FLEET ARCTIC OPERATIONS GAME - SLDinfo.com · Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report 5 Primary Findings Theme 1: The U.S. Navy is inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime

FLEET ARCTIC OPERATIONS GAME

GAME REPORT

U.S. Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

Report Prepared By:

Director: CDR Christopher Gray

Designer: Prof. Leif Bergey

Analyst: Prof. Walter A. Berbrick

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November 14, 2011

The War Gaming Department of the U.S. Naval War College hosted the Fleet Arctic

Operations Game on 13-16 September 2011. The following document was prepared by the

War Gaming Department faculty and has been reviewed by the appropriate game sponsor

staff personnel. The findings in this report reflect the observations, insights and

recommendations that were derived from the participants during game play.

The War Gaming Department conducts high quality research, analysis, gaming, and

education to support the Naval War College mission, prepare future maritime leaders, and

help shape key decisions on the future of the Navy. The War Gaming Department strives to

provide interested parties with intellectually honest analysis of complex problems using a

wide range of research tools and analytical methodologies.

Game reports are developed for the game sponsor; however, the game report and related data

may be available on an as-requested basis. For additional information please contact the

Chairman, War Gaming Department, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI

02841 or via electronic mail at [email protected]. Further information may be found

on our website, located at www.usnwc.edu/wargaming.

David A. DellaVolpe

Chairman

War Gaming Department

U.S. Naval War College

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.usnwc.edu/wargaming

Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report

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Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................................... 4

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 7

II. GAME DESIGN & RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ......................................................................... 9

Discussion of Game Design ...................................................................................................................... 9

Game Mechanics ..................................................................................................................................... 10

Analytic Framing .................................................................................................................................... 11

Collection Approach ............................................................................................................................... 13

III. ANALYSIS & RESULTS .............................................................................................................. 15

Analysis of Game Moves ........................................................................................................................ 15

Updates to Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS ......................................................................... 40

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................ 52

APPENDICES AND SUPPLEMENTAL DATA ....................................................................................... 57

Appendix A – Summary of Game Moves and Scenarios ........................................................................... 58

Appendix B - Final Plenary – Prioritized Solutions.................................................................................. 155

Appendix C - Survey Questionnaires ........................................................................................................ 162

Appendix D – Game Schedule .................................................................................................................. 165

Appendix F –Limitations of Game Design and Analysis ......................................................................... 172

Appendix G – Definition of Terms ........................................................................................................... 174

Appendix H – Data Collection Roles and Assignments ........................................................................... 176

REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................... 178


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The United States Naval War College (NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island hosted the Fleet Arctic

Operations Game (FAOG) on 13-16 September 2011. The FAOG was developed and executed

under the sponsorship of Commander, Second Fleet (C2F) initially and then Commander, U.S.

Fleet Forces (USFF) following the integration of the two staffs. The purpose of the FAOG was to

identify gaps that limit sustained maritime operations in the Arctic and recommend DOTMLPF-

P actions in order to inform United States Navy leadership.

After reviewing the research literature, the game sponsor and NWC Wargaming Department

(WGD) jointly developed three overarching objectives based on C2F‟s areas of interest:

Develop prioritized DOTMLPF-P maritime actions which support implementation of the

Arctic Road Map.

List the DOTMLPF-P gaps in maritime forces‟ ability to conduct sustained maritime

operations in the Arctic.

Develop near-term strategies to mitigate these identified gaps.

These objectives were framed to consider the operational level factors (e.g., risk, time space,

force composition, physical and environmental) that influence the maritime force‟s ability to

perform its missions. Additionally, these objectives allowed for consideration of potential

partnerships and interoperability issues encountered among U.S. and international forces and

organizations.

Participants and Game Structure

In addition to serving as a highly analytic event, the FAOG was designed to enhance

participants‟ understanding of potential challenges and cooperative strategies for conducting

sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. Players were selected based on their specialized

knowledge of the Arctic region or functional expertise related to planning, operations and cold

weather systems. A broad range of backgrounds were sought to ensure that as many perspectives

and variables as possible were considered during game play. More than half of the participants in

the four planning cells came from military and civilian operational commands and provided

expert perspectives from various aspects of sustaining operations in an austere environment. The

players in the White Cell were primarily from government, academia and industry and provided

expertise on strategy and policy as well as systems and climatology issues concerning the Arctic

region.


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Primary Findings

Theme 1: The U.S. Navy is inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime

operations in the Arctic region. This assertion is due to the poor reliability of current

capabilities as well as the need to develop new partnerships, ice capable platforms,

infrastructure , satellite communications and training. Efforts to strengthen relationships

and access to specialized capabilities and information should be prioritized. Currently, U.S.

Forces are characterized by an inability to reliably perform and maintain operations in the austere

Arctic environment. Reliability is improved by the acquisition and development of information

and capabilities made available through strong relationships in order to complete the mission and

reduce the likelihood of risk. The U.S. Navy currently must seek these from external

stakeholders.

Theme 2: As weather and climate conditions intensify (particularly the presence of ice,

strong winds and fog) and as the total time and distance traveled during an operation

increases, the greater the risk of both mission failure and loss of or harm to friendly forces

becomes. Players placed significant importance on the idea that harsh environmental conditions

and large distances will likely create uncertainty in planning and the timeliness of response,

which in turn could create conditions which exceed current operational capabilities.

Understanding the austere Arctic environment and its impact on the design limitations of aircraft

and surface warships is critical to planning operations in the Arctic region.

Theme 3: In order to reduce risk, players increasingly relied on additional information and

capabilities through partnerships with the USCG, JTF Alaska, tribal leaders, industry, and

multinational partners. As risk increased due to extreme climatic conditions and increased

operating and support distances, there was a corresponding increase in the need for specialized

information and capabilities. As this trend increased, the required information and capabilities

became less available in the U.S. Navy and planners were forced to look elsewhere for the

capabilities needed to execute their mission tasking. At the low end of the scale, these could be

found inside DoD, but eventually planners needed to rely on industry, international partners, or

the whole of U.S. Government. This further reiterates that sustainability in Arctic operations is

significantly dependent on strong relationships with international, regional and local partners in

government and industry. Mechanisms that strengthen these ties should be prioritized in future

planning.

Theme 4: The future application of solutions developed during the game was influenced by

the frequency of operations and desired reliability of U.S. Naval forces in the Arctic.

Specifically, the more frequent or consistently expected operations or missions would be

conducted, the more suitable long term proposed solutions were found to be. Conversely, when

less frequent or consistent operations or missions were anticipated, mitigating strategies or short-

term solutions were found to be acceptable. Long term solutions tended to be more formalized


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and structured in nature while the majority of mitigating strategies were more informal,

temporary and less structured.

Subsidiary Findings

Major DOTMLPF-P Gaps, Mitigating Strategies and Proposed Solutions

The overall assessment produced by the game was that the U.S. Navy does not have the means

needed to support sustained operations in the Arctic. This was due primarily to the lack of

appropriate ship types to operate in or near Arctic ice, the lack of support facilities in the Arctic,

and finally the lack of sufficient or capable logistics connectors to account for the long logistics

distances and lack of facilities. As noted in Theme 1, these gaps were mitigated or closed

through the use of domestic and international relationships with military, coast guard and

industry partners which made information or capabilities available to support scenario missions.

However, the game identified that many of these relationships and the information and capability

requirements that they enable do not exist or are poorly defined, further exacerbating the materiel

issues listed above.

Major CONOPS Changes

Overall, the players identified the Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS as a valuable tool

to support sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. There were three primary changes

identified to the CONOPS. First, the focus of the CONOPS should be shifted from warfighting to

include the missions identified by Task Force Climate Change as more likely to be a

requirement. These include HA/DR, regional security cooperation, maritime security and

Maritime Domain Awareness missions. Second, the CONOPS needs to address the likelihood

that mission requirements will include short notice crisis response actions. Currently, all

planning guidance in the CONOPS allows for extended planning and deployment timelines.

Third, the CONOPS should be expanded from an Atlantic Fleet perspective to address access to

the Arctic from the Pacific and operations in multiple Combatant Commander and fleet areas or

responsibility (AORs).

Recommendations

The recommendations generated by this game are characterized by their potential for immediate

impact at the operational level and the feasibility of near-term implementation. These actions are:

establish USFF Arctic Working Group or Arctic Center of Excellence; update CONOPS and

applicable doctrine to reflect game insights; deploy to the Arctic; build domestic and

international relationships; develop and manage lessons learned database; and pursue identified

areas for further research.


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I. INTRODUCTION

Statement of Sponsor’s Interest in this Topic

Commander, USFF requested the Naval War College (NWC) to develop and execute a game

which explored potential gaps that limit the U.S. Navy‟s ability to conduct sustained maritime

operations in the Arctic. This game, referred to hereafter as the Fleet Arctic Operations Game

(FAOG), sought to identify specific capability gaps, mitigating strategies and proposed solutions

to conducting sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. Additionally, this game sought to

identify improvements to the Arctic Maritime Response Force Concept of Operations

(CONOPS) within the context of eight distinct scenarios. USFF‟s primary interest in exploring

operations in the Arctic within this context stems from the premise stated in the Arctic Road Map

that changing conditions in the Arctic (e.g., opening of new passages and an increase in

commercial shipping) will require an increased U.S. Navy presence. In order to respond to any

emerging threat or incident in the Arctic, USFF also posited that numerous gaps exist in the

Navy‟s ability to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic.

The two overarching documents that guided the development of this research project included

the C2F Arctic Maritime Response Force Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Initial Draft

Version 1 and the United States Navy Arctic Road Map. The CONOPS provided primary

reference for the players during game play, and was used during post-game analysis for

comparing and contrasting findings of the game.

Objectives/Rationale for this Game

Based on USFF‟s area of interest and informed by the scholarly literature review, the Fleet

Arctic Operations Game was structured to explore three objectives. The mutually-agreed-upon

objectives developed by C2F and the War Gaming Department of the Naval War College are:

• Develop a prioritized list of DOTMLPF-P maritime actions to support implementation of

the Arctic Road Map at the Operational Level.

• List DOTMLPF-P gaps in the maritime forces‟ ability to conduct sustained maritime

operations in the Arctic.

• Develop near-term strategies to mitigate identified gaps and update the Arctic Maritime

Response Force (AMRF) CONOPS.

It should be noted that all three objectives are primarily analytical in nature. However, this event

was also designed to provide experiential value for the players who participated.


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Overarching Research Questions

Based upon USFF‟s area of interest, subsequent literature review by the Naval War College‟s

WGD faculty, and the three primary objectives for this game, the following three overarching

research questions were developed:

What DOTMLPF-P gaps limit the Navy‟s ability to conduct sustained maritime

operations in the Arctic?

What near-term strategies mitigate these DOTMLPF-P gaps?

What are the prioritized DOTMLPF-P maritime actions which support implementation of

the Arctic Road Map?

These research questions are framed to consider the operational level factors (e.g., risk, time

space, force composition, physical and environmental) that influence the maritime force‟s ability

to perform its missions. Additionally, these research questions will also consider potential

partnerships and interoperability issues encountered among U.S. and international forces and

organizations.

Identification of Independent and Dependent Variables

The two independent variables in this game consist of the DOTMLPF-P gaps (x1) and near-term

mitigating strategies (x2). The primary dependent variable is the cells ability to conduct

sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. In addition, in order to fully assess the U.S. Navy‟s

ability to conduct sustained military operations in the Arctic, a series of mediator (z) variables,

including the operational factors (e.g. time, space, force composition) (z1) and physical and

environmental factors (z2) are introduced throughout the entire duration of game play. These

factors are pre-scripted and tailored to each move during the game and are provided to the

players prior to execution. These mediating variables were assigned in a manner to be

progressively more challenging for the players as the game progressed.


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II. GAME DESIGN & RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Discussion of Game Design

Faculty assigned to the NWC‟s War Gaming Department (WGD) within the Center for Naval

Warfare Studies (CNWS) engaged in a preliminary literature review in order to appropriately

delve into C2F‟s area of interest. The two overarching documents that guided the development of

this research project included the C2F Arctic Maritime Response Force Concept of Operations

(CONOPS) Initial Draft Version 1 and the United States Navy Arctic Road Map. The CONOPS

served as the primary reference for the players during game play, and was used during post-game

analysis for comparing and contrasting findings of the game. Review of additional literature of

historical writings on Arctic operations using student papers in the Naval War College library

was also sought.

As an applied research and evaluation project, a one sided, seminar style game, which

incorporated elements of the operational planning process, was designed in order to focus on

specific events through an inductive lens. Such a process is best suited when addressing complex

operational issues including those raised in the research questions. This approach also affords

the opportunity to have the experts, operators, and planners from multiple disciplines describe

the operational environment in the Arctic, assesses current and future programs and systems, and

identify challenges to sustaining maritime operations in the Arctic. The game empowered

participants to make assessments of various conditions and factors impacting the ability to

conduct sustained maritime operations. The value of this methodology is that it opened the

aperture and allowed the participants to explore the issues from many angles without having the

participants be constrained by any single hypothesis. This was a single continuous game whereby

each move built upon previous ones. Throughout each move, players were afforded the

opportunity to use previous improvements made to the CONOPS and apply them to following

moves.

An independent white cell reviewed and analyzed player cell derived plans to develop an insights

and implications product. The White Cell was comprised of approximately thirty senior U.S.

civilian and military stakeholders with extensive knowledge of current future maritime

capabilities and programs, as well as representatives from several international maritime partner

nations and Arctic subject matter experts from academe. The White Cell was charged with

reviewing and analyzing each cell‟s course of action gaps, mitigating strategies, proposed

solutions and CONOPS updates. During this review process, the Cell generated a PowerPoint

Slide that captured their major insights and implications. White Cell members developed these

inputs through the lenses of C2, Intel, FIRES, Logistics and other observations. During game


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play, members of the White Cell also answered incoming requests for information (RFIs) from

each of the player cells. White Cell members participated in all combined plenary sessions.

In order to ground the players in a shared experience, the Fleet Arctic Operations Game began on

September 13, 2011 with several background briefs covering the Arctic Maritime Response

Force Concept of Operations, cold weather systems and platforms and programs, as well as U.S.

and International maritime perspectives on current operations in the Arctic.

Game Mechanics

Following the briefing sessions, approximately 88 players were divided into five focus groups

(or cells), with 56 players in each of groups A, B, C and D to examine sustained operations in the

Arctic from Atlantic and Pacific coast perspectives, and 32 players in the White Cell developed

strategic level insights and implications of each groups‟ moves. A summary of the players‟

backgrounds, including functional area of expertise, education, and years of experience is found

in Appendix E of this game report. A technology demonstration of the knowledge management

game tool and Multi Touch Multi User interface was presented to the players.

Subsequently, players engaged in an operational domain problem framing activity to explore

various factors (i.e., people, places, environment, and relationships) that maritime leaders should

consider when planning or conducting sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. Definitions

for each of these factors are found in Appendix F of this game report. This activity served as a

mechanism to foster robust, facilitated discussion within the game cells and as the initial mission

analysis phase for scenarios that would be introduced the following day. Insights from this

activity can be found in section III of this report.

At the conclusion of the facilitated discussion, participants completed a baseline survey and post-

activity survey to capture their individual thoughts and insights (see Appendix C). Each cell

populated proposed planning assumptions into the game tool, which served as an input by the

Control Cell for the development of the overarching assumptions used for game play.

Additionally, the control cell examined the survey data, key insights presented in plenary and

critical assumptions identified by the analysis team during this activity. The control team

developed injects for subsequent game moves in order to provide players a common foundation

to plan from.

At the beginning of each move, the cells were presented with a scenario which included the

environmental conditions, tailored operational task, and strategic guidance from command

authority. These scenarios (e.g., missions and environmental conditions) provided players with

the opportunity to plan sustained maritime operations in the Arctic under myriad conditions

which became more challenging as the game progressed. Cell A (Atlantic) was paired with Cell

B (Pacific) and Cell C (Atlantic) with Cell D (Pacific). Within a move, each pair received a


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different scenario which was additionally tailored for the geographic area for each cell. During

moves, all four cells concurrently sought to develop a Course of Action which focused

discussion on efforts to identify gaps, mitigating strategies, proposed solutions, and

improvements to the CONOPS associated with that scenario. Players supported the development

of a PowerPoint presentation which summarized the major insights derived from the group

during the move. These PowerPoint slides were used as to stimulate discussion in facilitated

plenary sessions. Finally, players completed a post-move survey to capture individual

perspectives and opinions.

At the conclusion of each move, Cells A and B, and cells C and D subsequently came together

for two distinct moderated plenary discussions. During these sessions, the group leads presented

the cells Course of Action and major insights regarding gaps, solutions and improvements to the

CONOPS. Subsequently, a Naval War College faculty member facilitated follow-on discussions

regarding key insights and themes developed by the analysis team where participants had the

opportunity to compare and contrasted insights identified in their respective groups. On the final

day of the game, each cell prioritized an aggregated list of mitigating strategies and proposed

solutions developed by all cells over game play. Players then engaged in two distinct final

combined plenary sessions. Additional player insights not readily discernable from the

PowerPoint briefs were captured.

Analytic Framing

The overall framing for this game is a combination of qualitative grounded induction (framed

through the C2F‟s lens of U.S. Navy presence in the Arctic) and more traditional quantitative

deduction. The post-game analytic process follows a widely-used process referred to as

triangulation. Current thinking in the field of social research suggests that a variety of analytic

tools should be employed in behaviorally based activities such as war games, thus maximizing

the credibility of the worki. One widely accepted methodology that takes advantage of multiple

data collection techniques is “triangulation.ii This approach allows us to derive the same or very

similar conclusions using different datasets or methods.iii

Much of the strength of triangulation

stems from its ability to “distinguish between the idiosyncratic…and the representative.”iv

This

method also allows the researcher to “…base inquiry in the assumptions being used… [and]

evaluate questions…with the appropriate methodology rather than the methodology driving the

evaluation.”v

Consistent with this approach, data streams collected during this game will incorporate a variety

of research procedures into analysis. A brief description of each analytic tool follows. The

overarching triangulation approach is also depicted in the figure found in this section of the

DCAP.


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Content Analysis: Described as “a…method whereby a researcher seeks objectively to

describe the content of communication messages that people have previously

produced”vi

. “Content analysis involves identifying coherent and important

examples…and patterns in the data… [and subdividing]…data into coherent categories,

patterns, and themes.”vii

For the purposes of this game, content will be binned to

determine which, if any, of the focus areas presented in this DCAP are supported by

player actions, comments, or control team assessment.

Grounded Theory: A more detailed, methodologically sound approach to analysis than

the initial step of content analysis, grounded theory employs systematic, hierarchical

procedures to develop inductively derived theory grounded in data. Rooted from the

discipline of sociology, grounded theory “directs researchers to look for patterns in data

so that they can make general statements about the phenomena they examined”viii

. For the

purposes of this game, the DCAT will be using “an inductive, theory discovery

methodology that allows the researcher to develop a theoretical account of the general

features of a topic while simultaneously grounding the account in empirical observations

or data”ix

The primary tool used during post game analysis to facilitate this process is

Atlas.ti. Coding will consist of both selective and in-vivo techniques, based on the

DCAT‟s review of the relevant literature and the suggested key search terms in the

players‟ own words.

Data Visualization: Atlas.ti, a grounded induction coding software will be used to depict

associations and relationships between disparate data. Word Clouds also were generated

to capture and visually depict most frequent words derived from participants. x

Ethnography: DCAT members will capture qualitative, descriptive data through

observation and listening to participants within a natural setting to understand the social

interactions and rational of their decisions and activities during the course of game play..


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In addition to these four primary analytic processes, Likert-based survey questions were

analyzed using descriptive tools such as mean, median, mode, standard deviation, and variance.

This allowed the DCAT to discuss the variance and player cohesion across the cells.

.

Collection Approach

The datasets collected and analyzed in this game are considered descriptive because they “reveal

the nature of certain situations, settings, processes, relationships… [and] systems…”xi

Because

Content

Analysis

Data Visualization

Grounded Theory

Ethnography Descriptive Statistics


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they are descriptive, the focus of the DCAT prior to presenting these datasets to the Commander,

USFF is to aggregate and “assess the data and clarify the information that has been gathered”xii

.

The primary datasets that were aggregated in this game are, in priority order, (1) Player

Generated insights via Game Tool, (2) Player Surveys, (3) Plenary PowerPoint slides, and (4)

Ethnographic notes from cell interactions and plenary sessions (5) Web IQ inputs. A summary of

the datasets and their corresponding analytic methodologies are included in Annex (F).

All of the Data Collection and Analysis Team (DCAT) members involved in these collection

efforts received instruction in proper data capture techniques during a pre-game bootstrap

session. DCAT members were responsible for ensuring quality assurance/quality control of the

datasets submitted during game play. Specifically, DCAT members ensured the following

parameters were implemented for these four datasets used for post-game analysis and

development of final deliverables:

Formatting and standardization: Game control staff will have available standard

templates for PowerPoint deliverables and data collection notes. Templates will be

located in folders for each cell and move. PowerPoint slides will be completed to the

same standard across all four game cells.

Internal validity: Collection instruments are designed correctly to ensure that accurate

conclusions can be drawn from the data. To ensure their proper use during game play,

specific internal validity issues with these instruments and the information they are

designed to collect were identified during the Alpha and Beta tests.

External validity: Due to the inherent challenges posed by ensuring consistent,

accurate measurement in gamesxiii

, criterion validity is used to “see if the results from

an item or set of measures (a scale) are similar to some external standards or

criteria.”xiv

External validity applies predominately to the baseline questions that will

be asked in the individual player surveys to be captured via the Unclassified

GAMENET on 13 through 16 September 2011. In order to “provide…quality controls

on data collection”xv

these questions were evaluated by an internal focus group as part

of the Alpha and Beta testing process, prior to being deployed in the game.

Specific roles were assigned to the DCAT based upon their experience, education, and interests.

The specific functions assigned to the DCAT, along with the names of those personnel

designated to perform them, are as follows:


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III. ANALYSIS & RESULTS

Analysis of Game Moves

This section provides an overview of the main themes that players derived as justifications for

the activities they discussed. The analysis team explored these player-derived themes and

compared them to the data from game play. Players, through an inductive reasoning process,

derived a number of hypotheses or themes throughout the game and coalesced on the final day of

game play. A mixed methods approach, consisting of various qualitative and quantitative

techniques was utilized for triangulation purposes in order to achieve credible and reliable

findings from the data collected. Game data were coded, grouped in categories, and themes were

developed by the analysis team. Data included post-move surveys, group PowerPoint slides,

ethnographic notes, cell game tool decisions, and Web IQ threaded discussions.

Theme 1: The U.S. Navy is inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime

operations in the Arctic region. This assertion is due to the poor reliability of current

capabilities as well as the need to develop new partnerships, ice capable platforms,

infrastructure development and training. Efforts to strengthen relationships and access to

specialized capabilities and information should be prioritized.

Sustainability creates and maintains the conditions which allow maritime forces to carry out

operations at the operational level within a sea, or ocean area, the adjacent coastal area, islands,

and the airspace above in order to achieve a desired end state. Sustainability is ensured by the

maintenance and acquisition of requisite capabilities and resources to carry out operations in the

Arctic region. Accordingly, reliability emerged as a key enabling factor to ensure sustainability

and reduce risk. Currently, U.S. Forces are characterized by an inability to reliably perform and

maintain operations in the austere Arctic environment. Reliability is improved by the acquisition

and development of information and capabilities made available through strong relationships in

order to complete the mission and reduce the likelihood of risk. The U.S. Navy currently must

seek these from external stakeholders. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the major

categories and relationships that were derived from game play, which in turn, form the basis for

subsequent sections under theme 1. This relationship is described in Figure 1 which shows

reliability and sustainability to be linked to specialized information and capabilities which are

currently enabled by strong relationships. Theme 1 depicts the major areas focused on during

game play and concludes that, of the DOTMLPF-P and CONOPS recommendations described in

this report, those actions connected to strengthening relationships and improving the availability

of specialized information and capabilities should have the highest priority for the U.S. Navy.


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Figure 1. Themes and Relationships Diagram

Relationships and Partnerships

Coordination and Collaboration

Building maritime partnerships with Arctic countries is critical prior to planning for or

responding to any emerging crisis in the region. The need for regional cooperative security

agreements with international navies and coast guards was identified in order to ensure reliability

and sustainment of future contingency operations. Similarly, due to budget constraints and

limited capabilities and resources, an increased emphasis was on the need to leverage regional

partner capacities. This cooperation and coordination focused on all countries that make up the

Arctic nations or those with Arctic capabilities. Specifically, leveraging multinational maritime

ice breakers, ice-capable vessels, and the need to share information related to maritime activity

and the environment (e.g., weather, ice, fog, etc.) was postulated in order to develop and

maintain Arctic Domain Awareness.

In order to improve interoperability, leverage capabilities, and share information between

services, interagency and international maritime partners in the long term, the establishment of a

standing Arctic Joint Task Force or maritime coordination center was suggested. When

describing characteristics of this future cooperative security model, participants drew several

parallels to Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South. This model was commonly referred to

as „JIATF- North‟. It was also suggested that this model could fall under the responsibility of


17

Commander, U.S. Northern Command. Conversely, this model was also discussed as a

supporting element to a much broader security initiative within the Arctic Council. The existing

Joint Task Force (JTF) Alaska model was also highlighted as a means to facilitate cooperation

and coordination among entities. However, discussions over the course of the game rapidly

evolved to encompass a much broader scope of regional partnerships. The use of Arctic

exchange officers on Canadian, Russian, Norwegian and Danish ships was recommended in

order to build experience and corporate knowledge in the region.

While player moves across the game leveraged substantial international support and

coordination, players simultaneously sought to leverage and integrate all domestic resources,

training, and capabilities. Due to budget constraints, capability gaps in resources, lack of subject

matter expertise and operational experience, as well as the distance from homeport to theater,

players asserted that the Department of Defense should consider the formulation of a “Whole of

Government” strategy to facilitate operations in the Artic.

Discussing the relevance of relationships in the Arctic, it was suggested to “institutionalize

relationships to leverage available assets from all potential sources; the Navy has extremely

limited capability to project power in a surface maritime environment, on behalf of U.S. in the

Arctic, including our own U.S. waters, regardless of the geopolitical or emergency situation.”

Leverage Industry Capabilities and Best Practices

The United States Navy should leverage industry and commercial capabilities to aid in

navigation, sustainment and replenishment at sea. Establishing relationships with regional

suppliers was identified as an essential first step to better understanding the challenges and best

practices for operating in the austere environment. In order to support these initiatives, the

development and application of procedures and policies for non-traditional logistical support to

operations is needed. One cell suggested using NAVSEA engineers to resolve integration issues

between naval platforms, systems, the operating environment and industry. Initiating these

concepts would provide reliability, in terms of quicker access to capabilities that are currently

limited or nonexistent in the Arctic region.

Limited Capabilities and Platforms

Acquisition of Ice-Capable Vessels

The limited availability of ice-capable platforms and fuel was a consistent theme that emerged

from game play. Throughout the game, the severity of risk to mission and friendly forces was

attributed to the inability to effectively sustain operations as a result of limited ice capable

platforms. Accordingly, the most significant capability gap identified throughout the game was

the inability to navigate in the Arctic region due to the lack of ice capable vessels. Without these


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mission-capable assets, the U.S. Navy cannot sustain operations without substantial support from

the U.S. Coast Guard and international partners.

Accordingly, a comprehensive acquisition strategy for procuring, leasing, and retrofitting ice

capable platforms is needed in order to support sustained year round operations in the Arctic.

Specifically, the need to improve existing USCG ice breakers (AGBs), procure additional ice

breakers for use by the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, and the need to retrofit existing U.S. Navy

vessels was also identified. The need to generate requirements for heavy lift, cold-weather

capable and vertical lift capable aircraft as well as the acquisition of U.S. organic ice rated units

to conduct work in the Arctic was highly suggested. One player noted, “Because the Arctic

environment is vastly different from most operating environments, the development of an

acquisition strategy should be analogous to preparing platforms to operate in high temperature

desert conditions”.

The development of an Arctic Capabilities Strategy “must include educational, developmental

and operational components” to facilitate cooperative exercises with relevant U.S. and

international stakeholders through “testing of actual capabilities of a range of seasonal

conditions.” Lessons learned from Arctic operations “would integrate into Service POMs,

CCDR IPLs, and other USG resource claimant processes, as well as policy processes and

priorities. The Arctic needs to be considered from both sovereignty and energy aspects, as well

as other concerns.”

Satellite Communications (SATCOM)

The reliability reach-back capabilities and robust communications is critical in the rapidly

changing conditions in the Arctic. Currently, the ability to sustain communications with chain of

command while operating in the Arctic is limited due to the ineffectiveness of geosynchronous

satellite coverage in the Arctic Circle. The acquisition of additional satellite coverage and

bandwidth, the need to generate requirements for that coverage, and the of increase global

commercial and military satellite communications footprint was discussed as essential elements

for obtaining access in the Arctic.

Logistics and Infrastructure Development

The insufficient infrastructure to facilitate logistics when attempting to sustain operations in the

Arctic was heavily emphasized in the game. The United States cannot conduct sustained

operations in the Arctic without a reliable fuel source. Harsh environmental and physical

conditions demand special considerations in order for critical systems to function and support

any shipboard or aircraft operations. In order to mitigate these challenges in the short term, the

United States Navy should leverage DOD, industry and multinational logistics hubs and

platforms. In the long term, the development of permanent infrastructure at the mid-point of a

NWP transit capable of providing fuel to maritime assets was recommended. Additionally, the


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strategic positioning of port facilities throughout the Arctic in order to resupply vessels in transit

was highly desired. The development of doctrine for logistical support to operations in the

Arctic was also highlighted throughout game play. One cell described the need to incorporate

maintenance practices to include augmenting Operational Sequencing System (OSS) procedures

in current doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).

Knowledge and Awareness

There was a substantial lack of knowledge and awareness among U.S. Navy personnel of

required training and capabilities that generate requisite capabilities (e.g., platforms, systems,

equipment, etc.). Specifically, there was a considerable gap in awareness and knowledge among

U.S. maritime operators and planners with respect to the environment (e.g., climate and wildlife).

Personnel planning or deploying to the Arctic would require specialized skill sets which are not

currently available in U.S. Navy training pipeline or professional military education. One player

noted “Encountering unpredictable sea ice conditions will present a planning challenge, of which

can only be overcome by institutional awareness and responsive adaptive force packaging.”

With respect to environmental data, accurate and timely environmental data (e.g., hydrographic

surveys, typography, and forecasting) is essential to decreasing risk to mission and friendly

forces and the overall success of the mission. Particularly, one player noted, “the accuracy in

data related to the environment will aid planners and operators for potential missions in the

region.” Current hydrographic surveys being conducted were described as “inadequate to safely

conduct sustained Arctic operations.” Players also identified the inability to understand the

widely distributed and diverse group of semiaquatic marine mammals in the Arctic region.

However, of all wildlife species discussed, the polar bear continuously emerged because of its

dependence on sea ice, its significance to the Arctic marine ecosystem and interaction with

potential visitors (e.g., maritime operators in the region).

In order to achieve and manage shared awareness, foster creative thinking and explore various

issues and problems related to the Arctic, the establishment of an Arctic “Center of Excellence

(COE)” was suggested. This center would facilitate research, education and training for

deployed U.S. Navy operators and other joint, interagency and international stakeholders

deploying to the Arctic region. Developing, executing and maintaining this COE was discussed

as a primary augment to the proposed JIATF-North concept. Specifically, there is a need to focus

on the education of Arctic operations, the environment, and current and future infrastructure,

capabilities, and partnerships.

Training for Planners and Operators

The overarching theme derived from „training‟ focused on the need to identify a comprehensive

list of training prerequisites in order to conduct sustained cold weather operations and determine

which training should be developed and maintained within the Department of the Navy.


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Emphasis was placed on consistent coordination with USCG to identify and coordinate Arctic

related training requirements. Similarly, there is also a need to develop and execute training with

international partners in the region. The focus was specifically related to coordinating and

leveraging training curricula and facilities of Canada, Norway, and Russia in order to garner

specific tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting sustained maritime operations in the

Arctic. Lastly, the USN needs to train deployed personnel in polar bear mitigation, cold weather

systems and platforms, cold weather survivability, and cold weather gear.

Lessons Learned

Lesson learned in the form of knowledge or understanding of operations in the Arctic gained by

experience through both US and international maritime stakeholders was a key requirement

generated by the game. “There needs to be a paradigm shift from lessons learned to lessons

applied.” An increased focus was placed on the limited application of lessons learned among

U.S. Navy personnel from previous operations to new ones. These lessons learned were viewed

as a key vehicle to improve both individual and organizational proficiency, inform planning, and

risk management for a particular operation in the Arctic region.

Due to the lack of knowledge and experience of U.S. Navy planning and operations in the Arctic,

the USN should seek to leverage lessons learned from USCG, industry and multinational

partners. There was also an overwhelmingly need to develop and institutionalize a process to

capture key lessons learned regarding Arctic operations and integrate them into planning and the

CONOPS. Lessons learned should be managed and disseminated through central database or

forum in order to provide consistency, accuracy and timeliness of information. This information

should be complementary to the CONOPS and AJP 3.1

Conversely, lessons learned were also discussed in terms of how other relevant stakeholders in

the Arctic could leverage U.S. Navy lessons learned. The Joint Lessons Learned Information

System (JLLIS) was noted as an entity that could facilitate this process or be integrated into a

database that captures specific lessons learned related to the Arctic. One player noted, “Having a

reliable and efficient central location for planners and operators to go to prepare for this

environment would be invaluable.” Specifically, there is a need to capture and integrate key

lessons learned in the areas of logistics and refueling, local culture, existing relationships among

industry and multinational partners, and how the environment impacts platforms and systems.

The Arctic Submarine Lab was frequently cited as an existing forum that captures key lessons

learned related to operations in the Arctic.

Lastly, the proposed Arctic “Center of Excellence” was cited as a tool that could be maintained

or integrated into a more structured formalized working group or forum in the U.S. Navy that

facilities all information related to planning and operations in the Arctic (e.g., at the operational


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level). This formalized group of subject matter experts would be complementary to Task Force

Climate Change, which conducts strategic level analysis on matters related to the Arctic.

