FLIGHT TRAINING INSTRUCTIONDEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY CHIEF OF NAVAL AIR TRAINING 250 LEXINGTON BLVD SUITE 102 CORPUS CHRISTI TX 78419-5041 CNATRA P-881 N712 5 Oct 20 CNATRA P-881 (REV

NAVAL AIR TRAINING COMMAND

NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS CNATRA P-881 (Rev. 10-20)

FLIGHT TRAINING

INSTRUCTION

INTERMEDIATE MARITIME

COMMAND AND CONTROL (MC2)

NFOTS SENSOR AND LINK

2020

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY CHIEF OF NAVAL AIR TRAINING 250 LEXINGTON BLVD SUITE 102 CORPUS CHRISTI TX 78419-5041

CNATRA P-881

N712

5 Oct 20

CNATRA P-881 (REV. 10-20)

Subj: FLIGHT TRAINING INSTRUCTION, INTERMEDIATE MARITIME COMMAND

AND CONTROL (MC2) NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING SYSTEM (NFOTS)

SENSOR/LINK

1. CNATRA P-881 (Rev. 10-20) PAT, “Flight Training Instruction, Intermediate Maritime

Command and Control (MC2) NFOTS Sensor/Link," is issued for information, standardization

of instruction, and guidance for all flight instructors and student military aviators within the

Naval Air Training Command.

2. This publication will be used as a guide for completion of Intermediate MC2 Training

curricula for all Student Naval Flight Officers.

3. Recommendations for changes shall be submitted via the electronic TCR form located on the

CNATRA website.

4. CNATRA P-881 (Rev 02-20) PAT is hereby cancelled and superseded.

S. E. HNATT

By direction

Releasability and distribution:

This instruction is cleared for public release and is available electronically via Chief of Naval Air

Training Issuances Website, https://www.cnatra.navy.mil/pubs-pat-pubs.asp.

https://www.cnatra.navy.mil/pubs-pat-pubs.asp.

ii

FLIGHT TRAINING INSTRUCTION

FOR

INTERMEDIATE MARITIME COMMAND AND CONTROL (MC2 NFOTS)

SENSOR AND LINK

P-881

iii

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

Dates of issue for original and changed pages are:

Original.. .0...19 Dec 17

Revision...1...20 Feb 20

Revision...2...05 Oct 20

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES IN THIS PUBLICATION IS 113 CONSISTING OF THE FOLLOWING:

Page No. Change No. Page No. Change No.

COVER 0 6-1 – 6-19 0

LETTER 0 6-20 (blank) 0

ii – viii 0 7-1 – 7-7 0

1-1 – 1-9 0 7-8 (blank) 0

1-10 (blank) 0 8-1 – 8-6 0

2-1 – 2-9 0 9-1 – 9-12 0

2-10 (blank) 0 A-1 – A-19 0

3-1 – 3-3 0 A-20 (blank) 0

3-4 (blank) 0

4-1 – 4-8 0

5-1 – 5-6 0

iv

INTERIM CHANGE SUMMARY

The following Changes have been previously incorporated in this manual:

CHANGE

NUMBER REMARKS/PURPOSE

The following interim Changes have been incorporated in this Change/Revision:

INTERIM

CHANGE

NUMBER

REMARKS/PURPOSE

ENTERED

BY

DATE

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES .................................................................................................. iii INTERIM CHANGE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ..............................................................................................................v TABLE OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................ vii

CHAPTER ONE – FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE ........... 1-1 100. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1-1

101. COMPOSITE WARFARE DOCTRINE ................................................................ 1-1 102. WARFARE COMMANDERS ............................................................................... 1-4 103. FUNCTIONAL GROUP COMMANDERS ........................................................... 1-5 104. COORDINATORS ................................................................................................. 1-6

105. CWC CONCEPT’S PLACE WITHIN THE UNIFIED CMD STRUCTURE ....... 1-7

CHAPTER TWO – AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEM THEORY .......................................... 2-1 200. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 2-1

201. RADAR THEORY ................................................................................................. 2-1 202. ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ............................................................................ 2-5 203. RADAR HORIZONS ............................................................................................. 2-6

204. LIMITATIONS AND MASKING ......................................................................... 2-6 205. MODES OF OPERATION ..................................................................................... 2-9

CHAPTER THREE – IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE (IFF) SYS THEORY ....... 3-1 300. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 3-1

301. IFF OVERVIEW .................................................................................................... 3-1

302. IFF CAPABILITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS ................................................ 3-1 303. IFF LIMITATIONS ................................................................................................ 3-3

CHAPTER FOUR – ELECTRONIC WARFARE OVERVIEW/ESM SYS THEORY ..... 4-1 400. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 4-1

401. ELECTRONIC WARFARE & THE ELECTROMAGNETIC (EM) SPECTRUM 4-1 402. SUBDIVISIONS OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE ................................................ 4-2

403. ESM COMPONENTS ............................................................................................ 4-6 404. ESM LIBRARIES, PARAMETRICS, AND AMBIGUITIES ............................... 4-7

CHAPTER FIVE – ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRARED SYSTEM THEORY ......... 5-1 500. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 5-1

501. ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRARED SYSTEM THEORY ............................ 5-1 502. ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRARED COMPONENTS.................................. 5-5

CHAPTER SIX – ISAR CLASSIFICATION AND SURFACE THREAT RECCE ........... 6-1 600. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 6-1 601. CLASSIFYING SURFACE CONTACTS WITH ISAR IN THE MCS ................ 6-1 602. SURFACE THREATS OVERVIEW ..................................................................... 6-4 603. SAMS ...................................................................................................................... 6-4

vi

604. CENTCOM AOR SURFACE THREATS............................................................ 6-12

605. PACOM AOR SURFACE THREATS ................................................................. 6-15

CHAPTER SEVEN – DATA LINK OVERVIEW ................................................................. 7-1 700. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 7-1 701. DATA LINK OVERVIEW ..................................................................................... 7-1 702. DATA LINK TYPES .............................................................................................. 7-3 703. LINK 4A ................................................................................................................. 7-3

704. LINK 11 .................................................................................................................. 7-3 705. LINK 16 .................................................................................................................. 7-4

CHAPTER EIGHT – TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND BREVITY ...................... 8-1 800. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 8-1

801. CALL SIGNS AND WEAPON/WARNING STATUSES..................................... 8-1 802. BREVITY PROCEDURE WORDS (PROWORDS) ............................................. 8-2

803. QUERIES AND BRIEFINGS ................................................................................ 8-2

CHAPTER NINE – DATA LINK EMPLOYMENT .............................................................. 9-1 900. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 9-1

901. DATA LINK EMPLOYMENT .............................................................................. 9-1

APPENDIX A – GLOSSARY .................................................................................................. A-1

vii

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1 Composite Warfare Doctrine Diagram ............................................................ 1-1 Figure 1-2 Specialized Warfare Commanders ................................................................... 1-3 Figure 1-3 Functional Group Commanders ....................................................................... 1-6 Figure 1-4 Coordinators ....................................................................................................... 1-6 Figure 1-5 UCP Operational and Administrative Chains of Command ......................... 1-7

Figure 1-6 US Geographic Combatant Commands........................................................... 1-9

Figure 2-1 Common Radar Terminology ........................................................................... 2-2 Figure 2-2 Douglas Sea Scale ............................................................................................... 2-5 Figure 2-3 Beam Path Characteristics ................................................................................ 2-6

Figure 2-4 Signal Noise......................................................................................................... 2-7

Figure 2-5 Terrain Masking ................................................................................................ 2-8 Figure 2-6 Radar Jamming .................................................................................................. 2-8

Figure 2-7 Airborne Surface Search Radar System Modes of Operation....................... 2-9

Figure 3-1 ATC Display ....................................................................................................... 3-3

Figure 4-1 Electromagnetic Spectrum ................................................................................ 4-1 Figure 4-2 Electronic Warfare Overview ........................................................................... 4-2

Figure 5-1 Electro-Optical System ...................................................................................... 5-1 Figure 5-2 Infrared System .................................................................................................. 5-2

Figure 5-3 Bands of Interest ................................................................................................ 5-3 Figure 5-4 Field of View ....................................................................................................... 5-3

Figure 5-5 Hand Controller and Turret ............................................................................. 5-4 Figure 5-6 Electro-Optical System Components ............................................................... 5-5

Figure 5-7 Infrared System Components ........................................................................... 5-6

Figure 6-1 Group I Example................................................................................................ 6-1 Figure 6-2 Group II Example .............................................................................................. 6-2 Figure 6-3 Group III Example ............................................................................................ 6-2

Figure 6-4 ISAR Interpretation Example in the MCS ...................................................... 6-3 Figure 6-5 Corresponding EO Imagery.............................................................................. 6-3 Figure 6-6 SA-2 GUIDELINE ............................................................................................. 6-4

Figure 6-7 FAN SONG Target Acquisition Radar ............................................................ 6-5 Figure 6-8 SA-3 GOA ........................................................................................................... 6-5

Figure 6-9 LOW BLOW Fire Control Radar .................................................................... 6-6 Figure 6-10 SA-5 GAMMON................................................................................................. 6-6 Figure 6-11 SQUARE PAIR Fire Control Radar ................................................................ 6-7 Figure 6-12 SA-6 GAINFUL .................................................................................................. 6-7 Figure 6-13 STRAIGHT FLUSH Radar .............................................................................. 6-8

Figure 6-14 SA-8 GECKO with LAND ROLL Radar ........................................................ 6-8 Figure 6-15 SA-10 GRUMBLE ............................................................................................. 6-9 Figure 6-16 FLAP LID Fire Control Radar ......................................................................... 6-9

viii

Figure 6-17 SA-20 GARGOYLE ......................................................................................... 6-10

Figure 6-18 TOMB STONE Fire Control Radar .............................................................. 6-10

Figure 6-19 MANPADS........................................................................................................ 6-11 Figure 6-20 Houdong ............................................................................................................ 6-12 Figure 6-21 Kaman (Mod La Combattante II) .................................................................. 6-13 Figure 6-22 Vosper MK 5 .................................................................................................... 6-13 Figure 6-23 MK III Class Patrol Boat ................................................................................ 6-14

Figure 6-24 Kilo Class Diesel-Electric Submarine ............................................................ 6-14 Figure 6-25 Huangfen Guided Missile Patrol Craft .......................................................... 5-15 Figure 6-26 Sariwon Class Patrol Boat............................................................................... 6-16 Figure 6-27 Komar Missile Boat ......................................................................................... 6-16 Figure 6-28 Najin Class Frigate .......................................................................................... 6-17

Figure 6-29 Shantou Class Patrol Boat............................................................................... 6-18

Figure 6-30 Chaho Class Patrol Boat ................................................................................. 6-18 Figure 6-31 Romeo Class SS ................................................................................................ 6-19

Figure 6-32 Sang O Submarine ........................................................................................... 6-19

Figure 7-1 Tactical Data Link Picture ................................................................................ 7-2 Figure 7-2 Multi-TDL Network Integration ...................................................................... 7-2

Figure 7-3 Data Links........................................................................................................... 7-3 Figure 7-4 Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Frequency Band ................ 7-4

Figure 7-5 Data Link Symbology ........................................................................................ 7-7

Figure 8-1 Standard Check-in Brief ................................................................................... 8-3

Figure 8-2 Surface Contact Report ..................................................................................... 8-4 Figure 8-3 Maritime Air Control (MAC) Baseline Comm Format ................................. 8-4

Figure 8-4 Checkout Briefing (In-Flight Report) .............................................................. 8-5 Figure 8-5 ACU Turnover Format...................................................................................... 8-6

Figure 9-1 Air Control NPG Uplink and Backlink ........................................................... 9-2

Figure 9-2 Multiple Nets ...................................................................................................... 9-6 Figure 9-3 Stacked Net ......................................................................................................... 9-7 Figure 9-4 OPTASK LINK Example 1 ............................................................................. 9-11

Figure 9-5 OPTASK LINK Example 2 ............................................................................. 9-12

FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE 1-1

CHAPTER ONE

FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE

100. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an overview of the basic USN fleet organizational and command structure,

which includes the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC), warfare commanders, functional group

commanders, and coordinators.

101. COMPOSITE WARFARE DOCTRINE

The post-Cold War geopolitical world has become increasingly complex and has seen a rapid

growth in the potential air, surface, and subsurface threats facing our naval forces. This

increased threat resulted, in part, from the numerous advanced weapon systems, sensors, and

delivery platforms now available on the open market.

Some of the countries supplying these advanced systems include North Korea, People’s Republic

of China, and the former Soviet Union. With more and more third world countries in possession

of these improved weapon systems, the reaction time available for friendly forces operating in

sensitive areas (e.g., Persian Gulf) decreases. The post-Cold War requires a realignment of

surveillance and reaction responsibilities with a much greater emphasis on decentralized

authority. The Composite Warfare Doctrine (Figure 1-1) provides a more effective means for

using the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) resources for tactical sea control.

Figure 1-1 Composite Warfare Doctrine Diagram

This section summarizes the key roles and terms associated with the Composite Warfare

Doctrine, including OTC responsibilities, composite warfare structure, and Composite Warfare

Commander (CWC) responsibilities.

CHAPTER ONE INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK

1-2 FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE

Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) Duties

The OTC is the senior officer with command authority over all forces within a maritime

Operational Area (OA). The OTC is the theater commander and is normally the numbered fleet

commander (e.g., 7th Fleet, 5th Fleet, etc.). Some of the more pertinent duties the OTC must

perform without delegations are:

1. Designate a force-wide CWC and alternate.

2. Direct and monitor operations.

3. Establish and (with the assistance of appropriate warfare commanders and coordinators)

promulgate policies for the force.

4. Establish C3 guidance; and establish force task organization if not already tasked by higher

authority. Specify chain of command between OTC, CWC, warfare commanders, and

coordinators.

5. Promulgate a force communications plan, including alternate plan; designating circuits and

frequencies and establishing guard requirements and circuit priorities.

Composite Warfare Command Structure and Capabilities

The Composite Warfare Command is a three-tiered structure that consists of warfare

commanders, functional group commanders, and resource coordinators. The OTC and CWC

lead the Composite Warfare Command with the CWC assigned by and directly subordinate to

the OTC. At times, the same commander/individual may share these roles. The CWC is

normally the CSG commander. Both of these commanders can assign specialized warfare

commanders based on mission requirements. In deciding the assignments and location of

warfare commanders and coordinators, the CWC should take into account the tactical situation,

size of force, and the capabilities of the available assets to cope with the expected threat.

The specialized warfare commanders (Figure 1-2) within the Composite Warfare Command are

the Air Missile Defense Commander (AMDC), Information Operations Warfare Commander

(IWC), Antisubmarine Warfare Commander (ASWC), Surface Warfare Commander (SUWC),

Sea Combat Commander (SCC), and Strike Warfare Commander (STWC). The CWC structure

enables offensive and defensive combat operations against air, surface, undersea, electronic, and

land-based threats. With respect to a carrier strike group, the CWC can best control combat

operations from the carrier itself. Methodologically speaking, the CWC doctrine provides a

structure around which tactics can be executed.

INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER ONE


Figure 1-2 Specialized Warfare Commanders

CWC Limitations

The CWC doctrine is designed for macro CSG or task force level operations. Smaller task units

or elements may allow a separate Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) to fulfill all sea control

functions him or herself. Tightly structured rules of engagement (ROE) may require the CWC to

maintain even more direct control of assets. Within the CWC doctrine, the multiple tasking of

CSG platforms without clear definition of priorities exists. The CWC and warfare commanders

must understand their responsibilities and how they may change in different tactical situations.

Composite Warfare Commander Responsibilities

The CWC is the officer to whom the OTC has assigned all of his/her authority and assigned

functions for the overall direction and control of the force. The OTC retains the power to negate

any particular action taken by the CWC.

