processes.

Each component of the fire support system is addressed in a separatesection of this chapter. Component characteristics, requirements, andcapabilities are described and examined in detail. Other referencessupporting the material in this chapter are listed in the Referencesportion of this publication.

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FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

“If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, thenwith the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then withthe trumpet, there would be a hell of a lot of noise but nomusic. To get harmony in music, each instrument mustsupport the others. To get harmony in battle, eachweapon must support the others. Team play wins.”

– General Patton

Fire Support OrganizationsCommand Responsibility

The force commander is responsible forintegrating fire support within the concept ofthe operation. At corps and division, as inother echelons of command, the commanderhas a fire support staff that works with hiscoordinating staff to help him discharge hisresponsibility for fire support. Fire supportcells (FS cells) are organized to facilitate thecoordination and execution of the fire supportsystem. The functions of the FS cells aresupervised by the force artillery commander,who acts as the fire support coordinator(FSCOORD) for the force commander.Normally, the FSCOORD operates throughthe FSE that is a part of the main commandpost (CP) fire support cell.

Fire Support Cell Functions

The FS cell is a central clearing house forplanning, coordinating, and synchronizing firesupport for the corps and division. The exactway it is organized varies among corps anddivisions. Organization depends on the unitmissions, availability of fire support assets, andcommand preferences. The actual makeup ofthe FS cell is flexible. However, it ensures thatall fire support assets respond to the force

commander’s intent. (Appendix A, Section I,gives the details of corps and divisionorganizations.)

Fire Support Cell StaffThe FSE staff personnel are from forceartillery headquarters; however, the FS cell isnot a field artillery organization. The fieldartillery is but one of several fire supportcapabilities represented in the FS cell. Thefollowing agencies normally operate as part ofthe FS cell:

Field artillery (FSE)1.

Tactical air support (tactical air controlparty [TACP])1.

Army aviation (avn)1.

Air defense (AD)1.

Electronic warfare (EW).

Naval fire support (naval gunfire liaisonofficer [NGLO])l,2.

G3 air1.

G23.

Engineer (engr).

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Air support operations center (ASOC)2.

Nuclear and chemical (NC) support.

Army airspace command and control(A2C2).1 Is a part of the corps A2C2 element.2 As required.3 May not be physically located in this cell on acontinuous basis. Provides input and/or informationas required.

Field ArtilleryMission

The mission of field artillery is to destroy,neutralize, or suppress the enemy by cannonrocket, and missile fire and to help integrateall fire support into combined

RolesThe field artillery systemsupport to maneuver forces.

arms operations.

provides closecounterfire, and

interdiction as required. These fires neutralize,canalize, or destroy enemy attack formationsor defenses; obscure the enemy’s vision orotherwise inhibit his ability to acquire andattack friendly targets; and destroy targetsdeep in the enemy rear with long-range rocketor missile fires. Field artillery support canrange from conventional fires in a companyzone to massive nuclear and chemical firesacross a corps front.

Command and ControlClearly defined, systematic, and positivecommand and control (C2) ensures that thefield artillery contributes to the fire supportsystem in a responsive manner and that it isadequate to support the mission. Commandand control relationships are establishedthrough command relationships (that is,organic, assigned,control [OPCON])

attached, or operationaland assignment of tactical

missionsgeneralsupport).

(that is, direct support,

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reinforcing,support reinforcing, or general

Fire Support IntegrationField artillery has the dual mission ofintegrating all fire support available to theforce commander and providing field artilleryfires. For this reason, the corps and divisionartillery headquarters and headquartersbatteries (HHBs) are organized and equippedto field full-time FSEs for the corps anddivision CPs. Each corps and division CPusually is divided into a tactical CP, a mainCP, and a rear CP. FSEs operate at thetactical CP and at the main CP, as part of theFS cell, simultaneously and continuously.

The FSE consists of field artillerymen who arespecialists in working all of the operationsphases of the three components of the firesupport system. They also ensure thefunctioning of each component as it relates tothe field artillery system. When the FSEdeploys to the corps or division main CP, itforms the hub of the FS cell.

Tactical Air SupportAir Support Operations Center

The ASOC plans, coordinates, and directsclose air support and tactical airreconnaissance operating in the supportedground commander’s area of responsibility. Itprovides tactical air representation to thecorps. It is an operational component of thetactical air control system (TACS), which istasked to coordinate and direct tactical airsupport operations. The ASOC is under theoperational control of the tactical air controlcenter (TACC) or the allied tactical operationscenter (ATOC) in NATO. Its primary functionis to provide fast reaction to satisfy immediaterequests from ground forces for close airsupport (CAS) and tactical air reconnaissance(TAR). It also helps in planning for battlefield

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air interdiction (BAI). The ASOC may be atthe division level when the division operates asa separate unit.

Requests for tactical air assets to support themaneuver commander’s concept of operationsare coordinated at the FS cell with the ASOCand are transmitted through Army commandchannels to the TACC. The air componentcommander (ACC), through the TACC ortheater equivalent, allocates resources to thecorps through the ASOC on the basis ofguidance provided by the joint forcecommander (JFC). Normally, the TACCretains operational control of air interdiction(AI) and TAR assets. The employment of AIforces against targets which are expected tohave a near-term effect on the maneuvercommander’s battlefield is known as battlefieldair interdiction. BAI and TAR are coordinatedwith the ASOC in as near real time aspossible. Mission, threat, and targetinginformation available at the FS cell must becoordinated through the ASOC with theTACC.

The TACC transfers control of CAS assets tothe ASOC for employment. The ASOC isresponsible for establishing and maintainingthe TACS at command levels below the landcomponent commander (LCC). This is donethrough TACPs assigned at corps, division,brigade, and battalion levels. Allocated CASassets are distributed to subordinate Armyunits on the basis of priorities established bythe G3. Normally, the ASOC is established atcorps level; however, its functions must beprovided at any command level if anindependent maneuver unit is provided tacticalair support.

Air Liaison OfficerThe ASOC is supervised by the air liaisonofficer (ALO), who serves as the primaryadvisor to the force commander on all AirForce matters. Although the manning of theASOC may vary, depending on the operational

requirement, the ASOC will always beprepared to work on a 24-hour basis. It has ajump capability to ensure continuousoperation. Representation from the ASOCforms an essential part of the FS cell at thecorps main CP. In some cases, the entireASOC may be situated within the FS cell;while in other corps, the ASOC proper is nearthe FS cell with the ALO or his assistantactually working with the FS cell.

Tactical Air Control PartyA TACP is provided to corps, division,brigade, and battalion. The TACP–

Provides advice to the Army commander.

Operates the Air Force air request net.

Provides a coordination interface with therespective FS cell.

Keeps the ASOC informed on divisionactivities; at the corps level, supplementsthe ASOC manning and/or integrates intothe corps staff in planning futureoperations.

Provides final attack control for CASattacks.

At corps and division levels, the TACPincludes an ALO, a fighter liaison officer(FLO), a tactical airlift liaison officer (TALO),and a reconnaissance liaison officer (RLO).

At maneuver brigade level, the TACP includestwo ALOs and two tactical air command andcontrol specialists (TACCSs). At maneuverbattalion level, the TACP consists of one ALOand two TACCSs. The duties of theseindividuals are as follows:

The air liaison officer –

Is the Air Force commander’s representa-tive at battalion through corps levels.

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Advises the respective maneuver com-mander and his staff on the capabilities,limitations, and employment of tactical air(TACAIR) – in particular CAS, BAI,suppression of enemy air defenses(SEAD), reconnaissance, and airlift.

Ensures the TACP maintains communi-cations on the Air Force air request net.

Helps plan the simultaneous employmentof air and surface fires, to include input tothe G3 (S3) air and FSCOORD for airsupport plans included in the fire supportplan.

Provides direct liaison for local airdefense measures and airspace manage-ment with the Army airspace commandand control element.

The fighter liaison officer —

Is a member of the FS cell and A2C2

element.

Advises the G3 (S3) air and FSCOORDon the capabilities, limitations, andemployment of resources allocated forCAS.

Helps in and advises on the developmentand evaluation of CAS and BAI requeststo include the suitability of targets forattack by air resources.

Directs close air strikes (normally not atdivision or corps).

The TALO is the Military Airlift Command(MAC) representative of the TACP. TheTALO provides specific knowledge andexpertise on the employment of tactical aswell as strategic airlift in support of groundoperations.

The reconnaissance liaison officer at corpssupports Army requests for reconnaissance.

Army AviationMission

Army aviation performs the full spectrum ofcombat, combat support, and combat servicesupport missions.

RolesIn support of the fire support mission area,Army aviation functions in the roles discussedbelow.

Dedicated Aerial Forward Observation. Targetacquisition reconnaissance platoons andcompanies provide aerial observation ortransport field artillery forward observers tovantage points that otherwise are impracticalto reach. With their lasing capability, theseunits can provide terminal guidanceinformation for various precision guidedmunitions.

Air Movement of Weapon Systems and/orAmmunition. Utility and cargo aircraft carryartillery to firing positions deep in enemyterritory to achieve surprise. These aircraft alsomove weapons and ammunition to supportwidely dispersed field artillery units in supportof close operations. They offer both speed ofmovement and flexibility of employment to theground commander. Also, Army helicopterscan move special munitions in support of fieldartillery operations.

Air Reconnaissance. Air reconnaissance unitsobtain and report near-real-time intelligenceinformation that is used for fire supporttargeting.

Intelligence Electronic Warfare. Fixed- androtary-wing special electronic mission aircraft(SEMA) serve as intelligence electronicwarfare (IEW) platforms for acquiring targetsfor fire support assets. The SEMA helicoptersprovide airborne communications intercept,direction finding (DF),support of division and

and jamming inarmored cavalry

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regiment (ACR) IEW operations. Also, corpsfixed-wing SEMA provide aerialreconnaissance, surveillance, communicationsintercept, and EW target acquisition in supportof corps IEW operations.

Attack Helicopter Operations. The primarymission of attack helicopter units is to destroyarmor and mechanized forces. Attackhelicopters are employed in combined armsoperations to maximize their weapons andaircraft capabilities in accomplishing thecommander’s antiarmor missions. They arewell suited for situations in which rapidreaction time is important or where terrainrestricts ground forces. On the basis of thecommander’s risk-versus-payoff assessment,attack helicopter units may be tasked toprovide fire support when no other firesupport elements or assets are available (forexample, in deep operations or whileoperating with ground maneuver forces in alow-intensity conflict environment out of rangeof friendly artillery). When tailored for thismission attack helicopters lose their antiarmorsystems to provide aerial rocket fire. Althoughthese aircraft can fire aerial rockets indirectlyat extended ranges, the fires delivered are notaccurate enough to warrant the largeexpenditure of ammunition required toperform this type of mission. To accuratelyemploy aerial rockets, the aircraft, usingrunning fire techniques, have to close with theenemy forces within ranges that make themvulnerable to a multitude of Threat airdefense weapon systems. The loss of theantiarmor capability and the increasedvulnerability dictate that attack helicopters beused in a dedicated fire support role only onrare occasions.

Aerial Mine Delivery. The Army is fielding anaerial mine delivery system. This system givesassault helicopter units the capability to layhasty antitank and antipersonnel minefield.When integrated with the obstacle plan, thefire support plan, and the groundcommander’s scheme of maneuver, this

capability increases the effect of canalizing anddefeating the Threat force.

Aeromedical Evacuation. Aeromedical unitsprovide evacuation for wounded and injuredpersonnel on a mission-by-mission basis.

Command and ControlThe command and control of Army aviationelements rests with the unit commander towhom they are organic, OPCON, or attached.The force commander decides how aviationwill be integrated into his overall battle planand if and when aviation will be used in a firesupport role. When the fires of aviation assetsare integrated into the commander’s schemeof maneuver, both supporting and supportedelements must understand the commander’sintent and purpose for the integration.Coordination between the ground force andthe aviation units ensures that thecommander’s conditions are established andknown by all concerned. These conditionsdescribe the support aviation will provide; andthey assign responsibilities concerning priorityof fires, available munitions, liaison,communications requirements, positioning, andfire planning.

Delivery System CharacteristicsArmy aviation can quickly reach and movethroughout the depth and breadth of thebattlefield. This mobility and flexibility helpthe combined arms commander seize or retainthe initiative. The types of aircraft used in thefire support mission area are categorized asdiscussed below.

Cargo and Utility. These aircraft have theprimary mission of transporting soldiers,weapon systems, ammunition, and suppliesthroughout the battlefield. These units canconduct air assault or air movementoperations. These aircraft allow thecommander to influence the action byintroducing combat power at critical times andcrucial locations to defeat the enemy forces.

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Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance. Theseaircraft serve as the eyes for the commander.They provide near-real-time intelligence andterminal guidance for a variety of weaponsystems; for example, Hellfire andCopperhead.

Attack Helicopters. These aircraft are equippedwith a considerable array of accurate andlethal weapons. They can deliver pinpointdestruction by firing antiarmor missiles orsuppressive area fires with rockets andcannons.

C2for Joint Air Attack Team Operations

Upon receipt of a joint air attack team(JAAT) mission, the aviation commanderassumes responsibility for the coordination andexecution of the JAAT operations. He shouldbe keenly aware of the ground and air tacticalplan.

Air DefenseA representative of the corps and division airdefense coordinator (ADCOORD) usually isin the FS cell. He helps coordinate firesupport for counterair operations. Thisincludes selection and prioritization of Armyoffensive counterair (OCA) and SEAD targets.

Electronic WarfareMission

The mission of electronic warfare is to exploit,disrupt, and deceive the enemy command andcontrol system while protecting friendly use ofcommunications and noncommunicationssystems.

RolesElectronic warfare is an essential element ofcombat power. In addition to itsintelligence-producing capability, it isconsidered a nonlethal attack means. As such,

it is a key resource to be integrated andsynchronized with fire support assets insupport of the battle plan. It can, whenintegrated into the overall concept ofoperation, confuse, deceive, delay, disorganize,and locate the enemy. It can delay the enemylong enough for the force commander toexploit a situation that otherwise would havebeen missed. Jamming, in particular, providesa nonlethal alternative or supplement to attackby fire and maneuver. It is especially wellsuited for targets that cannot be located withtargeting accuracy or that require onlytemporary disruption. Electronic warfare hastwo facets, offensive and defensive.

Offensive Electronic Warfare. Offensive EW isthe employment of assets to disrupt or denythe enemy’s effective use of his electronicsystems. It consists of electronic supportmeasures ( E S M ) a n d e l e c t r o n i ccountermeasures (ECM). Generally, ESMproduce combat information that can be usedfor attack by ECM, fire, or maneuver withlittle systematic analysis or processing. TheECM consist of jamming and deception. Onefunction of jamming is to degrade the enemy’scombat power by denying effective operationsin the electromagnetic spectrum. Anotherfunction of jamming is to reduce the signalsecurity of enemy operators and thereby gaininformation through ESM. Jamming may besubtle and difficult to detect, or it may beovert and obvious. It can be done from bothaerial and ground platforms. Electronicdeception is used to deceive enemy forcesthrough their own electronic systems. Itprovides false information to the enemythrough electronic devices to induce him to actin accordance with the supported battlefieldcommander’s desires. It is integrated with,extends, and reinforces tactical deceptionoperations.

Defensive Electronic Warfare. Defensive EWconsists of those actions taken to ensurefriendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

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NOTE: Although all these components of EW areof significant interest to the fire support system,the intent of this discussion is to focus onelectronic countermeasures as an attack means.See FM 34-1 and FM 34-40 for more detailed in-formation.

Command and ControlElectronic warfare assets are in militaryintelligence (MI) units at all levels and inother services. The electronic warfare section(EWS) is the staff element at corps anddivision that coordinates the employment ofECM. The EWS falls under the staffsupervision of the G3. The G3, in coordinationwith the G2 and the MI brigade or battalion,is responsible for the integration of ECM intothe fire and maneuver scheme. The EWScontrols jamming directed at high-payofftargets and targets of opportunity whileminimizing jamming effects on friendly systemsand operations. The EWS, the FS cell, and theG3 section operate together to plan the attackof high-payoff targets to support thecommander’s battle plan. The use of ECMshould always be considered when deciding toattack a particular target. More importantly,the synchronized, simultaneous use of ECMand lethal attack means requires the EWS tomaintain a close, continuing workingrelationship with the FS cell. The best meansof ensuring a close working relationshipbetween the EWS and the FS cell is tocollocate them.

Jamming CharacteristicsThe ECM system consists primarily ofjamming. This jamming can be divided intocommunications and noncommunicationsjamming.

Communications Jamming. Communicationsjamming interferes with enemycommunications systems. It may be applied tosecure communications systems to force the

enemy to transmit in the clear so that thecommunications can be exploited for combatinformation. Jamming can also aid in directionfinding. It forces the enemy to transmit longer,allowing time for tip-off and multiple locatorcueing from different locations for positiondetermination. Radiation jamming againstcommunications equipment is done by use ofspot, sweep, or barrage jamming.

Noncommunications Jamming. Noncommuni-cations jamming consists primarily ofreradiation jamming. It is directed against suchelectronic devices as radars, navigational aids,guidance systems, and proximity fuzes todisrupt them. It causes those systems toreceive false information and targets, therebydegrading system effectiveness. Reradiationjamming is done by the use of specialequipment to receive enemy transmissions,change them in some way, and retransmit thesignal back to the enemy.

Effectiveness. Jamming effectiveness isgoverned primarily by the distance of thetarget receiver from the jammer and thedistance between the transmitter and thereceiver of the targeted enemycommunications. Jammers are high-prioritytargets for destruction. Because of theirhigh-power output and unique electronicsignature, they are relatively easy to detect andlocate. Jammers have to move for survivabilityand to maintain favorable transmission pathsagainst enemy radios, which are moving as thebattle progresses.

Naval Fire SupportApplication

When naval fire support is available and thegeneral tactical situation permits its use, navalfirepower can provide large volumes ofdevastating, immediately available, andinstantly responsive fire support to combatforces operating near coastal waters. Thesefires may be in support of amphibious

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operations within range of naval aircraft andgunfire, but they also may be made availableto support land operations:

MissionThe general mission of navalsupport maneuver force

fire support is tooperations by

destroying, neutralizing, or suppressing enemytargets that oppose our forces. Naval firesupport may be provided by naval gunfire andnaval air power. Usually, it is delivered inconcert with supporting fires from other arms.

Naval Gunfire ShipsNaval gunfire ships are assigned one of twomissions – direct support or general support.Relationships between assigned ships andsupported ground force units are based onlimited, delegated responsibility. For example,a ship placed in support provides therequested fire within its capability, but shippositioning and method of delivery are at thediscretion of the ship captain. The supportedground force unit selects the targets, thetiming of fires on the targets, and theadjustment of fires.

Direct Support. A ship in direct support (DS) ofa specific troop unit delivers both planned andcall fires. Call fires are to the ship what targetsof opportunity are to artillery units. A navalgunfire spotter with the supported unitconducts and adjusts call fires. Call fires alsomay be adjusted by a naval gunfire air spotter.Members of the air and naval gunfire liaisoncompany (ANGLICO) are specially trained inconducting naval gunfire. However, theprocedures are simplified and standardized sothat any trained supporting arms observer caneffectively adjust the fire of a ship. Navalgunfire (NGF) DS is not the same as fieldartillery (FA) DS. A direct support ship willrespond to calls for fire from units other thanthe supported unit when ordered to do so bythe fire support group commander, thedivision naval gunfire officer, or the brigadeNGLO.

General Support. General support (GS) missionsare assigned to ships supporting units ofbrigade size or larger. The normal procedureis for the fires of the GS ship to be adjustedby an aerial observer or for the liaison officer(LO) to assign the fires of the ship to abattalion spotter for fire missions. In the lattercase, on completion of the mission, the shipreverts to general support. Prearranged firesare delivered in accordance with a schedule offires.

CapabilitiesMobility. Within the limits imposed byhydrographic conditions, the naval gunfire shipmay be positioned for the best support of theground force. The ability of the ship tomaneuver is an important factor in planningfor support of separated forces. It also allowsselection of the most favorable gun-target(GT) line.

Ammunition Variety. The variety of projectiles,powder charges, and fuzes permits selection ofoptimum combinations for the attack oftargets. Fuzes, for example, can be set toprovide for air, surface, or subsurfacedetonation of rounds.

Muzzle Velocity. The high muzzle velocity andrelatively flat trajectory of the naval gun makeit suitable for direct fire or assault fire,particularly against materiel targets that mustbe penetrated or destroyed and that present avertical face.

Rates of Fire. The large volume of fire that canbe delivered in a relatively short time is adistinct advantage in delivering neutralizationfires. For example, the 5-inch/54-caliber gunhas a rate of fire of 35 rounds per minute atthe maximum rate and 20 rounds per minuteat the sustained rate.

Deflection Pattern. The normal dispersionpattern is narrow in deflection and long inrange. Very close supporting fire can be

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delivered when the GT line is parallel to thefront line. This pattern also permits effectivecoverage of such targets as roads and runwayswhen the GT line coincides with the long axisof the target.

LimitationsFlat Trajectory. The relatively flat trajectory ofnaval gunfire results in a large range probableerror. Therefore, the dispersion pattern of thenaval gun is roughly elliptical, with the longaxis in the direction of fire. Before selectingnaval gunfire as the proper fire support means,the FSCOORD must consider the GT lineand its relation to the forward line of owntroops (FLOT).

Hydrography. The hydrographic conditions ofthe sea area in which the naval gunfire shipmust operate may be unfavorable. It maycause undesirable firing positions or requirefiring at longer ranges.

Fixing of Ship Position. The accuracy of navalgunfire depends on the accuracy with whichthe position of the firing ship has been fixed,Navigational aids, prominent terrain features,or radar beacons emplaced on the shore maybe used to compensate for this limitation.

Weather and Visibility. Bad weather and poorvisibility make it difficult to determine theposition of the ship by visual means andreduce the observer’s opportunities forlocating targets and adjusting fires. Badweather also might force the ship out to sea.

Changing Gun-Target Line. If the ship is firingwhile under way, the line of fire in relation tothe frontline may change. This could requirecancellation of the fire mission, because theinherent large range probable errors maycause rounds to endanger friendly forces.

Communications. The sole means ofcommunication between ship and shore isradio. Normally, several nets are established to

control and coordinate the support. Radiocommunications can be interrupted byequipment limitations, enemy EW, andunfavorable atmospheric conditions.

Enemy Action. If the naval gunfire ship comesunder enemy surface, subsurface, and/or airattack, the ship may cancel its fire missionwith the ground forces and try to counter thisthreat.

Magazine Capacity. The shore bombardmentallowance varies with the ship type (600 to1,800 rounds). When the need arises,remaining rounds will be held for self-defenseof the ship.

Naval Gunfire Support PersonnelThe ANGLICO personnel are available toadvise unit commanders from companythrough division levels on how to best use thenaval air and gunfire support available tothem. Liaison personnel can give unitcommanders and FSCOORDs information onweapon ranges, ammunition effects,all-weather bombing capabilities, and landingzone requirements. For maximumeffectiveness, ANGLICO support should beginduring the planning phase of an operation.The ANGLICO task-organized teams shouldbe attached to the units they will support assoon as possible. ANGLICO personnel at alllevels, company through division, are trainedas NGF spotters and/or forward air controllersand can request and control missions for theunits they support. So that, they can move inthe same manner as the unit they support,ANGLICO personnel are trained inparachuting, skiing, snowshoeing, andinflatable rubber boat operations.

Organization of the ANGLICOThe ANGLICO is composed of a companyheadquarters and a division air and navalgunfire liaison team, which includes threebrigade air and naval gunfire platoons. Each

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platoon consists of a brigade air and navalgunfire liaison team, to be located at thebrigade CP, and two supporting arms liaisonteams (SALTS), which can be assigned to anytwo of the maneuver battalions in the brigade.Each SALT contains a liaison section, to belocated at the battalion CP, and two firepowercontrol teams (FCTs), which can be assignedto any two companies in the battalion.

Division. At division level, the ANGLICOprovides its commander, a Marine lieutenantcolonel who functions as the naval gunfireofficer (NGO) in the division main FS cell,and the deputy commander, a Marine major

who functions as the naval aviation liaisonofficer (NALO) in the TACP.

Brigade. The brigade air and naval gunfireliaison team provides an air officer (a Marinemajor) and an NGLO to the brigade CP.Normally, they are located with the brigadeFS cell.

Battalion and Company. Two battalions may beassigned SALTS. The SALT controls andcoordinates naval firepower at the battalion FScell and oversees two FCTs. The FCTconducts naval air and gunfire missions atcompany level.

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Nuclear and Chemical SupportNuclear and chemical weapons can supportoperations throughout the AirLand battlefield,but the targets and tactical considerations varywith each operation. These weapons can beused to support either offensive or defensiveoperations. Nuclear and chemical weaponsenhance close operations by increasing thecapability of combat forces to control theFLOT. In deep operations, nuclear andchemical weapons can be used to retainfreedom of action for our own forces.However, use in rear operations should beviewed as the least likely application ofnuclear and chemical weapons.

Command and ControlAt the heart of nuclear and chemical weaponsemployment is command and control.Continuous positive control over thesemunitions is imperative; but at the same time,they must be responsive to the fire supportrequirements of the operational and tacticalcommanders. The corps is the focal point fortactical nuclear weapons employment.

PlanningThe planning process is continuous andcongruent. The focus of nuclear and chemicalplanning at any level is command guidance.Amplifying guidance, as well as changes andmodifications to the original written commandguidance, may be generated by the staffs andcommanders when required by the evolvingbattlefield situation. Command guidanceincludes the following:

Intent of nuclear and chemical weapons use.This includes specific guidance concerningtype of casualties desired, amount andduration of contamination, desired coveragepercentage, and degree of assurancerequired.

Synchronization with other attack meansand the scheme of maneuver.

Target priorities.

Acquisition of enemy targets.

Nuclear and chemical weapons employmentlimitations and preclusions.

Impact on future friendly operations.

Decision points.

Contingency plans.

Coordination with adjacent, supporting, andaffected units.

Delivery unit and weapon system status.

Availability and location of munitions.

Response time for execution.

Strike warning to friendly units.

Civil affairs.

Damage assessment.

Nuclear Weapons EmploymentConsiderations

When authority is granted, the long range andflexibility of nuclear fires make it possible toshift the focus and concentration rapidly overwide ranges. The commander can use nuclearweapons to support his scheme of maneuver;to mass fires rapidly without shifting maneuverforces; and to delay, disrupt, or destroy enemyforces in depth. Commanders can use nuclearfires to destroy, neutralize, or suppress surfacetargets including enemy weapons, formations,and facilities. Nuclear fires have the potentialto be the principal means of destroying enemyforces. The scheme of maneuver will besynchronized to exploit the effects of thenuclear fires.

Tactics, techniques, and technical proceduresare established for each type of deliverysystem. Artillery systems can be placed in ahigh state of readiness to expedite their

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delivery of nuclear munitions. Cannon artillery,because of range limitations, normally isemployed close to the FLOT. Theresponsiveness of the cannon system dependson the type and configuration of warhead usedand the location of the system in relation tothe target. The responsiveness of missilesystems is based on the status of warheadmating and location. The employment meansselected for a mission is based on the factorsof rnission enemy, terrain and weather, troopsand time available (METT-T). However,nuclear fires normally are integrated withconventional fires and smart munitions as wellas maneuver forces.

Nuclear-capable units are high-value targets.The enemy will use every means available todestroy them. To counter this, nuclear-capableunits must deploy early and be dispersedthroughout the battle area. Emphasis must beplaced on deception, cover, concealment,security, and the prevention of targeting by theenemy. Increased reliance on a combination ofdispersion, hardening, movement, anddeception will also improve their survivability.Depth of positioning is a command decision. Itmust be based on the factors of METT-T andweighed against the associated risk. Artillery inthe forward area is most vulnerable todetection and destruction; therefore, dispersionand concealment are critical. Nuclear assetsmust be survivable so that, when required,they are available to execute nuclear fire plansin a timely manner.

While nuclear weapons may be employedsingly in certain situations, they normally areemployed as part of a package. A package isdefined as a discrete grouping of nuclearweapons by specific yields designed foremployment in a specified area during aspecified period of time and for a specificpurpose. Packages may be designed to supportstrategic, operational, and tactical objectives;and they are planned as far in advance aspossible to meet potential battlefield situations.A package is identified and treated as a single

entity. A subpackage is planned and/ordeveloped at the division and meets the samecriteria as a corps package. The subpackageplan is forwarded to the corps for inclusion inthe corps package. The number and type ofweapons in a package vary depending on thelevel of command at which it is developed, thethreat, the rnission, the terrain, and populationcharacteristics. For a further discussion ofpackaging, see Appendix B.

Chemical Weapons EmploymentConsiderations

Missions. Chemical munitions give thecommander additional weapons support. Thetactical management of chemical ammunitionis carried out by allocation of and authority toexpend weapons and by prescribing a chemicalammunition load. The FSCOORDrecommends to the commander the chemicalammunition allocations, the authority toexpend, and the basic loads for those weaponsunder the commander’s control.

Allocations. Allocation is the apportionment ofspecific numbers and types of completeammunition rounds to a commander for astated time period. It is a planning factor foruse in the development of war plans. Anallocation lets the subordinate commanderdevelop plans based on the allocation ofchemical ammunition. Additional authority isrequired for the actual dispersal of allocatedweapons to locations desired by thecommander to support his war plans. Theexpenditure of these weapons is not authorizeduntil release by proper authority. Beforereceipt of Presidential release, only allocationof chemical ammunition will be made. WhenPresidential approval is received, the allocatingcommander may designate all or a portion ofthe allocation as an authority to expend.

Authority to Expend. A specific number ofcomplete chemical ammunition roundsauthorized for expenditure by a commander istermed “the authority to expend.” Authority

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may be for a specific period of time, for agiven phase of an operation, or for theaccomplishment of a particular mission. Whenweapons allocation is changed to authority toexpend, the number of weapons fired shouldbe reduced only when absolutely necessary;and notification should be given as early aspossible. Restrictions on the types of targetsthat may be attacked may be specified.Normally, they appear in the operation orderor standing operating procedures (SOP), Anycommander with an authority to expend mayfurther subassign chemical ammunition tounits under his control unless he is instructedotherwise. The authority to expend is relatedto physical possession of chemical ammunition.However, a commander could receive anauthority to expend weapons to be deliveredby aerial means, and the tactical Air Forcewould keep physical custody of the weapons.In accordance with Army doctrine, chemicalweapons are authorized to commanders whorequire and can effectively employ them.

Control. The responsibility for planning,coordinating, and controlling chemicalweapons remains at corps until after releasehas been approved and, most likely, throughthe first retaliation fires. The detailed planningand coordination are done at division. If ourretaliation does not end chemical activities,authority to use chemical munitions can begiven to division and brigade. If release isgiven to brigade, chemical fire planningbecomes a coordinated effort with the S3 andFSCOORD playing the key roles. On the basisof guidance given by the division and brigadecommanders, the brigade FS cell coordinateswith the S2, S3, and chemical officer to selecttargets for engagement. Following approval bythe brigade commander, appropriate nuclearstrike warning (STRIKWARN) messages aredisseminated to higher and lower maneuverheadquarters, FA units, and FS cells.

Mission-Oriented Protective Posture Levels.Mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP)levels provide a standardized method of

specifying the degree of protection requiredfrom nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)threats as determined by the commander.

G3 AirThe G3 air is an integral part of the FS cell atboth corps and division. He has staffresponsibility for the implementation of theArmy air-ground system (AAGS). The G3 airworks closely with the ALO and aviationofficer at division and with the ASOC at corpsin processing air requests. The FSCOORDdepends on the G3 air to add maneuverexpertise to the FS cell by participating in thepreparation and execution of all fire supportplans and orders.

IntelligenceThe all-source production centers (ASPCs) atboth corps and division are closely integratedinto the targeting process through the additionof fire support personnel. There is a need toestablish direct links between the FS cell andthe ASPC. Targeting guidance, established bythe commander, should drive the intelligencetasking to support target production. The G2,the G3, and the FS cell must establishdecision-making procedures to ensure that aproper balance exists between targetproduction and intelligence production. TheUnited States Air Force (USAF) weatherteams at corps and division provideobservation and forecasts of weatherconditions across the battlefield andintelligence preparation of the battlefield(IPB) products. Forecasts include upper airand cloud conditions which affect smartmunitions.

EngineerThe engineer is responsible for advising on theallocation and employment of engineer assetsand the consolidationplans. He has accessand terrain analysis

and support of obstacleto engineer topographicsupport from engineer

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units which may be of value in fire supportplanning. The assistant division engineer(ADE) at division and the assistant corpsengineer (ACE) at corps normally collocatewith the G3. However, they work closely withthe FSCOORD to ensure that all criticalobstacles can be covered by fire. The engineerstaff officer coordinates the planning of familyof scatterable mines (FASCAM) employment(Appendix C). FASCAM is a limited resourcethat must be carefully controlled for maximumeffectiveness. The FSCOORD ensures thatfield artillery units are positioned andmunitions are available to executemissions.

Army Air-GroundSystem

FASCAM

Army liaison to the Air Force begins with thebattlefield coordination element (BCE), whichinterprets the land battle situation for theTACC. The BCE focuses on planning andexecuting the interdiction (BAI) battle, whilethe CAS battle is executed at corps levelthrough the ASOC. The BCE providescoordination channels for the exchange ofintelligence and operational data between theArmy and Air Force components. The BCEcan provide full functional area interface withan Air Force, a Navy, or a Marine CorpsTACC, either unilaterally or simultaneously, toeffect the full synchronization of Armymaneuver and Air Force, Navy, or MarineCorps TACAIR. The BCE is organized in twodivisions, as described below.

Operations Division

The primary duty of the BCE operationsdivision is to synchronize Air Force executionof the interdiction targets requested by Armyforces and to interpret the ground battle forthe supporting Air Force. A fusion sectionvalidates BAI targets and provides battledamage assessment (BDA) to the Army. Italso maintains a constant exchange of current

enemy information with the Army. Anoperations section monitors the execution ofthe air tasking order (ATO) and updates BAItargeting data. Army air defense and airspaceactivities are coordinated with the TACCairspace control center (ACC).

Plans DivisionThe BCE plans division is responsible forintegrating the ground battle planning with theTACC tactical air support planning process.The plans section coordinates Army-plannedrequests for tactical air support, including BAI,planned CAS, EW, and TAR. The product ofthis coordination is an air tasking orderreflecting those TACAIR nominations fromthe Army that the air component commandercan and will execute. The intelligence sectioncoordinates with Army intelligence agencies toget reports and collection requirements. Theairlift section coordinates Army airlift supportrequirements with the airlift control center(ALCC).

Ground Liaison Officer and AirReconnaissance Liaison Officer

The Army further provides liaisonrepresentatives at each tactical fighter andairlift wing operations center supportingground operations. Ground liaison officers(GLOs) and air reconnaissance liaison officers(ARLOs) provide Army expertise to Air Forcewings and the Air Force reconnaissancesquadron. GLOs and ARLOs brief pilots onthe ground tactical situation and debrief pilotsupon return from missions.

Operations Cell of the RearCommand Post

DivisionThe division operations cell of the rear CP hasa fire support officer (FSO) and two fire

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support sergeants to assist in planning for rearoperations. They represent the FSCOORDand are responsible for rear area fire supportplanning and coordination. The FSOcoordinates artillery positioning (whenapplicable) with the rear operations cell;establishes procedures for requesting firesupport to include mortars, artillery, attackhelicopters, and TACAIR; recommends firesupport coordinating measures; and advises therear operations cell in fire support matters. Inheavy divisions, a variable format messageentry device (VFMED) at the rear CPprovides a digital link to the main FS cell andthe division artillery (div arty) CP. All rear CPfire support personnel and equipment areprovided by Reserve Componentaugmentation.

The rear operations (ops) net (FM) providesthe primary communications link between therear CP and the base or base clusters in therear area. Most rear area units also haveaccess to the division multichannelcommunications system (MCS) (or mobilesubscriber equipment [MSE], when fielded).Since there is no dedicated fire support net forrear operations, the FSO must use the rearoperations net or the MCS to plan andcoordinate fires. Regardless of the meanschosen, the FSO must ensure that all rear areaunits, to include the tactical combat force(TCF), are aware of the communicationsprocedures (net, call signs, and so forth) to beused to plan, coordinate, and execute rear areafire support. Bases, base clusters, and responseforces submit their fire support plans to therear area FSO. He collates them andcoordinates the composite rear area firesupport plan with the main FS cell. Calls forfire from a rear element are made to the reararea FSO. He coordinates those requestswithin the operations cell and with other reararea elements and forwards the request to the

main FS cell. The main FS cell determines themost suitable fire support asset available,initiates the request, and notifies the rear FSOof the decision and response.

The TCF designated to interdict and defeatlevel III threat forces normally includessupporting artillery. One net from thesupporting artillery unit may be used as a reararea fire support net, thus improvingresponsiveness and reducing traffic on the rearoperations net.

Corps

The corps operations cell of the rear CP hasan FSE consisting of one FSO, one firesupport sergeant, and a fire support specialistprovided by Reserve Componentaugmentation. The corps rear CP FSE has nodigital interface with the corps main FS cell.The primary communications link betweenbases, base clusters, rear area operationscenters, and the operations cell of the rear CPis MCS. Similar to division, there is nodedicated fire support net for corps rearoperations. If a fire support agency (such as anartillery or aviation unit) is designated tosupport rear operations, one of its nets can beused to plan, coordinate, and execute rear areafire support.

The FSO consolidates fire support plans fromsubordinate rear area operations centers(RAOCs), response forces, and the tacticalcombat force for integration into the overallcorps rear fire support plan. The FSOestablishes procedures for requesting firesupport. In the absence of a designated reararea fire support agency, requests for fire arecoordinated at the operations cell of the rearCP and forwarded to the main FS cell. (SeeChapters 4 and 5 for further discussion.)

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CHAPTER 2

FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING AT CORPS AND DIVISION

This chapter outlines the critical actions that must occur during the firesupport planning process. A tactical scenario explains what theseactions are and how they must occur within the context of a tacticalsituation. The situation is presented as a snapshot view of an armycorps engaged in a mature theater of operations. After describing thecorps decision cycle, targeting guidance, and general corps situation,the scenario focuses on the fire support planning that occurs in one ofthe committed divisions fighting the close battle. Although AirLandBattle doctrine stresses the importance of the corps role in theoperational and tactical levels of warfare, the actual fire supportplanning procedures work in a similar manner at corps and division.Several important aspects of AirLand Battle must be examined as partof the corps fire support planning process. These include:

Deep operations planning using fire support and/or maneuver(Appendix B, Section I).

Suppression of enemy air defenses (Appendix B, Section V).

Rear operations (Appendix B, Section III).

Corps nuclear package planning (Appendix B, Section VI).

Planning PrinciplesFire support planning is the continuousprocess of analyzing, allocating, and schedulingfire support. This chapter lays out thesequence of planning for corps and divisionfire support in a realistic manner in terms oftime and situation. This chapter takes thereader from the time the commander receivesa mission to the production of an operationorder (OPORD). It concentrates on thecoordination between the FSCOORD, the G2,and the G3 that takes place during the firesupport planning process. The user shouldkeep the following principles in mind:

Start planning early, and plan continuously.

Exploit all available targeting assets.

Consider the use of all available fire supportmeans, both lethal and nonlethal.

Follow the commander’s targeting guidance.

Select and use the most effective attackmeans.

Provide adequate fire support.

Avoid unnecessary duplication.

Provide for the safeguarding and surviv-ability of friendly forces and installations.

Use the lowest echelon capable of fur-nishing effective support.

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Furnish the type of support requested.

Consider airspace coordination.

Coordinate fire support with other combatpower multipliers.

Provide rapid coordination.

NOTE: These principles are amplified in FM 6-20.

ScenarioThe 10th (US) Corps is to be deployed withtwo divisions forward, an armored division inthe north, a light infantry division in the south,and a mechanized infantry division in reserve.The corps mission is to defend its sector andto defeat the first-echelon divisions in themain battle area (MBA) and the second-

echelon division and combined arms reservewith deep fires and maneuver. One division in contact is augmented with an armored cavalryregiment; the other, with an armored brigade.The corps reserve has an on-order mission asa counterattack force.

Opposing the corps is a combined arms army(CAA). The army first echelon consists ofthree motorized rifle divisions (MRDs) onseparate avenues of approach. The armysecond echelon consists of a tank division andan independent tank regiment (ITR). The tankdivision will be used as an exploitation force;and the ITR may be used to defeatcounterattacks, or it may be employed as anadditional exploitation force. The assessedmission of the combined arms army is to seizeriver crossings and overrun air bases in the10th (US) Corps rear.

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Decision Cycle

The commander and staff use thedecision-making process to arrive at and toexecute tactical decisions. The decision cycle isdesigned to direct staff functions to provide acoordinated operation plan (order) to achievethe mission in accordance with thecommander’s concept of the operation and hisintent.

The commander and his staff must beginplanning and coordination as soon aspracticable. Often, time becomes the mostcritical factor facing the commander and staffin the decision-making process. The cyclebegins with receipt of higher headquartersguidance 96 hours before execution time ofthe contemplated operation. To ensure thatsubordinate commanders have enough time forplanning, the corps staff must use no morethan one-third of the available time to developand disseminate their plan.

The commander and staff exchangeinformation about the mission, and the staffgives the commander information about thecurrent situation. After that briefing, the corpscommander issues his planning guidance to thestaff. His guidance normally includes attackguidance, priority intelligence requirements(PIR), and his maneuver planning guidance.

The commander’s concept is of majorimportance to the plans cell. Keying on enemyforces and not specific areas on the battlefield,the corps commander and staff use theconcept, together with target value analysis(TVA) and IPB, to determine high-payofftargets and attack guidance. The commander’sattack guidance is the basis for target datacollection, target development, and attackdecisions. Attack execution may remain undercentralized control for specific operations suchas SEAD, Lance, and electronic warfareambushes or BAI attacks. Other missions suchas electronic countermeasures or counterfiremay be centralized.

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The attack guidance format at corps separatesclose and deep operations into three areas ofconcentration

Enemy divisions in contact. These are theresponsibility of the corps or division incontact. The corps gives support to thedivisions; but it may take direct control ofcertain operations such as counterattacks,corps-directed SEAD, or cross-FLOTinsertions.

Enemy follow-on divisions. The primaryarea of responsibility falls beyond thedivision area of operations out to the limitsof the corps area of influence. Corpsdepends on fire support, air power, andnonlethal methods for the attack offollow-on forces in this area.

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Enemy follow-on army. This relates to thecorps area of interest. In this area, the corpsnominates targets to theater army forinclusion in its campaign.

The 10th Corps received a mission forplanning to defend in sector against elementsof a Soviet front. Both the corps commanderand the staff conducted a hasty missionanalysis. Then the corps commander issuedplanning guidance to the staff. His guidanceincluded initial PIR and attack guidance asfollows:

“Our mission is to defeat the first-echelonCAA of the front in our sector. Since theenemy may commit the army by echelon,plan for using the forward divisions todefeat the first-echelon divisions. We must

FM 6-20-30

identify the location of the main effortearly so we can effectively counter it. Ourintel must also watch for the timing andlocations of commitment of the follow-onarmy to the CAA. We cannot allow it tocommit while we’re still fully employedwith the CAA. If it becomes a threat,delay it 24 hours. Work up some optionsin accordance with the guidance, andprovide a recommendation in 12 hours.”

Having received the above planning guidance,the staff begins staff estimates, initialcoordination, and course-of-actiondevelopment. The FSCOORD and his planner,in conjunction with the G2, G3, ALO, Armyaviation, engineers, EW, ADCOORD, andlogistics, make a fire support estimate for eachcourse of action, to include tentative attackguidance.

Approximately 64 hours before the operation,the corps plans officer presents the staff’scourses of action and recommendations to thecommander for decision.

After receiving the corps commander’sdecision, the staff issues a warning order andbegins preparing an OPORD. The fire supportplanner prepares the Fires paragraph of thefire support annex and the fire support taskorganization portion of the OPORD. (SeeAppendix D.) He continues close coordinationwith those staff sections listed above to ensurethat the plan remains synchronized with thedeveloping situation.

As the corps planners complete and publishthe OPORD, it is transferred to the divisionsabout 50 hours before execution. The OPORDis modified as the situation dictates.

Division Commander’s Actionson Receipt of the Mission

Tactical planning begins with the assignment ofa mission or with the commander’s recognitionof a requirement. In this case, the light

division commander has been assigned hismission. On return to the division, and beforeconducting his mission analysis, thecommander needs information from his staff.In particular, he requires the G2’s analysis ofthe battlefield areas (see FM 34-l). He willalso ask for information from other staffmembers so he can analyze the mission anddetermine its key elements. He must deduce –

What must be done.

What tasks are specified in the mission.

What implied tasks are required toaccomplish the mission.

After studying the corps OPORD and thebattlefield area analysis and analyzing thethreat, the division commander identifies thepurpose of the division operation and thecorps commander’s intent. He then identifiesthe specified and implied tasks in theOPORD. He further identifies the tasks thatare essential to the accomplishment of hismission. The division commander then restatesthe division mission and gives planningguidance to his staff.

FSCOORD’s Actions onReceipt of the Mission

While the division commander is conductinghis mission analysis, the FSCOORD makes hispreliminary analysis of the fire supportmission. He studies the corps OPORD, keyingon his specific areas of responsibility. He mustidentify specified and implied fire supporttasks that are in the OPORD as well as factorsthat must be considered when planningcourses of action with the G3.

Factors that should be considered whendeveloping offensive and defensive courses ofaction are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Asthe FSCOORD is collecting information thatwill affect the performance of the fire supportmission, he should list them under theMETT-T headings as discussed below.

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MissionThe mission statement used in the estimateshould be a brief statement of thecommander’s intent and should detail allspecified and implied tasks. The value of theestimate largely depends on the correctdefinition of the mission, which should give, insimple terms, a full picture of the desiredresult. If the mission statement is wrong, thecommander’s intention may not be achieved.

NOTE: At this stage, the FSCOORD does nothave the commander’s restated mission to use.However, he does have the corps OPORD. Fromthis, he deduces the tasks to be performed by thedivision and for which he must provide fire sup-port.

