Florentino

7/27/2019 Florentino

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FLORENTINA A. LOZANO , petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M.MARTINEZ , in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, NationalCapital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the HONORABLE JOSEB. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.

YAP, J: Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularlyknown as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality.

BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account orfor value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in orcredit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full uponpresentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank forinsufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reasonhad not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment."The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days normore than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor morethan double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fineand imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, havingsufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws andissues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover thefull amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from thedate appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker ordrawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank tocover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult toestablish, the statute itself creates aprima facie presumption of such knowledgewhere payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient fundsin or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statuteprovides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days fromreceipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements forpayment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.

Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, providesthat the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check withthe drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto,giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute primafacie proof of "the making orissuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and


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the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached bythe drawee on such dishonored check."

The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course topresent proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.

ISSUE: Whether or not (W/N) BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbiddingimprisonment for debt.

HELD: No.The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing aworthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. Itis not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is notintended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is toprohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and puttingthem in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, thepractice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offenseagainst property, but an offense against public order.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of thecommunity at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee orholder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valuelesscommercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollutethe channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurtthe welfare of society and the public interest.

The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed publicnuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

ISSUE: W/N BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract.

HELD: No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to

enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are notlawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as merecontracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, hasbecome a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system andtherefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

ISSUE: W/N it violates the equal protection clause.


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HELD: No. Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for the crime asthe drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payeeby his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument istantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both theswindler and the swindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as theclassification is no unreasonable or arbitrary.

JOY LEE RECUERDO, peti t ioner , vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESAND THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents .

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO -MORALES, J .:

Before us for review is the July 16, 1997 decision of the Court of Appealsin CA-G.R. No. 20577 affirming that rendered by the Regional Trial Court(RTC), Branch 150, Makati City which in turn affirmed that of the MetropolitanTrial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 67 convicting Joy Lee Recuerdo(petitioner) for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing ChecksLaw) on 5 counts.

From the evidence of the prosecution, the following facts are established:

Sometime in the first week of December 1993, Yolanda Floro (Yolanda)who is engaged in jewelry business sold a 3-karat loose diamond stonevalued at P420,000.00 to petitioner who gave a downpaymentof P40,000.00. In settlement of the balance of the purchase price, petitioner issued 9 postdated checks, 8 of which in the amount of P40,000.00, and 1 inthe amount ofP20,000.00, all drawn against her account at the PrudentialBank . [1]

When Yolanda deposited 8 of the 10 checks to her depository bank,Liberty Savings and Loan Association, only 3, those dated December 25,1993, January 25, 1994, and February 25, 1994, were cleared. The remaining5 were dishonored due to the closure of petitioners account . [2]

Yolanda thus went to petitioners dental clinic and advised her to changethe dishonored checks to cash. Petitioner promised alright but she welshed onit. [3]

A demand lette r [4] was thereupon sent to petitioner for her to settle her obligation but she failed to heed the same , [5] hence, the filing of 5informations [6] against her for violation of B. P. 22 at the Makati MeTC, theaccusatory portion of the first of which reads:
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That sometime in the first week of December, 1993, in the Municipality of Makati,Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, theabove-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously makeout, drawn (sic) and issue to YOLANDA G. FLORO to apply on account or for valuethe check described below:

Check No. - 008789

Drawn Against - Prudential Bank

In the Amount of - P40,000.00

Postdated/dated - July 25, 1994

Payable to - Cash

said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said account did not havesufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the faceamount of such check upon its presentment, which check when presented for paymentwithin ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by thedrawee bank for the r eason ACCOUNT CLOSED and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment within five (5) banking days after receivingsaid notice.

Except for the check numbers and dates of maturity, the four other informations are similarly worded.

After trial, Branch 67 of the Makati MeTC convicted petitioner in a JointDecision [7] the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused guilty beyondreasonable doubt of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 on five (5) counts andtherefore sentences the accused to suffer an imprisonment of 30 days for each countand to restitute the amount of P 200,000.00 to Miss Yolanda G. Floro, which is thetotal amount of the five (5) checks, and to pay her also the amount of P20,000.00 asdamages to compensate the payment of attorneys f ees.