CWCs have the following responsibilities:

1. Control the specialized commanders by providing guidelines for operational conduct.

2. Must remain cognizant of the tactical picture in all warfare areas and must be able to

correlate information from external sources that develop locally.

3. Role of the central command authority to designate plan execution to subordinate warfare

commanders for various missions.



102. WARFARE COMMANDERS

This section introduces the responsibilities and functions of the warfare commanders that consist

of the AMDC, IWC, ASWC, SUWC, SCC, and STWC.

Air Missile Defense Commander (AMDC) Responsibilities and Functions

The Cruiser CO is normally designated AMDC. The AMDC is responsible for the measures

taken to defend a maritime force against attack by airborne weapons. The AMDCs duties

include defense against air and ballistic missile threats unless a separate command has been

designated. The AMDC reports to the CWC and collects, evaluates, and disseminates

surveillance information.

The AMDC carries out the following functions:

1. Recommends air defense warning conditions and weapons control status to the CWC

2. Recommends the air Surveillance Area (SA) to the CWC

3. Develops and implements the air surveillance and defense plan

4. Designates link management units

5. Issues criteria for weapons release and expenditure (using a matrix if applicable)

6. Coordinates and controls air surveillance

Information Operations Warfare Commander (IWC) Responsibilities and Functions

The IWC is responsible for shaping and assessing the information environment, achieving and

maintaining information superiority, developing and executing information plans, and supporting

other warfare commanders. The IWC is located onboard the carrier and is normally the senior

O-6 Intel Officer on the CSG staff.

Antisubmarine Warfare Commander (ASWC) Responsibilities and Functions

The ASWC is responsible for denying the enemy the effective use of submarines. The ASWC

collects, evaluates, and disseminates antisubmarine surveillance information to the CWC. The

ASWC is normally the Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) commander.

Surface Warfare Commander (SUWC) Responsibilities and Functions

The SUWC is responsible for surface surveillance coordination and war-at-sea operations. The

SUWC’s responsibilities encompass operations conducted to destroy or neutralize enemy naval

surface forces and merchant vessels. The SUWC can best perform his/her duties from on board

the carrier due to superior command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)



and the proximity to surface surveillance coordination (SSC) and war-at-sea (WAS) tactical air

assets. For this reason, the SUWC is normally the CO of the CVN. The SUWC establishes

aircraft alert requirements, and the OTC retains alert launch authorization unless specifically

assigned.

Sea Combat Commander (SSC) Responsibilities and Functions

The responsibilities of the ASWC and the SUWC are combined into the sea combat commander

(SCC) role whenever the level of activity and the complexity of the various mission areas are

deemed manageable. The SCC establishes sea combat guidance and controls assigned assets to

implement the sea combat plan. The tactical DESRON commander normally assumes the role as

SCC.

Strike Warfare Commander (STWC) Responsibilities and Functions

The STWC’s responsibilities are to conduct operations to destroy or neutralize enemy targets

ashore. These actions include attacks against strategic, operational, or tactical targets from

which the enemy is capable of conducting air, surface, or subsurface support operations. The

overall mission of the STWC is typically offensive. The STWC is located on the carrier and is

normally the carrier air wing commander (CAG).

103. FUNCTIONAL GROUP COMMANDERS

Warfare commanders may designate temporary or permanent functional groups or components

to conduct a specific activity that supports the overall mission. The establishing authority

determines the command authority of the functional group commanders.

Functional groups are subordinate to the CWC and are usually established to perform duties that

are more limited in scope and duration than those performed by warfare commanders. Their

duties generally span assets normally assigned to one or more warfare commanders. See

Figure 1-3 for the specific functional group commanders.



Figure 1-3 Functional Group Commanders

104. COORDINATORS

Coordinators are asset and resource managers who carry out policies of the CWC and respond to

specific tasking of either warfare or functional group commanders. Coordinators are highlighted

in Figure 1-4.

Figure 1-4 Coordinators



Air Resource Element Coordinator (AREC): The AREC (call sign “AR”) is a warfare

coordinator who allocates and apportions sea-based, fixed-wing, air assets and CVN-based

helicopters for Original...0...10 Jan 18 guidance, requests from warfare and functional group

commanders, aircraft and CVN helicopter availability, accessibility, maintenance readiness,

configuration, and weapons load out. The goal of AREC allocation is effective aircraft and CVN

helicopter utilization.

Helicopter Element Coordinator (HEC): promulgates air and air plans for non-logistical

helicopters to support CSG operations.

Submarine Operations Coordinating Authority (SOCA): acts as principle advisor to the SCC for

submarine matters when an SSN is assigned in direct support of the CSG.

Force Over-the-horizon Track Coordinator (FOTC): manages and collates all source (organic

and non-organic) contact information and designates contacts of critical concern to the CSG.

105. CWC CONCEPT’S PLACE WITHIN THE UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE

The National Security Act of 1947 and Title 10 of the United States Code provide the basis for

the establishment of combatant commands. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) established the

missions and responsibilities for commanders of combatant commands and establishes their

general geographic areas of responsibility (AOR’s) and functions.

The commander of a combatant command that includes a geographic AOR is a “geographic

combatant commander.” The commander of a combatant command with trans-regional

responsibilities is a “functional combatant commander.”

Figure 1-5 UCP Operational and Administrative Chains of Command



As of 2013, the UCP contains six geographical and four functional combatant commands:

1. Geographical combatant commands (Figure 1-6):

a. US Central Command

b. US European Command

c. US Northern Command

d. US Pacific Command

e. US Southern Command

f. US African Command

2. Functional combatant commands:

a. US Joint Forces Command

b. US Special Operations Command

c. US Strategic Command

d. US Transportation Command

Within any geographical combatant command, the Naval Component Commander is subordinate

to the combatant commander and may designate a CWC.



Figure 1-6 US Geographic Combatant Commands



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER TWO

AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEM THEORY 2-1

CHAPTER TWO

AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEM THEORY

200. INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews information previously covered in the basic radar theory lesson and

expands upon airborne radar specifics to include environmental effects on airborne radar, radar

horizons, airborne radar limitations, terrain masking, and airborne radar system modes of

operation. Airborne radar systems have a myriad of uses available to the tactical Naval Flight

Officer (NFO). Some of the more commonly used applications include detecting and tracking

enemy ships, aircraft, and missiles; providing guidance for missiles; navigation assistance

through adverse weather; engaging airborne targets beyond visual range; providing aim-point

information for gunnery systems; and safety of air travel.

201. RADAR THEORY

The acronym radar stands for radio detection and ranging. The purpose of airborne radar is to

detect contacts of interest and determine their location and movement. Depending on how it is

used, a radar system can be classified in one or more of the following categories:

Early Warning Radar

Early Warning Radar is used to detect enemy targets at long range, providing the greatest

possible advanced warning to aid the tactical decision maker. Consequently, this system has a

wider beam width, operates at lower frequencies, and requires large power outputs. Since the

main purpose of this system is early detection, positions reported are slightly less accurate than

systems designed for air search and fire control.

Surface Search Radar

Surface Search Radar is used to scan the Earth’s surface for ships and/or ground targets, operates

at higher frequencies than Early Warning Radar systems, and provides information that is more

accurate. Precise navigation is possible by using Surface Search Radar if suitable reflective

materials (e.g., channel buoys with radar reflective materials) placed in optimal positions.

Air Search Radar

Air Search Radar is used to locate the position of aircraft and can determine bearing, range, and

elevation. This type of radar is used to direct fighter aircraft on an intercept course with enemy

aircraft or to detect low-flying aircraft intruding on airspace (e.g., drug runners in Florida). This

system, which operates at much higher frequencies with a much narrower beam width, has a

shorter range than Early Warning Radar and Surface Search Radar and offers extremely accurate

information about target location. Air Search Radar is sometimes referred to as “3-D radar” due

to its three-dimensional capability.

CHAPTER TWO INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK

2-2 AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEM THEORY

Airborne Search Radar

Airborne Search Radar systems are installed in numerous types of aircraft and, therefore, must

conform to stringent size and weight restrictions. These limitations result in limited range

capabilities while retaining a high degree of accuracy. Airborne Search Radar systems provide

the capability for air-to-air (A/A) search, Surface Search (SS), ground mapping, terrain

avoidance, and radar navigation functions.

Fire Control Radar

Fire Control Radar systems are primarily used to control the guidance of weapons. They must be

capable of a high degree of target resolution, such as distinguishing two or more targets from one

another at close proximity. These radar systems typically operate at frequencies higher than that

of Search Radar systems because of the necessary precision guidance. Pulse Width (PW) is the

primary factor in determining range resolution (RR).

Radar Terminology

Discussions about Radar concepts and operations have common terms that are useful to

understand. The next figure provides definitions of some common Radar terms.

Radar Term Definition

Paint An unmodified (raw) radar return displayed on a scope

Contact A video display of returned radar energy for which the onboard

processor has determined, with a high degree of certainty, to be a

return from an actual entity, such as a ship or aircraft.

Clutter/noise Unwanted echoes displayed on the scope because of ground return,

clouds, chaff, and rain (The latter three do not affect radars with low

bandwidth and high power; however, the ground return will be quite

heavy).

Beam Radar energy focused by an antenna transmitted out into the

atmosphere.

Sidelobe Radar energy not part of the main beam.

Azimuth The angular distance from a reference point (usually the aircraft center

line) in degrees.

Signal-to-Noise

(S/N) ratio

A numeric measurement of contact return compared to clutter return

(The higher the S/N ratio, the easier it is to see the contact in clutter

and to track the contact.)

Boresight The direction of maximum gain of a radar antenna.

Figure 2-1 Common Radar Terminology



Radar Fundamentals

Radar energy, like all electromagnetic (EM) energy (to include visible light), travels at the speed

of light, (typically in straight-line paths). With few exceptions, it is reflected by physical objects.

Radar equipment can readily determine the position of objects in space by transmitting EM

energy along a known azimuth and “listening” for its return. If it “hears an echo,” the processor

knows there is something there. By determining the direction of the antenna and time it took for

the signal to “bounce back” and return, a distance, (or range) can be assessed. The accuracy can

depend on how wide the beam is, similar to car lights, flood lights, or pencil beams. Each of

these beams exhibit different properties depending on mission/function. Understanding the

properties of radar requires knowledge of the terms frequency and wavelength, discussed in

detail below.

The term wavelength refers to the spatial period of the wave; the distance the wave covers prior

to repeating. It is determined by measuring the physical distance between consecutive

corresponding points such as crests, troughs, or zero crossings.

The term cycle refers to a single change from up to down to up measured with respect to time.

One cycle (specified event) that is measured one second in time, is equal to one hertz.

As discussed earlier, frequency refers to the periodic oscillations of a radar signal over time or

the number of cycles per unit time. The concept of frequency can be applied to EM waves,

sound waves, or even waves on the beach. A radar’s frequency is determined by counting the

number of cycles that occur over a one second time interval. One cycle per second is known as

one Hertz.

Since EM energy all travels at the same constant speed (the speed of light), frequency, and

wavelength are inversely proportional. As wavelength increases, frequency decreases and vice

versa.

Multiple factors can affect overall radar performance. One important factor is the pulse

characteristics of width and length. Pulse width (PW) is the amount of time the radar takes to

transmit its pulse. Different PWs are used to achieve different radar parameters, including Rmin

and RR. Pulse Length (PL) refers to the physical distance of the transmitted pulse.

Other important radar theory fundamentals include display characteristics, target return potential,

radar return strength, Radar Cross Section (RCS), and topographical features.

A radar display does not show an obvious image of the ground. Instead, it produces various

intensities of radar paint based on the amount of reflected Radio Frequency (RF) energy. Areas

with a high degree of RF energy will display bright, while non-RF areas will appear dark. The

brightness on the display is directly proportional to the amount of reflected RF energy.

The target return potential refers to the ability of an object to reflect RF energy, thereby

producing an echo on the radar display. This potential is dependent on the following

uncontrollable factors: the object’s size, shape, composition, and environment. When taken



together with aspect angle, these factors comprise the target’s RCS. RCS is an expression of the

extent to which a target reflects a radar pulse. The larger the RCS, the more readily a radar can

detect a target.

The radar return strength refers to the controllable factors affecting the operator’s ability to

determine targets on the radar scope, such as transmitter power, slant range, run-in heading,

antenna tilt angle, receiver gain, and video gain.

The topographical features found on a Tactical Pilotage Chart (TPC), Operational Navigation

Chart (ONC), and Joint Navigation Charts (JNC) provide the information necessary for radar

navigation; however, the aircrew’s ability to predict object presentation potential on a radar

scope is vital to navigation success. The following features shall be considered:

Terrain

Flat terrain is displayed as a light dusting of snow on the scope. This dusting is caused by the

small reflections from the soil, rocks, and trees. Uneven terrain produces “shadow areas.” A

shadow area is caused by an object masking out a radar transmission. Objects in the shadow are

not displayed on the radar scope.

Areas where water meets land cause a brightened echo on the display that represents the

shoreline. This phenomenon is known as “far-shore brightening.”

Weather

A heavy thunderstorm can affect a radar picture. Sometimes precipitation is too light to return

an echo. Other times, it is dense enough to prevent the radar transmission from travelling

through it.

Should a return appear on the scope caused by weather and it has a shadow behind it, then it

means there is too much water in the cloud to fly through it.

Causeways

Causeways are constructed of dirt or rock fill and normally present land-water contrast.

Causeways have many of the same return characteristics as shorelines. They may serve as

excellent radar reference points particularly in coastal cities.

Ice and Snow

There are considerable global areas that are covered by ice and snow during the winter months.

If a land area is covered by snow, the radar beam reflects from the snow rather than the land

beneath it. Very smooth ice or snow does not show on the radar. In most cases, if rivers, lakes,

and harbors are frozen over or snow-covered, they are not visible as water features during the

winter months.



Sand and Desert

Large sand areas with surface ripples that are wind-blown tend to reflect radar energy similar to

ground return. A seasonal lake in desert terrain may appear as a no-show lake or ground return if

it has dried up. Large expanses of very flat beds, like the Bonneville Salt Flats in Utah, scatter

radar energy the same way as water and may not appear even though there is no water present.

202. ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS

This section describes how radar is affected by the environment and sea states. A radar system

sometimes experiences interference from echoes due to backscatter/ clutter from receiver noise,

atmospheric noise, other radar systems, or jammers. Backscatter/clutter may also come from the

ground, sea state, rain, chaff, birds, or ground traffic. The Moving Target Indicator (MTI) and

Pulse Doppler (PD) processing use Doppler to reject clutter and enhance detection of moving

targets. Smaller targets require more clutter suppression. MTI separates moving targets from

clutter and uses short waveforms. PD processing separates targets into different velocity regimes

in addition to canceling clutter. It provides accurate estimates of target velocity and uses long

waveforms.

Sea state is the general condition of the free surface on a large body of water, with respect to

wind, waves, and swell, at a certain location and time. As sea state increases, clutter to the radar

environment also increases. Sea states are described in levels, classified by wave heights in the

operating area, using a graduated scale from 0-9 called the Douglas scale. This scale was used in

the development of the radar sweep width tables. Douglas sea states over 3 are not used because

not enough detailed information has been collected under those conditions, and most radar

systems show excessive sea return (clutter) above a sea state of 3.

Figure 2-2 Douglas Sea Scale



203. RADAR HORIZONS

This section covers the radar horizons equation. It is crucial to know sight limitations of ground

radars and how to factor the radar horizon into the mission planning and execution of an airborne

radar system. The radar horizon equation is as follows:

Distance (in NM) = 1.237 √ height (in feet AGL)

The rule of thumb to remember when using this equation is; at the 15,000 ft. baseline, the radar

horizon is approximately 150 NM, for every 1000 ft., add or subtract 5 NM.