EnemyMost of the required Threat informationcomes from the division G2 and theintelligence annex to the corps OPORD(which the FSCOORD should have). A fieldartillery intelligence officer (FAIO) is in thedivision fire support element. Through him,the FSCOORD should give the FS cell acontinuous flow of information from the G2’sIPB and the situation development and targetdevelopment processes. The FSCOORD alsogets enemy information from the commander’splanning guidance when he issues it. The typeof Threat information the FSCOORD mustget from the G2 is outlined in FM 6-20-10.

Terrain and WeatherThe corps G2’s analysis of the battlefield area,begun long before hostilities, provides most ofthe terrain and weather effects on the enemyand friendly courses of action. The division G2uses the corps G2’s analysis, supplemented byIPB information pertinent to the division. Theanalysis includes contributions from theengineer’s terrain study, climatological studies,and weather forecasts. The FSCOORD must

obtain, through the FAIO, comprehensiveterrain studies and weather forecasts. Heconsiders how these factors affect weaponsystems employment for deep, close, and rearoperations.

Troops AvailableAt this stage, the FSCOORD is mainlyconcerned with ensuring that all fire supportresources available to the division areconsidered throughout the development of thecourses of action. He researches the corpsOPORD to ascertain the following:

Assigned, attached, and OPCON maneuverunits available for commitment.

The corps field artillery organization forcombat and priority of support.

The allocation of air support.

Combat service support resources availablefor the operation.

The G3 works on a similar list against whichthe FSCOORD should compare his own.Once developed, this force list is a constantfor each course of action developed by theG3. It does not preclude the FSCOORD fromrequesting additional resources at a later date,if required.

TimeThe only information available for theFSCOORD to use at this stage comes fromthe corps OPORD. The OPORD may includethe corps commander’s requirements for whenarea reconnaissance can begin, when the forceis to have completed the preparation ofdivision defensive areas, movement timings,anticipated phase timings, or the time bywhich the force must be ready in all respects.As the planning process progresses, theFSCOORD will gain more information thatwill allow him to consider the time factor inrelation to the tasks outlined in Appendix A,Section III.

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Commander’s Planning GuidanceOnce the commander has completed hismission analysis, he restates the mission andissues his planning guidance to the staff fortheir consideration when preparing individualstaff estimates. Among other things, hisguidance should include information ofparticular concern to the FSCOORD on thefollowing:

His perceptions of the most dangerous typesof targets. The FSCOORD should groupthese as follows:

Close support.Counterfire.

Interdiction.

SEAD.

Offensive counterair.

What he expects the fire support system tocontribute to the operation in the way of –

Supporting forces in contact.

Providing fire support that is immediatlyresponsive to the-force commander.

Synchronizing with the scheme ofmaneuver.

Sustaining the fire support effort.

Specific constraints on the employment offire support resources.

Example Mission Restatement and GuidanceAn example of how the division commandermay go about restating the mission and issuingplanning guidance is discussed below.

Commander’s Intent. The commander’s intent isstated as follows:

“I intend to defend well forward in sectorwith a strong covering force in order todefeat the MRD and set the preconditionsfor offensive operations.”

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Restated Mission. The restated mission is:“On order, the division establishes acovering force east of the BLUE River.On D-day, H-hour, conducts defensiveoperations in the security area and theMBA to destroy the first-echelon assaultregiments. Defends in sector in the highlyrestrictive terrain west of the BLUE Riverto hold the second-echelon regiments inplace as a fixing force in front of the corpscounterattack by the 22d Division.Supports corps offensive plan on order.”

NOTE: The restated mission now becomes thebasis for the commander’s and staff estimates. ItIs paragraph 1 of these estimates, whether oral orwritten. During the estimate process, the restatedmission may be refined and changed as required.The commander makes the final decision on whatthe mission statement will contain.

Constraints. The commander also noted thefollowing constraints from the corps OPORD:

“Use of the ACR is restricted to thecovering force operation and defense ofthe intermediate position.

“No ground maneuver across the REDRiver is authorized without approval fromcorps headquarters.”

FSCOORD’S Considerations. Based on thecommander’s planning guidance, the factorsdiscussed below are samples of those theFSCOORD would consider during planning.

The FSCOORD would consider destruction ofthe enemy fire support system before he hasthe bulk of his artillery within range of ourdefensive positions. This means that deeptarget acquisition and attack of counterfiretargets before and during the covering forceoperation must be considered. Also, theFSCOORD should consider the possibility of anight infiltration into the enemy flank to

interdict his C3 and lines of communication(LOCs). The FSCOORD coordinates with theG2 to focus surveillance and target acquisitionassets to locate and identify Threatsecond-echelon units. Once the units areidentified, the attack decision is confirmed,depending on the situation at the time.Nuclear fire plans must be submitted to corpswell in advance to facilitate execution byreinforcing corps artillery.

In general, the FSCOORD concentratesplanning efforts initially on the covering forceand intermediate position battles. Then hefocuses on coordinating the MBA defense. Healso should consider using the division aviationbrigade to attack high-payoff targets in depth.In this type of operation, ammunition stocksmust be pre-positioned for each phase of theoperation. The division is responsible forsupply of ammunition to artillery units organicto the separate armored brigade and the ACR.The FSCOORD coordinates with the G4 toensure that the required ammunition can bepositioned in time.

Possible Courses of ActionDuring his mission analysis, the commandermay have considered some possible courses ofaction. If so, he would state them at this point.In this example, the division commander gavethe staff courses of action to consider. The G3is responsible for developing at least one otheralternative for comparison. An explanation ofhow he goes about this task and the part theFSCOORD must play are in Appendix B. Inthe meantime, there is much the FSCOORDand his staff can do to begin the fire supportestimate, to prepare to help the G3 in hisdevelopment of the courses of action, and toprepare the subsequent analysis of thosecourses of action.

Staff Actions

While the G3 and G2 are collecting infor-mation from the IPB for use in development

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of courses of action, the FSCOORD and hisstaff must continue collecting information andlisting the factors of METT-T that will affectthe provision of fire support. The FSCOORDshould have gained an initial appreciation ofthe situation from the intelligence annex to thecorps OPORD, the commander’s missionanalysis, planning guidance, and the divisionG2’s situation and target developmentprocesses. These processes give thecommander and staff the intelligence neededto fight the AirLand Battle. Each is a distincttask, yet both must be integrated totally toprovide an accurate picture of the battlefield.Both tasks incorporate IPB and focus on thecommander’s areas of operation and interest.The G2 uses IPB to produce a description ofenemy force disposition on the battlefield interms of location, size, type, direction and rateof movement, and activity.

Situation DevelopmentSituation development provides an estimate ofenemy intentions in the following form:

Knowledge of the weather and terrainthroughout the areas of operation andinterest.

Knowledge of the enemy, to include:

Organization.

Equipment.

Tactics (how he fights).

Strengths and weaknesses of hisdispositions.

Capabilities, limitations, and patterns ofparticular units.

Operational, technical, and humanweaknesses.

Intentions.

Probable reactions.

Target DevelopmentBased on situation development, targetdevelopment is the process of providing directcombat information, targeting data, andcorrelated targeting information tocommanders and fire support means. It givesthe commander timely and accurate locationsof enemy high-payoff targets that are predictedto impact on current or projected operations.Targeting data must be accurate enough tosupport effective attack by fire, maneuver, orelectronic means. (The target numberingsystem is discussed in Appendix E.)

Staff EstimatesOnce the commander has given his guidanceand the courses of action have beendeveloped, the staff can begin to prepareestimates. It must be kept in mind that thedifferent staff elements and the personnelassociated with them have widely disparatefunctions and responsibilities and that they areoften separated by great distances. Therefore,for successful mission accomplishment, theymust effect constant coordination and keepeach other aware of the requirements.

The G3 is the focal point during the estimateprocess, and he is responsible for ensuringcoordination between the different staffs. Theways in which the different estimates affect thefire support estimate are outlined in FM 6-20.Here we will discuss only the fire supportestimate.

Fire Support EstimateThe fire support estimate is an informalprocedure that yields a dynamic mentalprocess that may or may not be written downby the FSCOORD. It helps him to integrateand synchronize the employment of firesupport resources within the fire supportsystem and with the force scheme ofmaneuver.

The fire support estimate is a realisticappraisal of the effort required to support the

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operation. It serves as a basis for identifyingpriority fire support requirements.

Any variable which could affect the mission isa factor. Before starting the estimate, allrelevant information must be collected fromall available sources. Once this information hasbeen assembled and the factors that couldaffect the plan have been identified, theyshould be listed and arranged in priority.Examples of the factors that may beconsidered are as follows:

The task organization of subordinate forcesand their missions.

The availability of field artillery resources,including cannons, multiple launch rocketsystems (MLRSs), missiles, ammunition(conventional, nuclear, and chemical), andtarget acquisition assets.

The availability of other fire supportresources, including mortars, NGF, tacticalair support, and Army aviation support.Also included are EW and otherintelligence-controlled surveillance assets.

In the attack, the enemy dispositions(including frontage and depth), the degreeof protection afforded the enemy, objectivesfor subordinate forces or units, the numberof phases, and the likely frontage and depthof the assault. These will affect theallocation of fire support resources tosubordinate units.

In the defense, the mission of the coveringforce, the frontage and depth of the mainbattle area, the contingencies forcounterattack, and considerations for deepand rear operations.

The speed of movement to contact andwithdrawal.

In light forces, the force antiarmor plan.

Courses open to the enemy artillerycommander, especially his most probable

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course of action. These are derived fromthe intelligence estimate and knowledge ofenemy artillery doctrine. Consideration ofthis factor results in –

The probable enemy artillery plan.

Enemy artillery vulnerabilities.

Enemy nuclear and chemical capabilityand posture.

Any information requirements on enemyartillery which have significant influenceon the tasking of weapons-locatingsensors.

The allocation of resources, weapons, andmunitions for counterfire.Measures to reduce the vulnerability ofour force.

The recommended counterfire prioritiesfor each phase of the battle (by thedesignation of critical friendly zones andenemy weapon systems).

The enemy EW situation.

The identification of high-payoff targets(derived from TVA and IPB).The commander’s information requirements(derived from the intelligence estimate).The availability and condition of roads,trails, and likely position areas. This leads tothe coordination of movement and positionareas with the operations staff.Ammunition consumption factors (type andquantity), pre-positioning requirements, andpriority of combat service support (CSS).The effects of survey and meteorological(met) upper air data and forecast weatherconditions on the ability to guarantee timelyand accurate fire support (to includeweapon and target acquisition assets).

The reliability and range of communi-cations.

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The time required for positioningtechnical preparation to engage targets.

The time to be ready to supportoperation.

and

the

Development of an initial nuclear analysisbased on preclusion-oriented target analysismethodology.

Formulation of corps nuclear packages ordivision subpackages (area, yield or numberof weapons, time) for each contingency asidentified by the G3.

Allocation of nuclear weapons for corpspackages and division subpackages.

Development of plans to prevent collateraldamage.Development of a schedule of nuclearstrikes in a package area. This includespreinitiation avoidance and joint schedulingof nuclear targets.

Target-oriented method of target analysisusing latest intelligence for refinement ofaimpoints.Transmission of warning order tonuclear-capable units alerting them ofpending nuclear strike(s).Maintenance and revision of Threat list ascurrent intelligence becomes available.

The availability of nuclear weapons at firingunits.

The distribution of and accountability forthese nuclear weapons.

MissionAs mentioned earlier, the mission statement inthis case is that of the division to besupported. The FSCOORD also should list theconstraints that were noted from the corpsOPORD, commander’s planning guidance andintent, and known factors that could affectperformance of the mission.

Situation and Coursesof Action

Tactical SituationThe FSCOORD must know the intendeddispositions of the major elements of thesupported force at the beginning of theoperation and at those stages of the operationwhen reassessment of fire support tasks maybe required. He gains this information duringthe G3’s development of each course of actionand from resultant sketches. The FSCOORDshould establish any special fire supportrequirements needed at the beginning of theoperation and at each subsequent stage.Intelligence preparation of the battlefield, thetarget development process, and the scheme ofmaneuver provide the factors to be consideredby the FSCOORD and his staff whenproducing a fire support plan. The IPB andthe target development process are theresponsibility of the G2, who is also chargedwith the dissemination of the data theyprovide. The FSCOORD plays a vital part inthe target development process by conductingTVA and advising on the most suitable firesupport assets with which to attack specifictargets. For more detailed information, refer toFM 34-1 and FM 6-20-10.

Tactical Courses of ActionThe commander’s restated mission andplanning guidance may indicate a number ofpossible courses of action for the scheme ofmaneuver. If not, they are developed duringthe G3’s operations estimate and passed on toother staff. The FSCOORD must consider thefactors that affect each course, in turn, todetermine whether it can be supportedeffectively with fire support. Examples offactors that should be considered in thedefense and offense are given in Appendix B.

Logistics and CommunicationsFactors that affect fire support logistics andcommunications will arise during consideration

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of other factors that affect the mission. Theseshould be listed and resolved during theplanning process. Occasionally, a separateestimate may be necessary to determinewhether a particular course of action can besupported logistically.

Analysis of Courses of ActionThe FSCOORD and the other staff officersmust work together to analyze the courses ofaction. The FSCOORD should have alreadyprepared for the analysis stage by examiningeach course of action as explained above.During the joint consideration of factorsaffecting each course of action, thesepersonnel war-game each course againstprobable enemy actions to see how the battlewill progress. They visualize the battle indepth to determine how deep attacks cansupport the plan. They fight each action up toand including mission accomplishment todetermine the risks involved and the probablesuccess of each course. The FSCOORD’sprevious assessment of the courses may causehim to advise against those that prove to beimpractical from a fire support point of view.To do this, he must mentally–

Attack emerging targets with the mosteffective system.

Determine the tasks and requirements forall fire support resources.

Consider proper distribution of assets forclose support of maneuver elements, forcounterfire, for interdiction, and for SEAD.

Visualize the indirect-fire-unit movementsrequired to follow the battle flow.

Consider logistic needs and their impact onthe battle.

As the war gaming progresses, the FSCOORDformulates a list of advantages and dis-advantages of each course from a fire supportpoint of view. Then each course of action is

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listed and followed by a concise statement ofits advantages and disadvantages.

Comparison of Courses of ActionAfter the analysis, the G3, G2, andFSCOORD compare the advantages anddisadvantages of each course of action todetermine which promises to be mostsuccessful. The result of this consideration is arecommendation to the commander to be usedas a basis for deciding his concept of theoperation.

RecommendationThe FSCOORD translates the recommendedcourse of action selected by the G3, G2, andhimself into a recommendation that normallyis presented informally. It is actually astatement which addresses the following:

Allocation of fire support resources.

Artillery organization for combat.

Command and control relationships.

Priority of effort.

Commander’s Concept of theOperation

After all courses of action have beenwar-gamed and analyzed and their advantages,disadvantages, and risks have been identified,the commander decides which course of actionto follow. He then states his concept of theoperation in his completed estimate. Includedare his decisions on who performs elements ofthe mission and his intent during all phases ofthe operation. His concept and intent form thebasis for paragraph 3a, Concept of Operation,in the operation order. The commander’s staff,to include the FSCOORD, now have thenecessary information to examine their areasof responsibility in detail and to prepareoperation plans and/or orders for thecommander’s approval.

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Discussion of Concept ofOperation Paragraph

This is a statement of the commander’s intentwhich expands why the force has been taskedto do the mission stated in paragraph 2. It tellswhat results are expected; how these resultsfacilitate future operations; and how, in broadterms, the commander visualizes achievingthose results (force as a whole). The concept isstated in enough detail to ensure appropriateaction by subordinates in the absence of addi-tional communications or further instructions.The who that will accomplish the concept ofoperation will be In subparagraphs to paragraph3a. Style is not emphasized, but the conceptstatement should not exceed five or SiX senten-ces written or personally approved by the com-mander. If an operation overlay is used, it isreferenced here; however, the concept state-ment must be present as paragraph 3a and onthe overlay.

After the concept of the operation has beenformalized, the G3, G2, and FSCOORDproduce a tentative high-payoff target matrix.This matrix provides further guidance to theelements engaged in targeting and allows themto prioritize the acquisition and engagementefforts. The FSCOORD also must finalize –

The allocation and positioning of firesupport assets.

Plans for the provision of target acquisitionassets, survey, and met support tosubordinate units.

Logistic support for subordinate units.

Orders and PlansAn operation order is a commander’s directiveto subordinate commanders for the purpose ofeffecting the coordinated execution of anoperation. For clarity and efficiency, theseorders follow a specific format as described in

FM 101-5. Fire support directives arepublished as discussed below.

Fire Support PlanThe fire support plan contains the informationnecessary for understanding how fire supportwill be used to support an operation. It is asubparagraph of paragraph 3 of the OPORD.It should include a subparagraph for each typeof fire support involved. Nuclear fire supportand chemical fire support usually warrant theirown subparagraphs under fire support.Appropriate fire support liaison representativesprepare their respective paragraphs. TheFSCOORD combines these subparagraphs intothe fire support plan. If the fire support planincludes a target list, it reflects only thosetargets the commander thinks are critical to hisoperations. See Appendix D for an example ofa division fire support plan. The FSCOORDmust also ensure that the fire support plangives enough commander’s guidance to ensuresufficient information is available for FAautomatic data processing (ADP) systems (forexample, all commander’s criteria inputs forthe tactical fire direction system [TACFIRE]).

Annex to the OPORDIf the operation requires lengthy or detailedplans or if paragraph 3 becomes unwieldy, afire support annex to the OPORD may beprepared. It amplifies the instructions in thefire support plan.

Appendixes to the AnnexSpecific support plans for each’ type of firesupport (FA support plan, air support plan,nuclear support plan, and chemical supportplan) are prepared, as needed, to amplify thefire support plan.

Enclosures to an AppendixDepending on the plan, overlays, target lists,and schedules may be attached for clarity andamplification.

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Target Overlay. This overlay is a display oftargets, fire support coordinating measures(see Appendix F), and positions forindirect-fire weapons. The planner uses it tohelp resolve duplication, evaluate the adequacyof planned support in relation to battle plans,and determine the most appropriate unit(s) toattack each target.

Target List. This is a compilation of targetingdata prepared in support of an operation. Itcontains data extracted from the target listwork sheet. It contains only targeting datarequired for the computation of technicalfiring data. Automatic data processing alsoprovides a fire plan target list.

Schedule. Schedules contain the sameinformation shown on the scheduling worksheets. However, schedules are in a formatthat is easier to duplicate and transmit tofiring units. Automatic data processingprovides targets for the schedule of fires.

Changes. Any changes to TACFIRE SOP maybe attached as an enclosure.

Tabs to EnclosuresTabs to enclosures may include sensor taskingsfor –

Moving-target-locating radar (MTLR).

Weapons-locating radar (WLR).

Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).

Aerial fire support observer (AFSO).

Observation posts (OPs).

Combat observation/lasing team (COLT).

NOTE: The complete fire support planning se-quence is shown in the flow chart on the nextpage.

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CHAPTER 3

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Most operations envisioned for US Army corps and divisions will bejoint operations. During these joint operations, a significant portion offire support will be provided by other services. Similarly, Army corpsand divisions will be required to provide fires to support thoseservices. Previous chapters explained the duties of fire supportpersonnel of other services. This chapter explains the specificprocedures that FSCOORDs at corps and division use to coordinatetire support in joint operations. This chapter presents discussions onthe several aspects of joint operations as follows:

USAF air support.

Amphibious operations.

Suppression of enemy air defenses.

Joint fire support communications.

USAF Air SupportThe USAF provides tactical air support to theArmy as one of its primary missions. Thetactical air control system and the Armyair-ground system bring together the Air Forceand Army components to conduct tactical airsupport for the Army and SEAD support forArmy aviation and the Air Force during jointoperations. The TACS and AAGS do thisby –

Establishing the personnel, facilities, andcommunications interface necessary forcentralized control of available air supportby the air component commander.The decentralized execution of air attacks inpriorities as prescribed by the joint forcecommander.

Centralized control of assets allows the aircomponent to fully exploit the flexibility ofassigned or attached air resources. The TACSprovides liaison through all Army echelonsdown to battalion level. The Army counterpartof the system is the Army air-ground system.

The AAGS gives the ground force commanderthe organization and means to process,evaluate, and coordinate requests for airsupport and tactical air reconnaissance and tocontinuously exchange combat information andintelligence with the air component.

Air Force MissionsThe Air Force missions that most directlyaffect Army operations are the air interdictionmission, to include battlefield air interdiction,and the close air support mission.

Air InterdictionAir interdiction is defined as air operationsconducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay theenemy’s potential before it can be brought tobear effectively against friendly forces and atsuch a distance from friendly ground forcesthat detailed coordination is not required.Typical AI targets might include enemy surfaceforces in the follow-on echelons, road and railnetworks, C3 nodes, and supply depots.

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Battlefield Air Interdiction Prior coordination is required between theBAI is an Air Force task within the framework Army and the Air Force for attack of BAIof the AI mission. The AI attacks conducted targets. BAI has a direct or near-term effectagainst hostile land forces that are not in close on surface operations.proximity to friendly forces are referred to asbattlefield air interdiction if the hostile forces Close Air Supportcould have a near-term effect on the operation CAS is air action in support of groundor scheme of maneuver of friendly forces. operations against hostile targets that are in

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close proximity to friendly forces and thatrequire detailed integration of each air missionwith the fire and movement of these forces.

NOTE: Close proximity means that friendly forcesand/or noncombatants are close enough to thetarget that care must be taken to avoid casualtiesfrom air-delivered weapons effects.

A joint air attack team is a combination ofArmy attack helicopter teams and tacticalaircraft (usually CAS) supported by fieldartillery, operating together to simultaneouslyattack a single target or target array. Normally,

the JAAT is an expansion of CAS in that itusually is employed close to friendly troops asan integrated member of the combined armsteam. However, it can operate independentlyaway from ground units. The relationship ofAI, BAI, and CAS to the corps battlefield isshown in the illustration below. A summary oftheir characteristics is shown in the table. Ofcourse, when dictated by the tactical situation,CAS and tactical surveillance andreconnaissance may also take place in theMBA or in rear areas. The illustration showsonly the battlefield forward of the forwardedge of the battle area (FEBA) and/or theFLOT.

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Planning and Requesting TacticalAir Support

The joint force commander decides on theobjectives and priorities for the employment ofair assets. The land component commanderand the air component commander negotiateon a recommended apportionment of airassets to meet the various requirementsanticipated. This process results in anapportionment recommendation, usuallyaround 72 hours before active execution. Onthe basis of this recommendation, the tacticalair control center gives the corps main CPinitial planning guidance for the number ofsorties expected to be available for BAI andCAS. This initial planning information is onlytentative. However, it is a basis, or a startpoint, for battle planners at the corps main CPto begin the estimate process for the corpsplan that will commence 72 hours later. Theestimate process should include the corpscommander’s decision on the following:

Priority for the TACAIR to subordinatedivisions.

process by identifying the types of targets thatwill most affect planned operations. Given theanticipated targeting requirements, Armyintelligence collection and acquisition assetsare used to develop an appreciation of theenemy for that time period. Air Forcereconnaissance assets also must be consideredfor inclusion in the targeting process. Both thecurrent Air Force tactical intelligence database and the current tactical airreconnaissance operations can provide usabletarget information during these initial planningphases. Refinement of target information is acontinuous process up to the time of thelaunch of attack aircraft. Information for theinitial BAI list should include the following:

Target type; for example, a free rocket overground (FROG) missile site.

Location — universal transverse mercator(UTM) grid coordinates or latitude andlongitude location.

Desired effects; for example, destroy,neutralize, or harass.

AI target and priorities.

BAI target and priorities.

Percent of the CAS to be retained forimmediate requests.

The G3 air, G2, and FSCOORD togethermust work out which targets developed or tobe developed for the planning period shouldbe attacked with air assets instead of withsurface fires. A prioritized initial BAI targetlist is developed and passed to the battlefieldcoordination element. Any targets that areidentified as AI nominations are passedseparately to the BCE.

The targeting process conducted during thisperiod must include predictions of target typesand confirmed targets that will logically beexpected to move before they are attacked.Target value analysis energizes the targeting

Time on target expressed as a specific time,a not-later-than time, or an inclusive timeperiod.

Air request number.

Certain types of targets may be dynamic innature; or certain attack considerations mayaffect how, when, and where the target isattacked. In these instances, mission-typerequests are acceptable. For example, “Stoparmor movement east of the RED River” isunderstood by and acceptable to TACCmission planners and to weaponeers.

Planning for BAI in the 72 hours forward timeperiod necessarily entails developing targets ofinterest to corps-level operations. However,targets that may have an effect on anticipateddivision operations during the ATO effectiveperiod also must be considered. Planningtargets in the division zone of action, accepting

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BAI nomination, and establishing CASallocation priorities help ensure thatsubordinate divisions receive effective airsupport for their respective operations. Thecorps FS cell, ASOC, and G3 air continue todevelop BAI plans for each ATO period up to72 hours (today’s campaign and 24, 48, and 72hours out). BAI targeting may include mobiletargets; thus, a frequent dialog is requiredbetween the corps main CP and the TACC toprovide accurate target information.

The prioritized BAI target list is forwarded tothe BCE by use of the joint tactical air strikerequest or the US message text format/airsupport request. The target list also may betransmitted by voice by using information ineither of those formats. The BAI target listshould include alternate targets to be attackedshould the target or tactical situation change as

the time of target attack draws near. In thecase of mobile targets, fixed targets, such asbridges and logistical and communicationssites, should be nominated as alternates if theystill support the BAI campaign effort.

Unforeseen real-time situations sometimesdevelop that would significantly changeplanned TACAIR support near or even duringthe ATO effective period. In these situations,the LCC may change his allocated air supportto fit the real-time contingency. This couldinclude diverting BAI missions tohigher-priority targets or reallocating CASmissions to meet a close battle emergency, forexample. Aggressive and timely coordinationwith the air component through the BCE andthe ASOC will ensure TACAIR efforts areredirected as necessary to meet the newrequirements.

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Air Tasking Order Planning andCoordination Process

The ATO is the means for implementingTACAIR support. It tasks assigned andattached fighter wings to do specific missionsand gives enough detail that mission aircrewscan plan and execute those missions. TheATO is published to allow enough time for airforces and supporting elements to plan theiraircraft, aircrew, support, and missionrequirements. The TACC issues the ATO,which is valid for a specified effective period,usually 24 hours. While the ATO itself coversa specific period, the ATO planning process is

continuous. At any given time, the TACC andBCE will be jointly working three or moreATOs – executing the current ATO, planningthe ATO for tomorrow, and forecasting andcoordinating for the ATO for the followingday.

The graphic below presents a snapshot of asingle ATO planning cycle. It is important tonote that coordination and information floware continuous. The actions described arethose events that occur during the planningand coordination process. Theater-specificprocedures dictate the actual time these eventstake place.

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Immediate Close Air SupportCertain amounts of allocated CAS can beretained by corps or allocated in priority todivision for immediate requests. ImmediateCAS can respond to contingencies thatdevelop during the course of division battles.Also, CAS can include spontaneous JAAToperations.

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Immediate CAS is initiated at any level. Therequest is transferred to the Air Force requestnet by the first available TACP and sent to theASOC. If the CAS request is part of a JAAToperation, it should be so identified in theremarks block of the immediate request. Oncethe request for immediate CAS is received atthe ASOC, the CAS section of the ASOCwaits for corps tactical CP approval of themission and prepares to transmit the calldirectly to the servicing air squadron. Theusual waiting period at the ASOC is 10minutes. This time is used for intermediateArmy levels to acknowledge the request andto intercede if necessary. Factors for Army andTACP consideration at intermediate levels areas follows:

What is the relative priority (of therequesting unit) for immediate CAS?Can the target be attacked and adequatelyserviced by use of Army assets?Is the request part of a JAAT operation?

After acknowledging the immediate CASrequest, silence on the part of intermediateArmy levels indicates approval of the request.At the ASOC, approval must be obtained bythe G3 air , FSCOORD, or otherrepresentative designated by the commander.Once this approval is gained, and if animmediate CAS sortie has already beenallocated, the request becomes an Air Forcerequirement.

Usually, the CAS fighter is scrambled at thewing or squadron airstrip. If necessary, a sortiealready aloft can be diverted to service theCAS requirement. In either case, the aircraft isusually on station and ready for control ontothe target area within 30 minutes. CASmissions require positive strike control. TheAir Force ALO or enlisted terminal attackcontroller (ETAC) at the unit normallyprovides this control. In their absence, theANGLICO FAC, an aerial fire supportobserver, or the company FSO is also qualifiedfor emergency control of the CAS attack.

Control of Close Air Support

Direct ControlDirect control of CAS target attack is thepreferred method for either immediate orplanned requests. The forward air controllercan identify friendly positions and observe thetarget, target marks (if used), and attackingCAS aircraft. The FAC may clear or abort theattack on the basis of what he actually sees.This control is achieved primarily by radiocommunications. Aircraft equipped withfrequency modulated (FM) radios are the AirForce A-7, A-10, A-37, and F-16 and the USMarine Corps A-4, F/A-18, and AV-8 A/BHarrier. Once the decision has been made toattack a target with air assets, the ALO or theFSO prepares final attack information andtransmits the data to the final controller. Afterthe final controller makes initial radio contactwith the flight leader, he asks the flight leaderto transmit the lineup information as-follows:

Mission number.

Aircraft call sign.

Type and number of aircraft.

Ordnance.

Time on station.

NOTE: The lineup Information received may bedifferent than that received initially from the ALO,but it will reflect actual air assets allocated for themission.

Indirect ControlIndirect control is used when the FAC cannotdirectly observe the target area duringweapons employment.

The FAC may be in contact with someonewho can directly observe the target area. Hemay then issue clearance or abort theattacking CAS aircraft on the basis ofinformation from the observer.

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If the FAC cannot maintain contact withsomeone who can observe the target area, hemay establish procedures with the groundcommander and the attacking CAS flightleader to allow weapons employment. Thisform of control is used only when authorizedby the ground commander. Normally,clearance is issued when aircraft are departingthe initial point (IP) or shortly thereafter.

Control MeasuresFollowing are the three control measures forCAS missions with which the final controller isconcerned:

The contact point (CP) is the point atwhich the aircraft makes initial radiocontact with the final controller.

The initial point (IP) is the point fromwhich the aircraft starts the timed runtoward the pull-up point (PUP).

The pull-up point is the point at which anaircraft at low level begins a climb toidentify the target and to gain altitude forthe attack on the target.

Target MarkingThe preferred method of marking a target isby use of a laser if the available aircraft has anairborne, passive laser tracker (Pave Penny). IfPave Penny is used, the final controller musthave the same laser pulse repetition frequency(PRF) code as the aircraft. To make the AirForce four-digit code match the laserdesignator three-digit code, drop the first digit.

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The PRF code is given in the mission brief.The final controller designates the target atthe command of the pilot or as the aircraftapproaches the apex of the PUP maneuver,whichever occurs first. He continuesdesignating until the pilot has identified thetarget or 20 seconds has elapsed, whicheveroccurs first. The call LASER ON is given tothe pilot at the start of designation.

The alternate method of marking a target fora CAS mission is with artillery smoke, artilleryand/or mortar white phosphorus (WP), orground-burst illumination. The marking roundshould impact about 10 seconds before theaircraft reaches the time on target (TOT) ortime to target. To have the round impact atthe appropriate time, the final controllerpasses the time on target (for example, 1215)or the time to target (2 + 00 . . . .MARK) to thefire direction center (FDC). The FDC then

computes the proper time to fire the markinground to allow for time of flight (TOF) so theround will impact 10 seconds before thebombs impact on the target. A good back-offtime must be sent to the FDC and to theaircraft from the final controller.

Mission ControlThe final controller’s control of the missionbegins when the flight leader makes initialcontact at the CP and the final controller hasthe flight leader’s lineup information. The finalcontroller then verifies that the flight leaderhas the attack information. If he does not, thefinal controller transmits the mission brief byusing the following format and sequence:

Initial point.

Heading (in degrees magnetic) (right orleft).

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Distance (in nautical miles).Target elevation (in feet, in relation tomean sea level).Mark (type) (color) (laser PRF code).

Friendlies (location) (danger close).Threat (type and location).Hazards.Weather.

Time to target ([minutes plusseconds] . . . .MARK).

The flight leader reports when departing theIP. The final controller then orients the flightleader to the target at the apex of his pull-up.He uses the clock method and relays directionand distance from the mark to the target.Direction is stated as one of the eight cardinaldirections, and distance is stated in meters.Once the final controller is certain the flightleader has identified the target correctly andthe aircraft is pointed at the target, he clearsthe aircraft to strike the target (cleared hot).The final controller should be prepared to calloff the attack (abort) anytime before actualordnance delivery if the aircraft starts to attackthe wrong target or to have the aircraftreattack the target if more ordnance isrequired. Under certain circumstances, theaircraft may be cleared hot at the IP.

Procedural Control – A TechniquePositive control of a CAS mission may not bepossible under some tactical conditions, or itmay not be necessary because the target isprominent and well away from friendly troops.In such cases, a technique called proceduralcontrol may be used to attack a lucrative CAStarget. In this technique, procedures aredetermined and agreed to between the USAFand the ground commander byprearrangement. The maneuver commander,G3 air, FSCOORD, ALO, and other membersof the FS cell generate and coordinate allnecessary data for procedure-controlled CAS.

These data, once developed and agreed to, areforwarded to the USAF air support controlsystem (TACS) for target attack scheduling.The minimum elements of informationnecessary for initiating this technique are asfollows:

Target location – grid coordinates orspecific terrain boundaries (box or circle).Code name designation for the target (forquick reference and identification).Nature of target and desired ordnance oreffects on target.Date-time frame within which procedure-controlled CAS may or should be delivered.

Emergency abort signal or codes.

Air Force Tactical AirReconnaissance

Air Force tactical air reconnaissance (TAR) isavailable for use by Army intelligence andtargeting agencies. TAR is ideal for targetdetection and surveillance and for intelligencegathering in areas that Army assets cannotadequately range or cover.

The tactical air force usually is configured withan air reconnaissance squadron. This squadroncould be tasked to execute weather, visual,imagery, or electronic reconnaissance. TheRF4C is the Air Force tactical reconnaissanceplatform. It is a two-seat, twin-jet aircraftcapable of all-weather, high-low, day-nightreconnaissance. A visual-type mission mightinclude weather reporting; but more often, it istarget confirmation based on what the crewsees. Visual missions are least precise but arequick in that there is no delay for processingdata. An in-flight report must be requested.Imagery missions can provide precise targetinformation, depending on sensor resolutionand weather. Optical sensors include framingand panoramic cameras, nonoptical sensorssuch as infrared (IR) side-looking radar (SLR).The tactical electronic reconnaissance

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(TEREC) RF4C can collect target signalemissions and down-link such information to aTEREC remote terminal (TRT) for furtherprocessing.

Requesting Tactical AirReconnaissance

The TAR requests can be either preplannedor immediate. The considerations andprocedures for requesting TAR are the sameas for requesting fighter TACAIR, except thatArmy intelligence communications channelsare used in forwarding preplanned TARrequests to the BCE. Immediate requests forTAR are transmitted by the TACP of theinitiating Army CP directly to the corpsASOC.

The corps G2 who requires TAR coordinateswith the reconnaissance liaison officer of theTACP. At division and below, the ALO is theAir Force liaison for TAR. The following keyquestions are considered before tasking aTAR sortie:

Can the information be obtained by usingArmy assets?

Is the information required alreadyavailable in the Air Force intelligence database?

DD Form 1975 (Joint Tactical AirReconnaissance/Surveillance Request) or USmessage text format/air support request is usedto forward and process both preplanned andimmediate requests for TAR.

Reports obtained from TAR sorties rangefrom in-flight reports with immediate butuncorrelated information to detailed analyseswhich produce valid intelligence data.

The in-flight report (INFLIGHTREP) isgenerated by the flight crew while theaircraft is over or near the target area. It iswhat the crew sees. Information may besketchy, but it is the quickest method by

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which to get information. TheINFLIGHTREP is used to reportperishable information.

The reconnaissance exploitation report(RECCEXREP) is sent via teletype. Itcomes from the first, rapid review ofimagery and crew debrief. It is sent out assoon as possible (ASAP) but not later than(NLT) 45 minutes after the aircraft lands.

The initial programmed interpretationreport (IPIR) is a teletype report with asecond look at imagery. It is a morecomplete report and contains more analysis.The IPIR is sent NLT 4 hours after theaircraft lands.

The supplemental programmed inter-pretation report (SUPIR) is a teletypereport on all significant targets covered bythe mission. It may require up to 24 hoursfor dissemination.

Requesting Electronic WarfareSupport

The Air Force has air platforms for thepurpose of electronic combat (EC) with aprimary mission of suppressing the enemy’sintegrated air defense structure. Nonlethalsuppression could include the EF1ll Raven asa radar jammer and the EC 130H CompassCall as communications jammer while the F4GWild Weasel and other attack aircraft (F4E orF16s with air-to-ground weapons) providelethal SEAD. Normally, such EC support isrequested by the corps through Army channelsto the BCE at the TACC as a preplannedmission. Such a request might be part of aSEAD requirement to support an Army airassault operation near or across the FLOT.Also, the Compass Call communicationsjammer could be requested to disrupt enemyC3 voice nets in conjunction with a corps orsubordinate unit operation. Such requestsnormally are preplanned; however, inemergency conditions, an immediate request

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could be intiated via the ait request net to theASOC. EC and EW operations must beclosely coordinated with electronic warfarestaff officer (EWSO) agencies to preventfratricide to friendly C3 or communicationsnets. However, such use of nonlethal weaponsacts as a combat multiplier to fire supportplans.

Amphibious OperationsAn amphibious operation is an attack launchedfrom the sea by naval and landing forcesembarked in ships or other craft for thepurpose of landing on a hostile shore.Normally, a naval officer is the commander ofthe amphibious task force (CATF). Troopcomponents, ground and air, are called thelanding force and are commanded by thecommander landing force (CLF). The CATFexercises the degree of authority over theentire force that is necessary to ensure success.Subject to this overall authority, the CLF isresponsible for conducting operations ashore.Planning and execution of the landing andassault are primarily his concern. Anamphibious operation is conducted in fivephases: planning, embarkation, rehearsal,movement, and assault.

Initially, the joint amphibious task force(JATF) commander is responsible for planningthe use of all air support and indirect fires. Heensures that coordinated naval gunfire and airsupport plans are prepared for all phases ofthe operation. He also establishes anamphibious task force supporting armscoordination center (SACC). It plans andcoordinates fires for the task force during theplanning and execution of the operation. TheCLF determines landing force needs for air,naval gunfire, field artillery, and mortars andprepares the fire support plan.

Coordination of Naval GunfireNavy surface vessels that mount guns can beused to support Army ground forces. The joint

force commander (JFC) decides on the use ofnaval gunfire to support ground operations.Fire support planners must be aware of theemployment considerations and procedurespeculiar to naval gunfire in support of Armyground forces.

MissionsThe JFC gives an individual naval gunfire shipthe mission to support a ground force byassigning either a DS or a GS mission.

Direct support makes ship fires responsiveto the needs of a battalion- or regiment-sizeground force. Destroyers and frigatesequipped with 5-inch guns usually are giventhis mission.

General support makes ship fires responsiveto the needs of a brigade-size or largerground force. Cruisers and battleshipsequipped with 5-inch and/or 16-inch gunsusually are given this mission.

ConsiderationsA naval gunfire ship fulfills its support missionmuch as do other indirect-fire systems. Thereare certain special considerations that firesupport planners must keep in mind.

The first priority of the ship isself-preservation. The ship will interrupt itssupport mission if its survival is threatened.This includes ammunition expenditure. Sincenaval guns are, in addition to shorebombardment, used for ship or fleet defense,the ship will keep a large percentage of itsmagazine capacity for this contingency.

Ships are positioned to provide support byassignment of a fire support station (FSS) or afire support area (FSA).

A fire Support station is a specific pointon the water where the ship is required tomaintain its position until the positioningauthority, usually the JATF, allows it to

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move. An FSS is preferred from a firesupport standpoint because the support shipis in a stable position and can provide morecontinuous and more accurate indirect fires.

A fire support area is an area within theamphibious objective area (AOA) wherethe support ship may steam at its owndiscretion. The FSA is preferred from asurvivability standpoint. However, thedelivery of indirect fires may be affectedbecause of the changing gun-target line andless precise self-location for firingcomputations.

Procedures

During amphibious phases of a joint operation,a naval task force provides interface with theArmy force senior FS cell through theship-based SACC. The SACC is responsiblefor coordinating all fires during the assault. Tofacilitate the coordination of fires in support ofthe landing force assault to shore, the SACCstaff is augmented with personnel andequipment from the senior landing force firesupport facility. For example, if the groundforce is a division, the main FS cell would becollocated with the SACC. Normal fieldartillery command/fire direction (CF) or fire(F) nets (FM) or the landing force firesupport coordination net (high frequency[HF]) may be used for coordination. Tominimize dependence on ship-to-shorecommunications, landing force units coordinatelaterally whenever possible and when firesclearance is required from only one otherlanding force unit. When ashore and preparedto do so, the landing force FS cell assumesresponsibility for fire support coordination.The change in responsibility for fire supportcoordination is based on the capability tocoordinate all ground and air fires and iscontingent on the decision of the CATF.Often, responsibility for controlling navalgunfire and artillery is phased ashore beforeresponsibility for controlling air fires.

Requesting Naval GunfireSupport

Army personnel may request and conduct firesupport missions using naval gunfire even inthe absence of ANGLICO personnel. TheNGF communications interface is as follows:

Net: Naval gunfire ground spot net.

Frequency: 2-30 MHz HF.

Compatible equipment:

USMC – PRC-104, GRC-193, MRC-138.

Army – GRC-106, GRC-193.

Air Force–PRC-104, MRC-107/108,GRC-206.

Naval AirNaval air support may be provided to Armyground forces when available Navy aircraftexceed anticipated Navy requirements. Theprimary missions of Navy aircraft are fleet airdefense and offensive attack.

Navy aircraft are capable of all Air Forceaircraft missions, to include BAI, CAS,electronic warfare, and TAR. When Navyaircraft are designated to support Armyground forces, those aircraft are placed in thegeneral aircraft sortie pool for tasking by thecontrolling TACC; and they conduct missionsin the same manner as Air Force aircraft.

The Navy tactical air control system is verysimilar to the TACS and AAGS locatedashore.

When Navy air supports Army groundoperations, communications and control ofNavy aircraft are the same as for Air Forceaircraft. BAI sorties are tasked by the TACC.CAS sorties require the same positive controlas Air Force CAS during the actual strike. Aswith Air Force CAS, the Air Force FAC, the

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ANGLICO, or the Army fire support team(FIST) can provide this strike control.

Army ground forces must be operating in anAOA or receiving their primary TACAIRsupport from the Navy (the naval aircommander is the air component commander).In this case, the BCE will deploy to theCATF’s TACC to perform the same fullfunctional area interface and synchronizationas it does with

USMC

the Air Force TACC.

Fire Support AssetsMarine Corps (USMC) forcesdepoloyed as a Marine air-

United Statesnormally areground task force (MAGTF). The MAGTF isorganized as a complete fighting organization.It is given artillery, TACFIRE and/orhelicopters, and logistics support from attachedUSMC support units from the Fleet MarineForce (FMF). The fire support assets of theMAGTF are controlled by the MAGTFcommander and are used solely to support theMarine ground operation. Employment ofseparate MAGTF elements such as the groundmaneuver element by another command isdoctrinally unsound. The Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) guidance and policy on separateemployment is in JCS Pub 12. Nonetheless,should a situation arise in which a Marinemaneuver force is employed separately, thecontrolling commander, Army or Marine, mustallocate fire support asets to the force.

Indirect fires are coordinated between theArmy and the USMC by the exchange ofliaison officers between the Marine artilleryunit and the senior force FSE. The USMCartillery LO coordinates USMC indirectsurface fires with Army indirect surface fires.He also provides an FM communicationsinterface for the exchange of targetinformation and requests for additional fires byeither force artillery.

The JFC has the authority toartillery units a tactical mission

assign USMCto support an

Army ground unit or to reinforce Armyartillery. The USMC artillery unit provides anLO to the Army ground unit CP or to theArmy artillery unit, as required. All aspects offire support doctrine apply and are exercisedby USMC artillery units. One exception is thatthe USMC artillery unit cannot provide FSOsor forward observers to supported Armymaneuver units. Army fire support personnelattached to the Army maneuver unit providethese fire support functions; the Marineartillery firing unit, linked by FMcommunications, performs firing operations.

Marine air can perform BAI, CAS, EW, andTAR. As a part of the MAGTF, Marine air isused to support Marine ground operations inany scenario. The MAGTF commander givesthe JFC available Marine air sorties in excessof USMC requirements. The JFC also has theauthority to apportion Marine air for supportof joint operations. In either case, Marine airsorties available for support of Armyoperations are controlled by the air componentTACC, usually the Air Force TACC. Marineair conducting CAS is controlled during theCAS strike in the same manner as are otherCAS aircraft.

Army forces may be operating jointly withUSMC forces in an AOA while elements ofthe Marine air command and control system(MACCS) (division air support center [DASC],tactical air operations center [TAOC], orTACC) are providing and controlling TACAIRsupport to Army forces in the AOA. Then theBCE will deploy to the Marine TACC or toother MACCS elements to perform the samefull functional area interface andsynchronization as it does with the Air ForceTACC. The DASC will perform thosefunctions normally performed by the ASOC.

Joint Suppression of Enemy AirDefenses

Joint suppression of enemy air defenses(J-SEAD) is that portion of SEAD operations

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that requires joint interaction to suppressenemy surface-to-air defenses having aninfluence on the operational and tacticalportion of the AirLand Battle. The goal ofJ-SEAD is to increase the overall effectivenessof friendly AirLand operations throughreduced attrition and improved capabilities ofArmy and Air Force air resources. Groundand naval forces have primary executionresponsibility for J-SEAD to their limits ofobserved fire from surface weapons. The limitof observed fire is the range to which anairborne or ground-based observer can visuallysee the point of impact or burst. The fire canbe controlled and adjusted on the basis ofobservation. The greatest indirect-firesuppression capability of ground and navalforces is against those threats that can beengaged by observed fire. SEAD operationalprocedures are in Appendix B, Section V.