Theme 2: As weather and climate conditions intensify (particularly the presence of ice,

strong winds and fog) and as the total time and distance traveled during an operation

increases, the greater the risk of both mission failure and loss of or harm to friendly forces.

While this conclusion may seem rather intuitive, it is fully supported by the analysis of player

responses and game play. In the Arctic, risk is increased significantly as compared to non-Arctic

operations due to both the austerity of available support and logistics infrastructure,

characterized by great distances between operating areas and even the simplest logistics hub, and

the extreme conditions caused by the Arctic environment which are unlike those that the Navy

has become accustomed to in recent decades. These factors are critical to operational planners

contemplating actions in the Arctic and also significant when considering priorities for the

implementation of DOTMLPF-P and CONOPS recommendation made in this report.

Figure 2. Factors that Impact Risk


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Weather and Climate

Ice and fog conditions, and to a lesser extent, precipitation and wind were identified as essential

elements that adversely affect the ability to conduct maritime operations in a timely manner.

There is a short window of opportunity for ice capable platforms and equipment to arrive on

scene and execute the mission before conditions deteriorate. Accordingly, the response time was

anticipated to be slower than in lower latitudes due to environmental extremes and lack of

infrastructure. Similarly, there is a limited time window to deploy and employ units to conduct

salvage operations at depths requiring saturation and cold water diving. The ice adversely

impacted existing naval platforms‟ ability to conduct long term sustained operations in the

Arctic. One player noted, “not only do severe ice conditions adversely impact naval platforms,

but also water intake and treatment systems on board”.

With respect to air operations, persistent cold weather and freezing rain would severely impact

rotary wing aircraft maintainability unless shipboard hangar facilities are available. Similarly,

cloud cover and fog makes persistent surveillance very difficult, especially during the summer

months. Due to limited ice capable vessels, players often opted to send aircraft to conduct

surveillance missions in the Arctic.

One player noted, “I sense a certain level of complacency about operating in the Arctic with

respect to the weather, ice and ocean conditions that will affect platforms, materiel and

personnel. Environmental conditions should not be under-estimated”.

Time and Distance

The large distance required to transport supplies to an area of concern greatly inhibited the

ability to sustain required time on station. Similarly, the inability to refuel and conduct resupply

due to inadequate infrastructure in the region presented the greatest difficulties for players.

Specifically, “the lack of refueling capabilities in the Arctic and long distances between refueling

stations make it improbable to have a ship (small boy) transit through the Northwest Passage to

San Diego.” In order to maintain required time on station, sufficient lead time should be

allocated when transiting long distances. Infrastructure development in the region, consistent

port calls and the use of resupply vessels were discussed as primary solutions to mitigate these

shortfalls.

Theme 3. In order to reduce the likelihood of risk, there was an increased reliance on

additional information and capabilities through partnerships with the USCG, JTF Alaska,

Tribal Leaders, Industry, and Multinational Partners.

Figure 3 shows that as risk increased due to extreme climatic conditions and increased operating

and support distances there was a corresponding increase in the need for specialized information

and capabilities. As this trend increased, the required information and capabilities became less


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available in the U.S. Navy and planners were forced to solicit external stakeholders for the

capabilities needed to execute their mission tasking. At the low end of the scale, these could be

found inside DoD, but eventually planners needed to rely on industry, international partners, and

the whole of U.S. Government. This further reiterates that sustainability in Arctic operations is

significantly dependent on strong relationships with all of these entities and that mechanisms that

strengthen these ties should be prioritized in future planning. It is also noteworthy that a limit

beyond which sustained Arctic operations become impossible, even in the case of perfect

relationships and availability to capabilities and information because it is not yet technically

feasible to operate in some environments.

Figure 3. Relationship between information and capabilities and Risk

Information

As distance and weather factors increased during the game, the more reliance on specialized

information increased. Planners became more reliant on receiving (e.g., pulling) additional

information pertaining to the environment, wildlife, and indigenous populations in addition to

augmentation by available and capable platforms and personnel in order to develop MDA and

accomplish the mission. Conversely, as these factors increased over game play, there was an

increased emphasis on the importance and necessity to disseminate (i.e., push) information to the

media, indigenous populace, industry and the international community in order to support


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strategic communications efforts, gain access to specific locations, and broaden coordination and

response efforts.

Capabilities

Similarly, as both distance and weather factors intensified over the game, the more specialized

and less available capabilities were. Unique capability shortfalls were identified with respect to

specific platforms (e.g., ice hardened vessels and ice breakers), subject matter experts (e.g.,

environmental, systems and platforms), logistics infrastructure (e.g., refuel and resupply) and

personnel (e.g., operators trained in cold weather operations) unique to the missions encountered

during the game. As additional specialized capability requirements emerged during the game, the

more players realized how limited their options were. This encouraged them to focus on the

value and importance of leveraging local, state, federal and multinational capabilities.

Theme 4: The future application of solutions developed during the game was influenced by

the frequency of operations and desired reliability of U.S. Naval forces in the Arctic.

As this game was conducted at the operational level, it was understood that many of the long

term solutions may prove to be too expensive or strategically unacceptable to be implemented,

hence the opportunity given to players to propose shorter term mitigating strategies. Many

solutions of both types are outlined in this report, but one was not favored over the other during

the game because of the lack of clarity on the Arctic strategy for the U.S. If the strategic vision is

that future Arctic operations are to be short-term, ad-hoc, and infrequent in nature, then the

consensus was that temporary, short-term and less formal solutions would be acceptable.

However, if regular deployments, frequent operations, exercises and large scale crisis response

actions were envisioned, then permanent, formal and comprehensive solutions were favored.


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Figure 4. The Relationship between the Types of Solutions and Frequency of Operations

The more frequent or consistent an operation or mission would be conducted, the more suitable

long term proposed solutions were found to be. Conversely, the less frequent or consistent an

operation or mission was executed; the more mitigating strategies or short term solutions were

accepted. Long term solutions tended to be more formalized and structured in nature while the

majority of mitigating strategies were more informal, temporary and less structured.

Additionally, permanent solutions typically were characterized by long development times and a

corresponding need to begin acquisition well before the anticipated need. In the long term, the

described permanent solutions would allow a quicker response time for forces and provide the

requisite capabilities to respond to both an emerging crisis and regular deployment missions.

Accordingly, one player noted, “there needs to be a combination of near term requirement and

near term solutions based on operational requirements; long term approach is able to be phased

based on a solid mission analysis that drives procurement and investments.” Arctic missions are

becoming more likely as noted in this comment: “Arctic Council SAR agreement, now in force,

and its expected oil spill response agreement, would provide reason to send Navy ships up north

and to engage in collaborative exercises.” Additionally, “it was evident in our scenarios (that) we

will be ineffective with our current gaps.”

Further policy guidance pertaining to the USN‟s role and responsibilities in the Arctic was

warranted in developing future short term or long term solutions. “Proposed solutions are costly.


26

Therefore, DoD and USN leadership must assess our long term strategy and determine the

priority to operate in the Arctic relative to our other missions and threat assessments. This will

help clarify the investment strategy and prioritize limited resources.”

In summary, deliberation on this issue is driven by “the need to develop an Arctic strategy and

define USN missions and goals in the Arctic over the next 20 years.” The decision to focus on

shorter term solutions or longer term, permanent solutions depended on a strategy which would

identify which type of employment would prevail. This analysis has not yet been completed. In

some cases, the inevitable transition from mitigating strategies to proposed solutions was

described as a phased approach that requires resiliency, patience, and a long term commitment to

cooperation in the region.


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DOTMLPF-P Gaps, Mitigating Strategies and Proposed Solutions

Overview

This game sought to identify gaps in the U.S. Navy‟s ability to conduct sustained maritime

operations in the Arctic region as well as mitigating strategies, and proposed solutions to close

those gaps. This section will describe the gaps identified in the game and provide suggested

mitigating strategies and solutions organized using the DOTMLPF-P construct. The reasoning

behind the selection of the identified gaps, mitigation strategies and solutions will be described

as well.

The overall assessment produced by the game was that the U.S. Navy does not have the means to

support sustained operations in the Arctic. This was due primarily to the lack of appropriate ship

types to operate in or near Arctic ice, the lack of support facilities in the Arctic, and the lack of

sufficient or capable logistics connectors to account for the long logistics distances and lack of

facilities. As noted in Theme 1, these gaps were mitigated or closed through the use of domestic

and international relationships with military and Coast Guard partners which made available

information or capabilities required to support scenario missions. However, the game identified

that many of these relationships and the information and capability requirements that they enable

do not exist or are poorly defined, further exacerbating the materiel issues listed above. These

issues and others surfaced during the game are described in the following pages. Comments in

quotations are reproduced directly from comments or written survey answers provided by players

during the game.

Doctrine

Throughout game play, several key doctrinal gaps affecting the ability to effectively plan or

conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic were identified. The lack of guidance

pertaining to command and control relationships among U.S. and international maritime

stakeholders was most notable. This included the lack of a common understanding of the

geographical boundaries, roles and responsibilities and capabilities between nations, U.S.

commandant commanders and the various U.S. numbered fleets. Furthermore, the capabilities,

organization and missions of partner militaries were not well understood, which made

coordination a challenge.

Proposed solutions to these gaps focused on additions to or creation of new doctrine. Fleet level

C2 issues could be resolved through modifications to the Arctic Maritime Response Force

CONOPS as is recommended later in this report. While some C2 relationships between U.S. and

international military and civilian organizations are addressed in AJP 3-1, further clarification is

needed, particularly with regard to the integration of other governmental agencies (OGAs) into

the CTF, particularly this includes non-military agencies from partner nations. Procedures and

supporting MOUs for the integration of these various entities, to include additionally those from


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non-NATO partners, into a C2 organization must be more fully developed and described in AJP

3-1 or a similar document. This is clearly a long term effort, but it is necessary as a critical

enabler to successful international and “whole of government” crisis action response. Looking

further ahead, participants called for development of doctrine in support of a multinational

maritime coordination center and response force in the region. Because significant sensitivities

exist with regard to militarizing the Arctic, there is a need to “keep the military footprint as low

as possible” when developing this coordination center and response force. Accordingly, this

multinational doctrine must focus on information sharing and enhancing cooperation in order to

achieve maritime safety and security in the Arctic.

Other doctrinal shortfalls were identified in the areas of development of awareness regarding

environmental and physical conditions, support to salvage and nuclear incident response in the

Arctic, and management of interactions with Polar Bears and other Arctic wildlife. “The group

had no recollection of extreme cold weather doctrine to support tactical or operational

deployment of naval forces for these scenarios. This doctrinal gap would place a high risk to

accomplishing the mission and to the forces used in this scenario.” Doctrinal guidance

supporting a collective understanding of specific environmental and physical conditions that

impact operations and a fundamental knowledge of specific capable platforms and capabilities

available to perform missions in the Arctic should be developed. The retrieval of nuclear

materials in the Arctic was viewed as an area that requires the development of cooperative

doctrine between Arctic states “in order to increase the probability of success and prevent

international incidents.” Finally, the game identified a need for doctrine regarding ROE and

training for encountering Polar Bears and other wildlife in the Arctic. This should be

accomplished by USFF in the CONOPS. These points should be added to ATP-17 as well as

other USN or joint doctrine.

Organization

Organizational shortfalls were exposed in four areas during this game: USN and joint

relationships, U.S. Whole of Government organization, structures supporting international

cooperation, and structures to support military cooperation with local and regional groups.

Beginning with USN and joint organization, definition and structure were found to be lacking at

the operational level with regard to operational authorities, geographical responsibilities, and

command relationships between U.S. Combatant Commanders, their components and numbered

fleets during operations in the Artic. Recent changes to the Unified Command Plan and relative

inattention to the possibility of conducting operations in the Arctic have added uncertainty to

command arrangements necessary for sustained Arctic Operations. Existing C2 relationships

among U.S. and international maritime forces in the Arctic are still immature, require further

examination, and may not be sufficient to support timely response to missions that require an

immediate USN presence. For example, a need to clarify C2 arrangements between U.S.

NORTHCOM, USFF, PACFLT, and the U.S. Navy‟s 3rd

and 6th

Fleets was cited, focusing on


29

further guidance regarding the roles and responsibilities of each entity, OPCON and TACON

shift points, and information sharing in the Arctic region. Early planning to identify unique or

establish ad hoc relationships was identified as a mitigating strategy.

Current U.S. contingency plans that may require an immediate U.S. “Whole of Government” and

international response in the Arctic, also require further refinement. U.S. interagency structures

to support operational level support to other agencies in the Arctic do not exist or are immature.

On a larger scale, it was seen as likely that the Navy would be requested by another government

to assist in a contingency response scenario resulting a need for rapid assimilation into a

multinational task organization in which a foreign flag officer will command. “Like (with) any

combined operation, establishment and integration of supporting and supported relationships

early on in the planning process is critical.” Similarly, when operating with coalition partners in

the Arctic, naval forces must have the ability to rapidly move and embark special naval units on

partner nation vessels. The long-term solution proposed during the game was to establish a

standing multi-national organization and supporting task force to prepare for Arctic

contingencies. To test and improve this concept, multinational exercises with relevant maritime

stakeholders should be conducted. In any case, clearly defined organizational relationships and

access to strategic locations, resources, and capabilities would support planning of contingency

operations and mitigate risk during their execution. A pre-planned response checklist using this

information and access “would be a valuable tool for planners in Crisis Action Cells.” Similarly,

lessons learned from other multinational and joint contingency operations, such as the Haiti

response, should be leveraged to develop these organizational structures and documents..

Finally, coordinating with key local, state and federal entities in the scenarios presented was

widely recognized as a “substantial organizational gap”. During this game, DoD response in

support of local, state, and federal responders was described in terms of “effectively setting up

conditions that enable rapid ship-to-shore movement of materials in order to execute mission

requirements.” However, this activity depends heavily on local and regional support, which was

found to be lacking. Additionally, the inability of deployed U.S. Naval forces to coordinate and

interact with local indigenous populations emerged as a persistent theme during game play.

Structures which support persistent engagement and communications with tribal leaders

throughout planning and execution in order to gain access to remote areas, better understand the

operational environment, and gain credibility and assurance with the local populace are needed.

Mitigating strategies for these shortfalls centered on the use of Tribal Liaison officers for

community relations and Arctic operations which are maintained by Alaska Command, USCG

District 17 and JTF-Alaska. Additionally, the use of ad hoc Tribal Liaison Officers during PDSS

and operations as well as the establishment of a permanent Tribal Liaison Officer at

NORTHCOM would help mitigate this shortfall.


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Training

All players agreed that the U.S. Navy lacks the experience and knowledge base to currently

operate forces in the Arctic on a year-round basis. Arctic missions require specialized skill sets

which are not currently available in U.S. Navy training pipelines. Specifically cited was a lack of

awareness of how to detect the percentage of ice, fog and wind and how these factors created an

impact on platforms and systems. Another shortfall was the ability to navigate in Arctic waters

and, in particular in austere ports. “U.S. naval officers must have sufficient skill and training to

con their vessels independently of assistance from tugs to enter and leave Arctic ports.” In

general, a lack of sufficient training for operating in the Arctic and, in particular, Arctic-unique

operations was noted. “Our expectation is that the USN is going to the Arctic to do something

other than sit below decks and shoot missiles (most likely some kind of sea-basing). This means

people are going to have to operate small craft and aircraft in extreme cold weather conditions

and those connectors present the highest risk and most vulnerable points of failure.” Other

training deficiencies were identified in the areas of the operation of ship-to-shore connectors, the

movement of heavy equipment and the loading and unloading of cargo during operations in the

Arctic.

The level of knowledge and awareness of NATO or allied national command authorities,

available multinational and industry logistics support hubs, platforms, and points of contact was

found to be inconsistent and a weakness among U.S. Navy personnel. “A clear understanding of

the various regulatory regimes of the sovereign states that ring the Arctic as well as the

international conventions and agreements for planners and operators is essential”.

Accordingly, the need to develop a comprehensive list of training prerequisites in order to

conduct sustained cold weather operations and determine which training should be developed

and maintained within the Department of the Navy was identified. “Future operations in the

Arctic region will not be a primary Area of Operations for USN and will not demand across the

board training for squadrons and ships to add Arctic training to current Training &Readiness

matrices. Rather, ensure a concise NWP or training syllabus exists of surface, helicopter and

fixed-wing assets for Arctic operations." This should include a certification program for

personnel deploying to the Arctic. Additionally it was suggested to develop an Advanced

Qualification Designator (AQD) for Arctic planning and operations. One player noted, “Tracking

officers and enlisted with Arctic experience through the Navy Personnel Command (NPC) data

base would enable Navy leadership to rapidly identify trained and educated personnel, should a

crisis require a U.S. Navy response in the Arctic.” Another recommendation was to leverage

Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG) as an entity to train and familiarize

personnel with cold weather and ice cargo movement operations. Training in the area of polar

bear mitigation (e.g., requisite equipment and ROE) was emphasized throughout game play and

identified as “a must have for all personnel deploying to the Arctic”. Finally, as noted in the


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CONOPS section of this report, U.S. Navy personnel must be further trained on the specifics of

crisis action response scenarios in Arctic.

While the U.S. Navy does not currently have a significant resource to conduct this training,

leveraging other Arctic nations‟ capabilities was a trend that emerged in many areas including

training to mitigate the lack of current capability. Training (e.g., exercises, workshops, games

etc.) with other international maritime partners must be developed and executed. Specifically, the

U.S. Navy should seek to conduct cooperative training using existing training curriculums and

facilities of Canada, Russia, Denmark, and Norway. “The U.S. Navy needs to take every

opportunity to deploy ships or personnel to the Arctic. This can also be achieved by

participation in Canadian and allied exercises (i.e. NANOOK, or FRONTIER) or by exchanges

where sailors of all trades have an opportunity to sail on other countries' ships”. Additionally,

this game highlighted the interrelationship between the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard. Aside

from leveraging assets and sharing information, players suggested the need to determine and

develop Arctic related training requirements for both services. Additionally, players lacked

fundamental knowledge of existing coordination constructs (e.g., JTF Alaska and Arctic

Council) and responsibilities of domestic organizations (e.g., USN, USCG etc.).

The primary proposal to compensate for the lack of available training among U.S. Navy

personnel regarding Arctic resources for information and specialized capabilities was the

establishment of an Arctic “Center of Excellence.” This center would serve as the focal point for

all matters related to research and training for DON personnel as well as own and manage the

knowledge base for conducting Arctic operations. Acknowledging the wealth of expertise that

exists among the Arctic nations, this center would strive to build relationships and contacts in

order to facilitate the rapid connection of a training or information resource to the command that

needs it. Additionally, cooperative arrangements with civilian universities, industry, and U.S.

and international military universities were also suggested.

Understanding the culture of the local and tribal populaces that inhabit the Arctic was another

area that U.S. Navy personnel lack awareness. Leveraging existing entities such as JTF-Alaska,

D-17, and international partners in order to engage with local tribal leaders was highly

encouraged. The development of long term training syllabus and courses via Navy Knowledge

Online (NKO) or in resident (e.g., similar concept or augment to MSOC) in this area was also

recommended. Maintaining relationships and a network of contacts with the local and indigenous

population in the Arctic should be a focus of the Arctic “Center of Excellence” noted above,

providing an exportable capability to Arctic deployers.

This game also exposed a shortfall in the ability to train personnel in the conduct of

environmental disasters such as oil spills, especially in the context of the Arctic. “DOD lacks an

inherent knowledge of how to handle man-made environmental disasters and is reliant on

commercial and civilian experts and equipment.” Several scenarios required U.S. Navy to


32

interact and perform logistics services for these entities. A formalized policy and education plan

to facilitate this interaction was suggested. To address this shortfall in the long term, several

players suggested developing internal DOD personnel with expertise in the area of

environmental spills and cleanup. Additional collaboration with USCG and industry sources

with oil spill containment and clean up experience and integrating key lessons learned into the

CONOPS would greatly enhance USN capabilities in the long run.

Additional shortfalls were identified in the areas of environmental prediction and observation

and in cold-weather survivability. Resources to train ice reconnaissance teams are very limited.

To mitigate this shortfall, the U.S. Navy could utilize Canadian Ice Reconnaissance resources to

assist in providing ice status to augment satellite imagery or embed contracted ice observers in

air detachments. In the long term, the establishment of a training regimen for ice reconnaissance

and navigation teams to augment satellite imagery and train air crews as permanent ice observers

was proposed. With regard to Arctic cold weather survivability training, it was suggested that all

deployed personnel receive pre-deployment training on cold-weather survivability as well as the

use of cold weather gear. As a mitigating strategy, the Navy should leverage industry and

international partner expertise in this area, while long term solutions involved development of a

standing schoolhouse to train personnel on the use of specialized equipment and facilities.

Finally, it was proposed that the lack of a robust onboard repair capability creates significant risk

in an austere environment such as the Arctic. “If a U.S. Naval vessel would sustain a significant

mechanical or electrical casualty while deployed in such a remote and austere environment, they

could be in trouble. At the very least, they will likely need to come off station and return south

to affect repairs. Much of our capability and expertise to effect self-repair is much degraded

relative to 15 or 20 years ago.” This was echoed during another scenario: “A sustained

operation in an austere environment far from logistics hubs requires greater self-sufficiency to

maintain and repair ships, particularly hull and structural systems (especially with a persistent

threat of heavy seas) than currently exists shipboard. (1) Though many ships have capable

machine shops onboard, ship's company lacks needed skills and experience levels to employ

equipment in the course of effecting repairs. (2) S/F has become reliant on fly-away teams for

complex troubleshooting or repairs, IAW a „operator‟ vice „maintainer‟ philosophy as well as

„minimal manning.‟ (3) Following repair of hull structures and systems (electrical or

mechanical), as well as main propulsion, S/F in general lacks training and qualification for

necessary non-destructive testing of repairs.”

Material

Shortfalls in materiel suitable for Arctic service emerged as a primary area of focus during the

game. A key finding of this game is that the U.S. Navy lacks appropriate platforms, equipment,

and communications systems to conduct sustained operations in the Arctic.


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Maritime Vessels

The first identified shortfall is in icebreaking capacity. “Single point failure is the USCG Ice

Breaker HEALY” was a common refrain as nearly every scenario response directed the

immediate deployment of HEALY to the area of interest. In order to mitigate the lack of ice

breaking capability in the near term, players relied heavily on coordination and cooperation with

the USCG, industry and multinational partners. Specifically, throughout the game, these

capabilities were leveraged (leased, borrowed) from both Russia and Canada. These nations‟

proximity to the operating areas and operational experience in the region made this the most

viable and practical solution. Over the long term it was suggested to develop an Arctic

Acquisition Strategy to procure, lease and retrofit ice capable platforms.

Beyond ice breakers, the finding that current warship designs are not robust enough to operate in

even light ice which is already broken was highlighted. In other words, even when escorted by an

icebreaker, transiting the NWP or other areas with more thanclim minimal ice coverage with

amphibious or CRUDES platforms was deemed to be exceedingly risky. Strategic and

operational planners will simply need to accept that certain areas in the Arctic remain off-limits

to U.S. warships unless the commander is willing to accept risks, the ice recedes away from the

area of interest, or ships are produced with additional ice strengthening. As a strategy to mitigate

risk, consultation with NAVSEA engineers and naval architects was determined to be necessary

to offer the commander sufficient understanding of design limitations, but the unpredictability of

ice movement and environmental conditions must also be factored in. Accordingly, the need to

strengthen USN hulls and procure ice breakers, ocean going salvage vessels, and tugs was a

focus throughout the game. The shortfall of available and capable ocean-going dive salvage ships

was area that received significant consideration during gameplay. Leasing these vessels through

industry and multinational partners would mitigate this gap in the near term, while procuring

additional TATF-X vessels was proposed as a long term solution. “If you want Navy presence up

there, we need bigger, better ports with more supplies and ice-classed ships. Ice-class ships

cannot be a retrofit of existing designs. Build new ships whose parameters adhere to a simple set

of rules to achieve classification. These ships are based on empirical information derived from

operating ships in the Arctic environment with minimal infrastructure. This is your best option to

succeed in the mission and mitigate catastrophic failure.”

An additional observation regarding readiness of current vessels for Arctic operations was that

while “most of our ships were originally designed for satisfactory performance in cold or very

cold weather, … maintenance of systems, particularly HVAC, is in general poor condition and

most ships should have a thorough and competent assessment and some level of overhaul and

refit of these systems before deployment to an Arctic environment."

Amphibious ships were highlighted as especially useful for the types of missions anticipated for

the Arctic. “The LPD-17 has a flight deck, hanger and well deck as well as personnel and


34

equipment carrying capacity and medical capability.” LCACs were also utilized frequently

during this game as part of the amphibious capability necessary to respond to the various

scenarios provided leading to much discussion on the value of retrofitting existing LCACs. “A

re-fit of our LCACs would work. Doing that, we can at least take some of the effort for SAR and

show a continued presence.” Using another approach, it was noted that “the problem is so

overwhelming with respect to lack of appropriate hulls and infrastructure to support larger hulls

that we probably need to think more out of the box and smaller…getting a smaller vessel with

decent legs such as the Tuuli (Finnish „Arcticized‟ ACV) which has already been tested might

just be the way to go.”

The lack of weather protected surface connectors in lieu of open bay small boat transfer vessels

(LCUs/RHIB) which do not protect personnel from extreme weather conditions was found to be

a limiting factor in mission planning. A mitigating strategy identified included the need to

increase the number of trained boat crews and reduce crew rotation time intervals until such time

that cold weather canopies or heated modules which can provide protection can be developed.

Finally, players asserted that there is insufficient capacity of naval forces to continue current

missions while adding missions, exercises and training in the Arctic with current vessel

inventory.

Aircraft

In order to mitigate the lack of ice capable vessels and ice breaking capability in the near term,

planners were forced to avoid areas where ice accretion was greatest. In these instances, air lift

and air support were relied upon. “A few long range Short Take Off and Landing (STOL)

aircraft would be beneficial in order to utilize the scattered gravel strips in the region and operate

off ship… it would be great to augment this with existing VTOL (shorter range) aircraft”.

However, it was noted that the availability of MV-22s for 6 month deployment would be limited.

To mitigate this shortfall in the near term, players suggested the use of other aircraft, such as H-

60s despite the range and lift problems attributed to this platform. A proposed solution included

the need to generate requirements for heavy lift, cold-weather capable, vertical lift capable

aircraft.

In order to support air lift and air operations in the Arctic AOR, scenario responses highlighted

the need for the development of airfields in Barrow or Prudhoe Bay to include military hangars

and fuel storage, as well as roads from Fairbanks to the airfields and supply nodes. “Currently,

materiel to support humanitarian relief operations must be drawn from disparate locations and

bases, which in turn increases the response time for the required equipment and supplies to arrive

on scene.” Using airlift capabilities to fly in equipment, personnel, and supplies to a staging area

may decrease the response time to a humanitarian relief event. Utilizing materiel from outside


35

organizations (state of Alaska, FEMA, etc.) to compensate for unavailable or prohibitively

distant USN assets was also suggested.

As a final comment, the challenges associated with operating aircraft in the Arctic were

highlighted. “Aircraft in these conditions are inherently more dangerous to operate than ships,

even in good weather. Sustained helicopter and landing craft operations in these conditions, with

all-purpose craft, not specifically designed to operate in these conditions, are going to be very

hazardous for the people and the aircraft." Given the harsh physical and environmental

conditions in the region and lack of capable maritime vessels, the use of unmanned aerial

vehicles for surveillance and distributing resources would be highly applicable and valuable to

supporting operations.

Equipment

The U.S. Navy does not outfit ships with PPE rated for Arctic conditions. The availability of

cold weather equipment and gear for ships and crew rapidly deploying to the Arctic was

highlighted as major materiel gap. To mitigate this shortfall in the near term, a pack-up kit in

fleet concentration area ready for transfer to ships deploying on short notice to the Arctic was

suggested. Test and evaluation processes for Arctic weather gear and AEL requirements must be

established. Procurement of cold weather gear and the development of a ready service locker of

Arctic equipment that is available for unit deploying to the Arctic were also suggested.

Interestingly, one player noted, “At Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base, there is a rotating pool

of gear available for expeditionary operations. You can check out flak jackets, helmets, etc.

Same concept should be applied to cold weather gear.” The limited frequency of use of this

equipment led players to leverage multinational and industry partners in order to acquire

information about best practices for this equipment and for a ready resource for emergency

equipage availability.

Communications

Consistent and reliable communications was identified as another area that lacks sufficient

capabilities. Short-term use of multiple communication methods and accepting reduced

bandwidth were identified as a mitigating strategy. The acquisition of additional polar orbiting

satellites for enhanced communication capabilities was identified as a long term solution.

The ability to conduct satellite surveillance using High Resolution Synthetic Aperture Radar was

another substantial shortfall identified in the game. Purchasing additional high resolution SAR

imagery through commercial companies or using aircraft as remote sensing platforms was

suggested as a mitigating strategy. The acquisition of additional U.S. satellites for SAR and IR

imagery was proposed as a longer term solution.


36

Support to Environmental Disaster Response

A lack of knowledge pertaining to oil spill dispersion trajectories under the ice and below the sea

surface was identified. In the near term, players suggested the need to leverage industry and

academia while investment in R&D for developing oil dispersion models was proposed as a long

term solution.

Leadership and Education

The need for strong support from U.S. political leadership for conducting operations in the Arctic

was consistently noted throughout the game despite an observed lack of attentiveness and

understanding among senior U.S. military and civilian leadership on the consequences and risks

associated with the myriad capability gaps identified in this game. The small cadre of military

leaders with significant Arctic knowledge and experience must continue to inform their civilian

counterparts and political leadership on the risks and opportunities of sustained operations of

U.S. maritime forces in the Arctic. Leadership must have the awareness to balance risk to

mission and forces with the costs of capabilities required to mitigate that risk. “The U.S. Navy

needs to have a clearer mandate on what the expected Naval missions will be; increased

education for policy makers with which to better adjudge risk in the Arctic and determine what

costs they are willing to take on in order to increase USN presence.”

Additionally, the game identified a general deficiency of knowledge among senior U.S. Navy

leadership regarding cold weather systems and platforms, climatic conditions, and C2

relationships in the Arctic. Integrating these topics in both junior and senior officer leadership

courses (JPME I & II) as well as the Senior Enlisted Academy was suggested. “The Navy needs

to include Arctic education in CAPSTONE courses, summary of this education to senior staffs,

and Fleet Commander Support for additional T-class ships, native language speakers, and

icebreakers. This would provide knowledge and capability to support increased operations in the

Arctic in the next 30 years.”

Personnel

Insights regarding key personnel gaps, mitigating strategies and proposed solutions have been

integrated within the training, leadership and education categories of this section of the report.

Facilities

The austerity of the infrastructure available to support maritime operations in the Arctic and the

great distances from available support facilities to the actual operating area had a tremendous

impact planning scenario responses and assessing the risks associated with those plans. As was

previously noted, distance and time required for forces to arrive on scene decreased mission

success and the lack of logistics facilities exacerbated this problem. Numerous gaps in logistics


37

infrastructure in the region were identified and the ability to support sustained maritime

operations without reliance on extended logistics lines to ports outside the Arctic was questioned.

Additionally, the lack of airports within close proximity to operating areas presented severe

challenges in conducting resupply and air drops of supplies and resources to the local populace,

during HA/DR missions, or to deployed forces. A mitigating strategy proposed during the game

was to use “sister service Air transport into Nome from Elmendorf and leveraging private and

commercial airfields.”

Another aspect of these facilities shortfalls was related to the importance of engagement with the

local communities in the Arctic. A fixed base in the Arctic is needed to maintain continuous

communications and build relationships with indigenous and regional populations and

leadership.

Another conclusion specified that in order to be able to conduct operations for any extended

period of time, logistics support from local authorities, industry and multinational partners is

required. Leveraging logistics facilities in Canada, Iceland, Greenland and Norway as well as

using Thule, Halifax, Nuuk and St. Johns were discussed primarily as mitigating strategies. The

development of permanent logistics infrastructure, Joint FOB‟s, as well as A-PODs and S-PODs

were cited as potential long term solutions. Specifically, infrastructure upgrades at Thule, GL,

Barrow, Ft. Wainright and Nanisivik to support refueling and resupply were identified as key

changes. Thule Air Force Base in the North Star Bay (e.g., Baffin Bay) was discussed as a

location that can provide logistical support in the summer months. Conversely, Resolute was

noted “as a small community that is often blocked by ice even in the summer.”

U.S. support for infrastructure development at Nanisivik was discussed as an example of the

complexities related to relying on non-U.S. Arctic facilities. Nanisivik was described as “a

mining facility with a pier for loading ore and has historically never been a full-featured port…

but has the potential to be refurbished and used for naval resupply.” However, “Nanisivik is not

yet established, and once it is, it will only be for fuel.” In the end, “Nanisivik Naval Facility is

intended partially to emphasize Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. U.S. involvement might

entail resolution or mitigation of the U.S.-Canadian sovereignty dispute over the status of

Canadian internal waters and international strait in the Northwest Passage region. However,

U.S. resources could meaningfully enhance the development of the facility and Canada might be

persuaded on that basis.”

Policy

A lack of policy guidance regarding coordination and collaboration with multinational military

forces (e.g., Canada, Denmark, Norway, Greenland, Finland and Russia) in support of Arctic

operations was a prominent concern throughout game play. Specifically, the importance of

Russian and U.S. relations and the need to develop U.S. policy towards working with Russian


38

maritime forces in the Arctic in the form of MOUs, bi-lateral and multilateral agreements in

support of future cooperation and collaboration was emphasized. The primary areas identified to

facilitate this include: participation in joint multinational exercises and the sharing of training,

logistics facilities, and information. Efforts to mitigate short term crisis responses (e.g.

environmental spill, natural disaster etc.) were noted as the most likely mission areas for

cooperation.