204. LIMITATIONS AND MASKING

This section covers the limitations of radar and how terrain masking affects radar. The beam

path and range of a radar system are sometimes limited. A radar beam follows a linear path in

vacuum, but follows a somewhat curved path in the atmosphere because of the variation of the

refractive index of air. Even when the beam is transmitted parallel to the ground, it rises above

the ground as the Earth’s curvature sinks below the horizon. The signal is attenuated by the

medium it crosses, and the beam disperses. Figure 2-3 defines the characteristics of different

types of beam paths.

Figure 2-3 Beam Path Characteristics



Signal noise is an internal source of random variations in a signal generated by all electronic

components. Figure 2-4 illustrates the differences in signals with and without noise.

Figure 2-4 Signal Noise

Radar systems must overcome interference (unwanted signals) in order to focus only on the

actual targets of interest. Interference may originate from both internal and external sources.

Interference may include clutter, terrain masking, and jamming.

Clutter refers to RF echoes returned from unwanted contacts to the radar operators. Such

contacts include both natural and man-made objects. Intentional radar countermeasures, such as

chaff, can also cause RF clutter.

Terrain masking is a tactic that takes advantage of the inability of radar to detect contacts of

interest in certain areas due to an obstruction, such as a mountain blocking the radar energy

(Figure 2-5). Tactical aircraft may use terrain masking to their advantage by flying low in hilly

or mountainous terrain to avoid detection by ground-based radars. Airborne radar operators may

be able to minimize terrain masking in an area of interest by altering position or altitude

(if practical).



Figure 2-5 Terrain Masking

Radar jamming refers to RF signals originating from sources outside the radar system that are

transmitting in the radar system’s frequency, thereby masking targets of interest. The figure

below demonstrates the effects of jamming on radar.

Figure 2-6 Radar Jamming



205. MODES OF OPERATION

This section covers the modes of operation of an airborne radar system. The Airborne SS Radar

system is designed to provide surface search and detection of ships and periscopes. It provides

imaging capability with Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar

(ISAR). The Airborne SS Radar System also aids in navigation and weather avoidance.

The modes of operation associated with this system are applicable to the Maritime Patrol and

Reconnaissance (MPR) aircraft. Some of the Airborne Air Search Radar modes include fire

control and the Airborne Moving Target Indicator (AMTI).

The next figure defines the modes of operation of an Airborne SS Radar system.

Mode Function

Periscope Moderately low altitude (3000 ft. or below) periscope search and

detection

Navigate Weather avoidance and coastline mapping

Search

Long-range SS with sea-clutter suppression and target brightness

enhancement

Image

Inverse

Synthetic

Aperture

RADAR

(ISAR)

Image ISAR relies on the motion of the target ship to generate a two-

dimensional image. Processing short aperture times, ISAR generates

continuous images that correspond in real time to target motion. Image

mode generates images of selected targets to help identify the target ship

class without flying over the ship.

Synthetic

Aperture

RADAR

(SAR)

SAR relies on the motion of the aircraft to generate a two-dimensional

image. Processing short aperture times, SAR generates continuous

images. SAR mode generates images of selected ground targets to help

identify the target without flying over the target.

Figure 2-7 Airborne Surface Search Radar System Modes of Operation




INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER THREE

IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE (IFF) SYSTEM THEORY 3-1

CHAPTER THREE

IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE (IFF) SYSTEM THEORY

300. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides information on the capabilities, characteristics, and limitations of the IFF

system. Additionally, this chapter discusses IFF modes and their specific uses.

301. IFF OVERVIEW

IFF is defined as a tool within the broader military action of Combat Identification that is used to

attain an accurate characterization of detected objects in the operational environment to support

an engagement decision. It is an identification and authentication system designed for command

and control. IFF is used in conjunction with radar systems. When activated, an identification

pulse is transmitted to help identify a target. This is known as an interrogation. If the target is

equipped with a transponder, a reply is generated that is sent back to the originating system. IFF

has both military and civilian uses. IFF helps systems to identify aircraft, vehicles, or ships as

friendly or neutral and determines their bearing, range, and altitude from the interrogator.

302. IFF CAPABILITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS

IFF uses interrogators and transponders. A command and control facility’s interrogator sends

interrogation pulses at 1030 Megahertz (MHz) in order to help identify targets. If the target is

equipped with a transponder, a reply pulse is generated at 1090 MHz and sent back to the

originating system.

IFF is used by the military to help identify friendly and commercial air traffic, help contribute to

the tactical decision-making process, and reduce fratricide. IFF is used by civilian aviation for

discrete aircraft identification, separation, flight following, positive control, and identification of

aircraft in distress.

IFF Modes

Both military and civilian aircraft use IFF, but there are certain modes that are reserved

exclusively for the military.

The following information provides a description of the IFF modes and associated codes:

1. Mode 1 – Two-digit, 5-bit mission code for military use only. The first digit can be 0 to 7.

The second digit can only be a 0, 1, 2, or 3. Mode 1 may be Carrier Air Wing assigned or used

for training purposes. Some examples are: Underway, Air Wings use mode 1 for mission

identification (e.g., Mode 1 of 61 for Mission Tanking) Mode 1 is also used to provide tipper

information to a C2 platform during training events. A Mode 1 of “11” might be used to signify

a live hostile aircraft during an exercise tactical air intercept (TACAIC).

CHAPTER THREE INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK

3-2 IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE (IFF) SYSTEM THEORY

2. Mode 2 – Four-digit octal unit code for military use only. Mode 2 may be Carrier Air

Wing (CVW) assigned. When assigned by the air wing, the first digit is typically the air wing

number followed by aircraft side number. For example, an E-2 Hawkeye, side number 602

attached to CVW 2, would squawk a Mode 2 code of “2602.”

3. Mode 3/A – Four-digit octal identification code for aircraft. Mode 3/A is used by both

military and civilian aircraft and is the normal air traffic control (ATC) transponder code for all

aircraft. Mode 3 may be ATC assigned, or Carrier Air Wing assigned.

NOTE

Modes 1, 2, and 3/A are collectively known as Selective

Identification Feature (SIF). The brevity proword for the SIF

transponder is “PARROT.” The brevity proword directing the use

of one or more modes of the SIF transponder is “SQUAWK.”

4. Mode C – Uses Mode 3/A four-digit octal code providing the aircraft’s pressure altitude in

thousands of feet displayed to Air Traffic Control (ATC) in a three-digit format rounded to the

nearest hundred feet. For example, a readout of 21.4 stands for twenty-one thousand four

hundred feet. Similarly, a readout of 02.4 stands for two thousand four hundred. (For military

and civilian use)

5. Mode 4 – Provides an encrypted method of positively authenticating a friendly military

entity (surface, air, or land). This reply is either valid or invalid; no numerical code is returned.

Mode 4 is used only by the military. The brevity proword for Mode 4 is “INDIA.”

6. Mode S (Select) – A civil aviation initiative that overcomes the deficiencies associated

with modes 3/A, and C. This mode provides unique aircraft identification, enhanced Mode C

height resolution, and flight details by transmitting Downlinked Air Parameters (DAPs). Mode S

transponders, which replace Mode 3/A, and Mode C transponders, enable the Traffic Collision

Avoidance System (TCAS) II. In addition, this mode allows for discrete interrogations and

replies to each aircraft, reducing the congestion of transponder replies on the frequency at the

same time as Mode 3/A. Enhanced altitude resolution and flight-path parameters provide for

more precise ATC tracking while also allowing TCAS II systems to compute collision avoidance

solutions. See Figure 3-1.

7. Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) – A surveillance technology (not

dependent on interrogations) that uses a one-way or two-way data link to track aircraft. ADS-B

is a further enhancement to a Mode S transponder or can be used as stand-alone equipment. In

addition to transmitting precise aircraft position and flight-path parameters, aircraft equipped

with an ADS-B receiver and suitable displays can receive traffic, weather, terrain, and other

flight information. The FAA has mandated that all aircraft be equipped with ADS-B in and out

by January 01, 2020.

INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER THREE

IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE (IFF) SYSTEM THEORY 3-3

Figure 3-1 ATC Display

SIF and Mode 4 De-Lousing

Carrier Strike group (CSG) and Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) air control agencies,

“REDCROWN” and “GREENCROWN” will perform SIF and mode 4 checks (Called

“PARROT/INDIA” checks) on aircraft departing from and returning to the carrier/LHD for

de-lousing. A radar contact without these IFF modes could be an adversary-in-trail. They will

also perform these checks on aircraft transiting or operating around the Vital Area (VA) or

Classification, Identification, Engagement Area (CIEA) such as a P-8 supporting the CSG/ESG.

303. IFF LIMITATIONS

IFF requires a cooperative target (i.e., one with the ability to respond to interrogations). IFF can

positively identify and authenticate friendly targets and provide the Mode 3C requirements to

complete a commercial air or civil air profile, but it can’t locate adversaries. If an IFF

interrogation receives no reply or an invalid reply, the object cannot be identified as friendly, nor

can it be positively identified as a foe with 100% certainty. In other words: IFF won’t tell you

who the adversaries are, but it will tell you who they aren’t providing friendlies and

commercial/civilian aircraft all have functioning IFF transponders.

CHAPTER THREE INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK

3-4 IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE (IFF) SYSTEM THEORY


INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER FOUR

ELECTRONIC WARFARE OVERVIEW/ESM SYSTEM THEORY 4-1

CHAPTER FOUR

ELECTRONIC WARFARE OVERVIEW/ESM SYSTEM THEORY

400. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a discussion of the fundamentals of Electronic Warfare (EW), its

associated components, an overview of the terms, characteristics, and limitations associated with

EW, as well as the basic components and operation of an airborne electronic support measures

(ESM) system.

401. ELECTRONIC WARFARE & THE ELECTROMAGNETIC (EM) SPECTRUM

EW is defined in Joint Publication 3-13.1 (Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare) as “military

action involving the use of electromagnetic (EM) energy and directed energy (DE) to control the

EMS or to attack the enemy.” EM energy propagates through space via waves, broadly

categorized, for EW purposes, by frequency or wavelength. The range or spectrum of these

frequencies is theoretically infinite. EW exists in a continuum ranging from radio frequencies at

the low end to x-ray and gamma-ray frequencies at the high end, with particular emphasis on the

RF and infrared (IR) portions of the spectrum. Military forces depend on the EM spectrum for

intelligence, communications and data transmission, navigation, sensing and targeting,

Command and Control (C2), and attack. While EW dramatically enhances combat power in

many ways, improper or careless employment of EW can adversely affect friendly forces. As

civilian, adversary, and friendly technology progresses and proliferates, the EMS is an

increasingly congested and contested environment. Figure 4-1 illustrates the EM spectrum.

Figure 4-1 Electromagnetic Spectrum

CHAPTER FOUR INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK

4-2 ELECTRONIC WARFARE OVERVIEW/ESM SYSTEM THEORY

402. SUBDIVISIONS OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE

EW is comprised of three subsets: Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Protection (EP), and

Electronic Warfare Support (ES).

Figure 4-2 Electronic Warfare Overview

Electronic Attack (EA):

The EA subdivision of EW involves the use of EM energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation

weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing,

or destroying the enemy’s combat capability. EA encompasses both offensive and defensive

activities to include countermeasures. While EA can limit enemy access to information and

degrade the enemy’s decision-making process, it requires coordination to ensure friendly access

to the EM spectrum. For example, jamming during an ES mission can be counterproductive if

not properly deconflicted. Various types of friendly electronic attack can also inadvertently

degrade friendly communications or weapons targeting accuracy. At times, this inadvertent

degradation may be deemed a worthwhile trade-off. Tactics and processes exist for mitigation

and conflict resolution.



Examples of EA:

Some examples of EA include: EM Jamming, EM Deception, directed energy, anti-radiation

weapons, and off-board countermeasures (expendables, e.g., flares and active decoys).

Radar Jamming denies, delays, or degrades the enemy’s ability to track aircraft or weapons via

radar. It can be done using EA-18G aircraft, using the ALQ-218 Tactical Jamming System and

ALQ-99 Tactical Jammer Pods. When an aircraft reaches a certain minimum distance from a

radar, jamming is no longer effective and returns from that aircraft can still be seen on the enemy

operator’s scope. This is called the “burn-through range.” Burn-through range is derived

directly from the radar equation and is the point at which reflected radar energy from the aircraft

is more powerful than jamming.

Communications Jamming denies, delays, or degrades the enemy’s ability to communicate. It is

primarily done by EA-18G or the Air Force’s EC-130 Compass Call aircraft. In the most basic

terms, communications jamming is done by “talking over” someone trying to use that frequency.

Voice or data are not required; it can be accomplished with noise by simply overpowering the

original transmission. Link distance refers to the distance between the original transmitter and

intended receiver and is one of the most important factors in communications jamming

effectiveness. Remember from the radar equation that the distance is squared. So, as the

communicators are closer to the desired recipient, jamming power must be increased

exponentially to have the desired effect. With most EA aircraft operating 3-5 miles above the

earth’s surface, plus any lateral distance from the communicators, it becomes obvious how hard

overcoming the problem can be even if the jammer’s power output is orders of magnitude greater

than the communicators’. This principle is analogous to burn-through range when jamming a

radar signal.

Electronic Protection (EP):

EP involves actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of

friendly or enemy use of the EM spectrum that degrades, neutralizes, or destroys friendly combat

capability. EP should not be confused with defensive EA. EP protects from the undesired

effects of EA (either friendly or adversary), while defensive EA is used to protect against attacks

by denying the enemy the use of the EM spectrum.

Deconfliction and frequency management are essential in mitigating the adverse effects to

friendly forces.

Examples of EP:

Some examples of EP include Spectrum management, EM hardening, and Emissions Control

(EMCON).

EM hardening is action taken to protect personnel, facilities, and/or equipment by filtering,

attenuating, grounding, bonding, and/or shielding against undesirable effects of electromagnetic

energy.



Radar signal processing features such as leading-edge tracking and pulse repetition frequencies

are designed to counter specific EA techniques.

Frequency agile radios and radars can rapidly adjust their operating frequencies to avoid enemy

EA. Frequency agile communications technologies, such as HAVEQUICK, are still susceptible

to enemy intelligence collection but are much more resistant to jamming, either by the enemy, or

inadvertently by friendly forces.

Encryption denies the enemy the ability to collect intelligence on friendly radio transmissions.

The Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) is a time and geographic-oriented list of all

frequencies that must not be jammed by friendly forces without proper coordination, such as

Guard frequencies (121.5 and 243.0 MHz, GPS frequencies L1 and L2, friendly communication

frequencies or nets, and enemy frequencies being exploited for intelligence collection. The

JRFL is subdivided into TABOO, PROTECTED, and GUARDED lists based on the reason for

inclusion and process for coordination.

Wartime reserve modes (WARM) are parametrics, procedures, and processing features held in

reserve for wartime or emergency use only, as their effectiveness relies upon being unknown to

or misunderstood by the enemy. Information on WARM is generally shared by partner nations

for coordination purposes, and to establish circumstances or severity of conflict at which they

would be activated.

Low observable (LO) technology, commonly referred to as “stealth,” refers to the use of

engineering and design features to minimize an aircraft or vessel’s radar, IR, and other

signatures.

EW Support (ES):

ES is the action taken to detect and intercept sources of EM energy for the purposes of threat

recognition. ES provides near-real-time information to supplement other intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) information.

Examples of ES:

Some examples of ES include threat warning, collecting information to support other EW

functions, and direction finding.

ES Purpose:

The purpose of ES is to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of

intentional and unintentional radiated EM energy for purposes of recognizing immediate threats,

targeting, planning, conducting future operations, and performing other tactical actions such as

threat avoidance.