FSCOORD Tasks forJ-SEAD

The FSCOORD brings together thedecide-detect-deliver process to accomplishJ-SEAD during corps and division operations.He does this by accomplishing the tasksdiscussed below.

Ensure that SEAD target queries areconducted for each BAI and planned CASrequest. The SEAD targets must be targeted,and the attack of these targets must besynchronized with the planned air strike. Thesources for development of SEAD targets inthe close battle area are primarily groundobservers and Army electronic, imagery, ortemplating techniques. Deep SEAD targets tobe suppressed for BAI attack missions areprovided primarily by Air Force TAR flightreports or other aircraft reports available fromthe BCE intelligence division.

SEAD targets are attacked either as acquiredor as part of a scheduled SEAD program. TheFSCOORD coordinates the synchronization

of SEAD programs with the ALO and theG3 Air.

Ingress and egress routes for aircraft should bean area of the battlefield focused for SEADtargeting. This information is available fromthe appropriate-level ALO or may be found inthe ATO. Often, requests for SEAD targetingwill come through the BCE to corps firesupport elements. Coordination in this casealso must be thorough and responsive toensure sustained aircraft survivability andsupport.

Joint CommunicationsInterface

Timely and efficient exchange of informationis a key requirement for successful jointoperations. Published joint and interserviceagreements on operations are commonlyaccompanied by communications guidelinesand responsibilities that facilitate the jointoperation. These agreements recognize theimportance of passing vital information to theappropriate individual or agency in a mannerthat is understood in both format and text.The surest form of communications interfaceis the collocation of coordinating agencies,such as the TACC and BCE. If personalcoordination is required but collocation is notpossible or desired, the exchange of liaisonpersonnel facilitates personal interface.However. in joint operations, some means ofradio-electronic interface among services isrequired.

TACS-AAGSCommunications

Communications facilities over which tacticalair support may be requested and directedexist from the frontline company through allechelons of command to the highest Armytactical CP. Communications are requiredfrom the lowest-level TACP or FAC upthrough the ASOC to the TACC.

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Communications also are required betweenthe CP and the liaison officers at the fighter,reconnaissance, and airlift bases and theTACC. The following paragraphs describe thecommunications available to the air-groundsystem, to include both Army and Air Forcesystems.

Multichannel SystemsThese systems provide the primary theatertransmission media. Both Army and Air Forcemultichannel systems are installed to connectthe BCE with the corps ASOC. These systemsare used primarily to pass preplanned BAI andCAS nominations from the corps CP to theBCE and to pass intelligence informationbetween the corps CP FS cell, the FSCOORDor G2, and the BCE intelligence and fusionsections. Other routine communicationsbetween the BCE and the corps ASOC arepassed over either multichannel system. Wheresecure facsimile very-high-frequency (VHF)radio communication is available, the TACCplans division is connected with the ASOC.

Air-Ground CommunicationsAll elements of the TACS are provided withan air-to-ground communications capability.Communications modes available in theseair-ground nets are ultrahigh frequency(UHF), very high frequency, and highfrequency/single sideband (HF/SSB). TACPsmay use UHF or VHF/FM for directing airstrikes. The ASOC air-ground communicationsprovide a partial control capability and allowmonitoring of TACP-aircraft communicationsfor immediate report of strike results andin-flight reconnaissance reports. The forwardair control post (FACP) also has UHF andVHF/FM for controlling the aircraft from theair base to and from the target. Spot reportsand in-flight reconnaissance reports are passedto the TACC by long-range HF/SSB and byUHF. Tactical airlift movements and Armyaircraft flights within the area have UHF andVHF air-ground communications with controlagencies.

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Air Force Air Request NetThe basic communications net in the tacticalair support subsystem of the TACS is the AirForce air request net. The Air Force isresponsible for providing, maintaining, andoperating this net. The net provides the meansfor rapid transmission of immediate requestsfor tactical air support from the TACPsdirectly to the ASOC. A separate air requestnet, terminating at the ASOC, is provided foreach corps supported. The primarycommunications means used is HF/SSB radio.The TACPs are also equipped withmanpacked HF/SSB and UHF/FM radios.

Tactical Air Direction NetThis net is used by the TACP, ASOC, andairborne forward air controller (AFAC) fordirecting aircraft on tactical air supportmissions. The ground equipment used in thisnet consists of VHF and UHF radios that areeither mounted in vehicles or manpacked.

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Tactical Air Control NetThis net provides direct communicationsbetween the TACC and the control andreporting center (CRC), Army aviationagencies, and Army air defense agencies withinthe combat area. Its purpose is to providecommunications for monitoring flights, airtraffic control, and air defense.

Communications for aPreplanned Mission

Communications nets for preplanned missionsare required from the frontline company tothe TACC. No special net is provided for thispurpose at any echelon. After approval bycorps, the request is forwarded to the tactical

air control center as a support requirement.The TACC orders the mission flown by one ofits tactical fighter units. Existing facilities areused to request preplanned missions as shownin the illustration below.

Communications for anImmediate Mission

The frontline company uses its fire request netor its battalion command (cored) net torequest an immediate CAS mission. Uponapproval of the request by the battalion, theAir Force TACP forwards the request directlyto the ASOC at corps on the Air Force airrequest net (SSB). The TACP intermediateheadquarters monitors this net andacknowledges all requests.

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Ground Liaison OfficerNet (RATT)

The highest Army command echelon mustfurnish a ground liaison officer to each tacticalfighter base. The duties of these officers are tobrief the pilots on the missions and to debriefthem on return from the missions. The GLOnet (radio teletypewriter [RATT]) links the G3air at the land component command post withthe ground liaison officers at the fighter bases.This net is used to give the GLOs informationto brief the pilots and as a means for sendingdebriefing reports to the Army command post.

Military Intelligence Battalion(Imagery Interpretations

Operations Net (SSB RATT)The military intelligence battalion (MIB)provides an air reconnaissance liaison officerand an MIB detachment for each tactical airreconnaissance wing and squadron. TheARLO is responsible for briefing anddebriefing the Air Force pilots on missionsflown in support of the Army and for passingthe debriefing reports to the MIB detachment

headquarters, the corps and higher army G2air sections (when appropriate), and the jointtask force (JTF) headquarters.

The MIB detachment includes an imageryinterpretation section and a reproductionsection. The Air Force processes theArmy-requested photographs and passes aduplicated negative and two prints of eachphotograph to this detachment. The imageryinterpretation section makes a detailed analysisof the photographs and prepares an imageryreport to be passed to the requester. Thereproduction section produces the requirednumber of prints and passes them to thebattalion headquarters for delivery to corpsand division levels.

The MIB operates a RATT communicationsnet (see the corps communications summarybelow). This net includes the battalionheadquarters, the ARLOs, the corps G2 air,and JTF headquarters. The debriefing andimagery reports are transmitted over this netto the corps G2 air for retransmission to therequester.

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NOTE: When an operation is conducted by acorps without army command headquarters thecorps requires the same nets normally requiredby a higher army command echelon.

US Message Text FormatJCS Pub 25 explains US message text formatand should be consulted for a completeunderstanding of this system.

TACS-AAGSAutomation

The ongoing Army-USAF initiative toautomate the BCE will soon provide anear-real-time data link between fire supportand intelligence agencies in the corps CP, tothe BCE at the TACC, and all the way downto the GLOs and ARLOs at USAF wingoperations centers (WOCs).

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CHAPTER 4

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Fire support for offensive operations can be described in terms of anoffensive framework presented in FM 100-15. This framework showscorps and divisions using five complementary elements in fightingtheir offensive battles:

A main attack with supporting attacks as required.

Reserve operations in support of the attack.

Reconnaissance and security operations forward and to the flanksand rear of main and supporting attacks.

A continuous deep operation in vital parts of the zone of attack.

Rear area operations necessary to maintain offensive momentum.

Section I. OFFENSIVE FIRE SUPPORT

DescriptionThe commander must provide responsive firesupport (from available air, ground, and searesources) that protects and ensures freedomof maneuver to forces in contact with theenemy in deep, close, and rear operations.Each of the five complementary elements ofthe offensive framework must be consideredwhen determining fire support requirements.

Basic TasksCorps and division commanders normallyensure adequate fire support for offensiveoperations through a process of allocation andretention of specific fire support assets. Thefour basic tasks of fire support are as follows:

Support forces in contact.

Support all aspects of the battle plan.

Synchronize fire support.

Support and sustain fire support.

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Support Forces in Contact mobility and survivability, and combatThis task includes the allocation of weapon service support.systems and sorties to subordinate elements,such as division and brigade, which actuallyengage the enemy. Supporting forces incontact usually means providing support forthe close operation.

Support the Battle PlanSupporting the battle plan means retaining firesupport for any possible contingency. Firesupport assets for rear operations and deepfires must be identified and marshaled forexecution at the right time and place.

Synchronize Fire SupportThe synchronization of fire support at corpsand division is essentially a command function.The FSCOORD helps the commanderintegrate all fire support with the appropriatebattlefield operating systems (BOSs). Thesesystems include maneuver, command andcontrol, fire support, air defense, intelligence,

Support and SustainFire support for offensive operations must besustained through all phases of an operation. Itmust survive through all phases of anoperation without a degradation of availability.

Attack and AcquisitionSystems

Specific fire support attack systems andacquisition systems are allocated throughnormal practices, such as field artilleryorganization for combat. Adequate fires aremade available to meet the corps and divisioncommanders’ close support, counterfire, andinterdiction requirements. Other fire supportmeans, such as tactical air, naval gunfire(division and below), and nonlethal (EW)systems, are allocated if available andapplicable to the needs of the forcecommander.

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Nuclear WeaponsThe allocation of nuclear weapons to supportoffensive operations is discussed in detail inFM 100-30. The table below summarizes theroles of nuclear weapons in offensiveoperations.

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Section II. MAIN ATTACK WITH SUPPORTING ATTACKS

Roles of Fire Supportin the Attack

Close SupportTo satisfy the close support needs of theattacking corps and divisions, FSCOORDsconsider the fires discussed below.

Preparatory Fires. These are fires that supportpenetrations of the main defensive belts. Theyare not necessarily scheduled preparations inthe classic sense; rather they are intense,concentrated fires that support an opening fora penetration.

Blocking Fires. Blocking fires isolate the maineffort and fix other forces in the maindefensive belt for the supporting attacks. UseFASCAM if necessary but be sure minefieldlocations have been coordinated with andapproved by the division engineer anddisseminated to all units.

Continuous Suppression. Continuous sup-pression of direct-fire weapon systems allowsmaneuver forces to close with the enemy anddestroy him with organic direct fire.

Obscuration and Screening Fires. Obscurationand screening fires allow maneuver forcesundetected movement.

SEAD Fires. SEAD is critical for all operations.CAS, BAI, and attack helicopter operations insupport of combat operations require SEADfires against the many antiaircraft systems thataccompany the Threat’s forward elements.Some of this SEAD is appropriate fornonlethal (EW) attack assets that jam airdefense radar systems. A critical element inperforming SEAD is locating enemy airdefense weapons and facilities. Electronicwarfare support measures and other targetacquisition sources are used for this purpose.

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SEAD fires may be developed into a programof fires to support friendly air operations, toinclude CAS, BAI, JAAT operations, andsupport to air corridors. Smoke also may beused to hide friendly aircraft from groundobservers. Airspace coordination areas andphase lines may be used to coordinate aSEAD effort.

CounterfireCounterfire at corps and division must beaimed against specific enemy fire supportfunctions. By using the IPB and/or TVAprocess and the decide-detect-deliver targetingmethodology, we can determine, locate, andattack specific high-value functional targetssuch as C3 nodes, target acquisition systems,and key weapon systems. The destruction,neutralization and suppression of these targetsyield high payoffs in the following areas:

Keep the enemy from disrupting our attackformations with a counterpreparation, thusensuring our freedom of maneuver.

Prevent the enemy’s ability to providecounterfire which would result in degradedfriendly fire support.

Eliminate or reduce the enemy’s capabilityto counterattack by shifting and massingfires.

Conduct a counterair program directedagainst the enemy’s use of attackhelicopters.

Counterfire at corps and division levels neednot be limited to field artillery. Artillerycannons, rockets, and missiles will provide thepreponderance of counterfire. However,tactical air support, electronic warfare, Armyaviation, and naval gunfire, if available, may beused to attack counterfire targets.

FM 6-20-30

InterdictionThe use of interdiction to support thecommander’s concept of operation and schemeof maneuver must take into account thefollowing:

Targeting efforts must focus on theenemy’s capability to shift resources todefend or reinforce his positions.

Interdiction will be conducted primarily bythe corps. However, the division maycontribute interdiction fires, depending onthe scale of the attack.

Interdiction attack assets may include fieldartillery rockets and missiles and Armyaviation and Air Force assets performingair interdiction and battlefield airinterdiction.

AllocationIn offensive operations, fire support assets areallocated to weight the main attack. For fieldartillery, this is done by assigning apreponderance of decentralized tacticalmissions (direct support and reinforcing) to themain attacking force. The corps commanderalso can add weight to his main attackingdivision by attaching corps field artilleryelements to the division or by providingreinforcing units to division artillery.Employment of field artillery brigades isdiscussed in detail in FM 6-20-2. Bydecentralizing field artillery units, corps anddivision commanders provide their subordinatemaneuver commanders the support they needto gain and retain the initiative of the attack.

Tactical air support adds weight to the mainattack when CAS sortie allocation is increased.A continuous flow of preplanned CAS sortiesallows the main attack force to respond tocontingencies that develop during the courseof the division battle as well as retain theinitiative.

Allocation of other fire support assets andresources must follow the same decentralizedmethodology. Based on the factors of METT-Tand the commander’s concept of theoperation, these allocations give subordinatemaneuver commanders flexibility andresponsive fire support. Decentralizedallocation gives the attacker the flexibility toexploit opportunities as they arise.

Positioning andDisplacement

Positioning of field artillery assets isdetermined by the mission assigned to thesubordinate field artillery battalions. Artilleryretained under corps or div arty control with amission of general support or general supportreinforcing (GSR) is positioned by thecommander of the respective force artillery. Bypositioning artillery in particular sectors andassigning zones of fire, the force artillerycommander can lend weight to the mainattack, provide additional adequate support,and facilitate future operations. In the offense,artillery is positioned well forward to exploitweapon ranges and to preclude untimelydisplacement when fires are needed the most.

Corps and division artillery units arepositioned well forward in the forward brigadesectors. MLRS units in particular, with theirinherent mobility, can be positioned wellforward, nearer the FLOT. There they canengage targets that are beyond the range ofcannon artillery. Good positions will be at apremium with units actively competing forthem. While the field artillery commandersselect positions, all positions must becoordinated through the FS cells in whosesectors the proposed positions are located.Ultimate approval rests with the maneuvercommander concerned. Units in direct supportof brigades and their reinforcing artillerynormally have overall priority in positioning.

In the offense, units must conduct timelydisplacements. Fire support must be

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continuous and must not be outpaced bymaneuver. Units that are positioned by corpsartillery, and even by division artillery, are inreal danger of being left behind unlessrepositioning is frequent and is synchronizedto support the forward progress of maneuverelements.

Corps and division tactical CP operations ceilsmust aggressively seek out the current forwardline of troops. They must ensure rapiddissemination to brigade CPs of this vitalinformation lest GS and GSR units be leftbehind. Survivability moves are less frequentin the offense. This is because moves arefocused more on supporting the maneuverforce and we have superiority in combatpower in the offensive zone.

Fire Support Planning andCoordination

Fundamental to the success of any operationare proper ordering of priorities and anorderly and logical consideration of each factoraffecting fire support. Thus, it is essential tothe success of offensive operations conductedby corps and divisions to instruct commandersand staff planners on each of the fire supportconsiderations. The fire support considerationsof consequence at all echelons for the attackinclude the following:

General planning coordinationparameters.

Fire support planning, coordination, andtasks.

Targeting procedures.

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

Use of electronic warfare assets.

Weapon status during the attack.

General ParametersAt the main CPs of corps and division, mostof the FS cell actions involve planning thedeep battle, coordinating the future andcurrent battles, and allocating resources forcurrent and future battles to the subordinateunits. Although these FS cells rarely requestfire support for immediate engagement oftargets, they must ensure that preplannedTACAIR requests are submitted during theplanning process. The brigade and battalionFS cells are much more involved in theexecution of the current battle, and mostimmediate TACAIR requests will besubmitted at these levels. They fight within theparameters established by the higherheadquarters and with the resources they havebeen allocated.

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This is not meant to imply that brigade andbattalion FS cells need not plan fires inadvance of operations. They just don’t plan asfar into future battles as the cells at corps anddivision. In fact, the fire support principle of“use the lowest echelon capable of furnishingeffective support,” as explained in FM 6-20,must always be considered by fire planners.Fire support planning, coordination, andexecution should be done at the lowest levelpossible with the fewest number of elementsnecessary to accomplish the mission. Forexample:

Division coordinated fire lines (CFLs)should be used sparingly and only to openup the division zone to fight the divisiondeep battle. The division FS cell is oftentoo far removed to emplace, cancel, andmove CFLs for the close-in operation.

A corps artillery asset with a GSR missionto a division artillery makes positioningextremely difficult. A preferred method inthe offense is to make that unit reinforcingwith the necessary restrictions to facilitatefuture operations.

SEAD should be planned and fired by theunit using the air support. It is almostimpossible to coordinate SEAD fired bydivisional DS artillery for CAS flown insupport of a brigade or task forceoperation. It is much easier to use thebrigade fire support with division artilleryaugmenting as necessary.

PlanningFire support coordinators develop a firesupport plan that assists and complements themaneuver plan. The fire support plan providesfires in direct support of committed maneuverelements and in general support of the entireforce. It also provides for fire support to thereserve when it is committed. When use ofnuclear or chemical weapons has beenauthorized, the fire support plan assigns such

weapons and fires to appropriate executingunits.

In planning a preparation, consider thefollowing factors:

Will the loss of surprise be significant?

Are there enough significant targets?

Are there enough fire support assets(weapons and ammunition) to support thepreparation?

Can the enemy recover before the effectscan be exploited?

Can you include flank or follow-on forces?

Can the effects of nuclear and chemicalfires affect the scheme of maneuver?

Other types of planned fires may besubstituted for a preparation. Aggressivelyapplied series, groups, and programs of targetscan be used to support each echelon ofmaneuver throughout the attack. These firesare continuously planned to suppress forces onflanks of the penetration, fix enemy forcesaway from the penetration, and preventreinforcement by follow-on forces. These fireshelp block enemy movement of reserves,destroy his command and control facilities,neutralize his artillery, and prevent the escapeof retreating elements.

CoordinationFor effective fire support coordination incombined operations, there must be anexchange of liaison personnel down to thelowest possible echelon along the commonboundary. Personnel not only must betactically and technically competent but,ideally, also should be proficient in language tofacilitate rapid coordination. The fire supportcoordinators at all levels are responsible toensure both fire support coordination andmutual assistance of fire support assets.

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TargetingTargeting for the attack follows generalprocedures detailed in FM 6-20-10. The FScell targeting decision process is shown in theillustration below. This example emphasizesthe targeting methodology of decide-detect-deliver. The planning associated with asuccessful targeting effort requires closeinteraction between the commander, theintelligence and operations staffs, the firesupport officers, and several combat supportagencies.

Done properly, the decide function provides aclear picture of the priorities applicable to thetasking of target acquisition assets, theselection of an attack means, and the

requirement for postattack assessment.Specifically, the decide function answers thesequestions:

What targets should be acquired andattacked?

Where will the targets likely be found?

What acquisition assets are best suited tolocate the targets?

Which attack option applies — maneuver,fire support, electronic warfare, or acombination of these?

Is damage assessment required and/orpossible?

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The detect function is performed by targetacquisition (TA) assets designated in theintelligence operations and fire support plansof the operation order. All TA assets must beconsidered and used if applicable.

Finally, the deliver portion takes place whenand where the guidance provided during thedecide function has determined.

Intelligence Preparation ofthe Battlefield

One requirement for a successful attack is athorough IPB. Important for all tacticaloperations, IPB is clearly critical if we are toavoid being surprised by the enemy. IPBprovides much of the information for theintelligence estimate, which in turn impacts onthe target development process. IPB is acontinuous, systematic effort to analyze theenemy, terrain, and weather we will be facingduring the attack. IPB seeks to evaluate Threatcapabilities and helps staff members predictenemy courses of action as we press on withour attack. IPB also seeks to provide the corpsand division commander and staffs a windowinto the minds of the enemy commander andhis staff. From this, we may anticipate theenemy’s reaction to our attack as well aspredict what his courses of action would be ifour present operation fails.

The initial IPB effort produces doctrinal,situation, decision support, and electronictemplates. Templates of terrain factors andweather conditions are initially based onclimatological weather records. Templates arelater based on current and forecast weatherand terrain conditions as the battle continues.

Target value analysis is used to identifyhigh-payoff targets that support thecommander’s concept. TVA produces a high-payoff target matrix and an attack guidancematrix. TVA is conducted by the plans celland is closely tied to the IPB.

Electronic Preparation ofthe Battlefield

The all-source production section (ASPS) atcorps and division CPs and the EWS performthe initial electronic preparation of thebattlefield (EPB) in support of the G2’s IPBeffort for the attack. The initial EPB is passedto the MI unit technical control and analysiselement (TCAE). This element expands theEPB and correlates it with technical data, toinclude call signs and frequencies. EPB alsoexamines the association of specific emitterswith identified enemy units. It checks the radioline-of-sight from these emitters to potentiallocations of friendly EW assets. The result ofthe EPB is the identification of targets that areimportant to the enemy’s defensive operationand that can be degraded with available EWassets.

Weapons StatusThe need for responsive fires is a driving forcein the assignment of tactical missions to fieldartillery units of the entire force. Yet,individual units must displace from time totime. They must rearm refuel, and maintainthe weapons if they are to provide the supportexpected. This is particularly true of certainweapon systems, such as the MLRS or thesemiautonomous howitzer improvementprogram (HIP) howitzer.

MLRS. The fire planner can ensure areasonable response time upon which to basehis fire plan by prescribing response postureoptions to the launchers. A detailed discussionof several options for the MLRS is in TC 6-60.To facilitate our main attack and thesupporting attack operations, the fire plannershould assign the hot status for MLRS units toensure immediate response time for thissystem.

Sustainment for and continued fire supportfrom MLRS can be facilitated by assigningsome elements (launchers) a cold status whennot needed for immediately responsive

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support. These two options, or statuses, maybe described as follows:

All operational launchers are placed in thehot (go) status during surge conditions,such as a full attack scenario. Weapons sodesignated are expected to respond to afire mission immediately. Launchers are ina position that eliminates or reduces thedistance, if any, necessary to displacebefore firing. Crews are on board and fullyalert. Estimated time of first round fired is2 minutes.

A cold (no-go) status extends the firemission execution time by 30 minutes.Operations officers must order an upgradefrom cold to hot as soon as a hot system isprocessing a mission. This is to maintaincontinuity of hot systems.

HIP Howitzer. In the case of the semi-autonomous HIP howitzer, the unit may bedirected to limit survivability moves duringcritical phases of the operation. This ensuresthe maximum number of howitzers areavailable for firing.

CommunicationsEffective command and control, as well ascoordination, depends heavily upon com-manders, staffs, and subordinate commandersexchanging battlefield information on a timelybasis. Although wire-dependent communica-tions assume a smaller role, the mobilesubscriber equipment system helps offset thisloss in capability. Radios provide the primarymeans of communication for fire supportcoordination.

SurveyThe establishment of a common survey grid isa command responsibility within each unifiedcommand. It is essential for the effectivemassing of indirect-fire systems.

Survey planning begins with understanding themaneuver commander’s intent and receivingthe FSCOORD’s guidance. During planning,full consideration must be given to thecommander’s concept, priorities, tacticalsituation, survey control available, desiredaccuracy, number of installations, andMETT-T factors. This information can betranslated into survey requirements for thetarget acquisition sensors and the designatedattack systems, which must be on a commongrid by the time required. Aggressive surveyplanning that answers who, where, when, why,and how is absolutely essential to ensuremission success.

Planning and coordination originate at thecorps survey planning and coordinationelement (SPCE), which is directed by thecorps survey planning and coordination officer(SPCO). The corps SPCE ensuressynchronization between topographicengineers, division artilleries, and nondivisionalunits and/or systems requiring commoncontrol. Coordination and planning at the divarty SPCE are done by the division artillerysurvey officer assigned to the div arty HHB.The div arty survey plan is further coordinatedat the battalion level with the battalionreconnaissance and survey officer (RSO).Interface among all echelons of commandmust be maintained to ensure that commonsurvey control can be provided to units insupport of maneuver commanders.Coordination and synchronization of the corpssurvey plan are essential to mission success.

Separate field artillery brigades also haveSPCEs organic to their HHBs. They plan andcoordinate the interface of their organic surveyrequirements with those of the corps ordivision SPCEs.

Meteorology

Current ballistic met data must be applied foraccurate artillery fires, battlefield forecasts,

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radiological fallout predictions, and targetacquisition. This information is in the form ofmet messages provided by the artillery metsections. Met sections are assigned to div arty,FA brigades, and FA battalions of separatebrigades. It is the responsibility of thecommanders (coordinating with the met officerand the S3 or G3) to position the met sectionsto best measure the atmosphere for support ofall firing units involved.

Planning and use of the met section beginswith the maneuver commander’s intent, theFSCOORD’s guidance, and the battlefieldweather conditions. During the planning, fullconsideration must be given to the following

Commander’s concept.

Mission priorities (type of met datarequired).

Tactical situation and security.

Prevailing winds (determine met sectionlocation).

Location of units supported.

Section III. RESERVE

Description

Location of other met sections.

Communications facilities.

Coordination and planning for met supportbegin at corps artillery with the corps ballisticmeteorology manager (CBMM), theFSCOORDs, and the FSOs, The CBMMestablishes liaison with all units involved andcoordinates the met support requirements. Theprimary consideration is that the met stationmust be located where the sounding of theatmosphere will best represent the met needsof the supported units.

A typical corps artillery configuration mayinclude two met sections positioned forward,where they can best sound the atmospherethrough which most weapon trajectories willpass. They provide ballistic and targetacquisition met data. Also, one section may beat the rear to provide upper air data forUSAF weather teams. This informationsupports aviation missions, determinationchemical warning areas, predictionradiological fallout areas, and preparationweather forecasts.

OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT

Contingencies for the use of reserves normallyare a part of the corps or division plan. In theoffense, a sizable reserve force exists. At thecorps, the reserve may be a division; while atthe division the fixed figure for a reserve forceshould not be estimated. Reserves can –

Deal with enemy counterattacks.

Reinforce or maintain momentum.

Sustain the attack of committed units.

Deal with a level III rear area threat.

Provide security.

OF ATTACK

ofofof

Complete the destruction of enemy forces.

Secure deep objectives.

Open the next phase of a campaign ormajor operation by seizing objectivesbeyond the defined area.

Allocation

In organizing the artillery for combat and inallocating other fire support assets, thefollowing must be considered:

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A plan for the use of fire support organicto or habitually supporting the reserveforce until it is committed.

Provision of adequate support to the forceat the time of commitment.

Factors of METT-T.

Scheme of maneuver.

Missions of GS to the force, GSR to a div artyof a committed division and DS to a brigadeare ideal missions for artillery of a reserveforce. Positioning and ammunitionexpenditures can be controlled by the forceartillery that has overall responsibility for firesupport. This helps the units make an easytransition to their on-order missions once theirforce is committed. The GS or GSR missionalso permits the unit to continue fire planningfor its on-order mission without being tooinvolved in the current battle.

Once the reserve is committed, all on-ordermissions are executed. Depending on themission of the committed reserve, normallymore than the organic or habitually supportingfire support is provided. Augmenting fires areprovided by–

Reinforcing artillery from corps assets orother div arty units now assuming a reservemission.

TACAIR.

Naval gunfire, when available.

Other agencies when used asmeans.

fire support

Similarly, the targeting effort also focuses nowon supporting the newly committed unit toensure success.

Units assigned to rear security operations tocounter level III threats or units that have

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follow-and-support missions are not consideredin reserve. They require their own organic firesupport or habitually supporting DS FAbattalion. However, if only one brigade of adivision has the rear area security mission,only that brigade needs its supporting DS FAbattalion. Meanwhile, the other artillerybattalions can be used to augment the fires ofother committed units.

If the likelihood of commitment for thereserve force is immediate, the organic orhabitually supporting artillery must be inposition to support the force. Therefore, onlylimited support to committed elements may beprovided by these units to ensure timelytransition to their on-order missions.

Fire SupportConsiderations

Plan fires to support the commitment of thereserve during movement. Fires are planned –

On the flanks to protect the force.

On the way to the objective.

On the objective to suppress, neutralize, ordestroy targets.

Beyond the objective to preventcounterattacks, to help consolidate theobjective, and to prevent reinforcement ofthe objective area.

On enemy elements that have beenby passed.

Plan deceptive fires to deceive the enemy intothinking the reserve is committed elsewhere.These may be massed fires and smokedelivered on forward enemy elements.

Plan mass fires at the breakthrough point or atthe point of assault to create a hole in theenemy defenses. Plan heavy suppressive fires

FM 6-20-30

throughout the breakthrough area. Fires arecontinuous until maneuver closes.

Fire support coordinating measures such asCFLs must be well forward to ensure the forcewill not outrun them.

Plan to rearm refit, and refuel organic andsupporting fire support before assumption ofthe on-order missions.

Section IV. RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

EmploymentReconnaissance and security operations arecharacterized by smaller forces spread overlarge areas. Generally, these forces are neededduring a movement to contact which consistsof a covering force, an advance guard, and rearand flank security forces.

ReconnaissanceOperations

Reconnaissance operations are used to gatherinformation through either route, zone, or areareconnaissance. Fire support contributes to thereconnaissance efforts by using aerial andground observers, sensors, and radars to gathercombat information and intelligence.

Fire Support TasksFire support tasks are as follows:

Orient on the location or movement of thereconnaissance objective.

Report all information quickly andaccurately.

Help the force retain freedom ofmaneuver.

Provide deceptive fires.

AllocationConsider attaching FA assets to thereconnaissance force.

Fire Support Planningand Coordination

FA units must have mobility equalthe supported force.

supported

to that of

Main body FA units should be positioned tosupport reconnaissance elements if possible.

Fire plans should be executed only if surpriseis lost. It is not normally the intent of thereconnaissance elements to become engagedwith an enemy force.

Plan UAV and TAR missions to help gathercombat information and to avoid physicalcontact with the enemy.

Security Operations

Covering Forces

These are self-contained forces, operating atextended distances from the main body. Acovering force is expected to penetrate theenemy’s security zone, locate forces in themain defensive belt, and limit the ability of the

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enemy’s security forces to collect intelligenceby stripping away his reconnaissance assets.

Fire Support Tasks. Covering force fire supporttasks are:

Provide responsive fires to covering forceelements. To penetrate the enemy’ssecurity elements without becomingengaged in a direct-fire maneuver battle,fire support must be immediatelyresponsive.

Provide deceptive fires. Deception incovering force operations allows somefreedom of maneuver in one area whilethe enemy’s security elements react inanother. This freedom of maneuver allowsa penetration of security forces.

Allocation. Although the covering force is aself-contained force, it operates as a thin forceover a relatively wide front. Normally, anarmored cavalry regiment is tasked to be thecovering force in a corps movement tocontact; however, a division also may betasked. In either case, the relative combatpower of the corps covering force to the maindefense of the enemy is unbalanced.

Fire support allocations to the covering forcemust make up for the combat powerimbalance. For field artillery, this meansextreme decentralization of assets. The corpsshould consider attaching FA brigade units tothe covering force to provide enough FA ofone DS battalion for each maneuver battalion-or squadron-size element. If possible, amixture of calibers in the covering force (155mm and 203 mm) helps to deceive the enemyas to the composition of the force. The mix ofcalibers, which may be achieved through cross-attachment, also maximizes the advantages ofboth weapon systems:

155-mm weapons provide rapid responsetime and a mix of munitions.

203-mm weapons provide a heavy punchand greater nuclear and chemicalcapabilities.

Other fire support allocations to the coveringforce may include CAS on ground or stripalert, EW, and UAV for reconnaissance andtarget location. Field artillery elements withinthe main body should be positioned so as tobe responsive to covering force units whenpossible. This may be difficult for cannonunits; but the MLRS, if positioned forward inthe main body, can provide fires againstenemy high-value targets in the main defensivebelt. MLRS fires also provide a greatermixture of calibers responsive to the coveringforce.

Fire Support Planning and Coordination. Plan forhasty attack and/or hasty defense. The coveringforce may encounter a formidable force withwhich it must become engaged. If possible, thecovering force will attack. If a hasty attack isnot possible, the covering force must prepare ahasty defense and plan a deliberate attack orallow the main body to pass through andattack.

Plan for a passage of lines by main bodyforces (see Chapter 6).

Plan nuclear and chemical fires to blockenemy avenues of approach and to denyessential terrain to the enemy.

Plan UAV, AFSO, and Air Forcereconnaissance to help locate the enemybefore physical contact.

Fire support coordinating measures should bepermissive and on-order but well in front ofthe rapidly moving covering force. (CFLsshould be established in conjunction withphase lines [PLs].)

Positions for FA units are best planned andcoordinated by FSCOORDs and their FSOs.

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Displacement will be frequent, and positionsmust be coordinated well in advance.

Fire plans should be simple yet as detailed aspossible. Modification of fire plans must beexpected throughout the covering forceoperation. Most fires will be fires againsttargets of opportunity.

Advance Guard and FlankSecurity Forces

These are normally furnished and controlledby the main body forces, while rear securityforces normally operate under corps control.The advance guard must maintain contact withthe covering force; and usually, it furnishes aliaison element to the covering forceheadquarters. The advance guard performsreconnaissance, conducts attacks, and delays ordefends as necessary to give the main bodytime to react. Security forces (flank and rear)normally perform a screening mission becauseof the extensive distances covered by a movingcorps.

Fire Support Tasks. Fire support tasks for guardand screening forces include the following:

Responsive fire support for the securityforces. The limited numbers of maneuverunits over a large area (especially for ascreening force) require very responsivefire support.

Fires to prevent decisive engagement ofsecurity forces or to support decisiveengagements when unavoidable.

Suppressive, screening (smoke), andillumination fires to allow freedom ofmovement.

Nuclear and chemical fires to block enemyapproaches and deny terrain.

Allocation. As security forces operate at somedistance from the main body, FA units may

need to be attached to the supported force.Air support, to include CAS and tactical airreconnaissance, also must be allocated tosecurity forces, as they may become engagedwith a far superior force.

Main body FA elements should be positionedto support security forces whenever possible.This may require nonstandard tactical missionsfor the main body FA. For example, a mainbody FA battalion may be given a nonstandardtactical mission of DS with second priority forcalls for fire to the security force headquarters.

Fire Support Planning and Coordination. An FAforce attached to a security force must be asmobile as the supported force. In afast-moving corps movement to contact, overextended distances, mobile FA units arenecessary to keep up with the maneuver force.

Positioning FA units is best done throughclose coordination between maneuver and FAheadquarters. The FSCOORD (FSO) is in thebest position at the maneuver CP to locate,plan, and coordinate subsequent position areas.Displacements are required often and must becoordinated well in advance.

Mixed calibers of FA weapons usually are notpossible in guard and screening missions.However, main body FA can be maderesponsive to these security forces if the FA ispositioned forward and to the flanks of themain force.

Tactical air reconnaissance and UAV missionsmay be used to help develop the situation.Other aerial sensor information from corpsmay be linked directly or indirectly to securityelements.

If available, COLTs and/or AFSOs designatetargets for laser-guided munitions. Engagementof command and control vehicles before thesituation develops allows the supported forceto gain and retain the initiative.

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Section V. DEEP OPERATIONS

DescriptionNormally, corps offensive operations focus onenemy units and support systems to the rear ofthe main defensive belt. Division deepoperations normally focus on the maindefensive belt second-echelon units andsupport. Fire support for deep operations mayinclude the fires of field artillery, rockets,missiles, and air support; and lethal andnonlethal command, control, and communica-tions countermeasures (C3CM).

Deep operations may include the attack of thefollowing general target types (notall-inclusive):

Follow-on echelons of the enemy.

Independent tank regiments and/orbattalions.

Attack helicopter units.

C2 and fire direction nodes and facilities.

Air defense systems.

Nuclear delivery systems.

AllocationAdequate fire support attack means andacquisition sensors must be identified andalerted for a possible deep operationscommitment. Field artillery ammunition andfuel must be provided at the critical time andplace. Army aviation assets must be retaineduntil the force commander decides to employhis deep option. The factors that should beconsidered when designating potential deepfire support assets are discussed below.

Field artillery unitstactical missions

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may require nonstandardor modified command

relationships. This involves the establishmentof ammunition expenditure restrictions andpositioning instructions for accompanying FAunits aimed at conserving fuel.

Fire support assets committed to the closeoperation may be required to provide SEADfires for tactical air and Army aviation assetsengaged in deep operations.

Specific fire support coordinating measuresmust be implemented. Airspace coordinationareas (ACAs) must be established inconjunction with air corridors. Restrictive firelines (RFLs) may be used to delineate thefires of converging ground and air forces.

AFSOs may be used to facilitate fire supportcoordination and execution.

Deep TargetingConsiderations

Usually, targeting for fires and nonlethal attackmeans is focused on planned engagements. Aplanned engagement entails some degree ofprearrangement such as general targetlocation, weapon system designation andpositioning, and munition selection. Plannedengagements may be scheduled for a particulartime or may be keyed to a friendly or enemyevent. Other planned engagements may bespecified by target type and may be on callbased on the characteristics of the target; forexample, dwell time or high-payoffconsiderations. Unplanned engagements maybe conducted, but they must satisfy the samerelevancy criteria as those of the plannedengagement.

The targeting effort is performed by the planscell. FM 6-20-10 details the members andduties of this functional grouping (cell) foreach echelon.

FM 6-20-30

Intelligence Preparation of theBattlefield

IPB, collection operations and management,and intelligence production are the keyfunctional processes underlying IEWcontributions to the deep fires decide-detect-deliver methodology. The maneuvercommander’s most critical role at everyechelon in deep fires is in the decide phase.The decisions made here guide those who planand control subordinate actions. They providethe frame of reference necessary forappropriate focus and synchronization of theassets available to the commander.

Decide PhaseSpecific IEW contributions to the decide phaseinclude the following:

Situation development (ASPS of the corpsCP support element).

Target development (ASPS of the corpsCP support element).

Collection management (collection,management, and dissemination [CM&D]section of the corps CP support element).

Situation Development. Situation develop- mentincludes the processing of all-source data tosupport battle management. It also includesdeveloping and forwarding all-source reportsand displays on the projected or currentenemy situation. IPB provides a framework forsituation development and guides missionplanning, collection, and analysis.

Target Development. Target development isbased on the commander’s target selection andattack criteria. It includes the processing of all-source data to propose targets for nominationand the reporting of target damage assessment(TDA) (discussed in the deliver phase). Targetdevelopment consists of the followingfunctional procedures:

Developing criteria.

Processing immediate targets.

Developing and nominating targets.

Performing target damage assessment.

Members of the plans cell concentrate onlocating high-value targets for consideration ashigh-payoff targets. High-payoff targets arethen arranged in a high-payoff target matrix.

Collection Management. On the the basis ofcommander’s intent, concept of operation,guidance on what targets should be acquiredand/or attacked, and target selection standards,the G2 formulates his collection plan (whereand when should targets be found and whocan find them?). The collection plan is adynamic tool used to coordinate and integratethe efforts of all collection units and agencies.Collection management is cyclic. It begins byprocessing information requirements (IR).These requirements may take many forms andare generated by many sources; for example,the commander’s PIR and IR, targeting needs,taskings from higher echelons, and requests forinformation from subordinate and adjacentcommands. In corps and division operations,most of these requirements are based oninformation needs associated with named areasof interest (NAIs) and target areas of interest(TAIs) developed through IPB. Once require-ments are analyzed, the element mustdetermine collection resource capability andavailability. After availability is determined,units and agencies are selected and tasked toacquire and report information. During thisprocess, all units and agencies are consideredfor tasking against every requirement. Capableassets are selected by a process of elimination,Collector and ASPS reports are thenmonitored throughout the collection process toensure that intelligence and information arereported to the right user in a timely manner.

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Target development, aided by the collectionmanagement process, is a cooperative effortbetween the G2, G3, and FSCOORD. The G2identifies specific target sets associated withthose critical Threat functions that couldinterfere with the friendly course of action.The G2’s analysis of the ability of the corps ordivision to find relevant targets must becoupled with the FSCOORD’s analysis of hisability to attack them. The FSCOORDdetermines availability of fire support assetsand ammunition status. The commander thenmakes the final decision on relevant targets,attack means, and priorities for bothacquisition and attack.

NOTE: For additional discussion, see FM 6-20-10.Additional coordination is made with echelonsabove corps and the Army BCE, located at the AirForce TACC. Thus, the necessary total AirLandBattle Interface is provided.

Detect PhaseSensors. IEW sensors are cued to providespecific information on the high-payoff targetsselected for actual attack during the decidephase. This usually is done while the sensorsare conducting their routine collection efforts.The sensors give the artillery system last-minute target updates just before launch.

Tactical Missile System. The tactical missilesystem (TACMS) requires that validinformation on target locations be provided tothe deep fires system no later than 30 minutesbefore launch in a centralized mode and innear real time in a decentralized mode. Theinformation which must be provided by theIEW sensors during this time consists of thefour items discussed below.

Target Description. Target descriptions provideshort summaries of what the target is; forexample, a battalion assembly area or aregimental CP.

Target Location. Target locations are given inUTM grid coordinates of at least six digits.Altitude is included if possible. Geographiccoordinates to the nearest minute may berequired in some circumstances; for example,for deep battle air support.

Target Location Error. Each sensor type has anassociated target location error (TLE).Analysts must ensure that the TLE associatedwith the target description meets theguidelines established in the attack criteria.

Dwell Time. Dwell time, or how long a target isexpected to be at a designated location, isrequired for critical targets. If a time cannotbe determined, the SOP established by the firesupport system will be used to execute a firingor jamming mission. Accurate dwell timespreclude reacting to old data that normallywould cause wasted expenditure of resources,including ammunition.

Confirmation. Because execution time will beconstrained, confirming detections can bebased upon single-source sensor data when atleast three conditions exist:

The single-source sensor must be onlyconfirming activity previously identified byall-source detection.

The sensor must be capable of reliable dis-crimination and locational accuracy.

The sensor must be capable of quicklycommunicating processed data to the corpsCP.

These three criteria are met by the followingsystems:

Guard Rail common sensor system.

COrpS IEW UAV system.

Joint surveillance and target attack radarsystem (J-STARS).

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Deliver PhaseFire Mission Processing. Deep, operational firesare delivered with different attack means, suchas field artillery tactical missiles. In terms ofC3, these fire missions are executed in either acentralized or decentralized manner or acombination of the two. The postattackassessment is a critical aspect of the deliverstage. It enables the fire support and IEWsystems to determine the effectiveness offriendly deep fires and nonlethal attack means.This assessment determines the degree towhich the attack has succeeded, and itprovides an input back into the targetingsystem for future reference.

Quick Fire Channels. Most deep targets aredetected through the all-source analysisperformed in the ASPS. However, sinceexecution time will be constrained,confirmation of target trigger event detection

can be based on single-source sensor data ifthe enemy target behavior has been previouslyderived from all-source analysis. Quick firechannels may be established for this purposeand also to provide last-minute target datadirectly to the firing unit.

DeceptionDeception measures can contribute to thesuccess of deep operations and should beconsidered. These measures can be used todeceive the enemy as to the nature, time, orlocation of the deep operation. Fire supportdeception measures may include the following:

Deception fires.

False transmission on fire support nets.

Movement of artillery.

Description

Section VI. REAR OPERATIONS

OperationsRear operations are defined as those actions,including area damage control, taken by allunits (combat, combat support [CS], CSS, andhost nation), singly or in a joint or combinedeffort, to secure the force, neutralize or defeatenemy operations in the rear area, and ensurefreedom of action in deep and closeoperations.

For purposes of this discussion, rear operationsmay be at all echelons down to division butnot including brigade rear areas, which actuallyare considered to be part of the MBA. Therear area starts with the brigade rear boundaryand extends through the boundary to the corpsrear line.

Corps rear operations are those activities fromthe corps rear boundary forward to the rear

boundaries of committed maneuver unitswhich are conducted to ensure the corpsfreedom of maneuver and continuity ofoperations, including continuity of sustainmentand command and control. The corps mustsynchronize the rear operations functions ofterrain management, security, sustainment, andmovement with the corps closeoperations, in consonance withcommander’s concept and intent.

Threat Activities

Soviet doctrine emphasizes the

and deepthe corps

integratedconduct of tactical operations in their enemy’srear. The purpose of these operations is toseize and maintain the initiative whiledegrading or eliminating their enemy’sflexibility and capability to sustain combatoperations. To achieve these aims, Threatactivities in a corps rear area target keyfacilities to include:

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Nuclear weapon storagesystems.

Critical corps command,communications facilities.

Air defense sites.

Reserve assembly areas.

and delivery

control, and

Critical support and logistic facilities.

Three levels of response to Threat activitiesserve as a guide for planning rear operations.Rather than focusing on the size or type ofthreat, these levels focus on the nature offriendly actions needed to defeat the threat:

Level I threats are those which can bedefeated by base or base cluster self-defense measures.

Level II threats are those which arebeyond base or base cluster self-defensecapabilities but which can be defeated byresponse forces, normally military police(MP) with supporting fires.

Level III threats are those whichnecessitate the command decision tocommit a corps combined arms tacticalcombat force to defeat them.

These Threat activities will not necessarilyoccur in a specific order, nor is there anecessary interrelationship between threatlevels. The corps rear area may face one ormore levels of Threat activities at one time.Also, some level I and II Threat activities willlikely begin well ahead of general hostilities.

In addition to the Soviet capabilities outlinedabove, their doctrine integrates into their deepoperations planning tactical air force andattack helicopter strikes; the delivery oflong-range artillery, missiles, and rockets; andradio electronic combat. Thus, the complexityof Soviet deep operations capabilities anddoctrine posesrear operations.