Additionally the lack of guidance regarding U.S. and Canadian C2 arrangements in the Arctic

region was significant. Given the scenarios encountered during the game, the U.S. and Canada

should have identified a need to “trade off responsibilities” between each other in various

operating areas and missions encountered and shared by both nations. Within this construct the

importance of identifying and respecting the boundaries of authority and jurisdiction for Arctic

operations. The establishment of clear boundaries within which combined operations could be

conducted under Canadian leadership and authority (e.g., specifically between Resolute and

Sachs Harbor) was suggested. In the long term, players suggested developing a bilateral or

multilateral agreement or policy similar to the Maritime Operations Threat Response (MOTR)

process to guide decisions on lead agencies for Arctic operations.

A recurring theme was the significant lack of guidance pertaining to how U.S. maritime forces

(e.g., USN and USCG) are integrated into a “U.S. Whole of Government” response effort in the

Arctic. Concerns were cited regarding the uncertainty of “On Scene Commander Expeditionary

Politics when conducting salvage operations close to other nation‟s territorial waters” and the

need for a “specifically whole of government integration.” A need to “Identify processes to

request support from foreign governments and other U.S. Government Agencies from a whole of

government approach.” was also cited. Emphasizing the importance of an integrated national

approach to HA/DR or other crisis response missions, it was claimed that “Whole of

Government (e.g., emphasized by Canada and a topic in the U.S.) or Whole of Governments

should be more readily acceptable to the Navy and DoD." Other comments highlighted the

uncertainties perceived in the policy guidance regarding lead agencies for various events, or the

accessibility of other government assets in the case of a crisis. “We need to have an indication

that direction on the military response to a maritime domestic event such as this oil spill will

come from U.S. NORTHCOM.” This lack of policy guidance also includes the other military

services, JTF-Alaska, and local, state and federal agencies as well as NGO‟s and the commercial

sector. Furthermore, “There are many capabilities to sustain operations in the Arctic, but they

are underutilized due to the lack of guidance and requirements to properly focus and integrate the

capabilities in such a way as to inform decision makers and policy development.”

Additional policy recommendations centered on the resolution of policy gaps regarding

environmental protection and other factors related to interacting with the natural state of the

Arctic. One issue identified was the need for ROE for mitigation of Polar Bears and other

wildlife. Another related concept was that maritime forces need to be given policy guidance to


39

govern how strict environmental regulations in large portions of the navigable Arctic can be

addressed. “Sensitivity to environmental regulations in the Arctic is far greater than we

experience anywhere else and if our policy to comply with or ignore is an afterthought decision

we will lose the jury of the public. We need to decide what we will do and then deliberately plan

the solutions and strategic communications to support or mitigate that. Thus, strategic

communications needs to be at the forefront of planning operations to understand „how our

presence looks from the other side‟, one player said.” This realization throughout the game

encouraged the identification of the need for further policy related to the discharge of waste and

disposal of trash from ships in the region. However, it is noteworthy that “a policy for USN to

abide by all HN and international regulations will prevent putting most ships in the AOR.”


40

Updates to Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS

This section provides an overview of the main themes that the players identified for improving

the Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS. The analysis team utilized a grounded theory

approach whereby themes were identified through a process of constant comparison and then

tested throughout the data. Moreover, the relevance of the themes was determined by linking the

themes to the Navy‟s Arctic Road Map and Arctic Maritime Response Force Concept of

Operations. This method attempts to explore both documents and inform leaders of the major

challenges and solutions players encountered when planning sustained maritime operations in the

Arctic. Comments in quotations are reproduced directly from comments or written survey

answers provided by players during the game.

Structural Changes and Overview

Overall, the Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS was identified to be a valuable tool to

support sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. However, the Atlantic Coast centric

approach to the Arctic and focus on war fighting missions and missions with long planning

opportunities of the CONOPS was inadequate to meet the most likely missions specified in the

Arctic Roadmap. Accordingly, it should be modified to support operations in both of the

Atlantic and Pacific Fleets as well as a wider range of operations to include crisis action planning

and crisis response.

Given that the original CONOPS was developed by COMSECONDFLT, its Atlantic focus is

natural. But, discussions during the game made clear that what works in one region cannot be

automatically applied in other regions. Entering the Arctic from the Pacific has a number of

significant differences to include changes to C2 procedures to account for interactions between

EUCOM, NORTHCOM and PACOM or USFF, PACFLT and the various numbered fleets, the

presence of sovereign U.S. territory in the form of Alaska, the corresponding reduction in the

criticality of international partnerships, and finally, the existing organization and networking of

USCG District 17 and JTF Alaska. For the CONOPS to be broadly accepted and implemented,

these factors must be taken into account. A common comment was: “Change the CONOPS to

reflect the bias to more of operating in the U.S. Arctic vice the Atlantic Arctic.”

Other discussions emphasized that likely missions and scenarios that would require a DOD

response consisting of “emergent tasking/crisis action planning in the Arctic.” Suggestions

included adding information and planning tools on crisis action planning for emergency

contingencies, better aligning the document with the Arctic Roadmap. The CONOPS requires a

careful review of the missions and what the “U.S. Navy shall, should, or could do in the Arctic.”

Additionally, the original CONOPS seemed to be written for combat or transit vice sustained

operations. There is “a need for more comprehensive vignettes outlining basic considerations for

crisis response for man-made natural disasters.” For example, “add an oil spill vignette in

CONOPS to include decontamination of equipment, personnel (as per industry), and PPE.


41

Include procedures on special Arctic restrictions, or resources/references for these special

procedures.”

Correspondingly, it was found that the CONOPS was inconsistent in its guidance regarding

missions for an AMRF or sustained operations in the Arctic. The scope of missions listed in the

CONOPS appeared to be focused predominantly on war-fighting instead of the more likely

scenarios of DOD support and response to emergent contingencies. The original document

concentrated on deliberate planning and timelines, and less on crisis action planning (CAP).

During the game, courses of action were repeatedly developed that required many assets and

services to be deployed and activated on an accelerated basis instead of the months of lead time

assumed in the existing CONOPS. To correct this, a crisis action planning section for emergency

contingencies should be added into the CONOPS. An abbreviated planning process associated

with a crisis action planning timeline similar to the Global Fleet Station (GFS) planning timeline

used as an example in the original CONOPS was suggested. The Office of Response and

Restoration (NOAA) provides comprehensive information on responding to a natural resource

crisis which could serve as a framework. Additionally, the CONOPS should include more CAP

vignettes, such as the disaster response, oil spill, or Homeland Security scenarios developed for

this game.

Many of the CONOPS changes recommended by game participants pertained to subjects that

were already largely addressed in the original document. However, it was believed that the

subject matter was inconsistently written, not intuitively organized or needed additional

amplification. Organizing the information to more closely align with joint planning doctrine and

amplifying pertinent information would improve the CONOPS. For example, in the “Planning

and Execution” section, reorganizing topics by joint operational function would help planners to

fully integrate the CONOPS into their plans.

Finally, players cautioned against too many additions to the CONOPS. “Keep the CONOPS

operational and put tactical elements into the ATP; there was a tendency not to make full use of

other publication formats (Shipboard pubs and guidance (Cold Weather Bills, deployment

guidance), AT/FP, and ONI assessments; reference to these would help keep the CONOPS

focused on its intended use.” Suggested revisions to the CONOPS should be crosschecked with

existing doctrine or publications to prevent duplication; referring to and referencing the location

where the needed information could be found would be sufficient.

Command and Control

The Arctic region is characterized by unique AOR boundaries as well as unique, ill-defined or

newly established organizational relationships at and between all levels of command. This

creates situations where planners do not fully understand command relationships or where all

interactions are based on different ad hoc relationships. A contributing factor to this problem is


42

that Arctic Maritime Response Force C2 procedures are not adequately addressed in the

CONOPS. The CONOPS should address the unusual nature of C2 in the Arctic, specifically in

resolving AOR overlaps and boundaries as well as unique and unusual command interactions

(such as COMTHIRDFLT operating in the NAVEUR/EUCOM AORs). Other updates should

include descriptions of relationships between USFF and PACFLT, LANTAREA and

PACAREA, and Canada‟s JTF-North. The CONOPS should include a chapter or an appendix

illustrating and defining existing C2 relationships and authorities which would provide a

standardized reference for routine transit or contingency mission planning. Finally, the process of

refining the CONOPS should also support refinement of the C2 relationships in the region, and,

as such, should be a fully collaborative process with all levels of command represented.

Another area of improvement identified is in the CONOPS‟ description of communications. This

was not examined in great detail during the game due to classification restrictions, but it was

noted that the inclusion of a standard or strawman communications plan would be beneficial to

planners and operators. This is especially valuable because unique communications systems are

required for Arctic sustainability which are not part of communications packages in other AORs.

This includes leveraging commercial or partner systems which may require system modifications

and which may come with limitations with regard to bandwidth or ability to carry classified

information. This communications plan should address the “Arctic communications limitations,

specifically the SATCOM footprint, and the corresponding impact to command and control.”

A recurring theme in the game was that C2 and command relationships in the Arctic region must

be clearly resolved and articulated early in the planning process. The seams in coalition C2,

CCDR and numbered fleet boundaries, and in partnerships and roles between interagency

organizations, federal-state, and government and non-governmental agencies discussed above

create significant additional effort for a planning staff. The CONOPS should highlight this factor

and call for staffs to begin C2 planning as early as possible, perhaps with the development of

preplanned C2 and communications packages for use in the event of a crisis.

Partnerships and Relationship Building

Throughout the game, the need to conduct operations in the Arctic in a cooperative manner due

to limitations in any one nation's capabilities was emphasized. The CONOPS should include

guidance on standing relationships with Arctic partners as well as the procedures for starting an

ad hoc relationship in support of a crisis response operation. Strong maritime partnerships are

critical to the ability to operate in the Arctic. Most Arctic nations are also members of NATO

and “an appendix with data on NATO procedures” should be included in the CONOPS to

facilitate the rapid establishment of C2 in the event of a crisis. The “CONOPS needs to expand

and emphasize the potential need for international cooperation to conduct Arctic operations”

along with detailed policy guidelines on C2 relationships. The process of requesting support

from Arctic nation and partners, specifically Canada, Norway, and the Kingdom of Denmark,


43

must be provided in an annex along with liaison points of contact (POC) information. Players

even went so far as to recommend that “a standing task force for multi-national operations

should be established with Arctic nations to address standard C2 relationships

(OPCON/TACON, etc.).” It is strongly recommended that the CONOPS provide guidance on

using “subject matter experts (SME) as liaison officers to involved organizations” including local

communities.

As with all operations, strategic communications are important. Due to the sensitive nature of

operating in the Arctic, it is imperative that commanders get the strategic communication right

and that it is consistent. The U.S. Navy wants to send the correct message of why the military is

operating in the Arctic. In line with this approach, it was recommended to delete CONOPS

sections focused on war fighting. Further, guidance is required on conducting military operations

that requires the use of lethal fires that prevent adversaries from scuttling ships that conduct

illegal activities. The cumulative effects of these instances would adversely impact the

ecologically sensitive Arctic region and send a negative message to Arctic partners.

It was also recognized that the nature of maritime operations would always be influenced by

"whose Arctic" the operations would be occurring within. Significant geographical,

meteorological, geopolitical, and infrastructure differences exist between the Arctic sub-regions.

For example, from the U.S. perspective, the presence of Alaska greatly changes the character of

Arctic operations when compared to other sub-regions. In almost every other case, a strong

relationship with the nearest Arctic nation to the planned operating area is essential to the

sustainment of forces and the cooperative response to the planned operation by interested

neighbors.

Numerous interested parties beyond the five Arctic Nations were also described. These included

U.S. and coalition forces, interagency organization and other government agencies (OGAs), non-

governmental organizations (NGOs), and the local population. Prior to and during operations in

the Arctic, planners and operators must understand all of these entities and the CONOPS should

include descriptions of key stakeholders, their interest areas, and their capabilities. Additionally,

these entities could be the key to a variety of specialized Arctic assets which exist and may be

utilized, but staffs may not be aware of their capabilities or even their existence. Planners should

consider that a partner, NGO, or civilian industry organization may have better capabilities to

execute certain missions or tasks. It was recommended that the CONOPS include “an Annex

addressing liaison points of contact for Arctic partner nations and actors (NGOs, IGOs,

contractors, etc.)”

The CONOPS should provide guidance on the procedure to solicit support from U.S.

government agencies given the engagement nature of many Arctic missions. CONOPS changes

must include descriptions of multiple U.S. government agencies and capabilities that have a

stake in the Arctic such as the National Incident Management System (NIMS). “Maritime


44

Operational Threat Response Plan should be considered as one process to facilitate the U.S.

Whole of Government response to Arctic issues/responses.”

The listing of the Arctic‟s key leaders and their primary points of contact from the various

organizations and indigenous people as well as an understanding of their interrelationships must

be understood to support PDSS efforts. There is a requirement to successfully engage with Arctic

region native populations that requires support from several entities that already have established

relationships such as the U.S. Coast Guard (District -17), other Arctic nations (Canada, Kingdom

of Denmark, Russia), and JTF-N in order to have a greater chance of understanding and

cooperation.

The environmental sensitivities associated with operating in the Arctic with ships required to

adhere to the “leave no trace” principle requires the development of specific guidance and

procedures associated with sustained maritime operations in this area. As noted elsewhere in this

report, the U.S. Navy needs to determine a policy with regard to compliance to the various

environmental and operating regulations that exist in large portions of the navigable Arctic for

both forces operating today and those currently being developed and procured. This policy

should be included in the CONOPS. In support of this policy, the CONOPS should include

information on special Arctic restrictions with listed resources and references as well as guidance

on how to “adhere to the environmental & wildlife considerations/ regulations of the Arctic

coastal state.” Additionally, include a section that provides guidance and procedures for the

discharge of various types of waste and the need “to hold/store waste for extended periods.”

Other suggested solutions include the option of discharging waste to other ships for further

transport for proper disposal.

Movement and Maneuver

Throughout the game it was noted that harsh and variable environmental conditions and large

distances will likely create uncertainty in planning, timeliness and timing, and can create

conditions which exceed current operational capabilities. This uncertainty should be understood

and taken into account when planning. To reduce this uncertainty, an appendix with a “GO/NO

GO criteria chart of ice operations (Air, Surface, and Subsurface operations)” was suggested.

“Arctic winter SMEs should be consulted on developing go/no-go criteria, assessing system

limitations, etc. if we are considering winter operations in the Arctic.” The “CONOPS should

identify the environmental (ship) threshold beyond which we are really standing into danger.

Kind of like the limits we establish on aircraft and landing craft operations. We know what risk

we are taking based on established limits and calculations. Then we determine if we can do it.”

Guidance must be provided that clearly defines the length of time or thresholds a ship which is

not ice rated or designed for Arctic operations can safely remain in the Arctic to inform planners

and operators that “there is also no defined amount of ice that non hardened ship can operate in.”


45

It was recognized that no chart could be comprehensive, but that a quick reference guide would

be necessary given the lack of Arctic experience and knowledge resident in the force.

A recurring theme throughout the game was that the U.S. Navy‟s ability to operate in the Arctic

under a wide variety of ice and weather conditions is limited and operators must understand the

design limitations of aircraft and surface warships. Shipboard design challenges include material

limitations associated with hull construction, various shipboard equipment limitations due to

Arctic conditions frequently exceeding design limits (sub-zero weather environments), and

propulsion and auxiliary equipment designs that do not incorporate measures that prevent sea

chests from becoming blocked by sea ice. The CONOPS section covering U.S. Navy “platform

selection criteria should be prioritized and is missing key factors such as sustainability and ice

(capability)” that best support mission accomplishment. Planners need a table that lists the ice

capabilities of all major classes of USN/USCG/USNS/MSC/MARAD ships. This table should

contain “the major plus and minus of each class (i.e. a DDG has exposed screws and bow

mounted sonar prone to ice damage.” It was also suggested that the CONOPS should “add an

appendix explaining Ship Ice Ratings to highlight capabilities and limitations.” Modification and

expansion are also required in the existing “Platform Section” (CONOPS p. 24) to include

information on ice breaker and salvage vessels and alternative resource options such as leasing

assets from Arctic nations or private industry (see also the discussion on U.S. Navy Contracting

procedures later in this report).

Similarly, there needs to be a section on the challenges of operating the airborne assets that

provide logistical support and intelligence gathering in terms of the acceptable risk level

associated with extreme cold weather, visibility, maintenance support, and transient basing.

Players were often surprised by unforeseen limitations in aircraft capabilities that were unknown

to the operators, but were well known to engineers or acquisition personnel.

In the case of smaller vessels, several aspects of Arctic operations create unique circumstances

with regard to ship-to-shore movement and surface connector operations. These include typical

shoreline and bottom characteristics, varying ice composition, and reduced exposure times for

vessel crew which prompted a suggestion that procedure to mitigate the impact of these factors

be included in the CONOPS. Also required is “amplifying guidance for cold weather impacts to

personnel similar to what is contained in USCG/CAN/KoD publications (Safe stay time charts

etc.).” The inclusion of cold weather operations information (or reference to the appropriate

document) specifically tailored for surface connectors such as LCAC, LCUs, and other U.S.

Navy craft would benefit planners and operators.

The CONOPS should reflect the requirement for all units to make accommodations for cold

weather operations. Details for these changes are spread throughout numerous technical manuals

and the like, but should be assembled and summarized into a reference guide or checklist.

Examples include requirements to change lubrication or modify operating procedures for cold or


46

icy weather. The inclusion of a “list technical references that provide the detailed maintenance

practices required to operation critical equipment in the Arctic/extreme cold weather” was

suggested.

Because of the specific requirements associated with Arctic operations and the rarity of actual

Arctic deployments, it was recommended that the CONOPS establish a structure to preselect

units to serve as the AMRF either on a planned or crisis action basis. “A squadron or specific

hulls need to be identified for AMRF instead of using the entire fleet as a pool for Arctic

response.” This smaller pool of units would be the focus for the training and materiel solutions

outlined elsewhere in this report. This was recommended as a way to mitigate the risk of Arctic

operations. “These deployed assets are self-sufficient for operating in austere, remote

environments where potential is much higher for damage to ship's systems and equipment than in

normal operating environments. (And you are much farther from help than we have grown

accustomed to.)”

For example, in the case of ice navigation, there are specific training requirements and materiel

solutions that would need to be implemented for potential Arctic deployers. Instead of spreading

these across the fleet, identifying a smaller pool of units would be more cost-effective. In any

case, the CONOPS needs to provide detailed guidance to ships operating in various sea ice

conditions placing emphasis on ice navigation and the associated risks of operating in sea ice

laden waters given current ship designs. The CONOPS should include a comprehensive

description of sea ice navigation issues given the fleet‟s responsibility to “man, train, and equip

U.S. Navy ships to navigate around or avoid the ice, or provide an ice breaking capability if we

intend to operate in areas constantly covered with ice.” Suggested references include the

“Canadian Coast Guard web site and search the Ice Navigation Guide. Also look at the

Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention act for guidance on ship/ice operations.” Finally,

the CONOPS should outline training standards and certification requirements for ice navigation

personnel, both resident within the crew or hired for a specific voyage.

Logistics

Arctic infrastructure is austere and extended logistics chains are vital to operating in the Arctic.

Due to this, logistics must be planned well in advance. Ports in the region maintain minimal on-

hand stores and the long-lead times required to order and deliver fuel or materiel to the region

can quickly place a fleet logistics planner in extremis and severely limit the options available to

planners and commanders. Additionally, economy of effort is a key to success as whatever

forces are operating in the Arctic must be supported from outside.

Logistics operations in the Arctic present several unique scenarios and conditions. The CONOPS

should present a strawman logistics plan or an overview of logistics plans for operations in the

various regions of the Arctic which should be maintained at the fleet level. As part of this, the


47

CONOPS should contain an annex that provides a comprehensive listing of Arctic APODs and

SPODs with detailed information on each site‟s capabilities to include the type of available

logistic support for U.S. military forces. This annex should also contain information on the

preferred lines of communication for each likely operating area in the Arctic. As these lines of

communication will be very long, planners must always keep the availability of CLF ships in

mind, as they can be a limiting factor. Additionally, the CONOPS should provide planners with

enough information to successfully “explore pre-configured logistics packages to support small

salvage ships when Combat Logistic Force (CLF) support is not available.” Due to the lack of

Arctic shore infrastructure and the potential to quickly strain shore side resources, the

“knowledge of shore side capabilities is just as important to planning as knowledge of maritime

capabilities.” Because of the lack of shore infrastructure, the CONOPS should address

procedures to pre-position logistics assets in preparation for planned or crisis action

deployments. Finally, logistics is an area in the original draft CONOPS document that is

characterized by deliberate planning and long planning horizons. This should be modified to

address crisis situations more thoroughly. The CONOPS should include crisis action

vignettes/scenarios that reflect the difficulty of operating so far from existing logistics hubs in

bad weather.” Another related issue is that ship husbandry contracts must typically be arranged

6-8 months in advance in order to permit materiel, supplies and fuel to be delivered prior to the

ship‟s arrival. The CONOPS should address this need and explore methods to expedite

arrangements for husbandry in the case of a crisis.

Related to this, the issue of Arctic operations requiring long lead times for logistical support

coordination and the importance of using PDSS visits for overall coordination was highlighted.

There is the potential for circumstances to delay and thus extend timelines associated with crisis

and emergent contingencies. It was suggested that PDSS for ports or airfields likely to be utilized

in crisis response operations should be regularly visited and their PDSS information updated to

reduce delays in deploying into the Arctic. In support of this, a list of military and USCG

installations and associated seaport and airfield information needs to be provided in an easy to

use reference list that provides basic capability information.

The CONOPS should provide detailed guidance on emergency procedures such as a medical

evacuation (MEDEVAC) that requires prior coordination. Guidance is required on emergency

medical capabilities and the medical compliment necessary to medically support the force in this

remote region. This should include information on embarked medical forces not normally

required during International Contingency Operations (ICO) due to Arctic conditions and the

need to embark earlier in the operation due to extended distances between operating areas and

suitable APODs.

U.S. Navy forces do not normally operate in the Arctic and these units must be supported by

equipment pack up kits (PUK) that can be quickly transported to the deploying unit during a

crisis response situation. These kits contain PPE and other cold weather support items not


48

normally carried onboard naval units. The CONOPS should define the composition of the PUKs,

the procedures for transferring them to deploying units and the responsible organizations for

maintaining them. Players called for a revamping the entire section on materiel concerns

associated with clothing requirements (CONOPS pages 31-33) and a comprehensive PPE list

with AELs appropriate for Arctic weather conditions. Additionally, the CONOPS should direct

fleet logistics planners to work with the Navy Supply System to identify and procure appropriate

specialized equipment (see above discussion regarding Pack Up Kits (PUK)). As a last point on

this subject, alternative fuel considerations and associated guidance need to be included in the

CONOPS. For example, tasks and plans developed during the game had elements that required

the use of unleaded gasoline (MOGAS) which is carried in very limited quantities on U.S. Navy

ships. U.S. Navy ships may be requested to stow and support various operations that require the

use of MOGAS. Similarly, alternative lubricants suitable for cold weather operations may be

required and should be identified for possible inclusion in the PUK.

A positive factor for Arctic logistics is the large and increasing industry and exploration presence

in the Arctic. Planners should attempt to leverage industry capabilities such as ice hardened

designed ships that are already positioned in the Arctic and operated by an experienced

workforce. “The most capable and readily available assets may already be in the AOR but are

privately owned.” The CONOPS should be updated to leverage commercial solutions in areas

such as communications, logistics, and specialized vessels such as dive support, salvage, towing,

or logistics support. The CONOPS needs to outline an approved procedure or identify the

contracting authority to lease ice hardened vessels that are capable of salvage, tug operations,

and ice breaking activities. “The most critical update of the CONOPS will be to take the

CONOPS from a transient type focus to more of long-term sustained operation focus. This will

include thorough examination of the logistics requirements. Additionally, given the Arctic has a

vast supply of natural resources a focus should be on our interaction with industry and making

sure our equipment/systems can interface with theirs.”

Finally, because of the need to self-support logistically, adhere to environmental restrictions, and

to retrograde any material brought into the Arctic, it was determined that planners should strive

for as small a footprint as possible. Specifically, each operation should be completed with as few

ships, aircraft, and personnel as possible. The CONOPS should emphasize that planners must

minimize the operational human footprint in order to reduce required logistical support and

retrograde requirements while limiting the environmental impact of the operation.

Knowledge and Training

Arctic operations will likely require tailored pre-deployment training and access to in-depth

information and analysis on a broad range of topics. These include environmental protection,

relations with local and indigenous peoples, operating with coalition partners, fundamental

shiphandling, and understanding meteorological conditions.


49

Some relief to this challenge was proposed by those who described disparate nodes of Arctic

expertise and called for the CONOPS to include a catalog of them in support of planning

activities. “The CONOPS needs to provide better information concerning already existing Arctic

centers of expertise concerning ice and weather forecasting. Secondly the CONOPS needs to

provide a better understanding of existing Navy and Coast Guard facilities and Command and

Control of other Arctic Nations in order to facilitate planning for Arctic Operations.” “Add an

Appendix / Annex with resources for key Arctic elements such as the National Ice Center,

International Ice Patrol, FNMOC, etc.” Players identified that a “Center of Excellence” should be

developed to maintain and coordinate all of these relationships, noting that it could be a very

small staff element which focused on Arctic relationships, non-Navy capabilities and issues.

Were such a “Center of Excellence” to be developed at the Fleet level, its organization and

functions should be described in the CONOPS.

There needs to be “clearer guidance to utilize and leverage the U.S. Navy‟s Lesson Learned

database and personnel.” The lack of U.S. Navy Arctic corporate knowledge, ice capable assets,

and Arctic experience has created a vast knowledge gap which could be closed by the capture of

numerous lessons learned in the Navy‟s Lessons Learned database. The lessons learned must

also incorporate “lessons learned from academia, partner nations, industry” and this database

“needs to reflect real world experiences in the Arctic environment from a broad group of experts

(international, national, and academia.).” These insights should be incorporated into the

CONOPS. The CONOPS should direct all levels of command to use the Navy Lessons Learned

process to seek out knowledge from the broadly available non-Navy expertise and to feed this

knowledge back into the lessons learned system. The CONOPS should also include a mechanism

for regular review of lessons learned and revision of the CONOPS itself.

There are numerous Arctic-specific areas where specialized training is needed to support safe,

sustained operations. The CONOPS should describe and define crew training standards for ships

or aircrew deploying to the Arctic. Because this remains a rare event, these standards would not

need to be maintained for all ships, but only for the selected few likely to operate there. This

description should include Navy or non-Navy sources for required training in support of both

deliberate or crisis action timelines. “The organizations (organic or DOD contracted) providing

this training would have the subject matter expertise to prepare units to operate in the Arctic.”

In a similar vein to the ice navigation training mentioned in the Movement and Maneuver section

of this chapter, a need for U.S. Navy training implementation on ice familiarization and

identification training for shipboard personnel was repeatedly identified, METOC detachments,

and air surveillance personnel to perform ice recognition, monitoring, identification and

prediction duties. The CONOPS should outline non-Navy sources for this expertise in support of

crisis response as well as training standards to include guidance on the level of ice navigation

training required before operating in the Arctic.


50

Another specialized skill in support of sustaining Arctic operations is linguistics. It was

recommended that the CONOPS clearly define the need for embarked linguist support in the

various regions of the Arctic. This section should also specify the languages needed for various

regions as well as sources for non-Navy expertise in these fields. An embarked linguistic

capability enhances the ability to quickly interact with other Arctic nations or indigenous groups

to ensure timely coordination.

Planners and operators supporting Arctic operations need to know a common language. The

CONOPS should include a section of terms and definitions associated with the Arctic

environment and associated operations to ensure clarity of understanding. An example of a

common misunderstanding is the definition of “ice-free” conditions. “It should be clear when

and in what conditions the operation is expected to be conducted.” Similarly, the CONOPS

should have a regularly updated appendix containing links to databases and a listing of

publications that supports U.S. Navy units in preparing for and conducting operations in the

Arctic environment. If an Arctic “Center of Excellence” were to be established, then this section

should be maintained in collaboration with it.

Another useful addition to the CONOPS would be a strawman Arctic ISR plan. This could serve

both as the starting point for actual operational plans and as an example to educate planners on

the unique aspects of and resources available for Arctic ISR. This plan would support various

CONOPS missions such as Maritime Domain Awareness, oil recovery efforts, and HA/DR

operations. “The CONOPS should cover in greater detail, a plan to do sustained ISR as a

combined effort with international partners. This pertains to collection on ice coverage,

changing weather conditions, oil dispersion, etc.” The plan should address proper positioning of

limited ISR resources and the possibility of combining ISR efforts with international partners

using Thule AFB as a coordination node.

Important considerations for planners and operators preparing to send forces into the Arctic are

the sensitivities associated with disturbing indigenous wildlife while operating in the Arctic.

Wildlife migrations take place at sea, on land, and in the air. Operations in this environment

should not normally adversely impact wildlife and the indigenous people who live and depend on

these food sources. A comprehensive Arctic marine mammal/wildlife guide of historic hunting

grounds as well as contact listings to determine the latest information on the current hunting

ground locations is a prerequisite to Arctic operations. Either this information or reliable

references which can be used to obtain it should be incorporated into the CONOPS. Arctic

deployers must also be prepared to deal with the dangers of indigenous wildlife such as polar

bears. Specialized Force Protection training, policy, rules of engagement and procedures to

protect forces from this wildlife should be included in the CONOPS. It was suggested that

planners coordinate with indigenous populations and First Nation Rangers for local expertise and

as a force protection security resource.


51

A complete understanding of the characteristics of the Arctic environment needs to be available

in a CONOPS appendix providing detailed oceanographic information, seasonal ice conditions,

and weather data to support extended Arctic operations. This appendix should address the

“corresponding assumption of risk as it pertains to intelligence preparation of the environment.”

This is especially important in terms of operating in the vicinity of Arctic ice. Arctic ice

conditions are dynamic and the addition of an ice appendix containing guidance and information

such as ship ice rating matrix with associated capabilities, ice navigation information, and

procedures for operating in sea ice would provide the necessary resources supporting operations

in the Arctic environment. The ice appendix would provide Arctic seasonal information, various

types of sea ice characteristics, reference links, and a listing of organizations providing weather

forecasting, oceanographic, and hydrographic information. Example organizations include “the

National/Navy Ice Center for ice remote sensing and ice charts, and Fleet Numerical

Meteorology and Oceanography Center (FNMOC) for numerical weather and ice forecasts.”


52

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

In focusing on the specific gaps that limit sustained operations in the Arctic region, players

sought to identify specific recommendations that USFF should consider when planning or

conducting operations in the Arctic. The following recommendations are characterized by their

potential for immediate impact at the operational level and the feasibility of near-term

implementation. The major DOTMLPF-P actions USFF should develop and implement are:

establish USFF Arctic Working Group; update CONOPS and applicable doctrine to reflect game

insights; deploy to the Arctic; build domestic and international relationships; develop and

manage lessons learned database; and pursue identified areas for further research. These are

summarized here with details provided earlier in the report .

Establish USFF Arctic Working Group or Arctic “Center of Excellence”

Develop a permanent working group within USFF to manage and facilitate all maritime planning

and operations associated with the Arctic. The core of this group would be a small group with the

primary duty of establishing and maintaining a corporate knowledge of Arctic matters. This

entity‟s primary focus would be to create resources to rapidly identify and consult with U.S. and

international entities in order to improve operational readiness for U.S. Naval forces and

personnel. This would serve as a necessary first step toward establishing a permanent liaison

entity with other U.S. and international Arctic stakeholders. Specifically, this entity would be

responsible for: coordinating and conducting research projects, workshops and seminars;

collaborating with Navy, Joint, interagency, and industry as well as multinational stakeholders at

the operational level; integrating lessons learned into applicable doctrine; coordinating with Task

Force Climate Change; managing and disseminating all information pertaining to the Arctic at

the operational level; tracking U.S. Navy Arctic expertise and experience; and ensuring the Navy

is adequately manned, trained and equipped for Arctic operations.

Other roles would include managing networking with indigenous communities in the Arctic and

leverage similar efforts performed by USCG District 17, Canada‟s JTF North, JTF-Alaska or the

like. In the case of Arctic deployments or exercises, this group would push fundamental required

information to the force and then respond to pull requests as needed, acting as a research support

activity for deployed forces. Finally, this group would be responsible for revising the CONOPS.

It is recommended that this group serve as the support hub for all U.S. Navy Arctic activities

until such time that Arctic deployments or exercises become much more common than they are

today.


53

Update CONOPS to Reflect Game Insights

This should be executed by the Arctic Working Group discussed above and should include all

operational level stakeholders (NAVEUR, PACFLT, C3F, C6F) with participation by

NORTHCOM, EUCOM and PACOM.

Deploy to the Arctic

During game play, it was repeatedly suggested that “The best way to gain expertise and

experience in the region is to deploy forces to the Arctic”. Accordingly, USFF should

periodically deploy a ship to the Arctic for a sustained period to gather lessons learned and

conduct COMREL with indigenous population. Coordination with USCG and multinational

forces to conduct refueling and resupply should also be considered during deployment.

Build Relationships

Working to improve cooperation with multinational partners (e.g., Canada, Russia, Demark,

Norway and Greenland) in the areas of information sharing, training and platform acquisition

should be a priority. This should include efforts to develop bilateral and multilateral agreements

with these nations in order to leverage capacities, resources and information. In order to foster

long term partnerships with relevant multinational maritime forces and develop operational

experience in the Arctic, USFF should position Arctic exchange officers on Canadian, Russian,

Norwegian and Danish ships as feasible. Additionally, regular and frequent exercises should also

be conducted among Arctic nations‟ maritime forces in order to explore interoperability

challenges and capability deficiencies. Similarly, USFF should spearhead efforts to build

relationships within the U.S. Navy (PACFLT, NAVEUR) and across the U.S. government in

order to build standing procedures, organizational structures and mutual trust.

Using the Arctic Center of Excellence described above, USFF should develop and maintain a

contact list of all domestic (e.g., Navy, joint, interagency, and industry) and international (e.g.,

all Arctic states‟ maritime forces and Arctic Council) Arctic. Within each of these respective

commands, indicate the commands‟ roles, responsibilities and capabilities pertaining to Arctic

planning and operations.