ES is the component of EW that results in information and intelligence reports that help analysts

answer the commander’s intelligence requirements. It provides planners with the necessary

information for future operations. ES actions are not under the direct control of an operational

commander because of decisions involving EW and other tactical employment.

Electronic Support Measures (ESM):

ESM gathers intelligence through passive listening of EM radiations having military interest.

ESM can provide initial detection of foreign systems, a library of technical and operational data

related to foreign systems, and tactical combat information utilizing that library.

ES can be broken down into the following phases: Search, Intercept, Locate, Identify, and

Report.

The search phase involves the use of ES systems to search for signals of interest (SOIs) within

the EM spectrum. A simplified ES system is composed of an antenna, receiver, recorder,

direction finder, and analyzer. In the search phase, the antenna detects and captures the signal

and sends it the receiver. The receiver converts the information into a usable format that can be

measured and recorded. Desirable antenna characteristics are a continuous broad area coverage,

broad EM spectrum coverage, and high sensitivity (gain).

ES receivers require a wide spectrum (bandwidth) surveillance capability to allow searches to be

performed through large frequency ranges. Since the distance from an SOI is often unknown,

receivers need a wide dynamic range allowing them to receive and process both very weak and

very strong signals without changing the signals characteristics.

The receiver must have a narrow bypass to be able to discriminate between the tuned frequency

and other unwanted signals near the SOI frequency.

Following detection and acquisition in the search phase, the signal goes from the receiver to the

recorder and analyzer for the intercept phase. Signals are recorded for future analysis and in the

event that the transmission is ended prior to signal parameter evaluation. The signal is also sent

to an analyzer to assist in SOI identification through the evaluation of parameters such as

modulation, pulse width, and sidebands.

The locate phase uses ES system components to obtain the geographic location (geolocation) of

an SOI. There are various methods for geolocation ranging from simple direction finding and

triangulation using steerable antennas to the more complex frequency difference of arrival

(FDOA) and time difference of arrival (TDOA). Whatever the method, geolocation of an SOI,

when used with other tools, assists in the identification of the SOI.

Once the raw data is collected in the search, intercept, and locate phases, a quick analysis is

performed to identify the intelligence information. A preliminary analysis is conducted and the

location of the SOI within a certain probability is calculated. The operator must then use

external tools and knowledge to properly identify the SOI. Orders of battle, intelligence reports



and briefings, and the common operational picture (COP) are used to identify the SOI and help

satisfy the commander’s intelligence requirements.

After the analysis to identify the SOI is complete, the information is relayed in the form of a

report (voice or data). The information collected, in this case, the identification and location of

an SOI helps build the commander’s overall operational picture or situational awareness.

Therefore, the information collected needs to be disseminated as quickly as possible.

Dissemination can take place via multiple paths (voice over secure circuits or data link) and

sometimes using both simultaneously. This preliminary reporting is almost always followed by a

detailed message traffic post-mission report.

The phases within ES are not a linear process. The system or operator is continuously searching

for signals and working with multiple SOIs simultaneously. ES can be viewed as a continuous

process. As intelligence requirements are met, new ones are created to maintain situational

awareness and assist in operational planning.

403. ESM COMPONENTS

There are two basic types of ESM: Communication Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic

Intelligence (ELINT). COMINT is the interception of communications whether it be via voice

or data link. ELINT is the interception and analysis of radar emissions from surveillance, fire

control, and missile guidance systems. It is often allied to an ESM system.

Capabilities of each system may vary, but a typical ESM system consists of the following basic

components: antennas, receiver, processor, and a display.

Antennas are strategically located around the aircraft to aid in signal reception. The receiver

takes signals from the antenna and forwards them to the processor. The processor compares

received signals to libraries and matches parametric data to loaded emitters. This allows easy

identification of signals for the operator. The signal flow is antenna to receiver to processor to

display.

The display displays processed information to the operator for action. Displays can vary from

raw data to highly automated systems.

Direction of arrival (DOA):

The antennas around the aircraft are extremely sensitive and are often placed at the “four

corners” of the aircraft, being the nose, tail, and wingtips. The signals amplitude received by

each antenna allows the system to calculate its bearing relative to the aircraft. As the signal

continues through the processor and onto the display, this information is presented to assist the

operator in localization and location of the signal.

The more times a signal is received and processed, the more “lines of bearing” or “DOA cuts”

can be generated to create an AOP and accurately locate the emitter.



404. ESM LIBRARIES, PARAMETRICS, AND AMBIGUITIES

ESM Libraries:

Receivers and processors do not have the memory capacity to store parametric data on every

single emitter worldwide. Instead, libraries that are focused on emitters in that operating area are

built and loaded for each mission.

A library contains the information on many emitters and allows the processor to compare

received signals to the parametric data stored in the library. If the received signal information

matches an emitter in the library, it is displayed as the library emitter, rather than as an unknown

signal.

Libraries are subject to concept of “garbage in = garbage out” when being built and care must be

taken to include all possible emitters without exceeding the memory capacity of the processor.

In some cases, libraries are built for the operator by an intelligence specialist or outside agencies.

In other cases, aircrews must build their own libraries. To help limit the size of a library,

determine which emitters can be excluded and which should be included. Some discriminating

factors include area of operation, land vs air vs maritime emitters, and mission objectives.

Care must be taken not to exclude friendly emitters simply because they are not threats.

Including them in the library as appropriate will help the processor identify the emitter and avoid

confusion. The general recommendation is to include friendly emitters as appropriate to aid in

identification.

Parametrics:

Signal parametric data includes, but is not limited to, RF, Pulse Repetition Frequency (PRF)/

Pulse Repetition Interval (PRI), PW, Sweep Rate (SR), and Sweep Type (ST).

RF: The frequency on which the radar transmits its carrier wave, measured in MHz or Gigahertz

(GHz).

PRF: The number of pulses of a repeating signal in a specific time unit normally measured in

pulses per second (PPS) or Hz.

PRI: The inverse of PRF; it is the elapsed time from the beginning of one pulse to the beginning

of the next pulse.

PW: The amount of time the radar takes to transmit one pulse.

SR: The amount of time, in seconds, it takes the radar to make one full sweep of its sector.



ST: The type of sweep the radar uses to scan its sector. Various types of radars and even radars

of the same type may use differing scans. Some of the more common STs are:

1. Alpha: A full 360-degree horizontal sweep, clockwise or counterclockwise.

2. Bravo: A partial, less than 360-degree horizontal sweep that switches between clockwise

and counterclockwise to scan a small sector.

3. Charlie: Similar to a B scan but vertical to aid in height finding.

4. Raster: Often used in air-to-air radar systems, the antenna remains stationary but uses

bursts to scan in a side-to-side pattern while moving up and down.

Ambiguities:

Ambiguities exist when parametrics overlap between two or more emitters. If two radars both

use the same or similar RF ranges, other means must be used to identify the emitter. This can be

any one or more of the other parametrics previously discussed.

Sometimes, multiple parametrics overlap to extent that the processor cannot fully discriminate

between two or more emitters. In this case, the operator must make the final decision to identify

the emitter. When this happens, the NFO/Mission Commander is earning his or her wings by

being a tactical decision-maker.

INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER FIVE

ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRARED SYSTEM THEORY 5-1

CHAPTER FIVE

ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRARED SYSTEM THEORY

500. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will discuss Electro-Optical (EO) and IR system theory and components, as well as

the characteristics and limitations of the EO/IR sensor.

501. ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRARED SYSTEM THEORY

Within EO/IR theory, a target exists in the environment along with background clutter. The EM

radiation from the target and the clutter passes through the atmosphere, where it suffer losses due

to water vapor and carbon dioxide molecules in its transmission path.

Electro-Optical and Infrared Systems

The EO System is comprised of a set of optics at the front end of the system. It collects the

radiation and focuses it on the detector. The detector produces an electrical signal based on the

amount of radiation received from the target and the environment. This signal is processed and

displayed to the operator. A diagram of an EO System is displayed in the next figure.

Figure 5-1 Electro-Optical System

CHAPTER FIVE INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK

5-2 ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRARED SYSTEM THEORY

The IR System uses either a photon or thermal type of transducer to detect and convert IR energy

into a measurable parameter. The IR System is similar to an EO System with one exception;

each IR System requires a cooler. IR Systems are cryogenically cooled to reduce the detector

noise temperature thus increasing the detection capability of the sensor. Every time the IR

sensor is turned on, it must go through a cool-down cycle. A diagram of an IR System is

displayed in the next figure.

Figure 5-2 Infrared System

For thermal radiation, the IR sensor collects radiation from the portion of the EM spectrum near

the red region of visible light, hence the name infrared. EO sensors collect radiation from the

visible portion of the EM spectrum.

EO and IR Systems convert photons into electrons, regardless of their wavelength. The EO and

IR Systems focus on the visible and IR spectrums. EO and IR sensors are passive systems.

The IR region of energy contains near-wave, mid-wave, and long-wave regions. These regions

are of primary interest to users. Typical aircraft IR cameras operate in the mid-wave band.

Typical aircraft EO cameras operate in the visible and near-wave bands. The bands of interest

are shown in the figure that follows.



Figure 5-3 Bands of Interest

Field of View

Focal lengths are used to determine Field of View (FOV). Focal lengths are measured in

millimeters (mm), and typically several focal lengths are available to the camera operator

(e.g., 40 mm, 200 mm, 1000 mm, or 3000 mm). FOV is demonstrated in the next figure.

Figure 5-4 Field of View

The optics are the lumped sum of all optics. The F factors on the figure represent the effective

focal lengths of the complete system. For a given detector size, a shorter effective focal length

results in an increased FOV and lower system magnification. Conversely, a longer effective

focal length results in a decreased or smaller FOV and higher system magnification. In addition

to focal lengths designed to enhance target imagery, optical filters are used to reduce certain

environmental disturbances. EO and IR cameras typically have normal condition, haze

penetration, and polarizer optical filters.



Airborne Electro-Optical and Infrared Camera System

EO and IR cameras are employed to search, detect, identify, and obtain intelligence. The IR

camera, with its shorter effective focal length, is used in the initial search for a target whereas the

EO camera, with its longer effective focal length, is used to obtain the details once the target is

located. The cameras are turrets with 360° azimuth and tracking capabilities. In addition to

imagery, EO and IR cameras provide latitude and longitude positional information for the

associated surface target. EO and IR cameras are controlled by an operator utilizing a video

display with a hand controller and a control panel (Figure 5-5).

Figure 5-5 Hand Controller and Turret



502. ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRARED COMPONENTS

Electro-Optical System Components and Functions

An EO System uses the basic components of targets, lenses, detectors, electronics processors,

controllers, and video displays. These components are displayed in the figure that follows.

Figure 5-6 Electro-Optical System Components

The primary functions of an EO System are to collect, filter, redirect, concentrate, and focus EM

energy. The lens collects, filters, and focuses EM energy onto the detector. The detector is a

transducer that converts EM energy into a measurable parameter. These parameters are

electronically processed and sent to a video display.

Atmospheric influences may affect EO signals in several ways, depending on the particular

wavelength. The influencing atmospheric factors are absorption, radiation, scattering, and

turbulence.



Infrared System Components and Functions

An IR System uses the basic components of targets, lenses, detectors, coolers, electronics

processors, controllers, and video displays. These components are displayed in the figure that

follows.

Figure 5-7 Infrared System Components

The IR System scans a portion of the terrain along the aircraft’s flight path and displays a

televised image of the IR patterns of the terrain. The primary function is to give the operator an

improved capability to detect, identify, and classify targets.

Weather conditions can limit effectiveness of the IR System. Cloud layers can obscure a clear

IR picture. Losses at lower altitudes are more significant than losses at higher altitudes.

Variations in image contrast resulting from daytime heating and nighttime cooling can also alter

effectiveness. Twice during each 24-hr. period, the temperature conditions are such that a loss of

contrast occurs between two adjacent objects on IR imagery. This phenomenon is termed

“thermal crossover.” A polarity switch inverts the IR image presentation from white hot (black

cold) to black hot (white cold).

ISAR CLASSIFICATION AND SURFACE THREAT RECCE 6-1

CHAPTER SIX

ISAR CLASSIFICATION AND SURFACE THREAT RECCE

600. INTRODUCTION

This chapter covers how to discern among gross naval vessel classes and appearance groups as

well as how to interpret ISAR imagery in the Multi-Crew Simulator (MCS). Additionally,

various threats to United States naval platforms to include surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and

surface threats found in the CENTCOM and PACOM AORs (Areas of Responsibility) will be

discussed in this chapter.

601. CLASSIFYING SURFACE CONTACTS WITH ISAR IN THE MCS

Today’s weapon system operators are trained to use specific methodologies to classify ships

using imaging sensors, such as ISAR. The classification process requires highly trained

operators and is platform exposure time intensive.

A two-step approach is taken for target classification. During step one, incoming imagery is

enhanced and "focused" to provide an integrated, multi-frame summed target image, where key

features are extracted from the sensor video imagery. Target features are then compared to

feature sets of known ship types to derive a classification.

Ships are normally classified in a hierarchical fashion using the following levels:

Perceptual/Gross, Naval Fine, and Type/Class/Unit level.

During MCS simulator events, ISAR imagery will be used by the operator to determine the

Gross Naval Class of a surface contact to a confidence level of POSS. Examples of Gross

Classes are: Combatant, Minor Combatant, Submarine, Merchant, and Small Craft. Merchant

vessels are further classified into Appearance groups which are determined by the size, shape,

and location of the superstructure.

Appearance Groups

A Group I Merchant Vessel (Figure 6-1) has a superstructure greater than one-third the total

length of the ship. Passenger Ships generally belong in this appearance group.

Figure 6-1 Group I Example

CHAPTER SIX INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK

6-2 ISAR CLASSIFICATION AND SURFACE THREAT RECCE

A Group II Merchant Vessel (Figure 6-2) has a composite superstructure less than one-third of

the total ship length that is located amidships. These ships generally have a small block-like

superstructure with deck spaces devoted to cargo-handling equipment and hatches.

Figure 6-2 Group II Example

A Group III Merchant Vessel (Figure 6-3) has a stack aft. Stack aft means that the ships have

funnels located in the aft third of the ship; however, if should the superstructure exceeds one-

third the overall ship length, the ship will be considered a Group 1 vessel.

Figure 6-3 Group III Example

INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER SIX


MCS ISAR Imagery

When ISAR Imagery of a surface contact is displayed on the MCS Tactical Plot (TACPLOT),

there will be two images (Figure 6-4). The image in the lower left corner is the raw ISAR. The

one in the upper right corner represents the digitized image of the contact that has been

processed, enhanced, and focused to show the vessel’s features with more clarity.

In the MCS, the perpendicular profile aspect of the vessel of interest will provide the best ISAR

imagery. When imaging using ISAR in the real world, a front or rear quartering aspect is

preferred. The following two figures depict an MCS ISAR image compared to its IR camera

image.

Figure 6-4 ISAR Interpretation Example in the MCS

Figure 6-5 Corresponding EO Imagery



602. SURFACE THREATS OVERVIEW

Several advances in technology have allowed warship identification to progress significantly

beyond where it was just a few decades ago. We now have thermal imagery, acoustic signatures,

electronic emission analysis, imaging radar, and even wake detection devices.

In spite of these advancements in technology, the classification criteria which must be met before

a weapon can be released at an intended target remain difficult to achieve. The drawback to

technological solutions is that they are seldom 100% reliable. Often, they cannot tell with

absolute certainty that the contact under surveillance is the right target or even a target at all.

At some point during the targeting process, a positive recognition of the target is necessary.

Usually, only an accurate visual recognition (eyes on the target or using an EO/IR system) can

resolve this problem.