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a formidable threat to corps

Defense Against Threat ActivitiesUnits are responsible for their own defenseagainst level I threats. Each base or base clustercommander is responsible to detect defeat andminimize the effects of level I threats and to limitthe effects of a level II threat. The best defenseinvolves aggressive preparation of fightingpositions, use of camouflage, sound and aggressiveguard and security procedures, well-rehearsedreaction forces and evacuation plans, artillery firesplanned in defense of positions, and so forth. Inall cases the planning and reaction time will beminimal. It is possible that defeat of a strong levelII force may require use of a reaction force ardorindirect fire. The key to success will be locatingtracking and fixing the enemy.

Fire SupportRarely will there be enough fire support assetsavailable to satisfy the needs of deep operations,the MBA, and the rear area at the same time.The availability and timely use of fire support inrear operations are critical to the commander’soverall battle plan. Rear operations are importantto sustain the MBA forces and to ensure freedomof action throughout the theater. A successful rearoperation may not directly affect the outcome ofclose or deep operations. However, its failure maydestroy a commander’s ability to conductsustained combat operations and ultimatelyachieve campaign goals. Indirect-fire assetsnormally are not available, nor necessarilydesirable, for employment against a level I threat.Operations against a level II or III threat requirethe timely application of fire support to ensure thedefeat of the rear threat.

With few exceptions, indirect-fire assets shouldnot be employed against a level I threat or againstthose level II threat forces that can be defeated bybase or base cluster units or by the reaction force.These are usually individual or small-unitoperations, of limited scope and duration, andprovide too fleeting a target for successfulengagement. Enemy forces, battalion or larger,which could comprise a level III threat have the

FM 6-20-30

size, combat power, and identifiability whichwould require the use of indirect-fire assets.

Rear operations are also a command responsibility.The operations cell of the rear CP is the tacticalcenter that controls rear operations at eachechelon. Operations in the rear of brigade, division,or corps areas will have a profound effect on theconduct of close and deep operations. Therefore,such operations must be anticipated and plansmust be devised to defeat the rear enemy. Allplans, to include fire support for rear operations,are passed through the tactical chain of commandto the rear CP.

The forces already on station are responsiblefor fighting the rear enemy initially. Theimmediate problem for the commanderresponsible for rear operations is how tomanipulate his limited resources, including firesupport, at the right time and place. Consider-ations that affect the application of firesupport for rear operations are as follows:

The reduction of fire support to the mainbattle effort.

The suitability as determined by the overalltactical situation.

The responsiveness of the available weaponsystems.

The precision and collateral damage effectsof the weapon systems.

The existence of communications nets tofacilitate fire support activities.

The availability of observers to identifytargets and adjust fires.

Potentially, the whole spectrum of fire supportsystems is available for deployment in rearoperations. Practically, some are more suitablethan others and all depend on the factors ofMETT-T.

The FS cell is responsible for continuousevaluation of fire support assets available for

rear operations. A Prioritized list should bedeveloped and coordinated with the operationscell of the rear CP. As close and deepoperations change the status of these firesupport assets, this list must be updated. Onlyin this way can effective fire support bequickly provided to counter a level III threator a level II threat which cannot be defeatedby base or base cluster forces or by thedesignated reaction force.

Field ArtilleryTwo options are available for the deploymentof artillery to support rear operations.

The first option is that artillery can be organizedfor combat to support the close operations (thecovering force and the main battles) with on-ordermissions given to selected units for rearcontingency plans. Artillery so organized must becapable of firing throughout 6,400 mils. It may beable to cover brigade rear areas from its forwardpositions. However, to engage targets for divisionand corps rear areas, it must be ready to displacerapidly to the rear. If attacks occur at the sametime in the main and rear areas – a likelycontingency– there will be conflicting priorities forfire support. There is also a time factor problemwith this plan in that artillery may have to displaceup to 50 kilometers (km) to engage targets in thecorps rear area. The time for this deployment mayrender its support ineffective. Furthermore, ittakes artillery already committed to closeoperations away from the main battle for anunspecified period of time. There are variations tothis option. Corps artillery may be used to coverdivision and brigade rear areas but be positionedto fire at maximum range into the MBA.

The second option is the allocation of someartillery to the tactical combat force assignedto counter level II and level III threats. Thereis some merit to this idea, since one battalionsplit into battery fire bases could cover aconsiderable area of the rear zone. The use ofair assault artillery in this role would facilitatecoverage of the rear and speed response times.

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Generally, the farther away from the FLOT theincursion occurs, the less likelihood there is thatthe threat may be met by FA sources. In the rearareas of the theater army, it is possibile that FAunits either transiting or reconstituting may beused to provide fire support. However, thelikelihood that they will be in range, completewith basic load and fuel, and in communicationwith the operations cell of the rear CP is remote.

Priority for MLRS is at present to deepoperations. Although its range enables it tocover a large area of the rear, its ammunitiontype is unsuitable for close support and is aptto create extensive collateral damage.

If a target is within range, if an observer canengage the target, and if he has the communi-cations to contact the firing unit, then FA remainsthe single most responsive all-weather,day-and-night fire support system for rearoperations.

MortarsNormally, mortars have insufficient range toengage rear areas, unless they happen to be inthe vicinity of an attack. If reserve infantrybattalions are in the vicinity, they may bedeployed as a tactical combat force to defeatthe threat; then their organic mortars wouldbe of value. In the light role, mortars could beinserted by helicopter to provide animmediate asset until other systems can bedeployed. They would require a secure basefrom which to operate and a logistical backupif they were to sustain fire support for alengthy period of time.

Ammunition considerations for both artilleryand mortars should, if time is available,include a request for ammunition forimmediate consumption. The required supplyrate (RSR) also must be increased to handlerear area (unforecast) consumption. The useof FASCAM should be severely limited.Under most conditions, it even should beruled out.

Close Air SupportCAS provides a swift response to a threat in anyarea Immediate CAS can be requested throughTACPs at maneuver command posts and throughthe rear CP operations cell. Aircraft can bedirected to any part of the battlefield withinminutes and can deliver an extensive range ofmunitions with precision accuracy. Terminal controlpresents, perhaps, the single largest problem forCAS. Most CAS aircraft must be guided onto atarget, by voice and/or procedure control or bylaser designation. Most CAS depends on weatherand daylight. Fratricide is a real possibility and mustbe minimized in rear operations.

AC-130H SpectreGunships provide a suitable rear area fire supportsystem. The reduced threat from air-to-air andground-to-air antiaircraft weapon systems, togetherwith its day-and-night capability and high volume offirepower, makes this aircraft ideally suited for reararea fire support It does have a VHF ground-link-to-observer capability; but it can also loiter over thetarget area acquire its own gun targets, and controlits own engagement. Its weapon array of two20-mm Vulcan cannons, one 40-mm cannon, andone 105-mm howitzer makes the system suitablefor engagement of all types of threat.

Naval GunfireNGF may be suitable for rear area fire supportwhen deployed in general support of a division orwhen given a nonstandard mission for rear areasupport. The suitability of NGF depends on theantishipping threat the hydrography of the area,and the ability of the ship to range suitable targets.One important factor is the large range dispersionpattern, particularly for the 16-inch gun, whichmust be considered in conjunction with assessmentof collateral damage.

Army AviationAviation brigades are units of which some elementsmay be used to provide fire support. Theadvantages of these units are their firepower,

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reaction time, mobility, and ability to engage atarget with precision and without the use of groundobservers. They are also responsive on Armycommunications nets. Attack helicopters provideone of the most readily available assets to engagerear area incursions. They have the command andcontrol structure, the mobility, and the firepower toengage large Threat forces autonomously, rapidly,and decisively. For attacks in the rear area, Armyaviation in conjunction with CAS is probably themost effective form of attack. For EAC, it isprobably the only means of attack that canneutralize the enemy swiftly and completely.

If available, AFSOs in OH-58D helicopters are apossible choice to support the rear area tacticalcombat force. They can help find the enemy forceand quickly bring artillery fires on that force.AFSOs could be employed when the aviationbrigade is the rear area tactical combat force.

Host Nation SupportIn certain areas, host nation support (HNS)provides CAS, artillery, and mortars. For example,there is a well-defined infrastructure in theGerman Territorial Army. The Territorial Army issubdivided into three commands throughoutGermany; each command is subdivided intodivision-size units called Wehrbereichskommando(WBK). Each WBK has a number of HomeDefense Brigades, organized along regular armybrigade lines. Each brigade has a battalion of fieldhowitzers in close support. Two of the fourmaneuver battalions are equipped with 120-mmmortars. US Army units in the rear areas canexpect to receive fire support from heavy mortars,105-mm and 155-mm howitzers, and German AirForce CAS. The normal practice of exchangingliaison personnel among allies working incombined operations greatly facilitates suchrequests for support.

Fire Support Coordinating MeasuresThe primary fire support coordinating measures(Appendix F) are restrictive measures– restrictivefire areas and lines. They should be established by

the operations cell of the rear CP. The proceduresfor establishing fire support coordinating measuresin the rear area must become part of the overallplanning process. Forces employed to deal with alevel III force in the rear normally are given anarea of operation. The establishment of a boundarywithin the rear and the possible addition of a forcefire support officer require close coordination withthe rear FSO. These measures should be reviewedroutinely by higher headquarters; posted on rearCP operations maps; entered into TACFIRE; andgiven to the Air Force, reaction forces, and anyTCF. Fire support coordinating measures thatapply to rear area operations are discussed below.

Restrictive Fire Area. A restrictive fire area (RFA)could be established around a base or base clusteror along a main supply route (MSR). No fires oreffects of fires are allowed inside the RFA unlessrequested by the base or base cluster commander.This permits fires in support of the base withoutthe additional step of clearing those fires with theestablishing authority. Fires along MSRs also arepermitted without closing the MSR to our ownresupply and troop movement. The restriction onthe RFA can be on certain types of munitions (forexample, no scatterable mines or no Air Force500-pound or larger bombs with delay fuzes). Theestablishing authority can allow the use of thesemunitions if they are deemed necessary.

No-Fire Area. A no-fire area (NFA) could beestablished around population centers and criticalfacilities. This prevents any fire into these areasunless authorized by the establishing authority orin cases of immediate self-defense.

Restrictive Fire Line. An RFL should be establishedby the commander of combined forces. This shouldbe done when using a tactical combat force. If thetactical force is non-US, the RFL must beestablished at the combined force headquarter thatcontrols both the US and the non-US forces.

EAC-Host Nation InterfaceAt EAC, fire support coordinating measuresmust be coordinated extensively with the host

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nation. They may, in fact, be established bythe host nation. This coordination must ensurea common understanding of graphics and theexact meaning of the measures used.

Fire PlanningOverall fire planning responsibility belongs tothe rear operations commander. He is assistedby his fire support staff members in the rearoperations cell. It is anticipated that most fireswill be on targets of opportunity.

Positioning ConsiderationsThe supporting artillery must be positioned tosupport rear operations. Positioning coordinationwith the rear CP operations cell is necessary toavoid fratricide of CS and CSS units anddestruction of critical supplies when field artilleryand other fire support means receive Threatcounterfire. This action also facilitates the abilityof the rear CP to coordinate terrain managementmovement control, and sustainment.

ObserversThe FA battalion personnel at all levels arepossible target sources in the brigade area becauseof the high density of troops in the zone. Thesepersonnel include FS cells of maneuver units inreserve; gun battery reconnaissance, survey, andoccupation of position (RSOP) and survey parties;and trains personnel. Distances at brigade levelmay be short enough for redeployment in a timelymanner. From division back to theater army areacommand (TAACOM), the likelihood of observersalready in position with communications isremote. Some repositioning would be necessary.

Aerial fire support observers and aeroscouts fromthe aviation brigade form a readily responsive,mobile asset. AFSOs can adjust artillery fire, andthe aeroscouts have the necessary communicationsto provide emergency final CAS control.

Normally, military police are designated as theechelon reaction force. They are in place in the

rear areas and have intimate knowledge of localterrain. They are trained in the adjustment of FAbut not in the control of CAS.

Army target acquisition assets available for rearoperations are limited. Most facilities are orientedto the close and deep operations. However,depending on the threat, the commander mayreallocate some resources to the rear on anon-call basis. Some readily available assets can beoriented quickly to assist acquisition in the rear.These include the Mohawk-borne side-lookingairborne radar (SLAR), side-looking infrared(SLIR), Quick Look (noncommunications emitterdetection), and aerial photographic equipment.Also, the Guard Rail communications detectionsystem is available through Army channels. TheAir Force has a number of assets available. Theseinclude airborne warning and control system(AWACS), SLAR, AC-130 Spectre (withforward-looking infrared [FLIR] andlow-light-level TV), photo imagery, and,ultimately, J-STARS. Some of these may betasked to provide accurate locations for predictedfire support.

Fire Support Commandand Control

The principles of fire support planning andcoordination in the rear areas do not differsignificantly from those in the forward areas.There is, however, a difference in the facilitiesavailable. MBA maneuver units are well- servedby FSOs at all levels from company up to corps,are equipped with quick fire channels to the guns,and are adequately staffed. Rear CPs have onlyLimited manpower and limited communicationsfacilities. Main operations will be fought and wonin the forward areas; and this operation should,naturally, receive the preponderance of assets. Therear area is primarily a reinforcement and logisticzone, whose main function is to facilitate the rapidand efficient resupply of forward fighting units. Itis not conceived as a combat zone. Nevertheless,if a level III attack occurs, or if a level II attackagainst high-priority units cannot be neutralized by

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base, base cluster, or reaction forces, the rear areamay temporarily assume an importance greaterthan that of the close operations. In this case, themaneuver C2 must be agile enough to cope withthe problem for time will preclude the shift of C2

from the main CP to the rear. Similarly, the firesupport planning and coordination channelsshould be able to complement the operationalflexibility and provide rapid application of fire inthe rear. This requires fire support personnel toadvise the rear operations commander; and itrequires communications to plan, coordinate, andcall for fire support.

The nature of command and control in rearoperations varies with the echelon of commandThe theater army rear presents problems whichdo not occur at the brigade. In general, the closerto the FLOT, the easier the problem of commandand control.

DivisionThe FSO, in conjunction with the operationsofficer at the rear CP, is responsible for firesupport planning. They establish and disseminatethe communications procedures (net call signs,and so forth) to be used by rear area elements forplanning and requesting fire support. Bases, baseclusters, and response forces normally request firesupport on the operations net or MCS (MSE,when available) to the rear CP. Calls for firenormally are not initiated by base or base clusters.They report situational information to theresponse force commander and the rear CP, whodetermine indirect-fire requirements and initiatethe request. The response force, whose objectiveis to eliminate the Threat without commitment ofthe TCF, integrates all available fire support intoits plans and operations. If no fire support agencyhas been dedicated to rear operations, responseforce requests for fire are sent to the FSO at therear CP. The request is coordinated at theoperations cell and forwarded to the main FS cell.

The most responsive approach to continue themission depends entirely on the agencyproviding the fire support and the requesting

unit. All indirect fires in the rear area must beobserved fires. The rear FSO should talkdirectly to the agency providing fire supportand the requesting unit on the same net. AnAFSO, if available, can be used for thisfunction. The FSO and/or AFSO provides thelink between the fire support agency and anyuntrained observer. Some assets, such as attackhelicopters and AC-130s, increase interactionbecause of their ability to actually observe thetarget and thus avoid nearby friendly elements.In fact, attack helicopters employed inconjunction with an AFSO may be the mostresponsive and efficient means of providingfire support to the rear area operations.

When the TCF is committed, one net from thesupporting artillery unit can be used as therear fire support net. The rear CP FSO andthe DS artillery unit commander plan fires andposition firing units where they can bestsupport TCF operations. The rear CP FSOmust carefully coordinate fires with rear areaelements to avoid fratrocide.

CorpsThe FSO located with the corps operationsceil of the rear CP conducts fire supportplanning and coordination. He effects firesupport planning and coordination among theoperations cell of the rear CP, the host nation,the corps MP brigade, the nuclear weaponslogistics element (NWLE), the ASOC, thecorps FS cell, the subordinate rear operationscells, and any fire support asset identified toprovide fire support for the rear area. There isno digital interface from the corps operationscell of the rear CP to the corps main FS cell.An option to provide a digital interface is toposition a corps artillery liaison section at therear FSE, if the situation permits.

Fire support planning and coordination forcorps rear operations are similar to those atdivision. The FSO collates base, base cluster,RAOC, and response force fire plans andcoordinates the composite rear operations fire

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support plan with the main FS cell and theTCF. Fire plans and requests for fire arepassed to the rear CP FSE over the rearoperations net or MSC (MSE, if available),except in cases when one net from a dedicatedfire support agency is available for use as therear fire support net.

Should the TCF with its supporting artillery becommitted to a level III threat operation, therear CP FSO will coordinate with the main FScell for additional fire support assets asneeded to assist base, base cluster, RAOC, orresponse forces in countering other level II orIII threat incursions. The TCF will retainpriority of fires. The FSO will provide specificguidance concerning control measures andwho can call for fires (normally limited toresponse forces).

TAACOM and TAACOM AreaSupport Group

Echelons above corps may include TAACOMs asthe next higher headquarters. Requests for firesupport to the TAACOM and/or TAACOM areasupport group (ASG) operations cell arecoordinated by the FS cell and planned by theplans officer. The tasking of fire support assets ispassed from ASG operations cell to TAACOMreserves or corps assets. This tasking should includeinformation about the signal operating instructions(SOI) for fire support assets to contact the ASGoperations FS cells for coordination. At corps andTAACOM there is a requirement for a rearoperations fire support net whose frequency isknown to all transmitting units. This net could bemonitored by all units in the area and bothrequests for fire and fire orders could betransmitted via the FS cell.

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Section VII. EXPLOITATION

Description

Exploitation is an offensive operation thatfollows a successful attack to take advantage ofweakened or collapsed enemy defenses.Indicators for exploitation are as follows:

The enemy is having difficulty maintaininghis position.

Attacking divisions are making decisivegains.

Enemy resistance, particularly supportingfire, is lessening.

Deep surveillance operations detect ageneral enemy withdrawal.

Exploitation can be directed by the next higherheadquarters or initiated by the corpscommander or division commander. Itspurpose is to prevent reconstitution of enemydefenses containing major enemy forces; todisrupt or to capture major enemy reserves; tosecure deep objectives, cutting major lines ofcommunication; and to position forces forfuture operations.

Allocation

Exploiting divisions should have as muchTACAIR as possible. These aircraft can –

Operate effectively when enemy defensesare crumbling.

Quickly deliver massive amounts ofordnance.

Operate across wide and deep sectors.

Seek out, follow, and destroy withdrawingenemy forces.

Present no rearming or refueling burdensto the land force.

Block avenues of approach for counter-attacking enemy forces.

Other fire support required for exploitationforces should be highly mobile and flexible torespond quickly to the needs of maneuver.On-order priorities and on-order missions forfield artillery must be designated to quicklyshift priorities to units within the exploitationforce and/or follow-and-support force ifnecessary.

Control of assets must be decentralizedbecause of the decreased requirement formassed fires and the need for extremelyresponsive fire support. In organizing corpsartillery for combat, attachment to divisionsand, in turn, division artillery should beconsidered. This would ease command andcontrol problems.

Fire Support ConsiderationsIn fire planning for the exploitation, thefollowing types of fires should be considered:

Fires not only in front of the force but alsoto the flanks and rear.

Massed fires on enemy choke points andkey terrain to canalize, slow, and block theenemy movement.

Suppressive fires to fix bypassed enemypockets of resistance until friendlymaneuver elements are safely past andfollow-on forces can deal with them.

Fires that do not create obstacles andbarriers to our own forces and limitforward progress. Chemical and nuclearfires, in particular, can hinder forwardmovement if improperly placed.

Fire support assets should be positioned wellforward and displaced continually.

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Some available CAS should be on groundalert.

Fire support coordination should be completedearly on. Use on-order measures to facilitaterapid emplacement and movement of assets.Consider placing RFLs between the direct-pressure force and the follow-and-supportforce.

Section VIII.

Description

When enemy resistance has broken downentirely, an attack or exploitation may give wayto a pursuit. The objective of the pursuit is tomaintain relentless pressure on the enemy andcompletely destroy him. The pursuit ischaracterized by broad decentralization ofcontrol and rapid movement. Because apursuit is rarely anticipated, forces normallyare not prepared for it. Also, lines ofcommunication become increasingly difficult tosustain. In conventional warfare, pursuits arerare, mainly because a force is not able tosustain such an operation to its completion.

A pursuit operation is basically conducted bytwo attacking elements. One element providescontinuous direct pressure against the enemyacross a broad front, while another highlymobile enveloping element intercepts theenemy’s retreat and destroys him.

AllocationField artillery organization for combat must beextremely decentralized to increaseresponsiveness of fires. Division and corpscommanders should strongly consider attachingFA units to the force conducting a pursuit.

Also, air support must be extremely responsiveto effectively slow the retreat of the enemy.

Sustainment of the force is primarily anexercise in the movement of assets. The abilityof the CSS structure to move forward withfuel, ammunition, and maintenance supportdetermines the limits of advance for the forceand force artillery.

Aerial resupply for units in exploitation is aplanning option for consideration to sustainthe operation.

PURSUIT

Ground or air alert may be necessary toprovide the degree of responsiveness required.

Fire SupportConsiderations

In planning fires for the pursuit, the followingshould be considered:

Provide responsive fire support to both thedirect-pressure force and the encirclingforce.

Provide fires to slow the enemy’s retreatand to allow the enveloping force to catchup. If FASCAM is used to slow theretreat, ensure safety zones for the mine-fields are disseminated.

Provide fires to stop reinforcements.

Use smoke to slow and disrupt the retreat.

Use CAS and attack helicopters againsthard targets and dual-purpose improvedconventional munitions (DPICM) on soft-skinned targets.)

Use quick fire planning techniques forhasty attacks.

Plan for continual displacement of mortarsand FA. Subsequent positions must be

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coordinated through FS cells as early aspossible.

Plan for greater use of retransmissionstation (retrans) communications equip-ment.

NOTE: The AFSO can be equipped to providevoice or digital retrans for short periods.

Provide fires to fix bypassed forces untilfollow-on elements can engage. Considerfree-fire areas around bypassed pockets ofresistance.

Ensure that fire support coordinatingmeasures are well forward to allow for thespeed of the operation.

Plan RFL when necessary between theconverging, enveloping, and direct-pressureforces.

Plan for increased petroleum, oil andlubricants (POL) and ammunition usage.Air transportation of supplies may berequired. Use captured enemy materiel andstocks of supplies when possible.

Plan the use of AFSOs, UAVs, tactical airreconnaissance, and surveillance aircraft.They are necessary for timely and accurateinformation about enemy locations andactivities.

Engage command and control elementswith lethal and nonlethal means to disruptthe enemy’s attempts to consolidate andreorganize.

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CHAPTER 5

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Fire support for defensive operations can be described in terms of adefensive framework presented in FM 100-15. This framework showscorps and divisions using five complementary elements:

Deep operations in the arm well beyond the FLOT.

Security force operations forward and to the flanks offorce.

Defensive operations in the main battle area.

the defending

Reserve operations in support of the main defensive effort.

Rear operations to retain freedom of act/on in the rear area.

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Section I. DEFENSIVE FIRE SUPPORT

DescriptionSuccess in the defense depends on the carefulplanning and execution, “as required, of firesupport simultaneously in deep, close, and rearoperations. Each of the five elements of thedefensive framework must be considered whendetermining fire support requirements.

Basic TasksAs in the offense, corps and divisioncommanders normally ensure adequate firesupport for defensive operations by retainingsome assets and allocating others tosubordinate units. The four basic tasks of firesupport provide the guiding principles:

Support forces in contact.

Support all aspects of the battle plan.

Synchronize fire support.

Support and sustain fire support.

Support Forces in ContactSupporting forces in contact usually meansproviding support for close operations. If donecorrectly, this task ensures the survivability offriendly forces and the freedom of maneuver.The various fire support assets support forcesin contact in various time-tested roles andmissions. The field artillery supports forces incontact in the defense by performing itstraditional roles of close support, counterfire,and interdiction. The Air Force operations ofCAS and SEAD are specifically intended tosupport forces in contact, although BAInormally directly affects ground maneuverforces.

Support the Battle PlanSupporting the force commander’s battle planmeans retaining sufficient assets for anypossible contingency. Fire support assets for

the rear and deep operations must beidentified. Doing this task gives the forcecommander the means to attack high-payofftargets whose destruction, neutralization, orsuppression is necessary for overall missionsuccess. The vagueness of the initial situationin the defense dictates that the forcecommander maintains more centralizedcontrol of his fire support. This is done at firstby keeping more assets under his immediatecontrol or by assigning FA units tacticalmissions that retain fire planning, priority offires, and position authority at higher levels.This ensures responsiveness by those units inmassing and shifting of fires.

Synchronize Fire SupportThe synchronization of fire support at corpsand division is essentially a command function.The FSCOORD is responsible for helping thecommander integrate all fire support with theappropriate battlefield operating systems. Afire support synchronization methodology isfound in the decide-detect-deliver approach totargeting and battle management. Thesuccessful use of this methodology enables thecommander to attack the right target with thebest weapon at the right time. Thus, the forcecommander can take the initiative in selecting,locating, and attacking high-payoff targets.

Support and SustainFire support for defensive operations must besustained through all phases of the operation.Fire support systems must be survivablewithout degradation of availability.

Attack and AcquisitionSystems

Specific fire support attack and acquisitionsystems are allocated through the normalpractices such as field artillery organization forcombat. Assets will be allocated to –

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Provide deep fires to disrupt, delay, anddestroy enemy follow-on forces before theycan engage friendly forces.

Provide counterfire to destroy, neutralize,or suppress the enemy’s indirect-fireweapons.

Provide SEAD to suppress enemy airdefense weapons immediately before andduring flight by friendly aircraft within thearea of operations.

Disorganize, delay, and disrupt criticalenemy elements before the attack.

Use both lethal and nonlethal attack meansto apply constant pressure to the enemy’scommand and control structure.

Acquire and attack high-payoff targetsthroughout the battlefield.

Provide fire support synchronized withmaneuver and command and controlcountermeasures (C2CM) in the conduct ofdeep operations.

Retain centralized control of fire supportresources in order to concentrate fire atthe decisive place and time.

Provide fires to support counterattacks.

Nuclear WeaponsThe allocation of nuclear fires is discussed indetail in FM 100-30. The table belowsummarizes the roles of nuclear weapons indefensive operations.

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Section II. DEEP OPERATIONS

Description

Deep operations begin before the enemycloses with the corps or division and continuethroughout the battle. Deep operations areused to effect closure times of follow-onelements and to create windows of opportunityfor destructive actions against them. Asuccessful deep operation may cause theenemy commander to change his attack planbecause it disrupts his flow of echelons as theymove toward the FLOT.

Allocation

Fire support assets for deep operations areallocated by determining the friendly area ofgreatest vulnerability and predicting where theenemy will conduct his main attack. Specificconsiderations include the following:

The provision of adequate fire support toachieve operational objectives.The destruction of high-payoff targets inenemy follow-on forces.

The delivery of SEAD to support tactical air.

The potential use of Army aviation as ameans of providing deep fires.

The use of AFSOs to facilitate fire supportcoordination and execution during opera-tions.

The use of chemical weapons to delayenemy follow-on forces, disrupt C2, anddeny critical facilities and assets (when useof these weapons has been approved).

The use of nuclear fires to destroy enemyfollow-on forces, C2 facilities, and otherhigh-value targets such as surface-to-surface missiles (when use of theseweapons hasauthority).

been approved by proper

Targeting

The decide-detect-deliver targetingmethodology is used to plan and execute firesupport for deep operations in a defensivesituation just as it is used for the offense.(Refer to Appendix B and FM 6-20-10.)

Section III. SECURITY FORCE OPERATIONS FORWARDFLANKS OF THE DEFENDING FORCE

AND TO THE

Description

Within the AirLand Battle defensiveframework, security forces perform one of twofunctions: screening or covering forceoperations.

Screening force operations for the offense anddefense are similar and require the same firesupport considerations as discussed in Chapter4.

Covering forcefrom those in

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operations in the defense differthe offense in that an enemy

attack is expected. Corps and divisioncommanders plan to use the’ advantages of thedefender to defeat the enemy. To exploit theseadvantages, the covering force must providethe force commander with a developed tacticalsituation that allows the MBA forces toestablish and execute a successful defense.Specifically, the covering force occupies asector far enough forward of the FEBA to –

Protect the MBA units from surprise.

Allow the MBA forces time to preparedefensive positions.

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Prevent delivery of enemy medium-rangeartillery fires against MBA units.

Deceive the enemy as to the location ofthe main defensive positions.

Defeat a specified-size force or exact aspecified percentage of damage to first-echelon forces.

The size and composition of the covering forceand the covering force area depend on themission, enemy, terrain, and available forces.Generally, a forward defensive covering forcearea should be deep enough to force theenemy to reposition his artillery and airdefense forces before he attacks.

The level of command for controlling coveringforces depends on the width and depth of thearea, communications capabilities, availablecontrol headquarters, and the number of unitsin the covering force. Normally, corps anddivisions control their own covering forceoperations. MBA brigade control of coveringforces is less desirable. It takes away assetsfrom the MBA, is difficult to control, andcomplicates reporting.

Fire Support TasksFire support tasks for security forces are asfollows:

Engage the enemy early to strip away hisreconnaissance elements. Specifically, theserecon elements must not infiltrate and slipthrough the covering force. Early fires alsohelp force the enemy to deploy his attackformations.

Assist maneuver in moving and disengag-ing.

Provide SEAD to allow attack helicoptersand Air Force aircraft to attack. Destroyair defense radars located by EW.

Engage engineer mobility detachments toreduce the enemy’s engineer mine-clearingcapability before he arrives in the MBA.

Mass fires that will delay, disrupt, or limitthe enemy’s advance.

Integrate fire and obstacle plans, andensure obstacles are covered by direct.observation.

Allocation of FireSupport

Normally, security forces operate at consider-able distances from their main force and haveonly minimum maneuver combat power.Additional combat power must be provided tosecurity forces in general and to coveringforces in particular. This is done throughdecentralization of fire support assets.Decentralized fire support provides theresponsive firepower needed to–

Make Up for the lack of maneuver inrelation to the large covering force area.

Cause the enemy to deploy, thinking hehas made contact with the MBA forces.

The degree of decentralization depends largelyon the amount of fire support available.Consider assigning–

One DS artillery battalion for eachbattalion-size maneuver element in thecovering force.

Nonstandard tactical missions to MBAartillery units to make them responsive tothe covering force artillery headquarters.

The preponderance of other fire supportassets to the covering force. For example,UAV, CAS, EW, AFSOS, and TACAIRrecon assets must be responsive to thecovering force.

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Considerations for allocating field artillerysupport to the covering force in the defenseare similar to those in the offense as discussedin Chapter 4. Specifically, three factors mustbe considered: attachment, representativecaliber, and mobility of fire support. At times,all of these considerations cannot be metbecause of the availability of types or caliberof weapon systems. Them planners must weighthe factors of METT-T against the overallgoals of the maneuver commander’s intent.

AttachmentCovering forces may operate at great distancesfrom the MBA forces. Therefore, it may bevery difficult to provide adequate support byonly assigning a tactical mission. Problems ofcommand and control may dictate a change tothe normal command relationship. This isparticularly true when covering forces arespread across a wide frontage or throughout adeep zone. The method of attachmentdepends on the control of the covering force.If the covering force is being controlled by theMBA headquarters, attachment of FA forcesis not necessary. Normally, this is not the caseand the covering force has a controllingheadquarters of its own. Likewise, a coveringforce artillery headquarters may be designated.This is often done by attaching an FA brigadeto the covering force. The FA brigadeheadquarters then becomes the force artilleryheadquarters, and the FA brigade commanderis the FSCOORD for the covering force.

Representative Caliber

Artillery supporting covering forces shouldrepresent those cannon and rocket systemssupporting the MBA forces. This helps deceivethe enemy as to the location of our MBA.

Mobility of Fire SupportThe field artillery supportingmust be as mobile as the force

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covering forcesit supports.

Fire Support Planning andCoordination

The keys to successful fire support planningfor the defense, and particularly for thecovering force, are staff interactionsthroughout the targeting process and thecorrect application of IPB and TVA. (See FM6-20-10.) Initial planning should be as detailedas possible to exploit the advantages thecovering force has when operating overfamiliar terrain with prepared defenses. Sincethe enemy has the initiative, predictiveplanning for all courses of action is necessaryo

Once execution begins, flexibility throughdetailed contingency planning is required toallow response to the unexpected.

Positioning of FA elements is a critical part ofthe detailed planning that must occur. A thinmaneuver covering force may have to travel agreater distance to react to an enemy threat.Field artillery units may have to movelaterally, forward, or to the rear to support thechanging tactical situation. This requiresdetailed planning and rapid coordination onthe part of the FSCOORD (FSO).

Fire support coordinating measures in thecovering force should be permissive in natureto open the battlefield to responsive firesupport. This can be done by planningsuccessive, on-order CFLs as close to friendlytroops as possible.

Crucial to the covering force battle areplanning, coordinating, and executing thebattle hand-over. As the battle progresses, arearward movement will occur eventually.Maneuver units and their FSCOORDs mustensure that needed information gets back tothe MBA units. Items such as targets, targetinginformation, status of covering force units,ammunition status, and requirements forpositioning must be current. Positioninginformation is particularly important if controlof the battle is to be passed smoothly to the

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MBA force. Handing over the battle and thecorresponding rearward passage of lines aredifficult operations that require a massiveplanning effort. One of the key elements ofthe battle hand-over is the change ofcommand and control of fire support. Controlof indirect fires passes to the MBA force asthe covering force hands over the battle. Thehand-over is sequenced one sector at a timeuntil the entire security force has beenwithdrawn. Management of this operation iscritical, since the confusion of combat maycause some covering force units to passthrough different units than originally planned.Detailed coordination between the passing andstationary force commanders and FSCOORDsis essential.

Similarly, the assumption of on-order tacticalmissions by the passing force FA units isdifficult to manage. On-order missions must becarefully planned to facilitate the likelynonlinear battle hand-over.

SustainmentExecution of combat service support forsecurity operations must be in concert with theoverall operation. The CSS must becoordinated with tactical operations in the rearand in the MBA.

Sustainment of security operations is a corpsresponsibility. When nondivisional units aregiven the mission, corps support command(COSCOM) assets directly support these units.When divisions conduct security operationswith division assets, the corps sustains thedivision in its habitual manner.

Only those CSS assets immediately essential tothe operation should be positioned forward inthe security area (fuel, ammunition, medical,and limited maintenance). These assets shouldbe withdrawn when no longer required orwhen the risk of their loss becomesunacceptable.

Section IV. MAIN BATTLE AREA DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

DescriptionThe MBA extends from the FEBA back to therear boundary of the brigade for the divisionand to the rear boundary of the division forthe corps. Normally, most of the defendingforce is deployed in the MBA to defeat theenemy’s main attack. Since the decisivedefensive battle is often fought in the MBAthat is where forces are concentrated. Themission of the MBA forces of the corps coversthe entire spectrum of operations. Thus, whilethe corps as a whole may be engaged indefensive operations of the MBA units withinthe corps area (divisions, brigades, and taskforces) may well be conducting any or all ofthe following operations:

Defend — control a limited area or position.

Delay—control an enemy.

Attack –enemy- or terrain-oriented.

Security and economy-of-force tasks.

Forward and rear passage of lines.

Movement to contact.

Bypassed operations and/or encircledoperations.

Thus, there will be differences in the waycombat forces fight the defensive battle. Bothheavy and light forces can conduct theseoperations. Task forces from the coveringforce join the MBA fight as they becomeavailable.

Fire Support ConsiderationsFire support in the MBA is used to slow, stop,or destroy attacking forces. The enemy is

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detected early and attacked continuously withall available fire support means. Fires acrossthe entire front force the enemy to deployearly into his attack formation. Fires in theeconomy-of-force areas are dense enough toslow or divert his supporting formations. Whenhe masses, his formations must be attackedrepeatedly and effectively with massed fires toreduce his momentum. Deep fires against theattacker’s follow-on forces keep them frominfluencing the immediate battle.

Fire Support TasksFire support tasks in defense of the MBA areas follows:

Mass fires to canalize and stall enemyforces, increase engagement, and destroyattacking elements.

Isolate enemy first-echelon elements byattacking follow-on forces.

Support friendly strongpoints.

Support obstacles to slowattempts.

Suppress enemy air defenses.

breaching

Help support rear operations by fire.

Provide counterfires.

Deny the enemy use of chosen avenues ofapproach.

Suppress and obscure enemy overwatchpositions.

Force enemy armored vehicles to buttonup and slow down.

Support counterattacks, or conduct coun-terattacks by fire.

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Provide an economy-of-force measure thataugments maneuver assets and frees themfor other critical areas.

Mass fires on enemy avenues of approach.

Coordinate TACAIR to engage majorarmor formations and follow-on forces.

Support disengagements of maneuverelements and repositioning to subsequentbattle positions.

Reinforce obstacles by use of FASCAM.

Allocation of Fire SupportFire support for the MBA battle is allocatedwith priority to the most vulnerable area.Usually, this area coincides with the enemy’smost likely avenues of approach and mainattack. While fire support for the defense ingeneral is most responsive when centrallycontrolled, the most vulnerable area of theMBA must be weighted more heavily withimmediately responsive fires. Reinforcing fieldartillery, immediate CAS sorties, EW, andtargeting assets can be used to provideresponsive support to forces bearing the bruntof the enemy’s attack.

Fire support for the MBA must be allocatedas early in the estimate process as possible toallow commanders enough planning time. Theproper integration of IPB and TVA givescommanders the best guess on likely enemycourses of action. This analysis is then used toprepare contingencies for the main battle. Thecovering force develops the situation anddictates which contingency should be executed.Appropriate fire support must be allocated foreach of these contingencies. As much firesupport as possible should be centrallycontrolled to facilitate a quick and smoothtransition into any contingency plan. Firesupport under centralized control allows theforcepower

commander to quickly shift combatwithout moving maneuver forces.

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Positioning of Field Artillery

At first, FA units may be positioned inforward supplementary positions in the MBAto allow for deeper fires. Supplementarypositions should be –

Along routes that facilitate displacementsinto the main battle area.

Selected to provide good cover and con-cealment to minimize their vulnerability toenemy air attack.

As the battle develops, FA units may findthemselves astride an enemy route of advance.When possible, these units should berepositioned along the flanks or deeper in theMBA. This gives maneuver forces room tooperate and reduces untimely displacementsduring the battle. Positions selected must becoordinated with the maneuver commanderresponsible for the terrain. (See FM 6-20-2.)

Target AcquisitionThe key to good combat information isknowing how the enemy will attack andknowing what to expect. For corps anddivisions, FSCOORDs and their staffs areexcellent information sources. Also, the fieldartillery has excellent combat communicationsby which to transfer this information.

In the MBA radars should be focused on theenemy’s main effort. This is where the enemycan be expected to concentrate his indirect-fireweapons. Weapons-locating radars should bepositioned to maximize lateral coverageimmediately forward of the MBA.

As MBA forces are repositioned to meet anenemy main effort, target acquisition elementsalso should be repositioned. Displacement ofthese resources should be staggered so thatsome coverage is always available.

AFSOs can provide target acquisition andcue other TA systems. The AFSO also

cancan

hand off and designate targets for Armyaviation and Air Force attack.

CommunicationsThe handoff of the battle from covering forcesto MBA forces is a critical point in thedefense. Effective command and control isespecially important to ensure a smoothchangeover and continuous and effective firesupport. Communications must be establishedbetween MBA and covering forces beforecontrol of the battle changes. This is bestachieved when MBA force artillery monitorsthe nets used by covering force artillery beforethe battle hand-over.

Radio communications should preclude thefollowing:

Covering force artillery having to changefrequencies at a critical time.

Issuing additional SOI extracts to units inthe covering force. This reduces the possi-bility of SOI compromise.

Early use of the MBA nets and possibledetection by enemy jammers or direction-finding equipment before the MBA fight.

Suppression of Enemy AirDefenses

The heavy use of friendly aircraft may beneeded during combat operations. Enemy airdefenses must be suppressed to let friendlyaircraft operate in the airspace above or nearthose defenses and their associated equipmentand facilities. This requires a coordinatedeffort between air and land elements to locateenemy facilities and to plan and executeSEAD operations with all available lethal andnonlethal means. Usually, the land forcemanagement of SEAD fires is centered at thedivision main FS cell; however, SEAD can beplanned, managed, and executed at allechelons.

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Normally, SEAD is planned at the divisionmain FS cell or below. Targets of concern tothe air elements are processed here andassigned to appropriate fire support or EWagencies.

Because fire support is limited, the forcecommander must indicate his priority forSEAD targets. The FSCOORDs planaccordingly.

Individual requests by flight leaders (pilots) forSEAD support are treated as targets ofopportunity (immediate targets).

Counterpreparation FiresCounterpreparation fires may be used if themaneuver commander desires. These fires aredesigned to break up enemy preparations forthe attack and the continuity of his attacking

elements. Acquisition resources and targetingefforts are directed toward detecting enemyforward elements, indirect fire support means,observation posts, command posts, andreserves. Counterpreparations are fired whenthe enemy attack is imminent.

Nuclear PlanningThe corps commander has the principalresponsibility for operational planning andexecution of nuclear fires. He develops andissues his planning guidance. The planningeffort must then be focused on thesecontingencies and developed into the corpsnuclear package. The package contains divisionsubpackages that include nuclear firesdelivered by the division artillery, Air Force,and supporting FA brigade. The corps mainFS cell must know the status of allnuclear-capable delivery units.

Section V. RESERVE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THEMAIN DEFENSIVE EFFORT

The primaryDescriptionpurpose of reserves in the

defense is to preserve the commander’sflexibility. The reserve is the commander’smain means of deciding a battle in progress orof affecting future operations. The commandershould decide the mission, composition, andsize of the reserve on the basis of his estimateof the situation.

Reserves may be air or ground maneuverunits. When the reserve is committed, allavailable fire support will be used to supportit. The committed reserve becomes the maineffort of the commander, and all combatpower is concentrated there by the force.

In the mobile defense, the reserve is reliedupon to strike the decisive blow. Whenconditions favor counterattack, the main effortshifts to the reserve, which then strikes with

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overwhelming combat power. The FSCOORDhelps by integrating the available fire support.

Commanders can use reserves to–

Counterattack to exploit enemy vulnerabil-ities (flanks, support units, and unprotectedforces in depth).

Reinforce forward positions.

Block penetrating enemy forces.

React to rear area threat.

Fire Support TasksFire support tasks for the reserve are asfollows:

Plan fires to support the commitment ofthe reserve during movement.

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Plan fires to strike at objectives in depth asenemy dispositions are revealed. This is tosupport the committed reserves and tobreak up the enemy’s coordination of theattack in the area defense.

Plan fires on the enemy’s flanks and rearwhere counterattacking forces are com-mitted in the mobile defense.

Plan deceptive fires to deceive the enemyinto thinking the reserve is committedelsewhere.

Plan for fire support coordinating measuressuch as a restrictive fire line in case ofconverging forces in the mobile defense ora restrictive fire area to safeguardstrongpoints in the area defense.

Plan to rearm, refit, and refuel organic andsupporting fire support before assumingon-order missions.

Allocation

In organizing the artillery for combat and inallocating other fire support, considerationmust be given to the following:

A plan for the use of fire support organicto or habitually supporting the reserveforce until it is committed.

Providing adequate support to the force atthe time of commitment.

Factors of MET-T.

Commander’s estimate

Commander’s intent.

of the situation.

As in the offense, a mission of GS or GSR isbest for artillery units designated to supportreserves once committed.

Once the reserve is committed, organic andhabitually supporting field artillery isaugmented by other lethal and nonlethal firesupport. Nuclear weapons also may beconsidered as reserves and set aside foreventual commitment if their use has beenapproved by proper authority.

Unnecessary changes in organization andtime-consuming movements should be avoidedto ensure adequate support for the committedreserve. Timely fire support planning ensurestimely support. The use of an FA brigadeheadquarters as a fire support planning agencyfor the counterattacking force should beconsidered. This would free the divisionartillery of this task.

Section VI. REAR OPERATIONS

Description corps rear must be planned to deal with levelsI, II, and III threats.

Corps or division rear operations in adefensive posture require increased vigilanceagainst the more pronounced threat to ourrear area. Rear operations are situational andare planned for as a contingency. They arewaged as the need arises and with the intensitynecessary to meet the threat level. Attempts todisrupt or destroy command and control,combat support, and combat service supportactivities can be expected. Operations in the

Defense Against Threat ActivitiesBases or base clusters are responsible for theirown defense against level I threats. The bestdefense involves aggressive preparation offighting positions, use of camouflage, soundand aggressive guard and security procedures,well-rehearsed reaction forces, and evacuationplans. Often, the planning and reaction time is

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minimal. Defeat of a strong level II forcerequires the use of a response force and mayrequire support by indirect fire.

The commander must allocate combat forcesto defeat level III threat forces. This tacticalcombat force normally is a brigade equivalentat corps and a battalion equivalent at division.Fire support for the TCF should be providedfor by an on-order DS mission for an artilleryunit. This requires the force artillery to planpositioning of units in anticipation of thatrequirement. Other fire support meansavailable may be naval gunfire, TACAIR, andArmy aviation. Army aviation is particularlywell suited for providing rear operations firesupport because of its ability to observe thetarget, its mobility, and its firepower.

Fire SupportRarely will there be enough fire support assetsavailable to satisfy the needs of deep, close,and rear area operations at the same time.The availability and timely use of fire supportin rear operations are critical to thecommander’s overall battle plan. Rearoperations are important to sustain the MBAforces and to ensure freedom of actionthroughout the area of operations.

With few exceptions, indirect-fire assets shouldnot be employed against a level I threat oragainst those level II threat forces that can bedefeated by base or base cluster units or bythe response force. These threats are usuallyindividual or small-unit operations, are oflimited scope and duration, and provide toofleeting a target for successful engagement byindirect-fire assets. However, Threat forcesbeyond base or base cluster self-defensecapabilities may require the use of indirect-fireassets.

Operations in the rear of division or corpsareas will have aconduct of close

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profound effect on theand deep operations.