Develop and Manage Lessons Learned Database

Coordination with Navy, joint, interagency and industry as well as international maritime

partners in order to garner specific lessons learned regarding Arctic planning and operations

should expand. This should be integrated with other lessons learned using the Navy Lessons

Learned Database. Finally, applicable U.S. Navy lessons learned regarding operations in the

Arctic should be made available to other domestic and intentional Arctic stakeholders.


54

Areas for Future Research

This section summarizes various areas for further study that may be useful to Commander, USFF

or other Arctic stakeholders through follow-on gaming or other research methods. These insights

may be useful to USFF as it seeks to improve the AMRF CONOPS and complete Arctic Road

Map tasking. The insights discussed in this report result from an inductive reasoning approach

and do not test a conclusive set of hypothetical actions that could be executed in a different

context – for instance, in the real world or even in other scenarios. However, the capability gaps,

mitigating strategies and proposed solutions developed by experts with a significant

understanding of the region and functional areas were broad in nature and are intended only to

indirectly inform Navy decisions regarding sustained maritime operations in the Arctic region.

This makes follow-on research efforts important to gaining a comprehensive understanding of

Arctic maritime operations.

U.S. Navy Doctrine and Strategy

Explore existing U.S. Naval strategy and its applicability to the Arctic region. Players asserted

myriad conditions and factors that are unique to the Arctic environment, which in turn,

substantially impact relationships, capabilities and information at the operational and tactical

levels. Leveraging the CS-21 refresher in 2012 would be an ideal forum to explore, how, if at all,

Arctic operations should be integrated for strategic consideration. One player noted, “It may

seem a retro move back to the Blue Nose Navy but we do need to update and re-think our old

doctrine for the area and then put it into practice in a way that allows us to evaluate and edit as

needed. Just jumping to the conclusion that it is „just colder but still Navy‟ is not a safe or really

effective way to approach this. Everything from cold water deck work to well deck operations,

flight ops and engineering must be carefully evaluated against our current state of technology on

ships.”

Relationships

Explore challenges and proposed collaborative solutions to sharing information (e.g.,

environmental information) among Arctic nations’ maritime forces in order to achieve

Maritime Domain Awareness. At a minimum, the challenges explored should include legal,

policy, cultural, and technical restrictions. Specific efforts in support of proposed collaborative

solutions should include: cooperative strategies and structures, supporting capabilities in an

information sharing system, and the specific information required to support national objectives.

Similarly, the integration or “fusion and analysis” of environmental information specific to the

Arctic region should also be considered within this research path.

Explore Command, Control, and Communications relationships among U.S. (Navy, Joint, and

Interagency) and international maritime partners (e.g., all Arctic states) in the Arctic. These


55

relationships should be explored under various climatic conditions and seasons, missions or

operations (e.g., crisis or scheduled deployment), and geographical locations in the Arctic region.

Specific, gaps, seams, overlaps as well as supported and supporting relationships should be also

examined. Subsequently, further research should be conducted to explore the characteristics,

attributes, and responsibilities as well as the missions and organizational structure of a potential

Joint, Interagency Arctic Task Force comprised of U.S. and international stakeholders in the

Arctic region (e.g., JIATF North model proposed during gameplay).

Explore the sharing of operational data when coordinating and collaborating among relevant

U.S. and international Arctic stakeholders during operations in the Arctic (e.g., both crisis and

scheduled deployments). Specifically, examine information sharing processes and “real-time

data transfer for rapid access and translation into operational and research products, and

structures required to facilitate coordination among stakeholders both at sea and ashore. The

sharing of information should be explored through three lenses: pre-operations, during

operations, and post-operations.

Explore the integration of information (e.g., lessons learned) pertaining to Arctic operations

among relevant stakeholders in order to prepare Navy planners and operators for Arctic

operations. Elements of this study should include: operational requirements, categorization of

information, impediments to information sharing, and data standardization criteria. Some U.S.

based elements that can be leveraged include, Office of Naval Research, Navy Research Lab,

USACE Cold Regions Research and Engineering Lab, Naval Post Graduate School, Naval War

College, and the Arctic Submarine Lab. More importantly, lessons learned from commercial

industry and multinational civilian and military organizations should also be incorporated in this

study.

Capabilities

At the unclassified level, explore the capabilities and limitations of all domestic and

international Arctic stakeholders in order to establish a baseline understanding of capable and

available platforms, systems, and personnel in the region. Capability areas of focus should

include national space based assets, operating in high altitude regions, ice breakers and ice

hardened vessels, training and logistics facilities, and existing relationships among the local

populace and tribal leaders. This study would also specifically generate „lessons learned‟ from

multinational partners regarding the effects of cold weather conditions on maritime forces‟

equipment, platforms, and aircraft as well as communication systems.

Based on the reliability and frequency of U.S. Naval forces’ in the Arctic, the U.S. Navy

should conduct a feasibility study to explore the costs and benefits of platform acquisition.

Specifically, compare purchasing or leasing of ice breakers and ice capable vessels from industry


56

and international partners, hardening existing U.S. Navy vessels (LCACs), and developing a new

„futuristic‟ ship designed to meet emerging requirements in the region.

Science & Technology

Explore alternative ways to employ capabilities (e.g., Maritime Domain Awareness, Maritime

Security and HADR) in the Arctic through the development and application of technological

solutions (satellites, sensors, etc.) vice a "Man on the Ice." More specifically, explore the use

of “sensors and sensor systems to improve observational programs, including the use of UUVs,

UAVs, acoustic navigation and communications.”

Logistics

Explore new and innovative ways to conduct resupply and refueling in the Arctic. Focus on

finding a reliable, cost efficient and effective fuel source through domestic or international

channels in order to refuel U.S. navy vessels during transit in the Arctic region. Specific areas of

research should include viable and reliable options for refueling and replenishment at sea, as well

as the use or development of shore infrastructure. “The U.S. Navy should leverage existing DoD

research initiatives that explore expeditionary power and logistics (including waste management)

in the Arctic.”

Environment

Explore new processes, relationships, and systems to improving weather and ice forecast

modeling in the Arctic region. Specific areas of further research should include factors and

processes that drive the retreat of the sea ice cover, atmospheric circulation, wildlife patterns,

surface radiation balance, ocean circulation and mixing, and waves and swell in ice. “Having

a better understanding of the myriad environmental considerations that impact operations (e.g.,

indigenous hunting grounds and marine mammals (noise, migratory patterns) in the Arctic will

better prepare U.S. Navy planners and operators.” Collaboration with U.S. and international

civilian universities, industry, and government organizations was highly encouraged.


57

APPENDICES AND SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

Appendix A – Summary of Game Moves and Scenarios

Appendix B – Final Plenary - Group Outbriefs

Appendix C – Survey Questionnaire

Appendix D – Game Schedule

Appendix E – Game Participants and Demographics

Appendix F – Limitations of Game Design and Analysis

Appendix G – Definition of Terms

Appendix H – Data Collection Roles and Assignments


58

Appendix A – Summary of Game Moves and Scenarios This section summarizes players‟ actions (e.g., what the players did and said) during each move

of the game. Four independent player cells encountered sixteen diverse scenarios over two days

of game play. Content Analysis was performed using game data from the cell based game tool,

ethnographic notes, and cell PowerPoint slides. Player derived insights in the section are

reflected in the following categories: Course of Action and Risk Assessment; Updates to

CONOPS; DOTMLPF-P Gaps, Mitigating Strategies, and Proposed Solutions; White Cell

Insights. The scenarios provided encountered for each cell during each move of game play are

also presented in this section. Player inputs are reported as stated in the game and have not been

evaluated for correctness, adherence to doctrine or internal consistency.

MOVE 1

Cell #1 (Atlantic Ocean): Scenario 1 - Forward Presence/ Deterrence Mission - MDA

Deployment


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Today is September 14, 2011. You are a multi-organizational planning team supporting CTF-20.

In advance of the many Navy Arctic initiatives scheduled for 2013, U.S. NORTHCOM has

directed a two-month Maritime Domain Awareness exercise, entitled, “Operation Blinding

Snowstorm” to be conducted August to October 2012. This exercise is to be conducted in

cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard and the Canadian, Danish and Norwegian Navies. This

mission is to take place in Baffin Bay and the Norwegian, Greenland, and Barents Seas. CTF-20

is tasked with conducting maritime surveillance activities with assigned forces and is designated

as the supported command. Additionally, forces shall conduct engagement visits to designated

ports and villages. Minimum force deployment is to be one rotary and one fixed wing aircraft as

well as one surface vessel. The intent of this exercise is to improve USN ability to attain Arctic

Domain Awareness and understanding of the ability to sustain operations in the Arctic

environment while building partnerships and relationships in the region.

Environmental Conditions:

Location

Date

(+/- 15

days)

Air

Temp

F/C

Sea

Surf.

Temp

Sea

Stat

e

0-9

Wind

s

Wave

Height

Meters

Precip

Hrs of

Dayligh

t

Ice

Accretion

Visibilit

y

% ≥

5nm &

1000ft

Ceiling

% < 2

nm &

600 ft

Baffin Bay 12-Sep

26-56F

-3to13C

34-40F

1to4C

0-5 Calm-

20 kts 0-5

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

13.25 Minimal if

any 70-80 10-20

Davis Strait 12-Sep

22-52F

-6to11C

34-40F

1to4C

0-5

Calm

-20

kts

0-9

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

13.5 Minimal if

any 80-90 0-10

Denmark

Strait 12-Sep

25-55F

-4to13C

33-39F

1to4C

0-7

Calm

- 30

kts

0-15

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

13.5 Minimal if

any 60-70 20-30

Norwegian

Sea 12-Sep

35-65F

2to18C

42-48F

6to9C

0-6

Calm

- 25

kts

0-13 Rain 13.25 None 70-80 10-20

Mission: CTF-20 will deploy a tailored Arctic Maritime Response Force to conduct a 2 month

Maritime Domain Awareness patrol 15 Aug - 15 Oct 2012 in the designated MDA operating


60

areas (1-4) in order to exercise MDA capabilities, forge domestic and international partnerships

and demonstrate a continuous U.S. military forward presence.

Commander’s Intent:

Purpose: Demonstrate and improve USN capability to operate in the Arctic.

Method: Identify, deploy and sustain maritime assets in Baffin Bay and the Norwegian,

Greenland, and Barents Seas. Patrol each designated area for a minimum of 12 days.

Engagement visits will be conducted in the following locations: Iqaluit, CN, and Nuuk, GL.

USNORTHCOM and USFF have granted CTF-20 DIRLAUTH for coordination with USCG and

the Canadian, Danish and Norwegian navies.

End State: Arctic Maritime Response Force has successfully deployed and been sustained for a

2 month operation. USN understanding of Arctic operations and the Arctic environment has been

improved. Domestic and international partnerships in the region have been improved.

TASKS:

1) Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships.

2) Identify required surface and air forces to conduct and sustain maritime surveillance

activities in specified MDA operating areas from 15 AUG to 15 OCT. Patrol each area

for a minimum of 12 days.

3) Determine required embarked forces to support transit, operations, training and

engagement.

4) Determine requirements to conduct engagement visits to the following ports:

a. Iqaluit, CN (N63 44‟ - W068 30‟)

b. Nuuk, GL (N64 11‟ – W054 41‟)

i. All engagement port calls shall include a visit and briefing for visited

community ashore and a tour for community leaders aboard at least one

surface ship. Local media representatives are also to be actively

encouraged to attend surface ship tours.

5) Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for

same.

6) Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Denmark,

Greenland, Iceland, Norway, and Canada to support all aspects of completing this

mission.


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Constraints: Coordinate with Canadian, Danish and Norwegian forces, local petroleum

industry and U.S. Government representatives. Comply with all applicable environmental

regulations while operating in the Arctic region. Respect all territorial seas.

Restraints (Can’t do):

1. Avoid undue interruption of indigenous population activities

2. Avoid undue interaction with Arctic terrestrial and marine wildlife

Summary of Move

Course of Action (COA) & Risk Assessment

The cell chose a COA that deployed a self-sufficient Arctic Maritime Reponses Force (AMRF)

consisting of USN and USCG, embarked surface craft and aviation detachments, land based P-

3s, and support from Canadian, Norwegian, and Danish navies. Forces conducted a 2 month

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) patrol in designated MDA operating areas 1-4 in order to

exercise MDA capabilities, forge domestic and international partnerships and demonstrate

continuous U.S. military forward presence. Due to the limited availability of icebreaking

platforms, the USN vessels deployed focused on operating in ice free areas. Ship to shore

operations with organic aircraft or landing craft facilitated engagement visits with local

communities.

Player discussions regarding Command and Control (C2) identified the need to establish

relationships between the USN, USCG and Canada, as well as Greenland, Norway, and

NATO for airspace and water space management.

Movement and Maneuver (M/M) and logistic issues centered on the time and distance

concern due to the vast distances between MDA operating areas 1-4 and associated

community relations visits. The players minimized the risk of not accomplishing the

entire mission by developing a patrol area sequencing plan that leveraged on major

regional supply centers to augment the deployed task force‟s organic resupply

capabilities. The cell determined that surface patrol information gathering supplemented

with land based air assets would achieve the requisite MDA understanding of the Arctic

region.

In the area of logistics, the cell identified locations of APODs/SPODs for emergent needs

as well as coordinating access to a NATO fuel depot in Iceland which served as a

resupply point for a USNS T-AKE that logistically supported the AMRF.

Intel discussions focused on understanding the native hunting ground areas.


62

Fires discussions focused on coordinating port visits, conducting community relations

projects, and meeting with local authorities.

Updates to CONOPS

Cell 1 identified a significant C2 change concerning the process of requesting support

from foreign governments and other U.S. government agencies given the engagement

nature of the mission. The cell determined that the CONOPS requires a C2 appendix for

the AMRF detailing international C2 relationships and command structures with Canada,

Denmark, and Norway while operating in areas which are historically associated with

NATO.

Recommended Intelligence and Movement and Maneuver changes include articulation of

historic hunting grounds as well as contact listings to determine the latest information on

the current hunting ground locations. Due to the lack of USN corporate knowledge of

Arctic operations, emphasis should be given to updating the Navy Lessons Learned

database with new lessons from experience in the Arctic.

Regarding logistics, the cell suggested the CONOPS discuss access to the NATO fuel

depot in Iceland.

Gaps, Mitigating Strategies & Proposed Solutions

The C2 gap identified during this move focused on the lack of understanding regarding

NATO procedures and the NATO/AMRF relationship. A mitigating solution suggested

inclusion of the training of AMRF deployers on NATO operational areas, cold weather

operations, and providing a primary contact list. A proposed solution includes training

deployers by incorporating NATO pre-deployment preparations into standard pre-

overseas movement (POM) checklists.

The Intel gap focused on the use of the Navy‟s Lesson Learned System and suggested

that it is not entirely understood and therefore underutilized. The mitigating strategy

included the training of Arctic deplorers who are operating in a high risk environment so

that these valuable lessons can be recorded properly. The proposed solution is to

mandate the use of the USN‟s Lesson Learned System into the CONOPS.

White Cell Insights

C2 insights focused on relationships and coordination between U.S. and international

maritime forces. USNORTHCOM permitted the task force DIRLAUTH with Norway

and KoD vice going through USEUCOM. The task force relationship focused only on

USNORTHCOM but there is also a need to coordinate/liaise with C6F. The task force


63

needed to establish a relationship therefore coordinated MDA operations with MCC

Atlantic/JTF Atlantic while operating in the MDA 1 OPAREA (e.g., in the vicinity of

Canada and Greenland). NATO/Northwood coordination may not be required but

coordination with NATO countries is advised. There is a need to establish relationships

with Arctic nation assigned Defense Attachés (DATTs) through USEUCOM. Some

coordination with Russia and other Arctic nations is desirable. These C2 insights have

implications that require cross-CCDR coordination. To reduce the potential friction with

Russia, the White Cell suggested informing the Russians of our intentions during this

scenario.

Movement and Maneuver insights highlighted the accessibility challenges of the

operating areas due to sea ice during the timeframe given in the scenario.

Fires highlighted the need to interface with the Arctic Council to facilitate and encourage

political dialogue.

Logistics efforts focused on the need to plan emerging requirements. Requirements

regarding logistical support and equipment must be identified for Arctic operations.

Intelligence insights included the need to identify opportunities to work with Russian

forces with the understanding that this would be a confidence building effort with the

Russian Fleet.

The need for robust meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) support services and

products during the planning process is a critical support prerequisite. The activities

taking place in the MDA OPAREAS such as commercial operations (fishing, industry)

and regional information (weather, iceberg movements) gathering along with associated

reporting requirements must be better shared across these entities to increase MDA. Both

public affairs (PAO) and Intelligence Specialist (IS) detachments should be onboard the

task force while operating in the Arctic. Strategic communications liaison efforts are

required to inform applicable nations of U.S. intentions while operating in the Arctic.


64

Cell #2 (Pacific Ocean): Scenario 2 – Forward Presence/Deterrence Mission - MDA

Deployment

Today is September 14, 2011. You are a multi-organizational planning team supporting

COMTHIRDFLT.

In advance of the many Navy Arctic initiatives scheduled for 2013, U.S. NORTHCOM has

directed a 2 month (minimum of 1 rotary and 1 fixed wing aircraft as well as 1 surface platform

vessel) Maritime Domain Awareness exercise, entitled, “Operation Blinding Snowstorm” to be

conducted August to October 2012. This exercise is to be conducted in cooperation with the U.S.

Coast Guard and the Canadian Navy. This mission is to take place in the Beaufort, Bering, and

Chukchi Seas. COMTHIRDFLT is tasked with conducting maritime surveillance activities with

assigned forces and is designated as the supported command. Additionally, forces shall conduct

engagement visits to designated ports and villages. Minimum force deployment is to be one

rotary and one fixed wing aircraft as well as one surface vessel. The intent of this exercise is to


65

improve USN ability to attain Arctic Domain Awareness and understanding of the ability to

sustain operations in the Arctic environment while building partnerships and relationships in the

region.


Location

Date

(+/- 15

days)

Air

Temp

F/C

Sea

Surf.

Temp

Sea

State

0-9

Winds

Wave

Height

Meters

Precip Hrs of

Daylight

Ice

Accretion

Visibility

% ≥ 5nm

& 1000ft

Ceilin

g

% <

2 nm

& 600

ft

Beaufort

Sea 12-Sep

15-45F

-9to7C

27-33F

-3to1C

0-6 Calm -

25 kts 0-5

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

14 Minimal if

any 50-60 20-30

Bering

Sea 12-Sep

30-60F

-1to16C

40-46F

4to8C

0-6 Calm -

25 kts 0-13 Rain 13 None 60-70 20-30

Chukchi

Sea 12-Sep

15-45F

-9to7C

23-29F

-5to-

2C

0-5 Calm -

20 kts 0-5

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

14 Moderate 40-50 30-40

Mission: C3F will deploy a tailored Arctic Maritime Response Force to conduct a 2 month

Maritime Domain Awareness patrol 15 Aug - 15 Oct 2012 in the designated MDA operating

areas (1-4) in order to exercise MDA capabilities, forge domestic and international partnerships

and demonstrate a continuous U.S. military forward presence.


Purpose: Demonstrate and improve USN capability to operate in the Arctic.

Method: Identify, deploy and sustain maritime assets in the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi

Seas. Patrol each designated area for a minimum of 12 days. Engagement visits will be

conducted in the following locations: Sachs Harbor, CN, and Barrow, AK. USNORTHCOM and

USFF have granted COMTHIRDFLT DIRLAUTH for coordination with USCG and Canadian

Navy.


66

End State: Arctic Maritime Response Force has successfully deployed and been sustained for a

2 month operation. USN understanding of Arctic operations and the Arctic environment has been

improved. Domestic and international partnerships in the region have been improved.

TASKS:


2) Identify required surface and air forces to conduct and sustain maritime surveillance

activities in specified MDA operating areas from 15 AUG to 15 OCT. Patrol each area

for a minimum of 12 days.

3) Determine required embarked forces to support transit, operations, training and

engagement.

4) Determine requirements to conduct engagement visits to the following ports:

o Sachs Harbor, CN (N71 59‟ – W125 15‟)

o Barrow, AK (N71 17‟ – W156 46‟)

All engagement port calls shall include a visit and briefing for visited





same.

6) Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Russia and

Canada to support all aspects of completing this mission.

Constraints: Coordinate with Canadian forces, local petroleum industry and U.S. Government

representatives. Comply with all applicable environmental regulations while operating in the

Arctic region. Respect all territorial seas.




Summary of Move



67

Cell 2 planned a two month MDA patrol to four MDA operating areas in order to exercise MDA

capabilities, demonstrate forward presence in the Arctic region, and conduct engagement visits

domestically and internationally. The COA divided the responsibilities among Canadian and

U.S. forces utilizing assets of the USN, USCG, and Canadian Maritime Forces to accomplish the

mission within the allotted timeframe.

C2 required the Task Force to report to USNORTHCOM, informing USEUCOM on

message traffic. The MPRA was TACON to CTF 30 for both U.S. and Canadian forces.

The task force employed the assistance of tribal liaison officers during community

relations visits. Direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) was given between USCG

District 17 and the Russian Border Guard.

Intel efforts focused on community relations (COMREL) projects and the appropriate

scope and supply needs, conducting pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS), and coordinate

with USCG District 17 on whale migrations, current indigenous peoples‟ hunting areas,

and other issues that are potentially sensitive.

Movement and Maneuver actions identified time frames associated with COMREL visits,

refueling operations and port visits of the task force surface forces, and the shore basing

of MPRA and Helicopter assets that support MPA operations.

Logistics actions identified APOD (Barrow) and SPOD (Dutch Harbor) and required

logistic ships to support the operation.

Fires included a strategic communications plan for the operation focusing on

humanitarian assistance, native engagement, Arctic MDA, and scientific research.

Force Protection efforts centered on cold weather training including procuring personal

protective equipment (PPE) and cold weather equipment modifications procedures

involving operation and maintenance.

Updates to CONOPS

Intelligence CONOPS changes centered on the need to develop an array of documents,

publications, and databases that prepares and supports Arctic operations to include

operational information such as a complete list of SPODs and APODs, various regional

conditions distances, climatic conditions, and key regional and international points of

contacts (POCs), and local indigenous leaders.

Movement and Maneuver CONOPS changes focused on the USN‟s ability to operate in

the Arctic under a wide variety of ice and weather conditions and to understand the

design limitations of USN ships operating in this environment. Information regarding


68

opportunities to leverage ice capable assets from industry that are already positioned in

the Arctic and supported by an experienced workforce would provide requisite situational

awareness of resident Arctic based industry capabilities. Sourcing information on

remotely operated vehicles in order to enhance wreckage location would have been vital

for the successful accomplishment of the scenario mission.

Logistic CONOPS changes included the need for a comprehensive listing of

APOD/SPOD information and the capabilities of these sites to support the development

of a logistical support plan. With sustainment of USN forces operating in the Arctic

requiring significant lead times in terms of years, a crisis response or emergent

contingencies would require organic logistical support. A logistical support plan for long

term sustained operations and crisis response situations must be included in the

CONOPS. The Navy Supply System must support Arctic operations by intensifying

efforts to identify materials and equipment necessary to operate successfully in the

Arctic. Examples include various equipment lubricants and PPE.

Identified Fires CONOPS changes were associated with medical evacuation

(MEDEVAC) procedures and the necessary coordination required with the other Arctic

nations to include veterinarian support.

Lastly, players suggested all CONOPS changes associated with Arctic missions listed in

the CONOPS should be validated or revised by USNORTHCOM and USEUCOM.


C2 gaps included satellite communications‟ ability to establish high latitude

communications which could be resolved by having additional satellite coverage. Ice

breaker and ice hardened ship shortfalls in the U.S. inventory and the unavailability of

industry assets require coordination with other Arctic countries (Canada, Finland,

Norway, Russia, and Denmark) for leasing their assets as a mitigation strategy. The

proposed solution is to build an organic capability. There is a lack of coordination

between the U.S. and Russian navies. The mitigating solution suggested was that USCG

District 17 act as a liaison with the Russian Border Guard and expand this coordination

effort to include both navies. The proposed solution is to establish a long term maritime

partnership between U.S. and Russian maritime forces through cooperative agreements.

Coordination with local villages requires enhanced efforts minimizing the potential for

negative engagement experiences. Creating a task force Tribal Liaison Officer billet for

PDSS and COMREL projects is the mitigating strategy with establishment of a Tribal

Liaison Officer billet at USNORTHCOM as the proposed solution.


69

An Intelligence gap focused on the need for persistent coordination for planning this

MDA mission. One example discussed by the group centered on the lack of survey

information of the operating areas. The mitigating strategy required close coordination

with USCG District 17. The proposed solution centered on the creation of a USN

detachment that is permanently stationed in the region to develop detailed operations

information in coordination with the various regional organizations.

The Movement and Maneuver gap focused on the lack of combat logistic force ship

availability while in an area where pierside refueling was not available. The mitigating

solution recommended the use of prepositioned refueling barges while the proposed

solution suggested the development of port facilities in the Arctic to resupply surface

forces.

The Force Protection gap centered on the need to establish a tribal liaison officer to

initiate close ties with local tribal communities, enhance cultural awareness, and

communication efforts. Closing this gap centered on leverage upon the knowledge base

of the local industry and the suggestion to develop a web-based software training

program.

White Cell Insights

C2 insights included the need for USNORTHCOM/USEUCOM to submit a request for

forces (RFF) for OPCON of THIRD Fleet forces from USPACOM. This implies that

more coordination is required between USNORTHCOM and USPACOM on a case by

case basis. The AMRF needs to establish a C2 link with USCG District 17. There are

questions on how NORAD MDA and JTF Alaska responsibilities fit into this

organization with the implication that the USCG has responsibility to both NORAD and

JTF Alaska.

Movement and Maneuver discussions centered on the idea that there are more appropriate

USN platforms to use for this mission such as an LPD with embarked LCAC, despite a

CG being a more robust C2 platform. Though accessibility might be hampered by ice

conditions, the platforms with the greatest flexibility in this environment are amphibious

platforms.

Logistics actions raised a question on why the cell chose Barrow as the primary APOD.

Amphibious ships provide better medical services due to the enhanced medical

capabilities which may facilitate engagement opportunities with the indigenous people.

Amphibious ships also have unique design features that include embarked

accommodations and large well decks with LCACs which enable access to unimproved

ports.


70

Cell #3 (Atlantic Ocean): Scenario 3 – Power Projection Mission – Strategic Repositioning

of Forces Exercise

Today is 01 January 2012. USFF has directed CTF-20 to reposition an Amphibious Ready

Group (ARG) and one DDG from Norfolk, VA to San Diego, CA via the Arctic. The route will

transit via the Northwest Passage (NWP) as a proof of concept exercise with a departure date of

28 August 2012.

You are a CTF-20 led operational planning group tasked to plan this exercise. Make

comprehensive preparations and coordinate numerous tasks associated with the transit of a task

force of several warships through the NWP and document the operational shortfalls and gaps

associated with this transit.


71


Time of year: September.

Location

Date

(+/-

15

days

)

Air

Temp

F/C

Sea

Surf.

Temp

Sea

State

0-9

Winds

Wave

Heigh

t

Meter

s

Precip

Hrs of

Daylig

ht

Ice

Accretion

Visibil

ity

% ≥

5nm &

1000ft

Ceiling

% < 2

nm &

600 ft

NWP (East

to West)

12-

Sep

10-40F

-

12to4C

22-28F

-6to-2C

0-5 Calm -20

kts 0-5

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

14.5 Moderate 50-60 20-30

Commander’s Mission:

On order from USFF, CTF 20 will conduct a transit from Norfolk, VA to San Diego, CA via the

NWP in cooperation with the Canadian Government, the Kingdom of Denmark, and

coordination with various U.S. government agencies in order to conduct a proof of concept

repositioning of naval forces and identify operational limitations, capability gaps, and document

deployment lessons learned. Provide required support for embarked media and Arctic

researchers throughout this exercise. Conduct four specified engagement port visits to foster

partnerships and examine any differences in ship to shore processes in the Arctic environment.


Purpose: Execute a proof of concept movement exercise by making requisite preparations and

reposition naval warships from Norfolk, VA to San Diego, CA in order to exercise the capability

of transiting through the Arctic region via the NWP to identify shipboard, personnel, and

procedural limitations.

Method: Conduct robust pre-deployment preparations and associated coordination with the

Canadian government, the Kingdom of Denmark, and various U.S. government agencies that

have stakes in the Arctic. Identify desired liaison efforts with private organization such as

industry and the indigenous population that are located along the transit route. Conduct four port

visits and emphasis partnerships and transparency with local Arctic leaders. Leverage embarked

media personnel when coordinating with Arctic community based media representatives. Make

requests to USFF for specialized training, logistic support, and initiating liaison efforts outside

the Department of the Navy.


72

End State: This proof of concept exercise is considered complete upon task force arrival at

Naval Base San Diego, CA.

Tasks:

1. Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships.

2. Determine composition of surface forces required to conduct assigned mission.

3. Conduct transit and associated engagement visits.

4. Determine required embarked forces to support transit, operations, training and

engagement.

5. Determine requirements to conduct engagement visits to the following ports:

o Iqaluit, CN (N63 44‟ - W068 30‟)

o Nuuk, GL (N64 11‟ – W054 41‟)


o Barrow, AK (N71 17‟ – W156 46‟)





6. Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for

same.

7. Identify coordination and liaison requirements with other U.S. government agencies and

the governments of Greenland, Denmark, Canada and Russia to support all aspects of

completing this mission.

Intelligence Estimate: Threat environment is current real world conditions.

Constraints (Must do):

1. Provide CHINFO approved media representatives logistical support as required





73

Summary of Move


Cell 3‟s COA centered on conducting a proof of concept transit that repositioned U.S. surface

forces from the East Coast to West Coast through the Northwest Passage (NWP). They sought to

minimize risk to USN ships and personnel by choosing to transit during a time with the least

amount of ice coverage. Transiting units were tasked to capture shipboard, personnel, and

procedural limitations as well as conduct engagement visits with four coastal towns. The task

force consisted of a DDG and an Amphibious Ready Group (LHD, LPD, and LSD) with ice

breaker escort. Embarked units include a PHIBRON staff, TACRON element, PAO detachment,

surface craft (LCAC/LCU) and aviation (rotary wing aircraft). The players viewed this force

repositioning transit as a high risk mission with the associated high probability of mission

failure. The predominant topics discussed included proper crew training and preparation, USN

ship design limitations, shipboard systems and various equipment limitations, reliability of

communications, lack of infrastructure providing support in the Arctic region, the needed support

from the Canadian liaison officials, and ice breaker escort. Player discussions highlighted

numerous limitations while operating in an Arctic environment that would result in significant

degradation of operational capability. Challenges identified centered on equipment failures and

human factors which would degrade the operational effectiveness.

C2 relationships focused on conducting this proof of concept of repositioning of USN

forces as a combined operation with Canadian forces. Intelligence identified the need to

have airborne ice reconnaissance assets to support ice avoidance measures and guide

surface ships safely through the sea ice.

Movement and Maneuver discussions stressed the importance of ice pilots especially

with non-hardened hulled ships transiting through the NWP. The players suggested a

USN surface ship and ice breaker ratio of 1:1 due to the large number and size of the

USN units transiting at once.

Logistics focused on refueling operations due to the lack of refueling opportunities in the

Arctic. All USN ships refueled in St. Johns/Halifax and again at Thule AFB. A

prepositioned ice class tanker was suggested in order to provide fuel as far north as

feasible based on the ice conditions.

Force Protection concentrated on local community visits using a Canadian Ranger Patrol

liaison official.


74

Updates to CONOPS

The cell posited that operating in an Arctic environment requires a reliable C2 structure

centered on multi-national partners, specifically Canada and Kingdom of Denmark,

which addresses standard OPCON/TACON relationships.

Intelligence CONOPS changes focused on operating U.S. Navy ships safely in the Arctic

environment by using airborne ice reconnaissance assets to identify safe transit routes in

a region experiencing dynamic weather conditions. An understanding of this airborne

capability, the logistically support and planning of Arctic intelligence requirements also

lacks sufficient guidance.

Logistic CONOPS changes focused on the Arctic‟s inherent lack of fueling facilities

thereby requiring the development of a logistical plan that properly supports a sustained

USN operational presence in this region.

Force Protection CONOPS changes highlighted the lack of USN ice hardened ships thus

heavily relying on ice hardened escort ships (ice breakers). The design limitations of

USN ships operating in ice laden Arctic waters requires guidance on ice hardened escort

vessel ratios to non-hardened combatants in various ice conditions. The associated

training deficiency is ice navigation training.

Specific guidance on ice navigation training requirements should also be included in the

CONOPS.


Identified USN gaps include the need for a standing coalition task force, trained airborne ice

reconnaissance teams, and fuel sustainment while operating in the Arctic.

The C2 gap identified the need of a standing task force to organize coalition forces

operating in the Arctic. To mitigate this challenge, the cell suggested the use of a C2

architecture centered on Nanook and Frontier Sentinel exercises. The proposed solution

is a combined military task force comprised of Arctic countries.

An Intelligence gap identified is the lack of resources to train ice reconnaissance teams.

A U.S. ice reconnaissance mitigation strategy would utilize Canadian based

reconnaissance resources to augment satellite imagery. The permanent solution is to

establish a U.S. reconnaissance training regimen to augment satellite imagery

capabilities.

The Logistics gap highlighted the need for Arctic region fuel resources, which in turn,

resulted in sustainment issues - especially for smaller combatant ships such as destroyers.


75

A short term solution suggested included tanker support at the furthest transit point that is

free of ice in the Baffin Bay and Bering Sea regions. The proposed solution is the

development of a port facility at the midpoint of the NWP transit route.

White Cell Insights

Regarding C2, the White Cell challenged the OPCON shift location between SECOND

and THIRD Fleets. The players created a CTF for this scenario which may not be

required since existing C2 entities are adequate. Regarding the need for a 1 to 1 ratio of

an ice breaker to non-ice hardened platform, the White Cell noted that this 1:1 ratio

would require that 4 icebreakers be dedicated to this mission which they considered to be

unrealistic.

Additionally, with regard to Movement and Maneuver, there are limitations of operating

in ice behind ice breakers. Some USN ships are wider than the ice breakers that would be

escorting them. Unexpected ice conditions, could pose a greater risk of damage to ships.