603. SAMs

A SAM is a missile designed destroy airborne aircraft or airborne missiles that is launched from

the ground. As airborne weapon system operators, it is important to be able to recognize the

various threat SAMS and their associated emitters represent. Knowledge of each system’s

emitters is helps identify the system using ESM.

SA-2 GUIDELINE

The SA-2 GUIDELINE Missile (Figure 6-6) is a Soviet designed, high-altitude, air defense

system. It is credited with the shoot-down of Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 while he was overflying

the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960. The system uses a SPOON REST Early Warning Radar and a

FAN SONG Target Acquisition Radar (Figure 6-7).

Figure 6-6 SA-2 GUIDELINE



Figure 6-7 FAN SONG Target Acquisition Radar

SA-3 GOA

The SA-3 GOA Missile (Figure 6-8) is a Soviet missile system that has a short effective range

and relatively low engagement altitude. It also flies slower than many other SAM systems.

However, its two-stage design makes it very effective against maneuverable targets. Iraq shot

down an F-16 using this system during Desert Storm in 1991. The SA-6 uses a FLAT FACE or

SQUAT-EYE Target Acquisition Radar and a LOW BLOW Fire Control Radar (Figure 6-9).

Figure 6-8 SA-3 GOA



Figure 6-9 LOW BLOW Fire Control Radar

SA-5 GAMMON

The SA-5 GAMMON Missile (Figure 6-10) was designed for the defense of the most important

administrative, industrial, and military instillations from all types of air attack. It is a very

long-range threat. The SA-5 uses a BAR-LOCK Radar for target detection and tracking with

integrated IFF and a SQUARE PAIR Fire Control Radar (Figure 6-11) for target tracking and

illumination.

Figure 6-10 SA-5 GAMMON



Figure 6-11 SQUARE PAIR Fire Control Radar

SA-6 GAINFUL

The SA-6 GAINFUL Missile (Figure 6-12) is a mobile, low- to medium-altitude surface-to-air

system of Soviet design. It was designed to protect ground forces from air attack. It has a short

range and uses the STRAIGHT FLUSH Radar (Figure 6-13) for target illumination.

Figure 6-12 SA-6 GAINFUL



Figure 6-13 STRAIGHT FLUSH Radar

SA-8 GECKO

The SA-8 GECKO Missile (Figure 6-14) is a highly mobile, short-range system. It is the first

mobile SAM system to incorporate its own engagement Radars on a single vehicle. The LAND

ROLL system is mounted on the front of the vehicle and is a derivative of the naval “POP

GROUP” system.

Figure 6-14 SA-8 GECKO with LAND ROLL Radar



SA-10 GRUMBLE

The SA-10 GRUMBLE Missile (Figure 6-15) is a Soviet long-range system designed to defend

against aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. It is regarded as one of the most potent

anti-aircraft missile systems currently in use. It also has the capability of being fitted with a

nuclear warhead. The system uses a TIN SHIELD Surveillance Radar and a FLAP LID Fire

Control Radar system (Figure 6-16).

Figure 6-15 SA-10 GRUMBLE

Figure 6-16 FLAP LID Fire Control Radar



SA-20 GARGOYLE

The SA-20 GARGOYLE Missile (Figure 6-17) is a variant of the SA-10. It is a newer, larger

missiles with performance improvements such as increased speed and range. It uses the

TOMB STONE Fire Control, Illumination, and Guidance Radar (Figure 6-18).

Figure 6-17 SA-20 GARGOYLE

Figure 6-18 TOMB STONE Fire Control Radar



MANPADS

These systems are primarily shoulder-fired weapons which are light and portable (Figure 6-19).

The missiles are about 5 to 6 feet in length and weigh anywhere from 37 to 40 pounds depending

on the model. Shoulder-fired SAMs generally have a target detection range of about 6 NM and

an engagement range of about 4 NM. Thus, any aircraft flying at an altitude 20,000 ft. or higher

are relatively safe.

Figure 6-19 MANPADS



604. CENTCOM AOR SURFACE THREATS

Houdong

The Houdong (Figure 6-20) is a Chinese missile boat. It is based off of the Huangfen missile

boat, which is itself a copy of the Russian Osa class missile boat. It is armed with a four-round

launcher for the C-802 cruise missile, as well as a turreted twin 30-mm cannon and a crewed

23-mm cannon for self-defense. Emitters associated with the Houdong are the SR-47A, DECCA

RM 1070A (Surface Search), and the Type 341 RICE LAMP Fire Control Radars. Crews may

also be carrying MANPADS.

Figure 6-20 Houdong

Kaman

The Kaman (Mod la Combattante II) class PCG (Patrol Craft Guided Missile) (Figure 6-21)

features a small-bridge superstructure forward of amidships. It has a 35-mm/90 gun mounting

on the bow and a tall lattice mainmast aft of the superstructure. Four surface-to-surface missile

(SSM) launchers are installed aft of the superstructure with the forward two trained forward and

starboard while the aft two are trained forward and port. The Kaman is RGM-84A Harpoon and

C802 capable. Emitters associated with the Kaman are the UPZ-27N, DECCA 1226 surface

search, and the SIGNAAL WM-28 Fire Control Radar which is unique to the vessel.



Figure 6-21 Kaman (Mod La Combattante II)

Vosper MK 5

The Vosper MK 5 (Figure 6-22) features a long forecastle with 4.5-inch gun mounted forward.

It has a short pyramid mainmast just forward of amidships. It has a low-profile sloping funnel

well aft with distinctive gas turbine air intakes forward of the funnel. Sited on its afterdeck from

forward to aft are a C802 SSM launcher, Limbo A/S mortar and 35-mm/90 twin gun turret

mounting. Emitters associated with the Vosper MK 5 are the AWS-1 Air/Surface search radar,

DECCA 1226 Surface Search, DECCA 629 Navigation, and the SEA HUNTER Fire Control

Radars which is unique to the Vosper MK 5.

Figure 6-22 Vosper MK 5



MK III Class Patrol Boat (PB)

The MK III Class Patrol Boat (Figure 6-23) has as speed of 30 knots and a 500 NM range at

28 knots. It has a 20-mm gun mounted forward. Its emitter is the RCA LN-66 Surface Search

Radar. Its crew likely carries MANPADS.

Figure 6-23 MK III Class Patrol Boat

Kilo Class Diesel-Electric Submarine

The Kilo Class Diesel-Electric Submarine (Figure 6-24) features a blunt, rounded bow and a flat-

topped casing that tapers toward the aft end. It has a long, low fin with vertical leading and after

edges and a flat top. Its hull-mounted diving planes are not visible and its rudder is barely

visible. It has a SNOOP TRAY MRP-25 emitter and is capable of launching Novator SSN-27

SIZZLER anti-ship missiles.

Figure 6-24 Kilo Class Diesel-Electric Submarine



605. PACOM AOR SURFACE THREATS

Huangfen Guided Missile Patrol Craft

The Huangfen Guided Missile Patrol Craft (Figure 6-25) is a Chinese copy of the popular Soviet

Osa I Class missile boat. Armed with the SS-N-2 Styx SSM, it boasts a low-profile rounded

superstructure. It has a pole mainmast just forward of amidships with a surface search radar

aerial atop. It has four large, distinctive Styx SSM launchers, two outboard of the mainmast, and

two outboard of the fire control director. Its emitters are the SQUARE-TIE Surface Search

Radar, ROUND BALL Fire Control Radar, and SQUARE HEAD/HIGH POLE IFF. Its crew is

likely armed with MANPADS.

Figure 6-25 Huangfen Guided Missile Patrol Craft

Sariwon Class Patrol Boat

The Sariwon Class Patrol Boat (Figure 6-26) has a long aft section with a composite

superstructure sectioned both forward and amidships with a tall lattice mast forward and a large

funnel stack amidships. It has 2 twin 57/80 cannons, 2 twin 37-mm guns, 4 quad 14.5-mm

machine guns, 2 five-tube antisubmarine mortar launchers and 2 rails for depth charges. Its

emitters are the POT HEAD Surface Search Radar and SKI POLE IFF. Its crew is likely armed

with MANPADS.



Figure 6-26 Sariwon Class Patrol Boat

Komar

The Soviet Project 183R Class, more commonly known as the Komar (Meaning mosquito)

(Figure 6-27), is a class of missile boats, the first of its kind, built in the 1950s and 1960s.

Notably, they were the first to sink another ship with anti-ship missiles in 1967. The Komar has

two distinct launchers mounted aft facing forward used to launch either the STYX missile or

CSS-N-1 SCRUBBRUSH missile. It has twin 25-mm/80 or twin 14.5-mm machine guns. Its

surface search radar is the SQUARE TIE and it has SQUARE HEAD IFF.

Figure 6-27 Komar Missile Boat



Najin Class Frigate

Bearing a striking resemblance to the ex-Soviet Kola Class Frigates, the Najin (Figure 6-28) is

unrelated to any Russian or Chinese design. It is a long composite group II with two distinct

funnels one just forward of amidships and one just aft of amidships. It was originally fitted with

a trainable triple 21-inch torpedo launcher which was replaced in the mid-1980s with fixed

STYX missile launchers which were taken from Osa Class Missile Boats. This redesign is

inherently dangerous and even a minor missile malfunction would result in significant damage to

the ship. The Najin carries SS-N-1 SCRUBBRUSH Missiles and its crew likely carries

MANPADS. It has a SQUARE TIE Air Search Radar, a POT HEAD Surface Search Radar, a

POT DRUM Navigation Radar, and a DRUM TILT Fire Control Radar.

Figure 6-28 Najin Class Frigate



Shantou Class Patrol Boat

The Shantou Class PB (Figure 6-29) has as speed of 45 knots, a 450 NM range at 30 knots, and a

600 NM range at 15 knots. It has two twin 25-mm/80 or two 37-mm or six 14.5-mm guns

(SINPO). All variants except SINPO have two 533-mm torpedo tubes. Its emitters are the SKIN

HEAD Surface Search Radar and the DEAD DUCK/HIGH POLE IFF. Its crew likely carries

MANPADS.

Figure 6-29 Shantou Class Patrol Boat

Chaho Class Patrol Boat

The Chaho Class Patrol Boat (Figure 6-30) has a speed of 37 knots and a range of 1300 NM at

18 knots. Its armament is one twin 23-mm/87 cannon, one twin 14.5-mm gun, one BM-21

multiple rocket launcher. It uses the POT HEAD Surface Search Radar and its crew likely

carries MANPADS.

Figure 6-30 Chaho Class Patrol Boat



Romeo Class SS

The Romeo Class SS (Figure 6-31) is a class of Soviet Diesel-Electric Submarines built in the

1950s. By today’s standards, they are considered obsolete but are still used by adversary nations

in the PACOM AOR for patrol and surveillance missions. The Romeo’s top speed is 15.2 knots

surfaced, 13 knots submerged, and 10 knots snorkeling. It carries 533-mm torpedoes and has

SNOOP PLATE and SNOOP TRAY Radar.

Figure 6-31 Romeo Class SS

Sang O Submarine

The Sang O (Figure 6-32) is a simple submarine for use in the covert insertion of Special

Operations Forces (SOF), mining, and/or SUW. The submarine comes in two different variants,

one with torpedo tubes, and the other without. Both variants have the capability to lay mines.

The Sang O’s top speed is 7.5 knots on the surface, 8.8 knots submerged, and 7.2 knots

snorkeling. It has a range of 2700 nm at 7 knots. Variant 1 has up to four 533-mm torpedo tubes

and both variants can carry 16 bottom mines. The Sang O has a FURUNO Surface Search

Radar.

Figure 6-32 Sang O Submarine




DATA LINK OVERVIEW 7-1

CHAPTER SEVEN

DATA LINK OVERVIEW

700. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will discuss data link basics, the terms, characteristics, procedures, and limitations

associated with data links, and how data links fit into the operating picture.

701. DATA LINK OVERVIEW

What is a tactical data link?

A tactical data link (TDL) is a communications system that supports the exchange of near-real-

time tactical data between participants using a variety of free- or fixed-format messages. These

messages are characterized by unique transmission characteristics, protocols, and standardized

message structure. TDLs permit a rapid exchange of information by automatically transferring

data between participating units. TDLs involve transmissions of bit-oriented digital information

that are exchanged via Tactical Digital Information Links (TADIL).

A TADIL is a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved standardized communication link suitable for

transmission of machine-readable digital information. The United States Navy uses the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) designation, Link-XX, when referring to TADIL. Link 16

is synonymous with TADIL J. Similarly, Link-11 is synonymous with TADIL A and Link-4A

with TADIL C.

Why are TDLs necessary?

The development of the ability to conduct warfare with an integrated force led to a requirement

for standardized digital data processing systems with the ability to process large amounts of data

securely and in near real time. TDLs provide several advantages to a fighting force:

1. Force multiplier: TDLs shift the paradigm from a platform centric view to a network

centric force

2. Improve situational awareness

3. Provide for automatic/digital command and control functions

4. Faster decision cycles

5. Reduced voice communications

6. Joint/combined interoperability with other services/coalition forces (Figure 7-1)

CHAPTER SEVEN INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK

7-2 DATA LINK OVERVIEW

Figure 7-1 Tactical Data Link Picture

Tactical Data Links and the Operating Picture

The different data link types are combined to form the multi-TDL network (Figure 7-2), which is

integrated into the joint data network and augments the recognized air and maritime pictures.

These pictures form the common tactical picture which, when combined with the joint planning

network, forms the common operating picture (COP). The purpose of the COP is to get the right

information to the right people at the right level at the right time.

Figure 7-2 Multi-TDL Network Integration

INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER SEVEN


702. DATA LINK TYPES

Common data links associated with maritime operations are detailed in the next figure.

Data Link Characteristics and Features

Link 4A (Dolly)

TADIL C

Link 4A is a link to provide vectoring or targeting information to

aircraft, primarily fighters, from an E-2, E-3, or ship. It is a UHF

data link that transmits 5000 bits per second.

Link 11 (Alligator)

TADIL A

Link 11 is an automatic, medium-speed, UHF and HF link used for

the exchange of picture compilations and C2 information between

ships, aircraft, and shore stations. Link 11 is primarily a

surveillance data link. E-2 and E-3 are the primary airborne Link

11 platforms.

Link 16 (Timber)

TADIL J

Link 16 is a real-time, Electronic Countermeasure (ECM)-resistant,

secure, bit-oriented data link that uses Time Division Multiple

Access (TDMA) technology. It combines the functionality of links

4A and 11 and is used for contact reporting, aircraft control,

weapons coordination, C2, and voice communications.

Figure 7-3 Data Links

703. LINK 4A

Link 4A, (TADIL C), is one of several tactical data links in operation in the United States Armed

Services and NATO forces. Operators use the proword “Dolly” when referring to this data link.

Link 4A provides digital surface-to-air, air-to-surface, and air-to-air tactical communications. It

is a command-and-response system that uses serial time-division multiplexing to transmit control

and reply messages over a UHF radio frequency. It provides for one- or two-way

communications between the controlling station and aircraft.

Link 4A was designed to replace voice communications for the control of tactical aircraft due to

the increased range (greater than radio voice range). The use of Link 4A has since been

expanded to include communication of digital data between surface and airborne platforms. First

installed in the late 1950s, Link 4A achieved a reputation for being reliable although its

transmissions are neither secure nor jam-resistant. The data link is easy to operate and maintain

without serious or long-term connectivity problems. Link 4A is quickly becoming obsolete with

the introduction of Link 16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) terminals

into fighter/attack aircraft.

704. LINK 11

Link 11 (TADIL A), employs netted communication techniques and a standard message format

for exchanging digital information among airborne as well as land-based and shipboard tactical

data systems. Link 11 data communications must be capable of operation in either the HF or

UHF bands. Operators use the prowords, “Alligator” or “Gator,” when referring to this data link.