Therefore, such operations must be anticipatedand plans must be devised to defeat the rearenemy. All operational plans, to include firesupport for rear operations, are passedthrough the tactical chain of command to therear CP.

The forces already on station are responsiblefor fighting the rear battle initially. Theimmediate problem for the force commanderin providing fire support assets for rearoperations is how to synchronize his limitedresources at the right time and place.Considerations that affect the allocation of firesupport for rear operations are as follows:

The reduction of fire support to the mainbattle effort.

The suitability as determined by theoverall tactical situation.

The responsiveness of the availableweapon systems.

The precision and collateral damage effectsof the weapon systems.

The communications nets available tofacilitate fire support activities.

The availability of observers to identifytargets and adjust fires.

Potentially, the whole spectrum of fire supportsystems is available for deployment in supportof rear operations. Practically, some are moresuitable than others, and all depend on thefactors of METT-T.

The FS cell is responsible for continuousevaluation of fire support assets available forrear operations. A prioritized list should bedeveloped and coordinated with the operationscell of the rear CP. As close and deepoperations change the status of these firesupport assets, this list must be updated.

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The same fire support assets and fire supportcoordinating measures applicable to offensiverear operations apply to defensive rearoperations. (See Chapter 4.)

Fire Support Command and ControlThe principles of fire support planning andcoordination in the rear areas do not differsignificantly from those in the forward areas.There is, however, a difference in the facilitiesavailable. Rear CPs have only limitedmanpower and limited communicationsfacilities. Nevertheless, if a level III attackoccurs, or if a level II attack againsthigh-priority units cannot be neutralized bybase, base cluster, or response forces, the reararea may temporarily assume an importancegreater than that of the close operations. Firesupport planning and coordination channelsshould be able to provide rapid application offires in the rear. This requires fire supportpersonnel to advise the rear operationscommander; and it requires communications inorder to plan, coordinate, and call for firesupport.

The nature of command and control in rearoperations varies with the echelon ofcommand. Since there is no dedicated reararea fire support net, the operations cell mustestablish and disseminate the communications

procedures to be used by rear area elementsfor planning and requesting fire support.Although they are not all-inclusive, theoperations cell should consider the followingoptions:

Rear area operations net (FM). Theoperations net may become overloaded,thus reducing fire support responsiveness.

Multichannel communications system (orMSE, when fielded).

One net from a dedicated fire supportagency (such as a field artillery or attackhelicopter battalion). This option providesmaximum responsiveness but is notpractical until the fire support agency isdedicated, not just on order.

A spare or alternate net identified toused as a rear area fire support net.

While the FSO in the heavy division rear

be

CPhas a VFMED that provide; a digital link withthe main FS cell and the div arty CP, the FSOat the corps rear CP does not have a digitalcapability. Consider providing one liaisonsection from HHB, corps artillery, to the corpsrear CP. The liaison section VFMED wouldprovide a digital link with the corps artilleryCP and the main FS cell.

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CHAPTER 6

OTHER OPERATIONS

This chapter Implements STANAG 2082, Edition 5, Amendment 3.

This chapter addresses the fire support considerations in the conductof other corps and division operations. These operations may beconducted in combination, sequentially, or as a single operation. All ofthese operations are inherently difficult to plan and support. Actualmethods for their planning and execution vary with the factors ofMETT-T as they apply to each corps and division. The followingoperations are discussed:

Retrograde operations.

Passage of lines.

Encircled forces.

River-crossing operations.

Heavy and light forces mix.

Section I. RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

DescriptionA retrograde operation is an organizedmovement to the rear away from the enemy. Itmay be forced or voluntary. In either case, aretrograde operation must be executedaccording to a well-organized plan. Adisorganized retrograde operation in the faceof enemy strength invites disaster. The threetypes of retrograde operations are as follows:

Delay — A unit gives up space to gain time.

Withdrawal — All or part of a deployed forcedisengages from the enemy voluntarily to freeitself for a new mission.

Retirement — A force not in contact with theenemy conducts an administrative move tothe rear.

Within a large command like a division orcorps, a combination of retrograde operationsis usually necessary. For example, a retirementmay be preceded by a withdrawal from actionor may be covered by a force executing adelaying action.

Retrograde movements are executed to do oneor more of the following:

Disengage from combat.

Avoid combat under undesirable conditions.

Draw the enemy into an unfavorablesituation.

Gain time without fighting a decisiveengagement.

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Place forces involved in a more favorableposition.

Permit the use of a portion of the forceelsewhere.

DelayA delay is conducted when forces areinsufficient to attack or to defend or when thedefensive plan calls for drawing the attackerinto an unfavorable situation. In delayingoperations, units trade space for time in orderto –

Reestablish the defense.

Cover a defending or withdrawing unit.

Protect the flank of a friendly unit.

Participate in an economy-of-force effort.

In ordering a delay, the corps or divisioncommander specifies the following

What must be done — the intent of theoperation; that is, the length of the delayingoperation – to delay the enemy forward of aline until a certain time.

Mission, composition, and location of thecorps or division covering force.

Task organization.

Control measures, to include phase lines,routes, and control points.

Employment of nuclear or chemical fireswhen appropriate.

Fire support,

Combat service support.

Hand-over of battle of covering force.

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Fire Support TasksThe fire support tasks for a delay are asfollows:

Attack enemy forces far forward.

Assist maneuver in disengagement.

Support limited counterattacks by fire.

Cover obstacles, barriers, gaps, and flankswith fires and scatterable mines.

Provide maximum continuous fire formaneuver forces as they displace to the rear.

Mass fires to slow the enemy as he deploysto concentrate for attack of our delaypositions.

Command and ControlDecentralized control is preferred. It may benecessary to attach field artillery units whenoperating on a broad front, Enough artilleryunits are provided to ensure one DS unit percommitted battalion or squadron.

Fire Support Planning and CoordinationInitially, position fire support assets wellforward to exploit range. Prepare a plan ofinterdiction fires covering main hostile avenuesof approach. Later position assets in depth toprovide maximum continuous fire.

Plan fires –

On barriers and natural obstacles.

To create obstacles with scatterable mines.

TO support strongpoints.

To cover and screen withdrawals. Use smokeextensively.

To support hasty counterattacks.

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On enemy forces congested behind obstaclesand/or minefield and to slow breachingattempts.

Use immediate close air support to helpdisengage and to slow advancing enemy forces.

Withdrawal

Withdrawals are conducted when it isnecessary to move away from the enemy toreposition forces on more favorable terrain, toconserve resources for future operations, togain time, or to avoid combat underunfavorable conditions. Withdrawals may beconducted under or free of enemy pressureand with or without the assistance of friendlyunits. Regardless, they always begin under thethreat of enemy interference and should beplanned accordingly.

Corps and division commanders organize acovering force and a main body whenconducting a withdrawal, The covering forceprevents effective pursuit or interference withthe withdrawal of the main body. The mainbody, prepared to defend itself, forms behindthe covering force. It moves to the rearprotected by advance, flank, and rear guards.The withdrawal plan should include adeception plan and provisions for the coveringforce or main body to defend or delay ifnecessay. Air and ground reserves should bemade available to support the withdrawal.Whenever possible, withdrawals take place atnight or in adverse weather to delay detectionby the enemy. To avoid signaling intentions,deceptive efforts are also necessary for unitsconsidering withdrawals.

Units must anticipate withdrawing underenemy pressure. The covering force fights adelay to permit the withdrawal of the mainbody. Main body units reinforce the coveringforce as necessary and delay or defendthemselves if the covering force fails. If thewithdrawal is without enemy pressure, the

covering force may remain in position toprolong the deception. The main body movesto the rear as fast as possible. The coveringforce moves when the main body haswithdrawn a safe distance.

Fire Support Tasks

Fire support tasks in a withdrawal are asfollows:

Mask the movement of friendly forces withsmoke.

Use fires to Slow the enemy. FASCAM isparticularly useful.

Cover obstacles with fire and observation.

Jam enemy command nets to Slow theenemy’s reaction to a withdrawal once it isunder way.

Use deep ties to relieve pressure on units incontact.

Provide final protective fires when necessary.

Be prepared to support a delay.

Allocation of Fire Support

All available fire support assets must beresponsive to the withdrawing force.Decentralized control of fire support,especially field artillery, is necessary to beadequately responsive. In fact, attachment offield artillery to maneuver maybe necessary toreduce the span of control. The maneuvercovering force must be weighted with fieldartillery to increase combat power. One FAbattalion in direct support of one maneuverbattalion in the covering force is desired.Reserves of the withdrawing unit may remainwell forward to assist by fire or to launchspoiling attacks. The priority of tactical AirForce missions in a withdrawal may be tomaintain local air superiority over the mainbody. CAS and BAI over and beyond thecovering force may be difficult because of the

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danger of enemy air action and air defenseduring a withdrawal.

Fire Support Planning andCoordination

The fire support planning aspects of awithdrawal are very similar to those of a delay,as the FSCOORD must plan for a withdrawalunder pressure. The enemy must be sloweddown as he concentrates his forces. Becausemaneuver units are moving while this occurs,the use of terminally-guided munitions againsthigh-payoff targets is essential. Deep fires alsomay be useful in relieving pressure on units incontact with the enemy. SEAD fires to supportBAI missions must be planned.

Displacement of field artillery elements, aswith all elements in a withdrawal, requiresextensive movement control to preclude

congestion on routes. Since movement may berapid, coordination of routes and positions is acontinuous effort.

RetirementA retirement is a retrograde operation inwhich a force that is not engaged with theenemy conducts either a tactical or anadministrative move to the rear. Artillery unitsare generally integrated with the maneuverunits. They are given GS missions withon-order missions of direct support to theirhabitually supported units.

Security forces covering the retirement ofother forces are given enough fire support todeal with guerrillas, air assaults, andlong-range fires. (See Chapter 4 for adiscussion of security force operations.)

Section II. PASSAGE OF LINES

DescriptionThe procedures in a passage of lines for acorps or division are basically the same asthose for a maneuver brigade. A passage oflines is conducted to allow a moving unit topass through a stationary unit. It can beconducted in offensive or defensive operations.A passage of lines is usually an implied task,not a primary mission. However, detailedplanning and coordination are essential duringa passage. This is because two separate unitsare temporarily concentrated in the same areaand are vulnerable to enemy action.

The FS cells of both the passing and stationaryforces must consider the fire support factorsdiscussed below.

Control MeasuresControl measures for a passage of lines are asfollows:

Location of passage points.

Location of contact points.

Recognition signals.

Attack positions or assembly area (forwardpassage).

Release points (rearward passage).

Location of CS and CSS (rearward passage).

Transfer of ControlThe commanders of the two forces decidewhen the transfer of control will beimplemented. The transfer may be triggeredby an event, but a specific time (H-hour) alsocould be used to effect the transfer of control.Commanders must recognize that the transferof control impacts on fire support. Forexample, the FA tactical mission may be DS

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on order to GS or GSR or GS, GSR, or R onorder to DS. Responsibility for fire supportcoordination passes from the FSCOORD ofone force to the FSCOORD of the other forceat the time the force commanders changecommand and control.

Forward Passage of Lines

Fire planning considerations for a forwardpassage of lines are as follows:

Obscure the enemy’s forward observation ofthe passage.

Plan fire on high-payoff targets; for example,enemy direct-fire systems, C2, enemy firesupport assets, and air defense targets.

Plan fires to support the deception plan.

Plan smoke to screen friendly movementthrough passage points.

Plan fires to interdict enemy counterattacksand reinforcements in the area of passage.

Mass indirect fires.

Ensure the stationary force supports the closeoperation while the passing force indirect-fireassets complete the passage.

Ensure counterfire is planned and controlledby the stationary force.

Plan appropriate fire support coordinatingmeasures as follows:o Plan on-order CFL.

o Consider RFAs on passage points.

Use AFSOs to cover flanks and dead spaces.

Ensure passing force plans fires to supportoperations after the passage of lines.

Rearward Passage of Lines

Fire planning considerations for a rearwardpassage are as follows:

Plan smoke to conceal movement throughpassage points.

Plan massed fires to disengage forces.

Plan fires to support obstacle ardor barrierplans.

Plan fires to support the deception plan.

Plan fire support coordinating measuresfollows:

o RFAs at passage points.

o On-call CFLs.

as

Ensure the stationary force Supports the closeoperation while the passing force indirect-fireassets complete the passage.Ensure counterfire is planned and controlledby the stationary force.

Plan fires on presage points to be fired afterfriendly units have passed through. ConsiderFASCAM to close passage lanes.

Ensure the stationary force plans fires tosupport operations after the passage of lines.

Positioning of Field Artillery

ConsiderationsThe most critical positioning issue is obtainingpositions for units short of the line ofdeparture and the passage points. Land will beat a premium. Coordination must be doneearly with the in-place unit.

Forward PassageThe field artillery of the passing force shouldbe infiltrated early from the rear assembly areato the designated primary positions to supportthe operation. These positions should be nearthe passage lanes but not so close that theyinterfere with the maneuver force movement.On a forward passage, position priority goes tothe passing force. During the passage of lines,the passing force FS cell and CP collocate with

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the stationary force FS cell and CP. Positionareas forward of the passage points areselected on the basis of anticipated rate ofmovement of the maneuver forces and terrainavailability. Also, they are selected away frompassage points.

Rearward PassageThe field artillery of the stationary forceshould be positioned well forward to providedeep fires to support the withdrawal of thepassing force. Again, these positions should beaway from passage lanes. In the rearwardpassage, the stationary force has positioningpriority. As the passing force artillery movesthrough, it should position behind thestationary artillery and move laterally awayfrom the passage lanes.

Coordination

Close coordination of plans between thecommanders and staffs of the involved forcesis mandatory. Once the passage of lines isordered, the FSCOORD of the passing forcein a forward passage of lines should send aliaison section to the FSCOORD of the forcein contact. In a rearward passage, theFSCOORD of the stationary force should senda liaison section to the FSCOORD of thepassing force. FSCOORDs define and assignmutually agreed upon fire supportresponsibilities to facilitate the passing force.Information that the two FSCOORDs shouldshare and areas that should be coordinated areshown below. The important point toremember is that each unit will be in the area

of responsibility of another unit for a period oftime and that detailed coordination is vital toensure that each of the two units understandshow the other operates. The units must do thefollowing:

Exchange unit SOPS and resolve differencesin operating procedures.

Exchange existing targets and fire plans.

Provide status of unit target acquisition assets.

Exchange attack guidance and casualtycriteria.

Exchange control measures in effect; forexample, passage points, passage lanes, andcontact points.

Coordinate recognition signals.

Provide information on obstacles andbarriers.

Coordinate position areas.

Provide met information to passing force.

Provide available survey control to passingforce.

Exchange SOIs and resolve communicationsdifferences; for example, frequencies, callsigns, challenge and password, and securesettings.

Coordinate security measures in effect.

Exchange intelligence.

Coordtiate subscriber table information.

Section III. ENCIRCLED FORCES

Description Forces face encirclement most often when

Because of the nonlinear nature of today’senemy forces bypass defending units or when

modern battlefield, forward or rear forces mayadvancing units are cut off by an enemy

become encircled. Encirclement occurs whencounterattack.

all the ground routes of evacuation and It is important forreinforcement for a unit are cut by the enemy. continue its mission,

the encircled force toestablish communication

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with higher headquarters, and act on its owninitiative within the intent of the highercommander. The most likely course of actionfacing the encircled force is to try a breakouttoward friendly forces and prepare for linkupoperations.

Breakout Toward Friendly ForcesBreakout operations must be planned,organized, and executed before the enemy hastime to react. Otherwise, the enemy force maybe able to contain and destroy the encircledforce. To achieve a breakout, the commandermust do the following:

Deceive the enemy as to the time and placeof the breakout.

Exploit gaps and weaknesses in the encirclingforce.

Exploit darkness and limited visibility ifpossible.

Organize the forces for breakout.

Concentrate combat power at the breakoutpoint.

Coordinate supporting attacks.

Provide for forces left behind.

Prepare for linkup operations.

Fire Support TasksFire support tasks in a breakout towardfriendly forces are as follows:

Reorganize available fire support.

Concentrate firepower at the breakout point.

Provide fires to support defense in otherareas to delay or disrupt enemy attempts toattack.

Consider the use of FASCAM in areas otherthan the breakout point or to help hold theshoulders of the breakout gap.

Support the deception plan.

Support forces left behind.

Allocation of Fire SupportFire support must be extremely centralized fora breakout. This is to ensure the maximumamount of combat power is brought to bear atthe breakout point. Commanders of encircledforces must seek to establish coordination withoutside forces and gain allocations of their firesupport.

Fire Support Planning andCoordination

The following must be considered in abreakout toward friendly troops:

Plan fires to support the immediate defenseand the breakout.

Coordinate with fire support agencies outsidethe encircled force for additional fire support.

Establish fire support coordinating measures.RFAs around encircled forces and RFLsbetween converging breakout and linkupforces should be considered. ACAs in thevicinity of the breakout point are necessary ifCAS is used.

Concentrate massed and continuous fires atthe breakout point to open a gap for therupture force.

Ensure radar (Q-36 and Q-37) sectors ofsearch and indirect fires cover 6,400 mils.

Plan for the use of chemical or nuclearweapons if force attrition and the politicalsituation favor their employment.

Make use of EW to deceive the enemy as tothe location of the breakout.

Plane for linkup operations.

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Linkup Operations

Linkup operations are conducted to join twofriendly forces. The forces may be movingtoward one another, or one may be stationary.Often, a linkup operation requires a passage oflines. When the linkup is made, the linkupforce may join the stationary force or it maypass through or around and continue theattack.

The controlling headquarters of both forcesestablishes the command relationship betweenthe two forces and the responsibilities foreach. It also establishes the control measuresto be used.

Forces that are linking up exchange as muchinformation as is practical before an operation.They must consider the following:

Fire support needed before, during, and afterthe linkup.

Recognition signals and communicationsneeds from both forces.

Future operations following the linkup.

Fire support considerations in a linkupoperation are as follows:

Employ RFLS as required. Consider the useof on-order CFLs or RFAs.

Ensure fire support personnel arecontinuously aware of the progress of thelinkup forces.

Ensure targets beyond the RFL are clearedby the controlling headquarters.

Ensure smoke and illumination fires do notcause adverse effects on the other friendlyforces.

Ensure that fires keep the enemy forcebetween the two friendly forces fromescaping. Use of scatterable mines should beconsidered to block enemy withdrawal.

Position indirect-fire weapons to allow themto mass fires at linkup points.

Ensure positions afford easy access to routesto be used after the linkup.

Section IV. RIVER-CROSSING OPERATIONS

Description

Corps and divisions can be expected toconduct river crossings as part of offensive anddefensive operations. Like the passage of lines,river crossings are usually implied tasks ratherthan primary missions. But large-unit rivercrossings involving corps and divisions presenta number of challenges to be overcome,particularly in the area of fire support. Thevarious phases of a river crossing are discussedbelow.

Advance to the RiverThis includes securing crossing sites andestablishing control measures.

Assault CrossingDuring this phase, forces develop crossingsites, emplace crossing means, and control unitmovement into and away from the crossingarea. Defensible terrain on the exit bank issecured. Follow-up forces provide overwatchand security and follow-and-support assistanceto the assault force.

Advance From the ExitBank

Assault forces continue to attack from the exitbank. Support forces help secure objectives.This may include a hasty or deliberate attackfrom the exit bank.

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Securing the BridgeheadDuring this phase, CSS elements must sustainthe assault and the subsequent advance to thebridgehead.

Fire Support

Fire support considerations in a river crossingareas follows:

Make fires immediately available to crossingforces. If necessary, have GS artillery firewhile DS artillery is crossing.

Assign priority of fires to assault forces.

Assign nonstandard missions to GS units.Change the priority of calls for fire, fireplanning, and other inherent responsibilitiesas necessary.

Plan smoke and suppression fires in greaterthan normal amounts if necessary.

Use smoke to screen both actual and dummycrossing sites.

Use smoke to obscure enemy direct-firepositions in the bridgehead area until thecrossing forces can engage them.

Suppress enemy forces in the bridgehead areauntil the assault force can provide its ownsuppressive fires.

Use all available targeting assets to developtargets in the bridgehead area.

Have indirect-fire weapons cross the riverwith the forces they support.

Section V.

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Plan to take advantage of the visibilityconditions that will prevail during the crossingor that can be produced to help support thecrossing.

Consider that the width of the crossing areaaffects the planning. The amount of timenecessary to cross a river, hence thevulnerability of the crossing force, affects thetypes and volume of fires requested.

Fire PlanningFire planning considerationscrossing operation are as follows:

Plan fires to soften enemy

for a river-

defense andcrossing sites and to seal- off exit bankpositions.

Plan fires to facilitate the assault forcesecuring the exit bank.

Plan preparations, groups, and/or series tosupport the operation as the assault forcesecures the bridgehead.

Plan and use on-order fire supportcoordinating measures.

Plan fires at depth to isolate the bridgeheadarea from enemy reinforcement.

Plan smoke to obscure actual and dummycrossing sites and to screen friendlymovements. Consider the use of smokegenerators.

Use CAS to expand the bridgehead.

HEAVY AND LIGHT FORCES MIX

Fire support principles of planning andcoordination do not change for a heavy andlight mix of forces in a mid- to high-intensityconflict.

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Fire Support Planning andConsideration

Medium and heavy artillery and targetacquisition assets may be required to enablethe light division to engage deep targets andexecute counterfire missions. Corps artilleryunits reinforcing a light division artillery is anoption to be considered. For logistical reasons,attachment of FA units is not usually anoption.

Medium and heavy artillery, support may berequired to enable the light division to employ

a greater array of ammunition; for example,DPICM, FASCAM, and nuclear munitions.

The relative lack of combat power in lightdivisions may require greater allocations of firesupport assets. CAS, Army aviation, and navalgunfire should be considered for the lightdivision before the heavy divisions in a heavyand light mix.

Operations against a technically sophisticatedenemy may require additional intelligenceassets. Therefore, corps IEW assets could beplaced in direct support of the light division.

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APPENDIX A

ORGANIZATIONS AND DUTIES

This appendix presents organizations and duties as follows:

Corps and division organizations.

Fire support cell organizations.

Duties of fire support personnel.

Section I. CORPS AND DIVISION ORGANIZATIONSOrganizations of the following corps anddivisions are shown in illustrations in thissection:

US Army corps.

Armored division.

Mechanized division.

Motorized infantry division.

Light infantry division.

Air assault division.

Airborne division.

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US ARMY CORPS ORGANIZATION

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ARMORED DIVISION ORGANIZATION

MECHANIZED DIVISION ORGANIZATION

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MOTORIZED INFANTRY DIVISION ORGANIZATION

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LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION ORGANIZATION

AIR ASSAULT DIVISION ORGANIZATION

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AIRBORNE DIVISION ORGANIZATION

Section II. FIRE SUPPORT CELL ORGANIZATIONS

Fire Support Cell

Division command posts are divided into atactical CP, a main CP, and a rear CP. Likethe command cell, current operations cell,plans cell, CSS cell, and all-source intelligencecenter (ASIC), the FS cell operates at themain CP. The field artillery representatives,who comprise the fire support element, formthe nucleus of the FS cell. Other personnelwho may either work in the FS cell habituallyor actively coordinate with it as needed arethe G2, G3 air, assistant division engineer,chemical officer, EW officer, andrepresentatives from the TACP, AD, divisionaviation and ANGLICO. The FSCOORD, orAFSCOORD in his absence, supervises FS

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cell activities. These include planning, Detailed breakdowns of the CP organizationscoordinating, and integrating fire support are in FM 71-100. The table below shows theoperations, to include TACAIR and EW FSE personnel authorized for different typessupport. of divisions.

TYPE DIVISION FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT

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Division Tactical Command PostFire Support Element

The tactical CP FSE is responsible for firesupport coordination for the current battle. Itis an austere organization. It coordinates andimplements the fire support from thesubordinate brigade FS cells and identifies firesupport requirements for the immediate andnear-immediate tactical situations.Representatives from all fire support resourcesresponsive to the division collocate with theFSE. The FSE is as mobile as the supportedmaneuver force tactical CP.

Organization

There is no standard organization for thetactical CP FSE. The table on page A-7 showsa possible division of FA personnel betweenthe tactical CP and the main FS cell in aheavy division. The figures below show typelayouts of tactical CP FSEs in heavy and light

divisions. The heavy division FSE is in anM577 command post carrier. The lightdivision FSE is in an HMMWV. Each vehicleshould be located near the G3’s vehicle foreasy coordination and flow of information.

Communications

Normally, the tactical CP FSE operates in thefollowing TACFIRE and non-TACFIRE nets:

Div arty command/intelligence net(FM-voice) or division command net(FM-voice).

Div arty fire direction net (FM-voice) or divarty operations net 1, 2, or 3 (FM-digital).

Div arty command/fire direction net 2(SSB-RATT).

Command multichannel link to the main CPFS cell and div arty CP when available.

TYPE LAYOUT, HEAVY DIVISION TACTICAL CP FSE

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TYPE LAYOUT, LIGHT DIVISION TACTICAL CP FSE

Division Main Command PostFire Support Cell

The main FS cell is collocated with thedivision main CP. It is responsible forproduction of the fire support portions of thedivision operation plans and orders. Itaugments the capabilities of the tactical FSE,when required. It is the focal point forplanning the fire support portion of theoperation plan (OPLAN) for extendedoperations.

Organization

There is no standard organization for the mainCP FS cell. The table on page A-7 shows anotional division of personnel between thetactical CP and main CP FS cells in the heavydivision. The figures below show type layoutsof a heavy division main CP FS cell in anexpansible van and a light division main CPFS cell in a HMMWV.

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TYPE LAYOUT, HEAVY DIVISION MAIN CP FS CELL

TYPE LAYOUT, LIGHT DIVISION MAIN CP FS CELL

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In addition to the operations and plans cells,the FS cell works closely with the A²C²element. The A²C² element manages airspaceover the division sector with emphasis on thearea between the brigade rear boundaries andthe division rear boundary. It helps the tacticalFS cell coordinate those activities associatedwith current combat operations but beyond thecapabilities of the tactical CP FSE. The FScell must keep the A²C² element informedand must coordinate fire support use ofairspace for planned operations.

Battle Coordination Functions

Both the division and corps commanderssynchronize close, deep, and rear operationsthrough a coordinated effort at the main CP.To help them in this function, specific staffelements are tasked to gather and provideinformation to the commander as required.

Battle coordination functions may include thefollowing:

Acquire and identify high-payoff targets.

Assess attacks.

Adjust assets.

Change battle plans.

React quickly to high-priority targets.

Specific requirements for FS cell representa-tives may include the following functions:

Recommend targets.

Use target value analysis to identify targetpriorities.

Determine fire support needs.

Expedite fire support.

Assess fire support effects.

Coordinate timing of fire support attacks (toinclude EW).

Recommend use of TACAIR assets.

Communications

Normally, the main CP FSE operates in thefollowing TACFIRE and non-TACFIRE nets:

Div arty command/intelligence net(FM-voice) or div arty command net (FM).

Div arty fire direction net (FM-voice) or thedesignated div arty operations net 1, 2, or 3(FM-digital). The radio identified for this usemay be used to operate in the divisioncommand/operations net.Div arty command/fire direction net 2(SSB-RATT).Multichannel link to the tactical CP FSE anddiv arty CP when available.

The FSE uses the VFMED to access the divarty TACFIRE computer to process data forthe FSE program. This is done on atime-shared basis with other div arty programsand users.

The FS cell operates within the guidance andpolicies established by the division commanderto direct the use of the fire support resourcesavailable to the division.

Division Rear Command PostFire Support Element

The division rear CP coordinates sustainmentof current operations, plans for futureoperations, terrain management of all unitscurrently residing or moving into the divisionrear, and base cluster security plans and rearoperations. The rear CP FSE, one fire supportofficer and two fire support sergeants, operatesin the rear operations cell. These individualsare reflected on the division rear tacticaloperations center (TOC) TOE (standardrequirement code [SRC] 87103L000). Rear CPmanning will come from the US ArmyReserve Component.

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Corps Fire Support Cell

The corps commander, like the divisioncommander, organizes tactical, main and rearCPs. The table below shows a possibledistribution of field artillery personnel in thecorps fire support element.

CORPS FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT

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Corps Tactical CommandPost Fire Support Element

Because of the organization of the corps FScell the manning of the tactical CP FSE mustbe minimal. The figure below shows a typelayout of a corps tactical CP FSE. The M577shown must be provided by the corps head-quarters and headquarters company (HHC), orit may be organic to the corps artilleryheadquarters battery. The VFMED authorizedfor the tactical CP FSE may be mountedeither in the M881 1 1/2-ton vehicle organic tothe fire support element or in the M577.

The tactical CP FSE can communicate withthe corps artillery CP over an FM net. Theyuse the RATT (SSB) capability deployed withthe corps CP for communication with themain FS cell, when necessary. They also usemultichannel communication, to includemultiple subscriber equipment, if available, tocommunicate with the main CP FS cell.

TYPE LAYOUT, CORPS TACTICAL CP FSE

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Corps Main Command PostFire Support Cell

The main FS cell is collocated with the corpsmain CP and must be close to the G2 and G3elements to be effective in fire supportplanning. The main FS cell is concernedprimarily with planning future operations andwith fighting deep operations. The figurebelow shows a type layout for the corps mainCP FS cell.

Battle Coordination Functions

The FS cell members serve with the corpsstaff in targeting efforts similar to thosedescribed earlier for the division level. TheLance liaison element is usually located at themain FS cell.

Communications

The primary means of communication for themain FS cell is the corps common-user

multichannel system. This provides secureaccess to all coordinating elements. Also, themain FS cell has an AN/VRC-46 radio set.This radio is used for FM communication withthe corps artillery commander and the tacticalCP when it is within radio range. Theavailable communications means are discussedbelow.

Corps Artillery Command/Fire Direction Net(SSB-RATT). The main FS cell communicatesover the corps artillery CF net (SSB-RATT)to coordinate nuclear fire support and to linkthe FS cell with field artillery retained undercorps control.

Corps Artillery Command/Operations Net(SSB-Voice). The Lance battalion commanderand operations element operate in this netwith the corps artillery HHB operations/intelligence section. The net is used fortactical and administrative control; forcoordinating and requesting fire support; andfor collecting, exchanging, and disseminatingintelligence information.

TYPE LAYOUT, CORPS MAIN CP FS CELL

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communications. Detailed coordination withthe division signal officer (DSO) is still a must.

Fire Support Cell Automation. The capabilities ofthe corps artillery TACFIRE are similar tothose of the TACFIRE at division level. Thecorps FS cell is the focal point for preparationof the nuclear package. The VFMED in themain FS cell is an excellent tool for preparinginterdiction attack options to supportinterdiction planning. Targets may bedeveloped in the corps main CP or submittedby subordinate units as requests for additionalfire support. The main FS cell uses thepreliminary target analysis program to identifyappropriate attack resources to engage thesetargets.

Corps Rear Command PostFire Support Element

The rear CP conducts rear operations. Thisfunction entails command and control of rearsecurity operations, terrain management withinthe corps rear area, sustainment, control ofadministrative moves, and other associatedfunctions. The rear CP FSE—one FA captain,a fire support sergeant, and a driver—operatesfrom the rear operations cell. Theseindividuals are reflected on the corps rearTOC TOE (SRC 52403L000). Rear CPmanning will come from the US ArmyReserve Component.

Section III. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF FIRE SUPPORTPERSONNEL

Fire Support operation. The FSCOORD must beCoordinator thoroughly familiar with the battle plan so that

he can anticipate missions, situations, andThe field artillery commander at corps ordivision is designated the FSCOORD. He is

changes and then advise the force commanderon the best use of fire support. The

the force commander’s primary advisor on fire FSCOORD’s primary responsibilities (at corpssupport matters. He maintains a good working or division level) are as follows:relationship with the commander. operationsofficer (G3), and ALO throughout the Establish and supervise the activities of theplanning and execution phases of the FS cell.

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Plan and synchronize fire support.

Prepare the fire support portion of the corpsor division operation plans and orders.

Advise and inform on all fire supportmissions.

The FSCOORD cannot always be physicallypresent in the supported unit CP because ofhis responsibility to command the organic fieldartillery. Still, he must approach his firesupport responsibilities with the same intensitythat he approaches his field artilleryresponsibilities. Therefore, the FSCOORD hasa full-time representative in the FS cell. Thisindividual is the deputy FSCOORD(DFSCOORD). The DFSCOORD is thepermanent supervisor of FS cell activities inthe FSCOORD’S absence.

Corps Deputy Fire SupportCoordinator

The corps FSE is organized with the deputycorps artillery commander serving as theDFSCOORD and enough assistantFSCOORDs (AFSCOORDs) to work in thetactical and main CPs on a shift basis. Eachdivision is organized with the DFSCOORD(05) and enough AFSCOORDs to work twoshifts in the main and tactical CPs.

The duties of the corps DFSCOORD are asfollows:

Supervise the operation of either the mainFS cell or the tactical CP fire supportelement.

Recommend fire support coordinatingmeasures to the corps commander or hisrepresentative as the battle progresses.

Keep close contact with the main FS cell ortactical CP fire support element to keepthem informed of current operations and theimmediate fire support needs of the forces.

Recommend changes to the field artilleryorganization for combat as necessary tosupport current and future operations.

Fire Support Officer, CorpsTactical Command Post

The duties of the FSO at the tactical CP areas follows:

Maintain the current status and capabilitiesof available fire support resources.

Supervise the FSE operations in the absenceof the AFSCOORD.

Maintain the fire support situation map.

Assistant Fire SupportCoordinator, Corps Main

Command Post

The duties of the AFSCOORD in the FS cellin the corps main CP are as follows:

Supervise the operations of the main CP FScell.

Control and supervise toxic chemical andnuclear weapons package planning andemployment within the corps.

Refine nuclear aimpoints in the corpspackage.

Recommend the use of fire supportcoordinating measures after coordination withthe air liaison officer.

Supervise preparation of the fire support planfor future operations.

Resolve conflicts and duplications among thevarious fire support systems.

Advise fire support liaison representativespresent.

Coordinate fire support for deep operations.

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Fire Support Officer, Corps MainCommand Post

The AFSCOORD is assisted by the FSO inthe corps main CP FS cell. The duties of theFSO are as follows:

Maintain the current status and capabilities ofall fire support resources available to thecorps.

Maintain the fire support situation map.

Develop the fire support plan for futureoperations.

In conjunction with the G2 air, the G3 air,and the air liaison officer, formulate theSEAD plan for the corps.

Perform the duties of the AFSCOORD in hisabsence.

Field Artillery Plans Officer andFire Support Sergeant, OperationsCell, Corps Rear Command Post

The FA plans officer and fire support sergeantrepresent the FSCOORD at the corps rearCP. Their duties are as follows:

Collate base, base cluster, and response forcefire support plans received from subordinaterear area operations centers into a compositerear operations fire support plan.

Integrate fire support provided by territorialforces into the rear operations fire supportplan.

Coordinate the rear operations fire supportplan with the corps FSCOORD and the TCF.

Coordinate with the FS cell at the main CPfor fire support for response forces.

Coordinate fires in support of response forcesand the TCF.

Review requests for CAS from responseforces or the TCF, and forward the requestto the FS cell at the main CP.

Division Deputy FSCOORD,Division Fire Support Cell

The duties of the division deputy FSCOORDare as follows:

Serve as the full-time representative of theFSCOORD to the force commander and hisstaff.

Position himself where he can provide thegreatest assistance (in either the tactical ormain CP).

Help integrate fire support into the battleplan.

Supervise the tactical FSE and the main FScell.

Recommend allocation of fire support andfield artillery organization for combat.

Recommend fire support coordinatingmeasures.

Advise the division commander and his staffon fire support matters.

Division AFSCOORD

The duties of the division AFSCOORD are asfollows:

Serve as the fill-time representative of theFSCOORD in the main FS cell or thetactical CP fire support element.

Supervise the operation of the main FS cell.

Plan and coordinate all means of fire support.

Advise the maneuver commander and hisstaff on all fire support matters.

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Supervise preparation of the interdiction planfor fire support.

Assign target numbers to targets developedby the main CP or FS cell.

Maintain the fire support status, and reportto the supported maneuver commander andhis staff as necessary.

Receive, coordinate, and forward fire supportrequests from subordinate units.

Ensure organic or attached nuclear-capableunits are correctly positioned.

Recommend the prescribed nuclear load(PNL) and prescribed chemical load (PCL)for division units.

Supervise preparation of the division nuclearsubpackage recommendation.

Recommend fire support coordinatingmeasures.

Coordinate with the A2C2 element to providethe corps main FS cell data for establishmentof minimum risk routes MRRs) for aircraft.Coordinate the division fire support plan withadjacent divisions and corps FS cells.

Advise other fire support representatives, andresolve conflicts and duplication among firesupport asset systems.

Coordinate the field artillery portion of firesupport plans with the div arty CP.

Send fire orders to the div arty CP whennecessary.

Pass the maneuver commander’s guidance ontarget attack priorities and allocation of fires

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to other fire support representatives and tothe div arty CP.

Fire Support Officer, OperationsCell, Division Rear Command Post

The FSO represents the FSCOORD at thedivision rear CP. The duties of the FSO are asfollows:

Collate base, base cluster, and response forcefire support plans into a composite rearoperations fire support plan.

Coordinate the rear operations fire supportplan with the division FSCOORD and theTCF.

Coordinate with the FS cell at the main CPfor fire support for bases or base clustersand/or response forces.

Review requests for CAS from responseforces or the TCF, and forward the requestto the FS cell at the main CP.

NOTE: The following paragraphs outline thegeneral duties and responsibilities of the key firesupport personnel at corps and division. In mostcases, the duties are similar at both echelons.

Field Artillery Intelligence Officer

The duties of the FAIO are as follows:

Serve as FS cell representative in the all-source production center.

Inform the ASPC of fire support intelligencerequirements; for example, high-payofftargets and indicators.

Screen and segregate combat information,weather, and intelligence in the ASPC foruse in fire support targeting.

Pass targets developed by the ASPC to theFS cell.

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Coordinate cueing of target acquisitionresources under ASPC control with the FScell.

Advise the ASPC on fire support and targetacquisition matters.

Target Analyst

The duties of the target analyst are as follows:

Analyze targets for possible engagement bynuclear and toxic chemical weapons, asdirected by the AFSCOORD.

Plan interdiction targets for attack byconventional, nuclear, and chemical fires orweapons.

Perform detailed nuclear target analysis andaimpoint refinement as part of the nuclearplanning effort.

Provide technical expertise regarding limitingrequirements, troop safety, collateral damagepreclusion and effects of nuclear weapons.Coordinate chemical planning with the corpsor division chemical officer.

Air Liaison Officer

The ALO is a member of the TACP at eachappropriate echelon of command. His dutiesare as follows:

Provide expertise, help request and monitorrequests for immediate CAS, and processnominations for BAI.

Work closely with the AFSCOORD todetermine where air-delivered systems can beused to the best advantage, and provideinformation on the requirements for SEADfires.

Keep the AFSCOORD and the G3 informedof the current status of air support assets.

Provide communications means to enter theair request net (USAF).

Assistant Air Defense Officer

The assistant AD operations officer comesfrom the corps or division Army airspacecommand and control element. He serves asthe A2C2 representative in the FS cell.

Naval Gunfire Officer (Division)

The NGO acts as the liaison officer for thenaval task force supporting the division. Hecoordinates all naval gunfire that is supportingthe division or that may affect divisionoperations. He advises the AFSCOORD on allmatters pertaining to naval gunfireemployment. These matters include capabili-ties, limitations, status of fire support ships,and targets suitable for NGF engagement.

Operations Sergeant

The duties of the operations sergeant at corpsand division are as follows:

Help maintain 24-hour operations in the FScell.

Supervise the installation of operationsequipment and communications in the FScell.

Supervise the enlisted personnel in the FScell, and process administrative matterspertaining to the FS cell.

Help the AFSCOORD prepare fire supportdocuments.

Supervise the posting and maintenance of allFS cell charts and records.

Prepare required reports in accordance withlocal directives.

Maintain classified files.

Assemble and disseminate the priorityinformation requirements and informationrequirements.

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Fire Support Sergeant

The duties of the fire support sergeant are asfollows:

Serve as primary assistant to theAFSCOORD in coordinating fire support.

Help the target analyst in interdictionplanning.

Supervise the fire support specialists.

Maintain and update fire support statuscharts and situation maps.

Perform the duties of the operations sergeantin his absence.

Maintain the staff journal.

Fire Support Specialist

The duties of the fire support specialist are asfollows:

Work under the guidance of the fire supportsergeant.

Help operate and maintain sectionequipment, to include computer equipment.

Help in fire support planning andcoordination.

Operate and maintain communicationsequipment.

Prepare and maintain a situation map.

Prepare and post daily staff journals andreports.

Help establish, operate, and displace the FScell equipment.

Target Processing Specialist (SGT)

The duties of the target processing specialist(SGT) are as follows:

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Maintain target acquisition plan (TAP).

Analyze targets on TAP for possibleengagement by nuclear and toxic chemicalweapons, as directed by the target analyst.

Plan interdiction targets on TAP for attackby conventional, nuclear, and chemical firesor weapons.

Help provide technical expertise regardinglimiting requirements, troop safety, collateraldamage preclusion, and effects of nuclearweapons.

Help perform detailed nuclear target analysisand aimpoint refinement as part of thenuclear planning effort.

Supervise the posting of targets on thetargeting overlay.

Supervise and maintain the relative valuematrix chart.

Supervise training of the section on targetlog, target cards, relative value matrix chart,and spread sheet.

Perform duties as required by the targetanalyst.

Perform duties of the fire support sergeant inhis absence.

Be knowledgeable of the Threat forceequipment and tactics.

Target Processing Specialist (SPC)

The duties of the target processing specialist(SPC) are as follows:

Log all targets from sources (for example,FAIO, division FS cell, brigade operations,and TACFIRE).

Maintain the relative value chart.

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Help post targets on the targeting overlay. Perform duties as required by the targetanalyst.

Fill out and maintain target cards.Perform duties of the target processing

Help the target analyst prepare spread sheets specialist (SGT) in his absence.and briefing materials.

Be knowledgeable of the Threat forceMaintain necessary references. equipment and tactics.

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APPENDIX B

FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING FACTORS

This appendix implements STANAG 2103/QSTAG 187, Edition 6,and STANAG 2104/QSTAG 189, Edition 6.

This appendix addresses the following areas of concern for firesupport planners on the AirLand battlefield:

Deep operations.

Close operations.

Rear operations.

Counterfire.

Suppression of enemy air defenses.

Nuclear operations.

Section I. DEEP OPERATIONS

DescriptionTo successfully conduct a deep attack, theFSCOORD, G2, and G3 must cooperate fullyto keep the proper emphasis on deepoperations.

In the offense, a deep attack is conductedprimarily by fire to isolate, immobilize, andweaken the enemy in depth in order to sustainthe momentum of the attack. In such anattack, fires are planned to block themovement of enemy reserves.

In the defense, the deep attack may beconducted by fires and/or by maneuver forces.

In either the offense or the defense, fires areplanned to degrade and disrupt enemy—

Attacking echelons.

Fire support.

Command, control, and communications.

Combat support and combat service support.

FSCOORD ConsiderationsLance missiles, Army tactical missile system(ATACMS), EW, attack helicopters, and BAIare the primary tools used to providelong-range deep attack fires. When maneuverelements are used in the deep attack artillerymay be required to accompany the force.When field artillery accompanies the maneuverforce in the deep attack, fire supportconsiderations include the following:

Mutual support must be planned for FA unitsequipped with automated fire supportequipment.

Extended communications lines are requiredbetween the MBA force artillery and theaccompanying artillery units.

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Ammunition expenditure will be large.

Maneuver force assistance may be needed toensure security and survivability of FA units.

Target acquisition and intelligence-gatheringassets will be taxed because of distances,frequency, and speed of moves.

Logistical support, to include recovery, repair,and resupply, constrain the force.

Mobility of FA units must match that of themaneuver force.

Command and control problems are inherentin any force operating at extended rangesfrom its parent organization.

Simultaneous interdiction fires usinglong-range weapon systems must be plannedto add weight to the attack.

Initially, the deep attack force must rely onthe MBA forces for most of its fire support.Counterair (CA) missions must be used toprepare the route of advance and to ensureeither local air superiority or air parity. Attackhelicopters may have to provide convoyprotection. Offensive EW will be necessary tokeep the enemy from effectively redeployingto meet the deep attack force. Tacticaldeception measures to cover development ofthe deep attack force help ensure surprise.

When the deep attack force has outdistancedthe MBA artillery, organic mortars,accompanying artillery, and CAS provide mostof the fire support for the force.

Successful deep operations create theconditions for future victory. The followingfactors must be considered in planning fordeep operations:

Deception.

Deep surveillance and target acquisition.

Interdiction by ground or air fires, ground oraerial maneuver, special operations forces(SOFs), or any combination thereof.

Command, control, and communicationscountermeasures.

Command and control.

Deep operations must be focused againstthose enemy capabilities which most directlythreaten the success of projected friendlyoperations.

Deep Operations Plan FormatA sample of a deep operations plan format isshown below. Individuals or elements shown inparentheses indicate responsibility forinformation in the paragraphs.

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Section II. CLOSE OPERATIONS

DescriptionAt the operational level, close operationsinclude the efforts of large tacticalformations—corps and army groups, joint orunified headquarters—to win current battles.At the tactical level, close operations includethe efforts of smaller tactical units to wincurrent engagements. Among the activitiestypically making up close operations are thefollowing:

Maneuver (including deep maneuver).

Close combat (including close air support).

Indirect-fire support (including counterfire).

Combat support and combat service supportof committed units.

Command and control.

The measure of success of deep and rearoperations is their eventual impact on closeoperations.

Fire PlanningTimely fire planning provides adequate firesupport to protect our forces in the close andrear battles. At the same time, it keeps theenemy from effectively developing his ownoperations by providing for deep attack oftargets, which would interfere with our battleplan. The process by which this is achievedincludes the following:

The formulation of a fire plan to coordinatethe allocation of resources. This includes theallocation of GS artillery and details ofcontrol arrangements and proposals for theuse of TACAIR. Thus, the fire plan can bemodified to meet changing requirements.