SO ORDERED .[8]

As stated early on, the RTC, on appeal, affirmed the decision of theMeTC . [9] And the Court of Appeals [10] affirmed that of the RTC.
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In the petition for review on certiorari at bar, petitioner proffers as follows:

1. Petitioner was convicted by an invalid law which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for being an unconstitutional law.

2. Petitioner was denied her constitutional right to due process for failure of the courtsa quo to uphold her presumption of innocence and for convicting her even if the

prosecution evidence does not prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

3. The findings of fact of the courts a quo, primarily the Court of Appeals, are basedon surmises, conjectures and speculations.

4. The Court of Appeals was biased against petitioner when it denied the petition moto propio (sic) without the comment of the Office of the Solicitor General. [11]

Petitioner contends that since banks are not damaged by the presentmentof dishonored checks as they impose a penalty for each, onlycreditors/payees are unduly favored by the law; that the law is in essence aresurrected form of 19 th century imprisonment for debt since the drawer iscoerced to pay his debt on threat of imprisonment even if his failure to paydoes not arise from malice or fraud or from any criminal intent to causedamage ;[12] and that the law is a bill of attainde r [13] as it does not leave muchroom for judicial determination, the guilt of the accused having already beendecided by the legislature . [14]

These matters subject of petitioners contention have long been settled inthe landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez [15] where this Court upheld theconstitutionality of B. P. 22:

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing aworthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It isnot the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes . The law is notintended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to

prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and puttingthem in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the

practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as an offense againstproperty, but an offense against public order .[16] (Emphasis supplied)

The contention that B. P. 22 is a bill of attainder, one which inflictspunishment without trial and the essence of which is the substitution of alegislative for a judicial determination of guilt , [17]f ails. For under B. P. 22, every
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element of the crime is still to be proven before the trial court to warrant aconviction for violation thereof.

Reinforcing her thesis, petitioner cites the speech made by now Vice-President Teofisto Guingona delivered before the Philippine Bar Association

wherein he stressed the need to review the law since it has not prevented theproliferation of bouncing checks . [18]

As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, however, while duedeference is given to the opinion of the Vice-President, the same shouldproperly be addressed to the legislature which is in a better position to reviewthe effectiveness and usefulness of the law . [19] As held in the caseof Lozano , [20] it is not for the Court to question the wisdom or policy of thestatute. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists between the means andthe end.

Petitioner further claims that the dishonored checks were not issued for deposit and encashment , [21] nor was there consideration therefor, in support of which she cites her alleged agreement with Yolanda that she could have thestone appraised to determine the purchase price , [22] and since she found outthat it is only worth P160,000.00 , [23] there was no longer any need to fund theremaining checks which should be returned to her . [24] Yolanda, however, sopetitioner adds, could no longer be reached . [25] Petitioner thus concludes thatshe had already paid in full the purchase price of the stone, she havingpaid P40,000.00 cash plus the P120,000.00 proceeds of the three clearedchecks . [26]

Petitioners submission does not lie. Such alleged agreement does notinspire belief. The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of thechecks are irrelevant . [27]

A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended for encashment, hasthe same effect like any other check . It is within the contemplation of B.P. 22,which is explicit that any person who makes or draws and issues any check to applyfor an account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not havesufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank x x x which check is subsequentlydishonored x x x shall be punished by imprisonment. [28] (Emphasis supplied.)

BP 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually beenvisioned by the parties , its primordial intention being to instead ensure thestability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency. It isa policy that can be easily eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for whichchecks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriateapplication of the legislative enactment can be made. [29] (Emphasis supplied)
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Additionally, petitioner argues that as no bank representative testified as towhether the questioned checks were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds(sic), such element was not clearly and convincingly proven , [30] hence, the trialcourt failed to uphold her right to presumption of innocence when she wasconvicted based on the sole testimony of Yolanda.

Whether the checks were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds, or Account Closed as alleged in the informations and testified on byYolanda , [31] petitioner s argument is untenable.