Link 11 provides high-speed computer-to-computer digital radio communications among

Tactical Data System (TDS) equipped ships, aircraft, and shore sites. In addition to the radio

requirements, it uses a data terminal set, a KG-40 crypto device, a data link interface unit, and a

combat data system. Link 11 is a polling system that utilizes a net control station (NCS) that

polls every player in the data link in turn.

Additionally, link 11 positional information is not geodetic. Each unit reports its position

relative to a pre-specified origin known as a data link reference point (DLRP). Link 11 has been

around for many years and is due to be retired soon. Link 16 is its replacement.

705. LINK 16

LINK 16 (TADIL J) is the Department of Defense's primary tactical data link for command,

control, and intelligence, providing critical joint interoperability and situational awareness

information. It is a relatively new tactical data link that is being employed by the United States

Navy, the Joint Services, some NATO nations, and Japan. Link 16 improves on existing tactical

data link communications in two ways—through more complete and more accurate tactical

information and through superior communications technology. Operators use the proword,

“Timber,” when referring to Link 16. The radio transmission and reception components of

Link 16 are known as the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System or JTIDS. JTIDS is a

high-capacity, UHF, line of sight, frequency-hopping data communication terminal that provides

secure, jam-resistant voice and digital data exchange. The Multifunctional Information

Distribution System (MIDS) is a smaller, less capable terminal normally installed on fighter

aircraft. A diagram displaying the location of the JTIDS frequency band is shown in the next

figure.

Figure 7-4 Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Frequency Band

JTIDS Units (JUs) are participants in a TADIL J network that are assigned to Network

Participation Groups (NPGs). JUs are designated as either C2 or non-C2. The C2 JU is a

JTIDS-equipped platform which is capable of directing the activities of other platforms by

exercising C2 authority. The non-C2 JU is a JTIDS-equipped platform with limited capability or

lack of capability to direct the activities of other platforms.



Time Division Multiple Access

The JTIDS network employs a communications architecture known as Time Division Multiple

Access (TDMA). TDMA consists of time slots that are allocated among all TADIL J network

participants for the transmission and reception of data. TDMA eliminates the requirement for an

NCS by providing a nodeless communications network architecture, however, one participant,

normally a C2 unit, must act as a Net Time Reference (NTR) for the network.

Precise Participant Location and Identification (PPLI) is a message used to transmit crypto-

secure location and identification information about a JU. In addition to position and positive

identification, each platform may provide status information such as fuel, weapons inventory,

and mission assignment tasking. This capability is one of the most important benefits of

TADIL J.

NOTE

The capability of all Link 16 participants to frequently provide

comprehensive position, identification, and status information is a

considerable improvement over other data links and has significant

capability to reduce or prevent fratricide (friendly-on-friendly

engagement).

Network Participation Groups

Link 16’s network capacity is apportioned among several “virtual circuits.” Each circuit or

Network Participation Group (NPG) is dedicated to a single function. NPGs are the functional

building blocks of a TADIL J network. Since NPGs are defined by their function, the types of

messages transmitted on them are also defined. NPGs are used or assigned, and each of the

transmit time slots is assigned an NPG that it supports.

Some of the specific functions of NPGs are as follows: NPG 14 is used by the USN for data

forwarding between Link 11 and 16. NPG 7 is used to share surveillance picture data. NPGs 12

and 13 are J voice A and B respectively, NPG 1 is used for initial network entry, NPG 9 is Air

Control, and NPG 19 is fighter to fighter.

Link 16 Relative Navigation

Relative Navigation (RELNAV), an automatic function of the terminal, is used to determine the

distance between platforms by measuring the arrival times of transmissions and correlating them

with reported positions. Terminals on a network need this information to maintain time

synchronization. RELNAV is in constant operation in all terminals, and its data can be used to

improve a unit’s positional accuracy.

If two or more units have independent, accurate knowledge of their geodetic positions, RELNAV

can provide all units in the network with accurate geodetic positions. As a result, the precise

geodetic position of every unit can be maintained constantly by every other unit.



Anti-Jam

Anti-jam is a method that ensures that transmitted information can be received despite jamming

attempts. The JTIDS terminal utilizes a pseudorandom frequency-hopping pattern, time jitter,

and frequency spreading to create a jammer-unfriendly transmitting environment.

Reed/Solomon (R/S) error coding allows the system to predicatively correct for any missing data

that could result from jammer interference; however, this will not work for voice data since it

does not follow a predictable pattern.

TADIL J has the capability to operate in a hostile EM environment. The TADIL J waveform

was developed in order to provide significant performance enhancements against optimized,

band-matching jammers. It was also made to preclude jamming by a narrow band jammer. To

accomplish this, the transmission frequency of the terminal is changed every 13 microseconds

(approximately 77,000 hops per second) across 51 discrete Lx Band frequencies. The

frequency-hopping pattern is pseudorandom and is determined by the Transmission Security

(TSEC) crypto key.

Link 16 J Voice

TADIL J provides two secure, digitized voice NPGs: J Voice A and B. Each voice NPG has a

data rate of 2.4 or 16 kilobits per second (kbps). When using the 16 kbps data rate, voice clarity

is enhanced, and time slot usage is significantly increased.

Voice circuits remain active when the terminal is set to the data silent mode of operation. J voice

is not currently used by some platforms.

Data Link Symbology

MIL Standard 2525 Data link symbology is detailed in the next figure. Your future platform

may differ slightly.



Figure 7-5 Data Link Symbology




TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND BREVITY 8-1

CHAPTER EIGHT

TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND BREVITY

800. INTRODUCTION

This chapter includes a discussion of warfare commander call signs, weapon control statuses,

threat warnings, brevity codes, queries, and briefings.

801. CALL SIGNS AND WEAPON/WARNING STATUSES

Call signs and threat warning/weapon control statuses provide an efficient and timely reference

to the commander in question or to the targeting instructions in the field.

A warfare commander is typically assigned a two-letter call sign associated with his or her

respective assigned duty. The call sign, which provides a clear picture of the command

organization, is a quick and easy reference for a commander to use in cross-warfare area

communications. The first letter (prefix) of each call sign signifies a specific composite warfare

organization. The second letter (suffix) of each call sign signifies a specific commander or

coordinator within a composite warfare organization.

Each warfare commander has a primary commander in charge and a designated alternate

commander. If the primary commander is not able to take control of their particular warfare

area, the alternate commander takes control. The warfare commander, functional commander,

and coordinator have their own call signs the same as a primary commander and an alternate

commander. The prevalent composite warfare commanders/coordinators introduced in chapter

21 and their call signs are as follows:

OTC: The theater commander’s call sign is (AA). Normally the OTC is the numbered fleet

commander (e.g., Commander 5th Fleet) and is usually the rank of, Vice Admiral.

CWC: Delegated authority by the OTC for the overall direction and control of the force. The

CWC is normally the CSG Commander, call sign (AB), and is a Rear Admiral Lower Half

(one-star).

AMDC: Call sign (AW) is normally the CSG Cruiser CO with the rank of Captain (O-6).

IWC: Call sign (AQ) is normally the senior O-6 onboard the CSG staff.

SCC: Call sign (AZ) is normally the DESRON commander with the rank of Captain (O-6).

STWC: Call sign (AP) is normally the Carrier Air Group (CAG) Commander (CAG) with the

rank of Captain (O-6).

FOTC: Call sign (AF) is normally the Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO), a limited duty

officer (LDO) onboard the CSG staff specializing in multi-tactical data link interface

architecture, planning, and operation.

CHAPTER EIGHT INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK

8-2 TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND BREVITY

Weapon Control Status

The OTC or the relevant warfare commander issues a weapon control status. This weapon

control status provides the commander’s general direction or policy for weapon employment for

all or part of a specific warfare area such as SUW, ASW, and AAW. The weapon control

statuses are: Weapons Free (open fire on any target that is not identified as friendly), Tight (Do

not open fire unless target is identified as hostile), and Safe (Do not open fire except in

self-defense or in response to a formal order). Weapon Control Statuses are general in nature so

as not to override ROE or command by negation.

Threat Warnings

Since threat, warnings are informative, force or individual unit actions are not automatically

linked to the warning. Sometimes, an OTC orders temporary action based on a certain situation;

however, threat warnings are typically issued as a direct result of detections and enemy reports.

The color codes that are applied to threat warnings denote the severity of the evaluated threats.

These color codes are Warning White (attack is unlikely without adequate warning), Yellow

(attack is probable), and Red (attack is imminent or has already begun).

Threat warnings apply to principal warfare areas and include, but are not limited to, AAW,

SUW, and ASW.

802. BREVITY PROCEDURE WORDS (PROWORDS)

Multi-service brevity prowords are used by various military forces and, by design, are a universal

language not tied to any one particular branch of service. Brevity prowords convey complex

information in simplified terms. They are intended to shorten, rather than conceal, the content of

a message. The latest edition of the Common Universal Brevity Code Manual (June 2018) is

available for download at the Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA) Website. The hyperlink

is http://www.alsa.mil/library/mttps/brevity.html and CAC login is required. It is highly

recommended that each student downloads and studies the terms found in the ALSA Common

Universal Brevity Code Manual. The ALSA manual refers to these prowords as “codes”,

however, as previously discussed, they offer neither security nor concealment. These terms will

be discussed in the CAI and MIL lessons associated with this chapter and will be utilized

regularly during simulator events. Students are responsible for the knowledge of ALSA brevity

words covered in this chapter’s CAI and MIL presentations.

803. QUERIES AND BRIEFINGS

Knowing how to respond to a query challenge (depending on location) is very important within

naval aviation. Knowledge of standardized briefs and reports is also critical to mission success.

Maritime Query Challenge Procedures

Freedom of the high seas includes the right of aircraft of all nations to use the airspace over the

high seas. The sovereignty of a state extends beyond its land area to the outer limit of its

http://www.alsa.mil/library/mttps/brevity.html

INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER EIGHT


territorial seas. The U.S. recognizes territorial sea claims up to 12 NM from a state’s land

boundaries. When U.S. military aircraft personnel experience different maritime situations,

specific procedures exist as described below.

A U.S. military aircraft that receives a challenge from an international authority while operating

in international airspace should advise the challenging authority that it is a U.S. military aircraft

and continue its planned route of flight. If a U.S. military aircraft is intercepted by foreign

aircraft, established DoD Flight Information Procedures and International Intercept Procedures

should be followed.

If intercepted in the territorial airspace of a foreign country, a U.S. military aircraft should

change course to comply with the foreign authority’s directions to depart territorial airspace or

directions to land (provided a safe landing can be accomplished). If the aircraft lands, the crew

should immediately contact the applicable U.S. embassy for assistance.

Briefs and Reports

Standardized briefs and reports provide useful information regarding assets, capabilities, targets,

actions, and other data. The briefing formats that should be used are the Standard Check-in

Brief, Surface Contact Report, Maritime Air Control (MAC) Comm Format, Checkout Briefing

In-Flight Report (INFLTREP), and ACU turnover Format.

The standard check-in format (Figure 8-1) is used in conjunction with Air Operations in

Maritime Surface Warfare (AOMSW) missions such as armed reconnaissance/strike

coordination and reconnaissance (AR/SCAR) with dynamic targets requiring quick reaction

times.

Figure 8-1 Standard Check-in Brief



The Surface Contact Report (Figure 8-2) provides standardized information on vessels or tracks

of interest. Do not transmit the line numbers.

Figure 8-2 Surface Contact Report

The baseline air-to-surface communications format for MAC (Figure 8-3) has been aligned to

closely resemble the one used for Tactical Air Intercept Control (TACAIC).

Figure 8-3 Maritime Air Control (MAC) Baseline Comm Format

INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER EIGHT


The Checkout Briefing (INFLTREP), shown in Figure 8-4, recaps actions taken during air

operations in maritime surface warfare (AOMSW) missions. Line numbers are not transmitted.

Figure 8-4 Checkout Briefing (In-Flight Report)

The off-going ACUs will complete a turnover with oncoming ACUs prior to checking off station

with the SCC. All relevant command and control information should be passed between them.

Figure 8-5 is an example of the ACU turnover format.



Figure 8-5 ACU Turnover Format

DATA LINK EMPLOYMENT 9-1

CHAPTER NINE

DATA LINK EMPLOYMENT

900. INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses employing Link 16 in an operational environment to include network

structuring, operational concepts, and tactical level network planning.

901. DATA LINK EMPLOYMENT

Link 16 Employment Overview

Airborne Link 16 platforms play a vital role in sharing, extending, and augmenting the tactical

information available to ships and to land-based facilities, thereby expanding the overall tactical

picture. These platforms also extend the radio horizon of the JTIDS network by acting as relays.

In order to achieve maximum effectiveness within the data link, a significant amount of network

planning, designing, and promulgation must take place in order to properly define the

participants, their transmit assignments, the hardware configurations they will use, and the link

configuration in which they will operate.

Structuring the Link 16 Network

The focus of this section is on Link 16’s logical structure, which is mission-oriented, and

changes based on fleet requirements. Many different logical structures are possible. These

structures are designed by the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command’s (SPAWAR)

Network Design Facility and are collected into electronic files called JTIDS Network Libraries

(JNL), and Network Description Documents (NDD).

Even though the end user has almost no control over defining the network structure, an

understanding of its design and functionality is helpful when it comes to tactical level planning

and troubleshooting. Additionally, it helps a user understand limitations that are inherent in the

design of a particular network.

As previously discussed, NPGs are the network’s functional building blocks. This functional

structuring allows JUs to participate only on the NPGs necessary for the functions they perform.

Network capacity is assigned first to NPGs then to users participating in that NPG.

In general, networks are designed to support particular operational goals. The following is a

description of some of the NPGs that may be found in a typical Network.

NPG 1 Initial Entry: This NPG supports coarse synchronization and entry into the network. The

JU assigned as NTR periodically transmits net entry messages in this NPG to be used by other

terminals in acquiring system time.

NPG 2 Round Trip Timing: Timing Messages are automatically exchanged among JUs to

support Fine Synchronization.

CHAPTER NINE INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK

9-2 DATA LINK EMPLOYMENT

NPG 7 Surveillance: Contacts that have been detected, evaluated, classified, and identified are

shared among participants on NPG 7. Air, surface, and subsurface tracks, land-based SAM sites,

reference points, ASW points, and EW bearings and fixes are all exchanged on this NPG.

Primarily, C2 platforms participate in the surveillance function.

NPG 9 Air Control: Command and control JUs can control non C2 JUs on this NPG. It is

configured as a stacked net with two parts, an uplink, and a backlink. Each net is assigned to a

specific controller, either a ship or an E-2, and the fighter aircraft being controlled. The

controlling unit provides the mission assignments, vectors, and target reports to the fighter

aircraft on the uplink. The fighters receive a processed and correlated tactical picture from their

controlling unit on the uplink.

Figure 9-1 Air Control NPG Uplink and Backlink

NPGs 12 and 13 Voice Group A and B: These NPGs provide secure digitized voice capability

for use by all JUs. They are usually configured as stacked nets with 127 possible sub-circuits

each. Depending on network design, these channels can be either 2.4 or 16 kbps non-error

correction coded.

NPG 19 Fighter to Fighter (Dedicated): Non-C2 units, such as fighters, exchange radar sensor

information and status on this NPG. It is usually configured as a stacked net. The maximum

fighter flight size is 8 fighters, but options are provided to allow 2, 4, or 8 fighters per net.

INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK CHAPTER NINE


Time Slot Assignments

The amount of network capacity assigned to a given NPG depends on communications priorities,

including:

1. The number and types of participants

2. How often the participant needs access to the NPG

3. The expected volume of data

4. The update rate of the information

5. Relay requirements

The number of time slots that must be allocated within the NPG to each participant depends on

the type of unit and the method of accessing the time slot. There are currently three modes of

access for time slots.

Dedicated Access: The assignment of time slots to a uniquely identified unit for transmission

purposes. Only the assigned JU may transmit during that time slot. If there is no data to

transmit, the time slot goes unused. The advantage of dedicated access is that each JU on an

NPG owns a predetermined portion of the network’s capacity and there will be no transmission

conflicts. A disadvantage is that assets are not interchangeable. For example, one aircraft cannot

simply replace another during an operation.

Contention Access: The assignment of time slots to a group of units as a pool for transmission

purposes. Each unit randomly selects a time slot from the pool during which to transmit. In

contention access, several units may transmit simultaneously. The advantage of contention

access is that each terminal is given the same initialization parameters for the time slot block.

This simplifies network design and reduces network management burden. Assets are

interchangeable with contention access. A disadvantage is that there is no guarantee a

transmission will be received.

Time Slot Reallocation (TSR) Access: The network capacity of an NPG is assigned dynamically

based on the projected needs of the participants. This access method is intended to support a

fluctuating demand from a varying group of users. Each platform reports its transmission needs

over the network, and algorithms within the terminal redistribute the pool of time slots to meet

the need. The advantage of time slot reallocation is that the network capacity is distributed

where it is needed as it is needed. A disadvantage is all users share in the network degradation if

the need exceeds the available capacity.



Network Roles

Network roles are functions available to a JU through initialization and operator selection. A

network role can support one or more of the following functions: synchronization, navigation,

and multi-link operations. With the exception of Network Manager, all roles may be changed at

the respective terminals during operations. Some of these roles include NTR, Initial Entry JU

(IEJU), Navigation Controller (NC), Position Reference (PR), Primary User (PRU), and

Forwarding JU (FJU). Roles are assigned to various units via the Operational Tasking Data Link

(OPTASK LINK) message. Certain roles have specific requirements that must be adhered to by

the unit assigned the role.

NTR: This is the most essential role when establishing a JTIDS network. A single JU is

assigned this role for a given network. If more than one unit assumes the role as NTR, the result

is known as a split net having virtually no functionality. The NTR must be a C2 unit that will be

present throughout the operation and that will have LOS connectivity with as many other units as

possible. Typically, A Navy surface unit or ground station will be NTR.

PR: The PR must have a geodetic positional accuracy within 50 feet and should be assigned to

well surveyed stationary sites. Never assign the role of PR to a Navy Unit.

NC: The NC is designated only when a relative grid is desired. This unit should be mobile,

present for the duration of the operation, and have good line of sight (LOS) connectivity to as

many units as possible. Should a unit designated as NC becomes stationary, it must relinquish

this role.

IEJU: This role provides system time to units beyond LOS of the NTR. Assign the role of IEJU

to all active units.

PRU: A PRU transmits round trip timing (RTT) to actively maintain synchronization within the

network. This role applies to all JUs except the NTR. Networks designed for use by the U.S.

Navy typically support up to 200 PRUs. If the number of participants exceeds 200, some will

have to be designated as secondary users which must operate passively.

FJU: The FJU translates and forwards data between tactical data links (e.g., Link 16 and

Link 11). In order to function as an FJU, a unit must have a command and control processor

(C2P) onboard. All ships can perform the FJU role but, ideally, only one FJU is assigned for the

entire force. This unit is commonly referred to as the data forwarder.

Net Entry

Net entry is performed by the JTIDS terminal. The process of acquiring system time is called

synchronization. The process begins with an estimate of the current time and can, therefore, be

simplified if the NTR uses coordinated universal time (UT) from the GPS. The first step to

entering a network is to acquire synchronization.



Coarse Synchronization (CS): Using a time estimate, the terminal chooses a time slot it is

certain has not yet occurred and begins listening for a net entry message. Once the message is

received, the terminal uses the message to correct its system time. When the message is

received, the terminal is declared to be in coarse synchronization. After coarse synchronization

is achieved, the terminal can begin to transmit RTT interrogations. This is the only transmission

that the terminal can make in coarse sync.

Fine Synchronization (FS): Once in coarse sync, the terminal uses both the measured time of

arrival of the RTT reply, and the reported time of arrival of the RTT interrogation to further

adjust its system time to remove the error due to propagation time. When the error is removed,

the terminal is declared to be in fine sync. Terminals must be in fine sync to transmit messages

on the network.

Relays

JTIDS is strictly a UHF LOS system. For air-to-air or ship-to–air data transfer, this is

approximately 300 NM. For ship-to–ship data transfer, it is closer to 25 NM. Because of this,

relays are almost always required for the CSG. Relays are established during network design

and time slots are allocated specifically for this purpose.

The network is designed with specific time slots designated as relay pairs and specific JUs

designated to perform the relay function. The designated relay JU must be provided with the

capacity to transmit the relayed message. Messages received in one time slot are relayed in a

later pre-allocated time slot. The original message and the relayed message are referred to as a

relay pair. Paired time slots are assigned as a part of each NPG that requires relay support. The

number of time slots required depends on the number of relay hops required to reach the

destination. The relaying unit must be in fine sync and in the normal range mode. Messages

with uncorrectable errors are not retransmitted. Some of the relay types are described below.

The most basic type of relay technique is called the paired slot relay. With this type of relay, the

transmit slot is paired with the receive slot using a fixed offset called the relay delay; however,

the use of paired slot relays reduces the potential capacity of an NPG by 50%.

The conditional relay depends on geographic coverage. It requires the terminal to selectively

activate or deactivate the relay function based on which JU can provide the most efficient

coverage. The conditional relay becomes active if its geographic coverage is greater than that of

the current relay. Geographic coverage is determined from height and range data derived from

the unit’s PPLI.

In a flood relay, all units act as unconditional multiple relays. This strategy is designed to

improve connectivity to units outside of LOS with each other. It is the principle relay mode for

the U.S. Navy and is used whenever practicable.

A relay assignment in which the relaying unit is unable to decipher the encrypted message

content is known as a blind relay.



Communications Security

Communications Security (COMSEC) is provided by the KGV-8 Secure Data Unit (SDU). The

KGV-8 attaches directly to the terminal and has memory locations available for 8

cryptovariables (4 today/tomorrow pairs), which are binary keys used to encrypt and decrypt

data. Every day is assigned a crypto period designator (CPD). The current CPD (CCPD) is

established by the date on which the terminal is initialized and designates which crypto pair to

use for today. The other is automatically used for tomorrow. Two layers of COMSEC are

provided. They are TSEC and message security (MSEC). To quickly obtain the current crypto

day, an operator will consult the JANIF table which knows the CCPD based on the Network

Operations start date.

Multi-netting

All users do not need to participate in every function. Therefore, some functions in networks are

mutually exclusive (EW and high update rate PPLI). These mutually exclusive NPGs are “multi-

netted.” The same time slots are used by different platforms for different functions; thus,

network wide throughput increases. The multi-net arrangement differs from stacked nets in that

participants perform different functions and cannot selectively switch from one to the other.

Multi netting can be established simply by specifying different net numbers. In multiple-net

structures, the time slots used on different NPGs may overlap, but different net numbers and/or

TSEC crypto keys prevent interference (Figure 9-2).

Figure 9-2 Multiple Nets



Stacked nets are created by assigning the same group of time slots to the same NPG with the

same TSEC parameter, but with different net numbers. Stacked nets support multiple,

simultaneous transmissions (Figure 9-3). Different nets do not hear each other. Stacked nets are

defined to the terminal with a net number of 127. This indicates “no statement” or no definition

and allows the operator to change net numbers within the NPG like changing channels on a

television. Voice nets and control nets are examples of stacked nets.

Figure 9-3 Stacked Net

Isolation between network users can be achieved by using different MSEC cryptovariables.

These are known as crypto nets. When a group of JUs is isolated from another group of JUs in

this manner, independent “Crypto-nets” are established where only authorized users will be able

to exchange information. If the MSEC cryptovariable is different, unauthorized users can

receive the signal, error correct it, and retransmit it, but cannot decrypt it. This is how the

previously discussed Blind Relay is established.

Multiple networks have a different TSEC and possibly a different MSEC variable. Each network

is independent of the other and each has its own NTR assigned. This complete isolation of

networks allows two different CSG networks to coexist in the same Op Area. Other ways to

achieve multiple separate networks are to use a different network file from the JNL or to offset

the JTIDS system time between the two networks. By offsetting the time, both networks can use

the same JNL file and the exact same crypto which makes dropping out of one network and

synching to the next one quite simple if the time offset is known.



Link 16 Operations

Link 16 provides a greatly improved friendly force location, identification, and status reporting

capability. It is designed to support the full range of tactical information exchange requirements

necessary in the great majority of operational scenarios. A far greater volume of information can

be exchanged over Link 16 as compared to Link 11. This section discusses Link 16 network

operation subfunctions, network management, data forwarding, and concurrent operations.

Network operation has three subfunctions: link establishment, link maintenance, and

information management. Link establishment is the monitoring, control, and troubleshooting of

JTIDS/MIDS units as they enter the link. Link maintenance consists primarily of

synchronization and navigation maintenance. Data registration and identification depend upon

link maintenance. Poor link maintenance could have serious consequences including causing a

blue-on-blue engagement. Information management is the handling of all information

exchanged across the interface. It is an ongoing process as long as the link is operational. In a

multi-link environment, the Track Data Coordinator (TDC) and Joint Interface Control Officer

(JICO) must coordinate all information management in order to direct multi-link measures to

correct items like dual designations, ID conflicts, and time latency.

Network management of the operating Link 16 network is performed by the JICO. It consists of

those actions needed to dynamically establish, maintain, and terminate Link 16 communications

among net participants. The JICO must be ready to take action to accommodate a changing

operational environment. The JICO must monitor force composition, geometry, proper network

configuration, and multi-link requirements, as well as perform general link administration. His

actions can include assigning network roles to specific units, activating and deactivating relays,

changing various settings, and changing the active or data silent status of a JU.

Data Forwarding is the process of receiving data on one digital data link and outputting the data

onto another digital data link in the proper format. In the process, messages received on one link

are translated to appropriate data fields in the corresponding messages. The term multi-link

operations refers to operations where both Link 11 and Link 16 operate and data is being

forwarded between them. Data forwarding allows as much tactical information as possible to be

shared by all members of a multi-link force. Any ship with a C2P can perform the FJU function.

If perfect connectivity could be maintained at all times, between all units of a multi-link force,

and if the FJUs could always remain fully operational, there would be no need for units to

operate on more than one link at a time. The world is not perfect however, and perfect

connectivity is improbable. The U.S. Navy has planned for this reality and developed the

concept of concurrent operations (CONOPS) in which units may be active on both Link 16 and

Link 11 concurrently, even when they are not acting a data forwarder. A unit that operates on

both links 16 and 11, but is not an FJU, is called a Concurrent Interface Unit (CIU).

A problem associated with CONOPS is data looping which is the forwarding of forwarded data

in an endless circle. To prevent data looping, several rules are established for CIUs and FJUs in

order to ensure that only a direct path is followed (CIUs transmit and receive data directly, not

through a data forwarder).



Network Planning

This section discusses the Network Management System (NMS), to include the network design

process, network planning, and the OPTASKLINK message. The NMS provides configuration

control for platform loads and a way to define the human activities involved in initializing and

operating the JTIDS/MIDS terminals. The JTIDS/MIDS terminal is programmable. Each

platform requires an initialization load. Coordinated loads are required for interoperability. The

NMS provides configuration control of the multiple platform loads.

The NMS is a four-step process: design, planning, initialization, and operation of the network.

It is heavily front-loaded toward design and planning in order to maintain configuration control,

remove the element of operator error, and minimize operator workload. More than 99% of all

terminal parameters are set during the design, planning, and initialization phases, leaving less

than 1% for the operator to either set or modify during operation.

Network design contains all the programming parameters required to initialize the JTIDS/MIDS

terminals that will participate in the network. Network Design Facilities (NDFs) are responsible

for network design. Two distinct products are generated during the network design stage: a

Network Description Document (NDD) and the network design. The NDD is provided to the

requestor to ensure the design meets their requirements. Network design contains all the

programming parameters required to initialize the JTIDS/MIDS terminals that will participate in

the network.

The second stage of the NMS is network planning or simply planning for short. This includes

both long-term planning and short-term planning.

During long-term planning, planners compare their requirements against all existing networks in

the JTIDS Network Library (JNL) to determine if one of them meets their needs. If there is no

existing network that satisfies the requirements, then requestors fill out a Network Design

Request and submit it to their Service Network Design Facility.

During short-term planning the OPTASK LINK message is generated (Figure 9-4 and 9-5). The

OPTASK LINK message is a set of detailed instructions for all link participants that provides the

guidance for interoperability. The OPTASK LINK contains link duty assignments, capacity

assignments, crypto key material information, plus activation and operating instructions.

The third stage of the NMS is network initialization or initialization for short. This is when the

operators use the products derived from the design and planning stages to set up their platform

for interoperability.

Although initialization procedures vary between platform types, the same basic functions are

performed by all platforms. The users, in order to meet the directions and guidance contained in

the OPTASK LINK message, parse out and modify their specific platform network load files so

that two or more of their platforms can be simultaneously participating in the network without

competing for timeslots.



For E-2 aircraft, these resulting files are called J load files that units will load into their JTIDS

terminal. Two E-2 aircraft that plan on being airborne at the same time will have to coordinate

ahead of time so they don’t accidentally load the same J Load file.

For fighter aircraft, these files are usually created during mission planning and transferred to the

aircraft on a data storage unit. On other platforms, such as the P-8, they are transferred into the

terminal via a data bus or Ethernet connection from the host system. The resulting network load

contains all the information necessary for the respective terminal to begin operations.

Network operation is the fourth and final stage of the NMS. It begins when the Network Time

Reference starts broadcasting the Initial Entry Messages (IEMs) and incorporates the three

previously discussed subfunctions: link establishment, link maintenance, and information

management.