Replenishment at Sea (RAS) operations are not feasible in icing conditions in the NWP.

Planning a RAS evolution in that region would require that the Naval Surface Warfare

Center Center of Excellence located in Port Hueneme, CA be consulted. Planning for

actual ice conditions is virtually impossible. Hydrographic survey teams can conduct

research along the proposed transit route. The implication resulting from this move is

that this mission is not feasible given the use of non-ice hardened vessels. This mission

may require the substitution of the vessels directed in the scenario with a more

appropriate vessel in order to accomplish the task.


76

Cell #4 (Pacific Ocean): Scenario 4 – Power Projection Mission – Strategic Repositioning of

Forces Exercise

Today is 01 January 2012. USFF has directed C3F to reposition an Amphibious Ready Group

(ARG) and one DDG from San Diego, CA to Norfolk, VA via the Arctic. The route will transit

via the Northwest Passage (NWP) as a proof of concept exercise with a departure date of 28

August 2012.

You are a C3F led operational planning group tasked to plan this exercise. Make comprehensive

preparations and coordinate numerous tasks associated with the transit of a task force of several

warships through the NWP and document the operational shortfalls and gaps associated with this

transit.


Time of year: September.


77

Location

Date

(+/- 15

days)

Air

Temp

F/C

Sea

Surf.

Temp

Sea

State

0-9

Winds

Wave

Height

Meters

Precip Hrs of

Daylight

Ice

Accretion

Visibility

% ≥ 5nm

& 1000ft

Ceiling

% < 2

nm &

600 ft

NWP

(West to

East)

12-Sep

10-40F

-

12to4C

22-28F

-6to-2C

0-5 Calm -

20 kts 0-5

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

14.5 Moderate 50-60 20-30


On order from USFF, C3F will conduct a transit from San Diego, CA to Norfolk, VA via the

NWP in cooperation with the Canadian Government, the Kingdom of Denmark, and

coordination with various U.S. government agencies in order to conduct a proof of concept

repositioning of naval forces and identify operational limitations, capability gaps, and document

deployment lessons learned. Provide required support for embarked media and Arctic

researchers throughout this exercise. Conduct four specified engagement port visits to foster

partnerships and examine any differences in ship to shore processes in the Arctic environment.


Purpose: Execute a proof of concept movement exercise by making requisite preparations and

reposition naval warships from San Diego, CA to Norfolk, VA in order to exercise the capability

of transiting through the Arctic region via the NWP to identify shipboard, personnel, and

procedural limitations.

Method: Conduct robust pre-deployment preparations and associated coordination with the

Canadian government, the Kingdom of Denmark, and various U.S. government agencies that

have stakes in the Arctic. Identify desired liaison efforts with private organization such as

industry and the indigenous population that are located along the transit route. Conduct four port

visits and emphasis partnerships and transparency with local Arctic leaders. Leverage embarked

media personnel when coordinating with Arctic community based media representatives. Make

requests to USFF for specialized training, logistic support, and initiating liaison efforts outside

the Department of the Navy.

End State: This proof of concept exercise is considered complete upon task force arrival at

Naval Base Norfolk, VA.

Tasks:



78

2. Determine composition of surface forces required to conduct assigned mission.

3. Conduct transit and associated engagement visits.

4. Determine required embarked forces to support transit, operations, training and

engagement.

5. Determine requirements to conduct engagement visits to the following ports:

o Iqaluit, CN (N63 44‟ - W068 30‟)

o Nuuk, GL (N64 11‟ – W054 41‟)


o Barrow, AK (N71 17‟ – W156 46‟)






same.

7. Identify coordination and liaison requirements with other U.S. government agencies and

the governments of Greenland, Denmark, Canada and Russia to support all aspects of

completing this mission.







Summary of Move


The cell explored a proof of concept repositioning of naval forces from the West Coast to the

East Coast via the NWP. The COA had the task force depart San Diego to transit through the


79

Arctic NWP when there is the least amount of ice along the transit route. The cell chooses to

conduct this mission in cooperation with Canadian and Kingdom of Denmark (KoD)

governments and various U.S. government agencies. The task group consisted of a DDG and an

ARG (LHD, LPD, and LSD) with an embarked ACE consisting of only rotary wing aircraft to

take advantage of self-resupply and Search and Rescue (SAR) capabilities. Pre-deployment

preparations included polar bear training, equipment and ship modifications, as well as embarked

Arctic researchers. The task force supported embarked media, conducted four port visit

engagements to foster partnerships, and captured lessons learned.

The cell experienced several C2 challenges during this move. While it was decided that

the deployment route was entirely in the NORTHCOM AOR, OPCON would shift from

C3F to C2F after Nuuk, GL. Additionally, close coordination was required with C6F for

force protection and liaison events while in port at Nuuk, GL since KoD is in C6F‟s Area

of Responsibility (AOR). Communication issues were considered, and generally

unresolved, regarding the availability of satellites and bandwidth.

Intelligence requirements suggested the need to be more familiar with marine mammal

routes, activities of wildlife including polar bears, special METOC support for weather

forecasting, cultural awareness training, and obtaining the most updated nautical charts.

Movement and Maneuver identified the need for ice pilots, ice navigation training, and

PDSS coordination.

Logistic requirements include ice breaker escort, underway replenishment tanker and

resupply support, cold weather gear issue, and embarkation of non-organic personnel

(media, research, NGOs, OGAs) and equipment support.

Force Protection identified the need for cold weather training prior to deployment and

coordination for security protection of personnel ashore.

Fires identified the need to provide shipboard tours if desired by the local by the local

Arctic community during visits.

Updates to CONOPS

Recommended C2 CONOPS updates included additional information contained in

annexes. Suggested annexes included a Unified Command Plan (UCP) map, a clarified

OPCON authority for command and control procedures, Liaison Points of Contact (POC)

for Arctic Partner Nations and regional actors such as NGOs and IGOs, and a POC listing

for standing commands such as JTF-Alaska (U.S.) and JTF-North (CAN). Players

suggested the establishment of a standing communications plan including recommended

resources necessary to accomplish the plan.


80

Suggested Intelligence CONOPS updates identified the need for a comprehensive Arctic

marine mammal/wildlife and environmental guide including associated regulations of the

Arctic coastal nation. Additional detail for METOC support (p.19) must include weather

conditions, ice analysis, and recommended transit diverts.

Movement and Maneuver updates were suggested to require the inclusion of guidance for

the utilization of ice pilots and to outline certification requirements for ice pilot

navigation.

Logistic CONOPS updates highlighted the need to modify the “Platform Section” (p. 24)

to include information on ice breaker and salvage vessels and alternative resource options

to lease these assets from Arctic nations such as Canada or private industry.


C2 gaps were related to unreliable, inconsistent communications in the Arctic due to the

inexistence of standard networks. Mitigating strategies include using alternative

networks and compression techniques for communicating and downloading imagery. A

Proposed solution is to acquire additional satellite coverage and requisite throughput or

bandwidth.

Intelligence gaps identified outdated hydrographic survey data. A suggested mitigating

strategy was to embark Navy METOC hydrography teams to provide safe navigation

support. The proposed solution is to coordinate with Arctic communities to conduct

accurate hydrographic surveys.

An identified Movement and Maneuver was in regard to ice pilot navigation and training.

The suggested mitigating strategy is to utilize existing training while the proposed

solution is to establish an integrated ice Common Operating Picture (COP) for display on

the bridge of Navy ships.

Regarding logistics the cell identified the lack of organic ice breaker capability. The

mitigating strategy suggested was requested support from other Arctic nations while the

proposed solution is to build either a USCG or Military Sealift Command (MSC) ice

breaker capability or get a MSC time chartered ice breaker capability.

White Cell Insights

C2 insights suggested one command maintains OPCON throughout the Arctic transit

rather than two. USPACOM needs to be involved during this operation. High tech

methods of communication may be impeded at these latitudes but HF radio is still

available with bandwidth issues remaining critical for timely imagery downloads.


81

Logistic efforts for contracted support and services may need to be in place up to 6

months prior to the start of operations. Arctic facilities may not exist to support this

mission but the indigenous population might be able to provide assistance based on

previous arrangements. These efforts can strengthen local relationships and build trust

over time.

Other white cell observations mentioned the need to develop a plan to deal with the

buildup of ice on the ship superstructures in consultation with NAVSEA engineers.


82

MOVE 2

Cell #1 (Atlantic Ocean): Scenario 5 - Search and Recovery of a Sunken Suspect Vessel

A merchant vessel assessed to be carrying several persons of interest and possible weapons of

mass destruction (WMD) components transited the Straits of Gibraltar (STROG) and was

assessed to be bound for an unspecified port in Asia via the Northwest Passage. The vessel and

persons of interest are associated with a large multi-national terrorist organization (Rebellion

Liberation Front) based in North Africa. While being tracked by national surveillance assets, the

vessel track stopped abruptly in international waters 30 miles east of Coburg Island, at the mouth

of Jones Sound. An EPIRB signal transmitted briefly from that location. A Canadian CP-140

flying from Thule AB discovered flotsam scattered throughout the water and ice floes

approximately 40 miles offshore. There was no sign of survivors or rafts. USFF has directed

CTF-20 with Canadian concurrence to be the lead agency to locate and survey the wreck, recover

human remains, information, and any suspected WMD material for further analysis.

Time of year: 01 September 2012



83

Location

Date

(+/- 15

days)

Air

Temp

F/C

Sea

Surf.

Temp

Sea

State

0-9

Winds

Wave

Height

Meters

Precip

Hrs of

Daylig

ht

Ice

Accretion

Visibil

ity

% ≥

5nm &

1000ft

Ceilin

g

% <

2 nm

& 600

ft

Baffin

Bay (76N-

076.7W)

12-Sep

11-41F

-12to5C

25-31F

-4to-

1C

0-6 Calm - 25

kts 0-5

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

15 Moderate 70-80 10-20


CTF-20 will conduct operations to locate, investigate and recover suspicious materials as

appropriate from sunken vessel suspected of carrying WMD components in order to facilitate

further intelligence analysis and exploitation.


Purpose: Deploy Arctic MRF in order to secure the wreckage site, prevent non-participating

parties from accessing ship wreckage and recover any WMD materials.

Method: Deploy forces, interagency, and supporting Canadian and KoD forces, locate, recover,

and transport WMD to a location determined by USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM authorizes

CTF-20 / USFF DIRLAUTH for U.S. to Canada and KoD military coordination. Location and

recovery of debris should be completed ASAP of receipt of this tasking. Recover as much

evidence as feasible given environmental conditions. Map extent of wreckage field on ocean

floor in order to support follow-on investigation. Coordinate closely with Canadian forces. The

U.S. Navy is the lead agency with other agencies supporting. Make requests for other agency

support through USFF for coordination.

End State: Sunken vessel has been located, inspected for WMD components and human

remains, and if possible, retrieved for further analysis.

TASKS:


2) Deploy forces to search for sunken vessel.

3) Maintain oversight and security of site.


84

4) Conduct recovery operations to retrieve WMD components, human remains, material for

analysis.

5) Transport and transfer collected material to authorities at Naval Station Norfolk.


same.

7) Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Canada and

Denmark to support all aspects of completing this mission.


1. Establish a Combined C2 structure with participating nations

2. Provide CHINFO approved media representatives logistical support and berthing




Intelligence: WMD material suspected to be radiological in nature and is potentially a biological

hazard.

Summary of Move


Cell 1‟s COA deployed the AMRF along with Canadian forces to the vicinity of Coburg Island,

Baffin Bay to locate, secure, survey, and salvage possible Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

materials from the sunken merchant Vessel of Interest (VOI). Transport recovered items to

Norfolk, VA and coordinate with Canadian and KoD officials. The cell developed a two phased

mission. Phase 1 encompassed identifying the sunken vessel location, securing the site area, and

conducting a survey using primarily foreign assets. Due to the expansion of the sea ice and the

time required to conduct recovery operations as winter approached, phase 2 would likely take

place after the winter ice receded allowing the task force to conduct salvage and recovery

operations.

C2 focused on establishing the senior Canadian Afloat Officer as the On-Scene

Commander (Officer in Tactical Command), reporting to CTF-20 in accordance with AJP

3.1 guidelines.


85

Intelligence focused on weather and ice data forecasts, requesting information on

indigenous people, and sunken vessel information such as ship blueprints and other

pertinent ship information.

Movement and Maneuver emphasized the need for international cooperation based on the

lack of U.S. ice capable assets as well as the delay associated with U.S. assets transiting

to the scene. The lack of USN ice hardened ships, cold weather experience, and training

in Arctic conditions resulted in the heavy reliance on Canadian and Danish units to

provide the bulk of the support thus highlighting the significant risk to the USN forces.

Logistic efforts centered on establishing Nuuk as a brief stops for fuel (BSF) site and

Thule AFB as the APOD/SPOD.

Fires efforts involved locating and securing the area of the sunken VOI and salvage

materials based on the limitations of the weather and ice conditions.

Force Protection measures focused on the need for adequate PPE and hazardous materials

(HAZMAT) PPE due to the efforts to recover the WMD materials.

Updates to CONOPS

During this scenario, the cell identified that the CONOPS should include guidance on how to

solicit support from foreign governments and pertinent U.S. government agencies.


C2 gaps identified concerns centered on “Expeditionary Politics” specific to “whole of

government” integration in support of salvage operations that take place close to

territorial seas of another nation. A concept similar to the Maritime Operational Threat

Response (MOTR) does not exist between governments, and specifically for Arctic

operations. The mitigation strategy is to continue efforts associated with joint exercises

that expand the use and integration of foreign and domestic agencies and maritime forces.

The Intelligence gap identified focused on the lack of oceanographic data such as

bathymetry, ocean conditions, and other sub surface factors (examples include

information on currents and contours) in the Arctic. These insights were specific to the

Baffin Bay area. The mitigating strategy suggested the use of embarked METOC experts

combined with a reach-back capability to ensure the accessibility of all available

information. The proposed solution mandated deployed units to conduct surveys and

mapping efforts as well as to provide this information to NAVO would help improve the

database information.


86

Movement and Maneuver gap centered on Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) which

was posited to be limited onboard USN units and insufficient to conduct sustained Arctic

operations. The mitigating strategy is to procure commercially available products from

major commercial suppliers. The proposed solution is to direct the USN supply system

to establish a cold weather gear center for units deploying to the Arctic.

White Cell Insights

C2 insights stressed the use of strategic communications to maintain continuity of effort

during this scenario. CTF-20 is the supporting command to RCN/JTF-N or MCC-E.

These types of missions require maintaining a list of relevant POCs. Implications

included consideration of forming a CJTF for this mission since this is a Canadian led

operation due to the search location. The immediate recovery timeline may not be

necessary and extended due to the changing Arctic environment.

Movement and Maneuver aspects of this move centered on the tandem support with RCN

or a Canadian icebreaker along with other RCN or Canadian support assets positioned in

Halifax that can reach the location of the task force quickly. Consideration should be

given to employ a submarine with embarked SOF for location and detection support.

Logistic aspects focused on the ability to scrutinize every asset that is sent north due to

the sustainment and resupply challenges. The requirement to conduct recovery efforts

and subsequent storage of recovered items may exceed the capability of the Arctic

SPOD/APOD. Arctic SPOD/APOD capabilities and limitations must be fully

understood.

Intelligence aspects focused on liaising with the Grise Fjord native population in order to

solicit information and desired support concerning this incident. The incident site is both

a crime scene and a recovery operation which requires interagency coordination

including U.S. and Canadian criminal investigative services.


87

Cell #2 (Pacific Ocean): Scenario 6 - Search and Recovery of a Sunken Suspect Vessel

A merchant vessel originating from North Korea was assessed to be carrying several persons of

interest and possible weapons of mass destruction (WMD) components. It had just transited the

Sea of Japan and the Bering Strait and was believed to be bound for an unspecified port in

northern Europe via the NSR. The vessel and persons of interest are associated with a large

multi-national terrorist organization (Rebellion Liberation Front) and was assumed to be in good

communications with the organization‟s leadership at their headquarters in Northern Africa.

While being tracked by National Surveillance assets, the vessel track stopped abruptly in

international waters 473 nm northwest of Point Barrow 24-hours ago, in the East Siberian

Chukchi Sea. An EPIRB signal transmitted briefly from that location. Sinking has been

confirmed by national assets. There was no sign of survivors or rafts. Fleet Forces Command

has responded to a RFF from EUCOM and has directed C3F to be the lead agency to locate and

survey the wreck, and recover human remains, information, and any suspected WMD material

for further analysis. USN and USCG had been working cooperatively in tracking the vessel.

The USCG will continue to support as required. The U.S. State Department reports that the

Russian Federation is aware of the sinking and will have an observation vessel on scene, but will

not participate in recovery operations.

Time of year: 01 September 2012


88


Location

Date

(+/- 15

days)

Air

Temp

F/C

Sea

Surf.

Temp

Sea

Sta

te

0-9

Winds

Wave

Heigh

t

Meter

s

Precip

Hrs of

Daylig

ht

Ice

Accretion

Visibil

ity

% ≥

5nm &

1000ft

Ceilin

g

% <

2 nm

& 600

ft

Chuchki Sea

(73.5N-

178.5E)

12-Sep

15-45F

-9to7C

23-29F

-5to-2

0-5 Calm - 20 kts 0-5

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

14 Moderate 40-50 30-40


C3F will conduct operations to locate, investigate and recover suspicious materials as

appropriate from sunken vessel suspected of carrying WMD components in order to facilitate

further intelligence analysis and exploitation.


Purpose: Deploy Arctic MRF in order to secure the suspected wreckage site, prevent non-

participating parties from accessing ship wreckage and recover human remains, information, and

WMD materiel.

Method: Deploy forces, interagency, and supporting local forces, locate, recover, and transport

WMD to a location determined by USFF. C3F has DIRLAUTH for interagency coordination.

Location and recovery of debris should be completed ASAP of receipt of this tasking. Recover

as much evidence as feasible given environmental conditions. Coordinate closely with

interagency and local authorities. U.S. Navy is the lead agency with other agencies supporting.

Make requests for other agency support to USFF for coordination.

End State: Sunken vessel has been located, inspected for WMD components and human

remains, and if possible, retrieved for further analysis.

TASKS:


2. Deploy forces to search for sunken vessel.

3. Maintain oversight and security of site.


89

4. Conduct recovery operations to retrieve WMD components, human remains, material for

analysis.

5. Transport and transfer collected material to authorities at Naval Station San Diego.


same.

7. Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Canada and

Russia to support all aspects of completing this mission.







Intelligence Estimate: WMD material suspected to be radiological in nature and is potentially a

biological hazard.

Summary of Move


The cell deployed a task force to locate, investigate, and recover suspicious materials from a

North Korean VOI which sank northwest of Point Barrow while attempting to make an Arctic

sea passage. The VOI is suspected of carrying WMD components. The cell‟s concept of

operations immediately deployed the polar ice breaker USCGC Healy to initially secure the site

and to act as a C2 platform until relieved by USN forces. Required support elements included

contracted commercial ocean tug and salvage vessels, various military units such as diving

teams, OGAs such as Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) scientists, various USCG

assets, and Canadian ice breaker support. USCGC Healy has limited security features and the

cell players determined additional security would be provided by USAF assets.

C2 identified the requirement to keep local populations including the area‟s native village

apprised of the recovery operations through existing Tribal Liaison Officers. The task

force‟s C2 node is an LPD with CHINFO personnel disseminating reports as necessary.

OPCON and TACOM were to SIXTH Fleet/ USEUCOM.


90

Intelligence efforts focused on establishing the LPD as the MDA center disseminating

information to Russian counterparts via imbedded Russian linguists. Information flow

focused on communications and intelligence updates, weather and ice information, and

the status of ongoing operations.

Movement and Maneuver efforts focused on identifying and movement of the required

mix of military, commercial, and Arctic country assets required to support the recovery

operations.

Logistics identified Nome, Alaska as the logistic support center due to its proximity to

the incident site and the ability to support APOD and SPOD activities. Navy combat

logistic ships would resupply the task force as required.

Fires focused on using USAF assets to provide additional security as the task force

arrived in the vicinity of the incident site. Cell planners noted that the Navy Supply

System must support Arctic operations by identifying materials and equipment necessary

to operate successfully in the Arctic. Examples include various equipment lubricants and

PPE.

Force Protection issues centered on a secure diving area envelope, security associated

with land based logistic support efforts, and safety concerns associated with indigenous

wildlife, as well as marine mammal migrations that could potentially occur in the incident

area.

Updates to CONOPS

Suggested CONOPS changes were provided in Intelligence, Movement & Maneuver, and Fires

categories.

The CONOPS change in Intelligence focused on the need to have Russian linguist

embarked to facilitate interactions. An embarked linguistic capability enhances the

ability to quickly interact with other Arctic nations in this often harsh environment.

Movement and Maneuver changes suggested that commercial vessels operating in the

Arctic are ice hardened and typically capable of salvage, tug operations, and, potentially,

ice breaking activities. The CONOPS needs to outline an approved procedure or identify

the contracting authority to lease these types of assets.

The CONOPS needs to be updated to include an abbreviated planning time line

associated with a crisis action planning timeline similar to the Global Fleet Station (GFS)

planning timeline.


91

Suggested Fires CONOPS changes should include contingency operations associated

with oil spill releases into the sensitive Arctic environment.

Security issues center on protecting personnel from indigenous wildlife by including

Rules of Engagement (ROE) guidance and security of land base support forces at APODs

and SPODs. Interagency coordination concerning WMD instances must have associated

guidelines with POCs. The group suggested rewriting the draft CONOPS to amplify

details associated with broader changes previously identified, specifically in the areas of

training (where they suggested the inclusion of a Russian-trained linguist and polar bear

hazing training), as well as some wording clarification with regard to operations in ice-

free conditions.

The overarching theme of the Cell 2 discussions focused on CONOPS changes involving

the development of an Arctic knowledge organization. This information should include

the weather and ice conditions in the region, distance challenges, and key Arctic,

international, regional, and indigenous leaders, as well as how all of these disparate

groups work together on issues they encounter.

As with the previous scenario, players reemphasized the issue of Arctic operations

requiring long lead times for logistical support coordination and the importance of using

PDSS visits for overall coordination. There is the potential for circumstances to delay or

extend timelines and the CONOPS should reflect that uncertainty in planning or suggest a

methodology for dealing with crises or emergent contingencies.


The most significant gap identified focused on the lack of icebreaker support due to a single

ageing USCG ice breaker. The mitigating solution suggested involved leasing ice breakers from

Canada, Russia or the commercial sector while the proposed solution focused on the

procurement of additional ice breakers. The lack of available and capable ocean going tugs and

salvage vessels were also identified. Leasing these vessels from Canada, Russia or the

commercial sector was suggested as a short term solution, while the procumbent of these

platforms was recommended as a long term solution. As operations in an Arctic environment

expand, the gap in knowledge and training of cold weather and ice operations continues to exist.

This gap can be mitigated by web-based training. Participants also recognized that a proposed

solution requires the development of an institutional training program that establishes the

requisite cold weather environmental knowledge associated with Arctic operations doctrine

(NWP). Force Protection focused on the indigenous wildlife with the proposed solution centered

on training security forces using approved ROE.


92

White Cell Insights

C2 insights focused on coordination between appropriate organizations during this

operation. The AMRF must coordinate with USEUCOM in addition to JTF-AK and

USNORTHCOM since the subject area for this scenario is in USEUCOM‟s AOR.

USCG District 17 must coordinate, keep informed, and reinforce the good working

relationship with the Russian FSB. The task force must coordinate with commercial

interest (Shell Oil) that could provide additional support. The appropriate lead agency for

this recovery effort could be USCG District 17 with the implication being that there may

be a strategic communications advantage in having the USCG out front leading this

effort.

Movement and Maneuver focused on using appropriately trained personnel to conduct

recovery operations with the understanding that sea ice and weather conditions are

volatile in September at the incident location.

Fires insights questioned the degree of overtness and covertness associated with this

mission. The USN should consider having representation from the company owning the

sunken merchant vessel.

Intelligence observations focused on Russia‟s potential high level interest in this mission

and the need to better understand their interest throughout this recovery effort.


93

Cell #3 (Atlantic Ocean): Scenario 7 – Surveillance and Boarding of a Suspect Vessel in the

Northwest Passage

It is August 24. You are the crisis action planning cell for CTF-20. A merchant vessel assessed to

be carrying several persons of interest and possible WMD components has just transited the

STROG and is assessed to be bound for an unspecified port in Asia via the Northwest Passage.

The vessel and persons of interest are associated with a large multi-national terrorist organization

(Rebellion Liberation Front) and is assumed to be in good communications with the

organization‟s leadership at their headquarters. In order to prevent premature disclosure of

planned and pending actions against this group‟s leadership and headquarters facilities, tracking

of the vessel must be covert and the boarding must be delayed until after these actions are

completed. Intent is to execute the boarding within 72 hours after this separate action is

complete. However, in order to prevent transfer of the personnel or materials to other shipping

after the vessel has entered more heavily travelled shipping lanes, the boarding must be


94

completed before the vessel reaches 167 deg W (anticipated to be 23 Sep). The suspect vessel

has transited the NWP in previous years.


Location

Date

(+/- 15

days)

Air

Temp

F/C

Sea

Surf.

Temp

Sea

Sta

te

0-9

Winds

Wave

Heigh

t

Meter

s

Precip

Hrs of

Daylig

ht

Ice

Accretion

Visibilit

y

% ≥

5nm &

1000ft

Ceilin

g

% <

2 nm

& 600

ft

Northwest

Passage

(NWP)

(East to

West)

12-Sep

10-40F

-12to4C

22-28F

-5to-2

0-5 Calm-20

kts 0-5

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

14.5 Moderate 50-60 20-30

Mission: Deploy the Arctic Maritime Response Force ASAP IOT maintain surveillance and,

when directed, board within 72 hours the suspected arms and terrorist transport vessel transiting

from Europe to Asia via the NWP.

Purpose: Prevent suspect vessel from delivering suspected WMD components while taking

persons of interest into custody and recovering WMD components for further analysis. Covert

posture is a priority in order to ensure that other operations against the RLF are not

compromised.

Method: Deploy forces and coordinate with joint, interagency and combined organizations as

needed to maintain covert surveillance with 6 hour max time between revisits. Position forces to

conduct VBSS within 72 hours after being directed by higher authority. Boarding is to be

conducted by USCG LEDET personnel augmented by RCMP and ship‟s company. Vessel will

be tracked by other means to a point (62 26N - 056 57W) at the southern end of Labrador Sea at

which time CTF-20 will assume responsibility for tracking and being prepared to board the

vessel. CTF-20 is supported commander until all duties are handed over to COMTHIRDFLT at a

point to be jointly determined by CTF-20 and COMTHIRDFLT, at which time COMTHIRDFLT

will become the supported commander.

End State: Target vessel is tracked covertly until Arctic-MRF is directed to conduct boarding.

Vessel is detained, persons of interest are in custody and the vessel is relocated to a U.S. port as

conditions warrant.

Tasks:


95


2. Identify required surveillance assets to covertly identify and then maintain surveillance

with 6 hrs max gap between revisits.

3. Identify required forces to conduct boarding within 72 hours of direction or in any case

before vessel reaches 167 deg W as coordinated with C3F.

4. Coordinate handover of surveillance and boarding duties to C3F.

5. Arrange for embarkation of LEDET and RCMP units.

6. BPT detain vessel and tow to U.S. Port.


same.


Demark to support all aspects of completing this mission.

Constraints: Vessel must be boarded prior to crossing the 167 deg W longitude line. Boarding

or disclosure of surveillance must be delayed until directed (after the operation against the RLF

headquarters and leadership cell is complete). Coordinate with Canadian and Danish forces.

Comply with all applicable environmental regulations while operating in Arctic waters. Respect

all territorial seas.

Restraints: Do not disclose surveillance or intent to board to target vessel until directed. Do not

interfere with the indigenous population.

Resources: DDG, CG (1 H-60), DDG (1 H-60), LPD (2 MV-22), LSD, and LCS (1 MH-60R)

returning from BALTOPS are within 3-day transit of planned handover point. All vessels were

replenished on 22 Aug. Other Assets may be requested via RFF to USFF. LEDET currently

located in Portsmouth VA. RCMP unit currently located in Ottawa.

Intelligence estimate: The vessel is lightly armed (personal weapons). It has good

communications with the terrorist organization‟s headquarters. The suspect vessel is known to

have made the NWP transit in 2 of 3 previous years.

Summary of Move


The cell‟s COA outlined a 4 phased operation that supported the Canadian RCMP and USCG in

conducting covert surveillance of a VOI possibly carrying WMD components for a large multi-

national terrorist organization. The phases were surveillance, pre-position forces, conduct


96

opposed boarding, and detain personnel/relocate the vessel. In the scenario, the VOI transited

from the Labrador Sea though Baffin Bay and the Northwest Passage and into the Bering Sea

heading to an unspecified port in Asia. The coalition force was prepared to conduct an opposed

boarding within 72 hours of the execution order to prevent the suspect vessel from delivering

weapons of mass destruction. This discussion centered on command relationships, ISR assets,

pre-positioned assets, and the ability to provide emergency medical support.

C2 efforts attempted to minimize the risks associated with this operation by coordinating

efforts between Canadian and U.S. forces to ensure the highest probability of mission

accomplishment. C2 focused on the VOI transit route that is geographically divided

between U.S. and Canadian forces for operational lead. The lead organization is based

on the jurisdictional waters where the VOI is located at the time of the takedown

operation. Hand over between C2F and C3F forces took place at Sachs Harbor, CN.

Intelligence deployed covert ISR resources to include satellite imagery, airborne

reconnaissance, and open source information sharing.

Movement and Maneuver geographically divided the VOI transit route along

jurisdictional lines with Canadian forces leading the activities within the NWP and the

U.S. forces leading the efforts within the Baffin Bay and Beaufort Sea areas. This

division developed due to the sensitivity associated with the territorial claims of the NWP

waters by Canada.

Logistics identified the need for additional emergency medical capabilities to supplement

the Fleet Surgical Teams resident onboard the LPDs located in Baffin Bay and the Bering

Sea to reduce the risk of the visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) operations.

Force sustainment was provided through the prepositioning of air and sea based assets.

Fires identified the risk associated with a VOI VBSS operation and the potential

shipboard damage due to the VBSS actions or the intentional scuttling of the ship by

terrorist forces.

Force Protection focused on pre-positioned airborne assets to implement an organic

security umbrella.

Updates to CONOPS

C2 focused on the jurisdictional sensitivities between Canada and the U.S. highlighted by

the scenario location of the VBSS operation. This scenario required close coordination

between Canadian and U.S. forces due to jurisdictional issues related to Canadian

territorial claims in the NWP and surrounding islands of northern Canada. This issue

requires amplifying guidance in the CONOPS to support operations in this region of the


97

Arctic. During this scenario, Canadian forces were supported for a boarding in Canadian

claimed territorial waters. C3F is the supported commander if the takedown occurs west

of Sachs Harbor and C2F is the supported commander if the takedown occurs prior to the

VOI entering the NWP.

Intelligence CONOPS changes identified the need for a standing plan for sustained ISR

which includes proper positioning of limited ISR resources and combine efforts with

international partners using Thule AFB as a coordination node.

Movement and Maneuver CONOPS changes focused on ensuring deployers had access to

U.S. policy regarding the legal status of waters in the NWP.

Logistic CONOPS changes highlighted the unique Arctic environmental conditions, the

lack of available logistic resources over this expansive area, and the proper pre-

positioning of logistic support assets in order to minimize risk to these supporting forces.

Another Logistic CONOPS change suggested additional guidance is sought on

emergency medical capabilities and the transportation of casualties out of the Arctic.

Jurisdictional issues were the focal point of the cell discussions.

Fires CONOPS changes need to address the use of lethal fires and the prevention of

adversaries from scuttling ships that conduct illegal activities. The cumulative effects of

these instances would adversely impact the ecologically sensitive Arctic region.


A significant C2 gap identified is the lack of a defined relationship or bilateral agreement

between Canada and the U.S. on operational level issues. To mitigate this gap, the

relationship between U.S. and Canada needs to be outlined in the CONOPS in order to

ensure continuity over the range of potential Arctic operations. The proposed solution is

to exercise existing joint Canada and U.S. doctrine that is used and taking place in waters

to the south such as Exercise FRONTIER SENTINEL, to the higher latitudes of the

Arctic.

An Intelligence gap focused on the lack of adequate ISR assets and capabilities. The

mitigating strategy is to concentrate ISR assets along geographical chokepoints while the

long term solution requires an increase of ISR assets combined with enhancing ISR

basing facilities at Thule AFB and Barrow Island.

A logistic gap identified is the lack of robust medical facilities in the Arctic. The

mitigating strategy requires surface units embarked with sufficient and properly trained

medical staff and supporting equipment to conduct emergency medical care. This may be

limited on DDG and CG type vessels.


98

White Cell Insights

Regarding C2, the cell identified the potential use of DoD SOF assets which can be

deployed as a backup to USCG for the opposed boarding.

Movement and Maneuver discussions focused on Canadian forces conducting the capture

of the VOI if it took place within Canadian waters. It is recommended that the boarding

team be located on an icebreaker.

Logistic discussions identified the need to have both medical and customs teams on hand

to assess personnel onboard the VOI. The environmental consideration associated with

the suspect vessel (VOI) must be continually assessed throughout the various phases of

the operation. After VBSS, there are limitations on what port locations the VOI may be

taken.

Intelligence insights centered on the covert tracking and coordination effort required to

conduct a successful operation. The plan requires the availability of covert collection

assets along with the support of the Canadian tracking systems, which may be sufficient

to track the VOI. The classification of the operation may impede data sharing. However,

sharing of classified and unclassified data with the appropriate agencies is based on the

need to know. The VOI with suspected WMD components could possibly change the

scope of the mission to a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) type framework.