The acquisition of information andhigh-payoff targets and the passing andprocessing of that information.

The consideration of weapon resourcesavailable and the selection of the mostsuitable weapons to attack the targets.

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Planning GuidelinesIn any fire planning, there are certain commonguidelines.

MassThe basic principle of mass must be kept inmind when making a fire plan. It can beachieved only by a proper organization forcombat, proper selection of weapons andammunition, and, in some cases, theamendment of a tactical plan.

FlexibilityThe provision of adequate fire supportdepends on flexibility, both in planning beforeand control during the event. It is alsonecessary to allow for modifications in the fireplan to cater to unforeseen circumstances.

SimplicityA simple fire plan is easier and quicker toproduce, has a better chance of beingunderstood by all concerned, and is easier tomodify if necessary.

SurpriseSurprise in defense and attack may beprejudiced by the preparations for supportingfire and by the use of stereotype methods. Toavoid loss of surprise, careful considerationmust be given to the amount of prioradjustment of fire that may be carried out.Some may be essential if fire is to be broughtdown close to our own troops. In other cases,it may be advantageous to accept a proportionof nonadjusted fire, especially if it can beadjusted by observation during the actualengagement of the target. The ideal, of course,is to bring down accurate fire without anyobvious preparation. This requires accurateand common survey between target acquisitionsensors and attack systems.

CoordinationMany weapons are used to produce firesupport, and their differing characteristics are

designed for a specific task or tasks. Theweapons available must be considered as awhole, each complementing the other. Atdivision level, the main weight of fire supportcomes from the division- and corps-allottedfield artillery. Yet, to make a fire plan firstwith field artillery and then to add air, mortar,and naval gunfire results in a badly balancedplan that fails to make the best use ofavailable resources. Fire support must becoordinated so that each weapon plays the partfor which it is best suited.

Ammunition SupplyThe supply of ammunition for a fire plan mustbe considered in the early stages of planning.The ability of the logistic system to provide thequantities of ammunition required affects theweight of fire support available. It can be acontrolling factor in the selection of H-hourand could affect the whole operational plan.Hence, every effort should be made to forecastthe need for ammunition in time for thelogistic system to have adequate stock readyrather than react after the need has arisen.

Sequence of Fire PlanningThe general sequence is the same for bothinformal and formal fire plans. In a formal fireplan, apart from the greater time available forits preparation, more fire support resourcesare used. Thus, greater coordination anddetailed planning at higher headquarters arerequired. An informal fire plan usually iscoordinated by the headquarters originatingthe plan.

ResourcesIn an informal fire plan, the planner knows theresources available to him. In a larger, formalfire plan, an allocation of resources usually isgiven with the task when it is handed downfrom higher headquarters. If the operationoriginates at the lower level, it may benecessary to ask for an allocation of extra

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resources. This allocation usually is made interms of fire units, ammunition, and aircraft. Itmay be qualified by times available orrestrictions to certain phases. In formal fireplanning, the initial allocation of fire support isa planning allocation, which can be changed asplanning proceeds and priorities areestablished. When considering resources,direct-fire weapons integral to the attack force,such as armor, must be considered as well asother sources. In either case, the moreinformation available on the enemy layout anddispositions, the more accurate and effectivewill be the fire support. Informationavailability also determines the resourcesretained under the commander’s direct controland the priorities of fire.

Commander’s ConceptThe commander’s concept is consideredagainst the fire support available. TheFSCOORD must advise the commander whenhe is making his estimate. Once thecommander has determined his concept,warning orders should be issued to firesupport agencies concerned. This allowspreparations to commence, includingadjustment and planning for redeployment,reallocation of resources, and bids for extrasupport.

Detailed Fire PlanOnce the course of action has been deter-mined, the detailed fire plan may be begun.The FSCOORD must know the following:

The targets to be engaged and timings.

Any targets on call.

Requests from the G3 air for TACAIR.

The effect required on each target which hetranslates into terms of weapons and types ofammunition.

The priority of engagement of targets.

Arrangements for changing the fire plan.

Policy on adjustment of targets beforeH-hour.

Fire Planning TermsThe various types of fire support required inbattle and the terms used to describe such firesupport include those discussed below.

Fire support tasks in all phases of war are asfollows:

Interdiction (attack at depth).

Counterfire.

Suppression of enemy air defense systems.

Defensive fire includes —

Support that includes counterpreparation fire,close planned fire, and final protective fires(FPFs).

Covering fire as support to a counterattack.

Offensive fire includes —

Preparation fire.

Covering fire.

Defensive fire to cover reorganization.

Interdiction FireThe aim of interdiction fire is to disrupt, delay,and destroy enemy forces that, because ofrange limitations or intervening terrain, cannotfire their primary weapon systems on friendlyforces. Targets include first-echelon forces notparticipating in the direct battle and follow-onechelons. Interdiction fire creates windows forfriendly unit offensive maneuver. Brigadecommanders may develop a requirement forinterdiction fires based on their concept of theoperation and war games or rehearsals. Thesetargets may then be given to the division maincommand post FS cell for inclusion in thedivision’s planned or on-call target list.

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Counterfire the maximum mass of counterpreparation fire

The aim of counterfire is to destroy orneutralize the enemy indirect-fire systems, toinclude mortar, artillery, air defense, missile,and rocket systems. Observation posts andfield artillery command and control facilitiesare also counterfire targets. Counterfire allowsfreedom of action to supported maneuverforces and is accomplished with mortars, guns,and aircraft. Counterfire is planned andexecuted for offensive and defensiveoperations, or it is fired in response to arequest from a maneuver commander. Anefficient combined arms target acquisitionsystem is required, and counterfire should becontrolled at the highest level that can ensurethe timely attack of targets. See Section IV fora detailed discussion of counterfire.

Suppression of EnemyAir Defense

SEAD is that activity which neutralizes,destroys, or temporarily degrades enemy airdefense systems in a specific area to enable airoperations to be successfully completed. ArmySEAD operations are designed to supportoperational and tactical plans by protectingArmy aviation assets near the FLOT or duringcross-FLOT operations. SEAD also includesthe protection of Air Force aircraft (such asCAS aircraft) supporting the groundcommander’s operation. The basic principle ofArmy SEAD operations is see-kill. This meansthat enemy air defense systems are attackedimmediately upon detection, consistent withthe commander’s intent and the bestapplication of resources. Formal SEAD fireplanning normally is conducted andcoordinated at division level or higher and mayinvolve other services (J-SEAD).

Defensive FireWhen enemy preparations for an attack arediscovered, his forces must be brought under

immediately. The objective is to defeat hisability to mount the assault and to start theclose defensive operation at the longestpracticable range. Defensive fire provides closesupport to maneuver. It inflicts both personneland equipment casualties on the enemy.

PlanningA defensive fire plan provides the frameworkon which to fight a defensive battle. It allowsthe maximum weight of fire to be brought tobear quickly on the enemy’s preparation forthe attack and his assault. All availableweapons must be included in this fire plan.

The volume of fire required on each targetmay not be known in the planning stages. Thesuccess of a defensive fire plan depends on theflexibility of response. The fire supportcommand and control system, coupled with itscommunications, provides the medium for thisflexibility. A large part of the defensive battleis fought and controlled through this system.

Planning SequenceDefensive fire planning starts with anexamination of the enemy’s probable action,usually based on his approaches to ourposition. The fire plan should not be based onindividual defensive fire tasks but rather onthe treatment of particular approaches. Thismust include the routes, assembly areas, linesof departure, and ground over which theenemy will assault. An enemy is particularlyvulnerable in his initial moves for an attackand when organizing into assault formation.Once an enemy attack gets under way, one ofthe main purposes of a defensive fire plan isto seal off the attack and keep the enemyfrom reinforcing it.

Fire planning is conducted through a formaltop-down process with bottom-up refinementas time permits. The corps G2, in conjunctionwith the G3 and FS cell representatives,

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performs a detailed IPB and target valueanalysis for the entire corps area of operation.Named areas of interest and target areas ofinterest are included in the IPB. High-payofftargets for the corps and specific targets ofinterest and/or schedules of fire come topdown to the division FS cell. Concurrently, thedivision G2 and FSCOORD must refine thecorps guidance for the division area andconcept of operation. As they are developed,the division FSCOORD receives from corpstargets in the division zone and area ofinterest which have been developed by thecorps IPB and/or acquired by corps or higheracquisition assets. The FSCOORD, workingwith other FS cell members, the G2 and theG3, develops targets within the division zone.He adds these targets of particular interest tothe division target list and passes the target listto each brigade. The target developmentprocess continues, concurrently, down tocompany level. After review of the battaliontarget list, the company FSO nominatesadditional targets in his zone or sector andforwards his target list back up to the battalionFSO. The battalion FSO considers the targetshe receives from each company FSO, con-solidates them (for example, eliminatesduplications) and forwards a copy of therefined target list back to the brigade FSO. Astarget lists are developed at each level, fireplans are prepared to support thecommander’s intent for synchronizing thescheme of maneuver with fire support. Fireplans also allocate targets to the appropriatefire support agency or asset for execution atthe appropriate time.

Counterpreparation FireUsually, there is some warning of an enemyattack. The enemy must be brought under themaximum mass of counterpreparation fire asearly as possible. The close defensive battleshould start at the longest practicable range.The ideal defensive fire plan is one thatdisrupts the enemy’s preparations to such anextent that he cannot mount an assault.

Counterpreparation fire disrupts the enemy’spreparations for an attack or a counterattack.It does this by striking him in his assemblyareas; breaking up his attack formations;disorganizing his command, control, andcommunications; impairing his targetacquisition efforts; and reducing his morale.Counterpreparations are usually scheduled ason call. The counterpreparation may bephased–although this is certainly notrequired– to successively attack certain typesof targets.

Phase 1 includes—

Forward elements.

Indirect-fire systems.

Observation posts.

Phase 2 includes—

Command posts.

Communication and reserves while attack ofindirect-fire systems continues.

NOTE: Targets are selected, usually at brigadelevel or higher, on likely enemy approaches todefensive positions.

Planned FireThe aim of planned fire is to break up theenemy’s attacks by striking him when he isforming up or assaulting. Subsequently, thefire is adjusted to continue attacking himduring his assault until he is forced to breakoff the attack. Targets are initially selected bycompany commanders; the final selection ismade by the battalion commander. Furthercoordination occurs at higher levels to preventduplication of targets; for example, near unitor force boundaries. When selecting plannedfire targets, the following factors areparamount:

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The likely enemy approaches.

The location on the ground at which theenemy is likely to be first detected whenattacking.

The likely enemy assembly area.

The use of planned targets as referencepoints for subsequent adjustment of fires.

Measured ResponseThe force SOPs should establish a standardresponse for certain defensive fire tasks. TheSOP also may identify the FSCOORDs orunits which may initiate these responses. Thisprocedure ensures that ammunition ex-penditure is controlled, that priorities aremaintained, and that FSCOORDs or unitsauthorized more fire support resources arekept informed as the battle progresses.

Fire Planning for an AttackPurpose

For the purpose of fire planning, the attackmay be considered as basically a movementproblem; that is, the movement of enoughforce onto an objective to achieve an aim. Theenemy will strive to prevent this by using hisfire support, obstacles, and maneuver. Themain purpose of a fire plan for an attack is toneutralize enemy direct and indirect fireduring all stages of the attack and to preventreserves and second-echelon forces frominterfering.

Types of PlansA fire plan for an attack can vary from aninformal fire plan required as soon as possibleto a formal fire plan in support of an attacksome time in the future.

Informal Fire Plan. Depending on the timeavailable, informal fire planning may benecessary at brigade level and below. Aninformal fire plan is developed to meet a

relatively urgent H-hour. However, themaneuver commander may have to delay hisH-hour if artillery redeployment orammunition availability so necessitates; andthis should be one of the factors considered inhis estimate. Having targets on call will bemore normal than having a timed programrelated to a rate of advance. Fire may have tobe adjusted as the attack proceeds if there wasnot enough time to do so previously.Well-rehearsed fire planning drills betweencommanders and FSCOORDs and/or FSOsare essential.

Formal Fire Plan. The formal offensive fire planfollows the same top-down process withbottom-up refinement as discussed earlier. Theplan often involves a large concentration offire support resources. The coordinatingheadquarters normally is the division or corpsFS cell (usually one level above the head-quarters making the fire plan). A substantialredeployment of artillery and a large-scalepositioning program for ammunition may berequired. This is the responsibility of thecoordinating headquarters. Consequently, aconsiderable amount of time usually is neededfor planning and coordination.

ChangesThe best prepared fire plan rarely goes beyondH-hour without some changes. FSCOORDsand/or FSOs at all levels must ensure that fireplanning and target adjustment drills are well-rehearsed and procedures for changing the fireplan are clearly understood by all.

Planning ConsiderationsThe fire plan must cover the entire attack andbe integrated with the actions of the attackingtroops. Offensive fire planning should includethe types of fire discussed below.

Preparation FirePreparation fire may vary from a brief, intensebombardment on selected targets to a

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prolonged effort over several days, covering alarge number of targets. Commanders must beclear on what they hope to achieve by this sortof fire. The effectiveness of preparation firevaries with each situation; and its feasibilitydepends on such factors as surprise,deployment, ammunition supply, and type ofweapons available. Preparation fire is plannedby the commander planning the attack,Normally, fire begins before H-hour and mayextend beyond it. Firing may start at aprescribed time, or it may be held on call untilneeded. The preparation may be phased asfollows:

Phase 1 — attack of fire support means andobservation capabilities, including artilleryheadquarters and command posts.

Phase 2 — attack of main command posts,communications facilities, assembly areas, andreserves.

Phase 3 — attack of defensive areas in theforward portions of the position areas andtargets that pose an immediate threat toattacking units or forces.

Covering FireCovering fire is used to cover the movementof the attacking unit or force during theformation, assault, and initial stages ofreorganization during the early stages of theattack. Its most effective form is massing offire on a time schedule. There may be targetson call, and some weapons must besuperimposed on targets to provide a reserveof firepower. This reserve is used to engagetargets of opportunity or to counterunexpected enemy action.

Covering fire is used during the attack andcounterattack. The aim of covering fire is toprotect assaulting troops by neutralizing enemydirect-fire weapons that can engage themduring the attack and counterattack.Neutralization is achieved when the enemy is

prevented from maneuvering, observing, andusing his weapons effectively and a 10 percentkill rate is inflicted. To be effective, coveringfire support should be potentially lethal,intense, and continuous. Covering fire supportfor an attack always should be planned inadvance by the commander planning theattack. Normally, it includes one or all of thefollowing: schedules, targets on call, andtargets of opportunity.

Schedules. Schedules establish planned timingsfor individual targets to cover the period ofthe attack. The schedule must be modifiable,since few attacks go exactly as planned. Ifcommunications are lost, fire support would beprovided in accordance with the schedule; themaneuver force would have to adjust its ratesof movement to synchronize with the schedule.

Targets on Call. These are planned targets thatare arranged in all detail less their timings.They ensure a quick response and can becalled for at any time. This is a form ofcontingency fire planning.

Targets of Opportunity. At times in an attack,covering fire support may be needed ontargets that have not been planned. Fire canbe called for by FSOs, COLTs, forwardobservers, air observers, naval gunfire liaisonofficers or air liaison officers supporting theattack, and the assaulting troops themselves.All combat arms officers and non-commissioned officers also should be trainedto call for and adjust fire support.

Defensive Fire During ReorganizationThe attacking unit or force is most vulnerableto counterattack during reorganization.Defensive fire to cover this phase must beincluded in the fire plan. Initially, these targetsare planned from maps, air photographs, orother information sources. Then they areconfirmed and, if possible, adjusted as soon aspossible after the assault arrives on theobjective.

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Cover for ExploitationNormally, this cover consists of massed fire oncall and an allotment of weapons andammunition. Opportunity exploitation tasksmay have to be supported by resourcesretained under the commander’s direct controlfor the purpose of influencing the battle whenrequired. The commander may have toreallocate fire support resources or changepriority of fires.

CounterfireThe neutralization of enemy guns and mortarsshould be a continuing process throughout theattack. Demands for fire support resources atcritical stages of the attack may restrictcounterfire for certain periods. Even thoughcounterfire is coordinated at the highest level,normally division or above, it must beconsidered at all stages of planning the attack.It must not be treated as a separate subjectafter the stages discussed earlier are planned.Counterfire must be considered as the neutral-ization of the enemy’s main fire support. Itsimportance to the success of the attack cannotbe overemphasized.

Determination of H-HourH-hour is determined by tacticalconsiderations and the time necessary toprepare for the attack. A commander mayhave to decide on the relative importance oflaunching his attack quickly as opposed towaiting for guaranteed accuracy of fire support.In larger-scale attacks, the preparations couldbe lengthy. They could include positioning ofammunition, redeployment of resources, and,possibly, movement forward of extra firesupport. From these factors, a D-day can beestablished. H-hour may still be governed bytechnical requirements. For example, ifresources must be moved under cover of dark-ness to new primary positions before they firethe fire plan, H-hour cannot be early in theevening. If close air support is to be relied

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weather conditions may be- needed.

Commander’s Ability toInfluence

In the same way the commander provides fora maneuver reserve for all stages of an attack,he also must retain control over fire supportresources (GS or GSR) that are immediatelyresponsive to his needs. The commander doesthis to —

Engage previously undetected targets thatthreaten to break the momentum of theattack.

React to enemy initiatives; for example,prevent the enemy from moving his reserveto reinforce a faltering sector of his defense.

Maintain a capacity for counterfire through-out the attack.

Provide for defensive fire during thereorganization stage.

Ensure he has enough firepower available tosupport exploitation or extraction of specificelements as dictated by the tactical situationas it develops during the attack.

As a general rule, the less the commanderknows about the enemy, the more fire supportresources he should retain to support thebattle plan as a whole. The amount andcomposition of resources retained undercentralized control by the commander dependon the following factors. These factors arededuced during the commander’s estimate (theFSCOORD’s and/or FSO’s advice would besought as appropriate):

The likely enemy reactions to the attack.

The size and composition of the likely Threatforce at each stage of the attack (bothmaneuver and firepower elements).

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The number and type of targets that must beattacked simultaneously during the attack.

The number and type of fire units andammunition available for the attack.

The size of the ammunition reserve mat canbe established for all stages of the battle.

The ability to position fire support resourcesunder centralized control so that they can besuperimposed on the fire of others. Thisshould be planned so that the removal atshort notice of the superimposed fire doesnot seriously diminish the effects of fire onthe target nor affect the structure of the fireplan.

Changes to Fire PlansA fire plan can be changed during itsexecution to meet unforeseen circumstances.The authority to do this should be kept at thehighest feasible level, usually with thecommander of the operation. Orders forchanges must be clear and simple so they canbe readily understood in the heat of battle.Change is easier if its possibility is consideredduring planning by—

Keeping the plan as simple as possible.

Dividing covering fire into clearly definedstages.

Grouping targets.

Section III. REAR OPERATIONS

DescriptionThe purpose of rear operations is to ensurefriendly forces freedom of action to supportcombat forces in the close and deepoperations. Depending on the threat levelinvolved (see Chapter 4, Section VI), rearoperations CPs control available forces for

Keeping enough GS fire units superimposed.The proper handling of GS firepower cansometimes obviate the necessity for a changeto the fire plan.

ObservationFire delivered in support of any plan shouldbe observed. Observers from the artillery,Army aviation, Navy, or Air Force, asappropriate, should be located where they canobserve the effect of fire and make anynecessary adjustments. Also, they should beable to pass back information on the progressof the attack. To be effective, these observersshould be in static positions and not intimatelyinvolved in the battle.

Mobile observers are needed with theattacking troops to deal with targets ofopportunity. They also provide observation,reporting, and liaison during the criticalreorganization phase. In particular, they adjustthe defensive fire tasks that have been plannedand request any additional planned closetargets for inclusion in the list of defensive firetasks.

The briefing of observers, either accompanyingan attack or observing it from a static orairborne position, is most important. Theymust fully understand the tactical plan and thefire plan, the authority for modification, andthe allocation of observers for the adjustmentof fire.

rear area security. The FSCOORDconsiderations unique to rear operations arediscussed in this section.

Fire Support TasksThe following are fire support tasks unique torear operations:

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Establish an FSE within the operations cell ofthe rear CP.

Identify fire support assets available for reararea fire support.

Select and prepare supplementary positionsfor indirect-fire weapons if needed.

Arrange survey control for rear area positionsfor indirect-fire weapons.

Determine FA ammunition considerations forrear operations.

Command and ControlCommand and control considerations in rearoperations include the following:

Fire support agencies committed to supportrear area forces are designated by on-ordermissions.

Communications procedures (net, call signs,and so forth) to plan and execute fire supportare established and disseminated.

Fire Support Planning andCoordination

Considerations in fire support planning andcoordination for rear operations are as follows:

Implement fire support into rear operationsplans.

Plan fires and targets in the rear area.

Coordinate for route clearance with the rearCP CSS cell and with the rear operations cellfor the movement of FA units through thecorps or division rear area.

Special ConsiderationsThe principal means of fire support normallyavailable to support rear operations aremortars, field artillery, and aircraft. In thoseareas near a coastline, NGF support also maybe available.

Dedicated fire support for rear operationsshould be considered when the Threatsituation dictates and sufficient fire supportassets are available.

For some rear operations, field artillery with a6,400-mil firing capability positioned within theMBA may be able to support rear operationsfrom its current positions. Other actions mayrequire supplementary positions from whichartillery can provide support. Routes to thosepositions are reconnoitered. Firing positionsare prepared as time and the situation permit.Communications for fire support are planned.Maneuver elements assigned to rearoperations will have their company firesupport teams in place. This gives theseelements FSCOORDs at levels throughbrigade-size forces.

The following factors must be addressed inplanning fire support for rear operations:

Assembly and movement of reserves:

Position reserves to support their antici-pated commitment and to be secure fromobservation and attack.Move reserves under protection fromenemy observation and interdiction.

Deployment routes free from observation.

Redeployment of fire support assets to—

Support future operations.

Protect them from enemy observation andinterference.

Maintenance and protection of sustainmentefforts:

Protect against ground, air, and missileattack.

Accumulate stocks to support projectedoperations without decreasing support tocurrently engaged units.

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Maintenance of command and control.

Deployment of command posts and com-munications networks where they cancontinue the fight without a break inoperating tempo.

Section IV. COUNTERFIRE

DescriptionJCS Pub 1 defines counterfire as fire intendedto destroy or neutralize enemy weapons.

Counterfire consists of fires targetedthroughout the battlefield that are intended toattack the total enemy fire support system. Itincludes fires against accompanying mortars;helicopter forward operating bases; vectortarget designation points (VTDPs); firesupport C²; artillery, rocket, and missilesystems; and support and sustainmentinstallations.

Counterfire gains freedom of action for allfriendly maneuver forces and is provided by allof the fire support means, both lethal andnonlethal. Counterfire is not a separate battle.It is inseparably tied to close and deepoperations and is part of the overall combinedarms fight to achieve fire superiority. A fineline may exist between counterfire and attackat depth. However, once a target is capable(that is, within range) of affecting the closefight, its attack is considered counterfire.

Counterfire is a function the force commandermust address; it is not solely the responsibilityof the force artillery commander. Intelligenceassets must be prioritized to accurately locate;and operational attack assets (such as artillery,mortars, TACAIR, attack helicopters, navalgunfire, and EW assets) must be brought tobear on the total enemy fire support system.

ThreatIn the Soviet Army, the artillery is the arm ofdecision and the king of battle. Historically,

from the Great Patriotic War to more recentexperiences in Afghanistan the Soviets exploitthe success of fire support with maneuverforces.

Threat artillery is the decisive factor to achievevictory and guarantee success. Its ability toconcentrate and mass fires for the main attackis expected to achieve devastating effects.

Typically, a Threat front commander pushesforward the target acquisition C², and artilleryassets from both the first- and second-echelonarmies. Our maneuver commanders will likelysee across the FLOT an array of fire supportsystems that includes accompanying regimentalfire support systems as well as supportingartillery positioned forward from division andarmy levels. Supporting artillery will beorganized into regimental artillery groups,divisional artillery groups (DAGs), and armyartillery groups (AAGs). The graphic on thenext page shows a doctrinal laydown of thetarget set belts for Threat fire support systems.

Accompanying artillery, RAGs, and DAGsfocus primarily on support of close operationsagainst friendly maneuver elements. However,as required, they will also engage our firesupport assets to support the Threat maneuvercommander’s efforts to gain fire superiority. Inmost situations, the primary targets foraccompanying and supporting artillery arefriendly maneuver forces and battle positions,not friendly artillery. The mission of the Chiefof Artillery or Chief of Missile Troops andArtil lery—as part of the overallreconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition,and fire support effort—is to use his organic

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and supporting assets to locate friendlymaneuver units and then create the conditionsfor a breakthrough attack by destroying themwith intense and overwhelming fires. Thesefire support systems (cannons, targetacquisition, and C2) are employed forward andlocated within 10 km of the FLOT.

The Soviets will also conduct extensivecounterfire operations against our fire supportsystems. Their number one target priorityremains the location and destruction of our

nuclear-capable artillery and missile units.Doctrinally, Soviet counterfire operations areconducted primarily by use of AAG assets;however, RAGs and DAGs can also be usedto support the counterfire battle. Centralizingcontrol of his counterfire effort allows theThreat commander to mass large volumes offires, possibly at the expense of timeliness.This potentially slower response may allow usto interrupt the Threat commander’s decisioncycle – a key ingredient to AirLand Battlesuccess.

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ConceptDuring Threat offensive operations, the mainobjective of Soviet fire support is to create abreakthrough situation in our maneuver forceforward positions. When on the defense, themain objective of Threat fire support is todisrupt our attack formations throughinterdiction, massing and firing a solid wall offire (barrages) in front of their own forwarddefensive positions. Our counterfire effortmust negate this intense, numericallyoverwhelming condition and give our forcecommander an opportunity to achieve firesuperiority. Fire superiority allows freedom ofaction for maneuver forces to achieve andmaintain dominance and to use direct firesystems to attack Threat maneuver forces.

Achieving fire superiority against a force withoverwhelming numerical advantage in deliverysystems requires a counterfire effort thatattacks the entire Threat fire support systemearly, in depth, and throughout the battle.Targeting the enemy fire support systemsincludes the proactive detection and attack ofenemy nonfiring systems (sensors, C3 facilities,support, and sustainment installations) as wellas firing systems (the weapons themselves)before they engage friendly forces; for

example, MRLs in assembly areas, a ZSU 23-4on the road, or the signature of an operatingVTDP.

The force commander must, throughcounterfire, wrest the initiative from his Threatopponent. To achieve fire superiority, ourcounterfire effort must do more than merelyreact to Threat fires. We want to attrit theoverall Threat fire support system by usingproactive counterfire and attacking Threatforces at depth, before Threat fire supportsystems can influence current operations. Thecounterfire efforts of the corps andsubordinate divisions must focus throughoutthe entire depth of each commander’s area ofresponsibility. Future organic target acquisitionand attack systems will further extend therange of the corps proactive counterfire effortto 150 km.

Counterfire is a shared responsibility. Bothcorps and division are responsible forcounterfire planning and execution. While theresponsibility is shared, the location of thetargets sets, the capabilities of sensorplatforms, and the ranges of available weaponsystems allow for an orderly and calculateddivision of labor.

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Counterfire must contribute to the successfulfulfillment of the corps commander’s intentand the corps mission. In some scenarios, thecorps mission may best be accomplished byplanning and executing counterfire centrally atcorps. To fix responsibility for counterfirewithin the corps, consideration must be givento –

The location of hostile targets.

The level at which the necessary assets andthe ability to synchronize acquisition,processing and delivery exist.

Corps Counterfire ResponsibilityThe corps commander is responsible forcounterfire throughout the depth of the corpsarea of responsibility. He, his FSCOORD, andhis staff assess the counterfire threat to thecorps. They determine the best way to protectthe corps combat forces and to defeat, delay,or disrupt the Threat array. This estimate oranalysis includes an assessment of thecounterfire capabilities of the corps and itssubordinate divisions. The corps commander’scounterfire responsibilities include thefollowing:

Describing his intent; planning; and thendeciding on the most effective course ofaction (COA) and task organization for thecorps and its divisions to successfully meetthe counterfire threat, protect the maneuverforce, and at the same time accomplish thecorps mission.

Segmenting the battlefield by delineatingmaneuver boundaries and/or assigning areasof responsibility for corps and its subordinatedivisions. This helps establish the delineationof counterfire responsibilities within the corpszone.

Assigning missions and responsibilities, toinclude specific taskings to intelligence assetsthrough the G2.

Allocating resources. The corps commanderensures that counterfire assets are allocated inaccordance with assigned missions and hisintent. Corps assets may be retained at corpsor allocated to subordinate divisions.Conversely, in some situations, the corpscommander may require the use of divisionassets to support a corps counterfireresponsibility. He should provide guidance foruse of certain critical assets such as the corpsaviation brigade, BAI and reconnaissancesorties, OH-58Ds, SOFs, and EW assets.

Requesting additional TA and attack systemsfrom army group, theater, or joint task forcelevel or from other EAC headquarters.

Detecting and attacking. The corps detectsand attacks targets within its area ofresponsibility, typically beyond the establishedfire support coordination line (FSCL). Thecorps also may attack targets within a divisionarea of responsibility when the division hasforwarded such a request to corps based onpriority and need. Within its capability, thecorps may respond to requests for additionalfires from adjacent units.

Monitoring. The corps commander monitorsthe execution of his intent throughout thecorps area.

Assessing. Finally, the corps commander mustassess the protection of his combat units andthe effects of counterfire against Threat firesupport systems. As appropriate, he adjustsintelligence collection and/or attack prioritiesfor protection of his force and attack ofenemy targets. He may reallocate assetsand/or modify the missions of subordinateunits.

Corps Counterfire Forward ofthe Division Area

By using organic assets and accessinghigher-level resources, the corps commanderhas a capability for proactive counterfire. (The

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ability of divisions to effectively conductcounterfire with organic assets against targetsbeyond 30 km is currently limited by bothacquisition and delivery means.) The corpscommander can—

Detect heavy MRL battalions, VTDPs,helicopter forward operating bases, and othercounterfire targets. He does this by use oforganic aviation assets and collectors fromthe corps MI brigade, long-range surveillanceunits (LRSUs), and special operations forces.

Attack Threat fire support systems withMLRS and cannon battalions of the corpsFA brigades out to ranges of 30 km. Beyond30 km, deeper strike assets (such as EW,Lance, ATACMS, Army aviation, allocatedAir Force sorties, and ground maneuverforces) must be considered for target attack.

Request additional acquisition and/or attackassets from EAC, the JTF commander, or theAir Force. The joint attack of artillery(JAART) concept requires that attackhelicopters, TACAIR, and available indirectfires attack Threat fire support systems acrossthe FLOT. A JAART is similar to a JAAToperation, but it is targeted against Threatfire support systems. A JAART may be aviable option if the corps commander facesan overwhelming counterfire threat anddecides to commit all available fire supportassets to reduce force ratios.

Corps Counterfire inthe Division Area

The corps commander decides how the corpswill conduct counterfire operations. Heinfluences how subordinate divisioncommanders fight through the allocation ofcorps assets, the issuance of attack guidance,and the identification of corps high-payofftargets. He can support a divisioncommander’s counterfire efforts by attackingThreat fire support systems at depth; thus, hehelps to shape the division counterfire battle.

In addition to allocating assets to divisions, thecorps commander can further support adivision counterfire battle by responding to thedivision requests with BAI, MLRS, Lance, andEW. With respect to counterfire in thedivision area of responsibility, the corpscommander—

Assigns missions to division and corps firesupport assets and delineates their areas ofresponsibility by establishing boundaries.

Provides IPB products and criticalintelligence information developed at corpsor received from higher or adjacentheadquarters.

Detects and attacks targets forwarded by thedivision. As appropriate, the corps, aftercoordinating with the division FSE, mayattack Threat fire support targets within thedivision zone by massing fires to achieverequired effects. Procedures for attackingThreat systems firing from across boundariesalso must be coordinated.

Task-organizes and allocates assets. On thebasis of the commander’s intent and thefactors of METT-T, the corps commandercan give the divisions added assets fordetection and attack of Threat fire support.Most often, corps provides nondivisional FAdelivery assets to augment div arty firesupport capabilities. This can be done byeither of the following actions:

Assigning an FA brigade a tactical missionsuch as reinforcing or GSR to a div arty.

Attaching the FA brigade to the divisionrequiring augmentation. The FA brigadenormally is then further attached to the divarty.

Normally, the corps commander retains thecommand relationship with the FA brigade.Thus, he can keep a string on corps deliveryassets for future requirements and maintain a

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capability to mass fires, when required. Hemay modify the seven inherent responsibilitiesof the assigned tactical mission of the FAbrigade. The addition of an FA brigade to thedivision provides the following:

An additional force artillery brigade-level C2

headquarters.

Additional target-processing capability.

Increased firepower, typically with a mix ofcannon and rocket battalions.

An FA brigade, however, does not bring withit additional assets to improve the TAcapability of the division. When FirefinderBlock III radars are issued to div arty TA units(mid-1990s), the displaced AN/TPQ-37counterbattery radars could be given to FAbrigade HHBs. With TA assets, FA brigadesafford additional flexibility to the corpscommander and a means of enhancingcounterfire target acquisition capabilities whenemployed in support of a div arty.

Division Counterfire ResponsibilityTypically, most of the reactive counterfirebattle takes place within the division area ofresponsibility. Most of the Threat active firesupport systems are located in this area.

The responsibilities of the division commandermirror those of the corps commander.Although his assets are fewer in number andvariety, the division commander does haveorganic target acquisition, target processing,and delivery assets to conduct counterfire. Thediv arty commander, as FSCOORD for thedivision, is responsible for orchestrating thedivision counterfire effort.

When an FA brigade from corps artillery isavailable to the division, the div artycommander may assign it the counterfire role.Responsibility for the execution of the divisioncounterfire effort, however, remains with thediv arty commander.

Counterfire for Low-Intensity andMid-Intensity Situations

During low-intensity conflict (LIC) ormid-intensity conflict (MIC), Threat firesupport systems will likely be less modern andperhaps less extensive than friendly firesupport capabilities. Nevertheless, the Threatcommander will use his fires much as hewould in a high-intensity environment. MostThreat systems will include mortars and towedhowitzers. Typically, self-propelled systems andMRLs will be introduced as the level ofconflict escalates. Host nation logistics bases,friendly laager areas, and main supply routesare all potential targets for Threat fire support.

Counterfire responsibilities and the planningand execution requirements for these situationsare identical to those previously discussed.Friendly capabilities to detect and attackhostile systems and rules for engagement arethe primary differences in LIC or MIC. Thelight force structure provides a more limitedcounterfire capability. Heavier forces, however,may also be employed in LIC and MICsituations.

Contingency operations responding to LIC orMIC situations could include heavy and/orlight forces. The task organization provided bythe JTF commander, manifested bycontingency plans and the time-phased forcedeployment list, dictate where theresponsibility for counterfire will be placed.and how it will be fought.

NOTE: The counterfire planning sequence at allechelons uses the decide-detect-delivermethodology. These functions as implemented atcorps and division are discussed below.

Corps Decide Function

Counterfire at the corps level begins with thecorps commander’s guidance to the corps

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artillery commander (the FSCOORD). At thislevel, decisions are made to meet a specificcommander’s intent. The ultimate results aremission assignments and a task organization.The intent and planning guidance of the corpscommander allow the corps FSCOORD, G3,and G2 to develop a restated mission and tobegin planning the assignment ofresponsibilities and resources for counterfire tosupport potential courses of action. As aminimum, the corps commander’s intent andplanning guidance should include thefollowing:

Responsibility for specific portions of thebattlefield.

Allocation of available assets.

Use of nuclear and chemical weapons.

Priorities for protection of friendly elementsand attack of enemy areas.

Permission to execute before H-hour.

Requirements for battle damage assessment.

Given the commander’s planning guidance andintent, the corps plans and FS cells (includingthe FSCOORD, G3, G2, and other key staff)develop COAs and associated organizationsfor combat to support the intent. The decidefunction of planning orients the collection andtarget acquisition effort and specifies thecommander’s attack guidance for execution.

The G2 is a key staff officer to help plan andexecute counterfire. He is best able to focusthe intelligence collection power of the corpsthrough the corps tactical operations centersupport element (CTOCSE). Within the corpsartillery, the G2 and G3 makerecommendations to the corps G2 to maximizethe use of corps TA and intelligence collectionassets. The factors of METT-T may dictatethat division-level acquisition means (such asEW assets and Firefinder radars) betask-organized under corps control. Consistent

with the corps commander’s intent, thefollowing must be carefully considered:

Who will control the countefire fight.

How these tasked assets will be returned in atimely manner to the divisions.

A key decision aid in the decide function forcounterfire is the IPB, which includes thefollowing:

Situational templates to identify potentialtargets and to develop NAIs and TAIs.

Decision support templates (DSTs) toprovide windows of opportunity and to helpidentify the key decision points.

Target value analysis to give the commandera cost-effectiveness analysis, which identifiesthe high-payoff targets. High-payoff targetsfocus both detection and attack assets againstspecific types of targets by templating,signatures, and vulnerabilities.

In addition to establishing boundaries andareas of responsibility, the corps commandercan also use fire support coordinatingmeasures to help delineate counterfireresponsibilities. The corps can establish anFSCL, which expedites the attack of all targetsforward of it by both surface and air-deliveredfires. The establishment of an FSCL allowshigher, adjacent, and lower headquarters toengage targets without coordinating with theestablishing headquarters. Thus, a portion ofthe corps area of responsibility is free for theattack of targets by all players. The attack oftargets beyond the FSCL by ground forcesshould, however, be coordinated withsupporting TACAIR when possible. Theprimary consideration for the placement of anFSCL is that it should be located beyond thearea in which the corps intends to shape itsdeep operations fight. However, the corpsdeep operations concept may not seek toshape the fight but may only focus on

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maximizing the destruction of enemy unitsand/or systems. Then, the corps shouldestablish the FSCL as close as possible to itsclose operations area. During offensiveoperations, the FSCL would be further awayfrom friendly forces than during defensiveoperations. In either case, the FSCL should beplaced on identifiable terrain and far enoughfrom friendly ground maneuver forces that itdoes not restrict their ability to maneuver. Theintent of the corps commander may be to freean area of the battlefield so that it can beexpeditiously attacked by both corps anddivision cannon and rocket fire supportsystems. In that case, he should limit the depthof the division areas of responsibility and notestablish a corps FSCL in an area he hasallocated to a division.

The following conditions should be met beforean FSCL is established by corps:

There is a portion of the corps deepoperations area in which selective targeting isnot required to shape the deep operationsfight.

The expeditious attack of targets beyond theFSCL will support the operations of thecorps, the attacking unit, or the higherheadquarters of the attacking unit.

The corps and its supporting units are willingto accept the possible duplication of effortwhich may result from dual targeting beyondthe FSCL.

The decide function at corps is mirroredthrough subordinate echelons. The decidefunction of the counterfire planning sequenceculminates with mission assignments and tasksto target detectors and shooters.

Corps Detect FunctionTarget acquisition tasks supporting the corpscounterfire effort flow from the decide functionand are issued in the corps collection plan.

The corps G2 and FS cell develop the targetacquisition plan and organize sensor taskingand reporting. Specific requirements fororganic collection assets and requests for

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nonorganic assets are included in the corpscollection plan. The corps FAIO located in theCTOCSE ensures that the MI brigade assets(ASPS and EWS) understand both accuracyand time requirements to produce validtargets. The corps artillery G2 and G3coordinate closely with the corps G2, FS cell,and FAIO to determine when selected sensorswill shift their priority from intelligencegathering to target production. This shift ineffort should be indicated on the corpsdecision support matrix and keyed to specificevents on the battlefield. The corps artilleryG2 also coordinates with the corps G2 and FScell to ensure his PIR for the acquisition andattack of enemy fire support assets areincluded in the corps collection plan.

The processing and developing of targetinginformation from nonorganic corps assets mustbe streamlined. The collection and target

acquisition process must also provide forassessment of target damage.

During the corps mission analysis andcommand estimate process, the need foradditional sensor assets may be identified. Onesource for additional sensors which would beunder the direct control of the corpscommander and his staff is the reservedivisions. The EW and TA assets organic to areserve division could be used to support thecorps counterfire effort or to augment thecapabilities of a committed division. One wayto do this is to task-organize the reservedivision acquisition assets (such as Firefinderradars, EW assets, and OH-58Ds) and assignthem a tactical mission such as GS to thecorps or GSR to a committed div arty. Caremust be taken, however, to ensure these assetswill be available to the reserve division whenit is committed.

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Corps Deliver FunctionThe deliver function for counterfire executesthe acquisition and attack guidance of thecommander. The attack of counterfire targetsmust feature streamlined target processing andviolent, massed fires.

The FAIO located in the CTOCSE facilitatestransmittal of timely targeting information tothe FS cell and/or the FA headquarterscontrolling the counterfire fight. He also givesCTOCSE personnel the accuracy andtimeliness requirements for friendly attack oftargets.

The FS cells process targets by matching targetdefeat criteria, commander’s attack guidance,and attack system capability. The corps FS cellattacks counterfire targets by—

Using cannon, rocket, and missile assets ofcorps FA brigades assigned a GS or GSRmission.

Providing the corps G3 air target locationsand desired effects for TACAIR packaging.

Coordinating with the G3 for attack withcorps aviation and/or EW assets.

Forwarding counterfire targets via firesupport channels to subordinate divisions forattack.

Providing targets to adjacent corps for attack.

Division Decide FunctionThe decide function for counterfire at divisionmirrors that at corps. Priorities are established,combat assets are allocated, and tasks arespecified to best meet the commander’s intent.

The division FSCOORD, G2, and G3 developand recommend the following:

Target priorities for acquisition. Theycoordinate with the EWS for EW targetacquisition.

High-value targets and priorities.

Target selection standards for accuracy andtimeliness.

Decision points and time lines for execution.

Fire support coordinating measures toexpedite the attack of counterfire targetsconsistent with the commander’s intent (forexample, CFLs and boundaries).

Requirements for target damage assessment.

The centralization of assets under a singlecommand and control headquarters is a keyaspect of an effective counterfire effort.Normally, during offensive operations firesupport assets are more decentralized than inthe defense. However, if the commander’sMETT-T analysis determines that counterfirewill be a major factor in the battle, he may optfor a more centralized organization for combateven for an offensive operation. This translatesto the assignment of fewer reinforcing missionsto available fire support assets in favor ofmore GSR missions. In accordance with theseven inherent responsibilities associated withthe tactical mission of GSR, the force artillerycommander retains first priority for calls forfire and positioning authority over a unit withthe GSR mission. This gives the headquarterscontrolling the division counterfire effort boththe assets and the flexibility to effectivelyconduct the counterfire effort. Thecommander’s intent and priorities for detectionand attack of Threat fire support aredocumented in the fire support appendix ofthe OPORD.

Division Detect FunctionResponsibilities

The division G2 is responsible for developingand implementing the division collection andtarget acquisition plan. This plan identifies thetasks MI assets must perform to support themaneuver and fire support plans developed bythe FSCOORD and G3. The G2 also

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coordinates with the div arty on how artillery

plan.TA assets can be used to support the overall

Agencies InvolvedGenerally, within the division, intelligence flowand target detection involve several agencies.

G2. The G2 focuses the overall collection andtarget acquisition effort for the division. Hecoordinates with div arty for the support of itsacquisition assets.

Military Intelligence Battalion. The MI battalionTOC and its TCAE are the central point fordata collection from both DS and GSintelligence assets. They are the link to thecorps MI brigade.

Division Tactical Operations Center SupportElement. The division TOC support element(DTOCSE) gives the division access tosensitive compartmented information. Thedivision FAIO is in the DTOCSE. He cantransmit perishable or time-sensitive targetingdata to either the FS cell or the artilleryheadquarters controlling the counterfire battle(div arty or a supporting FA brigade) whileproviding location accuracy requirements tocollection assets. To know where to sendinformation, the FAIO must know whatinformation or targets must be processed bythe FS cell for attack by other than FA assetsand what targets are to be engaged by the FA.The use of the attack guidance matrixdeveloped during the command estimateprocess is essential to providing the FAIO thisinformation.

Electronic Warfare Staff Officer. The EWSOhelps the DTOCSE translate mission guidancefor EW systems under division control.

Air Liaison Officer. The ALO provides currentcapabilities and status of Air Force assets.

Division Artillery S2. The div arty S2 has staffresponsibility for the division target acquisition

battery assets. He is aided by the counterfireofficer and the target production section. Theyrecommend positioning, target coverage and/orchanges in coverage, and organization forcombat for the div arty TA assets. The div artyS2 must coordinate the radar target acquisitionplan as discussed below.

Command and Control. The div arty has severalpossible options for the employment of itsradars:

It can keep them centralized with all assetsreporting information to a centralheadquarters (div arty or a supporting FAbrigade). The same headquarters would alsocontrol and coordinate positioning and zonesof search for the radars.

It can attach assets to subordinate units.Thus, the subordinate unit can establishreporting procedures and coveragerequirements and can position the attachedasset (for example, attach an AN/TPQ-36radar to a DS battalion).

It can use a combination of the above. Forexample, it can retain the AN/’TPQ-37s orAN/TPS-25s or -58s under div arty controland give command and control of (attach)the AN/TPQ-36s to the DS battalions.

NOTE: Regardless of which option the div artychooses, the radars should be attached to a sub-ordinate headquarters for survivability and logisti-cal support.

Positioning Considerations. Both tactical andtechnical aspects of positioning must beconsidered.

Zones of Search. Search zones prioritize thesearch pattern and provide the reactionposture of the radars to best meet themaneuver commander’s intent and priorities.Each Firefinder radar can store up to ninedifferent zones. There are four different types

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of zones used with the radar. Those types andtheir functions are as follows:

Critical friendly zone (CFZ). The CFZdesignates the highest priority friendlylocations of the maneuver commander andprovides the most responsive priority of firesfrom the radars. Cued radars detectingincoming rounds into this zone immediatelygenerate a priority request for fire.FSCOORDs recommend to maneuvercommanders positioning of CFZs and theirsize for best responsiveness. Typical CFZsinclude maneuver assembly areas,headquarters, forward arming and refuelingpoints (FARPs), and other troopconcentrations,

Call-for-fire zone (CFFZ). The CFFZdesignates a search area beyond the FLOTthat the maneuver commander wantssuppressed or neutralized. The CFFZdesignation is closely tied to the IPB process.A CFFZ would likely be a suspected RAG orDAG position. The CFFZ provides thesecond most responsive priority for fires fromthe radar.