Figure 9-4 OPTASK LINK Example 1



Figure 9-5 OPTASK LINK Example 2

GLOSSARY A-1

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

µsec microsecond

3D Three-dimensional

A/A Air-to-Air

A/FD Airport/Facility Directory

A/G Air-to-Ground

A/S Air-to-Surface

AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery

AAM Air-to-Air Missile

AAW Anti-Air Warfare

ACA Airspace Control Authority

ACC Area Control Center

ACM Airspace Coordinating Measures

ACO Airspace Control Order

ACU Aircraft Control Unit

ADC Air Defense Center

ADF Automatic Direction Finder

ADIZ Air Defense Identification Zone

ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast

Advanced MC2 Advanced Maritime Command and Control

AEA Airborne Electronic Attack

AESA Active Electronically Scanned Array

AEW Airborne Early Warning

AFB Air Force Base

AFCS Automatic Flight Control System

AGL Above Ground Level

AIM Aeronautical Information Manual

AIRMET Airmen’s Meteorological Information

AIS Automatic Identification System

ALCS Airborne Launch Control System

APPENDIX A INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK

A-2 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

ALR Acceptable Levels of Risk

ALSA Air Land Sea Application Center

AM Amplitude Modulation

AMDC Air Missile Defense Commander

AMRAAM Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile

AMTI Airborne Moving Target Indicator

AO Area of Operations

AOMSW Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare

AOP Area of Probability

AOR Area of Responsibility

AP Area Planning

AR Air-Refueling Track

AR/AI/SCAR Armed Reconnaissance/Air Interdiction/Strike

Coordination and Reconnaissance

AREC Air Resource Element Coordinator

ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Center

ASBM Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile

ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile

ASM Anti-Ship Missile

ASR Airport Surveillance Radar

ASROC Anti-Submarine Rocket

ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare

ASWC Anti-Submarine Warfare Commander

ATA Automatic Target Acquisition

ATC Air Traffic Control

ATFLIR Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared

ATIS Automatic Terminal Information Service

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

AWS Aegis Weapon System

BAMS Broad Area Maritime Surveillance

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

BDA Battle Damage Assessment

INTERMEDIATE MC2 SENSOR AND LINK APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY A-3

Acronym Definition

BHA Bomb Hit Assessment

BMD Ballistic Missile Defense

BR Bearing Resolution

BRAA Bearing, Range, Altitude, and Aspect

BUNO Bureau Number

BVR Beyond Visual Range

BW Beamwidth

BWE Beamwidth Error

C Central

C Coverage Factor

C/A Coarse Acquisition

C&R Coordination and Reporting

C2

C2P

Command and Control

Command and Control Processor

C3 Command, Control, and Communications

C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and

Intelligence

CA Crab Angle

CAG Carrier Air Group

cal caliber

CAP Combat Air Patrol

CAS Close Air Support

CB Citizen Band

CCOI Critical Contacts of Interest

CCPD Current Crypto Period Designator

CENTCOM Central Command

CERT

CFF

Certain

Clear Field of Fire

CGRS Common Geographic Reference System

CH Compass Heading

CIEA Classification, Identification, and Engagement Area


A-4 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

CIRVIS Communications Instructions for Reporting Vital

Intelligence Sightings

CIWS Close-In Weapons System

CIU Concurrent Interface Unit

cm centimeters

CNATRA Chief of Naval Air Training

CND Computer Network Defense

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

CO Commanding Officer

COI Contacts of Interest

COMINT Communications Intelligence

COMNAVAIRFOR Commander, Naval Air Forces

COMSEC Communications Security

CONOPS Concept of Operations/Concurrent Operations

CONUS Continental United States

COP Common Operational Picture

CPD Crypto Period Designator

CPS Cycles Per Second

CRC Cryptologic Resource Coordinator

CRM Crew Resource Management

CRT Cathode Ray Tube

CS Coarse Synchronization

CSAR Combat Search and Rescue

CSC Creeping Line Single-Unit Coordinated

CSG Carrier Strike Group

CSR Creeping Line Single-Unit Radar

CTPM Common Tactical Picture Manager

CTW-6 Commander, Training Air Wing Six

CVIC Aircraft Carrier Intelligence Center

CVW Carrier Air Wing

CW Continuous Wave

CWC Composite Warfare Commander


GLOSSARY A-5

Acronym Definition

DA Decision Altitude

DA Drift Angle

DAISS Digital Airborne Intercommunications and Switching

System

DAMA Demand Assigned Multiple Access

DAP Downlinked Air Parameter

DCT direct (code type)

DDP Digital Data Processor

DE Directed Energy

DEWIZ Defense Early Warning Identification Zone

DF Direction Finder

DH Decision Height

DIM Daily Intentions Message

DINS Defense Internet NOTAM Service

DLRP Data Link Reference Point

DME Distance Measuring Equipment

DOA Direction of Arrival

DoD Department of Defense

DP Departure Procedure

DP/SID Departure Procedure/Standard Instrument Departure

DPG Digital Processing Group

DR Dead Reckoning

DSN Defense Switched Network

DST Daylight Saving Time

E East (when used with latitude and longitude)

E Eastern

EA Electronic Attack

ECHUM Electronic Chart Updating Manual

ECM Electronic Countermeasures

EET Estimated Elapsed Time

ELINT Electronic Intelligence

EM Electromagnetic


A-6 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility

EMCON Emissions Control

EO Electro-Optical

EOB Electronic Order of Battle

EOBT Estimated Off-Block Time

EP Electronic Protection

ES Electronic Support

ESA Emergency Safe Altitude

ESG Expeditionary Strike Group

ESM Electronic Support Measures

ETA Estimated Time of Arrival

ETE Estimated Time Enroute

EW Electronic Warfare

F2T2EA Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess

FA Aviation Area Forecast

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FAC(A) Forward Air Controller (Airborne)

FACSFAC Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility

FAR Federal Aviation Regulations

FDC Flight Data Center

FDOA Frequency Difference of Arrival

FEZ Fighter Engagement Zone

FIC Flight Information Center

FIH Flight Information Handbook

FIR Flight Information Region

FIS Flight Information Service

FJU Forwarding JTIDS Unit

FL Flight Level

FLIP Flight Information Publication

FLIR Forward Looking Infrared

FM Frequency Modulation


GLOSSARY A-7

Acronym Definition

FMS Flight Management System

FONOP Freedom of Navigation Operations

FOTC Force Track Coordination

FOV Field of View

fpm feet per minute

FRS Fleet Replacement Squadron

FS Fine Synchronization

FSS Flight Service Station

Ft feet or foot

FTC Force Track Coordinator

FWB Flight Weather Briefer

GARS Global Area Reference System

GEOREF Geographic Reference

GHz Gigahertz

GMT Greenwich Mean Time

GMTI Ground Moving Target Indicator

GNC Global Navigation and Planning Chart

GP General Planning

GPS Global Positioning System

GS Groundspeed

HAA Height Above Airport

HARM High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile

HAT Height Above Touchdown

HEC Helicopter Element Coordinator

HF High Frequency

Hr hour or hours

HSI Horizontal Situation Indicator

HWD Horizontal Weather Depiction

Hz hertz

I&W Indications and Warnings

IAF Initial Approach Fix


A-8 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

IAP Instrument Approach Procedure

IAS Indicated Airspeed

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICO Interface Control Officer

ICS Intercommunications System

IDM Improved Data Modem

IEJU Initial Entry JTIDS Unit

IEM Initial Entry Message

IFF Identification Friend or Foe

IFR Instrument Flight Rules

IIR Imaging IR

ILS Instrument Landing System

IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions

in inch or inches

in Hg inches of mercury

INCSEA Incidents On or Over the High Seas

INFLTREP In-Flight Report

INFOCON Information Operations Condition

INS Inertial Navigation System

IR IFR Military Route

IR Infrared

IRU Inertial Reference Unit

ISAR Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

IWC Information Operations Warfare Commander

JAFF Jamming and Chaff

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition

JEZ Joint Engagement Zone

JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander


GLOSSARY A-9

Acronym Definition

JHMCS Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System

JICO Joint Interface Control Officer

JMPS Joint Mission Planning System

JNC Jet Navigation Chart

JNL JTIDS Network Library

JRFL Joint Restricted Frequency List

JSOW Joint Standoff Weapon

JSTARS Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System

JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System

JU Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Unit

kbps kilobits per second

kg kilogram

kHz kilohertz

KIAS Knots Indicated Airspeed

K-KILL Catastrophic Kill

km kilometers

kt knot

kts knots

kW kilowatt

LAC Launch Area Coordinator

LAT/LONG Latitude and Longitude

lbs pounds

LKP Last Known Position

LO Low Observable

LOP Line of Position

LOS Line-of-Sight

LSP Launch Sequence Plan

LSRS Littoral Surveillance Radar System

LWR Laser Warning Receiver

M meters

m2 square meters


A-10 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

M Mach

MAC Maritime Air Control or Controller

MAD Magnetic Anomaly Detector or Detection

MAG VAR Magnetic Variation

MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defense Systems

MATT Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal

mb millibars

MC Magnetic Course

MC Mission Commander

MC2 Maritime Command and Control

MCA Minimum Crossing Altitude

MCS Multi-Crew Simulator

MCW Modulated Continuous Wave

MDA Minimum Descent Altitude

MEA Minimum Enroute Clearance

MEZ Missile Engagement Zone

MH Magnetic Heading

MHQ Maritime Headquarters

MHz megahertz

mi mile or miles

MIDS Multifunctional Information Distribution System

MILDEC Military Deception

MILSTAR Military Strategic and Tactical Relay

min minute or minutes

MIOC Maritime Interception Operations Commander

MITL Man-In-The-Loop

MIW Mine Warfare

MIWC Mine Warfare Commander

mm millimeters

MN Magnetic North

MOA Military Operations Area


GLOSSARY A-11

Acronym Definition

MOCA Minimum Obstruction Clearance Altitude

MPA Maritime Patrol Aircraft

MPR Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance

MPRF Medium Pulse Repetition Frequency

MRA Minimum Reception Altitude

MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile

ms millisecond

MSA Minimum Safe Altitude

MSA Minimum Sector Altitude

MSEC Message Security

MSL Mean Sea Level

MTI Moving Target Indicator

MTR Military Training

MWWA Military Weather Warning Advisory

MWS Missile Warning System

N north

NADGE NATO Air Defense Ground Environment

NAFC Naval Aviation Forecast Center

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATOPS Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures

Standardization

NAVAID Navigational Aid

NCCOSC Naval C2 and Ocean Surveillance Center

NC Navigation Controller

NCS Net Control Station

NDB Nondirectional Beacon

NDD Network Description Document

NDF Network Design Facility

NFDC National Flight Data Center

NFO Naval Flight Officer

NFOTS Naval Flight Officer Training System

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency


A-12 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

NMS Network Management System

NOTAM Notice to Airmen

NPG Network Participation Group

NRaD Naval Research and Development Division

NSFS Naval Surface Fire Support

NTAP Notices to Airmen Publication

NTR Net Time Reference

NWS National Weather Service

O Immediate (message type)

OA Operational Area

OARS Omega Aerial Refueling Services, Inc.

OJT On-the-Job Training

OMFTS Operational Maneuver From the Sea

ONC Operational Navigation Chart

ONSTA On Station

OPAREAS Operating Areas

OPARS Optimum Path Aircraft Routing System

OPNAVINST Chief of Naval Operations Instruction

OPR Other Performance Reports

OPSEC Operations Security

OPTASK Operation Task

OPTASK LINK Operational Tasking Data Links

ORM Operational Risk Management

OROCA Off-Route Obstruction Clearance Altitude

OSC On-Scene Commander

OTC Officer in Tactical Command

OTH Over-the-Horizon

P Precision (code signals only)

P Priority (message type)

PA Public Announcement

PACOM Pacific Command


GLOSSARY A-13

Acronym Definition

PAR Precision Approach Radar

PD Pulse Doppler

PD Pulse Duration

PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis

PIC Pilot in Command

PID Positive Identification

PIW Person In Water

PL Pulse Length

PLE Pulse Length Error

PMSV Pilot-to-Metro Service

POB Persons on Board

POD Probability of Detection

POS Protection of Shipping

POSS HIGH Possible-High

POSS LOW Possible-Low

PPE Personal Protective Equipment

PPI Planned Position Indicator

PPLI Precise Participant Location and Identification

PPR Preplanned Response

PPS Precise Positioning Service

PR Position Reference

PRF Pulse Repetition Frequency

PRI Pulse Repetition Interval

PROB Probable

PRT Pulse Repetition Time

PRU Primary User

PW Pulse Width

QSL Query Station Location

R Routine (message type)

R2 Reporting Responsibility

R/S Reed-Solomon


A-14 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

R/T Receiver/Transmitter

RAAF Royal Australian Air Force

RAC Risk Assessment Code

RADALT Radar Altimeter

RAM Rolling Airframe Missile

RB Relative Bearing

RCC Rescue Coordination Center

RCIED Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device

RCS Radar Cross Section

RELNAV Relative Navigation

RF Radio Frequency

RM Risk Management

Rmax Maximum Range

Rmin Minimum Range

RMP Recognized Maritime Picture

RNAV Area Nav

RNLAF Royal Netherlands Air Force

ROE Rules of Engagement

RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenade

RR Range Resolution

RSI Radiation Status Indicator

RTB Return to Base

RTF Return to Force

RTT Round Trip Timing

RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum

RWR Radar Warning Receiver

RWY Runway

S south

S/N (Ratio) Signal-to-Noise

SA Selective Availability

SA Situational Awareness


GLOSSARY A-15

Acronym Definition

SA Surveillance Area

SAG Surface Action Group

SAM Surface-to-Air Missile

SAR Search and Rescue

SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar

SATCOM Satellite Communications

SC Screen Commander

SCAR Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (Coordinator)

SCC Sea Combat Commander

SDP Signal Data Processor

SDU Secure Data Unit

SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

Sec seconds

SEC Submarine Element Coordinator

SID Subscriber Identifier

SID Standard Instrument Departure

SIF Selective Identification Feature

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SIGMET Significant Meteorological Information

SIPRNet SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network

SITREP Situation Report

SLAM Standoff Land Attack Missile

SLAM-ER Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response

SLMM Submarine Launched Module Mine

sm Statute Mile

SM Standard Missile

SMC SAR Mission Coordinator

SOAD Standoff Outside of Area Defense

SOCA Submarine Operations Coordinating Authority

SOI Signal of Interest

SOP Standard Operating Procedure


A-16 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

SPINS Special Instructions

SPRAC Special Reporting and Coordinating

SPS Standard Positioning Service

SR Scan Rate

SR Slow Speed Low Altitude Training Route

SRO Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations

SRU SAR Recovery Unit

SS Surface Search

SSC Surface Surveillance Coordination

SSE Spot Size Error

ST Scan Type

STAR Standard Terminal Arrival

STOM Ship to Objective Maneuver

STRW Strike Warfare

STWC Strike Warfare Commander

SUWC Surface Warfare Commander

TACAIC Tactical Air Intercept Control

TACAN Tactical Air Navigation

TACC Tactical Air Command Center

TACON Tactical Control

TACPLOT Tactical Plot

TAD Tactical Air Direction

TADIL Tactical Digital Information Link

TAS True Airspeed

TB True Bearing

TC True Course

TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System

TCN Terminal Change Notice

TD Transponder

TDC Track Data Coordinator

TDD Target Detection Device


GLOSSARY A-17

Acronym Definition

TDL Tactical Data Link

TDS Tactical Data System

TDMA Time Division Multiple Access

TDOA Time Difference of Arrival

TF Task Force

TG Task Group

TH True Heading

TLAM Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

T/M/S Type/Model/Series

TN True North

T/O Takeoff

TOC Table of Contents

TOO Targets of Opportunity

TPC Tactical Pilotage Chart

TQ Track Quality

TSCM Tactical Strike Coordination Module

TSEC Transmission Security

TSR Time Slot Reallocation

TST Time Sensitive Target

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

TTY Teletype

TVM Track Via Missile

TWA Trailing Wire Antenna

UAS Unmanned Aerial System

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UHF Ultra-High Frequency

UIR Upper Flight Information Region

UMFO Undergraduate Military Flight Officer

UN United Nations

UNK Unknown

URG CDR Underway Replenishment Group Commander


A-18 GLOSSARY

Acronym Definition

USA United States Army

USAF United States Air Force

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

USNO United States Naval Observatory

UT Universal Time

UTC Universal Time Coordinated

V/STOL Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing

VA Vital Area

VERTREP Vertical Replenishment

VFR Visual Flight Rules

VHF Very High Frequency

VIP Very Important Person

VLS Vertical Launching System

VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions

VOI Vessels of Interest

VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol

VOR VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range

VORTAC VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range and Tactical Air

Navigation

VPN Voice Production Net

VR VFR Military Training Route

VSI Vertical Speed Indicator

VTUAV Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial

Vehicle

W watt or watts

W West (when used with latitude and longitude)

W Western

WARM War Reserve Mode

WAS War at Sea

WEZ Weapons Engagement Zone

WGS 84 World Geodetic System 1984


GLOSSARY A-19

Acronym Definition

WPT Waypoint

WSM Waterspace Management

WSO Weapons System Operator

WW Severe Weather Watch Bulletin

yd yard or yards

Z Zulu

Z Flash (message type)


A-20 GLOSSARY