99

Cell #4 (Pacific Ocean): Scenario 8 – Surveillance and Boarding of a Suspect Vessel in the

Northwest Passage

It is August 24. You are the crisis action planning cell for COMTHIRDFLT. A merchant vessel

assessed to be carrying several persons of interest and possible WMD components has just

transited the STROG and is assessed to be bound for an unspecified port in Asia via the

Northwest Passage. The vessel and persons of interest are associated with a large multi-national

terrorist organization (Rebellion Liberation Front) and is assumed to be in good communications

with the organization‟s leadership at their headquarters. In order to prevent premature disclosure

of planned and pending actions against this group‟s leadership and headquarters facilities,

tracking of the vessel must be covert and the boarding must be delayed until after these actions

are completed. Intent is to execute the boarding within 72 hours after this separate action is

complete. However, in order to prevent transfer of the personnel or materials to other shipping

after the vessel has entered more heavily travelled shipping lanes, the boarding must be

completed before the vessel reaches 167 deg W (anticipated to be 23 Sep).


100


Location

Date

(+/- 15

days)

Air

Temp

F/C

Sea

Surf.

Temp

Sea

Stat

e

0-9

Winds

Wave

Heigh

t

Meter

s

Precip

Hrs of

Daylig

ht

Ice

Accretion

Visibilit

y

% ≥

5nm &

1000ft

Ceilin

g

% <

2 nm

& 600

ft

NWP

(West to

East)

12-Sep

10-40F

-12to4C

22-28F

-5to-2

0-5 Calm-20

kts 0-5

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

14.5 Moderate 50-60 20-30

Mission: Deploy the Arctic Maritime Response Force ASAP IOT maintain surveillance and,

when directed, board within 72 hours the suspected arms and terrorist transport vessel transiting

from Europe to Asia via the NWP.

Purpose: Prevent suspect vessel from delivering suspected WMD components while taking

persons of interest into custody and recovering WMD components for further analysis. Covert

posture is a priority in order to ensure that other operations against the RLF are not

compromised.

Method: Deploy forces and coordinate with joint, interagency and combined organizations as

needed to maintain covert surveillance with 6 hour max time between revisits. Position forces to

be in position to conduct VBSS within 72 hours after being directed by higher authority.

Boarding is to be conducted by USCG LEDET personnel augmented by RCMP and ship‟s

company. Vessel will be tracked by CTF-20 assets to a handover point to be jointly determined

by CTF-20 and COMTHIRDFLT inside the Northwest Passage. CTF-20 is supported

commander until all duties are handed over to COMTHIRDFLT, at which time

COMTHIRDFLT will become the supported commander.

End State: Target vessel is tracked covertly until Arctic-MRF is directed to conduct boarding.

Vessel may be detained and relocated to a U.S. port as conditions warrant.

Tasks:


2. Identify required surveillance assets to covertly identify and then maintain surveillance

with 6 hrs max gap between revisits.


101

3. Identify required forces to conduct boarding within 72 hours of direction or in any case

before vessel reaches 167 deg W as coordinated with CTF-20.

4. Coordinate handover of surveillance and boarding duties with CTF-20.

5. Arrange for embarkation of LEDET and RCMP units.

6. BPT detain vessel and tow to U.S. Port.


same.


Demark to support all aspects of completing this mission.

Constraints (Must do): Vessel must be boarded prior to crossing the 167 deg W longitude line.

Boarding or disclosure of surveillance must be delayed until directed (after the operation against

the RLF headquarters and leadership cell is complete). Coordinate with Canadian and Danish

forces. Comply with all applicable environmental regulations while operating in Arctic waters.

Respect all territorial seas.

Restraints (Can’t do): Do not disclose surveillance or intent to board to target vessel until

directed. Do not interfere with the indigenous population.

Resources: Determine appropriate force package using available assets. Assets may be requested

via RFF to USFF. LEDET currently located in Seattle WA. RCMP unit currently located in

Vancouver BC.

Intelligence estimate: The vessel is lightly armed (personal weapons). It has good

communications with the terrorist organization‟s headquarters. The suspect vessel is known to

have made the NWP transit in 2 of 3 previous years.

Summary of Move


The overall concept for Cell 4 centered on deploying an AMRF from the West Coast to maintain

covert surveillance and eventual conduct a boarding or takedown of a merchant vessel associated

with a multinational terrorist organization suspected of carrying WMD components. Close

coordination between the East and West Coast AMRFs were required as the VIO transited from

Baffin Bay through the NWP towards the Bearing Sea. Sachs Harbor is the geographical transfer

point between the West and East coast AMRFs to transfer lead responsibility between U.S.

forces. The cell developed a three-phase COA: 1) position forces in the vicinity of Sachs

Harbor; 2) maintain covert tracking of terrorist vessel at intervals no greater than 6 hours; and 3)


102

conduct non-compliant boarding of the terrorist‟s vessel. Boarding will be conducted within 72

hours of direction from higher authority. The AMRF required the assets of subsurface, aviation,

and surface forces in addition to boarding team and WMD assets. Activities were closely

coordinated with Canadian authorities and USCG, who was the lead U.S. entity for this mission.

C2 required each task force to exchange LNOs to develop a common communication

plan between the CTFs, facilitate the OPCON shift between CTFs in the vicinity of Sachs

Harbor, and facilitate the integration with international forces.

Intelligence requirements included specialized WMD forces, relevant data on the terrorist

transport, weapons, personnel, and cargo. Coordination with Canada and Naval Mine

and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command (NMAWC) is required to establish MDA in the

vicinity of the terrorist vessel. Additional support is required from national ISR assets

and standing up an ISR Fusion Cell and with both CTF personnel for single ISR

collection plan.

Movement and Maneuver force requirements include a submarine, DDG, LHD w/ ACE

and elements of a MEU(SOC), tanker support, MPA, and a multi-agency boarding teams

for VBSS. The issue was brought up whether U.S. Law Enforcement alone could board

vessel, or coordinate with coalition forces.

Logistics required WMD specific gear, transport of additional WMD expertise as needed,

and the needed underway replenishment (UNREP) support for both task forces.

Fires supported the information operations (IO) campaign to control information,

provided disabling fire on the terrorist vessel, and the boarding team prepared to conduct

an opposed VBSS.

Force Protection centered on a consequence management plan for contingency

operations, determine supplemental ROE based on the potential threat, provide proper

WMD detection equipment and PPE for the boarding team, and identify a holding area

for captured terrorists.

Updates to CONOPS

Recommended CONOPS changes included the development of a section on aviation challenges

and resources such as cold weather, visibility, support services, and transient basing. Another

suggestion focused on a dedicated section development under Force Protection that includes

information on embarked medical forces not normally required during International Contingency

Operations (ICO) due to Arctic conditions and tyranny of distance.



103

An Intelligence gap identified the lack of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) Imagery Satellites to

see through Arctic cloud layer. The mitigating strategy is to lease or purchase commercial SAR

imagery to supplement Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) picture. The

proposed solution is to acquire more SAR imagery sensors that will ensure persistent Arctic

coverage.

White Cell Insights

Movement and Maneuver discussions centered on the issue of using the proper force mix

that takes into consideration the economy of force associated with this operation. The

white cell felt the force identified by the player cell was potentially comprised of too

many assets. It was also suggested that there is a chance of Russian intervention of the

VOI due to the vessel‟s track. Additionally, the cell focused on the ramifications

associated with the supply support in and surrounding the NWP.

The White Cell posited that the east coast USN has more experience in the Arctic than

their west coasts counterparts. The VOI takedown would most likely be accomplished by

east coast forces and led by Canadian forces. If the mission is geographically located on

the west coast, USCG would most likely lead this effort.

Intelligence insights reinforced the need for METOC information that provides critical

information for use during all phases of the operation from planning through execution.

Another asset available for DoD use includes Canadian SAR imagery that can be

dedicated to support this mission. An implication resulting from this move is there may

not be an ISR gap as identified in Cell 4, Move 2 C2 gaps.


104

MOVE 3

Cell #1 (Atlantic Ocean): Scenario 9 – Resupply Mission – U.S. Navy Ice Camp in Arctic

(Northeast)

Today is March 1, 2012. You are a multi-organizational planning team supporting CTF-20.

USFF has been tasked to form TF Arctic Venture which will support an ice camp which has been

established in the Greenland Sea northwest of Longyearben, Svalbard Island (Norway) and

approximately 164 nm SE of Nordostrundingen Point, Greenland. The camp‟s purpose is to

research the surface and atmospheric conditions at that location. This ice camp is projected to

remain active for one year beginning 20 October 2012. CTF-20 has been directed by USFF to

lead TF Arctic Venture and to provide year-round sustainment support and personnel transport as

required. The Kingdom of Denmark (KoD), and the governments of Norway and Canada have

been informed and are aware of U.S. activities. The ice camp is tied to a specific geographic

location on the sea bottom and may require sea basing repositioning monthly due to movement

of pack ice away from area of interest. Shelters are not land portable and must be airlifted to


105

reposition. Resupply will be required monthly. Most cargo and materials required for standup

and sustainment are transportable by MV-22 or MH-53 type aircraft.


Time of year: Year Round.

Location

Date

(+/- 15

days)

Air

Temp

F/C

Sea

Surf.

Temp

Sea

Stat

e

0-9

Winds

Wave

Heigh

t

Meter

s

Precip

Hrs of

Daylig

ht

Ice

Accretion

Visibilit

y

% ≥

5nm &

1000ft

Ceilin

g

% <

2 nm

& 600

ft

Greenland

Sea (76.4N-

003.6W)

13-Mar

-1 to 28F

-18to-2C

23-29F

-5to-2

0-6 Calm -

25 kts 0-10

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

11 Moderate 40-50 30-40

Greenland

Sea (76.4N-

003.6W)

19-Jun

18-48F

-8to9C

28-34F

-2to1C

0-5 Calm -

20 kts 0-5

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

24 Minimal if

any 60-70 20-30

Greenland

Sea (76.4N-

003.6W)

12-Sep

17-47F

-8to8C

27-33F

-3to1

0-6 Calm -

25 kts 0-10

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

14.5 Minimal if

any 60-70 20-30

Greenland

Sea (76.4N-

003.6W)

19-Dec

0-30F

-18to-1

23-29F

-5to-2

0-7 Calm -

30 kts 0-15

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

0 Moderate 50-60 30-40


CTF-20 will deploy the Arctic Maritime Response Force as TF Arctic Venture which will

conduct sustainment support operations for the Ice Camp IOT support research activities from 20

October 2012 through 20 October 2013.


Purpose: Sustain and support the ice camp in order to permit successful accomplishment of its

mission.


106

Method: Using the Arctic Maritime Response Force, support the Greenland Sea Ice Camp and

ongoing research activities at the Ice Camp. In the event that ice can no longer support a camp,

provide naval surface platform as base of operations. TF commander shall make requests for

other agency support to USFF for coordination.

End State: Ice Camp successfully sustained throughout the designated period.

TASKS:


2) Identify composition of required MRF to support Greenland Sea Ice Camp.

3) Deploy forces to conduct monthly resupply and repositioning as required.

4) BPT sea base all ice camp activities when ice stationing is no longer feasible.


same.

6) Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Canada, Iceland

and Kingdom of Denmark to support all aspects of completing this mission.







Summary of Move


Cell 3‟s COA deployed Task Force Arctic Venture to conduct monthly resupply operations to

support Arctic Ice Camp in the vicinity of Longyearben, Svalbard Island, Norway from October

2012 until October 2013. As required, maritime forces were tasked with repositioning of the ice

camp. The task force comprised of a USN amphibious ship with surface craft and organic

helicopter assets, a NSF ice breaker, and a P-3 detachment.


107

Intelligence issues focused on the need for weather and ice data information from various

sources such as the National Ice Center, the use of modeling to forecast ice and weather

conditions, and the use of P-3s with embarked ice observers to minimize the operational risk to

the ice camp. These activities would help planners and deployed personnel better understand the

environmental conditions and determine if movement of the ice camp was necessary in order to

properly support this mission.

Regarding C2, the cell focused on the need to plan and establish relationships with KoD,

Iceland, and Norway to support M &M aspects of the operation. Specifically this

relationship centered on APOD and SPOD support from these nations, a prerequisite in

properly supporting ice camp operations over an extended time period.

Force protection issues concentrated on properly training and equipping the ice camp

members in support of potential wildlife engagement (e.g., polar bears).

Updates to CONOPS

CONOP changes focused on several environmental factors that impacted maritime forces‟ ability

to operate on sea ice for an extended time frame.

Force Protection from Arctic wildlife such as polar bears requires procedural guidance

and Rules of Engagement.

Understanding the characteristics of the Arctic environment needs to be available in an

appendix providing detailed oceanographic information, ice conditions, and weather data

to support extended Arctic operations. Weather and ice experts would augment USN task

forces or be available to train and certify USN units conducting Arctic operations.

Coordination with foreign governments requires policy guidelines on C2 relationships

and structures. USCG ice breaker (AGB) support is required as well as inclusion of ship

ice rating information in an appendix.

The inclusion of cold weather operations information associated specifically for surface

connectors such as LCAC, LCUs, and other U.S. Navy craft would benefit the planners

and operators.


Significant gaps identified were related to Arctic weather and ice awareness while

operating in this austere environment. USN units tasked to operate in Arctic weather and

associated ice conditions lack resident knowledge associated with operating in these cold

weather areas. The mitigating strategy is to augment USN units by embarking weather


108

and ice experts. The proposed solution is to develop the requisite training pipelines, add

resources and references to the CONOPS and leverage reach back capabilities.

Weather and ice resource awareness of available metrological information can be

mitigated by making educating and training planners and operators on available

resources. The proposed solution is to add an appendix to the CONOPS on Arctic

meteorological information.

Additionally, USN aircraft lack embedded ice observers that are certified as air crew. A

mitigating strategy is to embark a limited number of ice observers to train and deploy on

aircraft. The proposed solution to train air crews as ice observers.

Other gaps discussed by cell players focused on operating on sea ice in an ice camp, coexisting

with the indigenous wildlife, and shipboard operations in ice laden waters.

Ice camps operations are complex with great changes taking place to the physical

environment over the course of a year. The evolution of repositioning an ice camp is an

event not experienced by the players. The proposed solution suggested included the use

of the Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG) to train deploying units

on ice cargo movement operations.

Operating on the ice requires guidelines on coexisting with wildlife such as polar bears.

A mitigation strategy is train deployers on polar bear ROE with a proposed solution

centered on incorporating guidance and procedures into doctrine.

U.S. ice breaker resources are extremely limited but are necessary to on non-ice hardened

USN ships. The mitigation strategies is to contract ice breaker and hardened hull ships

assets or permanently resolve this gap by building or acquiring organic ice breakers.

White Cell Insights

C2 insights focused on this operation taking place within the USEUCOM AOR with

EUCOM/NAVEUR leading the effort vice USFFC as provided in the scenario. USFF

would continue to provide support personnel. C2 and Fires identified the need for

consultation and involvement with the Arctic Council concerning the ice camp operations

specifically concerning sustainment and resource issues.

Movement and Maneuver insights identified that the ice drift is too great to maintain an

ice camp in this geographic location for an extended amount of time. Suggested

alternative is to use prepositioned ships (MPS) as opposed to a ground based camp.

Other vessels types might be needed to maintain the sea camp. For comparison purposes,

Norwegian bases have better infrastructure for Arctic operations.


109

Intelligence focused on the critical support requirements for long-term METOC support

and the requirement to deploy a mobile environmental team during the entire ice camp

operation.

Force Protection efforts focused on the need for an ice camp bailout contingency plan in

the event conditions required evacuation from the camp site.


110

Cell #2 (Pacific Ocean): Scenario 10 – Resupply Mission – U.S. Navy Ice Camp in Arctic

(Northwest)

Today is November 1, 2011. You are a multi-organizational planning team supporting C3F.

USFF has been tasked to form TF Arctic Venture which will support a research ice camp which

has been established 420 nm northwest of Barrow, Alaska in the Chukchi Sea. The camp‟s

purpose is to research the surface and atmospheric conditions at that location. This ice camp is

projected to remain active from Jun 15 until 1 November. C3F has been tasked by USFF to lead

TF Arctic Venture and to provide sustainment support and personnel transport as required. The

Canadian and Russian governments have been informed and are aware of U.S. activities. The ice

camp is tied to a specific geographic location on the sea bottom and may require sea basing or

repositioning monthly due to movement of pack ice away from area of interest. Resupply will be

required monthly. Most cargo and materials required for standup and sustainment are

transportable by V-22, MH-53 or SH-46 type aircraft.


111


Time of year: 15 June to 01 November 2012.

Location

Date

(+/- 15

days)

Air Temp

F/C

Sea Surf.

Temp

Sea

Stat

e

0-9

Winds

Wa

ve

Hei

ght

Me

ters

Precip

Hrs of

Daylig

ht

Ice

Accretion

Visibilit

y

% ≥

5nm &

1000ft

Ceilin

g

% <

2 nm

& 600

ft

Chuchki

Sea

(76.4N-

175.5W)

15-Jun

17-47F

-8to8C

26-32F

-3to0C

0-6 Calm -

25 kts 0-5

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

24 Minimal if

any 45-55 20-30

Chuchki

Sea

(76.4N-

175.5W)

12-Sep

0-30F

-18to-1C

20-26F

-7to-3

0-5 Calm -

20 kts 0-5

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

14.25 Moderate 40-50 30-40

Chuchki

Sea

(76.4N-

175.5W)

1-Nov

-12 to 18F

-24to-7C

0-6F

-17to-14C

0-5 Calm -

20 kts 0-5

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

2 Moderate 60-70 15-25

Ice Conditions: Up to 10/10 coverage. Ice becomes progressively more contiguous as you go

farther North.


COMTHIRDFLT will deploy the Arctic Maritime Response Force as TF Arctic Venture which

will conduct sustainment support operations for the Ice Camp IOT support research activities

from 15 June through 1 November 2012.


Purpose: Sustain and support the ice camp in order to permit successful accomplishment of its

mission.

Method: Using the Arctic Maritime Response Force, support the Greenland Sea Ice Camp and

ongoing research activities at the Ice Camp. In the event that ice can no longer support a camp,


112

provide naval surface platform as base of operations. TF commander shall make requests for

other agency support to USFF for coordination.

End State: Ice Camp successfully sustained throughout the designated period.

TASKS:


2) Identify composition of required MRF to support Ice Camp.

3) Deploy forces to conduct monthly resupply and repositioning as required.

4) BPT sea base all ice camp activities when ice stationing is no longer feasible.


same.

6) Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Canada and








Summary of Move


The mission is to conduct a sustainment operation for a research focused Arctic Ice Camp

located northwest of Barrow, Alaska in the Chukchi Sea from 15 June 2011 to 1 November

2012. The concept developed comprised the USCGC Healy and a LPD 17 with embarked MV

22s to conduct land or air drop resupply support.

C2 efforts highlighted potential limitations of reliable communications and focused on

leveraging best practices used by the local commercial industry. The task force would

chop to USNORTHCOM during the timeframe of this mission. PDSS efforts focused on

Dutch Harbor, Eielson, and Barrow, the locations of SPODs and APODs.


113

Intelligence focused on the use of organic intelligence and aviation assets for indications

& warnings and ice reconnaissance.

Movement and Maneuver identified USCGC Healy as the primary support platform

acting as a base of operations at the site of the ice camp, with an LPD 17 class ship with

an embarked MV-22s strategically positioned between the ice camp and Nome, Alaska,

except when re-supplying at Dutch Harbor. This ensures the ability to provide additional

logistical and air support while allowing it to stay a safe distance from sea ice.

Logistics identified some APODs (Eielson, Barrow, and Dutch Harbor) and an SPOD

(Dutch Harbor).

Fires aspects of the sustainment operation focused on emergency egress of the ice station

personnel due to shifting ice conditions or a MEDEVAC situation. Facilitating the visit

of Alaskan VIP‟s and U.S. Congressional representatives was also anticipated during this

move. A strategic communications plan would support national and international

audiences.

Force protection issues focused on the capability needed for ice camp personnel to

protect themselves from the indigenous wildlife. To mitigate this obstacle, the cell

suggested personnel receive requisite training and associated cold weather equipment as

well as lease accommodations in Barrow for weather and related emergencies for ice

camp personnel.

Updates to CONOPS

This scenario highlighted the need to train METOC and Air Surveillance personnel on ice

identification and reconnaissance.

Movement and Maneuver focused on the persistent issue of “leave no trace” and the

associated environmental sensitivities requiring the development of procedures associated

with sustained maritime operations in the Arctic region. This emphasized an effort to

operate with the smallest possible human footprint that requires less logistics support for

this and similar missions.

USN platform selection criteria need to be prioritized with focus on shipboard factors

such as sustainability and ice compatibility. A list of military and USCG installations

and associated aviation information needs to be provided in an easy to use reference list

which includes reference listings providing additional detailed information.


114

Logistic CONOPS changes focused on revamping the entire section on materiel concerns

associated with clothing requirements (CONOPS pages 31-33) and list with AELs the

complete PPE listing appropriate for Arctic weather conditions.

The cell agreed that the CONOPS emphasized Atlantic Coast operations, war fighting

missions, and missions with long planning opportunities. The players stated the emphasis

on these three issues were unrealistic and not aligned with likely scenarios that would

require a DoD response to emerging conditions.

The cell suggested the deletion of CONOPS sections associated with war fighting

language and replacing it with additional information on crisis action planning for

emergency contingencies. This modification would better align the document with the

most likely missions.


Due to the time and distance and amount of ice coverage in this scenario the following gaps

related to ice hazards were identified: ability to conduct ice-reconnaissance, trained METOC

personnel, the limited availability of icebreaking ships, and the USN‟s platform and doctrine

shortcomings with regard to ice capable vessels. Additionally, the USN possesses only a

theoretical knowledge of the fleet‟s Arctic limitations and the cell proposed a series of exercises

to understand the USN‟s actual capability and refine the true Arctic gaps and shortcomings of its

fleet.

Logistic gaps center on the Arctic‟s lack of robust port infrastructure to support USN

ships. The mitigating strategy is to lease Arctic port facilities if available with the

proposed solution to construct an Arctic Forward Operating Base that provides complete

basing support for sustained maritime operations.

Movement and Maneuver gaps included the lack of ice capable USN ships. The cell

suggested that USN vessel incapable opening in ice should navigate in waters that are ice

free. The proposed solution is to develop an acquisition strategy that procures, leases, and

retrofits ice capable platforms that have heavy lift capability, rotary wing supportable,

and cold weather capable attributes. Additionally, the cell focused on the limited

availability of the single USCG ice breaker. This would require leasing available ice

breakers from international partners or industry. To eliminate U.S. dependence from

leasing ice breakers, the cell suggested the long term procurement of an ice hardened

fleet to include ice breakers.

Another important asset identified in Arctic operations included the rotary wing aircrafts

embarked onboard USN ships. Rotary wing assets must be able to perform in cold

weather environments for extended periods.


115

Range and lift issues may occur depending on the distance taking into account that USN

ships must remain clear of ice hazards during periods of expanded ice coverage. The

proposed solution focused on having ice capable platforms with rotary wing support

features that would enhance the operational flexibility of the task force.

White Cell Insights

Regarding C2, the cell identified that operational activities remain in USNORTHCOM‟s

AOR with the primary support bases identified as Wainwright, AK and Eielson AFB,

AK.

Logistics discussions focused on establishing fuel and MX requirements at the ice camp

with air resupply efforts being the better choice over sea supply. Kotzebue airport may

be a support base option. Operating in an Arctic environment requires the operator‟s

complete understanding of the engineering and design limitations for both aircraft and

ships. Logistics issues focused on the persistent requirement to closely coordinate with

the local coastal communities and the local mayor to minimize disruptions.

Regarding Fires, the cell discussed the need to understand Russian maritime activities

that might complement the sustainment of operations. The White Cell‟s implications

focused on enhancing relationships, particularly with Russia. This also provides an

opportunity for VIP and DV visits to interface with DoD elements in the Arctic.

Intelligence aspects identified that the melting ice might preclude setting up the camp at

this time of year.

Force Protection focused on shipboard equipment and the adverse impact caused by the

extreme environmental conditions and associated icing experienced during the operation.

The extended hours of darkness may impede or limit the operational activities.


116

Cell #3 (Atlantic Ocean): Scenario 11 – Military Assistance Mission – Support to Oil Spill

Response in Baffin Bay (Northeast)

Hydrocarbon exploration and transportation has continued to expand in Canada‟s Baffin Bay. A

Panama flagged oil tanker owned and operated by the U.S. energy company OILCO was enroute

from the Beaufort Sea to a New Jersey oil refinery when it lost steering during a gale and ran soft

aground in shallow waters adjacent to Bylot Island, CN. The ship‟s icebreaker escort detached

one day earlier to escort vessels on a westbound transit and is more than two days away and

committed to continuing its westbound escort transit. Oil has been reported leaking from the

grounded tanker and is located ashore, in the surrounding waters, and on sea ice. The current

weather conditions are expected to continue for another day before abating.

There are no other vessels in the vicinity of the grounded vessel to provide immediate assistance.

Three salvage tugs with divers contracted by the grounded vessel‟s owner are enroute with a five

day ETA. Accompanying the three salvage tugs is a small oil tanker needed to perform oil


117

bunkering operations from the grounded oil tanker. OILCO has oil spill response vessels and

equipment prepositioned in the Beaufort Sea which are unavailable. They have contracted with

companies that drill oil in Greenland which will provide six small vessels currently located in

Nuuk. These vessels are capable of surface oil skimming operations, but cannot transit on their

own, require logistic support and crew berthing while on station. These vessels must be carried

or escorted by a mother ship.

Canada has assumed the overall lead in coordination for the spill containment, clean up, and

salvage efforts. The Canadian Coast Guard is sending two Coast Guard vessels which include an

ice breaker to direct local operations and assist in cleanup efforts; the ETA is four days. Having

exhausted existing capabilities, the Canadian Government requests berthing, logistic support, and

transportation for 200-300 cleanup crew who are working to clean up the oil that washes ashore.


Time of year: 1 Sept 2012.

Location

Date

(+/- 15

days)

Air

Temp

F/C

Sea

Surf.

Temp

Sea

Stat

e

0-9

Winds

Wave

Heigh

t

Meter

s

Precip

Hrs of

Daylig

ht

Ice

Accretion

Visibilit

y

% ≥

5nm &

1000ft

Ceiling

% < 2

nm &

600 ft

Baffin

Bay

(73.5N-

077W)

12-Sep

26-56F

-3to13C

34-40F

1 to 4C

0-5 Calm-20 kts 0-5

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

13.25 Minimal if

any 70-80 10-20


ASAP, CTF SPILL RESPONSE supports Canadian forces and government agencies, their

Canadian contracted companies, the Kingdom of Denmark, and other stakeholder organizations

in providing support to the oil containment response operations in the vicinity of Bylot Island,

Canada in order to minimize the harmful effects to the environment and indigenous populations

by providing required logistical support to the oil spill cleanup efforts.


Purpose: Deploy the Arctic Maritime Response Force as soon as possible in order to provide

required logistic support and associated C2 to Canadian forces, participating Canadian


118

government organizations, and assisting commercial industries supporting the oil response

cleanup effort.

Method: Our supporting efforts concerning the oil spill response efforts are focused on

logistical support to the oil containment and cleanup operations for a three month period

commencing upon arrival at the oil spill scene near Bylot Island, Canada. U.S. forces shall serve

as the platform that transports needed oil containment and spill cleanup equipment into theater

and subsequent support of all oil containment and cleanup operations. CTF shall provide fuel,

food, shelter, oil containment equipment, and ship to shore transportation resources during the

operation to the Canadian forces, involved Canadian government agencies, and associated

contracted industries. The U.S. Navy is a supporting agency for U.S. government support

efforts. Make requests for other U.S. agency support to USFFC for follow-on coordination.

End State: Operational support requirements are complete when either of the following two

situations occurs first: 1) three months have elapsed and relieving Navy forces have conducted

an on station turnover of duties or 2) the oil leak has been stopped, the Canadian led oil cleanup

efforts are progressing without the required assistance of the U.S. Navy.

Tasks:


2. Identify composition of required Maritime Response Force to support response.

3. Enable movement of contracted oil skimmer vessels from Nuuk to the scene, to include

any required logistical support.

4. Provide hotel and medical services to designated personnel (maximum 300 persons)

associated with the oil containment and cleanup operations.

5. Provide ship connector transportation support to the multiple cleanup sites via surface

(LCAC, LCU, and small boat assets) and aerial (helicopter) means for a maximum of 300

personnel employed in oil containment and cleanup operations.

6. Support C2 functions for the lead and associated oil spill response organizations.

7. Act as a platform for media efforts to support the timely dissemination of news reports

via all media modes.


same.




119

Intelligence Estimate: The grounded ship‟s crew is working to contain any leakage to the best

of their capability. Greenland based oil exploration activities have been notified of grounding

and asked to provide mutual assistance if requested.

Constraints (Must do): Integrate with Canadian and Danish forces, collaborate with local

petroleum industry, and U.S. Government representatives, and sortie ships to the grounding

location ASAP upon notification. Comply with all applicable environmental regulations while

operating in the Baffin Bay and adjacent Canadian waters, and respect territorial seas.




Summary of Move


The cell developed a 4 phase oil spill response COA that deployed forces to Bylot Island,

established a sea base, provided logistical, medical and C2 support, and returned to the U.S. upon

completion of assigned duties. The sea base units consisted of amphibious ships (LHD and

LPD) with an embarked PHIBRON staff, rotary wing assets, and surface connectors (LCUs,

LCACs, and RHIBs). ISR assets supported environmental reconnaissance support that provided

ice formation and oil dispersion information.

C2 efforts established a standing coalition task force structure with military to military

communications for coordinating with civilian elements of the operation.

Intelligence efforts focused on continuous ice formation assessments, oil dispersion

information, and developing weather forecast.

Movement and Maneuver was physically constrained by the movement of ice and the

approaching seasonal ice coverage expansion, which in turn, limited the time frame of the

operation.

Logistic efforts identified the need for certified Arctic PPE and the need to have

additional certified boat crews to operate the craft due to the limited exposure times. A

logistics node at Thule AFB provided air line of communication.

Fires focused on the timely dissemination of the USN centric strategic communications

plan concerning international support.


120

Force Protection centered on safe stay times in the extreme weather conditions for boat

crew members similar to what is contained in USCG, Canadian, and Kingdom of

Denmark publications. The players identified several risks during the oil spill response

operation.

Risk discussions centered on personnel exposure (safe stay times) to the Arctic weather

while providing ship connector transportation support (LCAC, LCU, RHIB) to multiple

oil clean-up sites. Sea base operations during this time of year focused on the expanding

ice coverage that shortened the operational time at the incident location. Sea ice poses a

substantial challenge to USN and associated connector platforms that are not designed to

operate in the Arctic environment.

Updates to CONOPS

The players emphasized the need for several Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS changes

identified during this oil spill response scenario.

C2 CONOPS changes identified the lack of a standing task force for multi-national

operations involving Arctic nations that can address standard OPCON/TACON

relationships.

Intelligence CONOP changes included amplification on environmental reconnaissance

using ISR assets and sustained ISR operations out of Thule AFB in conjunction with our

Arctic coalition partners. This would provide the detail information required concerning

ice coverage, changing weather conditions, and in this specific scenario, oil dispersion

rates.

Maneuver and Maneuver CONOPS changes identified the need for guidance, amplifying

procedures, and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) addressing ship maneuvering in

various Arctic ice and weather conditions.

Logistic CONOPS changes to support sustained operations in the Arctic require a

detailed annex for logistics nodes and preferred lines of communication.

Force Protection CONOPS changes require amplifying guidance on personnel working in

the Arctic environment similar to what is contained in USCG, Canadian, and KoD

publications. (Safe stay time charts based on temperature/wind chill).


A C2 gap identified focused on the lack of a C2 standing task force to organize coalition

forces operating in the Arctic. The mitigation solution is to utilize a C2 architecture

centered on Exercise NANOOK as a baseline C2 military coalition structure. The


121

proposed solution is the establishment a combined military standing task force to liaise

between Arctic countries at the strategic and operational levels.

Movement and Maneuver gaps include Navy ship design, various USN connector

designs, and personal protective gear. The lack of USN ships with ice hardened hulls

limits the Navy‟s operational capability in an Arctic environment. Additionally, the

CONOPS needs to provide information on USN ship design specifications along with the

associated limitations for operating in Arctic waters to enhance operational awareness.

The mitigating strategy is for USN ships to yield to any developing ice thus limiting

operations to ice free areas as a function of season (May-October). The proposed

solution is to build ice class ships that provide access of USN warships to ice laden

waters.

An integral part of the sea base operations are the various connector vessels (LCUs,

LCACs RHIBs) that are not designed to adequately protect personnel and equipment

against the extreme Arctic weather conditions. The mitigating solution for this issue is to

increase the number of trained boat crews assigned to each craft in order to reduce

rotation time intervals for exposed personnel. The permanent solution is for NAVSEA to

develop cold weather canopies or other suitable accessories for RHIBs, LCUs, and any

other connector that increases stay times thereby supporting operations that rely on

connector operations in the Arctic.

USN personnel gear does not have AELs for ease of ordering nor does it outfit ships with

gear rated for Arctic conditions. A temporary solution is to develop, test, and evaluate

cold weather gear and maintain an Arctic pack-up kit (PUK) that is Arctic weather

certified. This PUK would be available for tasked units prior to their emergency sortie

(usually within 48 hours).

White Cell Insights

C2 insights identified the Canadian Coast Guard as the lead organization for this mission

with support from the RCN since the Canadian Coast Guard is highly trained for this type

of event. C2 operations would be shore based at Resolute Bay versus the afloat option

since Resolute Bay is already established and known as a C2 entity.

Movement and Maneuver for this scenario focused on sending all available icebreakers to

the incident scene. Seabasing may not be favorable or advantageous due to weather and

time required to be on scene taking into account the expansion of the sea ice and the

response time of USN LPDs. Concerning ice capable ships, MSC/MARAD have more

capable ships.

The Fires aspect noted that Russia would not be involved in this scenario.


122

Cell #4 (Pacific Ocean): Scenario 12- Military Assistance Mission – Support to Oil Platform

Spill Response in the Chukchi Sea (NW)

Today is June 1, 2012. You are a multi-organizational planning team supporting C3F.

Hydrocarbon exploration and transportation has continued to expand into Chukchi Sea after

approval to drill for oil was permitted in 2012. Initial wells had recently started full production

when a casualty occurred on an OILCO owned OPLAT operating in the vicinity of Barrow, AK.