It is not required much less indispensable, for the prosecution to present the drawee banks representative as a witness to testify on the dishonor of the checks because of insufficiency of funds. The prosecution may present, as it did in this case, onlycomplainant as a witness to prove all the elements of the offense charged . She iscompetent and qualified witness to testify that she deposited the checks to her account

in a bank; that she subsequently received from the bank the checks returned unpaidwith a notation drawn against insufficient funds stamped or written on the dorsalside of the checks themselves, or in a notice attached to the dishonored checks dulygiven to the complainant, and that petitioner failed to pay complainant the value of thechecks or make arrangements for their payment in full within five (5) banking daysafter receiving notice that such checks had not been paid by the drawee

bank. [32] (Emphasis supplied)

Yolandas testimony that when she deposited the checks to her depositorybank they were dishonored due to Account Closed [33] thus sufficed. In fact,

even petitioners counsel during trial admitted the dishonor, and on thatground . [34]

Finally, petitioner imputes bias on the part of the appellate court when itdecided her petition for review without the comment of the Office of theSolicitor General.

The rendition of the decision by the appellate court without the comment of the People-Appellee is not by itself proof of bias. In any event, the Office of the Solicitor General gave its comment on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate courts decision.

In fine, the affirmance of petitioners conviction is in order.

Under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, imprisonment need not beimposed on those found guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 issued on February 14, 2001 vests in the courts the discretion todetermine, taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case,whether the imposition of fine alone would best serve the interests of justice,
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or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate theseriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwisecontrary to the imperatives of justice . [35]

In the case at bar, this Court notes that no proof, nay allegation, was

proffered that petitioner was not a first time offender. Considering this and thecorrectness of the case, it would best serve the interests of justice if petitioner is just fined to enable her to continue her dental practice so as not to depriveher of her income, thus insuring the early settlement of the civil aspect of thecase, not to mention the FINE.

WHEREFORE , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals findingpetitioner JOY LEE RECUERDO guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

In lieu of imprisonment, accused-herein petitioner JOY LEE RECUERDO,

is ordered to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each dishonoredcheck subject of the five cases at bar. And she is also ordered to pay privatecomplainant, Yolanda Floro, the amount of Two Hundred Thousand(P200,000.00) Pesos representing the total amount of the dishonored checks.

SO ORDERED.

People v. Nitafan G.R. No. 75954 October 22, 1992

Facts:

On January 20, 1985, aid accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Fatima Cortez Sasaki Philippine Trust Company Check No. 117383 in theamount of P143,000.00He knew that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the draweebank.The check was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, anddespite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay Sasaki the amount of saidcheck or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five banking days after receiving said notice.Private respondent, Mariano Lim moved to quash the Information of the ground that the factscharged did not constitute a felony as B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issuedwas a memorandum check which was in the nature of a promissory note in thus, is civil in nature.

On 1 September 1986, respondent judge, ruling that B.P. 22 on which the Information was basedwas unconstitutional, issued the questioned Order quashing the Information. Hence, this petitionfor review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the government.

Issues:

W/N B.P. 22 is unconstitutional

W/N a memorandum check issued postdated in partial payment of a pre-existing obligation iswithin the coverage of B.P. 22.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/133036.htm#_ftn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/133036.htm#_ftn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/133036.htm#_ftn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/133036.htm#_ftn35


9/9

Ratio:

The constitutionality of the Bouncing Check Law has already been sustained by the SC through jurisprudence in Lozano v. Martinez, and the seven other cases decided jointly with it.A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, with the word "memorandum", "memo"or "mem" written across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay the bona fideholder absolutely, without any condition concerning its presentment.Such a check is an evidence of debt against the drawer, and although may not be intended to bepresented has the same effect as an ordinary check and if passed to the third person will be validin his hands like any other check.A memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Lawwhich defines a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand."A memorandum check must therefore fall within the ambit of B.P. 22 which does not distinguishbut merely provides that "any person who makes or draws and issues any check knowing at thetime of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank which checkis subsequently dishonored shall be punished by imprisonment"A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank. Hence it does not

matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of indebtednessor whether it was issued is partial fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation, for what the law punishesis the issuance itself of a bouncing check 15 and not the purpose for which it was issuance.The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as anevidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum .

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order of respondent Judge of 1 September 1986 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, respondent Judge, or whoever presides over the Regional Trial Court of Manila,Branch 52, is hereby directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing of the case until terminated.

SO ORDERED.

Documents

Florentino