Artillery target intelligence zone (ATIZ). AnATIZ enables a maneuver commander towatch an area closely while assigning higherpriority to more important areas. Targetsidentified in this zone will be evaluated forattack as received but will not automaticallygenerate a fire mission.

Censor zone (CZ). A CZ is used to designateareas from which the commander does notwant to attack targets. This zone is often usedto avoid overlap and duplication.

Zone Management. Zone management mustsupport the maneuver commander’s intent,The key to zone management is thecoordination of zones among adjacent radarsto provide both optimum detection andpriority for attack. Zones are assigned toindividual radars according to how the div artyhas organized its assets for combat:

Radars under the operational control of divarty. Div arty designates specific zones foreach radar. In some instances, all divisionradars may be assigned the same nine zones.A specific zone may be designated on requestfrom a subordinate maneuver commander orfor the support of the division as a whole.The division may also have some zones eitherdesignated by the corps commander or sharedwith adjacent divisions.

Radars under the operational control of theclose support battalions. To coordinate allcoverage within the division, the div arty maystill designate all or a portion of the zones forthese radars. Zones may also be assignedindependent of other division radars to reflectthe protection priorities of the supportedmaneuver commander.

A combination of the above.

Establishment of Communications. Firefinder radarshave the capability for two FM nets, one ofwhich is digital. The digital net can be used topass information either to the counterfireheadquarters by use of the targetacquisition/intelligence net (digital) or to acontrolling FA battalion FDC by use of a firedirection (FD) (digital) net. The FM voice netcan be used to pass information either on acommand net or on an FD net.

Radiate Time. Threat EW activity consideredwith mission requirements will dictatecumulative radiation time before survivabilitymoves are required. FM 6-121 provides aradiation time survivability chart. In some LICor MIC situations where no counterradarthreat exists, radars could conceivably radiatecontinuously. Commanders should decide, andradar technicians should closely monitor,radiation times and movement requirements,

Cueing. One of the most difficult planningfactors is the determination of when and howto best cue the radar for activation. Thecounterfire headquarters must establish cueingguidance for radar sections. Both authority to

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cue and priority for cueing requirements mustbe clearly understood. Planned cueingschedules are normally ineffective. Therefore,cueing guidance should specify the cueingagent and the radar section to which he islinked (to include C2 and communications)and should establish the specific conditions foractivating the radar. The cueing scheme shouldbe included in rehearsals. Key personnel forcueing include FSCOORDs, FSEs, cueingagent(s), S2s of radar-controlling headquarters,and the radar section(s).

Fire Support Coordinator. The FSCOORDrecommends to the maneuver commanderdesignation and activation of CFZs based onmission and intent. The S2 must know whereCFZs are and their effective times.

Fire Support Element. FSEs coordinatecommunications links among cueing agentslocated in the CFZs, radars, and attack assets.

Cueing Agents. Cueing agents maintaincommunication with radars and establishinternal alert procedures within the CFZ withthe maneuver commander.

Radars. Radars respond to requests fromcueing agents and generate requests for fire.

CoordinationCoordination of zones among adjacent radarsprovides both optimized detection and priorityfor attack. Coordination of cueing guidanceand search zones is a dynamic process thatmust be closely tied to both operationsplanning and target acquisition. Successfulmanagement of these assets by the counterfireheadquarters is as critical to fire supportsuccess as the positioning of attack assets andfiring positions.

Division Deliver FunctionThe FSCOORD and division G3 supervise theexecution of counterfire within the division.

The division FS cell coordinates and monitorsthe execution of counterfire through—

The div arty S3 for all cannon and rocketsystems available to the division.

The ALO for allocated TACAIR support.

The division aviation officer for employmentof attack helicopter battalions.

The DTOCSE for EW support.

The div arty S3 plans the execution of thefield artillery portion of the fire support plan.The MLRS battery is the only organic GSshooter available for attack at depth,counterfire, and reinforcement of closeoperations. Therefore, the div arty willnormally require additional assets.

Assignment of Division CounterfireRole to a Field Artillery Brigade

Assignment of the counterfire role to an FAbrigade reinforcing a div arty is appropriate.The div arty commander as the divisionFSCOORD, however, remains responsible forall division fire support, to include counterfire.Div arty must ensure the FA brigade hasadequate personnel and materiel resources forcounterfire. The TAB personnel should gowith the radar assets to the FA brigade for C2

and employment expertise.

FA brigades require both TA assets andadditional processing capability to effectivelyperform counterfire. Closely linked to divisionmaneuver through the FS cell, the FSCOORDand div arty S3 must provide and coordinatethe following for the FA brigade:

Command intent for counterfire, to includerequired zones and cueing guidance.

Intelligence support from division-controlledassets. Counterfire targets from MI battalionassets, div arty ATI files, and higherheadquarters must be expeditiously forwardedto the FA brigade.

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Land management issues and position areas the Firefinder radars and the div arty TOC. Iffor FA brigade battalions and acquisition available, div arty should provide either aassets forward in the division area. VFMED with operator or a digital message

device (DMD) to the FA brigade.Traffic and movement priorities for units andammunition.

Ammunition forecasts and other servicesupport requirements. Often, FA brigadeshave equipment not normally found in thedivision; for example, in 203-mm (8-inch)battalions. Requirements for specialmaintenance or ammunition must becoordinated.

Survey and met support for FA brigade units.

In a heavy division, an automated (digital)capability must be provided to nonautomatedFA brigades to maximize communications with

Employment of TargetAcquisition Assets

The div arty target acquisition effort ismanaged by the div arty S2 and is coordinatedwith the division G2 and FSE. Div artyacquisition assets must support the corps effortand the intent of the division commander.

The div arty S2 recommends an organizationfor combat of TA assets to best meet thedivision and corps commanders’ requirements.Firefinder radars can be—

Centralized at div arty or at the FA brigade.

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Decentralized by attachment to a closesupport battalion. Control of radars by areinforcing battalion, when available, allowsthe brigade FSCOORD to better manage hisassets in support of the brigade battle.

A combination of the above.

Centralized control enhances responsiveness,increases survivability, and guarantees theoptimal coverage to support the divisioncommander’s intent. It is recommended whenthe IPB indicates a high counterfire threat. Invague situations or lower threat environments,assets may be more decentralized.

When Firefinder radars are attached to closesupport battalions, they are controlled byeither the direct support or reinforcingbattalion S2. Normally, the AN/TPQ-37 radarsand the MTLRs are retained centrally.Options for the command and control of theAN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 radars are shownbelow.

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How a division or brigade commander and hisFSCOORD plan to defeat Threat mortarsmust also be considered in determining howacquisition radars will be employed. TheAN/TPQ-36 radar was primarily designed as acountermortar radar. It is the choice forlocating enemy mortar units because of theballistic trajectory of the mortar and the closeproximity of the radar to the FLOT.Regardless of whether the radars have beenoperationally centralized or decentralized, thedivision AN/TPQ-36 radars must be linked toa shooter for mortar targets. This shooter mostlikely will be the close support battalion;however, in certain situations, we may want tolink the radar to a task force (TF) mortarplatoon. Given the inherent ballistictrajectories of mortars, friendly artillery mayhave to shoot high-angle fires to engage enemymortar positions. This makes the artillery unitmuch easier to detect. Although strictlydependent on the maneuver commander’sguidance and the situation, friendly mortarsengaging Threat mortars may often be the bestanswer to how we should conductcountermortar operations.

Division Artillery Support PlatoonThe heavy div arty is currently authorized sixOH-58D systems. A key divisional asset, theOH-58D system is employed to best supportthe division commander’s intent. Thecapabilities of this system make it an effective

combat multiplier for counterfire within thedivision.

The OH-58D can help locate and designateThreat artillery for attack with precisionguided munitions fired from cannon, aviation,or Air Force assets. The OH-58D is mosteffectively employed at night or in inclementweather. With a planning range of 10 km forits mast-mounted sights, this valuable assetmay be particularly useful for proactivecounterfire by detecting Threat fire supportsystems before they fire. In some situations,this system could conceivably detect anddesignate accompanying artillery, RAGs, andpossibly DAGs without crossing the FLOT.Operations forward of the FLOT demandcareful consideration and normally requirepackaging with other Army aviation or AirForce assets as well as SEAD for survivability.

Examples of Organization forCombat

As previously discussed, there are numerousways in which field artillery can be organizedto support the counterfire effort. (Remember,counterfire is only one consideration whenorganizing for combat to support the corps ordivision total mission.) The following examplesillustrate one way to organize for combat. Theorganization for combat is based on thecommander’s intent and available assets foreach scenario.

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Section V. SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSES

DescriptionThe effective employment of air assets in theAirLand Battle gives the force commander apowerful source of fire support. Army aviationand the air platforms of other services,particularly the Air Force, enable the groundcommander to quickly influence the close andrear operations and to add depth to thebattlefield.

Requirement for SEADThe availability of fire support from air assetsalso gives the force commander thecorresponding responsibility to protect thoseassets. This obligation is significant in view ofthe increasingly sophisticated threat that facesUS forces across the spectrum of warfare.

Advances in technology and force structureincreases have given Soviet forces, and Sovietclient forces, the capability to field integratedair defense networks stronger than anythingpreviously encountered by friendly air forces.These networks, consisting of weapon systems,radars, and C2 nodes, present a formidableall-altitude protection umbrella.

The most efficient enemy air defense systemswill be on the high-intensity battlefield.However, enemy air defense capabilities inmid- and low-intensity environments pose asignificant threat to US air assets. To facilitateAirLand Battle doctrine, friendly air assetsmust be able to survive to contribute their fullcombat potential. Therefore, SEAD is acritical function, which must be accomplishedquickly and efficiently.

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SEAD operations must be synchronized withall elements of the fire support system andwith all members of the joint and combinedarms team to produce maximum combatpower. Unity of effort is essential in thisendeavor. Synchronization of all fire supportrequires detailed planning and coordinationand precise timing. The synchronization of firesupport directed against enemy air defense isespecially critical and exceedingly difficult.

The degree of criticality of a given SEADoperation, as of any other operation, mustdepend on the force commander’s perceptionof the factors of METT-T. For example, therelative worth of enemy air defense targets interms of high payoff varies in accordance withthe need to commit air resources. A specificenemy air defense target may always beconsidered a high-value target. However, theadvisability of attacking such a target must beweighed against constraints affecting theallocation and distribution of fire supportassets. Actions against Threat air defenses thatare not engaged against friendly air assets maynot render a high payoff when ammunitionexpenditures are considered. However, the keypoint is that once the force commanderdecides that a specific air operation isnecessary to accomplish his mission, the firesupport system must be fully able to performSEAD.

Conduct of J-SEADTo maximize aircraft survivability, the USArmy and Air Force have developedprocedures for conducting J-SEAD operationsagainst enemy surface-to-air systems. Most ofthe SEAD operations conducted at corps anddivision will be of a joint nature involvingArmy, Air Force, or another service.Therefore, the scope of the discussion onattacking enemy air defenses will includeJ-SEAD. However, the fire support system canperform SEAD when the Army is operatingindependent of Air Force support. For

additional information, refer to TACP 50-23/TRADOC TT 100-44-1.

SEAD CategoriesCampaign SEAD

Campaign SEAD operations are preplanned,theaterwide efforts conducted concurrentlyover an extended period against air defensesystems that normally are located well behindenemy lines. They are designed tosystematically attack the enemy’s critical airdefense facilities, systems, and C2 nodes toreduce his overall air defense capability. Thisincludes establishing target priorities, aligningsuppression assets with specific targets, andpositioning these assets to effectively engagethose targets. Primarily, campaign SEADoperations are executed by Air Force suppres-sion assets. Army participation in campaignSEAD operations is limited. However,long-range surface-to-surface weapons and EWsystems are used to complement Air Forcecapabilities. At the same time, Army forcesconduct the localized and complementarycategories of SEAD to support SEADcampaigns. The overall responsibility forcampaign SEAD rests with the air componentcommander.

Localized SEAD

Localized SEAD increases the effectiveness ofcombat operations by protecting friendlyaircraft. It allows aircraft to fly in the low andmedium altitudes while operating within theengagement envelopes of enemy air defensesystems. Localized SEAD supports CAS andArmy aviation operations, reconnaissanceactivity, and the establishment of corridors forAir Force and Army aviation missions. TheArmy coordinates localized SEAD operationswith the Air Force through the ASOC whensupporting CAS aircraft and through the BCEwhen supporting other Air Force missionssuch as AI. Localized SEAD operations areconfined to geographic areas associated with

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ground targets that will be attacked from theair.

Complementary SEADComplementary SEAD involves a continuousprocess of seeking enemy air defense system(EADS) targets and attacking them, therebyreducing the enemy’s overall capability.Complementary SEAD is an unstructuredcampaign to degrade the enemy’s air defensecapability. It is conducted throughout thebattle area independent of specific aviationmissions. This differs from campaign orlocalized SEAD, in which targets arepreplanned. In general, all Army weaponsystems capable of engaging EADS shouldparticipate in this category of SEAD on asee-kill basis. However, as with most aspects ofAirLand Battle doctrine, Army involvement incomplementary SEAD is for the purpose ofsupporting current and future objectives. Thelevel of effort dedicated to complementarySEAD is controlled by the prioritization ofArmy fires within designated geographic areaswhere friendly air operations are anticipated.Complementary SEAD also includes thoseactions taken by the Army and Air Forceaircrews for self-defense.

ResponsibilitiesEach service has different suppressioncapabilities and responsibilities in SEADoperations. SEAD responsibilities aredetermined by weapon system characteristicsand SEAD mission requirements andobjectives. The Army conducts SEADprimarily near the FLOT, while the Air Forceis responsible for SEAD generally beyond thelocation of friendly forces.

The Army has primary responsibility for thesuppression of ground-based EADS to thelimits of observed fire. Observed fire is thatfire for which the points of impact can be seenby an observer. An observer could be a person(such as a forward observer or an aerialobserver) or target acquisition equipment

(such as air or ground radars and sensors thatcan control fires on the basis of observation).

Targets that cannot be engaged with observedfire are the primary responsibility of the AirForce. The Army has secondary responsibilityto suppress accurately located targets out tothe range limit of its weapons. In thesesituations, the Army can suppress targets withunobserved indirect fire if the targets arelocated accurately enough.

Air Force ResponsibilitiesThe air component commander is responsiblefor the following actions:

Coordinating priorities (including target andgeographic areas) for the SEAD effort withappropriate Air Force and Army commanders.

Prioritizing EADS targets for attack.

Planning and executing Air Force SEADoperations.

Requesting SEAD support from other com-ponent commands when required.

Army ResponsibilitiesArmy corps and divisions play an importantpart in SEAD operations. The corps FS celland the ASOC coordinate SEAD require-ments to support CAS missions. The corps FScell coordinates SEAD requirements insupport of other air operations through theland component commander’s BCE. The BCEcoordinates and integrates SEAD efforts,including Air Force SEAD, in support ofArmy aviation operations near and beyond theFLOT. The FS cell also advises the ASOC andBCE on Army SEAD effort in support of AirForce assets. The corps provides SEADsupport by using its own resources or bytasking subordinate units for support, whenapplicable. Also, the FS cell establishes targetand geographical area priorities and targetattack guidance for subordinate units.

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The division responsibilities are similar tothose of the corps. The division requests,coordinates, and synchronizes SEAD supportfrom the corps and Air Force when required.The division also develops intelligence onEADS composition and location anddisseminates it to corps, subordinate units, andother units supporting the division.

Initiating the SEAD ProcessThe SEAD process starts with the Army or AirForce unit that requests air operations. Firstconsideration is given to those suppressionmeans organic to or available to the requestingunit. When SEAD requirements exceed theavailability or capability of these means, theTACS or AAGS structure is used to request orcoordinate joint support.

SEAD is an integral part of air or aviationmission planning. Requests from subordinateArmy echelons are consolidated, reviewed,prioritized, and scheduled by use of availableArmy assets. Targets exceeding Armycapabilities are nominated and forwarded tothe Air Force for scheduling and inclusion intheir SEAD operations. SEAD requests areprocessed through the appropriate Army FScell channels. (Headquarters at EAC areorganized with fire support elements.) The FScell or FSE at each echelon is configured toplan, coordinate, and execute responsibilitiesinherent in SEAD operations. Requests forAir Force assets are then forwarded to theBCE or the ASOC. Once approved, theschedule and other pertinent information aresent back through the same channels to therequesting Army echelon.

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The Army also responds to AirForce-generated requests for Army SEAD tosupport air missions in accordance withestablished guidelines and priorities. As withArmy-initiated SEAD requests, Air Forcerequests are processed through appropriateArmy channels to the supporting units. TheArmy FSCOORD coordinates the mission anddirects the SEAD effort. The FSCOORD alsoassesses the effectiveness of Army SEAD toensure that results are forwarded to therequesting command.

spectrum of EW capabilities. EW systems areused to degrade jammable threats and toneutralize enemy systems when destruction isnot feasible.

The primary lethal attack means the Army hasfor supporting deep suppression is fieldartillery. Long-range rockets (MLRS) andsurface-to-surface missiles (Lance) may beused to support campaign SEAD if targets arewithin their ranges.

If response time is critical, SEAD requests canbe expeditiously processed. Time-sensitiveSEAD requests can be processed directly fromthe FS cell to the BCE (Army requests) andfrom the TACC to the ASOC (Air Forcerequests).

SEAD Planning and ExecutionThe corps is the focal point for Army SEADoperations. It assesses the situation, determinesrequirements, assigns priorities, and allocatesresources. Also, the corps ensures that theArmy SEAD effort is integrated into, andsynchronized with, the joint force commander’sbattle plan. In the corps CP, the FSCOORDdirects SEAD operations through thefunctioning of the corps FS cell. This requiresthe coordination of all fire support means aswell as intelligence-gathering and EWcapabilities. The G2, in conjunction with thecorps intelligence cell, gives the G3 and theFSCOORD information on the projectedenemy defense threat. These data, plusairspace use information, are integrated intothe SEAD plan by the FS cell (TRADOCPamphlet 525-9).

At the corps level, campaign SEAD issupported by the coordinated use of air- andground-based acquisition platforms, whichinclude helicopter and fixed-wing assets.Disruptive efforts are planned to complementdestructive efforts and include the full

NOTE: The conventional Lance warhead has alimited capability for SEAD. Near-term develop-ments in MLRS range capabilities will improve theArmy SEAD capability.

The corps plans and conducts localizedsuppression to protect aircraft that arerequired to penetrate the FLOT. This entailsthe suppression of EADS along the routes to(ingress) and from (egress) the attack objectiveas well as systems surrounding the objectivewhen they are within range of Army attackmeans. A corridor may have to be establishedto protect helicopters participating in airassault operations.

Within the division CP, the FSCOORDdetermines the availability of acquisition andsuppression systems. When Air Force assetsare to be involved in supporting divisionoperations, the TACP coordinates SEADrequirements and targets with the FSCOORD.Other staff responsibilities and coordination atdivision are similar to those at corps, with theFS cell directing and coordinating the SEADeffort. The division can participate in the threetypes of SEAD; however, its ability tocontribute to campaign SEAD or to conductdeep suppression is limited. Army involvementin complementary SEAD is primarily atdivision level. When the division SEADcapabilities are exceeded, support is requestedfrom corps.

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SEAD TargetingThe targeting process for SEAD is the sameas for any other target set. The targeting ofenemy air defense weapons is conductedwithin the framework of the decide-detect-deliver approach to targeting and battlemanagement. The product of the targetingprocess (that is, the successful conduct ofSEAD) must ultimately accomplish one or allof the four basic tasks of fire support. Theattack of enemy air defense weapons must –

Support air or aviation assets engaged incontact with the enemy air defense threat.

Fulfill some aspect of the commander’s battleplan.

Be synchronized with the air operation.

Be capable of sustaining its effort.

DescriptionPlanning and executing the use of nuclear

The synchronization of SEAD is even morecritical and difficult than the synchronizationof fire support for ground maneuver becauseof the time sensitivity of air operations.The responsibilities for SEAD targeting runacross the corps and division staff sections asdiscussed below.

The G3 has the primary staff responsibility forensuring that a particular SEAD operation isin consonance with the force commander’sbattle plan for using or supporting an airoperation. The G3 confirms the commander’srequirement for SEAD in terms ofsynchronization with the overall plan of battle,geographic areas such as corridors, andspecific times for SEAD support.

SEAD operations are directed through the FScell. The FSCOORD manages and directs thecorps or division SEAD effort.

Section VI. NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

Planning Considerations

weapons parallel those actions forconventional fire support. However, a fewprocedures and techniques are unique, andseveral considerations become increasinglyimportant. When determining the suitabilityfor use of nuclear weapons, the commandermust —

Weigh the relative effectiveness of nuclearand nonnuclear weapons to achieve thedesired results.

Recognize collateral risks (friendly troops,civilians, and obstacle creation).

Consider enemy responses

Consider the effect of denial or delay ofrelease.

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Nuclear weapons are available only in limitedquantities and must be used judiciously.Theater strategic employment is directedprimarily at producing a political decision.Employment at corps level and below isexplicitly intended to influence a decision atthe operational level on the battlefield.However, tactical commanders andFSCOORDs at corps and division levelsshould plan to employ and integrate thoselimited weapons directed for use to achievethe greatest possible tactical advantage. Thisplanning must–

Be continuous and flexible.

Integrate nuclear weaponssupport means and with maneuver.

Synchronize intelligence collection anddamage assessment with the nuclear releasetime frame and time span.

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Use maneuver to exploit the advantagegained from nuclear weapons.

Be coordinated with adjacent units.

Consider the effects of electromagnetic pulse(EMP) and blackout.

Avoid keeping all tactical nuclear weapons inreserve.

Planning Allocation andCoordination

Nuclear weapons must be applied to a specificpurpose in the battle plan. To do this, nuclearweapons are allocated (Do not confuse thisterm with “authorized for use”) to supportvarious tactical contingencies. This allocationprocess is continuous and occurs both beforeand after authorization for expenditure.

A tool that enables the corps commander andhis staff to allocate nuclear weapons andintegrate them into each tactical contingency isthe nuclear weapons package. A package is adistinct grouping of nuclear weapons foremployment in a specified area during a shorttime to support a corps tactical mission. Apackage is characterized and defined by fourparameters:

A specified number of nuclear weapons,listed by yield or by yield and delivery system.

The purpose for which the package would beemployed.

A time for employment.

An area for employment.

A package is given a name to identify and referto a specific set of parameters. That package isthen treated as a single entity for the purposeof request and release.

The corps develops package(s) to meetforeseeable contingencies. Normally, thepackage is then sent to higher echelons,

adjacent units, and supporting units to facilitatecoordination and to speed the release process.

Weapons within a package may be allocated todivision(s), a separate brigade, or an ACR forplanning. This allocation is referred to as asubpackage. It is a subelement of a package,and it lies in the sector or zone of asubordinate unit. A subpackage is planned bythe subordinate unit. Then it is forwarded tocorps for approval and inclusion in the corpsnuclear package.

Phases of PlanningBecause of the fleeting nature of the targetsusually attacked at corps level and below, mostpackages do not contain fixed target lists.

Like conventional fire support, nuclear fireplanning is continuous and dynamic. Nuclearemployment planning generally follows normalstaff planning procedures. Generally, packagesare developed through a four-phase refinementprocess.

Peacetime PlanningPeacetime planning is preliminary planningbased on the area, type of tactical situationexpected, hypothetical threat, known limitingrequirements, available resources, andproposed requirements.

Transition to WarTransition to war involves updates to packagesthat may apply to a particular upcomingcombat situation. Using updates to limitingrequirements, IPB, and the actual threatsupplements peacetime planning alreadyaccomplished.

Battle Focus and RefinementBattle focus and refinement are furtherdevelopment and refinement of the particularpackages that specifically apply to the currentfluid tactical situation. The situation also may

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require the development of new packages tomeet new contingencies. New and updatedpackages are developed in accordance withissued planning guidance and are forwarded tohigher headquarters to speed the releaseprocess if required.

Refinements are made to a package after ithas been approved and authorized forexpenditure but before firing. These are madeto accommodate changes in the tacticalsituation. They can be made without furtherauthorization if they remain within the scopeof the approved package. The refinementprocess is the most critical stage, because thefluidity of the tactical situation will most likelyrequire changes during the time it takes to getauthorization to fire the package.

Planning StepsThe steps discussed below for each phaseprovide the techniques for nuclear packageplanning and nuclear target analysis. Theassumptions are that no nuclear planning hasbeen done and there are no plans in existence.The initial focus is at corps level. The sameprocedures are used at division and are, infact, an extension of the planning done atcorps. Planning is actually a joint endeavorinvolving unity of effort and capitalizing on thesharing of information. Subsequently, the focusshifts to division level to discuss wartimeplanning actions within the scope of thescenario in Chapter 2.

Peacetime PlanningGiven a contingency plan with an area ofoperations and a type threat, a large portion ofthe time-consuming work of nuclear planningand analysis can be completed duringpeacetime, long before the war commences.The objective is to build packages that areusable but flexible enough to apply to a givensituation on a fluid battlefield. The idea is todo as much of this work as possible ahead oftime.

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References and CoordinationGather references, and initiate coordination asdiscussed below.

Read Nuclear References. Locate and read theappropriate nuclear references.

Read the EAC OPLAN. Extract the corpsmission, the assigned area of operations, andThreat information. Make particular note ofspecific nuclear planning guidance.

Input to the IPB Process. As the FAIO isparticipating in the G2’s IPB process, ensurehe is both including the enemy’s nuclearposture and identifying lucrative locations andtimes for friendly nuclear attack for furtheranalysis.

Coordinate for Obstacle Preclusion. Start coordi-nation with the nuclear weapons employmentofficer in the G3 plans section. This is toidentify critical features, such as a strategicbridge, that under most circumstances thecommander would not want damaged.

Coordinate for Logistical Support. Contact thecorps nuclear weapons logistic element officerto determine what weapons may be availableand to initiate nuclear weapons logisticalsupport planning.

Coordinate for Civilian Preclusion. Extractpopulation and structure preclusion guidancefrom the EAC OPLAN. Initiate coordinationwith the corps G5 to get specific data.

Coordinate for Delivery System Information.Contact the FA S3 and the ASOC to determinewhat delivery systems and air-delivered bombsmay be available.

Planning InformationCollect and compile planning information asdiscussed below.

Through the FAIO, get the G2’s initial situationtemplate and event template developed during

the IPB process. Place this information over amap.

Get the obstacle preclusion points from G3plans. Place this information over a map.

Get the population and structure preclusionpoints from the G5. Place this information ona map.

Get information from the FA S3 and theASOC about what delivery systems andair-delivered bombs may be available. Identifythe weapon yields involved.

Desired Ground ZeroIdentify tentative desired ground zeros(DGZs) for the largest-yield weapon that willfit within preclusion constraints on eachmobility corridor (MC) where critical eventsand activities are expected to occur and wherehigh-value targets (HVTs) will appear. Thespecific procedure is discussed below.

Start at the forward edge of the corps area ofoperations; and identify the locations wherecritical events, activities, and HVTs areexpected to occur on a specific MC. These maybe one point or a cluster of points within anarea. If they are a cluster of points, identify themost probable center or a weighted averagecenter.

NOTE: The EAC OPLAN may include the resultsof some operational-level nuclear planning thathas already been done within the corps area of in-terest. These results should be looked at in moredetail.

Select the largest realistic nuclear yield thatmay fit in the area.

that yield from FM 101-31-2 or from anautomated source. Apply the arcs to thepreclusion points.

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Place the weapon aimpoint on or as near aspossible to the point or center of points.Ensure that the aimpoint does not fall withinany preclusion arcs. If it does, move it slightlyoff-center of the point (within reason).

If the aimpoint still lies within a preclusionarc(s), select the next smaller yield weaponand repeat the two preceding steps.

Continue this process down each MCthroughout the corps area of operations. Theresult will be a map overlay identifying thelargest-yield weapons that could be used toattack HVTs in probable critical areasthroughout the corps area of interest withoutviolating preclusion constraints.

Overlay ModificationsAfter receipt of the corps commander’srestated mission and initial planning guidance,modify the overlay produced above asnecessary.

Selective Employment PlanDevelop a selective employment plan.

Courses of Action. The G2, G3, andFSCOORD, collectively, use the war-gamingprocess to develop courses of action. Theybring to this analysis the knowledge and resultsgathered thus far from their own analyses ofthe corps mission and its essential and impliedtasks. During the war-gaming process, the useof nuclear weapons is considered in eachinstance as are the other means of applyingcombat power (such as maneuver, EW, andTACAIR).

Using the planning guidance constraints The G2 plans officer, G3, and targeting officer,established by EAC or the G3, extract thepreclusion and least separation distances for

as the corps nuclear weapons employmentexperts, actively participate in this war-gaming

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process. As situations are identified where theuse of nuclear weapons is being considered asan opportunity or a requirement, this groupprovides its expert analysis and technicaladvice on the use of nuclear weapons.

To actively participate in the war-gamingprocess used to develop courses of action, thisstaff group develops a methodology forconducting the analysis and a framework forkeeping track of the various situations andproposed packages being developed. One wayto do this is as follows:

Split the corps area of operations into sectors.The avenues of approach lines and the timephase lines that run perpendicular to themand the MCs that were developed by the G2can be used. Label each panel and each MCfor internal reference. Use the same labels asthe G2 used.

Then draw a matrix and label each axisaccordingly. Use the matrix to record theobjective of use and the number and yield ofnuclear weapons to be used in each box. Addsome more panels to the matrix to considermultiple MCs and/or usage across the entirecorps front.

Detailed Analysis. As the G2, G3, andFSCOORD identify a situation that may be anopportunity or a requirement for the use ofnuclear weapons, the FSCOORD turns to thesupporting nuclear staff group for a detailedanalysis. Using the updated situation and eventtemplates and a stated objective, they begin toanalyze the situation. The G3 plans nuclearemployment officer and the targeting officertentatively identify aimpoints that will bestcounter the Threat actions as depicted on thesituation and event templates. The G2 plansofficer advises. To do this, two things must beassumed: the primary target category and theconventional damage contribution.

If a tank division is being attacked, theprobable choice for primary target categorywould be Personnel in Tanks/Immediate

Transient Incapacitation. Incapacitation is thedefeat criteria if the enemy could close on theFLOT within 24 hours. Latent Lethality is usedas defeat criteria if the enemy could close onthe FLOT later than 24 hours. On the basis ofthese two criteria, target coverage is thendetermined by the corps commander andstated to the staff as a percentage of coverage(for example, 30 percent coverage).

Conventional damage contribution might be,for example, 50 percent. This means that 50percent of the overall required damage will becontributed by conventional weapons and 50percent by nuclear weapons.

Adjusted Aimpoints. After selecting tentativeaimpoints for this one box, the target analystoverlays the preclusion information developedas described above. If any of the tentativeaimpoints selected violate any preclusionconstraints, an attempt is made to offset theaimpoints enough to avoid the violation yetachieve the desired target coverage. If thisdoes not work, try one of the followingprocedures:

Repeat the same steps, using smaller-yieldweapons that potentially could be deliveredin this box.

If the preclusion constraints are self-imposed,modify them.

Repeat the same steps, exchanging nucleartargets for conventional targets or changingthe total damage contribution mix.

If the preclusion constraints are imposed byEAC, make a note that they prevent theoptimum execution of a package in this area.This may be addressed to EAC later.

Using the adjusted aimpoints, determine thefeasibility of delivering the yields andquantities of weapons within the box. Modifythe yields, types, and/or quantities as necessaryto arrive at a package that is deliverable.

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Combine the objectives and damageThus far, the following results of evaluatingthis situation should be recorded on theappropriate box in the matrix:

Type and strength of forces involved.

Objective of use.

Nuclear-conventional damage contributionmix.

Primary target category and/or coverage.

Number of weapons by type and yield

Any unresolved preclusion problems.

This process is used to evaluate the entirecorps area of interest. When the G2, G3, andFSCOORD have completed their preliminaryanalysis of MCs, they evaluate the courses ofaction that involve the use of multiple MCs.The use of nuclear weapons in situationsinvolving multiple MCs and/or usage acrossthe entire corps front should also be evaluated.Include this information in the matrix.

Weapons Package Options. From the situationand event templates and the matrix, identifythe key large-scale situations that provide thebest opportunity for, and/or that most likelywill require the use of, nuclear weapons.Consider the worst-case scenario for thefollowing:

Each main enemy avenue of approach intothe corps area of operations.

Multiple approaches.

Limited use across the corps front.

From the matrix, extract the weapons packagesthat apply to the situations identified in thepreceding paragraph. Compare them with eachother, and select the weapons package that islarger in either yield size or quantity ofweapons or both.

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contribution mixes for as many situations aspossible.

Coordinate with the NWLE to determine thefeasibility of logistically supporting eachsituation. Modify the situation as necessary.

The result of this process is the identificationof one nuclear weapons package that isadequate to meet each specific situation yet isbroad and flexible enough to be employedacross the corps front. If two or more of thesituation packages or objectives are sodrastically different that one package will notsuffice, two or more weapons packages optionsmay be included within the emerging plan.

If EAC preclusion constraints in one of thesituations identified above would prevent theuse of nuclear weapons, the G2, G3, andFSCOORD must decide if the situation shouldbe reported to the corps commander. If thecorps commander agrees and thinks it isnecessary, he may elect to identify thesituation to the EAC commander and requestthat the constraint(s) be modified. He shouldpoint out the projected detrimental effect onfriendly forces if the constraints are notmodified.

Briefings. The G3, with the advice of the G2and FSCOORD, selects the best course ofaction. The staff then briefs the corpscommander. They report the results of theirefforts, focusing specifically on the selectedcourse of action. In their briefing, the G3 andFSCOORD include the results of thepreliminary nuclear analysis that affects theselected course of action.

Subsequently, the nuclear staff group joins theG2, G3, and FSCOORD and briefs the corpscommander on the results of the packagedevelopment effort. This briefing summarizesthe results of the analysis of other courses ofaction from a nuclear perspective. It includesthe nuclear weapons requirements for each

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course of action throughout the corps area ofinterest and, most importantly, the package(s)that will enable the corps to meet each ofthese requirements. Also at this time, thenuclear staff group informs the commander ofany constraints established at EAC that, if notmodified, would prevent the most effectiveemployment of a nuclear weapon(s).

The corps commander tentatively approves thepackage and issues his nuclear employmentconcept to amplify his intent. He explains hisdecision and states any changes to be made oradditional situations to be considered.

The supporting nuclear staff group modifiesthe package as required on the basis of thecorps commander’s intent and guidance justreceived.

Coordination. Coordinate with subordinatedivisions.

The G3 plans nuclear employment officer,with input from the G2 plans officer and thetarget analyst, writes the nuclear planningguidance that goes in the nuclear support planthat is part of the corps OPLAN. This nuclearplanning guidance should include thefollowing:

Corps commander’s concept for employmentof nuclear weapons.

Nuclear-related planning assumptions.

Obstacle and civilian population and/orstructure preclusion information.

Type and yield of weapons potentiallyavailable for use.

Largest-yield weapon as compared to thepreclusion overlay.

IPB situation and event templates, nuclearsector overlay, and nuclear employmentmatrix (discussed above).

Division Actions. The division staff shouldfollow the procedures listed above in conduct- ing the nuclear analysis. Specifically, theyshould—

Validate the portion of the corps nuclearanalysis that falls within the division area ofinterest.

Conduct a detailed nuclear analysis of thedivision area of operations. This includesdeveloping their own more refined IPBsituation and event templates and nuclearemployment matrix.

Compare the results of the analysis with thecorps-developed package(s). Recommendedchanges necessary to meet certain situationsor to increase flexibility are noted.

Brief the division commander on the resultsof the nuclear analysis, and get his approval.

Give the results of the nuclear analysis, alongwith recommended changes, to the corpsnuclear support planning staff.

Corps Actions. The corps nuclear support staffconsolidate the results of the division detailedanalysis, eliminate duplications, and make anynecessary changes to the corps package(s).Working with the NWLE, they developdelivery unit prescribed nuclear loads anddetailed nuclear logistical deployment andsupport plans to support the package. They—

Brief the corps commander, and get hisapproval. The briefing should include areview of the following:

Nuclear package employment assumptions.

Courses of action that require nuclearweapons.

Contents of package(s).

Deployment and logistical support plan.

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Forward the package to the EAC forapproval. Continue to track the actionthrough the approval process.

Review and update the package as follows:

As new information becomes available.

When new requirements are developed byEAC.

At least annually.

Transition to War PlanningThe current state of peacetime planning mustbe determined—what has been done so far.

The division receives the wartime missionfrom corps. Contained in that order arenuclear planning guidance and an initialweapons planning allocation. Actions atdivision are as follows.

Extract pertinent information.

Gather and quickly review nuclear references.

If not stated, ascertain which package andsubpackage provide the best framework forconducting initial planning.

Update IPB and limiting requirements.Adjust aimpoints as necessary.

Ascertain threat to nuclear weapons fixedstorage sites. Report assessment to corps,Review nuclear weapons deployment plans.

Conduct nuclear vulnerability analysis fordivision units based on updated Threatinformation available. Repeat as new Threatinformation becomes available. Give resultsto division commander, via G3, for decisionand subsequent transmittal to subordinatebrigades.

Participate in war-gaming process. Modifyexisting subpackages as necessary.

Analyze new courses of action for use ofnuclear weapons as they are developed.

Complete the initial nuclear planning withinthe nuclear planning guidance issued bycorps.

Forward the results of initial nuclear planningand any nuclear planning done as a result ofthe war gaming discussed above that may berelevant to corps. (For example, planningmight be outside the realm of current corpsguidance, in line with a different subpackage,or completely new.)

Ensure current nuclear weapons configurationin PNL or prescribed nuclear stocks (PNSs)and corps nuclear ammunition supply points(NASPs) adequately supports the potentialuses identified above.

Monitor nuclear weapons deployment.

Report lost, damaged, or destroyed weaponsto corps NWLE via the corps FS cell; andrequest replacement.

Battle Focus andRefinement

This is now the middle of war. Tactical nuclearuse has not occurred. Looking out 72 to 96hours, corps has determined that use ofnuclear weapons will be required. Corpssubmits a request to EAC. In a new nuclearplanning guidance message, corps instructsdivision to conduct detailed planning; planningis continuous.

Division extracts the corps nuclear planningguidance from orders and the latest messages.Included are specific guidance in line with anexisting nuclear package and a specificweapons allocation in line with a recentrequest message.

More war gaming is done between the divisionG2, G3, and FSCOORD.

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High-value targets are identified, Specific TAIsand NAIs are identified. Potential high-prioritytargets (HPTs) for nuclear weapons areidentified.

Decision points are locked in.

Nuclear targeting tasks are included intargeting and intelligence-collection tasks tothe collection manager for tasking of sensors.

Organic sensors are tasked. Requests for othersensors are forwarded to corps and on to EACif necessary. This includes collection fordecision making at decision points, targetingwithin TAIs, and posts trike analysisrequirements.

A new contingency has just arisen for whichthe G2, G3, and FSCOORD have developed anew course of action that may involve nuclearweapons. This requires the creation of a newsubpackage that does not fit the scope of thecurrent request or any existing package well.The subpackage is created and forwarded tocorps for consideration.

Package RefinementThe corps package is refined. The followingactions are now taken within the subpackage:

Confirm decision points.

Determine delivery units.

Confirm FLOT locations.

Confirm preclusion data.

Process sensor information.

Identify HVT locations.

Receive release.

Adjust aimpoints.

Report FLOT and aimpoint locations tocorps for deconfliction.

Coordinate aimpoint locations with con-ventional fire support and maneuver actions.

Receive authority to expend nuclear weapons.

Prepare nuclear warning (STRIKWARN)messages IAW STANAG 2104/QSTAG 189.

Analyze probable Threat response. Reanalyzefriendly nuclear vulnerability, and recommendchanges to unit posture if necessary.

Execute strike.

Report nuclear detonation in accordancewith STANAG 2103/QSTAG 187.

Submit expenditure reports through channelsIAW SOP.

Make poststrike reconnaissance and analysis.

Evaluate results of poststrike analysis.Determine if restrike is necessary and, if so, ifit is permitted.

Follow-On StrikeThe situation has shifted, and EAC hasdirected corps to prepare for first follow-onuse immediately. Division has recommendedto corps that certain of the nuclear targets inthe first strike be restruck in this next use.Also, this next use will be in an adjacentdivision in an adjacent corps. The situation willrequire the transfer of weapons to thisadjacent allied corps, corps-to-corps nuclearsupport, and restrike of the division targets.

Nuclear Logistical SupportPrinciples

To deliver the nuclear package(s) on the enemy,nuclear ammunition must be positioned

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properly on the battlefield. Therefore, somenuclear ammunition usually is carried bydelivery units, and some is carried by othercombat support units.

Nuclear ammunition that is designated for andcarried by a delivery unit is called theprescribed nuclear load.

Nuclear ammunition that is designated for adelivery unit but carried by a combat supportunit is called prescribed nuclear stocks.

A unit PNL or PNS may be changed at anytime by the corps or division commander.When determining or changing a unit PNL orPNS, the following should be considered:

Unit mission.

Requirements for numbers of weapons incurrent and future packages.

Availability, survivability, and security of bothnuclear weapons and their associated deliverysystems and/or units.

The carrying capacity of the unit.

When planning overall nuclear logisticalsupport, the following should be considered:

Capability to concentrate nuclear fire in anysector of the corps area quickly.

Minimum handling and movement of nuclearweapons.

Simplicity and uniformity in procedures.

Survivability of weapons.

Security of classified or critical material,installations, and communications.

Nuclear Weapons ResupplyOne area requiring specific or additionalplanning effort when nuclear weapons may beused is nuclear weapons resupply.

The nuclear weapons logistical supportstructure may vary according to the uniquerequirements of a specific theater, but it mustprovide timely and reliable support in the sixareas outlined below. The methods ofimplementation, however, will requireflexibility and innovation in response to shortreaction times and changing combatconditions. Support must do the following:

Ensure operational readiness. Maintain thecapability to provide nuclear weapons supportto appropriate units as required to supportplanning and execution.

Move smoothly from peacetime storage todeployment locations to support nucleardelivery units as required.

Provide continuous nuclear weapons support.This support includes, but is not limited to,resupply and maintenance (and in some casestransportation support) to move weaponsforward or laterally for redistribution.

Ensure timely delivery of complete rounds.Coordinate with firing units to deliver nuclearrounds (warhead section, fuze, powder, ormissile body) as required.

Support US allies as required. Maintain UScustody of nuclear weapons until properrelease is directed. In addition, provideweapon support such as supply and mainte-nance.

Be survivable. Nuclear weapons storage areaswill be prime intelligence targets. Goodoperational security techniques/must bepracticed. Dispersal, in fact, may be the keyto survivability. Also, a deception plan mustbe written and executed at each level ofcommand.

Nuclear-capable units joining a mature theatermust get the supporting special weaponsbrigade SOP and the communications security(COMSEC) materiel required to authenticate

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nuclear control orders. In an immaturetheater, nuclear ammunition is moved into thetheater by USAF or US Navy assets. Once inthe theater, ammunition can still be movedinto the corps by either USAF or Navy assets.At this point, US Army ordnance units secureand move the ammunition before it is issuedto using units.

Nuclear weapons resupply is coordinated inthe corps by the nuclear weapons logisticselement (see FM 9-6 and FM 9-84). Thespecial ammunition ordnance brigade is amajor subordinate command of the theaterarmy. It is responsible for providing the corpscommander service and sustaining support forArmy nuclear weapons and high-cost,low-density missiles. This support includessupply, accountability, surveillance, andmaintenance of the items from entry into thetheater until expenditure or retirement. Thebrigade also provides security until the nuclearammunition is issued to the firing unit. Thebrigade commander normally serves as thetheater army logistic system manager fornuclear ammunition. Special ammunitionordnance battalions are assigned to theammunition ordnance brigade. The battalionprovides a corps with nuclear ammunitionsupply and maintenance services. Normally,the battalion forms mobile NASPs and aweapons holding area (WHA). The NASPs,located in the corps area, usually contain thenuclear weapons designated for the supportedcorps. The WHA, located in thecommunications zone (COMMZ), contains thetheater reserves. An NWLE is at the corpstactical CP to coordinate nuclear logisticsupport for the corps. The corps NWLEcoordinates the distribution and reallocation ofweapons between the NASPs and the deliveryunits as directed by the corps FSCOORD.

The NWLE officer is the key to effectivenuclear logistical support within the corps. Hecan best perform his duties if he is located inthe FS cell. He provides expertise on

movement and resupply capabilities andrequirements to the FSCOORD. TheDFSCOORD’s, target analyst’s, and NWLEofficer’s combined knowledge of nuclearweapons release procedures, deployment plans,movement and resupply capabilities andrequirements, weapons effects, analysistechniques, and existing packages form thetechnical base of expertise within the corps FScell for the employment of nuclear weapons.The NWLE officer is specifically responsiblefor –

Maintaining the current status on all nuclearweapons within the corps. Reporting changesin status to the NWLE at EAC.

Recommending positioning of the NASPssupporting the corps to ensure weaponsurvivability, permit flexible response, andbest support corps delivery units.

Anticipating logistical requirements.

Advising the FSCOORD and corpscommander on nuclear logistical matters.

Coordinating ground or air transportation forthe movement of nuclear weapons within thecorps or between the NASPs and deliveryunits.

Coordinating for the delivery of newwarheads and evacuation of unserviceablewarheads through an airhead or seaportlocated in the corps area.

Coordinating the movement of warheadsbetween ordnance battalions or delivery unitsoutside the corps. This may involve thetransfer of warheads to allied units.

Coordinating permissive action link (PAL)teams.

Submitting nuclear accident incident responseand assistance (NAIRA) reports to EAC.

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References FM 9-84.

References pertaining to nuclear operations FM 100-30.are as follows:

FM 3-100.FM 100-50.

FM 5-103.FM 101-31-1.

FM 5-106. STANAG 2103/QSTAG 187 (ATP 45).

FM 9-6. STANAG 2104/QSTAG 189.

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APPENDIX C

IMPROVED ARTILLERY MUNITIONS

This appendix describes the following special-purpose field artilleryammunition:

Family of scatterable mines.

Laser-guided field artillery projectile (Copperhead).

Obscurant smoke.

Family of ScatterableMines

Types of FA-Delivered FASCAMFA-delivered FASCAM allows the maneuvercommander to quickly emplace a minefield.There are two types of FA-deliveredFASCAM: area denial artillery munitions(ADAM) (antipersonnel mines) and theremote antiarmor mine system (RAAMS) (foruse against lightly armored vehicles). Both areavailable only in 155 mm. FASCAM has twopreset self-destruct times: short duration(unclassified self-destruct time of less than 24hours) and long duration (unclassifiedself-destruct time of greater than 24 hours).The corps commander has the authority toemploy FASCAM. Employment may bedelegated for specific operations or for limitedperiods of time as follows:

Long-duration mines down to maneuverbrigade.

Short-duration mines down to maneuverbattalion.

Engineer Officer’s ResponsibilityThe engineer officer is responsible forproviding expertise on the employment of all

types of FASCAM; however, the FSO providesthe technical expertise to the engineerconcerning the employment of FA-deliveredFASCAM. The advisor to the engineer officerconcerning FASCAM delivered by the AirForce is the ALO.

Defensive CapabilitiesCapabilities in the defense include thefollowing:

Close gaps and lanes in other obstacles.

Reseed breeched minefields.

Delay or disrupt attacking forces.

Deny enemy unrestricted use of areas.

Disrupt movement and commitment ofsecond-echelon forces.

Develop targets for long-range antitankweapons.

Disrupt and harass enemy command andcontrol, logistics, or staging areas.

Reinforce existing obstacles.

Disrupt or delay river crossings.

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Offensive CapabilitiesCapabilities in the offense include thefollowing:

Supplement flank reconnaissance and securityforces in protecting flanks along avenues ofapproach.

Suppress and disrupt enemy security elementsonce contact has been made.

Hinder withdrawal of enemy forces.

Hinder the ability of the enemy to reinforcethe objective area.

Employment OptionsFASCAM may be delivered by itself– eitherall RAAMS, all ADAM, or a combination ofboth. If RAMMS and ADAM are employedon the same target, ADAM is fired as the lastvolley.

FASCAM may be delivered in conjunctionwith other munitions. If so, it extends theeffects of those munitions; for example, firingADAM into a logistic site after firing DPICM.If fired in conjunction with other munitions,FASCAM is delivered in the last volleys.

Employment ConsiderationsDelivery error and availability of tubes maylimit FASCAM use. Normally, FASCAMrequires large amounts of ammunitiondelivered with high-angle fire. This adverselyaffects FA survivability. Also, the FA unitsnormally must provide other types of fireswhile delivering FASCAM.

FA-delivered FASCAM has reducedeffectiveness on hard surfaces such as concreteand asphalt.

Logistic requirements for FA are increased.Normally, FA units carry only short-durationmines. If long-duration mines are to be used,

the FA unit must be notified well in advanceto allow transport from the ASP to the firingunit.

FSO’s ResponsibilitiesNormally, the FSO obtains the safety zone(minefield size) of the minefield either bycalculating it himself or by having it calculatedby the DS battalion S3. The engineer isresponsible for disseminating the safety zone.

DeliveryNormally, FASCAM is delivered at high-anglefire. The exact number of rounds depends onthe size of the minefield, the minefielddensity, and whether the rounds are deliveredby high-angle or low-angle fire (RAAMSonly). For specific employment (for example,aimpoints and number of rounds), see FM6-20-40 or FM 6-20-50.

Laser-Guided Field ArtilleryProjectile (Copperhead)

DescriptionCopperhead is a 155-mm cannon-launchedguided projectile (CLGP) with a shaped-charge warhead and a laser seeker. Whenfired at a moving or stationary hard pointtarget, Copperhead homes in on laser energyreflected from the target during the finalportion of its trajectory. Laser energy isprovided by a remote laser designator.Optimum use of Copperhead is againstmultiple targets in large target arrays outsidethe range of maneuver direct-fire weaponsystems (approximately 3,000 meters). Singletargets or very few, widely separated targetsmay be engaged by Copperhead if they arehigh-value targets; for example, an enemycommander’s vehicle. Targets appearing withinthe range of maneuver direct-fire weaponsystems should be engaged by Copperheadonly when the maneuver commander directsor when the direct-fire systems are unable toengage them.

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StrengthsCopperhead has high hit probability on pointtargets, moving or stationary, at longer rangesthan possible with current direct-fire weapons.

Copperhead is extremely lethal.

A rapid rate of fire is possible against an arrayof targets within the same footprint because ofvolley fire.

A laser designator does not have thepronounced firing signature of an antitankguided missile.

WeaknessesResponsiveness of the system depends onseveral variables created by distinct acquisitionand delivery components of the system and bythe weather.

Weather can limit performance. Cloud-freeline of sight from the projectile path to thetarget is required for target acquisition andengagement. The ground/vehicular laserlocator designator (G/VLLD) operator mustbe able to visually acquire (see) the target.

The G/VLLD and operator are vulnerable tosuppressive fires.

The Copperhead system depends on two-waycommunications between the operator and thefiring battery FDC.

Effectiveness of target engagement is limitedby the operator’s ability to track the targetduring the last 13 seconds of flight of theround.

The emitted signal from the designator can bedetected.

The success of the Copperhead dependsgreatly on reflected energy. Therefore, thecompany FSO should ensure the G/VLLD ispositioned to optimize the system capabilities

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and to complement the direct-fire weapons.Laser designation requires an uninterruptedline of sight between the designator and thetarget. Anything that obstructs or weakens thelaser signal will cause a significant decrease inthe performance of the round. Remember thatterrain, vegetation, fog, smoke, precipitation,and dust obstruct visibility; and the maximumrange is 5,000 meters to a stationary target foreffective use of the Copperhead round.

EmploymentCopperhead targets can be engaged as eitherplanned targets or targets of opportunity.Planned targets are the preferred method ofengagement, because the firing batteryrequires less reaction time. Normally, thetarget-of-opportunity technique is used onlyduring mobile operations and before plannedtargets are developed.

The Copperhead and the designator must haveidentical laser switch settings (laser pulsecodes). Switch settings are assigned toobservers on a semipermanent basis. They arechanged only for cause; for example, changesin the organization for combat that causeduplication of settings in adjacent units. Switchsettings are sent as part of the message toobserver to ensure that the appropriate switchsetting has been applied. Laser pulse codes arecontrolled and allocated by the corps FS cell.A clear SOP should be established forallocation and control.

NOTE: For an in-depth dicussion of the Copper-head and its employment, refer to FM 6-30.

Obscurant SmokeOffensive Operations

Obscurants have many applications on thebattlefield. During offensive operations,obscurants are used to conceal units and

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individual weapon systems. This enables thecommander to maneuver behind a screen andto deceive the enemy about his strength andposition. Obscurants are also used to blindacquisition means.

Defensive OperationsDuring defensive operations, obscurants areused to separate and isolate attackingechelons, create gaps, disrupt enemy weaponsystems, force mechanized infantry todismount, and make enemy targets easier tohit. It also may conceal defensive positions.

ApplicationsFour general applications of obscurants on thebattlefield are as follows:

Obscuration — smoke placed on or near theenemy position to interfere with enemyobservation of the battlefield.

Screening — smoke placed within areas offriendly operations or in areas betweenfriendly and enemy forces to degrade enemyobservation and fire. It is primarily intendedto conceal friendly forces.

Marking and signaling — smoke used tocommunicate actions on the battlefield or tomark locations.

Deception — smoke used in conjunction withother actions to confuse or mislead theenemy. Generally, this is used in conjunctionwith other deceptive measures.

Employment ConsiderationsTo be effective, smoke must be used insufficient quantities. Factors affecting thequantity are atmospheric conditions, type ofsmoke required, size of the area to be

smoked, and length of time needed. On thebasis of those factors, excessive amounts ofammunition may be required to meet thecommander’s guidance. Also, FA survivabilityis adversely affected when firing long-durationsmoke screens.

Smoke adversely affects battlefield systemsthat must operate in concert, such asTACAIR, armor, infantry, field artillery, andArmy aviation.

Smoke hinders visual communications, causingthe unit to rely to a greater degree on radios.

SourcesMortars can deliver a high volume of smoke atmidranges and are the most rapid andeffective indirect delivery means. Both 81-mmand 107-mm weapons deliver WP.

Field artillery cannons can deliver smoke outto distant targets. They can deliver hydrogenchloride (HC) and WP. However, as smoke isavailable in limited quantities, excessive useshould be planned in advance.

Smoke pots can produce large volumes ofsmoke for extended periods of time. They arethe commander’s primary means of producingsmall smoke screens.

Additional smoke sources which should beconsidered when planning smoke operationsinclude —

Mechanical smoke generators.

Air-delivered smoke.

Vehicular smoke grenade launchers.

Vehicle engine exhaust smoke systems.

Battlefield dust and obscurants.

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APPENDIX D

PLANS, ORDERS, AND ANNEXES TO PLANS ANDORDERS

This appendix implements STANAG 2014/QSTAG 506, Edition 5, Amendment 4.

The commander’s selected course of action, his concept of theoperation, his intent, and all guidance given during the planningprocess form the basis for the development of the operation order.The OPORD merges maneuver and fires. Paragraph 3 of the OPORDoutlines how the supported commander wants to use his fire supportand maneuver assets.

STANAG 2014 prescribes standard formats for the OPORD and itssupporting documents. This publication implements STANAG 2014 as itpertains to fire support operations and functions.

Operation OrderOPORD paragraph 3a, explanation, Conceptof Operation, is a statement of thecommander’s intent which expands why theforce has been tasked to do the mission statedin paragraph 2. It also tells what results areexpected, how these results facilitate futureoperations, and how, in broad terms, thecommander visualizes achieving those results(force as a whole). The concept is stated inenough detail to ensure appropriate action bysubordinates in the absence of additionalcommunications or further instructions. Thewho that will accomplish the concept ofoperation is in subparagraphs to paragraph 3a.Style is not emphasized, but the conceptstatement should not exceed five or sixsentences written or personally approved bythe commander. If an operations overlay isused, it is referenced here; however, theconcept statement must be present asparagraph 3a and on the overlay.

ResponsibilitiesThe FSCOORD prepares the fires portion ofthe concept of operation subparagraph of the

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OPORD. He also coordinates the preparation fire support plan includes a subparagraph forof the fire support subparagraph (or annex), each fire support agency (means) involved inwhich constitutes the fire support plan. The the operation. Input for these subparagraphs is

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prepared by the appropriate fire supportrepresentatives within the fire support cell. Ifthe fire support subparagraph needsamplification, the FSCOORD prepares a firesupport annex. See the table below forplanning responsibilities.

Fire Support PlanThe fire support plan for a force headquartersneed not totally depend on target input fromsubordinate elements. The fire support plantells subordinate commanders what they are to

do and what they need to know to accomplishtheir missions. The plan should not addressitems in SOPs and should not includehow-to-implement instructions to individualfire support agencies. That type of informationshould be addressed in SOPs or inimplementing instructions issued after thereceipt of the fire support plan.

Once the fire support plan is prepared, it isdisseminated as a part of the force operationorder.

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The following example shows a division paragraph 3 is complete. It does not requireOPORD in which the fire support plan in amplification in a fire support annex.

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Fire Support AnnexAt the higher echelons, the fire support planmay be too extensive to be fully contained inparagraph 3 of the OPORD. At any echelon,the force operations officer (who isresponsible for preparing the OPORD) maydirect a limited fire support input to paragraph3. In either case, a fire support annex to theOPORD may be necessary. This annexexpands the fire support information inparagraph 3 of the OPORD.

The need for the more extensive document,the annex, must be carefully weighed by theoperations officer and the FSCOORD. If thefire support plan in paragraph 3 is adequate, afire support annex is not published.

The example below shows the format of a firesupport annex and describes the informationpresented in each paragraph. In this example,the annex is issued separately.

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Chemical Support PlanThe example below depicts a chemical supportplan to support a force OPORD. The formatand content are the same for supporting anOPORD with or without a fire support annex.This example plan supports an OPORD thathas a fire support annex. The chemical supportplan may be issued at a different time than theOPORD and may have a more limiteddistribution than the OPORD.

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Nuclear Support PlanThe example below shows a nuclear supportplan. The plan supports the example firesupport annex. Because nuclear supportplanning progresses at a different rate at times,the distribution for the nuclear support planmay be more limited than that for theOPORD. TAB A shows a subpackage withaimpoints. TAB B shows a subpackage withonly weapon requirements.

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TACFIRE ConsiderationsTACFIRE, through its command and controlfunctions, helps the commander andFSCOORD manage their resources. Itprovides more timely and accurate informationand gives them parameters with which toinfluence computer solutions.

Commander’s criteria are a wide range ofparameters a FSCOORD can input into thecomputer so that commander’s guidance and

the tactical situation are considered. Theseparameters guide the computer processing.Although most units routinely prescribe thecriteria in SOPs, modifications necessary toinfluence the tactical and technical fire controlsolutions unique to each fire plan or operationmay be necessary.

The fire support plan includes specificcommander’s criteria when the criteria differfrom SOP. The FSCOORD should considerthe commander’s criteria listed to the left andshould include them in the fire support plan asrequired.

The FSCOORD should review the establishedattack criteria (FM;ATTACK:). Criteria otherthan SOP are included in the OPORD.

Mutual support assignments are published aspart of the organization for combat.

The artillery target intelligence (ATI) functionaids in the management of targetinginformation. Critical ATI criteria are as shownbelow.

NOTE: More information on TACFIRE proce-dures is in TC 6-40A.

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APPENDIX E

TARGET NUMBERING SYSTEM

This appendix implements STANAG 2147/QSTAG 221, Edition 4, Amendment 2.

To designate nonnuclear targets for fire support operations, the Armyadheres to the provisions of STANAG 2147 and QSTAG 221. Targetdesignators consist of two letters followed by four numerals; for example,AA1000. This numbering system is used for each corps-size force.

Normally, nuclear targets are not assigned a special block of targetnumbers. A target should be assigned a number when it is received at afire planning agency. If a target is selected for attack, the mostappropriate means of attacking the target will be used (nuclear, chemical,or conventional) as determined by target analysis. That analysis is guidedby the commander’s attack guidance and other factors (nature of target,munitions available, and so forth).

First Letter Designator Each army headquarters will allocate a firstletter to its corps. A corps may be assigned

The first letter of the two-letter group desig- more than one letter, Letters assigned to eachnates a particular nation or a corps associated nation may be reused as long as the adjacentwith a particular nation as shown in the table corps of that nation do not share the samebelow. letter.

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Second Letter DesignatorThe second letter is assigned by corps down tobrigade level. Also, second letter designatorsare made for corps artillery CPs, corps FScells, div arty CPs, and division FS cells. Theletters I and O are not used.

Blocks of NumbersBlocks of numbers are assigned by thoseheadquarters having two assigned letters. Fieldartillery elements assign blocks from 0001

through 7999 as needed. A battalion- orsquadron-size element with a block ofnumbers suballocates numbers. Assignmentsare shown in the following tables.

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APPENDIX F

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATING MEASURES

This appendix implements STANAG 2099/QSTAG 531, Edition 4.

The FSCOORD coordinates all fire support impacting in the area ofresponsibility of his supported maneuver commander, including thatrequested by the supported unit. He ensures that fire support will notjeopardize troop safety, will interface with other fire support means,and/or will not disrupt adjacent unit operations. Fire supportcoordinating measures help him in those efforts. They are designed tofacilitate the rapid engagement of targets and, at the same time,provide safeguards for friendly forces.

STANAG 2099/QSTAG 531Some fire support coordinating measuresdescribed here have not yet been agreed to byNATO and American, British, Canadian, andAustralian (ABCA) allies. The US terms“coordinated fire line, restrictive fire line,restrictive fire area,” and “fire coordinationline” are being proposed by the US forinclusion in STANAG 2099/QSTAG 531. Thefire support coordination line and the optionaluse of the no-fire line (NFL) are the onlymeasures agreed to in STANAG 2099/QSTAG531. The US has entered a reservation usingcoordinated fire line in lieu of no-fire line.

EstablishmentAll fire support coordinating measures exceptboundaries are established by the supportedmaneuver commander on the basis ofrecommendations by the FSCOORD. TheFSCOORD’s recommendations are based onthe force commander’s guidance, location offriendly forces, the battle plan, and anticipatedenemy actions.

Graphic PortrayalOnce established, coordinating measures aredisplayed on maps, firing charts, and overlays

and are stored in computers. Graphic portrayalincludes, as a minimum, the visual code, theabbreviation for the measure, the establishingheadquarters, and the effective date-timegroup (DTG). Often, the date-time group isshown as a from-to time. Usually, coordinatingmeasures are labeled at each end of a line orwithin the graphic, space permitting. Both thegraphics and the lettering are in black for allmeasures.

BoundariesIn various operations, boundaries are used bythe maneuver commander to indicate thegeographical area for which a particular unit isresponsible. They describe a zone of action orsector of responsibility for a maneuver unit.Normally, they are designated along terrainfeatures easily recognizable on the ground.They are so situated that key terrain featuresand avenues of advance or approach arecompletely included in the area assigned toone unit. A boundary is the basic fire supportcoordinating measure. Boundaries are bothpermissive and restrictive in nature. They arerestrictive in that no fire support means maydeliver fires across a boundary unless the firesare coordinated with the force havingresponsibility within the boundary or unless a

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permissive fire support coordinating measureis in effect that would allow firing withoutfurther coordination. Fires delivered nearboundaries also should be coordinated withthe adjacent unit. They are permissive in thata maneuver commander, unless otherwiserestricted, enjoys complete freedom of fire andmaneuver within his own boundaries.Boundaries apply to both the maneuver ofunits and the employment of fire, to includeconventional and special ammunition and theireffects. Boundaries are displayed as solid blacklines with the appropriate designation of theunit(s) to which the boundary applies.Proposed or planned boundaries are displayedas dashed black lines. Boundaries are alsoused by fire support personnel to designate thezone of fire for supporting field artillery andnaval gunfire ships.

Zones of FireZones of fire are assigned to FA and NGFunits for the control of fires laterally and indepth to support operations. Lateral limitswithin which a unit must be able to fire maybe designated by azimuths or boundaries.Zones in depth may be designated byminimum or maximum range lines or byforward or rearward extensions of the lateralboundaries of the supported force. The zoneof fire for an artillery unit is dictated by theassigned tactical mission. For example, thedirect support mission specifies that the zoneof fire is the zone of action of the supportedmaneuver force. Uniform coverage is not arequirement, since the maneuver commandermay want to weight certain portions of hiszone of action with a fire support means suchas artillery.

Types of MeasuresWith the exception of boundaries, fire supportcoordinating measures are either permissive orrestrictive. In essence, the primary purpose ofa permissive measure is to facilitate the attackof targets. The establishment of a restrictivemeasure imposes certain requirements forspecific coordination before the engagement ofthose targets affected by the measure.Therefore, the primary purpose of a restrictivemeasure is to safeguard friendly forces.

Permissive MeasuresCoordinated Fire Line

A coordinated fire line is a line beyond whichconventional or improved conventionalindirect-fire means (mortars, field artillery, andNGF ships) may fire at any time within thezone of the establishing headquarters withoutadditional coordination. The purpose of theCFL is to expedite the attack of targetsbeyond it. Usually, the CFL is established by abrigade or a division, but it may be establishedby a maneuver battalion. It is located as closeto the establishing unit as is possible, withoutinterfering with maneuver forces, to open upthe area beyond to fire support. Brigade CFLsmay be consolidated at division level as adivision CFL designated for the division zoneof action. If any modifications to the brigadeCFLs are considered, they must becoordinated with the brigades to ensurecomplete compatibility with their battle plans.In essence, the brigade commanders establishCFLs, and the division commander merelyconsolidates them and designates a divisioncoordinated fire line.

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The CFL is graphically portrayed by a dashedblack line with CFL followed by theestablishing headquarters (brigade or division)in parentheses above the line and a date-timegroup below the line. Locations for CFLs aredisseminated by message and/or overlaythrough both maneuver and fire supportchannels to higher, lower, and adjacentmaneuver and supporting units.

Fire Support Coordination LineAn FSCL may be established by the corpswithin its area of operation to support itsconcept of the operation. It must becoordinated with the appropriate tactical aircommander and other supporting elements.The purpose of this permissive fire controlmeasure is to allow the corps and itssubordinate and supporting units (such as theAir Force) to expeditiously attack targets ofopportunity beyond the FSCL. The attack oftargets beyond the FSCL by Army assetsshould be coordinated with supporting tacticalair. This coordination is defined as informingand/or consulting with the supporting tacticalair component. However, the inability to effectthis coordination does not preclude the attackof targets beyond the FSCL. The interfacewithin the FS cell between the various firesupport representatives provides an excellentmeans of initially coordinating the attack oftargets in this area. Targets of opportunity

beyond the FSCL are attacked by a unit ifsuch attacks support the operations of any oneof the following:

The attacking unit.

The higher headquarters of that unit.

A headquarters supported by that unit.

Three conditions should be met before anFSCL is established by the corps:

A portion of the corps deep operations areadoes not require selective targeting to shapethe deep operations fight.

The expeditious attack of targets beyond theFSCL will support the operations of thecorps, the attacking unit, or the higher head-quarters of the attacking unit.

The corps and its supporting units are willingto accept the possible duplication of effortwhich may result from dual targeting beyondthe FSCL.

The primary consideration for placement of anFSCL is that it should be located beyond thearea in which the corps intends to shape itsdeep operations fight. The deep operationsfight is shaped by restricting the movement ofenemy follow-on forces to influence the timeand location of their arrival into the closeoperations area. This usually requires selective

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targeting and coordinating of fires in the areawhere shaping is to occur. Normally, the FSCLis established well beyond the range of cannonand multiple rocket FA systems to providesufficient depth to shape the fight against aSoviet-type echeloned attack. In this case, onlycorps missile systems, tactical air support, andpossibly attack helicopters have the rangecapabilities to attack targets beyond the FSCL.

However, the corps deep operations conceptmay not seek to shape the fight but only focuson maximizing the destruction of enemy unitsand/or systems. Then the corps shouldestablish the FSCL as close as possible to itsclose operations area. This maximizes thenumber of fire support systems capable offiring beyond the FSCL. A restrictive fire areaor a no-fire area can be used to protect keyfacilities or terrain features beyond the FSCL.This would still allow for an FSCL short of thefacility or terrain feature which must beprotected.

Whether attacking or defending, the corpsusually designates an initial FSCL and plansfor a series of on-order FSCLs. A change ofFSCL location usually is transmitted wellahead of time to higher, lower, adjacent, andsupporting headquarters.

Dissemination of the FSCL is the same as thatfor the coordinated fire line.

NOTE: The above information is in compliancewith the provisions of STANAG 2099/QSTAG 531.However, FM 100-26 states “Areas on the bat-tlefield should never be considered the absoluteprovince of either USA or USAF commanders.Both component commanders will have a con-tinuing interest in the enemy regardless of depth.They will want to collect intelligence and attack–or cause to be attacked – targets that will affecttheir future operations. The planning to attack tar-gets in the second echelon should be coor-dinated among components, concurrence sought,and if not obtained, the matter should be referredto the next higher headquarters.”

FSCL employment considerations are asfollows:

Type of operation — offensive or defensive,and so forth.

Deep operations with maneuver.

Name and location of Threat.

Target acquisition capabilities.

Allocations of air support.

Future operations.

Free-Fire AreaA free-fire area (FFA) is a specific area intowhich any weapon system may fire withoutadditional coordination with the establishingheadquarters. It is used to expedite fires andto facilitate the jettison of munitions whenaircraft are unable to drop them on a targetarea. Usually, the FFA is established by adivision or higher commander. It is located onidentifiable terrain when possible or by griddesignation when necessary. It is disseminatedthrough both maneuver and fire supportchannels.

F-4

FM 6-20-30

Restrictive MeasuresRestrictive Fire Line

This is a line established between convergingfriendly forces (one or both may be moving)that prohibits fires or the effects of fires acrossthe line without coordination with the affectedforce. The purpose of the line is to preventinterference between the converging friendlyforces. It is established by the commandercommon to the converging forces. It is locatedon identifiable terrain, usually closer to thestationary force. Its location is disseminated inthe same manner as that of a coordinated fireline.

Airspace Coordination AreaThe ACA is primarily a coordination effort ofTACAIR and indirect fires; therefore, firesupport people are the focal planning point.

The ACA is a block of airspace in the targetarea in which friendly aircraft are reasonablysafe from surface fires. Occasionally, it may bea formal measure (a three-dimensional box inthe sky). More often, it is informal. Thepurpose of the ACA is to allow the simulta-neous attack of targets near each other bymultiple fire support means, one of whichnormally is air. For example, tactical aircraft,field artillery, and naval gunfire can attack the

same target complex or targets close to oneanother while operating within the parametersof an established ACA.

Implementation of the formal ACA takes asignificant amount of time. Therefore, informalACAs are most often used and are thepreferred method. The informal ACA can beestablished by using time, lateral separation, oraltitude to provide separation betweensurface-to-surface and air-delivered fires. Anexample would be to designate a road as thelateral separation feature and direct airsupport to stay north of the road and restrictFA and naval gunfire to airspace and targetssouth of the road. The informal ACA can beestablished at task force or higher level and isnot normally displayed on maps, charts, oroverlays.

Occasionally, there may be a requirement for aseparate brigade or higher-level commander toestablish a formal ACA. Its location iscoordinated by the FS cell with the A2C2

element and the FDC. It is located above thetarget area as recommended to the FS cell bythe air liaison element. The size of the area isdictated by the type of aircraft and theordnance in use.

Vital information defining the formal ACAincludes minimum and maximum altitudes

F-5

FM 6-20-30

(alt), a baseline designated by grid coordinatesat each end, the width (either side of thebaseline), and the effective times. Informationconcerning the area is disseminated in thesame way that it is for the coordinated fireline.

No-Fire AreaAn NFA is an area into which no fires oreffects of fires are allowed. Two exceptionsare –

When establishing headquarters approvesfires temporarily within the NFA on amission-by-mission basis.

When an enemy force within the NFAengages a friendly force. The commandermay engage the enemy to defend his force.

The purpose of the NFA is to prohibit fires ortheir effects in the area. Usually, it isestablished by a division or corps onidentifiable terrain, when possible. Also, it may

be located by grid or by a radius (in meters)from a center point. Like other fire supportcoordinating measures, its location isdisseminated through both maneuver and firesupport channels to concerned levels.

F-6

FM 6-20-30

Restrictive Fire AreaAn RFA is an area in which specificrestrictions are imposed and in which fires thatexceed those restrictions will not be deliveredwithout coordination with the establishingheadquarters. The purpose of the RFA is toregulate fires into an area according to thestated restrictions. It is established bymaneuver battalion or higher echelons ofcommand. On occasion, an RFA may beestablished by a company operatingindependently. Usually, it is located onidentifiable terrain, by a grid or by radius (inmeters) from a center point. Its location isdisseminated in the same manner as that ofthe coordinated fire line. Restrictions may beshown on a map or an overlay, or referencecan be made to an OPORD that states therestrictions.

F-7

FM 6-20-30

GLOSSARY

A²C²

AAAAGAAGSABCA

ABCCC

abnACAACC

ACE

ACRADADAADAMADCOORDADEadmin/logADPAFACAFSCOORDAFSOAFSOUTHAHBAIALCCALCEALO

alt

AArmy airspace command and controlavenue of approacharmy artillery group (Soviet)Army air-ground system (counterair)American, British, Canadian, andAustralianairborne battlefield command andcontrol centerairborneairspace coordination areaair component commander; airspacecontrol centerassistant corps engineer, AlliedCommand Europearmored cavalry regimentair defenseair defense artilleryarea denial artillery munitionsair defense coordinatorassistant division engineeradministration/logistics (radio net)automatic data processingairborne forward air controllerassistant fire support coordinatoraerial fire support observerAllied Forces Southern Europeattack helicopter battalionair interdictionairlift control centerairlift control elementair liaison officeraltitude

AMLSammoAMFANGLICOanxAOAOAAPPAR/LCCARLOarmdASBASAPASCEASGASICaslt helASOCASPASPCASPSassyATACMSATGMATIATIZatk helATOATOCaveavnAWACS

airspace management liaison sectionammunitionACE Mobile Force (Land)air and naval gunfire liaison companyannexarea of operationsamphibious objective areaappendixArmy/land component commanderair reconnaissance liaison officerarmoredaviation support battalionas soon as possibleair support coordination elementarea support groupall-source intelligence centerassault helicopterair support operations centerammunition supply pointall-source production centerall-source production sectionassemblyArmy tactical missile systemantitank guided missileartillery target intelligenceartillery target intelligence zoneattack helicopterair tasking orderallied tactical operations centeravenueaviationairborne warning and control system

Glossary-1

FM 6-20-30

BAIBBBCEBDAbdebnBOSbtry

C²C²CM

C³

C³CM

CACAACAABCABCACCASCASPCATF

cavCBMMcbtCCTcdrCENTAGCEWICFCFA

Bbattlefield air interdictionbattleshipbattlefield coordination elementbattle damage assessmentbrigadebattalionbattlefield operating systembattery

Ccommand and controlcommand and controlcountermeasurescommand, control, andcommunicationscommand, control, andcommunications countermeasurescivil affairs, counteraircombined arms army (Soviet)cavalry air assault brigadecombined arms battalioncombat aviation companyclose air supportchemical ammunition supply pointcommander of the amphibious taskforcecavalrycorps ballistic meteorology managercombatcombat control teamcommanderCentral Army Groupcombat electronic warfare intelligencecommand/fire directioncovering force area

(radio net)

CFFZ call-for-fire zoneCFL coordinated fire lineCFZ critical friendly zoneCG CGN guided missile cruiserCLF commander landing forceCLGP cannon-launched guided projectilecml chemicalCM&D collection, management, and

disseminationco companyCOA course of actionCOLT combat observation/lasing teamCOMAFSOUTH Commander Allied Forces SouthcmdCOMMZCOMSECCOPCOSCOMCPCRCCRPCSCSABCSRCSSCTADCTOCSE

CZ

DADAGDASC

DD

command (radio net)communications zonecommunications securitycombat operations post (Soviet)corps support commandcommand postcontrol and reporting centercontrol reporting pointcombat supportcombat service support battalioncontrolled supply ratecombat service supportcorps target acquisition detachmentcorps tactical operations center supportelementcensor zone

DDepartment of the Armydivision artillery group (Soviet)direct air support center; division airsupport coordinationdestroyer

center (Marines)

Glossary-2

FM 6-20-30

DDGdefdetDFDFSCOORDDGZDISCOMdivdiv artyDMDDPICM

DSDSODSTDTGDTOCSE

EACEADSECECMEMPengrENSCEEPB

ESMETACEWEWPEWSEWSEEWSO

guided missile destroyerdefensivedetachmentdirection findingdeputy fire support coordinatordesired ground zerodivision support commanddivisiondivision artillerydigital message devicedual-purpose improved conventionalmunitionsdirect supportdivision signal officerdecision support templatedate-time groupdivision tactical operations centersupport element

Eechelons above corpsenemy air defense systemelectronic combatelectronic countermeasureselectromagnetic pulseengineerenemy situation correlation elementelectronic preparation of thebattlefieldelectronic support measuresenlisted terminal attack controllerelectronic warfareemergency warned protectedelectronic warfare sectionelectronic warfare support elementelectronic warfare staff officer

FFAFACFACPFAIOFARPFASFASCAMFCLFCTFDFDCFDSFDOFEBAFFFFAFFGFINFISTfldFLIRFLOFLOTFMFMFFOBFPFFRAGOFRGFROG

FSFSA

Ffire (radio net)field artilleryforward air controllerforward air control postfield artillery intelligence officerforward arming and refueling pointfield artillery sectionfamily of scatterable minesfire coordination linefirepower control teamfire direction (radio net)fire direction centerfire direction systemfire direction officerforward edge of the battle areafrigatefree-fire areaguided missile frigatefinancefire support teamfieldforward-looking infraredfighter liaison officerforward line of own troopsfield manualFleet Marine Forceforward operational basefinal protective firefragmentary orderFederal Republic of Germanyfree rocket over ground (Sovietweapon)fire supportfire support area

Glossary-3

FM 6-20-30

FSBFS cellFSCLFSCOORDFSEFSOFSSFWD

G1

G2

G3

G4G5

GLO

gpGSGSACGS-LAR

GSRGT

G/VLLD

forward support battalionfire support cellfire support coordination linefire support coordinatorfire support elementfire support officerfire support station (Navy)forward

GAssistant Chief of Staff, G1(Personnel)Assistant Chief of Staff, G2(Intelligence)Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 (Operationsand Plans)Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 (Logistics)Assistant Chief of Staff, G5 (CivilAffairs)ground liaison officergroupgeneral supportgeneral support aviation companygeneral support –light artillery androcketgeneral support reinforcinggun-target (line, distance, and soforth)ground/vehicular laser locator

HHC

HFHHB

designator

Hheavyhydrogen chloridehigh frequencyheadquarters and headquartersbattery

Glossary-4

HHC

HHTHIPHMMWV

HNShowHPTHQhrHUMINTHVT

ICMIEWINF

headquarters and headquarterscompanyheadquarters and headquarters troophowitzer improvement programhigh-mobility multipurpose wheeledvehiclehost nation supporthowitzerhigh-priority targetheadquartershourhuman intelligencehigh-value target

Iimproved conventional munitionsintelligence and electronic warfareinfantry

INFLIGHTREP in-flight reportintelIPIPB

IPIR

IRITIITR

J-SEAD

J-STARS

JAARTJAATJATF

intelligenceinitial pointintelligence preparation of thebattlefieldinitial photographic interpretationreportinfrared, information requirementsimmediate transient incapacitationindependent tank regiment (Soviet)

Jjoint suppression of enemy airdefensesjoint surveillance target attack radarsystemjoint attack of artilleryjoint air attack teamjoint amphibious task force

FM 6-20-30

JCSJFCJOCJTF

kmKT

LABLCLCCLDLD/LCLICLLLOLOCLOILOSLRSULSD

MACMACCS

MAGTFmaintMANmaxMBAMCMCCMCS

Joint Chiefs of Staffjoint force commanderjoint operations centerjoint task force

Kkilometerkiloton

Llight assault battalionline of contactland component commanderlime of departureline of departure is line of contactlow-intensity conflictlatent lethalityliaison officerline of communicationletter of instructionlime of sightlong-range surveillance unitleast separation distance

MMilitary Airlift CommandMarine air command and controlsystemMarine air-ground task forcemaintenancemaneuvermaximummain battle areamobility corridormovement control centermultichannel communications system

mechmedmetMETT-T

MIMICminMLRSmmMOPPMPMRBMRDMRLMRR

MSBMSDMSEMSRMTLR

NAINALONAIRA

NASPNATONBCN/CHNCNCONFANFL

mechanizedmediummeteorologicalmission, enemy, terrain and weather,troops and time availablemilitary intelligencemid-intensity conflictminutesmultiple launch rocket systemmillimetermission-oriented protective posturemilky policemotorized rifle battalion (Soviet)motorized rifle division (Soviet)multiple rocket launcher (Soviet)motorized rifle regiment (Soviet),minimum risk routemain support battalionminimum safe distancemobile subscriber equipmentmain supply routemoving-target-locating radar

Nnamed area of interestnaval aviation liaison officernuclear accident incident responseand assistancenuclear ammunition supply unitNorth Atlantic Treaty Organizationnuclear, biological, chemicalnuclear and chemicalnuclear and chemicalnoncommissioned officerno-fire areano-fire line

Glossary-5

FM 6-20-30

NUE

NGFNGLONGONLTnuc

NWLE

OCAoffOPOPCONOPLANOPORDopsops/intel

PADS

PALPCLPDRA

PGBPIRPLpltPNLPNRM

PNSPOLPOMCUS

naval gunfirenaval gunfire liaison officernaval gunfire officernot later thannuclearnegligible risk to unwarned exposedpersonnelnuclear weapons logistics element

Ooffensive counterairofficerobservation postoperational controloperation planoperation orderoperations (radio net)operations/intelligence (radio net)

Pposition and azimuth determiningsystempermissive action linkprescribed chemical loadPeople’s Democratic Republic ofAtlanticaprecision guided bombpriority intelligence requirementsphase lineplatoonprescribed nuclear loadPeople’s National RevolutionMovementprescribed nuclear stockpetroleum, oil and lubricantspre-positioning of material configuredto unit sets

Glossary-6

posPRFPSSPSYOPPUP

QSTAG

RRAAMSRAGRAOCRATTRCRECRECCE

positionpulse repetition frequency (laser code)personnel services supportpsychological operationspull-up point

Qquadripartite standardizationagreement

Rreinforcingremote antiarmor mine systemregimental artillery group (Soviet)rear area operations centerradio teletypewriterReserve Componentradio electronic combat (Soviet)recornnaissance (USAF)

RECCEXREP reconnaissance exploitation reportreconregtretransRFARFLRLORSORSOP

RSRRSTA

SACCSALT

reconnaissanceregimentretransmission stationrestrictive fire arearestrictive fire linereconnaissance liaison officerreconnaissance and survey officerreconnaissance, survey, andoccupation of positionrequired supply ratereconnaissance, survey, and targetacquisition

Ssupporting arms coordination centersupporting arms liaison team

FM 6-20-30

SASPSEADSEMASIGSIGINTSLARSLIRSLRSOFSOISOPSPSPCE

SPCO

sptsrSRCSSBSSMSTANAGSTRIKWARNsupSUPIR

TTATAATAACOMTABTACATACAIRTACC

special ammunition supply pointsuppression of enemy air defensesspecial electronic mission aircraftsignalsignal intelligenceside-looking airborne radarside-looking infaredside-looking radarspecial operations forcesignal operating instructionsstanding operating proceduresself-propelledsurvey planning and coordinationelementsurvey planning and coordinationofficersupportseniorstandard requirement codesingle sidebandsurface-to-surface missilestandardization agreementnuclear strike warningsupplysupplemental photographicinterpretation report

Ttowedtarget acquisitiontactical assembly areatheater army area commandtarget acquisition batterytactical air coordinator, airbornetactical airtactical air control center

TACCS

TACFIRETACMSTACONTACPTACSTAFTAITALOTAMCATAOCTAPTARTARC

TCAE

TCFTDATERECTFTFW

TLETOCTOETOFTOTTOW

TPFDDTPStransTRTTVA

tactical air command and controlspecialisttactical fire direction systemtactical missile systemtactical controltactical air control partytactical air control systemtactical air forcetarget area of interesttactical airlift liaison officertheater army movement control agencytactical air operations centertactical acquisition plantactical air reconnaissancetarget acquisition reconnaissancecompanytechnical control and analysiselementtactical combat forcetarget damage assessmenttactical electronic reconnaissancetask forcetactical fighter wingtarget location errortactical operations centertables of organization and equipmenttime of flighttime on targettube-launched, optically tracked,wire-guided missiletime phase force development datatarget processing sectiontransportationTEREC remote terminaltarget value analysisTheater of Military Operations (Soviet)TVD

Glossary-7

FM 6-20-30

U VHF very high frequency

UAV VTDPunmanned aerial vehicle vector target designation point

UHF ultrahigh frequencyW

US United StatesUSAF United States Air Force WBK wehrbereichkommando (German

unit)USMC United States Marine Corps

WHA weapons holding areaUTM universal transverse mercator

WLR weapons-locating radarV WOC wing operations center

VFMED variable format message entry device WP white phosphorus

Glossary-8

FM 6-20-30

REFERENCES

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONSRequired publications are sources that users must read in order to understand or to comply with this publication.

Army Regulation (AR)310-25 Dictionary of United States Army Terms (Short Title AD)

Field Manuals (FMs)6-20 Fire Support in the AirLand Battle100-5 Operations100-10 Combat Service Supportl00-16 Support Operations Echelons Above Corps100-20 Low Intensity Conflict101-5-1 Operational Terms and Symbols

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PUBLICATION (JCS PUB)25 U.S. Message Text Formating Program

RELATED PUBLICATIONSRelated publications are sources of additional information. They are not required in order to understandthis publication.

2 0 2 8Department of the Army (DA) Forms

Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms4655-R Target List Worksheet (LRA)4656-R Scheduling Worksheet (LRA)

Department of Defense (DD) Form1975 Joint Tactical Air Reconnaissance/Surveillance Request

Field Manuals (FMs)1-103 Airspace Management and Army Air Traffic in a Combat Zone(J)3-10-1 Chemical Weapons Employment3-50 Deliberate Smoke Operations3-100 NBC Operations5-100 Engineer Combat, Operations5-103 Survivability

References-1

FM 6-20-30

5-1066-26-156-20-2 (HTF)6-306-1216-1226-141-26-1619-69-8411-5017-9521-2634-134-4034-8144-190-290-3 (HTF)90-5 (HTF)90-690-10 (HTF)90-13 (HTF)100-2-1100-26100-42100-50101-5l0l-10-1/l101-31-1101-31-2

FM 101-50-1

Employment of Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM Operations)Field Artillery SurveyField Artillery MeteorologyDivision Artillery, Field Artillery Brigade, and Field Artillery Section (Corps) (How to Fight)Observed Fire ProceduresField Artillery Target AcquisitionField Artillery Sound Ranging(C) Field Artillery Target Analysis and Weapons Employment: Nonnuclear (U)Field Artillery Radar SystemsAmmunition Service in the Theater of OperationsSpecial Ammunition (Nuclear) Direct and General Support Unit OperationsCombat Communications Within the Division (How to Fight)Cavalry OperationsMap Reading and Land NavigationIntelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations(S) Electronic Warfare Operations (U)Weather Support for Army Tactical OperationsUS Army Air Defense Artillery EmploymentBattlefield DeceptionDesert Operations (How to Fight)Jungle Operations (How to Fight)Mountain OperationsMilitary Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) (How to Fight)River Crossing Operations (How to Fight)Soviet Army Operations and TacticsThe Air-Ground Operations SystemUS Air Force/US Army Airspace Management in an Area of OperationsOperations for Nuclear-Capable UnitsStaff Organization and OperationsStaff Officers Field Manual– Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data (Volume 1)Staff Officers’ Field Manual: Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures(SRD) Staff Officers’ Field Manual: Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data (U)

Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals (JMEMs)Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual/Air-to-Surface

References-2

FM 6-20-30

FM 10l-60-l

FM 101-60-2

FM 101-60-3

FM 101-60-6

FM 101-60-7FM 101-60-9

FM 101-61-3

FM 101-62-1

FM 101-62-3

ATP-27ATP-35(A)JCS Pub 1TACP 50-23/TRADOCTT 100-44-1

(C) Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual/Surface-to-Surface Effectiveness Data for Mortar,81-mm: M29 (U)(C) Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual/Surface-to-Surface: Effectiveness Data for Howitzer,105-mm, M101A1 (U)(C) Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual/Surface-to-Surface Effectiveness Data for Howitzer,155-mm, M109 (U)(C) Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual: Surface-to-Surface Effectiveness Data for 5-Inch/38-Inch Naval Twin-Gun Mount, MK-28, -32, and With Gun, Fire Control System MK-37 (U)(C) Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual: Effectiveness Data for Mortar: 4.2-Inch, M30 (U)(C) Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual: Surface-to-Surface Effectiveness Data for NavalSingle-Gun Mount, MK42 w/Gun Fire Control System, MK68 (U)(C) Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual/Surface-to-Surface (JMEM/SS) – Weapon/MunitionsApplication: Ammunition Reliability (U)(C) Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual Surface-to-Surface: Safe Distances for FragmentaryMunitions (U)(C) Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual/Surface-to-Surface Manual of Fragmentation Data (U)

Miscellaneous LiteratureOffensive Air Support OperationsLand Force Tactical DoctrineDepartment of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD) Operations

NOTE: TACP 50-23/TRADOC TT100-44-1 can be obtainedfrom HQ TAC, ATTN: XPJ-ALPO, Langley AFB, VA 23665.

2014/5062031/51520822099/5312103/187

2104/189

TRADOC Pam525-9 (S) J-SEAD (U)

NATO Standardization Agreements/QuadripartiteStandardization Agreements (STANAGs/QSTAGs)

Operation Orders, Annexes to Operation Orders, and Administrative and Logistics OrdersProforma for Artillery Fire PlanRelief of Combat TroopsFire Coordination in Support of Land ForcesReporting Nuclear Detonation, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting and Warning ofAssociated Hazards and Hazards Area (ATP-45)Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning to Armed Forces Operating on Land

References-3

FM 6-20-30

2147/221 Target Numbering System (Nonnuclear)

NOTE: STANAGs and QSTAGs can be obtained fromNaval Publications Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadel-phia, PA 19120. DD Form 1425 may be used to requisi-tion documents.

Training Circulars (TCs)3-15 Nuclear Accident Incident Response and Assistance (NAIRA)6-20-5 Field Artillery Delivered Scatterable Mines6-40 Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery6-40A Field Artillery Automated Cannon Gunnery6-60 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Operations34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Projected PublicationsProjected publications are sources of additional information that are scheduled for printing but are not yetavailable. Upon print, they will be distributed automatically via pinpoint distribution. They may not be obtainedfrom the USA AG Publications Center until indexed in DA Pamphlet 25-30.

FM 6-20-10 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting ProcessFM 6-20-40 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for BrigadeFM 6-20-50 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for BrigadeFM 71-100 Division OperationsFM 100-6 Large Unit OperationsFM 100-15 Corps OperationsFM 100-30 Nuclear Operations in Support of the AirLand Battle

Operations (Heavy)Operations (Light)

References-4

FM 6-20-30

Index-1

FM 6-20-30

Index-2

FM 6-20-30

Index-3

FM 6-20-30

18 OCTOBER 1989

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

CARL E. VUONOGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

WILLIAM J. MEEHAN IIBrigadier General, United States Army

The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11E, Requirementsfor FM 6-20, Fire Support In the AirLand Battle (Qty rqr block no. 772).

✩ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1994-300-421/82318

PIN: 066726-000