Oil has been reported leaking from OPLAT and OILCO has coordinated with the oil industry

and associated contractors to mobilize in order to respond to and control the magnitude of the oil

spill.

The U.S. Coast Guard has assumed the overall lead for U.S. Government activities to support

OILCO‟s efforts toward spill containment and cleanup operations. Examples of U.S. agencies

involved include FEMA, USEPA, and NOAA. Having exhausted existing capabilities, the

USCG requests U.S. Navy assistance in providing logistic support in terms of berthing, feeding,


123

and transporting 200-300 personnel who are working to contain and clean up the oil that is in the

surrounding waters and that has washed up on multiple sites along the adjacent ice flows.

Additionally, OILCO has contracted with companies that drill oil off Alaska to provide six small

vessels which are located in Barrow, Alaska. These vessels are capable of surface oil skimming

operations, but cannot transit on their own, require logistic support and crew berthing while on

station. These vessels must be carried or escorted by a mother ship.

USFF has tasked C3F to form TF SPILL RESPONSE as the USN contribution to the USG effort

in this crisis.


Time of year: 01 June 2012.

Location Date (+/-

15 days)

Air

Temp

F/C

Sea Surf.

Temp

Sea

Stat

e

0-9

Winds

Wave

Heigh

t

Meter

s

Precip

Hrs of

Daylig

ht

Ice

Accretio

n

Visibil

ity

% ≥

5nm &

1000ft

Ceilin

g

% <

2 nm

& 600

ft

Chuchki

Sea

(73.5N-

178.5E)

15-Jun

17-47F

-8to8C

26-32F

-3 to 0C

0-6 Calm -

25 kts 0-5

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

24 Minimal

if any 45-55 20-30


Deploy the Arctic Maritime Response Force as TF SPILL RESPONSE as soon as possible in

supports of the U.S. Coast Guard as the lead U.S. government agency and other supporting U.S.

government agencies, oil industry and contracted company efforts as well as other stakeholder

organizations in providing support to the oil containment and cleanup operations taking place

110 NM offshore of Point Barrow, AK in order to minimize the harmful effects to the

environment.


Purpose: Provide required logistic support and associated C2 to the U.S. Coast Guard,

participating U.S. government agencies, and private industry efforts associated with the oil spill

containment and cleanup effort located offshore Point Barrow, AK.


124

Method: Deploy the Arctic Maritime Response Force in order to provide logistical support to

the oil containment and cleanup operations for a three month period commencing upon arrival at

the oil spill scene offshore of Point Barrow, AK. U.S. forces shall transport needed oil

containment and spill cleanup equipment into theater and subsequent support of all oil

containment and cleanup operations. Support efforts provided by the Canadian and Russian

governments associated with the oil spill incident.

End State: Operational support requirements are complete when either of the following two

situations occurs first: 1) three months have elapsed and relieving Navy forces have conducted

an on station turnover of duties or 2) the oil leak has been stopped, the U.S. Coast Guard led oil

cleanup efforts are progressing without the required assistance of the U.S. Navy.

Tasks:


2. Identify composition of required Maritime Response Force to support response.

3. Enable movement of contracted oil skimmer vessels from Barrow, AK to the scene, to

include any required logistical support.

4. Provide hotel and medical services to designated personnel (maximum 300 persons)

associated with the oil containment and cleanup operations.

5. Provide ship connector transportation support to the multiple cleanup sites via surface

(LCAC, LCU, and small boat assets) and aerial (helicopter) means for a maximum of 300

personnel employed in oil containment and cleanup operations.

6. Support C2 functions for the lead and associated oil spill response organizations.

7. Act as a platform for media efforts to support the timely dissemination of news reports

via all media modes.


same.



Intelligence Estimate: Russian and Canadian governments have been notified and asked to

assists in the oil containment and cleanup efforts.

Constraints (Must do): Coordinate with U.S. Coast Guard and other U.S. Government

representatives, the local petroleum industry as well as Canadian and Russian government


125

representatives as applicable. Comply with all applicable environmental regulations while

operating in the Arctic region. Respect all territorial seas.




Summary of Move


Cell 4‟s overall concept had the USN supporting the USCG led oversight of the oil spill clean-up

efforts located north of Point Barrow, AK. The COA deployed Task Force Spill Response

(TFSR) composed of one LPD and one LHD (with aviation support) for a period not less than 90

days to support this oil spill operation. The logistic support focused efforts centered on

providing medical, berthing, and transport for up to 300 personnel associated with the oil

containment and cleanup operations. USN platforms provided the primary support for C2

functions during the oil spill response effort. C3F maintains OPCON with USCG maintaining

TACON.

C2 actions included the need for LNOs to Task Force Spill Response (TFSR) from

Russia, Canada, and Alaska state agencies to inform and coordinate efforts as necessary

during this spill incident. Intelligence needs included the acquisition of oil spill trajectory

calculations using modeling to keep USN ships out of the spill area and embarking of a

METOC team with ice experts for environmental support and ship navigation.

Movement and Maneuver activities included the use of organic assets to support air

traffic control efforts in the incident area. U.S. Navy platforms supported embarked oil

company efforts to control the oil leak and spill containment efforts.

Logistics activities included the need for extensive support requirements including waste

disposal, PPE decontamination for boat crews, and establishing the Lines of

Communication (LOC) at sea, ashore and from the air to replenish and support the

seabase. Ice breaker support was required in the vicinity of Point Barrow, AK.

Additional support to embarked detachments (e.g., METOC, public affairs, small boat

units (LCAC and LCU), medical, ice pilots, Mobile Diving Support Unit (MDSU),

SUPSALV, Interpreters, environmental specialists, combat camera, and cultural

specialists).


126

Force Protection identified the need to arrange for First Nation Rangers to provide

protection against indigenous wildlife. USN personnel must be trained on oil awareness

training.

Updates to CONOPS

Recommended CONOPS changes need to include C2 amplification within the

“Organization” section (p.4) on embarked command staff, JTF staff, specialized

observers, and other embarked personnel. The CONOPS should include a section

discussing the standing Arctic capabilities such as JTF Alaska and, JTF-North (Canada).

Intelligence identified the need for oil spill information that provides decontamination

procedures for equipment and personnel PPE. The Office of Response and Restoration

(NOAA) provides comprehensive information on responding to a natural resource crisis.

The CONOPS should include information on special Arctic restrictions with listed

resources/references.

Suggested Logistics CONOPS updates include the development of a section that provides

rules on the discharge of waste due to the unique environmental considerations and the

potential need to hold/store waste for extended periods.

Several players also commented that the CONOPS seemed to be written for transit vice

sustained operations Alternative fuel considerations and associated guidance need to be

included in CONOPS such as supporting efforts that require automotive gasoline

(MOGAS) which is carried in very limited quantities on USN ships. USN ships may be

requested to stow equipment for and support various operations that require the use of

MOGAS.

Force Protection CONOPS modification identified the need to use First Nation Rangers

for local expertise and as a security resource.


The major gap identified in this COA focused on the inability to track oil spill dispersion in

subsurface conditions in the Arctic basin. The mitigating strategy is to improve oil dispersion

modeling by relying on industry and academia. The proposed solution is to invest Research,

development, Testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds to develop subsurface oil dispersion

models.

White Cell Insights

Logistic insights focused on coordinating with civilians workers supporting the cleanup

efforts, the oil companies that have robust capabilities to clean up the spill, and Canadian


127

resources that are available for clean up through MOUs or MOAs. Arrangements must

be made concerning waste removal efforts from the cleanup site.

Intelligence efforts focused on receiving accurate data on ice drift and currents at the

incident site as well as keeping indigenous people informed as well as including them in

the cleanup effort. Russia should be kept involved and informed of the status of the

OPLAT and cleanup operations.

Force Protection centered on the oil spill cleanup operations. Oil cleanup efforts should

utilize fishing fleet and a conscious effort to properly manage and control volunteer oil

cleanup crews. The necessity of meeting with the media to provide them updated

incident reports is a key function during this operation.


128

MOVE 4

Cell #1 (Atlantic Ocean): Scenario 13 – Search and Recovery of a Crashed C-17

(Northeast)

An Air Force C-17 aircraft was transporting nuclear weapons on a routine flight through the

Arctic to a Midwestern U.S. Air Force Base. When in the vicinity of Baffin Island in Northern

Canada the aircraft transmitted a mayday call reporting an onboard fire and then disappeared off

RADAR. A Canadian CP-140 Aurora flying from Thule AB discovered some small pieces of

wreckage scattered throughout the ice approximately 180NM east of Iqaluit, CN. There was no

sign of survivors or rafts. A Canadian Forces CC-130 is expected in the area today to continue

search for survivors and collect information on extent of wreckage field. Canada and Denmark

have agreed to support U.S. efforts to retrieve the lost weapons by providing ports and airports

for logistic support bases and ice capable ships as available.

Time of year: June 10th


129

Ice Conditions: Ice becomes progressively more contiguous as you go farther north.

Location

Date

(+/- 15

days)

Air

Temp

F/C

Sea

Surf.

Temp

Sea

Stat

e

0-9

Winds

Wave

Heigh

t

Meter

s

Precip

Hrs of

Daylig

ht

Ice

Accretion

Visibilit

y

% ≥

5nm &

1000ft

Ceiling

% < 2

nm &

600 ft

Baffin Bay

(62.7N-

062.7W)

19-Jun

20-50F

-

7to10C

28-34F

-2to1C

0-5 Calm - 20

kts 0-5

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

20 Minimal if

any 70-80 10-20


Commander FFC will conduct nuclear incident response operations to secure the incident site,

recover nuclear weapons, and recover service members‟ remains, support investigations, and

oversee site remediation.


Purpose: Deploy maritime forces as part of the Incident Response Force (IRF) and Response

Task Force (RTF) in order to secure the mishap site, prevent non-participating parties from

accessing aircraft wreckage or nuclear weapons, and recover nuclear weapons, U.S. service

member‟s remains and aircraft wreckage.

Method: Using the Arctic MRF, interagency, and supporting Canadian & Danish forces,

recover nuclear weapons and transport to location determined by U.S. Air Force.

USNORTHCOM authorizes IRF Commander DIRLAUTH for U.S. to participating nation

military coordination. Recovery of weapons should be completed within 30 days of receipt of

this tasking. Recover remains of U.S. service members lost in incident. Recover as much of

aircraft as feasible given environmental conditions. Map extent of wreckage field on ocean floor

in order to support follow-on investigation. Draft an environmental impact statement for

eventual release and coordination with Canadian Forces upon approval from higher authority.

Coordinate closely with Canadian forces to ensure minimal impact to local Inuit population. The

CTF-20 is assigned as lead with other agencies supporting. Make requests for other agency

support to USNORTHCOM via USFF for coordination.

End State: This mission is considered complete when the nuclear weapons have been recovered

and are in U.S. Air Force custody, missing service member have been recovered and transported

to CONUS and aircraft wreckage has been recovered to the best extent feasible considering


130

environmental conditions. The IRF Commander will retain lead until the higher authority passes

Site Remediation Working Group (SRWG) responsibilities to another U.S. government agency.

Tasks:


2. Deploy forces to search for aircraft wreckage.


4. Conduct recovery operations to retrieve weapons, human remains, and debris for

analysis.

5. Transport and transfer collected material to authorities at Naval Station Norfolk.


same.


Denmark to support all aspects of completing this mission.








Definition of Terms:

Incident Response Force (IRF). A tailored force dispatched from the closest military

installation by the Secretary of Defense or by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the

Secretary of Defense, through the Deputy Director of Operations (DDO), National Military

Command Center (NMCC), immediately upon notification of a nuclear weapon incident or other

nuclear or radiological incident to establish security and mitigate immediate effects of the

incident.


131

Response Task Force (RTF). A Military Department-specific DoD response force led by a flag

officer and appropriately staffed, trained, and equipped to coordinate all actions necessary to

respond to a nuclear weapon incident, whether on or off DoD installations. The specific purpose

of the RTF is to direct DoD consequence management activities at a U.S. nuclear weapon

incident site. Geographic CCDRs assume operational control of RTFs at an appropriate time in

the response as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

Summary of Move


This move focused on deploying, securing, retrieving, and transporting the remaining material of

a U.S. Air Force C-17 carrying nuclear weapons that crashed off the southern coast of Baffin

Island. The COA deployed maritime forces as part of the Incident Response Force and Response

Task Force in order to secure the mishap site, present non-participating parties from accessing

aircraft wreckage or nuclear weapons, and recover nuclear weapons, U.S. service member‟s

remains, and aircraft wreckage and return them to Norfolk, VA. Significant forces were

deployed to the crash scene consisting of assets from the USN, USCG, Woods Hole

Oceanographic Institute, and Canada and KoD forces. These forces included ice capable ships

such as ice breakers and an ice patrol vessels.

This scenario required extensive C2 efforts in coordinating with various agencies of the

U.S. government and other Arctic nations to support USN recovery efforts.

Intel aspects included the need for up to date and accurate weather and ice forecast that

were critical information in operating salvage operations in this challenged environment.

This information supported M & M of forces conducting the recovery operation from the

initial response that secured the crash area to completion of the salvage mission.

Logistic efforts centered on identification of SPODs and APODs and logistic ships to

provide sustained support during operations in the incident area.

Fires centered on locating and surveying the wreckage site utilizing air and surface assets

from the U.S. and Arctic nations. Force protection measures included HAZMAT

considerations and wildlife control.

Updates to CONOPS

During this scenario, the cell identified CONOPS changes that centered along operating in

adverse weather and various ice conditions. Arctic ice conditions are dynamic and the addition

of an ice appendix containing information such as ship ice rating matrix with associated

capabilities, ice navigation information, and procedures for operating in sea ice would provide


132

the necessary resources concerning Arctic operations. An ice appendix would provide Arctic

seasonal information, reference organizations providing oceanographic and hydrographic

information along with points of contacts, and a polar bear mitigation strategy that includes an

ROE. An additional appendix providing detailed guidance and policy references on C2

relationships with Arctic countries would also be useful.


The predominant gaps identified were associated with operating in an environment dominated by

ice and extreme weather conditions.

Arctic weather and ice knowledge and the resources available were not fully understood.

Meteorological training for planners and operators or the embarkation of ice experts to

augment the staff would ensure the proper weather and ice considerations are understood

prior to and during the operation. Proposed solutions included adding an appendix listing

available Arctic weather and ice resources and developing the appropriate USN Arctic

training pipelines.

The ice hazard associated with operating in this environment requires a mitigation

strategy that leverages the use of other nation‟s ice breakers and ice hardened vessel fleet

to support sustained operations. The proposed solution to this shortage of capability is to

procure organic ice breakers and ice hardened vessels. Lastly, as identified in previous

moves, the need for ROE pertaining to wildlife was also desired.

White Cell Insights

White cell insights and implications were not generated for this scenario due to time constraints

and competing deliverables.


133

Cell #2 (Pacific Ocean): Scenario 14 – Search and Recovery of a Crashed C-17 (Northwest)

An Air Force C-17 aircraft was transporting nuclear weapons on a routine flight through the

Arctic to a U.S. Air Force Base. When in the vicinity of Beaufort Sea northeast of Prudhoe Bay,

AK and Banks Island in the Inuvik Region, Northwest Territories, CN the aircraft transmitted a

mayday call reporting an onboard fire and then disappeared off RADAR. A USCG C-130 flying

from Kodiak, AK discovered some small pieces of wreckage scattered throughout the ice east of

Banks Island. There was no sign of survivors or rafts. A Canadian Forces C-130 is expected in

the area today to further search for survivors and collect information on extent of wreckage field.

Canada has agreed to support U.S. efforts to retrieve the lost weapons by providing ports and

airports for logistic support bases and ice capable ships as available.

Time of year: July-August


134

Ice Conditions: 4 / 10 Ice coverage. Ice becomes progressively more contiguous as you go

farther north and west.

Location

Date

(+/- 15

days)

Air

Temp

F/C

Sea

Surf.

Temp

Sea

Stat

e

0-9

Winds

Wave

Heigh

t

Meter

s

Precip

Hrs of

Daylig

ht

Ice

Accretio

n

Visibilit

y

% ≥

5nm &

1000ft

Ceilin

g

% <

2 nm

& 600

ft

Beaufort

Sea

(72N-

128W)

31-Jul

25-55F

-4to-1C

25-31F

-4to-1

0-5 Calm - 20 kts 0-5

Freezing

Spray to

Rain

24 Minimal

if any 50-60 20-30


Commander FFC/C3F will conduct nuclear incident response operations to secure the incident

site, recover nuclear weapons, and recover servicemen‟s remains, support investigations, and

oversee site remediation.


Purpose: Deploy maritime forces as the Incident Response Force (IRF) and Response Task

Force (RTF) in order to secure the mishap site, prevent non-participating parties from accessing

aircraft wreckage or nuclear weapons, and recover nuclear weapons, U.S. servicemen‟s remains

and aircraft wreckage.

Method: Using the Arctic MRF, interagency, and supporting Canadian forces, recover nuclear

weapons and transport to Naval Station Bremerton. USNORTHCOM authorizes IRF

Commander DIRLAUTH for U.S. to Canada military coordination. Recovery of weapons

should be completed within 30 days of receipt of this tasking. Recover remains of U.S.

servicemen lost in incident. Recover as much of aircraft as feasible given environmental

conditions. Map extent of wreckage field on ocean floor in order to support follow-on

investigation. Draft an environmental impact statement for eventual release and coordination

with Canadian Forces upon approval from higher authority. Coordinate closely with Canadian

forces to ensure minimal impact to local Inuit population. C3F is the supported commander with

other agencies supporting. Make requests for other agency support to USNORTHCOM via

USFF for coordination.


135

End State: This mission is considered complete when the nuclear weapons have been recovered

and are in U.S. Air Force custody, missing servicemen have been recovered and transported back

to CONUS and aircraft wreckage has been recovered to the best extent feasible considering

environmental conditions. The IRF Commander will retain lead until the higher authority passes

Site Remediation Working Group (SRWG) responsibilities to another U.S. government agency.

Tasks:


9. Deploy forces to search for aircraft wreckage.


11. Conduct recovery operations to retrieve weapons, human remains, and debris for

analysis.

12. Transport and transfer collected material to authorities at Naval Station Bremerton.


same.










Definition of Terms:

Incident Response Force (IRF). A tailored force dispatched from the closest military

installation by the Secretary of Defense or by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the

Secretary of Defense, through the Deputy Director of Operations (DDO), National Military

Command Center (NMCC), immediately upon notification of a nuclear weapon incident or other


136

nuclear or radiological incident to establish security and mitigate immediate effects of the

incident.

Response Task Force (RTF). A Military Department-specific DoD response force led by a flag

officer and appropriately staffed, trained, and equipped to coordinate all actions necessary to

respond to a nuclear weapon incident, whether on or off DoD installations. The specific purpose

of the RTF is to direct DoD consequence management activities at a U.S. nuclear weapon

incident site. Geographic CCDRs assume operational control of RTFs at an appropriate time in

the response as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

Summary of Move


The mission is to conduct a nuclear incident response operation to secure the incident site,

recover nuclear weapons and servicemen‟s remains, support the investigations, and oversee the

remediation of the site. Initial response conducted in accordance with DoD Publication 5100.52.

Initial actions deployed USAF PJs in cooperation with Canadian Rangers out of Sachs Harbor to

secure the area of ice closest to the crash and any debris or personnel on the sea ice. Concern

centered on the wreckage location which is in close proximity to the edge of the continental

shelf, indicating that the wreckage could be in a water depth between 150 and 3,000 feet. The

DDG would transport the recovered nuclear weapon from the incident site to a prearranged site

for transfer.

C2 focused on coordination between the JTF and the Canadians, other government

agencies, USNORTHCOM, and commercial assets leased to support the recovery efforts.

Intelligence activities included the need to gain MDA in the vicinity of the incident site.

Specifically, a USN DDG would maintain MDA, Air Traffic Control Canada would

establish a no fly zone, U.S. national assets would support operations as required, and

USN submarines in the area are tasked to assist in locating the wreckage.

Movement and Maneuver activities included the establishment of a sea base in the

vicinity of the wreckage site. The sortie of forces included USN ships, USCG units,

Canadian assets, leased commercial vessels to support recovery operations, various

detachments such as a field hospital, and fixed and rotary wing assets.

Logistics identified APODs and SPODs with Sachs Harbor as the FOB. Fires focused on

establishing a Joint Information Center at Elmendorf AFB. Liaison efforts focused on

coordination with the officials and indigenous people at Sachs Harbor to minimize impact

of operations to the local population.


137

Force Protection efforts focused on security efforts associated with the operational

support functions residing at Sachs Harbor.

Updates to CONOPS

In previous scenarios as well as during this move, several CONOPS changes players

identified earlier in the game were revisited. There is a persistent theme associated with

the need for USN training implementation on ice familiarity for METOC and air

surveillance personnel. The concept of “leave no trace” in this environmentally sensitive

region drives a desire to operate with the smallest possible footprint.

A crisis action planning section for emergency contingencies needs to be included in the

CONOPS due to the greater likelihood of an occurrence.

Due to the tyranny of distances and extreme weather challenges, it is better to move

assets and hold short while you wait for orders.

Lastly, the CONOPS should identify which Navy platforms are most capable of operating

in the Arctic and a prioritization of their use for Arctic operations.

C2 changes included expanding the liaison efforts during international Arctic operations

using Arctic subject matter experts as LNOs.

Intelligence CONOPS changes must reflect the establishment of USFFC and the roles of

USCG PACAREA and CN JTF-North.

Movement and Maneuver CONOPS changes included revamping the lists associated with

Naval Missions, Naval Aviation Missions, Surface Warfare Missions, and Subsurface

Missions to reflect the missions DoD is most likely to support vice the war fighting

missions.

Fires CONOPS changes focused on the value of seeking knowledge of the area from the

indigenous people, industry operating in this region, and the Arctic nations. DoD

presence in the Arctic requires a dedicated strategic messaging resources such as public

affairs to respond to worst-case reactions and build the theme of international cooperation

for Arctic operations.


The most significant gap identified during this move focused on doctrinal, training, and

equipment impediments to operating in this environment. Accordingly, to address these

shortfalls properly training, equipping, and supporting personnel along with the requisite

doctrinal development are long term practical and essential solutions.


138

Due to extreme weather conditions (e.g., ice coverage) coupled with the USN‟s lack of

understanding of and the ability to operate in this scenario, a stable, long term logistics

support and infrastructure is required. The limited support infrastructure (Movement and

Maneuver) is a common restraint throughout the vast Arctic region. This poses

significant operational and logistical challenges that can be resolved through the

development of a Forward Operating Base. Many logistic challenges are unique to the

Arctic environment. This requires the special development of doctrine and training to

accomplish the “outside the box” logistics needed in this region.

Intelligence gaps focused on limited Remote Operating Vehicles (ROVs) and other

needed ISR Arctic assets. The mitigating strategy is to lease industry or Canadian assets

or leverage other industry capabilities to assist in accomplishing portions of the mission.

White Cell Insights

White cell insights and implications were not generated due to time constraints and competing

deliverables.


139

Cell #3 (Atlantic Ocean): Scenario 15 – HADR Following Earthquake/Tsunami in Arctic

(Northeast)

You are a member of the CTF-20 Crisis Action Team directed by USFF to provide disaster relief

in response to a large underwater earthquake which originated approximately 125nm due west of

the island of Spitsbergen (part of the archipelago of Svalbard). This underwater earthquake had

a magnitude of 8.1 (Ms) and created a tsunami which coupled with the earthquake and its

associated aftershocks affected all infrastructure on Spitsbergen; all services within the tsunami

strike zone are considered out of service at this time. The tsunami damage was magnified by the

funneling effect of the fjord increasing the wave height significantly (over 100‟). The

archipelago of Svalbard falls under Norwegian rule. All four permanent settlements located on

Spitsbergen (Longyearbyen, Barentsburg, Sveagruva and Ny-Ålesund) were affected.

Spitsbergen


140

The town of Longyearbyen runs along a valley southwest - northeast down to the body of water

known as the Isfjorden and has a population of approximately 2,000 personnel. It is also home

to the University Centre in Svalbard. Approximately 500 students and staff from 25 different

countries attend the university which is located adjacent to the fjord.

Longyearbyen

Ny-Ålesund

Barentsburg

Sveagruva


141

The portion of the airport runway which was built on top of landfill/permafrost has been washed

away; 2/3 (4900‟) of the runway remains in an unknown surface/subsurface condition fouled by

large ice, boulders and other debris. Piers in Longyearbyen sustained heavy damage. The road

from airport to town was washed away as well. Power for the town is out and lighting capability

is nil. Survivors have moved “up valley to higher ground” on the outskirts of town, however,

there is not enough permanent shelter there for all the evacuees.

The town of Barentsburg (22nm West of Longyearbyen) has a population of approximately 500

Russian and Ukrainian citizens. Russia maintains a consulate here. Details of casualties are not

complete and reports have been unreliable through diplomatic channels.

Longyearbyen

Airport

University


142

The settlement at Ny-Ålesund (125nm NW of Longyearbyen) with a population of

approximately 30 personnel, escaped significant damage except for the airport (3000‟) which

received ice damage much in line with Longyearbyen‟s airport. Some damage occurred to the

pier as well. No casualties were reported.

Sveagruva, a coal mine boom town with a population of 300 workers (25nm SE of

Longyearbyen), also escaped significant damage. The only services available at Sveagruva are a

3000‟ gravel runway.

The U.S. will assist Norway in providing Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA/DR)

services to the affected people of Spitsbergen. Additionally the Russian settlement on the island

may have been affected necessitating the need to potentially coordinate with the Russian

government and its associated recovery efforts.

The lead U.S. organization is the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) with

primary support from the Department of Defense (DoD).

Expect the Norwegian government agencies to be the primary first responders. Their main

mission at this stage will be to assess the overall damage, air drop food and temporary

shelter/supplies, provide limited first-aid and triage and conduct Search and Rescue Ops.

Barentsburg

Piers

N


143

CTF-20 forces will assist upon arrival by providing sea based logistics and manpower to support

rescue and repair operations in the communities in Spitsbergen. The intent is to provide a more

robust “local” base from which to conduct the mission. CTF-20 has been directed to sortie with

additional medical personnel and means to construct semi-permanent shelters ashore for a

minimum of 2 months.

Time of year: December (no useful daylight from 26 October through 16 February). Also of

note: While the western approach to Spitsbergen remains fairly accessible at this time of year,

ice coverage and thickness are growing at a rapid pace.


Time of year: 01 Dec 2012.

Location

Date

(+/- 15

days)

Air

Temp

F/C

Sea

Surf.

Temp

Sea

Sta

te

0-9

Winds

Wave

Heigh

t

Meter

s

Precip

Hrs of

Daylig

ht

Ice

Accretion

Visibil

ity

% ≥

5nm &

1000ft

Ceilin

g

% <

2 nm

& 600

ft

Spitsbergen

(78N-011E) 19-Dec

1-31F

-17to-1C

28-34F

-2to1C

0-6 Calm -

25 kts 0-10

Freezing Spray

to Rain 0 Moderate 40-50 30-40


ASAP, CTF TSUNAMI (Arctic Maritime Response Force) will conduct HA/DR operations in

support of USAID, the Norwegian and possibly the Russian governments in coordination with

other agencies to facilitate the distribution and restoration of basic human services, provide

medical support, and conduct critical engineering operations in order to alleviate overall human

suffering.


Purpose: Alleviate overall human suffering through the distribution and restoration of medical

support, basic human services, while conducting critical engineering operations.

Method: Deploy maritime forces in order to establish local sea base(s) off Spitsbergen. Deploy

appropriate units ashore in order to support overall relief mission as required. Serve as primary

provider of sea based berthing for aid workers and displaced residents and act as coordinator for

all ship to shore aviation activities.


144

Endstate: The mission is considered complete when stable conditions in shelter, services,

transportation and resupply lines of communication have been established and the Norwegian

(and/or Russian) government no longer requires CTF TSUNAMI assistance.

Tasks:


2) Identify required forces to conduct assigned HA/DR operations.

3) Deploy TF Tsunami to support HA/DR operations off the western coast of Spitsbergen.

4) Upon arrival assist with the initial response efforts in close coordination with the

Norwegian government, USAID and other agencies.

5) Deploy appropriate units ashore to effect the following:

a. Clear and repair all runway and tarmac surfaces.

b. Sufficiently repair one pier to support offload of relief supplies.

c. Provide MEDEVAC and local medical services.

d. Provide semi-permanent shelter.

e. Provide temporary power services.

f. Provide transportation services for relief workers to remote sites.


same.

7) Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Canada,

Denmark, Norway and Russia to support all aspects of completing this mission.








145


Seismicity Map – North Atlantic Ocean

Source: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/seismicity/n_atlantic.php

Summary of Move



146

The players selected a COA that deployed a task force to provide assistance to the population of

the Svalbard archipelago that experienced a devastating tsunami. The task force assisted in

distributing relief supplies and restoring basic human services, providing medical support, and

conducting critical engineering operations in support of USAID led HA/DR efforts in

Spitsbergen. The task force developed a 5 phase operation that deployed the forces, established

a sea base, recovered and evacuated personnel, repaired facilities and community infrastructure,

and redeployed to homeport.

Movement and maneuver considerations established a sea base that could be positioned

either in close proximity to Spitsbergen to support HA/DR efforts or half way between

Norway and Spitsbergen to support lily pad operations.

Command and Control supported HA/DR efforts while operating in a seabase optimized

for VHF/UHF LOS non-encrypted communications.

Intelligence focused on airborne reconnaissance assets that determined the most effective

seabase location based on sea ice conditions.

Force Protection considerations required continuous assessment since the sea base

operated in one of the most severe Arctic weather seasons (December), thus requiring

very special expertise in determining the risk. The risks associated with this extreme

Arctic operation posed significant challenges to personnel and equipment (maintenance

challenges to critical shipboard and aircraft systems).

Logistic focused on the ability to conduct sea based relief operations for the inhabitants

of Spitsbergen while assessing risk operations under extreme weather and ice conditions.

Fires focused on disseminating the information on the HA/DR efforts provided by the

USN.

Updates to CONOPS

Suggested CONOPS changes centered on the need to operate in the most extreme Arctic weather

conditions.

C2 CONOPS changes should address Arctic communications limitations, specifically

SATCOM footprint and the corresponding impact to command and control.

Intelligence CONOPS changes focused on guidance associated with airborne

reconnaissance operations, the desire to support year –round operations, and the

acceptable risk level associated with extreme cold weather airborne operations.


147

Logistics CONOPS changes identified the need for Arctic and extreme cold weather

subject matter expertise in order to operate equipment on or outside the limits of

equipment specifications.

Force Protection CONOPS changes identified the inclusion of a list of technical

references that specifically address the detailed maintenance practices required to operate

equipment in extreme cold weather. Sustained year round operations in the Arctic must

be fully understood with information available on correlated risk assessments for

shipboard equipment operations.


Gaps encountered during this scenario were satellite communications, Arctic training, and cold

weather equipment operating procedures.

A C2 gap centered on C2 limitations with sea base units needed to operate in close

proximity to maximize LOS communications capability. This was due to the limitations

of satellite availability in high latitudes. The proposed solution is to increase global

commercial and military SATCOM footprint that permits SATCOM access in the Arctic

to the standard available at lower latitudes.

Logistics gaps focused on the prerequisites to operate in the Arctic which requires

specific training in various fields. A mitigation strategy is to leverage other DoD training

facilities or contracting civilian/government subject matter experts. The proposed

solution is to develop a comprehensive list of training prerequisites and create these

training programs in order to support sustained cold weather operations.

Force Protection gaps identified the lack of maintenance practices, guidance on tactical

and technical maintenance requirements for operating in the Arctic. Systems are not

typically tested during the acquisition phase in harsh conditions like those encountered in

the Arctic. The mitigating strategy is to identify cold weather specifications and

procedures by coordinating with the SYSCOMs to determine various system limitations

for dissemination. The proposed solution is to implement a permanent training program

and Operating Sequencing System (OSS) procedures that incorporate cold weather

maintenance practices during Arctic operations.

White Cell Insights

C2 insights focused on the U.S. Ambassador‟s actions that require him to declare a state of

emergency that would activate USAID‟s Office of Military Affairs (OMA). The task force

would be OPCON to USEUCOM. The inclusion of a CONOPS capabilities annex would be


148

helpful to operators involved in this relief effort. M & M insights centered on using units that

have been trained or have recently conducted some operations in the Arctic.


149

Cell #4 (Pacific Ocean): Scenario 16 – HADR Mission Following Earthquake/Tsunami in

Arctic (Northwest)

You are a member of the C3F Crisis Action Team directed by USFF to provide disaster relief in

response to a large underwater earthquake (7.8 Ms) which originated approximately 75 nm due

west of Kotzebue, Alaska. The resulting tsunami hit nearly all land areas inside Kotzebue Sound

while smaller wave effects hit the coastal areas of Alaska from the Bering Strait (Wales) north to

Point Hope. The total population for this region is approximately 7,200. All infrastructure

within the tsunami strike zone is considered out of service at this time. The most severely

damaged area is the Kotzebue Sound region. The overall estimated wave height was 30 feet,

with a 45 foot wave observed at Kotzebue (population 3,200).

Additionally, large car-sized chunks of ice were thrown ashore, destroying much of the

infrastructure in the town of Kotzebue. Ralph Wein Memorial Airport (PAOT) is completely

unusable due to the ice and debris fouling the runway with associated damage to the runway

surface (washouts and large potholes). The control tower and field radios have been destroyed as

well. The next largest (and undamaged) airport capable of sustained operations of the magnitude

needed to support the recovery effort is in Nome, Alaska – 159 nm to the SE. There is no other

access into the town other than by water. The town‟s fuel farm which was located on the

Russia

Chukchi Sea

Alaska

Kotzebue

Wales

Point Hope


150

beachfront was severely battered and much of the superstructure has washed away and thus

added a large fuel & oil spill condition not only in the surrounding water but across the much of

the Kotzebue peninsula. The majority of dwellings (especially ones closer to the beach) suffered

the same fate. Limited refuge is available in town; the town‟s primary shelter was the local

school system‟s group of buildings, but their close proximity to the beach has rendered them

untenable. The local hospital (4 blocks off the shore) is intact, but filled to capacity, incapable of

handling the anticipated second-order disease surge and operating on limited generator power.

FEMA is the lead agency. Along with the U.S. Coast Guard and State of Alaska agencies they

will be the primary first responders. Their main mission at this stage will be to assess the overall

damage, air drop food and temporary shelter/supplies, provide limited first-aid and triage and

conduct Search and Rescue Ops.

C3F forces will assist upon arrival by providing sea based logistics and manpower to support

rescue and repair operations in coastal communities of the western Alaska coast. The intent is to

provide a more robust “local” base from which to conduct the mission. C3F has been directed to

sortie with additional medical personnel and means to construct semi-permanent shelters ashore

for a minimum of 2 months.

Control Tower

& Radios

Hospital

School

Buildings

Fuel Farm

Kotzebue


151

Time of year: June


Location Date (+/-

15 days)

Air

Temp

F/C

Sea

Surf.

Temp

Sea

Stat

e

0-9

Winds

Wave

Heigh

t

Meter

s

Preci

p

Hrs of

Daylig

ht

Ice

Accretion

Visibility

% ≥ 5nm

& 1000ft

Ceiling

% < 2

nm &

600 ft

Kotzbue

Sound

(67N-

165W)

19-Jun

31-61F

-1to6C

28-35F

-2to2C

0-5 Calm - 20 kts 0-5 Rain 24 None 70-80 10-20


ASAP, CTF TSUNAMI (Arctic Maritime Response Force) will conduct HA/DR operations in

support of FEMA and in coordination with other agencies to facilitate the distribution and

restoration of basic human services, provide medical support, and conduct critical engineering

operations in order to alleviate overall human suffering.


Purpose: Alleviate overall human suffering and prevent further loss of life through the

distribution and restoration of medical support, basic human services, while conducting critical

engineering operations.

Method: Deploy Arctic Maritime Response Forces in order to establish local sea base(s) within

the Chukchi Sea area of operations between Wales and Point Hope. Upon establishment of sea

base(s) deploy appropriate units ashore in order to support overall relief mission as required.

End state: The mission is considered complete when stable conditions in shelter, services,

transportation and resupply lines of communication have been established and FEMA no longer

requires CTF TSUNAMI assistance.

Tasks:

1. Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships including National Incident

Management System (NIMS) integration.


152

2. Identify required forces to conduct assigned HA/DR operations.

3. Deploy TF Tsunami to support HA/DR operations in the Chukchi Sea AOO between

Wales and Point Hope.

4. Upon arrival assist with the initial response efforts in close coordination with FEMA,

USCG and State of Alaska agencies.

5. Deploy appropriate units ashore to effect the following:

a. Clear and repair all runway and prepared aircraft parking surfaces.

b. Sufficiently repair one pier to support offload of relief supplies.

c. Provide MEDEVAC and local medical services.

d. Provide semi-permanent shelter.

e. Provide temporary power services.

f. Provide transportation services for relief workers to remote sites.


same.



8. Establish C2, security and logistics architecture.

9. Establish stable conditions in shelter, services, transportation and resupply lines of

communication.

10. As needed/requested, assist in containment and/or collection of fuel and oil HAZMAT

IVO of Kotzebue. Provide appropriate PPE support to units ashore.









153

Summary of Move


Cell 4‟s COA deployed CTF TSUNAMI (Arctic Maritime Response Force) to support FEMA‟s

efforts in conducting HA/DR operations in the vicinity of Kotzebue, AK. CTF TSUNAMI was

composed of a CVN (C2/helicopters), an ARG (MV-22/helicopters), a USN hospital ship, tanker

support ships, and a Seabee construction battalion. USN units would deploy as soon as possible

to Kotzebue Peninsula to provide sea-based logistic support to the Kotzebue Peninsula area that

included medical services, build temporary shelters for displaced citizens, infrastructure repair,

waste cleanup, and rebuilding the pier facility and airfield runways.

C2 issues focused on the need for coordination between existing commands and assets

(JTF Alaska, USCG, National Guard, Air National Guard, and NORTHCOM) and newly

formed commands such as CTF TSUNAMI in addition to coordinating with civilian

agencies (FEMA, Red Cross, NGOs, IGOs, and the governments of Canada and Russia)

under the National Incident Management System (NIMS). During this move, there was a

lack of knowledge pertaining to the C2 structure in support of FEMA as the lead agency

overseeing the coordination through NIMS. The cell decided to place C3F as the JFMCC

under CTF TSUNAMI thereby relieving the group from describing the actual C2 plan.

Intelligence activities focused on the need for continuous seismic monitoring for follow

on seismic activity, the requirement for the National Ice Center (NIC) to conduct

surveillance of current ice conditions in the vicinity of Kotzebue, and for a Hydro Survey

Team to resurvey approaches to the impacted coastal area. A Seabee unit would deploy

via air as a SLRP (site liaison recon party) to conduct an initial engineering survey prior

to the arrival of the Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB).

Movement and Maneuver actions included support from the Maritime Prepositioning

Force (MPF) even though their utility may be limited, MSC support for replenishment

(food and POL), and heavy lift coordination with Joint Forces Air Component

Commander (JFACC) for potential delivery of supplies to Nome for further transport to

the disaster area.

Logistics requirements include medical and casualty support, waste containment and

collection support, heavy equipment support, ice breaker support, and coordination with

local authorities (non-disaster area) for acquisition of essential humanitarian supplies.

Bottled and potable water would be air-dropped for a short term solution, while a reverse

osmosis purification unit (ROPU) would be brought for long term support to the affected

population.


154

Force Protection would coordinate and augment local authorities to conduct security

activities ashore. Fires identified the need to have public affairs coverage supported by

combat camera to highlight the military support effort during this natural disaster.

Updates to CONOPS

C2 recommended CONOPS changes to include a brief description of NIMS and the

standing Arctic JTF capabilities (i.e., JTF Alaska and Canadian equivalent).

Intelligence changes focused on including a description of with capabilities provided by

the National Ice Center (NIC).

Movement and Maneuver changes include adding a section on MPF capabilities.

Logistic changes centered on the ship to shore movement of various types of landing craft

with supplies and the shoreline contour challenges that are prevalent for many types of

U.S. Navy craft.


No additional gaps were identified in this move.

White Cell Insights

C2 discussed that JTF Alaska is in place under USNORTHCOM. Alaska has the

capability to operate independently in these types of situations for some time. There is a

need to consider the Russian capabilities in supporting this disaster relief mission. A

capabilities annex would be helpful to operators involved in this scenario.

Movement and Maneuver issues discussed include the lack of agreements in place with

Russia and Canada supporting these types of efforts. Additionally, oil companies

operating in these surrounding areas also have significant capabilities.

Logistics discussions highlighted the ability to expedite contracting system efforts, which

in turn, will expedite the HA/DR recovery efforts.


155

Appendix B - Final Plenary – Prioritized Solutions

Final Brief - Cell 1 Top 5 Solutions and Why

#1 Solution: Establish Combined Joint Alliance with Arctic States

Leverage Regional Partner Capabilities

Exercises

Capabilities (ships, satellites, cultural awareness)

Environmental knowledge

(Solution #s – 27/33/34/29/35/16/36)

Justification for Priority Status: Affords access and capabilities quickly that we don‟t possess organically.

CNO Direction provided in Arctic Roadmap

#2 Solution: Smarter Logistics Solutions

Establish relationships with regional suppliers

Leverage commercial capabilities

Exercise procedures/policies for non-traditional logistics

(Solution #s – 1/31/3/13/25/11/17)

Justification for Priority Status: Affords access and capabilities quickly that are limited in the Arctic

#3 Solution: Procure/Lease/Retrofit Ice Capable Assets

Heavy Icebreakers

Ice Rated ships

Leverage NAVSEA engineering know how (operating limits in ice)

(Solution #s – 9/6/19/10/5/18/12/30)

Justification for Priority Status:

Expands mission and capabilities.

Reduces reliance on non-organic resources

#4 Solution: Observing, Understanding and Forecasting in the Arctic

Knowledge of available resources and how to access data from those centers of

excellence.

Ice Understanding

Surveys

Bottom Topography

Polar Bears/ Marine Mammal awareness

(Solution #s – 22/8/26/21/24)



156

Navy access to Arctic Environmental Data is lacking Accurate environmental factors

dictates mission success

#5 Solution: Training

Determine and develop Arctic related training requirements within USN/USCG

Update Navy Arctic NWP

Update Arctic CONOPS

Improve deployer use of Navy Lessons Learned program

Develop & execute training with external partners

(Solution #s – 2/14/7/15/23/37/32/4)


Navy Arctic experience has atrophied


157


#1 Solution: Arctic Naval Platforms: (#9, (10, 18, 20))

Develop Acquisition Strategy (procure, lease, retrofit, etc.) for ice capable platforms

Generate requirement for heavy lift, cold-weather capable, vertical lift capable

Increased use of Arctic will require increased air lift and ice capable ships

Acquire US organic ice-rated units for work in the Arctic


Without mission-capable assets USN cannot sustain operations year-round without

significant support from USCG and other partners

#2 Solution: Communications (# 5)

Acquire additional satellite coverage and requisite throughput bandwidth

Generate requirements for additional satellite coverage

Increase global commercial and Mil SATCOM footprint that permits SATCOM access in

the Arctic comparable to lower latitudes


Ability to sustain communication with chain of command, National Command Authority

while operating in the Arctic

#3 Solution: Logistics (# 3, 13, 31, 1)

Build permanent infrastructure at the mid-point of northern transit capable of providing

fuel to maritime assets

Establish FOB in support of Arctic operations

Build port facilities in/near Arctic that can resupply surface ships

Develop Arctic logistics doctrine


There is insufficient infrastructure for logistics to maintain sustained operations

#4 Solution: Ice Breakers (# 6, 19)

Acquire additional and better equipped USCG AGBs

Procure additional US icebreaker


158


Availability of US ice breaker year-round

#5 Solution Arctic Knowledge (# 14, 2, 30, 22, 7, 15, 12, 31)

Increase education of Arctic operations, infrastructure, and environment, e.g.:

Identify a comprehensive list of training prerequisites in order to conduct sustained cold

weather operations

Determine which training should be developed and maintained with DoN


USN needs proficiency needed to plan and operate in the Arctic


159


#1 Solution: Build permanent fuel infrastructure at the mid-point of northern transit which

is capable of providing fuel to maritime assets


U.S. cannot conduct sustained operations in the Arctic without a permanent and reliable

fuel source

#2 Solution: Identify a comprehensive list of training prerequisites in order to conduct

sustained cold weather operations; determine which training should be developed and

maintained within DoN


The Arctic mission requires specialized skill sets which are not currently available in

U.S. Navy training pipeline; No Arctic deployment certification program

#3 Solution: Develop an acquisition strategy for ice capable platforms; generate

requirements for heavy lift, cold-weather capability, vertical lift capability in Arctic;

Acquire U.S. organic ice rated units for work in Arctic


Arctic environment is vastly different from most operating environments; acquisition

strategy should be analogous to preparing platforms to operate in high temperature desert

conditions

#4 Solution: Need to establish a standing combined task force in order to liaise between

Arctic countries at the strategic and operational level


Building maritime partnerships with Arctic countries are important to have established

prior to crisis action response due to austere & vast operating environment with limited

resources

#5 Solution: Incorporate maintenance practices to include augmenting Operational

Sequencing System (OSS) procedures that support conducting sustained operations in the

Arctic


Harsh environmental conditions demand special considerations in order for critical

systems to function in support of shipboard/aircraft operations


160


#1 Solution: (5)

Acquire additional satellite coverage/throughput/ bandwidth


Due to our reliance on reach-back capabilities, communications are critical in the rapidly

changing conditions of the Arctic. Geosynchronous satellites are ineffective in the Arctic

circle.

#2 Solution: (8, 26)

Conduct accurate hydrographic surveys

Include in NAVO databases


Current surveys are inadequate to safely conduct sustained Arctic operations.

Combined due to similar/redundant solutions

#3 Solution: (2, 14, 24)

Establish US Arctic “Center of Excellence”

Training and education

Resource development


It‟s essential to research existing assets and understand required training and capabilities

and generate required material acquisition. An organization to own and manage the

knowledge base for conducting Arctic operations needs to be developed. (These proposed

solutions were similar enough to combine.)

#4 Solution: (6, 9, 10, 19)

Increase maritime Arctic operational capability

Ice breakers

Ice classed hulls


Comprehensive acquisition strategy to support sustained Arctic operations to include ice

breakers, ice classed hulls and supporting equipment

#5 Solution: (27, 33, 34)

Establish standing Arctic Joint Task Force, maritime coordination center or organization

within NORTHCOM among Arctic partners IOT improve facilitate leveraging

capabilities and interoperability between service, interagency and international partners

(e.g., JIATF-South)


161


Better prepare for and conduct Arctic contingency operations by improving expertise,

building enduring relationships and sharing information.


162

Appendix C - Survey Questionnaires

Post Move Player Survey (Move 1-4)

The purpose of this survey is to provide timely and candid feedback regarding your individual

thoughts regarding your cell's actions during this move of the game. This information will be

evaluated in post-game analysis. Your responses will greatly assist Commander, Second Fleet in

his efforts to identify DOTMLPF-P gaps, mitigating strategies, and long-term solutions that

impact the ability to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. Please be assured that

your responses will be held in the strictest confidence.

1. Please indicate your cell

a. Cell 1

b. Cell 2

c. Cell 3

d. Cell 4

2. During this move, please describe the most significant environmental or physical factors

that impact the ability to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic.

3. Please select the level of risk of mission failure associated with your cell's Course of

Action. (10-9 = Catastrophic: High potential for mission failure and unacceptable

collateral damage. 8-6 = Critical: Some potential for mission failure and significant

collateral damage. 5-3 = Marginal: Degraded mission accomplishment and some

collateral damage 2-1 = Negligible: Little or no adverse impact on mission

accomplishment and collateral damage)

a. 10

b. 9

c. 8

d. 7

e. 6

f. 5

g. 4

h. 3


163

i. 2

j. 1

4. Please select the level of risk of harm to Friendly Forces associated with your Cell's

Course of Action. (10-9 = Catastrophic: High potential for death or permanent disability,

loss of major critical system or equipment, major property or facility damage, and

unacceptable collateral damage. 8-6 = Critical: Significant potential for degraded

readiness and extensive damage of equipment, systems, property or the environment. 5-3

= Marginal: Degraded ability to unit readiness and minor damage to equipment, systems,

property or the environment. Injury or illness of personnel. 2-1 = Negligible: Minimal

first aid or minor medical treatment. Slight equipment or system damage, but fully

functional and serviceable. Little or no property or environmental damage.)

a. 10

b. 9

c. 8

d. 7

e. 6

f. 5

g. 4

h. 3

i. 2

j. 1

5. During this move, please select the DOTMLPF-P area that characterizes the most

significant gap to conducting sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. (For the

purposes of this game, GAP is defined as the inability to achieve a desired effect or

perform a set of tasks under the conditions provided during game play due to no existing

real world capability, lack of proficiency or sufficiency in existing capability, or the need

to replace an existing capability. These gaps should be viewed through the perspectives

of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and

facilities (DOTMLPF).)

a. Doctrine

b. Organization


164

c. Training

d. Material

e. Leadership and Education

f. Personnel

g. Facilities

h. Policy

6. Based on your response to question 5 above, please describe the most significant GAP to

conducting sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. (For the purposes of this game,

gap is defined as the inability to achieve a desired effect or perform a set of tasks under

the conditions provided during game play due to no existing real world capability, lack of

proficiency or sufficiency in existing capability, or the need to replace an existing

capability. These gaps should be viewed through the perspectives of doctrine,

organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities

(DOTMLPF)).

7. During this move, please describe the most significant MITIGATING STRATEGY that

supports sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. (For the purposes of this game,

mitigating strategy is defined as any activity designed to provide short term relief or

support to conducting sustained maritime operations in the Arctic .)

8. During this move, please describe the most significant PROPOSED SOLUTION that

supports sustained maritime operations in the Arctic.( For the purposes of this game,

proposed solution is defined as any activity designed to provide long term relief or

support to conducting sustained maritime operations in the Arctic .)

9. Please describe the most critical update to the Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS

that you encountered during this move.


165

Appendix D – Game Schedule


166

Appendix E – Game Participants and Demographics

The 88 players who participated in the Fleet Arctic Operations Game consisted primarily of mid

to senior level naval officers, civilian government officials and industry experts. While majority

of the players represented U.S. civilian and government organizations, representatives from

several partner nations also contributed (Canada – 6, Norway – 2, Germany, Denmark, and

Finland – 1). All participants had sufficient knowledge and experience to draw upon when

developing a potential course of action or anticipating challenges that may limit the U.S. Navy‟s

ability to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. The players were selected based

on their specialized knowledge of the Arctic region and cold weather systems and platforms. The

design team sought a broad range of backgrounds and viewpoints for game play. More than half

of the players in the White Cell came from industry, academia and civilian government while

players in the Atlantic and Pacific player cells consisted primarily of military and civilian

government and industry.

The demographic statistics included in this section of the Game Report are based on self-reported

responses from the players garnered during the baseline survey administered prior to the start of

Move 1. Overall, players in the game reported to have a moderately high level of experience in

their respective fields. The 88 players averaged more than 20 years of experience in the three

categories of organizations shown in figure 1.0.

Figure 1.1 – Players‟Average Years Experince

The overall education level for Fleet Arctic Operations Game participants was moderately high

relative to other games conducted at the Naval War College, with more than ½ of the players

possessing a minimum of a master‟s degree in a relevant field, including 9 percent holding an

earned doctorate (PhD, EdD, etc.) and 1 percent possessing a law degree (juris doctorate).

Educational attainment by the players is summarized in figure 1.2.


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Doctoral Degree9%

Juris Doctorate

1%

High School2%

Professional Engineering

Degree1%

Ship's Master Qualification

1%

Technical Certficate

2%

Asscoiate's Degree

1%

Figure 1.2 - Summary of Game Participants‟ Education from Baseline Survey

The overall Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) level for Fleet Arctic Operations

Game participants was relatively low when compared to other games conducted at the Naval

War College, with more than 60 percent of the players not completing any JPME. When

conducting this analysis, it was assumed that all foreign participants who graduated from their

respective national staff colleges were awarded JPME Phase 1 equivalent. Conversely, the

Maritime Staff Operator‟s Course (MSOC) was not integrated with the other JPME responses

because JPME credit is not awarded upon completion of the course. However, these data may

also reflect the large number of civilian participants, who are not required to enroll in JPME

courses of study.

Graduate Degree 60%

Bachelor’s Degree 22%


168

Figure 1.3 - Summary of Game Participants‟ completion of JPME from Baseline Survey

As part of the post-game data coding process, each player was assigned a primary functional area

of expertise based on their baseline survey responses. Players‟ primary functional area of

expertise is listed in table 1.0. However, the majority of participants had extensive experience in

more than one discipline, so the actual diversity of expertise is even greater than shown in table

1. Experts on undersea, surface, air and expeditionary operations were classified under

“operations” while those with expertise in specific maritime systems and platforms were

classified under “platforms”. Participants with considerable expertise in various dimensions of

the Arctic (social, historical anthropologic) were classified under “regional expertise”, while

those with expertise in weather, climatology or the environment were categorized under

“environmental”. These characteristics suggest that the players reflected the intended

characteristics (mid to senior level operators and planners, system engineers and subject matter

experts with diverse backgrounds in the disciplines related to sustaining operations in the Arctic

region) desired by Commander, U.S. Second Fleet and the game design team.

Table 1.0 – Summary of Player Functional Areas Coded from Baseline Surveys


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Rank Player Command

CAPT David Critchley COMSECONDFLT NR

Capt(N) Sean Cantelon Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force North (Canada)

Glenn Palmer EWCT USFF Amphib Advisor

CDR Mark Ferley HSCWL

LCDR Brian Casper NWDC

CDR Mike Moore NAVSUP LOC

CDR Tom Peterson SWOSCOLCOM (former CO, USS PORTER)

Dr Martin Jeffries ONR

LCDR Matt Ritchey COMSECONDFLT NR

LT Chris Kent MDSU-2

CDR Uwe Stuermer JFCOM (German Navy liaison)

CDR Wayne Clayborne USCG District 1

CAPT Lars Saunes Chief Naval Ops, Norwegian Joint HQ

Charles McGarvey HQ Space Command

CAPT Craig "Bark" Lloyd USCG District 17

CDR Calno Soule DMRS (Canada)

LCDR Hubert Clapp ESG-2

CDR Michael Noonan COMTHIRDFLT

Paul Hess Office of Naval Research

CAPT Timothy O'Brien COMTHIRDFLT

CDR James Anderson SWOSCOLCOM

CDR Jim Katin COMSECONDFLT

Jeffrey Gossett Arctic Sub Lab Technical Director

CDR Warren Fridley OPNAV N873B

Fred McAdams Alaska Clean Seas

LTjg David Bannish Naval Postgraduate School

CDR Jon von Weissenberg Finnish National Defense University

UCCM Timothy Menzie UCT1

CAPT Ed Harrington Commodore Naval Beach Group-1

LCDR Richard Lane MARLANT

LT Miguel Cantu Navy Supply Corps School

LCDR Mark Monturo VP-62

Neil Meister

CDR Aaron Traver COMSECONDFLT

LT John Chuma USS PORTER

CDR Steve Martin Office of Naval Research

LCDR Brandon Murray ESG-2

LT Grant Bryan Naval Postgraduate School

LT AnTwan Jefferson Former Navigator, USS PORTER

LCDR Matt Funderburk USCG LANTAREA


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CDR Michael Bager J5 - Island Commander Greenland (Denmark)

Rick Caldwell COMMSCLANT

CAPT Steve Swittel COMTHIRDFLT

Cdr Ian Anderson Canada Command (Canada)

LCDR Matt Mullins Naval Beach Group-2

LCDR Craig Speer HSC-22

Jeffrey Koleser NAVSEA 05D

LCDR Antonio Carmichael Navy Supply Corps School

Lenard Duffy JFCOM

Tim Raglin Raytheon Environmental predictions

LT Ryan Dropek COMSECONDFLT NR

CDR Kris Moorhead VP-62

Capt Pete Stalkus MSC

CDR Dave Pugh NWDC (USCG Liaison)

LT Cory Woods 7th Naval Construction Regiment

Don Perovich

U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering

Laboratory

CAPT Kevin Hill USFF N8/N9

LCdr Dave Puddington COMSECONDFLT, Canadian Liaison

Katarzyna Zysk Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies

Superintendent Andy Maillet Canadian CG Regional Ops Center

Cdr Bob Neeve CMS (Canada)

COL Daniel Neuffer EUCOM

Col Tarn Abell NORTHCOM

Rick DeLude NORTHCOM

LCDR Anna Bryant USFF

Pat Charters NAVEUR

Dr Gregg Jacobs Naval Research Laboratory

CDR Blake McBride OPNAV N2N6E (Task Force Climate Change)

CAPT Tony Miller OPNAV N2N6E (Task Force Climate Change)

Denise Brown OPNAV N00X

Mike Bosworth NAVSEA 05

Jim Webster NAVSEA 05D

LCDR Vic Sorrentino OPNAV N86

Bill Hardy OPNAV N42

Malcolm Williams USCG HQ and USCG Academy

Esther McClure

Arctic, Energy & Environmental Policy Strategy Office

OSD Policy

Ed Weitzner Systems Planning & Analysis

LT Jamie Cook Naval Postgraduate School

CDR Mike Rodriguez COMSECONDFLT NR

CDR Tony Caramando COMSECONDFLT NR


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CDR Jim Sarafolean COMSECONDFLT NR

Jacqueline Richter-

Menge

U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering

Laboratory

Mitch Brown Naval Postgraduate School

Walter Weiss NUWC

Dr Art Horbach

Tom Holden National/Naval Ice Center

CDR Eric Buch Naval Research Laboratory

Zac Hamilla Office of Naval Intelligence

Dick Wilbur Naval War College, Wargaming Department

LCDR Anthony Koss USFF N8/N9


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Appendix F –Limitations of Game Design and Analysis Gaming is a unique research technique that allows for exploring, examining, and evaluating

various issues or problems of complexity and enables researchers to gather an in-depth

understanding of participants‟ behavior and the reasons that influence such behavior. Gaming

also creates a decision-making environment that fosters education and forges relationships

among players. Whether exploring an emerging paradigm, evaluating an existing policy or

strategy, or examining a specific set of hypothesis, gaming seeks to establish the meaning of a

phenomenon through the views of the players.

One of the greatest challenges for the Naval War College, War Gaming Department is to develop

a game that provides the robust insights into an issue or problem sought by the game‟s sponsor.

Accordingly, managing stakeholder expectations about what final game report will tell them with

respect to broad-based implications is essential. Stakeholders often seek findings that will

provide them with predictive conclusions for decision-making purposes. Unfortunately, gaming

is a predominately descriptive process because games are not experiments. Even if a game is

repeated, it lacks sufficient controls over player inputs and the central limit theorem for a

distribution to ensure validity. In other words, sponsors should not attempt to draw inferences

beyond what a specific group of players did in a particular game to yield generalizability (the

ability to apply the findings observed for a small population to the broader world around us). The

Fleet Arctic Operations Game is no exception to this premise.

This game was designed to be highly inductive in order to garner broad-based thoughts and

insights on the overarching research question concerning the major gaps and solutions that

impact the U.S. Navy‟s ability to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. The value

gained from the interpretation of insights derived from game play results enabled analysts to

identify key themes and recommendations concerning potential mitigating strategies and long

term solutions for conducting sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. Themes and insights

derived through this inductive process have set the conditions to explore future deductive

processes and games.

Analysis effectiveness can be measured in terms of internal and external validity. Internal

validity refers to the extent that cause-and-effect relationships identified in the game can be

inferred from collected data. External validity refers to the extent that the results in the game

accurately reflect the external conditions in the real-world. A number of potential threats to

internal and external validity need to be accounted for and the analysis effort must attempt to

minimize the effect of these threats.

Two threats to internal validity were the quality of the data collected and the accuracy of the

analytical techniques used to review these data. To ensure quality data collection, the DCAT

relied on individual surveys, cell-derived PowerPoint presentations, and data generated from the

internal game tool. Insights extracted from these data sources were subsequently cross-checked,


173

or triangulated, with other data sets including the ethnographer‟s notes to ensure accuracy and

conclusiveness. To ensure the correct analytical technique was used, multiple methods and tools

were employed to review the same data. These methods were content analysis, grounded theory,

and data visualization. Although internal validity threat mitigation strategies were used, the

greatest limitation to developing insights and themes from the data resulted from the diverse

backgrounds of participants. Despite their expertise, different lexicons and perspectives of the

same situation added a level of difficulty to interpretation.

To explore the degree of external validity, one must ask whether the data allow generalization to

other subjects among the population. To answer this inquiry, one must then look at the

demographics data of the participants. The game was designed to identify specific capability

gaps given the complex operating environment. To think beyond the most likely case, and

define problems from holistic approach, players were selected to represent a cross-section of

military, government, and industry perspectives.


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Appendix G – Definition of Terms

Gaps: The casual factor behind an inability to achieve a desired effect or perform a set of tasks

under the conditions provided during game play due to no existing real world capability, lack of

proficiency or sufficiency in existing capability, or the need to replace an existing capability. These

gaps should be viewed through the perspectives of doctrine, organization, training, materiel,

leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).

Sustained Maritime Operations: The process of maintaining a naval operation at the operational

level within a sea, or ocean area, the adjacent coastal area, islands and the airspace above in

order to achieve a desired end state.

Materiel solution: Correction of a deficiency, satisfaction of a capability gap, or incorporation of

new technology that results in the development, acquisition, procurement, or fielding of a new

item (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related software, spares,

repair parts, and support equipment, but excluding real property, installations, and utilities)

necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without disruption as to its

application for administrative or combat purposes.

Non-materiel solution: Changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and

education, personnel, facilities, or policy (including all human systems integration domains) to

satisfy identified functional capabilities. The materiel portion is restricted to commercial or non-

developmental items, which may be purchased commercially, or by purchasing more systems

from an existing materiel program.

Doctrine: Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their

actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.

Organization: In the Navy, an organization which assigns to responsible commanders the means

with which to accomplish their assigned tasks in any planned action.

Training: How we prepare to fight tactically; basic training to advanced individual training,

various types of unit training, joint exercises, etc.

Materiel: All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related

spares, repair parts, and support equipment, but excluding real property, installations, and

utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction

as to its application for administrative or combat purposes.

Leadership and education: how we prepare our leaders to lead the fight from squad leader to 4-

star general/admiral; professional development.

Personnel: Those individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to accomplish the

assigned mission.


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Facilities: A real property entity consisting of one or more of the following: a building, a

structure, a utility system, pavement, and underlying land.

Policy: A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the

national level in pursuit of national objectives.

Risk Assessment Definitions

a. Risk posed by Mission

10-9 = Catastrophic: High potential for mission failure and unacceptable collateral damage.

8-6 = Critical: Some potential for mission failure and significant collateral damage.

5-3 = Marginal: Degraded mission accomplishment and some collateral damage

2-1 = Negligible: Little or no adverse impact on mission accomplishment and collateral damage

b. Risk to Friendly Forces

10-9 = Catastrophic: High potential for death or permanent disability, loss of major critical

system or equipment, major property or facility damage, and unacceptable collateral damage.

8-6 = Critical: Significant potential for degraded readiness and extensive damage of equipment,

systems, property or the environment.

5-3 = Marginal: Degraded ability to unit readiness and minor damage to equipment, systems,

property or the environment. Injury or illness of personnel.

2-1 = Negligible: Minimal first aid or minor medical treatment. Slight equipment or system

damage, but fully functional and serviceable. Little or no property or environmental damage.


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Appendix H – Data Collection Roles and Assignments

DCAT Team Lead/Report Lead: Responsible for all aspects of data management, collection,

analysis, and post-game report writing. DCAT Team Lead was responsible for collection

strategies, analytical information technology challenges, concerns with methodologies and

analytic procedures. This position also served as the primary author for the Game Report,

responsible for organizing, writing, and editing much of its four primary areas (i.e., Introduction,

Game Design & Research Methodology, Analysis & Results, and

Conclusions/Recommendations for Further Study). Tasks other members of the DCAT with

preparation of report sections and ensures compliance with requisite deadlines. The DCAT

Lead for this project was Assistant Professor Walter A. Berbrick. Other DCAT members who

supported post-game analysis and report writing include Mr. Steve Burke, CDR Christopher

Gray and Assistant Professor Leif Bergey.

Cell Facilitators: Experts in the art of garnering information from players and SMEs. The

facilitators, (one per cell who will be War Gaming faculty) helped players explore the gaps and

solutions to sustained operations in the Arctic and the prioritization of the mitigating strategies in

order to improve the CONOPS. The facilitators for each player cell and white cell were as

follows: CDR Gordon Muir, LtCol Hunter Kellogg, Associate Professor Shawn Burns, CDR

Dustin Martin and Assistant Professor Jeff Landsman.

Collection Lead: Responsible for data management during the game, post-execution organization

of files and regular coordination with Knowledge Manager. The Collection Lead for this project

is CAPT Paul Younes.

Template Control Officer: Populates cell templates based on participant discussions and ensured

that data are properly saved on the Unclassified GAMENET for subsequent analysis. Performed

on-going analysis through the course of game play including review of incoming data streams for

common themes and ideas, content analysis, grounded theory, and data visualization. Reported

emerging patters throughout the course of game play to DCAT Team Lead, for use by Game

Director, Designer, and Guided Facilitation/Plenary Session personnel. At the conclusion of the

game, develops link charts, word clouds, and serves as primary author(s) of the data visualization

portion of the Game Report. The Template Control Officer for this game was Assistant Professor

Walter A. Berbrick

Ethnographer (Environmental Recorder(s)): Employed a variety of ethnographic techniques to

capture player insights and White cell/subject matter expert ideas during the game play.

Recorded observations in Microsoft Word for use by Real-Time Analyst(s) both during and after

game play. Ethnographers for this game are as follows: LCDR Shiho Rybski, CAPT Pamela

Carel, LT Sherie Williams, LTjg Vincent Grasso, and CAPT Paul Younes.

Technographer: During each move, technographers, located in each player cell used the Game

Tool to record data generated during cell discussions. This member also populated the cell

presentations via Microsoft PowerPoint. This data was critical to generating word clouds during


177

game play and during post-game data analysis. The assigned technographers were Associate

Professor Robin Babb, Mr. Jeff Shaw, LCDR Doug Meagher, and Ms. Gia Harrigan.


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iii Leedy, P.D, & Ormrod, J.E. (2005). Practical Research: Planning and Design (Eighth Edition) (p. 99). Pearson.

iv Potter, W.J. (1996). An Analysis of Thinking and Research About Qualitative Methods. (pp. 154-155). Lawrence

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Methods Can Enhance Understanding. (p. 25). University of Georgia. vi Levin, J. & Fox, J.A. (1991). Elementary Statistics in Social Research. (p. 6). HarperCollins.

vii Patton, M.Q. (1987) How to Use Qualitative Methods in Evaluation (p. 149). Sage.

viii Potter, W.J. (1996). An Analysis of Thinking and Research About Qualitative Methods. (p. 151).

ix Myers, M.D. (Ed.) (1999). Qualitative Research in Information Systems in Martin, P.Y. and B.A. Turner. "Grounded

Theory and Organizational Research x Westphal C. & Blaxton, T. (1998). Data Mining Solutions: Methods and tools for Solving Real-World Problems.

Wiley. xi ibid (p. 134).

xii Berg, B. L. (2007). Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Sixth Edition). (p. 228). Allyn & Bacon.

xiii Gilad, B. (2009). Business War Games (Chap. 2). Career Press.

xiv Nardi, P.M. (2003). Doing Survey Research (p. 50). Allyn & Bacon.

xv Patton, M.Q. (1987). How to Use Qualitative Methods in Evaluation (p. 135). Sage

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FLEET ARCTIC OPERATIONS GAME - SLDinfo.com · Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report 5 Primary Findings Theme 1: The U.S. Navy is inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime